Multinational Capital Structure and Tax Competition

This paper analyzes tax competition when welfare maximizing jurisdictions levy source-based corporate taxes and multinational enterprises choose tax-efficient capital- to-debt ratios. Under separate accounting, multinationals shift debt from low-tax to high-tax countries. The Nash equilibrium of the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 34-2009)
Main Author: Wrede, Matthias
Format: Work
Language:English
Published: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2009
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Call Number: urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-es2024-00150
Publication Date: 2024-01-02
Downloads: 16 (2025), 38 (2024)
License: https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0
Access URL: https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0015
https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0015