Rating Agencies – An Experimental Analysis of their Remuneration Model

Does it matter who pays for ratings? Yes, but not for the rating agencies’ behavior. These are the findings of our experiment where we analyze the effect of the remuneration model of rating agencies on their assessments as well as on investors’ and issuers’ behavior. First, we find that rating agenc...

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書誌詳細
出版年:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 55-2014)
主要な著者: Bühren, Christoph, Plessner, Marco
フォーマット: 論文
言語:英語
出版事項: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2014
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要約:Does it matter who pays for ratings? Yes, but not for the rating agencies’ behavior. These are the findings of our experiment where we analyze the effect of the remuneration model of rating agencies on their assessments as well as on investors’ and issuers’ behavior. First, we find that rating agencies’ assessments are comparable whether the agency is (partially) paid by issuers, investors, or solely by the experimenter. Issuers, on the other hand, more often do not return investor’s trust when they or investors pay for ratings. Further, investors more often act according to the agencies’ recommendations when they have to pay for this information.
物理的記述:27 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0354