Dokument
Titel: | Contracting with Researchers |
Autor: | Verbeck, Matthias |
Weitere Verfasser: | Schulte, Elisabeth |
Veröffentlicht: | 2016 |
URI: | https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0497 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-04976 |
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0497 |
ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
DDC: | 330 Wirtschaft |
Publikationsdatum: | 2024-01-19 |
Lizenz: | https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0 |
Schlagwörter: |
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Moral hazard, Diversity in research, Delegated research, Incentives in teams, Hidden action, Academic organization |
Summary:
We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on
behalf of a principal. The agents' success depends on effort and the
choice of a research technology that is uncertain with respect to its
quality. A single agent has no incentive to deviate from the principal's
preferred technology choice. In the multiagent-setting researchers pursue
individual rather than overall success which yields a preference for
the most promising technology. We show that a mechanism that deters
this bias towards mainstream research always entails an effciency
loss if researchers are risk-averse. Our results suggest that there is too
little diversity in delegated research.
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