Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector

Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector

Performance budgeting schemes in the public sector have to operate with imperfect performance measures. We argue that these imperfections lead to wasteful fund-seeking (window dressing and lobbying) by the administrative units that produce public services. We develop a game-theoretical model to anal...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2012)
Main Authors: Bischoff, Ivo, Blaeschke, Frédéric
Format: Work
Language:English
Published: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2012
Subjects:
bureaucracy
Performance budgeting
Wirtschaft
public-sector efficiency, conditional grants
rent-seeking
opportunistic government
Economics
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Call Number: urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-01262
Publication Date: 2024-01-03
Downloads: 17 (2024)
License: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0
Access URL: https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0126
https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0126

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