Publikationsserver
Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector
Performance budgeting schemes in the public sector have to operate with imperfect performance measures. We argue that these imperfections lead to wasteful fund-seeking (window dressing and lobbying) by the administrative units that produce public services. We develop a game-theoretical model to anal...
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| Wydane w: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2012) |
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| Główni autorzy: | , |
| Format: | Arbeit |
| Język: | angielski |
| Wydane: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2012
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| Hasła przedmiotowe: | |
| Dostęp online: | PDF pełnotekstowe |
| Etykiety: |
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