Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector
Performance budgeting schemes in the public sector have to operate with imperfect performance measures. We argue that these imperfections lead to wasteful fund-seeking (window dressing and lobbying) by the administrative units that produce public services. We develop a game-theoretical model to anal...
Kaydedildi:
Yayımlandı: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2012) |
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Asıl Yazarlar: | , |
Materyal Türü: | Arbeit |
Dil: | İngilizce |
Baskı/Yayın Bilgisi: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2012
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Konular: | |
Online Erişim: | PDF Tam Metin |
Etiketler: |
Etiketle
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Internet
PDF Tam MetinYer Numarası: |
urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-01262 |
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Yayın Tarihi: |
2024-01-03 |
Downloads: |
17 (2024) |
Lizenz: |
https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0 |
Erişim Adresi URL: |
https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0126 https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0126 |