Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector
Performance budgeting schemes in the public sector have to operate with imperfect performance measures. We argue that these imperfections lead to wasteful fund-seeking (window dressing and lobbying) by the administrative units that produce public services. We develop a game-theoretical model to anal...
-д хадгалсан:
-д хэвлэсэн: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2012) |
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Үндсэн зохиолчид: | , |
Формат: | Arbeit |
Хэл сонгох: | англи |
Хэвлэсэн: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2012
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Нөхцлүүд: | |
Онлайн хандалт: | PDF-н бүрэн текст |
Шошгууд: |
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