Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator

It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular k...

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Bibliographic Details

Published in:	MAGKS - Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics (Band 01-2008)
Main Authors:	van Aaken, Anne, Feld, Lars P., Voigt, Stefan
Format:	Article
Language:	English
Published:	Philipps-Universität Marburg 2008
Subjects:	Wirtschaft Prosecution Agencies Corruption Judicial Independence and Positive Constitutional Economics Economics
Online Access:	PDF Full Text
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