Participation and Decision Making: A Three-person Power-to-take Experiment This paper

It is often conjectured that participatory decision making may increase acceptance even of unfavorable decisions. The present paper tests this conjecture in a three-person power-to-take game. Two takers decide which fraction of the responder's endowment to transfer to themselves; the respond...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 05-2008)
Main Authors: Albert, Max, Mertins, Vanessa
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Philipps-Universität Marburg 2008
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Online Access:PDF Full Text
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Summary:It is often conjectured that participatory decision making may increase acceptance even of unfavorable decisions. The present paper tests this conjecture in a three-person power-to-take game. Two takers decide which fraction of the responder's endowment to transfer to themselves; the responder decides which part of the endowment to destroy. Thus, the responder can punish greedy takers, but only at a cost to herself. We modify the game by letting the responder participate in takers' transfer decision and consider the e�ect of participation on the destruction rate. We �nd that participation matters. Responders destroy more if they (1) had no opportunity to participate in the decision making process and (2) are confronted with highly unfavorable outcomes. This participation e�ect is highly signi�cant for those responders (the majority) who show negative reciprocity (i.e., destroy more when takers are greedier).
DOI:10.17192/es2023.0192