Do Federal Reserve Presidents Communicate with a Regional Bias?

In this paper, we analyze the determinants of U.S. monetary policy stance as expressed in speeches by Federal Reserve (Fed) officials over the period January 1998 to September 2009. Econometrically, we use a probit model with regional and national macroeconomic variables to explain the content of th...

ver descrição completa

Na minha lista:
Detalhes bibliográficos
Publicado no:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 03-2011)
Principais autores: Hayo, Bernd, Neuenkirch, Matthias
Formato: Arbeit
Idioma:inglês
Publicado em: 2011
Assuntos:
Acesso em linha:Texto Completo em Formato PDF
Tags: Adicionar Tag
Sem tags, seja o primeiro a adicionar uma tag!
Descrição
Resumo:In this paper, we analyze the determinants of U.S. monetary policy stance as expressed in speeches by Federal Reserve (Fed) officials over the period January 1998 to September 2009. Econometrically, we use a probit model with regional and national macroeconomic variables to explain the content of these speeches. Our results are, first, that Fed governors and presidents follow a Taylor rule when expressing their opinions: a rise in inflation or the Leading Index makes a hawkish speech more likely. Second, when Fed presidents make a speech in their home district, its content is influenced by both regional and national macroeconomic variables, whereas speeches given outside the home district are influenced solely by national information. Third, the influence of regional variables increases during (i) Ben Bernanke’s tenure as Fed Chairman, (ii) recessions, and (iii) the financial crisis. Finally, speeches by nonvoting presidents reflect regional economic development to a greater extent than those by voting presidents.
Descrição Física:22 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0069