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Titel:Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?
Autor:Hefeker, Carsten
Weitere Verfasser:Zimmer, Blandine
Veröffentlicht:2010
URI:https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0031
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-00318
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0031
ISSN: 1867-3678
DDC:330 Wirtschaft
Publikationsdatum:2024-01-02
Lizenz:https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0

Dokument

Schlagwörter:
Central bank independence, Transparency of monetary policy., Conservatism

Summary:
This paper revisits the trade-off between central bank indepen- dence and conservatism using a New Keynesian model with uncertainty about the central banker's output gap target. It is shown that when this uncertainty is high, the trade-off no longer holds. In this case, the optimal combination between independence and conservatism is characterised by complementarity.


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