Central Bank Transparency and Financial Market Expectations: The Case of Emerging Markets
In this paper, we study how central bank transparency influences the formation of money market expectations in emerging markets. The sample covers 25 countries for the period from January 1998 to December 2009. We find, first, that transparency reduces the bias (the difference between the money m...
Enregistré dans:
Publié dans: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 36-2011) |
---|---|
Auteur principal: | |
Format: | Arbeit |
Langue: | anglais |
Publié: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2011
|
Sujets: | |
Accès en ligne: | Texte intégral en PDF |
Tags: |
Ajouter un tag
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
|
Résumé: | In this paper, we study how central bank transparency influences the formation of
money market expectations in emerging markets. The sample covers 25 countries for
the period from January 1998 to December 2009. We find, first, that transparency
reduces the bias (the difference between the money market rate and the weighted
expected target rate over the contract period) in money market expectations. The effect is larger for countries with no exchange rate peg and countries with low income. Second, an intermediate level of transparency is found to have the most favorable influence on money market expectations: neither complete secrecy nor complete transparency is optimal. Finally, all subcategories of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) index lead to a smaller bias in expectations, with political transparency having the largest effect. |
---|---|
Description matérielle: | 21 Seiten |
ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0101 |