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Tipping versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good
In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public good...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 29-2015) |
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| Autoren: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2015
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online Zugang: | PDF-Volltext |
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| Zusammenfassung: | In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a
global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this
paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a
“tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public
good provided enough other players contribute, and a prisoners’ dilemma,
the classic cooperation game. In the prisoners’ dilemma, the first best
outcome is attainable, but cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. In
the tipping game, only a second best outcome may be attainable, but there
exists a Nash equilibrium that is strictly preferred to the one in the
prisoners’ dilemma. We show that groups do significantly better when
they choose the tipping game, and yet many groups repeatedly choose the
prisoners’ dilemma, indicating a mistaken and persistent tendency to
prefer a game with potentially higher payoffs to one having a strategic
advantage. |
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| Umfang: | 43 Seiten |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DOI: | 10.17192/es2024.0388 |