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A Note on Competing Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust Cases: Can the Best Be Identified?
Advanced economic instruments like simulation models are enjoying an increased popularity in practical antitrust. There is hope that they – being quantitative predictive economic evidence – can substitute for qualitative structural analysis and lead to unambiguous results. This paper demonstrates...
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| Vydáno v: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 03-2008) |
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| Hlavní autor: | |
| Médium: | Článek |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Vydáno: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2008
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| Témata: | |
| On-line přístup: | Plný text ve formátu PDF |
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| Shrnutí: | Advanced economic instruments like simulation models are enjoying an increased
popularity in practical antitrust. There is hope that they – being quantitative predictive
economic evidence – can substitute for qualitative structural analysis and lead to
unambiguous results. This paper demonstrates that it can be theoretically impossible to
identify the most appropriate simulation model for any given merger proposal. Due to the
inevitable necessity to reduce real-world complexity and multi-parameter character of merger
cases, the comparative fit of proposed merger simulation models with mutually incompatible
predictions can be the same. This is valid even if an ideal antitrust procedure is assumed. This
insight is important regarding two aspects. First, the scope for partisan economic evidence
cannot be completely eroded in merger control. Second, simulation cannot eliminate or
substitute for qualitative reasoning and economically informed common sense. |
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| DOI: | 10.17192/es2023.0190 |