Incentives and the Delegation of Decision Making Power in Sovereign Wealth Funds

The paper models the incentives of a politician to delegate the decision making power in a sovereign wealth fund to an independent external manager. It formalizes the learning-effects as well as the increase of transparency of the SWF and the rise of investment possibilities associated with higher t...

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Publicado en:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 17-2011)
Autor principal: Grigoryan, Artur
Formato: Arbeit
Lenguaje:inglés
Publicado: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2011
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