Rating Agencies – An Experimental Analysis of their Remuneration Model

Does it matter who pays for ratings? Yes, but not for the rating agencies’ behavior. These are the findings of our experiment where we analyze the effect of the remuneration model of rating agencies on their assessments as well as on investors’ and issuers’ behavior. First, we find that rating agenc...

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Publicado en:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 55-2014)
Autores principales: Bühren, Christoph, Plessner, Marco
Formato: Artículo
Lenguaje:inglés
Publicado: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2014
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Acceso en línea:Texto Completo PDF
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Sumario:Does it matter who pays for ratings? Yes, but not for the rating agencies’ behavior. These are the findings of our experiment where we analyze the effect of the remuneration model of rating agencies on their assessments as well as on investors’ and issuers’ behavior. First, we find that rating agencies’ assessments are comparable whether the agency is (partially) paid by issuers, investors, or solely by the experimenter. Issuers, on the other hand, more often do not return investor’s trust when they or investors pay for ratings. Further, investors more often act according to the agencies’ recommendations when they have to pay for this information.
Descripción Física:27 Seiten
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0354