Partial cross ownership and collusion

Partial cross ownership and collusion

This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 32-2016)
Main Authors: de Haas, Samuel, Paha, Johannes
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2016
Subjects:
Merger Control
Wirtschaft
Collusion
Coordinated Effects
Unilateral Effects
Minority Shareholdings
Economics
Online Access:PDF Full Text
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Summary:This article finds that non-controlling minority shareholdings among competitors lower the sustainability of collusion. This is the case under an even greater variety of situations than was indicated by earlier literature. The collusion destabilizing effect of minority shareholdings is mainly caused by their unilateral effects, and it is particularly prevalent in the presence of an effective antitrust authority.
Physical Description:42 Pages
ISSN:1867-3678
DOI:10.17192/es2024.0485

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