Publikationsserver
Conditional grants to independent regional governments: The trade-off between incentives and wasteful grantseeking
The paper addresses the welfare implications of conditional grants in the presence of inefficiencies in regional production. While conditional grants may set incentives for regions to reduce inefficiencies, resources are wasted in the process of grant-seeking. We provide a theoretical model to asses...
में बचाया:
| में प्रकाशित: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 30-2010) |
|---|---|
| मुख्य लेखकों: | , |
| स्वरूप: | Arbeit |
| भाषा: | अंग्रेज़ी |
| प्रकाशित: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2010
|
| विषय: | |
| ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | पीडीएफ पूर्ण पाठ |
| टैग: |
टैग जोड़ें
कोई टैग नहीं, इस रिकॉर्ड को टैग करने वाले पहले व्यक्ति बनें!
|
| सारांश: | The paper addresses the welfare implications of conditional grants in the presence of inefficiencies in regional production. While conditional grants may set incentives for regions to reduce inefficiencies, resources are wasted in the process of grant-seeking. We provide a theoretical model to assess the net effect on welfare. A game-theoretic context is developed to derive the optimal grant-distribution scheme. Depending on the characteristics of the collective good and of the regional government, the optimal ratio of conditional to block grants and the optimal number of recipients vary. The impact of different factors on the optimal grant-distribution scheme is derived. |
|---|---|
| भौतिक वर्णन: | 32 Seiten |
| आईएसएसएन: | 1867-3678 |
| डिजिटल ऑब्जेक्ट पहचानकर्ता: | 10.17192/es2024.0060 |