Titel:Policy Deviations, Uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice
Autor:Hefeker, Carsten
Weitere Verfasser:Neugart, Michael
Veröffentlicht:2013
URI:https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0172
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0172
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-01727
ISSN: 1867-3678
DDC:330 Wirtschaft
Publikationsdatum:2024-01-03
Lizenz:https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0

Dokument

Schlagwörter:
European Commission, court behavior, uncertainty, compliance, European Court of Justice, legal process, European Union law, directives

Summary:
The implementation of European Union directives into national law is at the discretion of member states. We analyze incentives for member states to deviate from these directives when the European Commsision may sue a defecting member state and rulings at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are uncertain. We find that higher uncertainty about the preferences of the ECJ increases policy deviation, irrespective of whether a case is taken to court or not. If decisions of member states to deviate are interdependent, the incidence of filed cases decreases while for those policies reaching the ECJ deviations increase.


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