Publikationsserver
Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular k...
में बचाया:
| में प्रकाशित: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 01-2008) |
|---|---|
| मुख्य लेखकों: | , , |
| स्वरूप: | लेख |
| भाषा: | अंग्रेज़ी |
| प्रकाशित: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2008
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| विषय: | |
| ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | पीडीएफ पूर्ण पाठ |
| टैग: |
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