Experimental Evidence on Forecaster (anti-) Herding in Sports Markets
We experimentally analyzed whether (anti-)herding behavior of forecasters in sport-betting markets is influenced by the incentive structure of the market (winner-takes-all vs. equal payment of most accurate forecasts) and by personal traits of forecasters. We found evidence of anti-herding in foreca...
محفوظ في:
الحاوية / القاعدة: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 38-2020) |
---|---|
المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | , , |
التنسيق: | مقال |
اللغة: | الإنجليزية |
منشور في: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2020
|
الموضوعات: | |
الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | PDF النص الكامل |
الوسوم: |
إضافة وسم
لا توجد وسوم, كن أول من يضع وسما على هذه التسجيلة!
|
الملخص: | We experimentally analyzed whether (anti-)herding behavior of forecasters in sport-betting markets is influenced by the incentive structure of the market (winner-takes-all vs. equal payment of most accurate forecasts) and by personal traits of forecasters. We found evidence of anti-herding in forecasts of the German Bundesliga. Self-reported knowledge and, more surprisingly, winner-takes-all incentives reduced anti-herding. On average, forecasts were less accurate with stronger anti-herding. Winner-takes-all incentives and self-reported knowledge improved forecasts. |
---|---|
وصف مادي: | 29 Seiten |
تدمد: | 1867-3678 |
DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0664 |