Publikationsserver
What’s in a Second Opinion? Shadowing the ECB and the Bank of England
One way of evaluating how well monetary authorities perform is to provide the public with a regular and independent second opinion. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England are shadowed by professional and academic economists who provide a separate policy rate recommendation in advanc...
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| 出版年: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 31-2011) |
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| 主要な著者: | , |
| フォーマット: | Arbeit |
| 言語: | 英語 |
| 出版事項: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2012
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| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | PDFフルテキスト |
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| 要約: | One way of evaluating how well monetary authorities perform is to provide the public with a regular and independent second opinion. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England are shadowed by professional and academic economists who provide a separate policy rate recommendation in advance of the central bank announcement. We explore differences between shadow and actual committee decisions based on an adapted Taylor rule and report a few systematic differences. The shadow committee of the ECB tends to be relatively less inflation averse than the ECB’s Governing Council. Perhaps most significantly our interpretation of the stance of the shadow committees is sensitive to the use of real time data, especially during the global financial crisis. |
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| 物理的記述: | 26 Seiten |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0097 |