Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector
Performance budgeting schemes in the public sector have to operate with imperfect performance measures. We argue that these imperfections lead to wasteful fund-seeking (window dressing and lobbying) by the administrative units that produce public services. We develop a game-theoretical model to anal...
Furkejuvvon:
Publikašuvnnas: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2012) |
---|---|
Váldodahkkit: | , |
Materiálatiipa: | Arbeit |
Giella: | eaŋgalasgiella |
Almmustuhtton: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2012
|
Fáttát: | |
Liŋkkat: | PDF-ollesdeaksta |
Fáddágilkorat: |
Lasit fáddágilkoriid
Eai fáddágilkorat, Lasit vuosttaš fáddágilkora!
|
No abstracts were found for this record.