Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector

Performance budgeting schemes in the public sector have to operate with imperfect performance measures. We argue that these imperfections lead to wasteful fund-seeking (window dressing and lobbying) by the administrative units that produce public services. We develop a game-theoretical model to anal...

Full beskrivning

Sparad:
Bibliografiska uppgifter
I publikationen:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2012)
Huvudupphovsmän: Bischoff, Ivo, Blaeschke, Frédéric
Materialtyp: Arbeit
Språk:engelska
Publicerad: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2012
Ämnen:
Länkar:PDF-fulltext
Taggar: Lägg till en tagg
Inga taggar, Lägg till första taggen!