Firm Selection and the Role of Union Heterogeneity

Empirical evidence suggests that high-productivity firms face stronger trade unions than low-productivity firms. Then a policy that puts all unions into a better bargaining position is no longer neutral for firm selection as in models with a uniform bargaining strength across firms. Using a Melit...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 43-2017)
Main Authors: de Pinto, Marco, Michaelis, Jochen
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2017
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Summary:Empirical evidence suggests that high-productivity firms face stronger trade unions than low-productivity firms. Then a policy that puts all unions into a better bargaining position is no longer neutral for firm selection as in models with a uniform bargaining strength across firms. Using a Melitztype model, we show that firm selection becomes less severe. Since more low-productivity firms enter the market, the negative employment effect of unionization is mitigated. Neglecting inter-union differences in bargaining power leads to an overestimation of the negative labor market effects. However, trade liberalization increases unemployment because firms with the least powerful labor unions have to leave the market.
Physical Description:32 Pages
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0529