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Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular k...
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| 發表在: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 01-2008) |
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| Autoren: | , , |
| 格式: | Artikel |
| 語言: | 英语 |
| 出版: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2008
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | PDF-Volltext |
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