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Strategic Forecasting on the FOMC
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve consists of voting- and non-voting members. Apart from deciding about interest rate policy, members individually formulate regular inflation forecasts. This paper uncovers systematic differences in individual inflation forecasts submitt...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 17-2010) |
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| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | Arbeit |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2010
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | PDF-Volltext |
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| Zusammenfassung: | The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve consists of voting- and non-voting members. Apart from deciding about interest rate policy, members individually formulate regular inflation forecasts. This paper uncovers systematic differences in individual inflation forecasts submitted by voting and non-voting members. Based on a data set with individual forecasts recently made available it is shown that non-voters systematically overpredict inflation relative to the consensus forecast if they favor tighter policy and underpredict inflation if the favor looser policy. These findings are consistent with non-voting member following strategic motives in forecasting, i.e. non-voting members use their forecast to influence policy deliberation. |
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| Umfang: | 17 Seiten |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0047 |