Table of Contents:
This doctoral dissertation concerns the second Analogy of Experience in Kant's ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ and scrutinizes the question whether Kant succeeded in proving the validity of the second Analogy, which is regarded as the critical revision of the principle of sufficient reason. When approaching this project, it is important to be aware of the main objective of the Transcendental Analytic. Namely it aims at establishing a theory of transcendental subjectivity according to which the understanding is by means of the categories the author of experience and prescribes a priori laws to nature as complex of all phenomena. In view of the architecture of the Transcendental Analytic this theory culminates in the Analogies of Experience, especially in the second Analogy, so it is finally to be justified and confirmed by proving of the second Analogy. For the purpose of examining whether Kant did it successfully this dissertation is divided into three parts:
The first part of it discusses Kant's methodological thought of metaphysics between 1760 and 1766 and points out that it is within this methodological framework impossible to found the principle of sufficient reason or causality.
The second part devotes Kant's arguments of the Transcendental Deduction to show how he established the theory of transcendental subjectivity. Besides, this part attempts to determine the systematic location of the Schematism in the Transcendental Analytic.
The last part expounds Kant's proof of the second Analogy. At first it emphasizes that it is important to demonstrate the dynamical continuity of time to establish a system of the principles of the pure understanding. However the interpretation shows that the dynamical continuity of time can not be demonstrated within the framework of stipulations of transcendental subjectivity established in the Transcendental Deduction. For that reason it is doubtful that Kant succeeded in justifying his theory of transcendental subjectivity.