Incentives and the Delegation of Decision Making Power in Sovereign Wealth Funds
The paper models the incentives of a politician to delegate the decision making power in a sovereign wealth fund to an independent external manager. It formalizes the learning-effects as well as the increase of transparency of the SWF and the rise of investment possibilities associated with higher t...
محفوظ في:
| الحاوية / القاعدة: | MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 17-2011) |
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| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
| التنسيق: | Arbeit |
| اللغة: | الإنجليزية |
| منشور في: |
Philipps-Universität Marburg
2011
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | PDF النص الكامل |
| الوسوم: |
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MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics