Incentives and the Delegation of Decision Making Power in Sovereign Wealth Funds

The paper models the incentives of a politician to delegate the decision making power in a sovereign wealth fund to an independent external manager. It formalizes the learning-effects as well as the increase of transparency of the SWF and the rise of investment possibilities associated with higher t...

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Опубликовано в::	MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 17-2011)
Главный автор:	Grigoryan, Artur
Формат:	Arbeit
Язык:	английский
Опубликовано:	Philipps-Universität Marburg 2011
Предметы:	Transparency Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) Wirtschaft Ex- ternal Management Policy Delegation Economics
Online-ссылка:	PDF-полный текст
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