Publikationsserver
Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector
Performance budgeting schemes in the public sector have to operate with imperfect performance measures. We argue that these imperfections lead to wasteful fund-seeking (window dressing and lobbying) by the administrative units that produce public services. We develop a game-theoretical model to anal...
Gespeichert in:
| Udgivet i: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2012) |
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| Autoren: | , |
| Format: | Arbeit |
| Sprog: | engelsk |
| Udgivet: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2012
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| Fag: | |
| Online adgang: | PDF-Volltext |
| Tags: |
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Internet
PDF-Volltext| Klassifikationsnummer: |
urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-01262 |
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| Publikationsdatum: |
2024-01-03 |
| Downloads: |
13 (2024) |
| Lizenz: |
https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0 |
| Zugangs-URL: |
https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0126 https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0126 |