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Partial cross ownership and collusion
This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused...
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| Опубликовано в:: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 32-2016) |
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| Главные авторы: | , |
| Формат: | Статья |
| Язык: | английский |
| Опубликовано: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2016
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| Предметы: | |
| Online-ссылка: | PDF-полный текст |
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| Итог: | This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority. |
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| Объем: | 42 Seiten |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0485 |