Publikationsserver
Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector
Performance budgeting schemes in the public sector have to operate with imperfect performance measures. We argue that these imperfections lead to wasteful fund-seeking (window dressing and lobbying) by the administrative units that produce public services. We develop a game-theoretical model to anal...
में बचाया:
| में प्रकाशित: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2012) |
|---|---|
| मुख्य लेखकों: | , |
| स्वरूप: | Arbeit |
| भाषा: | अंग्रेज़ी |
| प्रकाशित: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2012
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| विषय: | |
| ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | पीडीएफ पूर्ण पाठ |
| टैग: |
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