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Cartel Formation With Endogenous Capacity and Demand Uncertainty
This article analyzes the strategic decisions of firms whether to establish and adhere to a cartel when they can also shape competition by investing into production capacity while being subject to unexpected demand shocks with persistence. The model shows that a negative demand shock can facilitate...
שמור ב:
| הוצא לאור ב: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 43-2013) |
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| מחבר ראשי: | |
| פורמט: | Artikel |
| שפה: | אנגלית |
| יצא לאור: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2013
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| נושאים: | |
| גישה מקוונת: | PDF-Volltext |
| תגים: |
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| סיכום: | This article analyzes the strategic decisions of firms whether to establish and adhere to a cartel when they can also shape competition by investing into production capacity while being subject to unexpected demand shocks with persistence. The model shows that a negative demand shock can facilitate cartel formation despite lowering collusive profits. This is because lower demand reduces capacity utilization and makes competition more intense especially when capacities are durable and when demand falls much within a short time. The model also shows that firms with a low discount rate strive for a dominant position in the market which results in asymmetric capacity distributions. These obstruct collusive strategies. This is interesting because a low discount rate is usually considered a facilitating factor for collusion. |
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| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0206 |