Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector

Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector

Performance budgeting schemes in the public sector have to operate with imperfect performance measures. We argue that these imperfections lead to wasteful fund-seeking (window dressing and lobbying) by the administrative units that produce public services. We develop a game-theoretical model to anal...

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Xehetasun bibliografikoak
Argitaratua izan da:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 12-2012)
Egile Nagusiak: Bischoff, Ivo, Blaeschke, Frédéric
Formatua: Arbeit
Hizkuntza:ingelesa
Argitaratua: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2012
Gaiak:
bureaucracy
Performance budgeting
Wirtschaft
public-sector efficiency, conditional grants
rent-seeking
opportunistic government
Economics
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