Publikationsserver
Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector
Performance budgeting schemes in the public sector have to operate with imperfect performance measures. We argue that these imperfections lead to wasteful fund-seeking (window dressing and lobbying) by the administrative units that produce public services. We develop a game-theoretical model to anal...
Sábháilte in:
| Foilsithe in: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2012) |
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| Príomhchruthaitheoirí: | , |
| Formáid: | Arbeit |
| Teanga: | Béarla |
| Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2012
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| Ábhair: | |
| Rochtain ar líne: | An téacs iomlán mar PDF |
| Clibeanna: |
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Ar líne
An téacs iomlán mar PDF| Gairmuimhir: |
urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-01262 |
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| Dáta a fhoilsithe: |
2024-01-03 |
| Downloads: |
17 (2024) |
| Lizenz: |
https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0 |
| URL Rochtana: |
https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0126 https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0126 |