Incentives and Influence Activities in the Public Sector: the Trade-off in Performance Budgeting and Conditional Grants
Performance budgeting schemes in the public sector have to operate with imperfect performance measures. We argue that these imperfections generate incentives for the potential recipients of performance-based funds to use up resources in socially wasteful influence activities. We develop a game-theor...
שמור ב:
הוצא לאור ב: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 20-2013) |
---|---|
Autoren: | , |
פורמט: | Artikel |
שפה: | אנגלית |
יצא לאור: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2013
|
נושאים: | |
גישה מקוונת: | PDF-Volltext |
תגים: |
הוספת תג
אין תגיות, היה/י הראשונ/ה לתייג את הרשומה!
|
MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics