Publikationsserver
Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector
Performance budgeting schemes in the public sector have to operate with imperfect performance measures. We argue that these imperfections lead to wasteful fund-seeking (window dressing and lobbying) by the administrative units that produce public services. We develop a game-theoretical model to anal...
Gespeichert in:
| Udgivet i: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2012) |
|---|---|
| Autoren: | , |
| Format: | Arbeit |
| Sprog: | engelsk |
| Udgivet: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2012
|
| Fag: | |
| Online adgang: | PDF-Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tilføj Tag
Ingen Tags, Vær først til at tagge denne postø!
|
No citations were found for this record.