



Part III: COMPARATIVE POLITICAL CULTURE

The Political Culture of Kenya

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Habilitationsschrift  
von  
Dirk Berg-Schlosser

and at the same time a contribution to the civilization of the world.

by Leopold Edgar Schaper

So far, we have attempted to give a general account of seven of Kenya's main ethnic groups describing for each the most important social, political, and traditional cultural aspects. This is based on available anthropological and other literature, supplemented by official statistics and the results of our own survey. We feel, this description is necessary for the non-African reader who lacks fundamental information on these societies, information which may be taken for granted in cases more familiar to "Western" observers. However, we are fairly sure, that even many Kenyans are unfamiliar with basic facts concerning ethnic groups other than their own.

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Part III: COMPARATIVE POLITICAL CULTURE

"In the final analysis, our task is to realize a symbiosis of our Negro-African values and European values - European values because Europe contributes the principal technical means of the emerging civilization. Not all the values from either side are to be retained: Some are negative; others, belonging to the past, are interesting only as folklore. In a word, sub-Saharan man must realize his full potential as a man of the twentieth century, and at the same time make his contribution to the Civilization of the Universal."

Léopold Sédar Senghor

So far, we have attempted to give a general account of seven of Kenya's main ethnic groups describing for each the most important economic, social, and traditional cultural aspects. This was based on available anthropological and other literature, supplemented by official statistics and the results of our own survey. We feel, this description is necessary for the non-African reader who lacks fundamental information on these societies, information which may be taken for granted in cases more familiar to "Western" observers. Moreover, we are fairly sure, that even many Kenyans are unfamiliar with basic facts concerning ethnic groups other than their own.

We now proceed to an analysis of "political culture". We are dealing here mainly with the "subjective" dimension



of politics at the "mass" level of Kenya's society. "Structural" factors will only be considered in so far as they constitute a "vertical" and "horizontal" frame (consisting mainly of ethnic groups and "classes") in which the cultural elements can be located. The particular dynamics of these structures and their interactions are discussed elsewhere. "Elite" aspects of Kenya's political culture (e.g. consensus about the "rules of the game", potential coalition behavior, etc.) also are excluded here.

We first discuss some formative factors which contribute to the specific pattern of Kenya's political culture. We then turn to political identifications at different levels of Kenya's society. This is followed by a discussion of relevant religious, economic and political attitudes which characterize the seven groups today. Finally, orientations towards the present national political system and various fundamental political issues are compared and examined to see what light they may shed on future developments. For such "attitudinal" characterizations our survey data provide the main source of information.

In order to save space and not to swamp the reader with informations and documents some of which may be of relatively little interest, we only report those findings in detail which are particularly outstanding and characteristic for a specific group. Only where the distribution of a certain variable seems to be of interest for all the groups concerned, we reproduce a table in full, together with the necessary and most relevant controls. In each case the results were subjected to a chi-square test of "significance", i. e. the probability that these findings are not purely due to chance. All results reported here are significant at least at the 0.05 level, i. e. a probability

of 95 %. In most instances the level of significance actually is considerably higher than that. Where it seems to be of interest and indicative for certain theoretical propositions, measures indicating the strength of an association, as lambda, gamma, eta, etc., depending on the level of measurement (nominal, ordinal, or interval) of the variables concerned, are reported as well. We also do not want to create the impression of a "false accuracy" by quoting percentages taken from our survey up to the last decimal point. In view of the limitations of our sample we do not feel that such a procedure would be justified. We are fairly confident, however, that our results do reflect a correct order of magnitude for most of the variables discussed here.

view of the results of the first major cross-cultural study which they conducted, discussed the influence of early childhood socialization: "... we would be most hesitant to attribute... gross differences in political culture to the relatively slight differences in childhood socialization brought to light in our findings. They seem more clearly to be related to characteristics of the social environment and patterns of social interactions, to specifically political histories, and to differences in experience with political structure and performance."<sup>2</sup> And they expressed the hope that "...the most productive research in political psychology in the future will treat childhood socialization, social personality tendencies, political orientation, and political structure and process as separate variables in a complex, multi-directional system of causality."<sup>3</sup>

1) Cf., e. g., the works by Benedict, Ruth, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1946 (on Japan); Gorer, Geoffrey and Rickson, John, *The People of Great Russia*, London: George Allen, 1949; Maslow, Margaret, *Evolutionary Attitudes Toward Authority*, New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1957; or Schiffrin, Herbert, *Authoritarianism - A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family*, New York, 1943.

2) *Almond and Verba*, op. cit., p. 24.

3) *Ibid.*



CHAPTER 1: SOME FORMATIVE FACTORS

The dominant attitudes existing in a given society at a given point in time have been shaped of course, by a great variety of influences. These lie both in the individual psychological sphere, and in the collective experiences which larger groups of people have in common. So far, no theoretical model is able to account adequately for the appearance of particular attitudes. Early "national character" studies<sup>1)</sup> based on rather simplistic psychoanalytic assumptions, drew far-reaching inferences from patterns of early childhood training to political attitudes and personality structures. Almond and Verba, in view of the results of the first major cross-cultural study which they conducted, discounted the influences of early childhood socialization: "... we would be most hesitant to attribute... gross differences in political culture to the relatively slight differences in childhood socialization brought to light in our findings. They seem more clearly to be related to characteristics of the social environment and patterns of social interactions, to specifically political memories, and to differences in experience with political structure and performance."<sup>2)</sup> And they expressed the hope that "...the most productive research on political psychology in the future will treat childhood socialization, modal personality tendencies, political orientation, and political structure and process as separate variables in a complex, multi-directional system of causality."<sup>3)</sup>

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1) Cf., e. g., the works by Benedict, Ruth, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1946 (on Japan); Goser, Geoffrey and Rickman, John, The People of Great Russia, London: Cresset Press, 1949. Mead, Margaret, Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority, New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1951; or Schaffner, Bertram, Fatherland - A Study of Authoritarianism in the German Family, New York, 1948.

2) Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 34.

3) Ibid.

Later studies on political socialization attempted to consider a wider range of variables and to analyze the effect experience in schools, at work, in peer-groups, voluntary organizations etc., on an individual's cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations towards politics.<sup>4)</sup> From these studies a more refined picture of the different structures and processes which shape political attitudes and behavior has emerged. Most studies of this kind have been restricted to the United States so far and deal with institutions. The socio-psychological approach employed in most of these works tends to neglect such relevant factors as a person's level of political information for political and economic interests depending on "class" positions.<sup>5)</sup> One reason why the effects of class may have been overlooked is the fact that economic interests and the effects of family and other socialization tend to coincide when there is no inter-generational class mobility.

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- 4) For a summary of major studies in the 1950's, cf. Hyman, Herbert H., Political Socialization, New York: The Free Press, 1959. Later Works include: Greenstein, Fred I., Children and Politics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965; Easton, David and Dennis, Jack, Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy, New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1969; or Langton, Kenneth P., Political Socialization, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. See also the readers edited by Adler, Norman and Harrington, Charles, The Learning of Political Behavior, Glenview/III.: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1970; Dennis, Jack, Socialization to Politics - A Reader, New York: Wiley, 1973; or Greenberg, Edward S., Political Socialization, New York: Atherton, 1970.
- 5) Some of this criticism is raised, for example, in March, David, "Political Socialization: The Implicit Assumptions Questioned", British Journal of Political Science, I (1971), pp. 453 - 465; cf. also the discussion by Schissler, Jakob, Politische Kultur und Politische Struktur, unpublished manuscript.



In Kenya, the situation is complicated by the variety of social and political traditions and the different "modernizing" influences at work on various ethnic groups today. These include the differential impact of foreign elements, starting with colonial rules, but continuing through "demonstration effects" and through outright dependence and neocolonial forms of domination.

In the following section we consider the impact on political attitudes and behavior of a limited number of factors: 1) aspects of family socialization in the different ethnic groups, 2) membership in modern voluntary organizations, 3) the differential impact of the modern mass media, and as a more collective source of influence, 4) the particular historical experiences which important groups of people have had in recent decades. The influence of Kenya's modern school system, work relations, particularly in a modern administrative, commercial or industrial setting, and aspects of "peer-group" socialization are dealt with only cursorily despite their importance.<sup>6)</sup> Far-reaching inferences should not be drawn from the limited amount of data presented here which deal with only some of the relevant factors.

a.) Family socialization:

In our survey we included a number of questions relating to patterns of decision-making and punishment in the families of our respondents. Our first set of questions inquired about the patterns of decision-making and authority in the generation of the parents of our respondents: "When you were a child, who made the decisions relating to economic matters (e.g. the

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6) Some of the effects of school education on political values in East African countries are discussed, for example, in: Prewitt, Kenneth (ed.), Education and Political Values, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971.

planting of crops, the work different persons do etc.)?" and: "When a child was punished for some bad behavior, who did it usually?"<sup>7)</sup> The responses are summarized in table III.1:

Table III.1: Parents' decision-making; by ethnic group:

Economic matters decided by (%):	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Father	42	66	42	54	58	63	56	53
Mother	20	5	6	14	13	--	5	11
Both	35	26	46	32	29	37	38	34
Somebody else	3	3	6	--	--	--	1	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Children punished by:

Father	42	50	60	64	59	59	65	55
Mother	38	29	16	30	19	28	13	27
Either one	19	20	18	6	22	13	22	17
Somebody else	1	1	6	--	--	--	--	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	270	152	86	156	192	92	106	1054

This pattern clearly reflects the traditionally dominating position of the male in these societies,<sup>8)</sup> but in at least one third of all cases women also took part in the eco-

7) Questions 28 a and b.

8) See also the respective sections in Part II above.



conomic decision-making. The relatively higher share of mothers who make economic decisions among the Kikuyu, Luyia and Luo is explained to a large extent by the higher degree of male absenteeism (husbands working in town or on large-scale farms) in these groups (32% of the fathers of our Kikuyu, Luyia and Luo respondents were engaged in non-agricultural occupations compared to 20% on the average for the other groups). Only 46% of the respondents whose fathers were in non-agricultural occupations reported that economic decisions were made by the father compared to 57% of the respondents coming from agricultural families.

In the punishment of children women play even greater roles, but still in all groups the husbands were most often responsible for the punishment. Some generational change in this regard is also indicated by the fact that 65% of those of our respondents who are above the age of 50 said that as a child they were usually punished by their father, whereas this figure is only 51% for the group aged below 30.

The differences between the generations become even more pronounced when we compare table III.1 above, with the answers by those of our respondents who are married and to whom we put the same questions concerning their own family today:

Insert table III.2: Decision-making in own family;

Table III.2: Decision-making in own family; by ethnic group:

Economic matters decided by (%):	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Father	53	76	72	68	58	90	71	66
Mother	15	15	9	18	17	--	12	14
Both	30	6	19	14	25	10	17	19
Somebody else	2	3	--	--	--	--	--	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Children punished by:								
Father	37	30	37	34	46	41	47	39
Mother	34	52	24	33	26	37	19	33
Either one	27	13	39	33	28	22	34	27
Somebody else	2	5	--	--	--	--	--	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	192	124	74	130	138	59	83	800

As becomes apparent from these comparisons, in the younger generation the mothers, indeed, play a greater role in the punishment of the children (in no group do the fathers constitute a majority among those responsible for punishment, whereas in the older generation only one group, the Kikuyu, mentioned the fathers in less than 50% of all cases). The economic decision-making, however, presents a different picture. While the percentage of woman who make economic decisions on their own increased slightly (from 11% in the older to 14% in



the younger generation on the average), the percentage of those who make the decisions together with their husbands was cut by half (17% in the younger generation compared to 34% in the older one). Our hunch that these changes are due to a large extent to the more general social and economic developments which have occurred in Kenya in recent decades is confirmed by a closer look at the "class" position of the respective groups of respondents. Here, among the still largely subsistence-oriented "proletaroids"<sup>9)</sup> the traditionally somewhat limited positions of males in day-to-day economic affairs has remained unchanged (49% of husbands make economic decisions compared to 53% for the fathers in the older generation), and the number of women who make decisions completely on their own has even increased (to 30%), because of the higher level of male absenteeism in this group today. In the "agricultural bourgeoisie", on the other hand, the economic role of males now concerned with the planting of cash-crops and the keeping of grade cattle has been greatly strengthened. There, 67% of the husbands and only 14% of the wives decide in economic matters, the number of those making joint decisions (19% compared to 34% on the average in the older generation) has also been reduced. These changes become even more pronounced in the non-agricultural classes: 70% of the husbands and only 12% of the wives make the economic decisions in these groups, 16% make them jointly.

In contrast to what perhaps might have been expected, modern developments have not led to a higher degree of "emancipation" of married women, at least in the vital sphere of economic decision making, but rather to a greater confinement of women to their more limited roles

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9) For a discussion of this terminology see also Part I, chapter 1 above.

as housewives both in towns and in the more modern agricultural sector. Only in cases where married women pursue a cash-earning occupation of their own (and this is still a very small number in Kenya today), has the advent of "modern times" actually decreased their economic dependence on their husbands.

How these changes in family structure and authority affect the socialization of children is revealed by a comparison of the methods of punishment in the parents' generation of our respondents and their own: <sup>10)</sup>

Verbal	69	72	77	80	89	80	80
Deprivation	13	3	3	3	6	6	7
Mild physical							
Severe physical							
Other							
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Insert table III.3: Methods of child punishment;

Verbal	25	27	25	12	18
Deprivation	4	4	6	—	3
Mild physical	4	2	2	—	2
Severe phys.	62	73	73	75	75
Other	5	—	2	—	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted					
N:	299	146	87	158	191

<sup>10)</sup> Respondents with own children only

10) Questions 28 c and d. In order to be able to compute rank order correlations for these variables grouped the responses to these questions into an approximate ordinal scale ranging from verbal forms of punishment through deprivation of privileges and mild physical punishment to severe physical punishment.



Table III.3: Methods of child punishment; by generation and ethnic group:

Parents' generation (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Verbal punishment	7	3	3	10	3	8	3	5
Deprivation of privileges	5	1	--	6	7	--	11	5
Mild physical punishment	6	3	--	4	--	3	--	3
Severe physical punishment	69	90	88	77	84	89	80	80
Other	13	3	9	3	6	--	6	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Respondents' generation*)								
Verbal	25	21	12	17	15	25	12	18
Deprivation	4	4	--	6	--	--	--	3
Mild physical	4	2	--	2	--	--	--	2
Severe phys.	62	73	88	73	85	75	88	76
Other	5	--	--	2	--	--	--	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	255	146	87	158	191	92	107	1036

\*) Respondents with own children only

As this table shows, severe physical punishment such as beating or "caning" is the method reported most often by all groups. In the older generation the variations between the groups are not very great. Only the percentage for the Luyia and, in particular, for the Kikuyu are below the mean. This also coincides with the significantly higher level of education both for the fathers (25% among the Kikuyu and 13% among the Luyia had some formal schooling compared to a mean of 10% for all the other groups) and the mothers of our respondents (14% among the Kikuyu, and 13% among the Luyia compared to a mean of 4% for the other groups). When we control for this factor the deviation of the Luyia disappears, but the lower percentage for the Kikuyu remains significant even among illiterate parents. The correlation between the level of education of the fathers and the severeness of punishment is relatively weak, but still significant (Spearman's  $r_s = -0.063$ ;  $p < 0.05$ ). For the mothers this correlation is even weaker ( $r_s = -0.045$ ) and above the 0.05-level of significance.

Again the differences between the generations are very pronounced. Severe forms of physical punishment have been greatly reduced in the younger generation among the Kikuyu, Kamba, Luyia and Kalenjin, while verbal methods (scolding, admonishing) have significantly increased. As further analysis shows, these changes again can be attributed largely to the more general economic development and social differentiation which have taken place and by which these groups have been more strongly affected than the Luo, Mijikenda and Maasai. Among agricultural proletariats severe forms of physical punishment remain common for all groups (82% on the average); whereas this figure drops to 69% for the agricultural bourgeoisie and to 70% for all non-agricultural classes combined. The differences according



to the level of education of our respondents are even more striking: 84% of the illiterates reported severe physical punishment as the usual method, while only 71% of those with some primary and 62% of those with some secondary education did so (the Spearman correlation coefficient between level of education of our respondents and severness of punishment is  $-0.34$ ). The sex of our respondents, on the other hand, is of relatively little importance for the over-all results (75% of the males compared to 78% of the females report severe methods of physical punishment). In this case the traditionally somewhat "softer" attitude of women is balanced by the generally lower level of formal education among them. When we control for this latter factor the sex difference becomes evident: 80% of the illiterate females reported using severe forms of physical punishment compared to 89% of illiterate males, while only 46% of women with some secondary education punished severely compared to 65% for their male counterparts.

These results concerning the reported behavior of respondents are supplemented and, to a certain extent, confirmed by answers to one attitudinal item included at a different point in our interviews: "A child should never be asked to do anything unless he is told why."<sup>11)</sup>

Table III.4: Attitude towards child-rearing; by ethnic group:

Tell children (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Agree	72	76	58	66	55	77	53	65
Disagree	27	33	42	33	45	23	47	35
Don't know	1	--	--	1	--	--	--	--
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	268	155	96	157	193	92	108	1069

11) Item 35 of question 40.

As we can see, the disagreement is strongest among the Mijikenda, Luo and Maasai, which coincides with findings for the younger generation in the previous table.<sup>12)</sup> Severe methods of physical punishment and thus, if we may call it so, a certain "authoritarianism" in child-rearing practices were most common in these groups.<sup>13)</sup> Controls by class tend to work in the same direction: Disagreement to this item is strongest among the agricultural proletarioids (40%), reaches an intermediate level in the non-agricultural classes (32%), and is lowest in the agricultural bourgeoisie (22%). Age, level of education, and place of residence are of very little importance in this regard, while a control by sex produces a significantly different response by females (30% disagreeing compared to 38% for males).

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12) At first sight, the level of agreement seems to be rather high for all groups, which apparently contradicts the actual behavior of our respondents reported above. We have reason to believe, however, that this quite difficultly worded item (one of the relatively few "negative" statements in our interview) has produced a fairly high "socle" of "yeah-sayers" in all groups. We think, therefore, that the relative differences between the groups rather than their absolute levels of agreement are most relevant to our interpretation.

13) Whether this attitude is also related to a more general "political authoritarianism" will be further discussed in chapter 4.e) of this part below.



b.) Organization membership:

In addition to "primary" socialization in the family a great number of "secondary" and even "tertiary" influences shape a person's social and political attitudes and behavior. Some of these, such, as school authorities or industrial relations, probably affect ethnic groups in Kenya, in the same fashion while others may be more specifically related to cultural traditions. Among the latter is "l'art de s'associer", as de Tocqueville called it.<sup>14)</sup> This has been the center of attention of a number of writers on "mass society" who attempt to analyze the functioning of democratic process under modern "mass" conditions.<sup>15)</sup>

The existence of "voluntary associations" has been regarded as important for transmitting the interests of a group and enhancing both the material and psychological well-being of its members under otherwise very unstructured and often "anomic" circumstances.<sup>16)</sup>

To probe for influences of this kind we included a number of questions in the survey referring to membership in formal organizations. The questions dealt with one particularly striking form of loosely structured common endeavors, the "Harambee" or "self-help" efforts which can be found in Kenya today among all ethnic groups

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14) de Tocqueville, Alexis, De la Démocratie en Amérique, Livre II, Deuxième Partie, Chapitre V (in the edition used by us: Paris, Union Générale d' Editions, 1963, p. 282).

15) The most comprehensive work on this subject is still Kornhauser, William, The Politics of Mass Society, New York: The Free Press, 1959.

16) For a study of organisations of this kind in an African context cf., e. g., Little, Kenneth, West African Urbanization: The Study of Voluntary Associations in Social Change, London: Cambridge University Press, 1965.

and classes. A first series of questions referred to membership in any professional organization (such as cooperatives, the Kenya Farmer's Association, unions, the chamber of commerce, etc.):<sup>17)</sup>

Table III.5 Membership in professional organizations; by occupation:

Kind of occupation	Skilled white collar	Unskilled white collar	Skilled blue collar	Unskilled laborer	Workers in informal sector	Progressive farmers	Subsistence farmers	Total*)
Percentage organized	62	32	50	17	8	44	10	33
Total N:	48	41	24	42	12	80	66	313

\*) Excluding housewives, unemployed, and students

The level of organization thus clearly is highest for the skilled "white collar" (i.e. mainly managerial occupations, members of the "professions", etc.) and skilled "blue collar" workers (such as highly qualified craftsmen, foremen etc.), and the "progressive" farmers (amounting to 40% or more). On the other hand, only a sixth of the laborers is professionally organized. Percentages for workers in the informal sector and subsistence farmers are even lower. Within each occupational category men tend to be members of professional organizations more often than women (34% on the average for males compared to 17% for females;  $r = 0.19$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), and those in the middle age groups - 30 - 49 year - more often than in the younger and older

17) Question 6 f.



ones (34% on the average compared to 16% of those below the age of 30 and 15% for those aged 50 and above;  $r = 0.06$ ,  $p < 0.05$ . Initial differences by ethnic group (the Kikuyu having by far the highest level of organization, followed by the Kalenjin, Luyia and Luo) become insignificant when the occupation of each respondent was controlled for.

A second question asked at a different point in our interviews, concerned membership in any non-professional voluntary association, such as private clubs, societies, "tribal welfare association", sports organizations and the like.<sup>18)</sup> Here, the distribution by ethnic groups proved to be most revealing:

Table III.6: Membership in non-professional voluntary association; by ethnic group:

Percentage organized in:	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Sports, Hobby or youth org.	4	3	4	8	8	5	2	5
Harambee or charity org.	10	4	9	3	1	3	1	5
Tribal welfare associations	1	--	1	3	2	--	--	1
Political party	3	3	--	6	--	--	--	2
Other	13	5	--	2	5	3	3	6
Total organized	31	15	14	23	16	11	6	19
Weighted N:	84	24	14	37	30	10	7	206

18) Question 17 a.

Again the Kikuyu (almost one third of our respondents) have by far the highest percentage of those organized in some voluntary association, followed by the Luyia. Luo, Kamba, Mijikenda, and Kalenjin occupy a somewhat lower intermediate position, while the Maasai come last. The relatively great number of Kikuya engaged in some "Harambee" or charity organizations is also remarkable. Differences among the other groups and those concerning other forms of organization, given the low number of respondents in these sub-categories, do not seem to be significant. The relatively low number mentioning membership in a political party (KANU being the only one at the time of our interviews), and, somewhat surprisingly, in a "tribal welfare association" such as the "Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association" (GEMA) or the "Luo Union", also are noteworthy. The activities of the "Luo Union" and the "Abaluyia Association" seem to have lapsed somewhat in recent years. GEMA, which first came to life in the early 1970s, and which is the most active group today, does not seem to have penetrated the rural areas to any large extent at the time of our interviews in early 1974.

Controls show that membership in voluntary associations is highest in the agricultural bourgeoisie (27%) and the urban middle and upper classes (20%). It drops to 17% for the lower urban classes and to 14% for the agricultural proletarioids. Organization membership is also significantly related to the sex (13% for the females compared to 24% for males; Pearson's  $r = 0.14$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and level of education (11% for illiterates compared to 24% for those with some primary and 29% for those with some secondary education;  $r = 0.18$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) of our respondents, while age or place of residence (independent of the class position) do not exer-



cise a significant separate influence. Further inquiries<sup>19)</sup> indicate that membership in these organizations is fairly stable (more than 80% of those organized said that they have been a member for more than one year, the majority has been a member for more than five years). Somewhat more than two thirds pay fees for their membership and attend meetings regularly. About one fourth of those organized also held an office in an organization at some time.

Answers of our respondents indicate some interesting  
A third set of questions was specifically related to a form of organization, which has become a distinct feature of Kenya's over-all economic system and which tends to mitigate somewhat its otherwise strong "capitalistic" orientation. These are the "Harambee-" or "self-help" groups.<sup>20)</sup> They are often formed on an ad hoc basis to carry out a particular local development project, such as the building of a school or a health center, the construction of piped water supplies, a cattle-dip, or some similar works. Other Harambee efforts have an even larger scope, as, for example the collection in some areas of large sums of money for the regional "Institutes of Technology", in recent years.<sup>21)</sup> Not rarely projects of this kind also serve as springboards for aspiring local and even national politicians, who seek to gain election support by taking the lead in such efforts or by contributing con-

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19) Questions 17 b - e.

20) For a more general discussion of Kenya's economic system and the role of Harambee see also Berg-Schlosser, Dirk and Schneider-Barthold, Wolfgang, chapter on "Wirtschaft und Entwicklung" in: Leifer, Walter (ed), Kenya, Tübingen: Horst Erdmann, 1977, pp. 359 ff..

21) Some of the more critical aspects of projects of this latter type are also discussed, for example, by Godfrey, Martin and Mutiso, Gideon C., "The Political Economy of Self-Help. Kenya's Harambee Institutes of Technology," Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol. VIII, No. 1, 1974, pp. 109 - 133.

siderable amounts of money themselves.<sup>22)</sup> Even though a number of these communal projects are ill-conceived, badly organized, or abused for some personal purposes, efforts of this kind constitute one of the most important forms of social organization in Kenya today, frequently making use of more traditional social ties, such as clan or, where it still exists, age-set membership.

Answers of our respondents indicate some interesting differences in the level of participation in efforts of this kind by class and ethnic group:

Table III.7: Participation in Harambee efforts;  
by class and ethnic group:

Percentages by class	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle + up- per classes	69	93	(80)	(87)	(75)	(100)	(100)	78
Proletariat	56	83	(57)	46	72	80	(80)	60
Non-agric. proletaroids + sub-prole- tariat	49	(20)	--	(80)	65	(33)	(50)	51
Agric. bour- geoisie	94	(50)	(50)	83	100	92	62	86
Agric. pro- letaroids	81	81	62	63	92	90	16	70
Total	72	79	60	65	86	87	29	71
Total weigh- ted N:	258	151	96	146	182	85	99	1017

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category)

22) The role of Members of Parliament, for example, in this regard is further discussed in chapter 5 e of this part below.



The percentage of those participating in Harambee efforts is thus, on an over-all ethnic basis, highest among the Kalenjin and Luo, followed by the Kamba and the Kikuyu. In the last group the lower percentages for members of the non-agricultural classes (and their relatively greater number) contribute most strongly to this relatively low score. Within the agricultural classes alone the Kikuyu rank as high as members of the other leading groups. The Luyia and Mijikenda are at the lower end of the scale of those engaged in self-help efforts, because of the relatively low level of involvement of the agricultural proletarioids in these groups. The Maasai again rank last; their figure of 16% for the rural proletarioids (i.e. still mostly nomadic herdsmen in this case) is the lowest for any of the sub-categories listed above.

The over-all differences by class indicate a relatively strong rural component in this kind of organization:<sup>23)</sup> The agricultural bourgeoisie clearly shows the highest level of involvement of all classes, followed by the members of the non-agricultural middle and upper classes. Their ability to pay is of course also much higher than that of the lower classes, when monetary contributions to Harambee projects are required. Among the latter, again the agricultural proletarioids are more active than the urban proletariat or their non-agricultural counterparts. The over-all difference between town and countryside amounts to 71% of our respondents participating in the rural areas compared to 60% among the urbanites; ( $r = 0.08$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Males are again somewhat more active than females (73% compared to 65%;  $r = 0.08$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). The level of activity also is higher in the middle age groups (81%), compared to 70% for those aged

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23) See also our discussion of the significance of rural political participation in chapter 5 b of this part below.

above 50, and 62% for those below the age of 30 ( $r = 0.10$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Education shows a curvilinear relationship: Those with some primary education are most often engaged in Harambee efforts (76%), compared to 63% for illiterates, and 67% for those with some secondary education (the over-all Pearson correlation is  $r = 0.08$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ).

By far the majority of the Harambee efforts involving our respondents concern the construction or further improvement of schools and other educational facilities (60% of all the projects mentioned). 17% of the projects relate to health centers, water supplies or similar local infrastructural improvements, another 17% concern some non-local public purposes (such as the already mentioned regional institutes of technology). 5% are devoted to churches. The majority of our respondents (70%) made cash contributions (12% of them donating more than Kshs 100!). About one fourth contributed by working on the project itself, 5% gave donations in kind (such as chickens or goats which then could be auctioned).<sup>24)</sup>

#### c.) Media Exposure:

Another important factor responsible for shaping personalities and social and political attitudes is exposure to the modern media of mass communication.<sup>25)</sup>

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24) Some absolute figures concerning the level of donations by members of the different ethnic groups are also contained in our table "Comparative data..." above.

25) One of the earliest empirical studies of the effects of mass communications in the developing areas is Lerner, Daniel, The Passing of Traditional Society - Modernizing the Middle East, New York: The Free Press, 1958. Other important works in communications theory include: Klapper, Joseph T., The Effects of Mass Communication, New York: The Free Press, 1960. Rogers, Everett M., The Diffusion of Innovations, New York: The Free Press, 1962; Schramm, Wilbur, Mass Media and National Development, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964; and Pye, Lucian W. (ed.) Communications and Political Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.



But, as some proponents themselves had to realize in recent years,<sup>26)</sup> early "communications theories" often were overly optimistic as to the "developmental" effects of modern means of communication, and they tended to overstate the implications of media exposure for the personalities and social and political attitudes of the people involved. Our survey data however, show that exposure to media does have some effect.

The most important means of mass communication in Kenya, as in most Third World countries, is the radio, in particular the transistorized "pocket" type.<sup>27)</sup> Official statistics do not keep track of all radio sets in the country, but the figure of approximately 500,000 licenses issued by 1974<sup>28)</sup> indicates a rough order of magnitude. In comparison, the approximately 25,000 T.V. licenses issued by 1974 indicate the very limited impact of this medium; television remains largely restricted to the cities and towns and has made very little headway in rural Kenya.<sup>29)</sup> The frequency of listening to the radio among our respondents is as follows:<sup>30)</sup>

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26) Cf., e.g., Schramm, Wilbur and Lerner, Daniel (eds.), Communication and Change: Ten Years After, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976; or Rogers, Everett M. (ed.), Communication and Development-Critical Perspectives, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976.

27) For a brief review of the history and development of the mass media in Kenya see also the section on "Presse, Rundfunk und Fernsehen", in Leifer, Walter (ed.), Kenia, loc. cit., pp. 162 - 176.

28) Cf. Statistical Abstract 1974, loc. cit., p. 198.

29) The use of a TV set is usually also dependent, of course, on a permanent supply of electricity, which is not yet available in most parts of rural Kenya.

30) Question 18.

Table III.8: Radio exposure; by ethnic group:

Percentages listening	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Almost daily	4	17	3	3	7	6	9	7
Once or twice a week	12	20	13	16	10	28	12	15
Less than once a week	54	34	23	49	38	45	21	41
Never	30	29	61	32	45	21	58	37
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100.
Totalweigh- ted N:	269	156	93	158	186	92	104	1058

Those who never listen thus are most strongly represented among the Maasai and Mijikenda, followed by the Luo. This reflects the great number of people still following a largely traditional way of life in these groups. This pattern of radio exposure is also closely connected to other important socio-economic characteristics: Those never listening are most frequent among the agricultural proletariat (51%), compared to 29% for the agricultural bourgeoisie, 27% for the urban proletariat and 10% for the salariat. The over-all rural-urban ratio of those never listening to the radio is 41% to 14%; ( $r = 0.08$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). Those with a higher level of education also listen much more often (only 12% among those with secondary education never listening compared to 60% for the illiterates;  $r = 0.18$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Sex (28% of males never listening compared to 49% for females;  $r = 0.16$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) is an additional factor influencing this pattern, even when level of education and place of residence are controlled for (the partial correlation than is 0.12,  $p < 0.001$ ). The effect of age, on the other hand, becomes insignificant after these controls.



Of those listening to the radio almost three-fourths do so at home, another fifth at a friend's or neighbor's place, the rest at some public locality. News and political information (44%), educational programs (10%), and general entertainment are the favorite features mentioned most often by our respondents. In addition to programs broadcast either in English or Swahili, transmissions in the vernacular often proved to be very popular (favored by 12% of our respondents).

The second most important mass medium is the press. The three main daily newspapers ("Daily Nation", its Swahili sister "Taifa Leo", and "The Standard") have a combined circulation of about 120,000 copies. In addition, a large variety of weekly and monthly papers and magazines are published by different social, economic, religious and other organizations. The frequency of newspaper exposure of our respondents (either by reading themselves or by having it read to them by somebody else)<sup>31)</sup> is reported in table III.9:

Table III.9: Newspaper exposure; by ethnic group:

Percentage reading	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Almost daily	12	12	12	17	15	17	6	13
Once or twice a week	19	15	4	19	19	35	10	17
Less than once a week	21	10	10	27	25	4	10	18
Never	48	63	74	37	41	44	74	52
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	158	153	96	153	172	89	105	1026

<sup>31)</sup> Question 19.

Thus again more or less the same pattern prevails: The Maasai and Mijikenda clearly have the lowest numbers of those exposed to newspapers, this time followed by the Kamba. The variation among the rest is not very great. The factors influencing contact with newspapers are rather similar to those affecting radio exposure: The number never reading a newspaper is highest among the agricultural proletarioids (68%), followed by the urban proletariat (47%) and the agricultural bourgeoisie (42%), but goes down to 12% in the urban middle classes. Exposure is also lower in the countryside (57% of those in rural areas never read a paper compared to 24% or those in town;  $r = 0.11$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) among females (71% never exposed compared to 39% for males;  $r = 0.21$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and in the higher age groups (71% of those aged 50 and above never read a newspaper compared to 46% for those below the age of 30;  $r = 0.10$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Only 16% of the illiterates are ever exposed to news reported in the papers which is read to them or told by others.

About half of those who read a newspaper said they find the political parts most interesting. About one third is most interested in sports, cultural features, and other kinds of entertainment. About 5% each look for economic news and the letters to the editor. The rest are most interested in a variety of smaller items ("Your Lucky Stars", etc.), and the advertisements.

Among those who did not report any exposure to the mass media, about 40% said that they are kept informed by family members, friends, or neighbors. Another quarter stated that they get their information from public officials (such as local chiefs or sub-chiefs), or at public meetings ("barazas") organized by government officials or Members of Parliament. A few other minor sources



(local traders, bar owners, etc.) were also mentioned. Slightly more than one fifth of those not exposed to the media (11% of our total sample) stated that they are not informed about things happening outside their location at all, which includes almost one third each of our Maasai and Mijikenda respondents, 13% of the Kamba, 7% of the Luo and between 3 and 5% of the other groups.

d.) Common Historical Experiences:

So far we have discussed some of the factors which are potentially relevant to the formation of socio-political attitudes and the behavior of individuals and the differential distribution of these factors in Kenya's main ethnic groups and classes. In addition to these influences, some collective experiences contribute to characteristic aspects of the political culture of larger groups. Experiences of this kind constitute a "collective memory" of larger groups of people or of a whole society and reflect the historical events that society (and all of its members at this time, of course.) have had to go through. In particular, economic crises like depressions, revolutions, wars, or political assassinations may leave their "scars" in the life history of a society and sometimes generations later may result in political behavior which otherwise cannot be adequately understood. Some authors contend, for example, that there still is a revolutionary consciousness in France dating back to the events which followed the seizure of the Bastille in 1789,<sup>32)</sup> and certainly crises like the depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s, or the experience of the two World Wars in this century have left

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32) Some aspects of the upheaval in France in May 1968 have, for example, been attributed to this latent "revolutionary tradition" and consciousness in this country's political culture, cf., e.g., Rioux, Lucien and Backmann, René, L'explosion de mai, Paris: Robert Laffont, 1968.

their marks in the minds of men and thus in the political culture of the societies concerned. Recent experiences in the United States with the war in Vietnam or the effects of "Watergate" are cases in point.

The impact of such events, as far as they are not personally experienced, is transmitted both in its cognitive and its evaluative and possibly also affective aspects by stories told by parents or other influential figures, or is contained in the history or civic lessons which are part of a person's formal education. Recent and current events of course, are, transmitted by the news media and other personal and impersonal communications structures; they contribute to a socializing factor which sometimes vaguely has been termed "Zeitgeist" (the "spirit of the times").<sup>33)</sup> However subtle or imperceptible influences of this kind may be, their importance for the total picture of a society's political culture can hardly be denied.

In Kenya the most important collective formative experiences of this kind have been the events of the colonial period, the "emergency", the attainment of independence, and some of the post-independence crises, such as the assassination of influential politicians.<sup>34)</sup>

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33) Cf. e. g., Schoeps, Hans-Joachim, Was ist und was will die Geistesgeschichte - Über Theorie und Praxis der Zeitgeistforschung, Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1959.

34) For a brief review of the history of this period see also Part I, chapter 2 c above.



The impact of these events has been documented by historians <sup>35)</sup> and in noteworthy literary accounts. <sup>36)</sup> In order to assess the effect such events have on the destiny of our respondents and their families we included two sets of open-ended questions in our interviews, one asking for important events in general which affected the lives of our respondents, <sup>37)</sup> the other probing more specifically for political events. <sup>38)</sup> The answers to our first, more general question already reveals some significant distinctions:

Table III.10: Important personal experiences:  
by ethnic group:

Percentage of events named	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Events concerning respondent's:								
family	25	17	20	29	19	14	17	21
health	2	6	8	6	3	14	--	5
education	12	3	--	6	6	--	2	6
economic position	13	4	20	10	14	13	25	13
Political events	10	4	--	2	4	--	4	4
Other	7	14	17	11	6	3	24	11
No particular event	31	52	35	36	48	56	28	40
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

35) The most comprehensive work covering Kenya's pre-independence political development is Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit.

36) Cf., e.g., Ngugi wa Thiongo, Weep not, Child, London: Heinemann, 1964; or idem, The River Between, London: Heinemann, 1965.

37) Questions 16 a and b.

38) Question 16 c.

The majority of our respondents thus, not surprisingly, mentioned events of a largely personal nature. Some of these, however, point to more general calamities as they are expressed in some of the verbatim answers of our respondents:<sup>39)</sup> A 35-year old Kamba peasant: "Whenever there is drought life is not okay", or an older Maasai pastoralist: "Great hunger, cattle died." Other responses reflect significant features of the traditional life of these peoples:<sup>40)</sup> A 32-year old Keyo peasant's wife reported, for example: "The Suk had raided us and took the cattle." A 22-year old Maasai woman stated: "When I had my first-born I was respected more." A Maasai moran boasted: "My cattle raids have always been successful, I have become famous among my colleagues" and "Another time I speared a lion dead." Not all events of this kind had a similarly happy ending, however. Another Maasai moran: "I was sent to jail for stealing cattle." And an approximately 60-year old Maasai woman complained bitterly: "I'm old now but no help comes. I have no way of supporting myself. My only two sons died in warrior fights."

Table III.10 also indicates one directly political phenomenon, namely the exceptionally high percentage of Kikuyu respondents (one seventh of those who mentioned any particular event at all), who spontaneously mentioned some political event as having been most important in their lives. This relatively high salience of politics for the Kikuyu as well as specific events they were involved in become even more apparent in the responses to the more directly political set of questions:

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39) Most of the interviews were conducted in a vernacular language, we reproduce here the verbatim English transcriptions of our interviewers.

40) See also the respective chapters in Part II above.



Table III.11: Important political events effecting respondents; by ethnic group

Percentage of events mentioned	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Kolonial rule in general	4	1	--	4	--	7	--	2
State of Emergency (Mau-Mau)	31	12	--	11	3	26	5	14
Attainment of independence ("Uhuru")	13	5	--	4	1	--	3	5
Post-independence crises	1	--	--	--	5	--	--	1
Other events	3	2	5	3	2	4	--	3
Total percentage mentioning political events	52	20	5	22	11	37	8	25
Total weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

Again the Kikuyu have the greatest percentage of those who state that their lives were affected by some particular political event. The Kalenjin, Luyia, and Kamba the occupy an intermediate position, followed by the Luo, while the Maasai and Mijikenda rank last. The degree to which our respondents were affected by historical events of the period is also a function of their age, sex and place of residence. Members of the older age groups, for example, mentioned political events much more often than younger people. (37% among those aged 50 and above, i.e. who were at about the age of 30 at the time of the emergency, compared to 18% for those who at the time of our interview were below the age of 30, and 30% for those in the intermediate age groups). Males are also much more often

affected than females (29% compared to 19%), and those living in the rural areas (27%) compared to 17% for those in town. Level of education and social class, on the other hand, do not seem to have any clear-cut influence in this respect when these other factors are controlled for.

More interesting even than these more general responses are the specific political events mentioned by the different groups. Thus among the Kikuyu the "Mau Mau" period clearly was most often referred to as particularly important. The kind of experiences can be illustrated by some of the verbatim responses: A 56-year old Kikuyu peasant: "During the emergency I was deported for 6 years and ten months to Kajiado. All my property and land were destroyed. I had to start all over." A 40-year old peasant's wife: "I was in prison for 6 months on pretext that I had fed the terrorists." A 30-year old farm laborer: "I was unable to move to Nairobi to seek for a job. I have never earned enough money to go to school." A 24-year old unemployed: "I could not start school, because father was a freedom fighter." The attainment of independence ("Uhuru") was also praised most often by our Kikuyu respondents. An 80-year old Kikuyu peasant: "We Africans are liberated now." A 44-year old Kikuyu cash crop farmer's wife: "We have more chances, freedom of speech and movement. We can own shops." "Mau Mau" and the period preceding independence were not perceived, however, by all groups in the same way, and some of its side-effects left somewhat different marks: A 45-year old Kamba peasant: "We were forced to take oath, some of us were beaten to death." Or a 38-year old Kamba peasant's wife: "Many people lost possession. Maasai took a lot of cattle, because Kamba heroes were in the war."



Significantly, too, post-independence "crises", i.e. mainly the formation and banning of the opposition party "Kenya People's Union" (KPU), the detention of its leaders, the assassination of Tom Mboya with the ensuing widespread unrest, and the somewhat mysterious death of C.M.G. Argwings-Kodhek, were mentioned most often as particular events affecting their lives by our Luo respondents. A 27-year old cash-crop farmer stated, for example: "After the killings of Mboya and Kodhek our tribe is now politically backward because of the losses." A 54-year old peasant: "My cousin was killed as a result of Mboya's death." A 36-year old laborer: "Tom Mboya would have helped me to secure a job."

Concluding this chapter, we can state that factors shaping the political culture of Kenya show some characteristic differences between the major ethnic groups, but, to an increasing extent, the emerging social classes are of greater significance. In the case of family or "primary" socialization, contrary to what one might have expected, the position of males is further strengthened in the less traditional household, and varies according to social class, at least as far as economic decision making is concerned. On the other hand, mothers apparently assume a greater role in child-rearing as males become primary wage-earners or control cash-crop farming. Methods of punishment seem to change from often quite severe physical forms to less severe and increasingly verbal methods. This is reflected in attitudinal changes which were observed.

Modern conditions have also led to a higher level of organization in both professional and non-professional voluntary associations and the numerous "Harambee" or self-help activities. The less traditional ethnic groups,

such as the Kikuyu, but also to a somewhat lesser extent the Luyia, tend to have the highest level of membership in modern voluntary associations, while the Maasai, on the other hand, are least affected by organizations of this kind. In terms of social class, agriculturalists who grow cash crops and employ advanced methods of production and those engaged in non-agricultural occupations, are also organized more often in modern voluntary associations. For "Harambee" efforts, which are often based on more traditional forms of social organization, it can be shown that rural people are more involved than urban residents.

Modern forms of mass communication differentially affect Kenya's ethnic groups and classes. They have the strongest impact of all among the Kikuyu and Luyia, to a somewhat lesser extent among the Luo, Kamba and Kalenjin, while the Mijikenda and the Maasai are least exposed to the modern mass media. Social class differences within each ethnic group, should not be overlooked. The middle and upper non-agricultural classes clearly are more exposed to the modern news media, the agricultural bourgeoisie is exposed somewhat more strongly than the urban proletariat, while the agricultural proletarioids clearly come last.

The experience of the colonial period and in particular "Mau Mau" and the state of emergency still loom large in the minds of our respondents. It could be shown, not surprisingly, that the events of this time and their aftermath are still most keenly felt by the Kikuyu who were most engaged in the independence struggle. The Luo, on the other hand, expressed their strongest concern about some of the post-independence crises, such as the detention or assassination of prominent



politicians from their area. The differences between the other ethnic groups are not as pronounced, but the relatively greater isolation of groups like the Maasai and Mijikenda from the mainstream of Kenyan politics again becomes apparent.

So far, we have provided some background information concerning important formative factors of Kenya's political culture. How these different factors effect particular social and political attitudes, will be discussed, in greater detail, in subsequent chapters of this part below.

Identification may become so predominant that it tends to prevail over all others as in cases of extreme ethnocentrism or nationalism. In other periods multiple identification may exist relatively harmoniously side by side; they are activated only when a situation calls for an expression of group solidarity at a particular level. Together with such "positive" identification "negative" ones usually can be found which more clearly define a person's attachment in terms of his "ingroup - outgroup" membership. Again some of this negative identification may become excessive in certain individuals and groups, as in cases of extreme xenophobia, or they may find their expression in strong and persistent ethnic or racial prejudices.<sup>1)</sup> The factors involved in the formation of such attitudes operate at both a psychological and a social level and they can only be meaningfully analyzed and adequately understood if both the "subjective" and "objective" conditions in each situation are considered.<sup>2)</sup>

1) Cf., e.g., William S. Hoelzer's discussion of "Political Identification" in the International Encyclopedia for the Social Sciences, New York: Macmillan, 1968.

2) This was stressed, for example, by Erik H. Erikson, who is the author of some pioneering studies in this field, cf., e.g., his Childhood and Society, New York: Norton, 1950; or Identity, Youth and Crisis, New York: Norton, 1958.

## CHAPTER 2: LEVELS OF SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION

A person's identification with various groups at distinct levels of his social environment are among the most basic factors which shape political action. These range from family bonds to identification with social classes, religious groups, ideological movements, political parties, a sense of "national" identity, and, possibly as a last stage, a feeling of solidarity with mankind as a whole. In some individuals a particular identification may become so predominant that it tends to prevail over all others as in cases of extreme ethnocentrism or nationalism. In other persons multiple identification may exist relatively harmoniously side by side; they are activated only when a situation calls for an expression of group solidarity at a particular level. Together with such "positive" identification "negative" ones usually can be found which more clearly define a person's attachment in terms of his "ingroup - outgroup" membership. Again some of this negative identification may become excessive in certain individuals and groups, as in cases of extreme xenophobia, or they may find their expression in strong and persistent ethnic or racial prejudices.<sup>1)</sup> The factors involved in the formation of such attitudes operate at both a psychological and a social level and they can only be meaningfully analyzed and adequately understood if both the "subjective" and "objective" conditions in each situation are considered.<sup>2)</sup>

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1) Cf., e.g., William Buchanan's discussion of "Political Identification" in the International Encyclopedia for the Social Sciences, New York: Mcmillan, 1968.

2) This was stressed, for example, by Erik H. Erikson, who is the author of some pioneering studies in this field, cf., e.g. his Childhood and Society, New York: Norton, 1950; or Identity, Youth and Crisis, New York: Norton, 1968.



It is very difficult to assess the different scopes and degrees of intensity of positive and negative identification with the common instruments of empirical research. Some of the more direct "measures" which have been developed for this purpose<sup>3)</sup> have proven to be rather limited in their potential applications, especially in cross-cultural studies such as ours. Truly comparative quantitative material is extremely rare and even the study by Almond and Verba, which was pioneering in many respects, provides us with relatively little information on this point. Their analysis of what they call "system affect", which deals with answers to the question "what are the things about this country that you are most proud of",<sup>4)</sup> is more concerned with certain attributes of one's society such as the political system and economic achievements ; it pre-supposes the existence of this very society by the kind of question they pose. Little is revealed, therefore, as to the actual feeling of national identity which may exist in the countries discussed by them. This approach can be justified for countries which look back an a long period of relatively stable existence, but it is not possible in areas where new political entities have emerged more recently, and where identities are in a state of flux and exist on various levels side by side. Most of the measures which have been developed so far have focused on a particular kind of positive or negative identification as ethnocentrism or the question of "national identity" and do not deal with possible multiple identification and their differing degree of intensity within a given political unit.

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3) Cf., e.g., the "ethnocentrism-scale" developed by Adorno, Theodor W., et al., in idem, The Authoritarian Personality, New York: Harper, 1950; or some of the scales reported in Robinson, John P. and Shaver, Phillip R., Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes, Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1969.

4) Almond and Verba, op.cit., p. 64

We do not pretend to be able to offer any generally applicable and "final" solution to the problem of assessing a person's different scopes of social identification in their various degrees of intensity, but we think that preliminary insights may be gained from the answers we obtained in our survey. These at least seem to confirm some of the "hunches" advanced by other authors and some of the expectations gained by our own experience.

a.) Personal Identity:

Some very limited insights into the aspect of personal identity can be reached from the answers to some of the items in our study which are related to a person's self-confidence and "self-esteem".<sup>5)</sup> The statement, for example, "I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal scale with others"<sup>6)</sup> is answered by almost two-thirds of our respondents in an affirmative manner ("agree somewhat" or "agree strongly"). The scores of most of the groups do not show a great deal of variation to this mean, except for the Maasai, where 80% so responded. This difference remains significant when we control for age, sex, level of education, occupation and social "class" of our respondents. While we do not want to imply too much in such a single finding, it seems to confirm the more general reputation of the Maasai of showing an expression of high self-esteem.<sup>7)</sup> At the other extreme, the score of the Kalenjin of only 42% is remarkable, too, and remains consistent regardless of the control factors.

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5) This is the name of a scale developed by Rosenberg, Morris, Society and the Adolescent Self-Image, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, from which a few selected items have been employed in our survey.

6) Item no. 39 of question 40 in our questionnaire, see also our "Methodological Appendix" below.

7) See also Part II, chapter 7 d above.



We do not have any ready explanation for this deviation, although the imperfections of the sample may account for some part of it. (Younger males are slightly over-represented in comparison to the other groups; their ambitions may be higher than their present conditions are able to satisfy).

One other item probing for a similar attitude ("On the whole, I am satisfied with myself")<sup>8)</sup> proved to be more strongly related<sup>9)</sup> to the general satisfaction with the present way of life (e.g. mainly the economic situation of our respondents),<sup>10)</sup> and does not show any significant deviation on the basis of the respective ethnic groups.<sup>11)</sup> However, when we control this variable for economic satisfaction in order to get more directly at the aspect of personal satisfaction with oneself and "self-esteem" in general, a highly significant relationship emerges which, in Rosenberg's terminology had been "suppressed" before.<sup>12)</sup> It turns out, that the Maasai again show the highest level of self-esteem (approximately 75%) while the personal satisfaction of the Kalenjin is by far the lowest of all groups (only about one third agreed with the above statement, the mean for all groups being close to 60%).

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8) Item no. 18 of question 40.

9) A value for gamma of more than 0.15 compared with a relationship of less than 0.05 with the previous item.

10) Cf. also the discussion of attitudes relating to this sphere in chapter 2 of this part below.

11) The inter-item product-moment correlation between these two statements of 0.006 is also very low.

12) Cf. Rosenberg, Morris, The Logic of Survey Analysis, New York: Basis Books, 1968, in particular chapter 4, pp. 84 ff.

b.) Family Relations:

Beyond the level of an individual's personality and his "identity", the relationship to one's family is of the most immediate concern and constitutes the most intensive social bond. In Kenya, as in most other Sub-Saharan African countries, not only is the size of a "nuclear" family (husband and wife or wives and their children) usually much larger than the size of a nuclear family in Europe for example, (the main household size in our sample varies between slightly less than eight persons for the Kalenjin and more than thirteen for the Luyia), but feelings of intensive family bonds often comprise a much larger intra- and intergenerational group as well. This is also reflected in the terminology used in these relationships: persons who are known as "cousins", "uncles", "nephews", "nieces" etc. in European countries are often called "father" or "mother", in Kenya if they belong to the generation of one's actual parents, or "brother" or "sister" if they are of the same age group. In each case the descent from a common, even a somewhat more remote ancestor is the decisive criterion determining one's family membership and the kind and degree of one's obligations. There is a good deal of variation between different ethnic groups in Kenya in the extent to which these relationships are learned and perpetuated over a number of generations. We need only to compare the very strict extended lineage system of the Luo and the Maasai system of "systematical forgetting" of one's ancestors, for example, to illustrate this point.<sup>13)</sup> But, from survey material and other sources there do not seem to be great differences in intensity of feelings towards members of one's "family" among the different ethnic groups we analyzed, even if the scope of such relationships may differ somewhat.

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13) See Part II, chapters 5 c und 7 c above.



Three items in our survey are most directly related to this issue: "Those who earn money should share it with all members of the family"; "Hospitality demands always to give food and a place to sleep even to more remote relatives"; and, contradicting the first two statements somewhat "I only care about myself and my immediate family, the rest must take care of themselves".<sup>14)</sup>

Table III, 12: Family relations; by class and ethnic group

Percentage agreeing		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Iuo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Agric. Bourgeoisie	Share money	61	(100)	(100)	67	75	77	(23)	67
	Offer hospitality	78	(100)	(100)	92	75	100	100	88
	Only care for immediate family	50	--	--	50	37	77	(56)	51
Agric. proletarioids	Share money	87	88	86	80	74	82	81	83
	Offer hospitality	80	90	80	85	73	91	85	83
	Care for immediate family	57	32	51	22	41	63	50	44
Non-agric. classes	Share money	82	82	100	92	76	75	(82)	83
	Offer hospitality	78	70	85	79	77	70	(75)	77
	Care for immediate family	42	31	(36)	34	37	(45)	(42)	38
Total	Share money	79	87	89	81	75	78	73	80
	Offer hospitality	79	86	83	84	75	90	86	82
	Care for immediate family	48	30	45	33	39	68	50	43
Total weighted N:		269	145	90	158	194	92	107	1055

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category)

14) Questions no. 29 a, b and c.

The answers to the first two questions thus were overwhelmingly affirmative, while a considerable proportion of our respondents disagreed with the third one.<sup>15)</sup> The variations by ethnic group are not very pronounced, at least if one compares the results among the still largely traditional agricultural proletariats. The only minor exception are the Luo who showed a somewhat lower level of agreement with our first two statements.

This pattern is affected by the class position of our respondents. Here it becomes apparent that to offer hospitality even to more remote relatives still is accepted by most members of the agricultural bourgeoisie. To share one's cash income with them is, on the other hand, much less acceptable to this group. In contrast, in the non agricultural classes hospitality obviously becomes a greater problem (living under often quite crowded conditions in town), whereas the sharing of money with other family members, reflecting the continuing links between those living in town and their kin up-country, is agreed to more often. To "care only about one's immediate family" is also more widespread among the members of the agricultural bourgeoisie. In the non-agricultural classes this attitude is less common, again possibly reflecting the more symbiotic relationship between family members in town and in the rural areas.

Further controls show that the first item in particular is strongly related to the sex of our respondents (females stating much more often that money should be shared by all family members;  $r = 0.15$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Age and level of education, on the other hand, are factors which exercise relatively little independent influence on these attitudes.

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15) The inter-item correlations are 0.21 between the first two statements, 0.06 between the first and the third, and 0.17 between the second and the third one.



That family relations and the expectations put on better-off relatives can also become problematical, is revealed by some of the answers to our open-ended question probing for our respondents' biggest personal problem.<sup>16)</sup> There, a considerable number of middle and higher level employees and members of the non-agricultural bourgeoisie report that their family obligations are a heavy burden for them.

c.) Traditional Social Bonds:

The next level of social identification to be analyzed is that of the traditional social groupings within each ethnic community. We did not collect any attitudinal data in this respect, given the diversity of traditional social groups but more factual information concerning the actual clan ("ukoo" in our Swahili questionnaire) and age-set ("rika") membership of our respondents can be provided:<sup>17)</sup>

Table III, 13: Clan and age-set membership; by class and ethnic group:

Percentage being member of clan/age-set		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Agric. classes	Clan	100	100	78	100	93	100	100	96
	Age-set	46	8	18	42	--	100	100	41
Non-agric. classes	Clan	89	85	45	79	70	100	100	85
	Age-set	43	26	22	56	--	100	97	41
Total	Clan	95	97	76	93	89	100	100	93
	Age-set	45	12	19	48	--	100	99	41
Total weighted N:		254	153	96	136	178	80	108	1028

16) Question 39 a.

17) Questions 26 d and e, see also the respective chapters of Part II above.

Practically all of our agricultural Kikuyu, Kamba, Luyia, Luo, Kalenjin, and Maasai respondents thus are still aware of their clan membership and know their clan name. Among the Mijikenda, where a more mixed pattern of clans and lineages used to exist before, it was partially superseded by outside factors, this percentage is somewhat reduced. In the non-agricultural classes, however, knowledge of one's clan affiliation has decreased in all groups, except for the Kalenjin and Maasai. These two are also the only groups where age-set membership is still reported by almost all respondents. The Kikuyu and Luyia occupy an intermediate position in this regard (almost half of them still know the name of their age-set). This percentage has been drastically reduced for the Mijikenda and Kamba, reflecting the traditionally lower significance and the relatively early breakdown of this institution among them. The Luo did not have this form of social organization.

Age is the strongest positively correlated factor for both kinds of group membership ( $r = 0.11$ ,  $p < 0.001$  for clans, and  $r = 0.17$ ,  $p < 0.001$  for age-sets). Clan and age-set membership are also reported much more often by males ( $r = 0.07$  and  $0.12$  respectively), and by those living in the rural areas ( $r = 0.29$  and  $0.09$ ). The level of education of our respondents, on the other hand, is negatively correlated ( $r = 0.06$ ,  $p < 0.05$  for clan; and  $r = 0.08$ ,  $p < 0.01$  for age-set membership).

We attempted to assess the comparative importance of traditional leadership roles in an indirect manner. When we asked our respondents, whether they had gone to anyone recently seeking advice,<sup>18)</sup> about one fifth of those who had done so in our rural sample named a "respected person in the community" (one third named family members, one fourth friends and neighbors, and one eighth government officials such as

18) Question no. 22, cf. also question no. 109 by Lerner, Daniel, The Passing of Traditional Society, New York: The Free Press, 1958, pp. 431 f... The advice sought was related to economic and financial affairs for more than 40% of our respondents, about one quarter was concerned with personal or health problems, and about one fifth with educational matters.



local chiefs). In general, those with a higher level of education tend to seek advice more often. Those who had asked "respected persons" for advice tend to be in the lower educational categories and the more subsistence-oriented occupations. We could not discern any clear-cut differences between the various ethnic groups because the total number of respondents in each sub-category was rather small. What seems to be remarkable, however, is the fact that the category of "respected person" was not mentioned by any of our respondents in our urban sample ("family" and "friends and neighbors" with about 35%, and government officials, (15%) are the categories quoted most often). In both samples the number of politicians, (e.g. Members of Parliament, or KANU officials), who are mentioned as advisers, is negligible.

d.) Scope of Social Trust:

We then attempted to probe into the scope of social trust a person might have towards others by posing the question: "Some people say that most persons can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with other people. How do you feel about it? Can you trust most people, only a few people, or don't you trust anybody?"<sup>19)</sup> If the middle category was chosen, we probed further: "Would you say you trust only members of your family, only personal friends, only members of your age-group, only members of your clan, only members of your tribe, all Kenyans?"<sup>20)</sup> The answers to this middle category reveal some interesting distinctions between the different ethnic groups; these are shown in the following table:

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Insert Table III, 14, Restricted scopes of trust;

19) Question no. 23.

20) Only the first answer was recorded in each case, multiple responses were not provided for.

Table III, 14: Restricted scopes of trust; by ethnic group:

Percentage who trust only	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Family members	26	43	57	56	26	35	37	39
Personal friends	40	46	29	25	42	19	11	32
Members of age-group	2	1	--	1	5	11	21	6
Members of clan	5	--	3	4	4	5	4	4
Members of tribe	5	4	11	7	4	15	12	7
All Kenyans	22	6	--	7	19	15	15	13
Weighted N:	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	112	82	28	102	79	62	73	538

As might have been expected, family members and friends are thought to be most trustworthy in all groups. In comparison, other traditional kinships structures such as, the "clan", do not play any significant role. Only for the Maasai and, to a lesser extent, the Kalenjin do other traditional social structures such as "age-sets" still prove to be very important. Trust towards all members of one's "tribe" is also rare; only the Kalenjin seem to put somewhat more emphasis on this aspect.<sup>21)</sup> The possibility "all Kenyans" on the other hand, was chosen, perhaps after some second thoughts, by a small but not very divergent percentage of all groups, and it seems that the respondents in this category can more or less be grouped with those trusting "most people" except perhaps for some stronger feeling of suspicion towards expatriates among

21) It is likely, however, that the term "tribe" in our question was understood by most of them to refer to the different sub-groups, as, e.g. the Nandi, Keyo etc., and not to "the Kalenjin" as a whole. The same is probably true for the "Mijikenda" and "Maasai" who come next in this respect.



them. When we control for a number of independent factors possibly influencing this attitude it becomes apparent that urban residence and a higher level of education tend to weaken traditional attachments (e.g. trusting only members of one's family, clan, age-set or tribe) and that, instead, personal friends or "all Kenyans" are trusted more often.<sup>22)</sup>

At the most general level, too, the existence of feelings of social trust shows some interesting differences among Kenya's ethnic groups. In addition to the more general question already quoted above, we probed for two somewhat more specific aspects: "Speaking generally, would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves", and "Do you think that most people are trying to take advantage of you, if they get the chance, or would they try to be fair."<sup>23)</sup> The combined answers to these questions are as follows:

22) The exact percentages are:

Respondents with	Trusting only: family members	personal friends
no formal education	22	14
primary "	18	16
secondary "	17	23
rural residence	21	15
urban "	11	20

23) Questions no. 24 a and b, these are somewhat similar to those employed by Morris Rosenberg in his "Faith in People" - scale, cf. his "Misanthropy and Political Ideology" in: American Sociological Review, XXI, pp. 690 - 695; and "Misanthropy and Attitudes Toward International Affairs", in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, I (1957), pp. 340 - 345. The associations between these questions were rather strong in our survey, too (a value of gamma of 0.24 for questions 23 a and 24 a, and a value of - 0.12 for questions 23a and 24 b). We did not attempt, however, to construct a separate coherent scale in this regard.

Table III, 15: Aspects of general social trust; by ethnic group:

Percentage who trust	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Most people	32	40	51	22	31	24	14	31
Only few people	53	45	31	68	48	67	63	53
Nobody	15	15	18	10	21	9	23	16
Percentage who think that people:								
Help others	29	45	23	40	20	36	10	29
Look out for themselves	71	55	77	60	80	64	90	71
Take advantage	74	65	68	53	71	37	51	63
Are fair	26	35	32	47	29	63	49	37
Weighted N: (including missing data)	275	156	96	158	194	92	103	1079

It seems to be remarkable, that our Maasai respondents showed the lowest level of general trust and have by far the highest percentage of those who think that most people are inclined to look out for themselves. As we have seen above, this attitude prevails not only towards outsiders, but, to a large extent, towards members of their own ethnic group as well. The Kikuyu and Luo are next among those who indicated high levels of distrust. The Luyia and Kalenjin seem to be most discriminating as to whom they trust (choosing the middle category most often), but their specific suspicion that others take advantage of them is somewhat lower than that of the groups already mentioned. In the case of the Kalenjin an attitude of fairness is expected to prevail even by a clear majority of our respondents, the only group to do so in our sample. The Kamba showed, relatively speaking,



the highest levels of trust in a rather consistent manner, while the findings for the Mijikenda (the highest percentage of "general trust", but rather low scores on the other two items) are somewhat ambiguous. Taken altogether, an attitude of general social trust was expressed by somewhat less than a third of our respondents. If the results in the study by Almond and Verba, who probe for a similar attitude, are reliable, this places the population in our sample distinctly below that of the United States or the United Kingdom, for example, but far above that of Italy and still somewhat above that of Mexico.<sup>24)</sup>

When we introduced a number of controls, it turned out that the level of education and place of residence influence the degree of social trust most strongly across all ethnic groups. The higher the level of education the more discriminating were our respondents (62% of those with secondary education choosing the middle category of question 23 compared to 48% for the illiterates); the number of those "trusting nobody" increased as well (from 15 to 20%). In town the level of distrust is also much higher (25% "trusting nobody") than in the country-side (14%). These results are rather consistent for all ethnic groups, the differences between them tend to disappear in the urban setting. Other factors which might potentially affect this attitude, e.g. sex, age, or religion did not prove to be significant when we checked their influence within each ethnic group.

e.) Ethnic Identity:

In our search for distinct levels of social identification we now come to the level of ethnic (or "tribal")<sup>25)</sup> identity.

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24) Cf. Almond and Verba, op. cit., p.213

25) For a discussion of this term see also footnote 15 in Part I, chapter 2 above. The "tribal element in the modern era" is also discussed, for example in some of the contributions to the volume edited by Gulliver, P. H. (ed.), Tradition and Transition in East Africa, London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1969

As we pointed out in the preceding part, none of the present main ethnic groups in Kenya constituted a single coherent social and political unit in the past.<sup>26)</sup> There are, however, some remarkable differences in the degree of cohesion and homogeneity which traditionally existed in these societies and a certain rank-order can be established in this respect. Thus it can probably be said that the Kikuyu and Kamba, despite regional variations, traditionally showed the greatest degree of social unity. Next are the Maasai and Luo, who, despite consisting of distinct "sub-tribes" in the past, demonstrate a great measure of cultural similarity and who have always been known to members of these groups themselves and to outsiders by a common "tribal" name. They are followed by the Mijikenda and Abaluyia who are composed of still rather distinct sub-groups and who have come to be known by a common designation only in the relatively recent past. The least coherent group, finally, are the "Kalenjin" who comprise people showing a considerable cultural variety and great differences in their dominant modes of production. Their common name also is the most recent and, quite clearly, the most artificial one.

All these groups, however, have developed a certain measure of "ethnic identity" and they are perceived as distinct comprehensive social units at least in their relationships towards each other. In this sense "tribalism" must be seen and understood as a modern phenomenon operating in a new social and political context and not merely as an atavistic feature. Thus it is not surprising that feelings of ethnic identity have persisted and in some cases even increased in modern urban environments, for example,<sup>27)</sup> and that ethnic

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26) See the respective sections in Part II above.

27) Cf., e.g., the studies by Mitchell, James C., Tribalism and the Plural Society, London: Oxford University Press, 1960; and Southall, Aidan (ed.), Social Change in Modern Africa, London: Oxford University Press, 1960.



groups still constitute the most "natural" social unit with which people identify when they are acting in certain competitive situations. The degree of ethnic identity shown by each group and the loyalties which are invoked in any particular situation depend however very much on the actual circumstances. If "tribalism" is understood in this way, it is not only an "evil power" which causes nepotism, corruption and a great deal of social strife, but it is also, to a certain extent, a constructive force, the effects of which have to be assessed quite realistically in a larger "pluralistic" social and political setting.<sup>28)</sup> When no feelings of superiority or dominance are implied, the particular identity and heritage of each group can become a valuable factor enriching the cultural diversity of a "nation" as a whole.

Again our "measuring devices" assessing the degree of ethnic identity of each group are somewhat inadequate, but at least some preliminary insights can be gained from the answers to one of the items in our survey: "I cannot imagine to be anything else than a ..." (The ethnic group of the respondent had to be inserted here by the interviewer).<sup>29)</sup> The strongest agreement was expressed by our Kamba respondents (more than 85%), while the rest did not diverge greatly from the mean of almost 70%. This sense of ethnic identity among the Kamba, if we can interpret it as such, remains at a consistently high level, even after several controls (age, sex, level of education, religion, occupation and social "class" of our respondents) have been imposed. In all ethnic groups this variable is most strongly influenced by the level of education of our respondents (diminishing from a high of 76%

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28) For a similar point of view cf., e.g. also Lewis, I.M. "Nationalism, Urbanism and Tribalism in Contemporary Africa", Proceedings of the Meeting of the East African Academy, held in Kampala, September, 1966 (Mimeo), partly reprinted in Gertzel, Cherry et al (eds.) Government and Politics in Kenya, loc. cit., pp. 51 f..

29) Item no. 14 of question 40.

among illiterates to 67% for those with primary education and 57% for those with some secondary schooling) and the place of residence (those in the urban areas ranking consistently lower in their expression of ethnic identity, than their rural counterparts, 56% compared to 71%), Affiliation to one of the "African Independent" churches rather than to one of the missions, and the social class of our respondents (e.g. proletaroid subsistence farmers ranking higher than the progressive "agricultural bourgeoisie")<sup>30)</sup> also influence this attitude, while sex or age do not have any independent effect on our results. All these findings are more or less in line with various previous hypotheses of social changes.<sup>31)</sup>

Another measure employed in our study, a scale of "social distance", sheds additional light on a different aspect of ethnic identity. While its main thrust was directed at analysing particular aspects of inter- ethnic relations,<sup>32)</sup> it opens some interesting insights into the degree of ethnocentrism of each group as well. When we add up the mean scores of the members of each group indicating the "distance" they expressed towards the other peoples we are able to construct an index which reflects to a certain extent the intensity of social identification one has with one's own ethnic group. The scores obtained in this way are reported in the following table:<sup>33)</sup>

Insert Table III, 17:

- 30) For this terminology see also Part I above.
- 31) Cf., e.g., Geertz, Clifford, "The Integrative Revolution- Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in New States", in: idem (ed.), Old Societies and New States, New York: The Free Press, 1963; But these should be regarded as being only supplementary to others which emphasize the possibility of continuing or even increasing conflicts along "commercial" lines. Cf., e.g., Melson, Robert and Wolpe, Howard, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective", in: American Political Science Review, vol. LXIV, No. 4, December 1970, pp. 1112 - 1130.
- 32) See chapter 5 on this part below.
- 33) These are based on the answers to our Bogardus-type "social distance-scale" (question 32), see also our "Methodological Appendix" below.



Table III,17: Self-centeredness of ethnic groups:

	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.
Average mean of social distance towards all other groups	1,2	0,8	1,1	1,0	1,2	1,8	2,2

This pattern remains significant even after we introduce a number of controls. We think that these results should be considered supplemental to our other findings, rather than contradictory or reinforcing, because a high sense of tribal identity may very well coincide with a low expression of social "exclusiveness", as seems to be the case with the Kamba, for example. The Kalenjin and the Maasai, on the other hand, show a rather high degree of "ethnocentrism", provided this term is not used with its aggressive and negative connotations,<sup>34)</sup> but rather as a strong expression of and preference for social relations centering around one's own ethnic group.

f.) Religious Affiliations:

One social bond which potentially can transcend traditional communal ties and ethnic identities is membership in a religious community. While traditionally in Kenya, as well as in most other parts of Africa, the particular characteristics of a person's religious beliefs coincided with those of his ethnic group,<sup>35)</sup> church organizations today are cut across the different peoples, and also create divisions within them. This spread of "modern" religious groups, however, is still rather uneven. Most of the pastoralist peoples, for example,

34) Cf., e.g. Adorno et al., op. cit.

35) See also the sections on traditional belief systems in Part II above.

have been left out so far, and some religious communities are heavily concentrated in certain regions and among ethnic groups. Muslims among some of the Mijikenda peoples and other groups living in the coastal area for instance. Nevertheless, distinctions between religious communities have emerged which are independent of the ethnic origin of their members and which have led to special group identifications. Our means of assessing the magnitude of such feelings may not be very accurate, but as was the case with the expressions of ethnic identity, at least some clues to religious exclusiveness can be gained from answers to our "social distance" scale.<sup>36)</sup> The average mean scores of social distance expressed towards members of other religious groups thus indicate a certain degree of "self-centeredness" for each group:

Table III,17: Self-centeredness of religious groups:

	Catholics	Anglicans	African Independents	Other Christians	Muslims	Respondents with no formal religion
Average mean of social distance towards all other religious groups	0,9	0,7	0,8	0,8	1,0	1,4

The scores here are generally lower than those found for ethnicity, which confirms the more general observation that religious divisions are, at least as yet, of relatively little importance in Kenya's society although some political divisions based on religion exist within certain ethnic groups.<sup>37)</sup>

36) Cf. the section of question 32 relating to religious groups. Some aspects of the actual content of the religious beliefs of our respondents are discussed in the next chapter below.

37) Cf., e.g., the discussion of Nandi politics in The Weekly Review, and the letters to the editor on this topic, particularly in the issues of February 14, 21 and 28, 1977.



This in contrast, for example, to neighboring Uganda, not to speak of religiously quite strongly divided countries such as the Netherlands and Germany or, India, Lebanon and Ireland. The relatively high score for those with no formal religion can be explained to a large extent by the coincidence of this feature with a high sense of ethnic self-centeredness, particularly among our Maasai respondents. The differences among the other religious communities show tendencies towards greater or lesser exclusiveness; the slightly higher figure for Catholics (compared to members of the "Protestant" churches) and the even higher score for Muslims can be taken as indications of this fact.

When we control for ethnic group, level of education, sex, age, and social class, it turns out that ethnic affiliation is the strongest factor influencing the distance of our respondents from members of other religious groups (explaining almost one fifth of the variance for practically all scores.<sup>38)</sup> The differences by religion within each ethnic group, and the ethnic differences in each religious group remain significant, indicating the independent strength of both factors. Education, another significant factor, shows a curvilinear relationship: Those having a medium (i.e., in our case, primary) level of education showed the least distance; those with secondary education became somewhat more discriminating; those with no formal education at all showed most discrimination. Males showed considerably less distance towards members of other religions than females. Age and social class, on the other hand, hardly influenced this attitude.

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38) For example a value of  $\eta^2$  squared of 0.18 for our score for Catholics.

40) See also our discussion of different "structural" approaches to the analysis of the social bases of politics and our outline of the "class pattern" we employ in this study in Part I above.

g.) Class Consciousness:

The most important factor cutting across ethnic and other communal ties in modern societies is membership in a social "class", which is characterized by common interests and aspects of life-style. While problems of social inequality have been discussed by political theorists of all times, it was, of course, Karl Marx who employed the notion of class. He emphasized the dynamics resulting from different patterns of class interactions in the course of economic and social developments as a central explanatory concept in his theory of political development and in his philosophy of history as a whole.<sup>39)</sup> Today much literature deals with the concept of "class" and problems of social stratification in general, stressing definitions based on different objective and subjective factors and different methods of empirical investigation. For our purposes we prefer to employ the notion of class in its "objective" meaning based on the differential access to the ownership of the means of production and authoritative decision-making power over them.<sup>40)</sup> The question,

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39) Marx formulated his basic axiom most succinctly in the preface to his Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie: "In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society - the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness". First published 1859, English translation from Feuer, Lewis S. (ed.), Marx and Engels, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, New York: Anchor Books, 1959, p. 43, our emphasis.

40) See also our discussion of different "structural" approaches to the analysis of the social bases of politics and our outline of the "class pattern" we employ in this study in Part I above.



however, whether persons who objectively belong to a certain class (i.e. who in Marx' term form a "class in itself") actually are conscious of this fact and act on this basis in a solidaristic manner (i.e. constitute a "class for itself") is an empirical problem; it cannot be resolved a priori by merely calling all discrepancies between objective conditions and subjective sentiments a "false consciousness". At least in short term analyses subjective interpretations of existence have to be considered a factor potentially as important as objective interests in determining political actions, no matter whether the first or the second is held to be the original and independent variable.

Thus we are faced with the difficult task of assessing feelings of class consciousness and potential solidaritiy in a meaningful and empirical way. This poses even greater problems than in the case of ethnic or other communal identifications, because it cannot be assumed that the units of such an analysis existed except in some very rudimentary form in the minds of our respondents prior to our own investigation. Thinking in terms of belonging to the "lower middle class", "upper class" etc.<sup>41)</sup> is alien to African tradition. A self-assessment given in response to a questionnaire phrased in these terms cannot solve the original dilemma of determining the subjective sentiments of members of objectively identified social groups. We, therefore, probed for class identification indirectly. When we stratify the answers of respondents according to objectively determined class criteria some interesting differences both within and among the ethnic groups become apparent. While the influence of "class" as an independent factor is considered in the analysis of all the variables in this study we limit our discussion at this place

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41) See also our discussion of different "structural" approaches to the analysis of the social bases of politics and our outline of the "class pattern" we employ in this study in Part I above.

to questions related most directly to respondents' perceptions of their economic position in Kenyan society and their life chances as a whole.

At the most general level, the statement "labor gets a fair share of what it produces"<sup>42)</sup> reveals some interesting differentiations according to the social class of our respondents:<sup>43)</sup>

	Non-	Agric.	Sal-	Pro-	Sub-	Stu-	Un-
Agree	(73)	80	58	59	72	57	62
Dis-	(27)	18	42	40	(28)	37	38
Don't know	--	(2)	--	(1)	--	(6)	2
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Insert Table III, 18:

42) Item 37 of question 40.

- 43) For our conceptual definition of this term see Part I above. For the classification of our respondents we employed the following operational definitions:
- "capitalists": self-employed businessmen, large-scale farmers, monthly income of Kshs. 3,000,-- and above;
  - "state class": high ranking officials in the public service, income of Kshs. 1601,-- and above;
  - "non-agricultural bourgeoisie": self-employed businessmen and craftsmen, income of Kshs. 801,-- to 3,000,--;
  - "agricultural bourgeoisie": small-scale cash-crop farmers cultivating more than 5 acres;
  - "salariat": employed "white collar"-workers, income of Kshs. 401,-- and above;
  - "proletariat": all employed "blue collar"-workers and other employees earning less than Kshs. 400,--;
  - "non-agricultural proletaroids": all self-employed businessmen and craftsmen earning less than Kshs. 800,--;
  - "agricultural proletaroids": subsistence-farmers, pastoralists, cash-crop farmers with less than 5 acres;
  - "sub-proletariat": urban unemployed.



Table III, 18: "Labor gets fair share; by class<sup>44)</sup>:"

Percentage who	Non-agric. bourg.	Agric. bourg.	Salariat	Proletariat	Non-agric. proletaroids	Agric. proletaroids	Sub-proletariat	Students	Total
Agree	(73)	80	58	59	72	57	65	66	62
Disagree	(27)	18	42	40	(28)	37	35	34	36
Don't know	--	(2)	--	(1)	--	(6)	--	--	2
N:	100 11	100 60	100 60	100 114	100 25	100 187	100 54	100 35	100 546

(Numbers in parentheses indicate a N of less than 10 respondents in a particular sub-category)

The members of both the non-agricultural and agricultural bourgeoisie and the self-employed non-proletaroids thus showed the highest level of agreement on this issue. Respondents belonging to the proletariat, salariat, or the agricultural proletaroids, on the other hand, tended to disagree with this statement much more often. The number of those who answered "don't know" is highest among the agricultural proletaroids.

44) The low number of members of the "capitalist" and the "state classes" in our sample did not warrant their inclusion here. In Kenya's society as a whole these groups only constitute a very small fraction. We did not oversample this category, however, because we are more interested at this place in the "mass" aspects of Kenya's political culture. For the exact specification of our sample see also the "Methodological Appendix" below.

All these results seem to conform with generally held expectations concerning the functions and relative value of labor in these classes. This pattern remains largely consistent, even after imposing a number of controls, e.g. as to age, sex, etc. A differentiation by ethnic groups, reveals that this pattern of class stratification is significant only within the Kikuyu, Mijikenda and Luyia groups, and not among the Kamba, Luo, Kalenjin or Maasai. The Kikuyu and Luyia show the most remarkable differences between the "agricultural bourgeoisie" (89% and 92% agreeing) and the agricultural proletarioids (46% and 57% agreeing). In addition, the pattern of stratification among the Kikuyu is characterized by relatively strong pronouncements by the salariat and proletariat (only 46 and 51% agreeing respectively). The Luo are rather low in all classes (between 45 and 50% agreeing).

When we asked the more specific question, "some people think that business firms make too much money while not paying enough to their workers, others think that they pay fair wages and make a fair profit. What is your opinion?"<sup>45)</sup> more or less the same relative class positions prevailed (although, in absolute terms, the number of those who said that firms do not pay enough was much higher than those who disagreed with the previous statement):

Insert Table III, 19:

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45) Question no. 35 c.



Table III.19: Acceptance of wages and profits; by class

Percentage who	Non-agric. bourg.	Agric. bourg.	Sala-riat	Pro-leta-riat	Non-agric. prole-taroids	Agric. prole-taroids	Sub-pro-le-tari-at	Stu-dents	To-tal
think firms pay not enough	(22)	58	66	66	52	58	43	59	58
think firms pay fair wages	(67)	39	31	30	(32)	28	43	41	33
Don't know	(11)	(3)	(3)	(4)	(16)	(14)	(14)	--	9
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N:	9	59	61	116	25	174	56	32	532

(Numbers in parentheses indicate a N of less than 10 respondents in a particular sub-group)

Our controls also work in the same direction as before: In ethnic terms class stratification remains significant only within the Kikuyu and Luyia groups. Within classes ethnic differences maintain their importance among members of the agricultural bourgeoisie and the agricultural proletaroids. In each case the observed variations tend to support our preceding remarks.

Another question relating to a basic feature of Kenya's economic system ("Should property in land be communal, that is belong to a tribe, a whole village, the government or a larger group of people, or private, that is belong to one person or one family only")<sup>46)</sup> did not reveal the expected

46) Question no. 35 b.

distinctions according to the social class of our respondents. Across all classes approximately two thirds of all respondents are in favor of private land ownership. In terms of ethnic affiliations, however, some basic differences become apparent:

Table III,20: Preferred form of land ownership; by class and ethnic group

Percentages in favor of		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Agric. bourgeoisie	Communal land ownership	22	--	--	42	(38)	54	(25)	34
	Private	78	(100)	(100)	58	50	46	56	63
	Don't know	--	--	--	--	(12)	--	(19)	(3)
Agric. proletaroids	Communal	14	13	26	46	32	64	50	30
	Private	83	79	73	49	55	36	46	64
	Don't know	(3)	8	(1)	(5)	13	--	(4)	6
Non-agric. classes	Communal	22	32	(14)	24	38	(25)	(25)	26
	Private	78	65	86	73	59	75	(67)	72
	Don't know	--	(3)	--	(3)	(3)	--	(8)	(2)
Total	Communal	19	17	23	36	34	51	44	30
	Private	80	76	76	61	56	49	50	66
	Don't know	(1)	7	(1)	(3)	10	--	(6)	4
Total weighted N:		275	156	96	158	194	108	92	1079

(Numbers in paranthese indicate an N of less than 10 respondents a particular sub-category)



The Kikuyu, Kamba and Mijikenda clearly stand out in their preference of private land ownership, while the Luyia and Luo take an intermediate position and the Kalenjin and Maasai are split rather equally on this issue.<sup>47)</sup> This is in line with what would have been expected from our discussion of the diverging economic traditions of these groups and their differential development in recent decades.<sup>48)</sup> Within the ethnic groups differences between the two main agricultural classes also are significant. While the variations in the first five groups are not really outstanding (the differences for the Kamba and Mijikenda are based on a very small N for members of the agricultural bourgeoisie), the pattern for the Kalenjin and Maasai (who, taken altogether, showed the highest preference for communal ownership) seems to lend support to the proposition that economic modernization (at least under present economic and political circumstances in Kenya) works towards a greater acceptance of private land ownership in agricultural production.

That a rural "capitalism" of this kind (if it can be labeled as such) should not run completely unabated, however, is clearly expressed in the response to our next question: "Do you think people should be allowed to own as much land as they can afford or no more than they themselves can cultivate?"<sup>49)</sup> The response is quite similar for all classes and almost two thirds of the respondents stated that people should not be allowed to own more land than they can cultivate themselves. Between ethnic groups some differences persist, however, confirming to a certain extent our previous observations:

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47) This question, perhaps, should have been modified referring to private or communal ownership of cattle for the pastoralists among our respondents in order to see their position towards private property of their means of production more clearly.

48) See Part II, section b of each chapter above.

49) Question no. 35 a.

Table III,21: Percentage favoring limitation of land ownership; by class and ethnic group:

		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Agric. proletarioids	Unrestricted ownership	42	51	49	20	33	(27)	22	37
	Restricted	51	46	41	65	67	46	54	53
	Don't know	(7)	(3)	(10)	(15)	---	(27)	24	10
Agric. bourgeoisie	Unrestricted	50	(50)	(100)	50	(25)	39	(19)	43
	Restricted	50	(50)	--	50	75	61	62	55
	Don't know	--	--	--	--	--	--	(19)	(2)
Non-agric. classes	Unrestricted	29	41	(64)	22	30	37	(11)	31
	Restricted	69	59	(36)	73	70	63	(89)	67
	Don't know	(2)	--	--	(5)	--	--	--	(2)
Total+)	Unrestricted	37	48	54	28	32	34	21	35
	Restricted	60	50	38	64	68	56	59	59
	Don't know	(3)	(2)	(8)	8	--	(10)	20	6
Total weighted N:		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

+) Including students

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category)

Thus, those groups who are most in favor of private land-ownership (i.e. the Kikuyu, Kamba and Mijikenda) also tend to be for the unrestricted individual acquisition of land, while the others support this idea to a much lesser extent. The position among the Kikuyu and Luyia seems to depend most strongly on the social class of our respondents, which again lends support to some of our earlier remarks concerning these groups (the number of members of the agricultural bourgeoisie among the Mijikenda in our sample really is too small to warrant any meaningful differentiations).



If we attempt to sum up these findings we can say that opinions on certain key issues relating to the over-all social and economic order reflect objectively determined "class" differences. Sentiments expressed by the proletariat the agricultural bourgeoisie and the agricultural proletarioids differ from those in other "classes". Within ethnic groups class differentiations are most pronounced among the Kikuyu and the Luyia (among the latter these coincide to a certain extent with variations between the more densely populated areas and the less populated parts, as among the Bukusu). The fact that answers to different questions put at different points in the interviews, more or less, tend to support each other, can perhaps be interpreted to establish a certain "construct validity"<sup>50)</sup> The findings do not demonstrate that an actual class consciousness or class solidarity exists among those in the objective categories that would make them true "classes in and for themselves". But at least some latent and significant contrasts can be shown to exist between members of the various categories based on objective differences in interest, which can lead to the emergence of actual conflict groups in the future. The chance of this happening depends on their ability to organize themselves on this basis and to actually employ their conflict potentials.<sup>51)</sup> Opportunities in this regard seem to be best for the urban proletariat and the agricultural bourgeoisie who have already organized themselves to a certain extent (in trade unions, marketing societies etc.), and who through their links with the national and international economy (e.g. as producers of major export crops) possess a considerable conflict potential. The position of the agri-

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50) For the use of this term cf., e.g., Nunnally, Jum C., Psychometric Theory, New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1967, pp. 83 ff..

51) The notions of "Organisationsfähigkeit" (ability to organize) and "Konfliktfähigkeit" (the ability to employ the actual conflict potential of a class) have been discussed, for example, by Offe, Claus, "Politische Herrschaft und Klassenstrukturen. Zur Analyse spätkapitalistischer Gesellschaftssysteme", in: Kress, Gisela and Senghaas, Dieter (eds.), Politikwissenschaft, Frankfurt/Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1969, pp. 155 - 189.

cultural proletarioids, on the other hand, is somewhat more dubious. There is probably truth in Marx' characterization that a landholding peasantry based on subsistence agriculture is basically non-revolutionary.<sup>52)</sup> He himself has shown, however, in the same study that such a peasantry can nevertheless become a significant political factor when its sympathies are aroused by a skillful populist leader, or, as seems to be the situation in Kenya, when its solidarity is activated not on a class but on an ethnic basis in situations where ethnic groups as a whole and not the classes within them are perceived as the relevant conflict groups. The future dynamics of this situation will depend to a large extent on actual economic developments in the coming years and decades and the relative improvement or deterioration of the life chances of each group.<sup>53)</sup>

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52) Marx' most famous statement in this regard is contained in his Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, first published in 1852:

"The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse ... Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it itself directly produces the major part of its consumption, and thus acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society... In this way the great mass of the ... nation is formed by simple additions of homologous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes. In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests, and their culture from those of the other classes and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants and the identity of their interests begets no community, no national bond, and no political organization among them, they do not form a class". Translation from Feuer (ed.), loc. cit., pp. 338 f., our omissions.

53) Cf. also our paper on "Entwicklungstendenzen der Klassenstruktur in Kenia", presented to the committee on the politics of the developing areas of the German Political Science Association in Frankfurt/Main, April 1978 (unpublished manuscript).



h.) National Identity:

Our final unit of identity is that of the "nation-state". In the course of a long development which culminated in Europe in the 19th century this kind of social community became the prototype which political leaders everywhere emulated. In some parts of the world its scope is again beginning to be transcended by an even larger unit (like, possibly, a federation of European states); in other regions the very step of achieving this kind of national integration is yet to be taken and constitutes a matter of foremost concern. At the same time, it has been increasingly realized that while some of the "objective" factors once thought essential to the process of nation-building, (such as a common economy, common ethnic origin, or common language) may greatly facilitate the establishment of a larger community, they are not in themselves sufficient to account for such a development. In the last analysis, it is the "spiritual" unit, the sharing of certain positive affective and evaluative attitudes towards a common object, the nation, which is the ultimate criterion for the definition of nationhood.<sup>54)</sup> A psychological factor, which may be involved in this process, is a certain "need to identify" either with a social group as a whole or with a particular political leader, which may be the result of a personal or social insecurity which causes "people to feel a deep need to be bound to others, to escape the sense of individual isolation".<sup>55)</sup> The nation-state is one of the objects with which such an identification has most commonly been made at least at a certain stage of economic and political development.

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54) We have given a short account of this problem, mostly referring to the Kenyan case, in our article on "Die Problematik des 'nation-building' in Afrika", Internationales Afrika Forum, July/August 1968, pp. 457 ff..

55) Pye, Lucian W., Politics, Personality and Nation Building, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, p. 5.

In the case of most Sub-Saharan African countries the creation of "workable" modern political and economic units has been made all the more difficult by the fact that most of the boundaries between them were drawn by the colonial powers, often dividing existing ethnic communities and grouping together others which had little or no relation with each other in the past. The borders of the present state of Kenya, for example cut through the Maasai peoples in the south, divide sub-groups of the Abaluyia, Karamojong and Turkana in the west and separate parts of the Somali-speaking peoples in the north-east.<sup>56)</sup> Nevertheless, the declared policy of the "Organization of African Unity" (OAU) has been strictly adhered to so far namely not to open this "Pandora's box" of pre-colonial ethnic allegiances again, which could lead to a complete re-drawing of the map of this continent, but also in the very process of doing so, to utter chaos and misery. This was most dramatically shown in the cases of threatening secessions in Zaire and Nigeria, for instance.

In most cases the existing states and their boundaries have been accepted by a majority of the population living within them and the existing administrative structures have developed a sufficient momentum of their own to keep them going. This does not mean, however, that largely homogeneous "nations" in the somewhat idealized sense of European 19th century nationalism have actually emerged. Even there Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were important exceptions to this. In most cases it seems to be a more pragmatic, matter-of-fact acceptance of a given administrative and economic unit, to which there are few if any workable alternatives today. Any sense of "national identity" which may be expressed and which centered around certain modern economic, political or other achievements of the new country thus has to be seen in this somewhat more "realistic" light. Sub-"national" identities, such as those described in the preceding sections, persist in

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56) See also Part I above.



most cases often in conjunction with some forms of attachment to the new nation, but they sometimes create conflicts between "national" and ethnic loyalties, which, it seems, most often still tend to be resolved in favor of the latter.

When we asked the respondents in our survey, "As a Kenyan, what are some of the things in this country you are particularly proud of?",<sup>57)</sup> we obtained the following results: Almost 30% mentioned the attainment of independence ("uhuru") and the political stability and leadership of the country, about one fifth referred to the economic and social achievements of the post-independence years, and a slightly smaller percentage named the beauty of the countryside. More than a quarter of our respondents, on the other hand, stated that there is nothing they are particularly proud of.

This general picture becomes even more revealing when we stratify the answers according to the ethnic group of our respondents:

Table III, 22: Objects of national pride; by ethnic group:

<u>Percentage proud of</u>	<u>Kik.</u>	<u>Kam.</u>	<u>Mij.</u>	<u>Luy.</u>	<u>Luo</u>	<u>Mal.</u>	<u>Maas.</u>	<u>Tot.</u>
Political achievements	41	29	13	36	16	27	13	28
Social + economic	22	15	23	30	21	25	8	21
Natural environment	20	12	15	10	9	31	32	17
Other	6	14	16	1	7	7	3	7
Nothing	11	30	33	23	47	10	44	27
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

57) Question no. 38 a, cf. also Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 64 ff..

As is readily apparent, political achievements are most often stressed by the Kikuyu, the country's dominant and politically most active group. Social and economic achievements are highlighted among the Luyia, whereas the Kalenjin and Maasai most often emphasize the beauty of the natural environment. The Kamba and Mijikenda do not rank very high on any of these scores and almost one third of them reported that there is nothing in particular to be proud of. The lack of pride of almost half the Maasai and Luo is even more striking. While the figure for the Maasai can most probably be attributed to their more general "parochialism" <sup>58)</sup> the score for the Luo seems to be an indication of their genuine disenchantment with central political institutions in Kenya and the relative isolation and alienation they have suffered in the wake of the assassination of Tom Mboya, the banning of the KPU and the detention of its most influential leaders. <sup>59)</sup>

These different ethnic characteristics remain highly significant even after a number of controls. A higher level of education, "higher" social class and urban residence tend to cause a decrease, however, in the number of those who are not proud of anything (most dramatically in the case of those with some secondary education, where this figure drops to only 11% compared to 41% for illiterates). Answers mentioning the natural environment or some other object remain rather stable, but those referring to social and economic achievements (25% compared to 14%) or political achievements (37% compared to 18%) increase significantly. It is not quite clear whether these increases are merely due to the higher level of knowledge of these groups or whether they reflect a higher degree of an affective "national" attachment as well. The fact that "political achievements" in particular are mentioned so much more often by these groups may perhaps lend support to the latter interpretation.

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58) See also chapters 4 and 5 of this part below.

59) See also Part I above.



In order to probe the reverse of this attitude, we then asked: "What, if anything would you criticize in this country?"<sup>60)</sup> A cross-tabulation of this question with the preceding one results in the following picture:<sup>61)</sup>

Table III, 23: Persons proud and/or critical of their country, by ethnic group:

Percentage	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Proud/not critical	39	37	37	32	16	27	28	32
Not proud/critical	3	7	10	6	21	4	--	87
Proud/critical	52	40	39	47	39	65	28	46
Not proud/not critical	7	16	14	15	24	4	44	15
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	145	123	71	134	150	77	68	868

It can be seen, supporting our previous findings, that the percentage of those who are proud of their country without criticizing anything is highest among the Kikuyu, followed by the Kamba and the Mijikenda. The Luo again have by far the highest percentage of any group who are not proud of anything but who are critical of a number of aspects. The more general parochialism of the Maasai is confirmed by the fact that almost half of the respondents are not proud or critical of anything.

In conclusion, we can thus say that the levels of social identification form a characteristic pattern within each of the ethnic groups considered here. The Maasai, for example, show a high degree of self-esteem, are hospitable and helpful towards family members, but tend to restrict their support to their more immediate family. Traditional social bonds

60) Question no. 38 b.

61) The specific issues criticized by our respondents are discussed in chapter 4 of this part below.

of clan and, in particular, age-set membership, on the other hand, are still of great importance. The realm of trust is largely confined to groups within their own community; they are rather suspicious towards outsiders. Their expression of ethnic identity and ethnic "self-centeredness" is also rather high. In contrast, religious and class differentiations among them are not very pronounced and the feeling of a "national identity" is also still very low. The latter fact must probably be attributed to their more general "parochialism" and does not seem to be due to a disenchantment with present national politics, as is the case with the Luo, for instance.

The Kikuyu, at the other extreme, show about average scores for their expression of personal identity and the intensity and scope of their family relations. Traditional social bonds are of very little importance among them today. They are quite discriminating as to whom they trust, and make their judgements in this regard most often on a personal basis. Their expression of ethnic identity is also about average. Religious differentiations and, in particular, class differentiations among them are strong, a great majority of them favoring a more individualistic economic system. Their feeling of national identity and their pride in political achievements are the highest for any of the groups discussed here. This does not mean, however, that many are not critical of some aspects of Kenya's social and political life.

Each group can be characterized according to its average rank and its degree of differentiation for each of the variables. The difference between them will become even clearer when we look at other significant religious, economic and political features for each group.



### CHAPTER 3: RELIGIOUS AND ECONOMIC ATTITUDES

Traditional religious beliefs of each of the ethnic groups were outlined in the ethnographic section of this study. We shall now compare the beliefs which prevail among them today. Religious beliefs are among the most fundamental convictions of any person and form the bases of attitudes existing in the more secular, i.e. economic and political sphere. For more than a century now religious beliefs have been strongly influenced by the missionizing efforts of the established Christian churches. In some areas, by Islam and, in more recent years, by an increasing number of independent syncretistic sects and religious movements of indigenous origin. Still, a great number of the "converts" keep many of their old convictions or relate them to changing conditions in a new way. Thus, for example many traditional beliefs in magic and witchcraft have persisted among persons who at the same time profess to be devout Christians.

In this way these practices still constitute an important part of social reality and are even sometimes exploited today in commercial forms.

In the first part of this chapter we give results from that portion of the survey constructed to tap respondents' religious beliefs. We shall then relate them to some aspects of a more secular nature, such as the different forms and levels of time consciousness, but also possible "achievement" motivations. Subsequently other attitudes in the economic sphere will be explored, particularly as they are connected to the actual economic situation of our respondents and their expectations of future development in this regard.

3) Jahn, Johannes, *Opfer*, Düsseldorf: Dietrichs, 1938.

4) White, John S., *African Religions as Philosophy*, London: Heinemann, 1969.

5) Dr. Edgar A. Bruner, *Ästhetik der Religionswissenschaft*, 3 vols., Jübingen: G. B. Sch. 1955.

a.) Religiosity and worship:

African religious beliefs, particularly as they relate to conditions of contemporary social and economic life, still remain relatively unexplored. Most anthropological studies have been restricted to single ethnic groups and even there, except for a few path-breaking relatively recent works<sup>1)</sup>, the religious sphere has not been adequately dealt with. Attempts to characterize traditional African religious beliefs in a more general manner have been few and dubious. The works by Tempels<sup>2)</sup> and Jahn<sup>3)</sup>, for example, are sympathetic efforts of this kind, but are based on rather scant material and presented at a too far reaching level of generalization. A useful characterization of traditional Sub-Saharan African religions has been given by Mbiti<sup>4)</sup>, whose account rests both on his own personal experiences and a broad knowledge of the available comparative material, but he does not attempt to relate traditional African beliefs to more contemporary social problems. Thus, we do not have any comprehensive accounts so far of what Weber<sup>5)</sup> calls the "Wirtschaftsethik" (economic ethics), of African religions or of their "political ethic", e.g. the specific attitudes towards political authority which are fostered by these beliefs.

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- 1) Cf., e. g., Evans-Pritchard, E. E., Nuer Religion, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956; or Lienhardt, Godfrey, Divinity and Experience - The Religion of the Dinka, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961.
  - 2) Tempels, Placide, Bantu Philosophy, first published: Antwerpen, 1946.
  - 3) Jahn, Janheinz, Muntu, Düsseldorf: Diedrichs, 1958.
  - 4) Mbiti, John S., African Religions and Philosophy, London: Heinemann, 1969.
  - 5) Cf. Weber, Max, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, 3 vols., Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1920.



We do not pretend to be able to fill this gap in any way, not even for Kenyans. The subject deserves to be studied much more thoroughly. The survey data can serve as a basis for generating hypotheses for further and more detailed studies. In contrast to the emphasis put on traditional belief systems of Kenya's ethnic groups in the ethnographic sections, in most of the seven groups members of formal churches constitute by far the majority today. Almost 70% of Kenya's total population belong to some kind of Christian organization, another 6% are Muslims. The respective percentages for the ethnics groups considered in our study are even higher on the average, except for the still largely traditional Maasai and the other pastoralist groups among the Kalenjin<sup>6)</sup>.

Keeping Mbiti's assertion in mind that "Africans are notoriously religious"<sup>7)</sup>, it was our first concern to establish empirically the "level of religiosity" of different groups in our sample. Responding to our question "in guiding your actions everyday, do you personally find that your religious beliefs are very important, fairly important, or not very important?"<sup>8)</sup>, almost three-fourths of those interviewed attached a high importance to their religious beliefs. The exact distribution is shown in table III, 24:

sex of our respondents are not very pronounced. We also attempted to probe this attitude by the responses to three questions<sup>10)</sup>, which we used to construct a separate "index"<sup>11)</sup>. These included one item<sup>12)</sup> Insert table III, 24: uncertainty about man and his existence ("There are things in life men will never fully understand")<sup>12)</sup>, another one emphasizing divine sources of

6) See table II "Comparative data ..." above.

7) Mbiti, op. cit., p. 1.

8) Question 31 c.

10) Items 22, 23 and 41 of question 40.

11) For a discussion of "indices" and "scales" cf., e. g., Tabachnick, B. G., Survey Research Methods, Belmont: Wadsworth, 1973, pp. 254 f.

12) This item is somewhat similar to one employed in the original P-scale, Form 78 item no. 46, developed by Adorno et al., cf. ibid., pp. 226

Table III, 24: Importance attached to religious beliefs;  
by denomination 9)

Percentages proclaiming religious beliefs to be	Catho- lics	Angli- cans	African Indepen- dents	Other Christ- ians	Tradi- tio- nals	Mus- lims	Total
Very important	72	69	84	69	77	14	71
Fairly important	20	22	15	24	20	57	22
Not very impor- tant	8	9	1	7	3	29	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted	400	115	102	227	90	21	955
N:							

In particular, the high value for members of African Independent Churches seems to be remarkable, whereas the differences among members of the mission churches are not very great, the Muslims clearly having the lowest score. In terms of ethnic origin, the Maasai, a fourth of whom say that their religious beliefs are not very important, clearly stand out from the rest. The differences by social class, level of education, age, or sex of our respondents are not very pronounced.

We also attempted to probe this attitude by the responses to three questions<sup>10)</sup>, which we used to construct a separate "index"<sup>11)</sup>. These included one item expressing a general uncertainty about man and his existence ("There are things in life men will never fully understand")<sup>12)</sup>, another one emphasizing divine sources of

9) Because this question was put in connection with the church attendance of our respondents, only very few of the "traditionals" replied to it.

10) Items 22, 23 and 41 of question 40.

11) For a discussion of "indices" and "scales" cf., e. g., Babbie, Earl R., Survey Research Methods, Belmont: Wadsworth, 1973, pp. 254 f.

12) This item is somewhat similar to one employed in the original F-scale, Form 78 item no. 46, developed by Adorno et al., cf. idem, op. cit., p. 226



political legitimacy ("No matter how we like to talk about it, political authority comes not from us, but from some higher power"),<sup>13)</sup> and a third one on "ancestor worship", which highlights a specific element of traditional African religious beliefs ("It is very important to pay respect to one's ancestors"). We tentatively labelled this index, for lack of a better "common denominator", "religiosity", although we are well aware that religious feelings are more complex phenomena and have more dimensions than can be expressed by these three items.<sup>14)</sup>

The index reveals interesting differences which remain highly significant both as to the ethnic group and the religious affiliation of our respondents even after we introduced a number of controls:

Insert table III, 25

As is apparent in this table, the level of religiosity expressed by the index is particularly high among Catholics and members of "other Christian" churches (consisting mainly of a variety of Protestant missions). The scores of Anglicans, "African Independents" and "Traditionals", on the other hand, are considerably lower. The stratification by ethnic group shows that the Kikuyu stand out by far in their "religiosity", the other groups do not show very great deviations from the mean. Controls by age, sex, and level of education do not

13) This item is taken from McClosky's "conservatism"-scale, cf. McClosky, Herbert, "Conservatism and Personality", American Political Science Review, 1958, 52, pp. 27 - 45.

14) The construction of this index and its exact statistical properties are discussed in our "Methodological Appendix" below. Several "religiosity"-scales, which attempt to tap a greater number of dimensions, are discussed, for example, in Robinson and Shaver, op. cit., pp. 543 ff.. Most of these, however, are quite culture-bound, reflecting their usage in the United States, or, at least, in an entirely Christian setting.

Table III,25: Expression of "religiosity"

Expression of religiosity(%)		Kik.	Kan.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Catho- lics	Low	17	(20)	(50)	45	28	(11)	(9)	21
	Medium	25	30	(17)	26	33	47	(33)	31
	High	63	50	(33)	29	39	42	(58)	48
Angli- cans	Low	(31)	(31)	(75)	(6)	25	--	--	26
	Medium	(17)	53	(25)	(25)	47	--	--	38
	High	52	(16)	--	69	28	--	--	36
African Inde- pen- dents	Low	(6)	37	--	(33)	(5)	--	(20)	22
	Medium	(50)	24	--	(67)	(47)	--	(80)	40
	High	(44)	39	--	--	(48)	(100)	--	38
Other Chris- tians	Low	(9)	(20)	(33)	(15)	(26)	(23)	(7)	16
	Medium	31	65	(11)	27	(10)	77	86	36
	High	60	(15)	(56)	58	64	--	(7)	48
Mus- lims	Low	--	--	(17)	(29)	(50)	--	--	20
	Medium	--	(67)	40	(43)	(50)	--	--	38
	High	(100)	(33)	43	(28)	--	--	--	42
Tradi- tionals	Low	(5)	(50)	(14)	(50)	(33)	--	(18)	21
	Medium	47	(22)	45	(50)	(33)	(60)	44	42
	High	48	(28)	(41)	--	(34)	(40)	38	37
Total	Low	11	29	22	29	26	14	14	20
	Medium	29	36	37	31	33	48	44	35
	High	60	35	41	40	41	38	42	45
Total, weighted N:		263	150	93	156	191	86	108	1047

(Numbers in parentheses indicate a very small N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category)



reveal any remarkable variations. Non-agricultural occupation and urban residence, on the other hand, are factors which lead to a significantly higher level of expression of religiosity (5% in town scoring high compared to 41% in the country-side ( $r = 0.12$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). These latter results, which are contrary to what one would expect e.g. for members of long established churches in most European countries, show that a "secularization of beliefs is not, at least at the present stage in Kenya, a necessary concomitant of "modernity". Rather, in view of our data, the opposite conclusion, that the totality of missionizing efforts in Kenya has been a "modernizing" factor in itself seems to come nearer to the truth.<sup>15)</sup>

Both the level of "religiosity" as expressed by our survey data, and the rate of actual church attendance are quite high. The latter is certified by available official statistics,<sup>16)</sup> but is also quickly apparent to the casual observer who happens to watch the large congregations of religious groups on Sundays or other days of religious importance. In our survey, three-fourth of the respondents who are members of religious organizations stated that they go to their place of religious worship at least once a week.<sup>17)</sup> Even if we account for some overstatement, this is a very high figure, compared for example, to most West European countries:

Insert table III, 26:

15) See also our discussion of religious influences and "achievement motivation" in section e of this chapter below.

16) Cf. Kenya Churches Handbook, loc.cit., table 4, pp. 181 ff..

17) Question 31 b.

Table III,26: Frequency of formal religious worship;  
by demoninations:

Frequency of worship (%)	Catholics	Anglicans	African Independents	Other Christians	Muslims	Total
More than once a week	7	1	8	5	37	8
Once a week	70	65	70	69	29	66
Once a month	8	17	9	12	12	10
Rarely	13	15	13	13	12	14
Never	2	2	--	1	10	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total N:	211	65	54	130	41	501

The differences among the Christian churches apparently are not very great; only the Anglicans seem to go to church somewhat less frequently. The Muslims, in the tradition of Islam, have the highest number of those who worship publicly, more than once a week. Among them, however, the number of those who never go to their place of religious worship is also the highest. This may be because they belong to the oldest and most established church organization with a long tradition along the coast, where, as in other countries with long established church traditions, a greater number tend to become purely "nominal" members. These figures remain consistently higher across all social classes and almost all ethnic groups, and major exception being again the Maasai, among whom only about 40% of church members attend religious services regularly. Females reported a slightly higher rate of attendance than males (75% attending regularly compared to 71%;  $r = 0.04$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). Members of the older generation, again in contrast



to the situation in most European countries, go to church less often than those belonging to the younger and middle age-groups, (67% compared to 75%;  $r = 0.12$ ,  $p = 0.001$ ), which, of course, is a reflection of the relatively recent advent of Christianity in Africa. Similarly the frequency of religious worship of literates is higher than those of illiterates, which is an indication of the close link, a least in the earlier stages, between the missions and the chance to obtain some formal schooling; ( $r = 0.15$ ,  $p = 0.001$ ). At a closer look, however, the level of education of our respondents shows a curvilinear relationship with the frequency of church attendance: Only 61% of those with no formal education go to church regularly. This figure increases to 71% for those with primary education, but then decreases again to 64% for secondary school leavers. As these results show, the "religiosity" of different African peoples is subject to a good deal of variation, which makes its analysis all the more interesting. In order to understand this variety more fully we shall now discuss some specific religious beliefs and their distribution among Kenya's main ethnic and religious communities.

b.) Some Specific Religious Beliefs:

One of the most essential aspects of any religious conviction is the question whether there is some kind of "life after death" of a person. When we asked "Do you believe that there is a life after death in some form or other, are you not sure, or don't you believe this?"<sup>18)</sup>,

We obtained a highly significant pattern of responses both according to the ethnic group and the religious community of our respondents:

18) Question 31 d.

Table III, 27: Belief in life after death; by denomination and ethnic group:

Percentage believing in life after death		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	KaI.	Maas.	Tot.
Catholics	Believing	65	41	(67)	51	67	54	(17)	58
	Not sure	21	28	(33)	22	26	36	83	27
	Not believing	14	31	--	27	(7)	(10)	--	15
Anglicans	Believing	88	(37)	(100)	81	82	--	--	76
	Not sure	--	(10)	--	(19)	(12)	--	--	10
	Not believing	(12)	53	--	--	(6)	--	--	14
African Independentists	Believing	67	74	--	(100)	100	--	(40)	73
	Not sure	(33)	(14)	--	--	--	(100)	--	21
	Not believing	--	(7)	--	--	--	--	(60)	6
Other Christians	Believing	71	55	(100)	55	48	100	(42)	63
	Not sure	(14)	(30)	--	22	36	--	(42)	21
	Not believing	15	(15)	--	23	(16)	--	(16)	16
Muslims	Believing	(100)	(33)	73	(7)	(50)	--	--	58
	Not sure	--	--	21	71	(50)	--	--	30
	Not believing	--	(67)	(6)	(22)	--	--	--	12
Traditionals	Believing	(35)	--	--	--	--	--	(12)	9
	Not sure	(12)	(50)	(29)	--	--	(25)	(26)	26
	Not believing	(53)	(50)	71	(100)	(100)	(75)	62	65
Total	Believing	67	47	60	52	79	53	13	55
	Not sure	17	25	20	23	21	36	27	23
	Not believing	16	28	20	25	10	(11)	60	22
Total weighted N:		269	152	89	157	191	86	99	1043

(Numbers in parentheses indicate a very small N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category)



The total percentage of those believing in some form of "life after death" is rather high, but, perhaps, not as high as one might have expected from our discussion of the importance attached to religious beliefs and the "religiosity" of Africans in general.<sup>19)</sup> Again the "African Independent Churches" seem to have the most devout and fervent followers (only 6% "non-believers"), while the scepticism among the members of the mission churches (between 14 and 16% non-believers) is considerably greater. It seems that the Catholic church in particular cannot be all too sure of its converts; more than a fourth of them expressed a feeling of uncertainty. The Muslims' faith is expressed most strongly where it has been established for the longest time, namely among the Mijikenda (73% believing in life after death).

The few converts to islam elsewhere (only 29 persons in our sample) are much more varied in their beliefs and seem to be generally less convinced. Most surprising, however, is the attitude expressed by the "traditionals". They are the only group where the "non-believers" by far constitute a majority (65%). Even if we account for the more general "agnosticism" of the Maasai (who form the greatest single group of traditionals in our sample), the disbelief expressed by "traditional" members of most of the other ethnic groups compared to their churchgoing counterparts still remains remarkable. This seems to suggest that these respondents conceive of a "life after death", even as an "ancestor spirit", in a manner different from what is preached, for example, by Christian churches.

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19) This attitude is also quite strongly associated (a value of gamma of 0.40) with the importance our respondents attach to their religious beliefs.

20) See also part II, chapter 7 & above.

21) Item 17 of question 10.

In terms of ethnic origin again the Kikuyu and also the Luo stand out in the intensity of their religious convictions. While the other groups do not show much deviation from the mean, the Maasai, confirming what has been stated elsewhere,<sup>20)</sup> clearly are at the lower end of those expressing their beliefs in life after death. Controls by social class, place of residence, and age do not reveal very great deviations. Males (36% not believing) tend to be somewhat more sceptical than females (15%); ( $r = 0.09$ ,  $p = 0.001$ ). Education shows the already noted curvilinear pattern: The percentage of those not believing in a life after death being highest (27%) among illiterates, while the number of non-believers is lowest among those with primary education (15%), but then increases again among those with secondary education (23%).

This pattern of a somewhat restricted enthusiasm for "other-worldly" orientations among members of certain religious communities and ethnic groups finds some further confirmation by the responses to our statement "Not our life on earth, but what happens afterwards is really important"<sup>21)</sup>. 60% of our respondents agree "somewhat" or "strongly", the figure being highest for the Muslims (67%), about average for members of the Christian churches (between 55 and 61%), but again rather low (44%) for the traditionals. The Kalenjin (77%), Kikuyu (67%), and also the Mijikenda (68%), reflecting the great number of Muslims among them) scored highest among the ethnic groups. The Maasai (42%) again rank quite low, even as members of Christian churches. It seems, that the missions have had quite a superficial impact. Further controls show that this attitude tends to increase rather continuously with age (from 55% for the

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20) See also part II, chapter 7 d above.

21) Item 17 of question 40.



youngest to 69% for the oldest age group), but decreases with a higher level of education (from 61% for illiterates, even though practically all traditionals are in this group, to 56% for those with some secondary education and 43% among students), and urban residence (54% compared to 60% for those living up-country). Sex and social class of our respondents remain relatively unimportant in this regard.

All in all, these findings can perhaps be interpreted to lend support to Mbiti's observation that, even though there is a belief in the continuation of life after death in all traditional African religions, such a belief does not necessarily constitute a hope for a future and a better life: "To live here and now is the most important concern of African religious activities and beliefs... there is neither paradise to be hoped for nor hell to be feared in the hereafter".<sup>22)</sup>

c.) The sphere of magic:

Closely related to religious convictions and in fact in many ways inseparable from them are beliefs, at least in a traditional African context, concerning the power of "magic" and "witchcraft".<sup>23)</sup> We have already briefly discussed some of these traditional beliefs and practices for each ethnic group.<sup>24)</sup> But there can be no doubt that even in a "modern" setting and among those who are today members of Christian churches, convictions of this kind still occupy an important place in the belief system. The explanation of modern science, for example, often stop short

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22) Mbiti, op. cit., pp. 4 g..

23) Among the best and most comprehensive works on this subject still are Evans-Pritchard, E.E., Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1937; Parrinder, Geoffrey, Witchcraft, Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1958; and Middleton and Winter (eds.), op.cit.

24) See section d of each chapter of Part II above.

of what many people want to know, namely not that a certain virus can cause a disease, but why this person and not another one has become ill. To say that this had happened "by accident" still is much less convincing for many modern Africans than the suggestion that a particular misfortune was caused by a certain ill-wishing member of the community. In any case, many people consider it safer to take at least some precautions in this regard by obtaining some "protective charms", for example, than to face the vicissitudes of life completely unprepared.

Magic and witchcraft, therefore, constitute, no matter what an "enlightened" observer may think about them, an important and, in some instances, even increasing part of social reality in most African countries. Even in the "secular" and "rational" Western world, "superstitions" of this kind are far from extinct. Take, for example the beliefs in the predictive power of astrology, in "lucky numbers", or certain "omens". Thus, rather than rejecting such beliefs off hand, we must at least temporarily accept them as one aspect of reality, if we are to understand the social and political life in contemporary Africa more fully.

As we pointed out in the ethnographic chapters above, one distinction, often made in this sphere is that between "good" and "bad" magic. While the services of the former are often sought and its practitioners enjoy socially approved positions, the effect of the latter is widely feared and, at least traditionally, suspected "witches" were often put to death. In the interviews, we attempted to probe for both kinds of beliefs by employing one item referring to the generally respected "medicine man" ("mganga" in the Swahili questionnaire), and another one, which circumscribed the harm affected by the ill wishes of other members of the community.



The responses to our first item ("There is something in the power of a medicine man which really works, even if people do not know how")<sup>25)</sup> are reported in table III, 28:

Table III 28: Belief in power of medicine men; by ethnic group:

	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo.	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Percentage believing	45	74	44	59	63	57	68	58
Total weighted N:	258	153	86	153	189	88	108	1035

These results confirm to a certain extent the stereotypes which exist about the Kamba<sup>26)</sup>; their frequent practice of magic or "wizardry", the more general term,<sup>27)</sup> becomes obvious. The still largely traditional Maasai also rank very high. The Kikuyu, on the other hand, who are most advanced economically, seem to have become more sceptical in their beliefs in this regard. The score of the Mijikenda is somewhat of a surprise, because the "Coast people", too, are quite renowned for their practice of magic. Here, it seems, that the existing stereotype can be said to be an unfounded prejudice, which perhaps is caused by the fear of the Islamic religion and culture of this area, alien to most of the other parts of Kenya.

When we stratify the answers to this question according to the religious affiliation of our respondents, Muslims score the lowest (48%). Members of the mission churches are somewhat below the mean (between 52 and 57%), while those professing their traditional religion (67%) and adherents of "African Independent" sects (70%) are quite clearly above it.

25) Item 28 of question 40. In retrospect these variables more balanced direct questions might have produced even more clear-out results than these attitudinal items.

26) See Part II, chapter 2 d above. It also should not be overlooked that some practices of traditional African medicine are based, in terms of modern science, on sound physiological and psychological effects.

27) Cf., e. g., Middleton and Winter (eds.), op. cit..

This latter figure can possibly be interpreted as an indication of the syncretistic nature of these movements and the salience of still largely traditional elements in their beliefs.

Agreement to our statement also tends to increase somewhat with the age of our respondents (50% agreeing in the lowest age groups compared to 60% in the highest;  $r = 0.06$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) Females, however have lower scores than males (50% for the former and 60% for the latter;  $r = 0.10$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). We do not have any ready interpretation for this result. Perhaps the fact that the practice of evil magic is most often attributed to women also accounts for the relatively greater respect (of fear?) expressed by men for the powers of traditional doctors. Women, on the other hand, are often unjustly suspected of dealing in such matters, and are therefore probably not so easily "taken in". A check by the educational level of our respondents also produces a result which is surprising at a first glance: Those with secondary education score much higher (71%) than illiterates (58%) for those with some primary education (53%;  $r = 0.07$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). This, perhaps, should remind us of the fact that "education", at least if its level is only determined by the number of years of formal schooling and the passing of certain standardized examinations, is not the single "enlightening" force leading to a detached "rational" view of the world. It is rather a complex social process which by uprooting traditional bonds and opening new forms of social communications may create expectations and forms of behavior, but also new anxieties which then are expressed in seemingly "irrational" ways.

The answer to our second item ("Some people have the power to do harm to other just by wishing it may happen")<sup>28)</sup>

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28) Item 12 of question 40.



show that beliefs in "good" and "bad" magic do not necessarily coincide for the same persons and groups; it seems that more powerful means than mere wishes are required to effect any harm.

Table III, 29: Belief in power of ill wistes; by ethnic group:

	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Percentage believing	60	54	45	69	65	71	68	64
Total weighted N:	249	152	92	157	187	92	107	1036

Here the Kamba have a relatively low score, whereas the Kalenjin, Luyia and Maasai rank quite high. Only the Mijikenda are consistently low on both items. This latter score also coincides to a large extent with the low value for the Muslim community as a whole (41%). Catholics (71%) and traditionals (65%) are located at the other extreme, which is another indication that, contrary to Protestants, those converted to Catholicism have not changed so much in their original beliefs. Members of the other churches do not show significant deviations from the mean. Age, sex, and social class of our respondents are of relatively little importance in this regard. A higher level of education ( $r = 0,06$ ,  $p < 0,05$ ) and urban residence ( $r = 0,07$ ,  $p < 0,05$ ) tend to cause a slight decrease in the number of those agreeing with our statement.

d.) Time consciousness:

One important concept essential in understanding traditional African religious beliefs, numerous aspects of day-to-day economic life, and especially traditional African ontology as a whole, is the notion of "time" 29).

According to Mbiti, time in most traditional Sub-Saharan-African societies is conceived as a span of events which reaches some generations into the past, includes present

29) This point is also emphasized, for exemple, by Mbiti, cf. idem, op. cit., pp. 15 ff..

experiences, but has practically no "future". This is in contrast to the "linear" concept of time of the "West" which is based on the steady progression of mathematically defined elements, the "cyllical" concepts of some traditional Asian societies and their idea of repetitive births and rebirths, but also to the traditional Amhara culture of Ethiopia which is based on a cycle of religious events within the Coptic church.<sup>30)</sup>

Beyond a certain number of still remembered generations of ancestors and a future of immediately imminent events, "time" does not exist. The possibility of the repetition of events in a certain order, is also alien to traditional African thinking, except for cycles of "age-sets" among some peoples, as the Giriama in Kenya. Thus this concept can perhaps be compared to the somewhat paradoxical notion in modern economics of a "moving equilibrium", i. e. a balanced state in a dynamic process where neither the "movement" as such nor any beginnings or ends are actually conceived. A numerical calendar also does not exist in the traditional African cultures and the flow of time is regulated by the phases of the moon and the seasons of the year.

Both the concept of time and the actual span of generations covered among different African people<sup>31)</sup> differed. Today many people at least town live "by the clock"

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30) For a discussion of the conception of time of the Amhara cf., e. g., Levine, Donald N., Wax and Gold-Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopiaan Culture, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965, pp. 72 ff..

31) Cf., e. g., the differences between the Maasai and Luo in this regard, see section d of chapters 5 and 7 in Part II above.



The survey sought to establish how concepts of time vary among the different groups considered here. After we had asked our respondents, whether they possess a working watch or clock in their home (38% of them do), <sup>32)</sup> we wanted to know whether they think it important always to know the "right" time, or whether they do not care so much. <sup>33)</sup> The answers indicate perhaps to a certain extent the spreading of a more "linear" concept of time, differentiated by ethnic group and some significant class cleavages, among our respondents:

Table III, 30: Time consciousness; by class and ethnic group:

Percentage stressing importance of knowing right time	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Agric. bourgeoisie	93	(100)	(100)	91	71	73	63	83
Agric. proletaroids	78	71	83	67	78	50	29	67
All non-agric. classes	84	95	100	95	93	100	92	90
Total:	84	78	87	85	82	72	41	73
Total weighted N:	245	156	92	137	187	75	108	1000

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category)

Among the "agricultural proletaroids", i.e. subsistence farmers and pastoralists, the most traditional group, differences are readily apparent: The Maasai stand out among those who do not care about knowing the exact hour of the day, followed by the Kalenjin. Even Maasai and Kalenjin members of the "agricultural bourgeoisie" show

32) Questions 20 a and b.

33) Question 20 c.

this more "easy-going" attitude, although this class as a whole shows a much higher percentage in caring about time than the agricultural proletarioids. Only in the non-agricultural classes do differences between ethnic groups tend to disappear. Further controls reveal that illiterates; ( $r=-0.28$ ) adherents of traditional religious beliefs, females; ( $r=0.13$ ) and members of the older age groups; ( $r=-0.14$ ) all score significantly lower than their respective counterparts within each of the ethnic groups. These findings seem to confirm our expectation that a more "linear" notion of time is an important part of the "modernity" syndrome.

To find out what our respondents actually do with their time and whether they think they spend it usefully we asked two more questions at different points in our interviews. One inquired about the actual hours our respondents' work each day; <sup>34)</sup> the other probed for agreement to the statement "I feel I waste time and spend it uselessly"; <sup>35)</sup>:

Male laborers	73	61	31
Unemployed	—	36	56
Farmers and businessmen	Insert Table III, 31: (30)		
Cash crop farmers	56	47	67
Subsistence farmers	43	33	73
Agric. housewives	41	46	100
Non-agric. housewives	80	36	44
Students	(45)	42	36

34) Question 6 c

35) Item 51 of question 40.

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents in a particular sub-category)



Table III, 31: Work hours and work satisfaction;  
by occupation:

Occupation:	Percentage working 8 hrs. or more per day	Percentage feeling they waste their time	Total N:
Professionals (managerial)	70	37	33
Skilled clerical workers	71	24	17
Skilled crafts- men	96	35	26
Service workers	92	37	41
Workers in informal sector	(100)	(50)	13
Laborers (except agric.)	(47)	(40)	15
Farm Laborers	79	61	31
Unemployed	--	36	56
Farmers cum businessmen	71	(30)	20
Cash crop farmers	56	47	67
Subsistence farm- ers	43	33	73
Agric. housewives	41	46	100
Non-agric. house- wives	80	36	44
Students	(45)	42	36
Total	53	43	572

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10  
respondents in a particular sub-category)

These results show that the objective amount of time spent working and a feeling of having spent time usefully do not always coincide. Among those who actually spend most of their time working each day, the farm-laborers and workers in the informal sector (both very low paid, often tedious occupations) stand out in their dissatisfaction with what they are doing. Skilled clerical workers and farmer-businessmen, on the other hand, seem to be most satisfied with the way they spend their time. The objective time spent working by agricultural housewives seems to be a certain understatement, considering the actual working conditions of this group and the long hours needed each day to fetch water, collect fire wood, work in the field, and look after the children, but the amount of work here, of course, is measured much less formally than in other occupations. Some routine duties, such as child care, probably are not counted as work. The relative dissatisfaction of this group, however, (47% feeling they spent their time uselessly) is quite remarkable, too. Further controls indicate that females (48% compared to 38% for males;  $r=0.10$ ,  $p 0.001$ ) persons with rural residence (44% compared to 36% for urbanites;  $r=0.06$ ,  $p 0.05$ ), and those with a low level of education (46% for illiterates compared to 26% for those with some secondary education;  $r=-0.13$ ,  $p 0.001$ ) factors which all tend to coincide for "agricultural housewives", state more often that they are wasting their time.

e.) Achievement motivation:

Another link between the spheres of religion and day-to-day life can be found in the particular motivating forces of certain religious beliefs for more worldly ends



and in the more general "economic ethic" ("Wirtschafts-ethik"), which is an integral part of each religion. This latter aspect has, of course, been analyzed in particular by Max Weber. <sup>36)</sup> Most famous among his studies still is "The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism". <sup>37)</sup> In it he attributed the rise and spread of the capitalistic mode of production in 16th and 17th century Europe to the particular combination of religious beliefs inherent in the Puritanistic creed, namely an ethic of hard work coupled with an "inner-worldly asceticism". Both attitudes then led to an initial accumulation of capital in the hands of a few persons and families who in this way could prove to themselves and others that they had been "chosen by God" according to the Calvinistic theory of predestination. Even if not all of Weber's argument can be sustained today, <sup>38)</sup> and other particularly "structural" factors <sup>39)</sup> have to be considered as well, there can be no doubt that the "economic

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36) Cf. his impressive Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, 3 vols., loc. cit..

37) First published as "Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus", Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, vols. XX and XXI, 1904 and 1905; first English edition 1930, translated by Talcott Parsons.

38) For a critical review of some of his theories and some modern comparative empirical studies cf., e.g., Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. (ed.), The Protestant Ethic and Modernization, New York: Basic Books, 1968.

39) For this point cf. also Part I, chapter I above.

ethic" of different groups of people deserves to be analyzed carefully, if processes of social change and "development" are to be understood more fully.

From our present perspective it seems that it is not specific beliefs, but, to borrow Eisenstadt's term,<sup>40)</sup> the whole "transformative capacity", of a belief system that has to be considered. This includes, for example, the economic activity of religious and other minority groups and their structural position in society,<sup>41)</sup> the motivating power of a general "need for achievement",<sup>42)</sup> or the "functional equivalents" to a Protestant ethic which may be inherent in more worldly beliefs.<sup>43)</sup> As yet, to our knowledge, no one has attempted to analyze the specific "economic ethic" of traditional African religions. Studies of the "achievement motivation" of certain economically successful ethnic groups have been highly

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40) Cf. idem (ed.), op. cit., in particular pp. 7 ff..

41) For this point cf., e.g., Hagen, Everett E., On the Theory of Social Change, Homewood/Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1962.

42) This, of course, is David McClelland's somewhat controversial hypothesis, cf. his The Achieving Society, Princeton: van Nostrand, 1961.

43) This latter aspect has been stressed, for example, by Mazrui, Ali A., "Political Culture and Economic Socialization in East Africa", East African Social Science Council, Conference Papers, Dar es Salaam, January 1968.



controversial or have remained rather inconclusive. 44)  
In the Kenyan situation today these different aspects, together with the impact of the different organized churches, have to be taken into account, if links between religious beliefs and organizations and the economic and social sphere are to be understood. It seems likely, however, that here, as elsewhere, it is not so much the specific creed of a particular denomination, but rather the effect of the Christian missions as a whole which has led to the most important structural and attitudinal changes.

Some of the implications of missionary activities for structural changes in African societies have been

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44) Cf. e.g., Le Vine, Robert A., Dreams and Deeds: Achievement Motivation in Nigeria, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1966; or Ostheimer, John, "Achievement Motivation Among the Chagga People of Tanzania", University Social Science Council, conference papers, Kampala, 1966, later published in Journal of social psychology, 78, 1969, pp. 17-30.

Another example is Dittmann, Freya, Kultur und Leistung, Saarbrücken : SSIP-Schriften, 1973, who did not find any significant differences in the achievement motivation of Kenyan Asian and Luo secondary school students in Kisumu. Her attempts to generalize these findings to the level of these two communities at large must remain, however, doubtful, given her small and very specific sample and in view of the culturally largely unvalidated research methods which were employed.

emphasized by Gideon Mutiso,<sup>45)</sup> who contends that some of the "germs" of present-day social stratification in Kenya were laid by the missions through their economic and political support of converts to their creed. These "asomi" (literally: the "learned ones", even though many of them remained only semi-literate) initially were recruited often, according to Mutiso, among the "pariahs" or at least some of the more marginal groups of their own societies. Their new, though rather rudimentary skills of reading, writing and speaking English or Swahili made them useful to the missionaries and the colonial administrators as intermediaries between the new authorities and the masses. Soon they were able to apply their new knowledge and support to improved methods of agriculture or the establishing of small trading posts and other businesses. In these endeavors they often enjoyed preferential treatment by the colonial authorities (e.g. when land rights or business licenses were to be granted). In this way and within a relatively short period of time there emerged a new indigenous economically successful group of persons most of whom were loyal to the colonial regime. Compared to the pre-colonial period the social status of these persons had been reversed. Those from more traditional leadership groups began to follow their example.

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45) Cf. Mutiso, Gideon Cyrus, "Cleavage and the Organizational Base of Politics in Kenya", in: idem, Kenya, Politics, Policy and Society, Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975, pp. 3 ff..

46) Cf. pages 2, 10, 24, 40, 46, 48, 55 of question 40.



This line of reasoning provides a plausible explanation for one of the structural aspects of the impact of Christianity in Kenya and possibly in other parts of Africa as well, but it still needs better empirical evidence in its support. In Kenya it seems to apply fairly well to the situation among the Kikuyu and perhaps some Kamba in parts of Machakos district, but not so much to the people of western Kenya who were missionized in the same way, but where a social differentiation of this kind has not become equally apparent. A theory of this kind also cannot explain differences between the levels of economic advancements of various ethnic groups as a whole, where the missionary factor has been at work in a similar manner among them. The question of what particular attitudes have been changed and to what extent they reflect a certain "achievement orientation" similarly cannot be answered from this kind of approach alone.

In our study "need-achievement" is not assumed to be a necessary prerequisite for economic growth and social change, as with McClelland, but rather as a concomitant attitudinal change in a more general process of "modernization" which is caused by other, mainly structural, internal and external factors.

Among the attitudinal statements in our interviews some relate to a possible "achievement orientation", although without any specific religious content. <sup>46)</sup> From four of

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46) Cf. items 2, 10, 24, 40, 44, 48, 55 of question 40.

47) The exact procedures are discussed in our "Methodological Appendix" below. The items selected are number 10, 2, 43 and 45.

these items we were able to construct a separate index<sup>47)</sup> as a more general measure of this attitude. These are: "The raising of one's social position is one of the more important things in life", "I set goals for myself which I attempt to reach", "I work like a slave at everything I undertake until I'm satisfied with the result", and "most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough willpower". The responses to this index reveal some interesting variations both as far as total ethnic groups and different religious communities are concerned:

Table III, 32: Achievement orientation; by denomination and ethnic group:

Percentage expressing "achievement orientation"		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Members of Mission Churches	Low	28	42	(32)	39	58	25	(12)	38
	Medium	31	44	(42)	26	26	51	(38)	32
	High	41	14	(26)	35	16	24	50	30
Members of African Independent Churches	Low	(24)	37	--	(67)	(44)	(43)	(20)	39
	Medium	(35)	47	--	--	(28)	--	(60)	34
	High	(41)	(16)	--	(33)	(28)	(57)	(20)	27
Muslims	Low	--	(50)	46	(9)	--	--	--	37
	Medium	--	(33)	36	(64)	(50)	--	--	38
	High	(100)	(17)	18	(27)	(50)	--	--	25
Traditionals	Low	(24)	72	(27)	--	(67)	--	47	41
	Medium	52	(22)	59	--	(33)	(60)	35	43
	High	(24)	(6)	(14)	--	--	(40)	(18)	16
Total	Low	27	45	38	38	54	22	34	38
	Medium	33	42	43	27	28	50	41	35
	High	40	13	19	35	18	28	25	27
Total weighted N :		251	148	96	139	193	86	102	1015

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents in a particular sub-category)

47) The exact procedures are discussed in our "Methodological Appendix" below. The items selected are number 10, 24, 44 and 48.



According to this measure members of the mission churches show a somewhat higher level of achievement motivation than members of African Independent Churches and Muslims. The contrast is most striking, however, in comparison to adherents of traditional beliefs. This confirms our expectation concerning the "transformative capacity" of the mission churches and other institutionalized religions in Africa. A higher achievement orientation is not specifically related, however, in any significant way to the importance our respondents attach to their religious beliefs, their frequency of worship, or a belief in a life after death.

In addition to this religious factor, there is also a strong independent influence reflecting the ethnic origin of our respondents. Here the Kikuyu clearly stand out in their high percentage of those showing a strong achievement motivation, which must be taken at least as a contributing factor to their actually achieved relatively high standard of living.<sup>48)</sup> The Kamba, Mijikenda, and Luo, on the other hand, score low on this index, which, coincides with a relatively low level of "development" in large parts of the home areas of these groups, even though the missions have been active particularly among the latter. In contrast, the Maasai, with a majority still adhering to traditional beliefs, occupy an intermediate position which may be an indication for the fact that not only an orientation towards modern economic achievements, but also a desire for excellence (e.g. wealth in cattle, bravery in warfare, high social status) is measured by our index.

Further controls indicate that this achievement motivation is strongest among those in non-agricultural occupations and higher among members of the "agricultural bourgeoisie" than among subsistence farmers. Males score somewhat higher

49) Item 55 of question 46.

48) See also our table "Comparative data..."

than females ( $r=0.05$ ,  $p 0.05$ ) and younger persons rank higher than members of the older age groups ( $r=0.08$ ,  $p 0.01$ ). A higher level of education, ( $r=0.06$ ,  $p 0.05$ ) and urban residence ( $r=0.07$ ,  $p 0.01$ ) also tend to work in this direction. An analysis of the variance "explained" by these different factors shows that ethnic origin is the strongest independent factor (a beta of 0.24), followed by religious affiliation (0.11), social class (0.11), and level of education (0.06).

That the achievement orientation even of "high achievers" among our respondents does not go completely unmitigated, however, is shown by the answers to one other item. The statement, "A happy family life is of more value to me than becoming rich" <sup>49)</sup> produced a very high level of agreement (83%) including a large number of those ranking high on our "achievement index" (e.g. 91% of our Kikuyu respondents). Only the Maasai (65%) deviate somewhat from this more general pattern which is perhaps a reflection of their somewhat more detached family relationships on the whole. <sup>50)</sup> This attitude can be observed rather consistently across all social classes, age groups, sexes, levels of education, and places of residence.

f) Economic satisfaction:

The level of achievement motivation and of actual economic satisfaction of a person or a group may stand in somewhat contradictory relationships. On the one hand, a high "need" of achievement often leads to actual economic success, so that in an objective sense there is reason to be satisfied with what one has achieved.

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49) Item 55 of question 40.

50) See also Part II, chapter 7 c and chapter 1b of this part above.



On the other hand, a strong achievement motivation may set the expectations so high and make "achievement" a virtually limitless endeavor that, no matter what actually has been accomplished in material terms, a nagging feeling of dissatisfaction remains. A third combination of these two factors, that of a low sense of achievement but actual satisfaction with one's situation (that of the proverbial Chinese swineherd) is, of course, also possible, while the fourth variant, that of low achievement and low satisfaction seems to prevail in many situations of widespread destitution, where people are resigned to their plight. When we asked respondents, "generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your present way of life?",<sup>51)</sup> all four combinations were found, which opens some interesting insights into both the economic, and psychological situation of each of the groups concerned:

Insert table III, 33:

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51) Question 15 a

Table III, 33: Life satisfaction and achievement orientation; by ethnic groups:

Percentage expressing	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
High satisfaction/low achievement	17	28	21	16	39	21	39	25
High satisfaction/high achievement	26	14	2	12	14	2	25	15
Low satisf./high achiev.	34	9	23	35	11	54	20	26
Low satisf./low achiev.	23	49	54	37	36	23	16	34
Total:	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:*	158	86	48	101	133	43	56	625

\* The "medium" scores have been excluded here.

A combination of low satisfaction and low achievement motivation thus is the most common of all. It is particularly prevalent among the Mijikenda and Kamba, which also coincides with the objectively rather poor living conditions for a large number of people in these groups. On the other hand, a high level of satisfaction coupled with a low sense of achievement can be found among the Maasai and Luo; both groups are apparently still quite satisfied with their traditional way of life. The Kalenjin, Luyia and Kikuyu have the highest number of dissatisfied achievers, which may be one reason for the rather high level of economic activities in these groups in recent years. Only a minority (the smallest subgroup of all) among the high achievers are actually satisfied. Within this minority a relatively large number of Kikuyu and Maasai can be found.

Dissatisfaction with one's way of life is also strongly related to the social-economic "class" of our respondents:



Table III, 34: Life dissatisfaction; by class and ethnic group:

Percentage expressing dissatisfaction with way of life	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. bourgeoisie	(50)	(50)	--	(33)	(50)	--	(100)	50
Salariat	54	77	(80)	(80)	(87)	(100)	--	69
Proletariat	66	92	(86)	83	(53)	100	(80)	76
Non-agric. proletaroids and sub-proletariat	75	(80)	(100)	(80)	70	(67)	(100)	72
Agric. bourgeoisie	61	--	(50)	83	(43)	61	(46)	60
Agric. proletaroids	62	51	75	69	46	73	45	58
Total	64	55	77	77	51	73	47	63
Total weighted N:	267	156	88	158	187	92	98	1046

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents)

On the whole, the proletariat and the non-agricultural proletaroids are most dissatisfied with their situation. The percentage for the salariat is also remarkably high. The agricultural classes show a significantly lower level of discontent, whereas the non-agricultural bourgeoisie exhibits the highest degree of satisfaction. Differentiated by ethnic group, the Maasai, Luo and Kamba have the highest level of those among the agricultural proletaroids who are satisfied with their traditional way of life, whereas dissatisfaction is strongest for the Luyia, Kalenjin and Mijikenda followed by the Kikuyu. Further controls indicate that satisfaction is higher in the older generation (48% for those aged 50 and above compared to 33% for those below the age of 30;  $r=-0.09, p 0.001$ ), and among females (42% compared to 34% for males;  $r=0.04, p 0.05$ ). Other factors such as illiteracy, rural residence and traditional religion which all contribute independently to a higher level of satisfaction, tended to level off when we controlled them by ethnic group. Of those who

said that they are somewhat or strongly dissatisfied with their present way of life almost 80% gave economic reasons for their dissatisfaction, another 10% cited health and other personal matters, the rest expressed a variety of minor concerns. 52)

As far as their actual daily work is concerned, 53) almost one fifth of our respondents expressed their satisfaction over their income, about one third over the kind of work, another fifth over the work environment, the rest gave a variety of other reasons. About 10% of our respondents stated that there is nothing that they particularly like about their work. Asked to state what they disliked about their work, 54) almost one half of our respondents did not dislike anything, about 10% each said that the remuneration is too low, the work environment unpleasant, or the kind of work not rewarding. 5% stated that there is too much work, the rest cited other reasons. The number of those who did not dislike anything about their work tends to be significantly higher in the agricultural occupations, among females, and in the higher age groups. Low pay was quoted most often by members of the proletariat.

The answers to our question, "What would you say is the biggest problem that people in circumstances like yours face in life?" 55) also shed some light on the degree of satisfaction our respondents have with their economic situation.

Insert table III, 35

52) Answers to question 15 b.

53) Question 6 d, only the first answer of each respondent was recorded.

54) Question 6 e.

55) Question 39 a.



Table III, 35: Biggest personal problems; by class and ethnic group:

	Biggest personal problem (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Iuy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
	unemployment	(4)	(13)	--	(12)	(8)	--	--	(7)
	general economic situation	65	(60)	(60)	(63)	(67)	--	(50)	63
Non-agri-cultural middle + upper classes	personal+family affairs	(15)	(20)	(20)	--	--	--	--	(12)
	community relations	(4)	--	(20)	--	--	(100)	--	(6)
	other	--	--	--	(12)	--	--	(50)	(3)
	no problem or "don't know"	(12)	(7)	--	(13)	(25)	--	--	(9)
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	unemployment	13	(17)	--	(9)	31	--	(14)	14
Non-agri-cultural lower classes	gen.econ.situat.	61	59	(78)	53	42	(89)	(29)	58
	pers.affairs	4	(18)	(11)	(4)	3	--	(14)	5
	comm.relations	2	--	--	--	--	--	--	(1)
	other	1	--	--	(6)	--	--	--	(2)
	no problem	19	(6)	(11)	28	24	(11)	(43)	20
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	unemployment	--	--	--	--	(13)	--	--	(2)
Agric. bourgeoisie	gen.econ.situat.	78	(50)	(100)	67	50	69	(44)	65
	pers.affairs	(5)	--	--	(8)	--	15	--	7
	comm.relations	(5)	--	--	(8)	--	--	--	(3)
	other	--	(50)	--	(8)	--	--	--	(3)
	no problem	(11)	--	--	(9)	(37)	(23)	(56)	20
<hr/>									
	unemployment	(4)	(1)	--	15	11	--	--	4
Agric. proletarioids	gen.econ.situat.	52	67	78	27	60	(18)	38	53
	pers.affairs	(10)	10	(4)	(12)	(5)	--	16	9
	comm.relations	(7)	(3)	(4)	(10)	(3)	(9)	--	4
	other	(10)	(8)	(1)	(5)	(5)	(9)	--	5
	no problem	17	11	13	31	16	64	46	24
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	unemployment	7	(4)	--	9	15	--	(2)	7
Total	gen.econ.situat.	62	64	78	47	54	51	37	57
	pers.affairs	8	11	(5)	8	(4)	(7)	13	8
	comm.relations	4	(3)	(4)	6	(1)	(4)	--	3
	other	3	8	(1)	7	(4)	(3)	(2)	5
	no problem	16	10	12	23	22	35	46	20
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Total weighted N:		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents)

Economic problems thus are foremost in the minds of all groups. Unemployment was mentioned most often by the Luyia and Luo as a particularly salient issue. Personal and family affairs are of relatively great concern for the Maasai and Kamba. Problems of community relations were stressed by a significant group of Luyia and Kikuyu. The number of those who stated that they do not have any big personal problems is remarkably high among the Luo and Maasai. This confirms our earlier findings concerning a relatively high satisfaction with their way of life, particularly among the "traditionalists" in these groups. In terms of class stratification unemployment is a major concern for the non-agricultural lower classes (i.e. the proletariat, the non-agricultural proletaroids, and the sub-proletariat), but also for the agricultural proletaroids among the Luyia and Luo. Unemployment as a major personal problem is also mentioned more often by those with a higher level of education (e.g. by 15% of those with secondary education compared to 6% among illiterates), those in the younger age groups (9% for those below 30 compared to 4% above the age of 50), and those living in towns (20% compared to 4% in rural areas). Those who have "no problem" or who answered "don't know" are more frequent among illiterates (26% compared to 11% for those with secondary education), and females (24% compared to 19% for males).

When we probed further and asked, "Is there anything that you as an individual can do to solve this problem?", the number of those who gave a negative answer is particularly high among the Maasai, Luo (78% each), and Mijikenda (72%), whereas the score for the Luyia, Kikuyu and Kamba varies between 53% and 60%, and is only 39% for the Kalenjin. When we asked, "Who else do you think



could help you?", almost half of the respondents from all ethnic groups named the government, the only exception being the Luo, only about a fourth of whom expect help from this direction. The variations between other possible sources of help (family members and friends, politicians, respected persons, businessmen, foreign aid institutions etc.) are not very great. The Kamba and Mijikenda have the highest number of those (24% and 20% respectively) who said that nobody can help them (the men being 14%), thus indicating a certain amount of despair.

g.) Perceptions of the economic future:

More than 50% of our respondents have a family cash income of less than Kshs 200 (approx. US \$ 25/month). Despite this poverty and the widespread dissatisfaction with the present way of life (approx. two thirds were somewhat or very dissatisfied) a majority of them look optimistically into the future, at least as far as their economic circumstances are concerned. The variations which exist in this regard according to ethnic groups and social class are, however, remarkable: 56)

Insert Table III, 36:

56) Answers to question 15 c.

Table III, 36: Perceptions of the economic future;  
by class and ethnic group:

Percentage perceiving economic future to be		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Iuo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle+upper classes	better	70	(45)	(100)	(50)	(33)	(100)	(50)	57
	about the same	(13)	(45)	--	(50)	(45)	--	(50)	30
	worse	(17)	(10)	--	--	(22)	--	--	(13)
Proletariat	better	59	100	(80)	75	(46)	(60)	(33)	66
	same	(19)	--	(20)	(10)	(27)	(40)	(33)	17
	worse	(22)	--	--	(15)	(27)	--	(33)	17
Non-agric.pro-letaroids+sub-proletariat	better	69	(100)	--	(100)	81	(50)	(100)	75
	same	(17)	--	--	--	(13)	--	--	(13)
	worse	14	--	--	--	(6)	(50)	--	(12)
Agric. bourgeoisie	better	76	(100)	(100)	(78)	(33)	92	(83)	78
	same	(12)	--	--	(11)	(67)	(8)	--	(15)
	worse	(12)	--	--	(11)	--	--	(17)	(7)
Agric. pro-letaroids	better	52	65	65	76	(25)	100	(28)	53
	same	40	(28)	(29)	(6)	63	--	48	36
	worse	(8)	(7)	(6)	(18)	(12)	--	(24)	11
Weighted Total	better	65	69	70	77	35	89	38	62
	same	22	25	25	9	53	(10)	39	26
	worse	13	(6)	(5)	14	12	(1)	23	12
Total weighted N:		231	121	57	123	152	91	87	891

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents in a sub-category)

57) Item 45 of question 40.



The Luo and Maasai respondents (the latter possibly fearing a further destruction of their traditional way of life) thus are most pessimistic, whereas the Kalenjin (who enjoy a favorable land:population ratio in their home area) look for more optimistically into the future. The other groups rank somewhere in between, but more on the optimistic side. In terms of social stratification members of the agricultural bourgeoisie are more optimistic than their poorer colleagues, optimism in the non-agricultural classes is also rather widespread. The effects of further social differentiation can perhaps be seen most clearly among the Kikuyu. Here the proletaroid farmers, short of land and other resources, and the members of the proletariat are most pessimistic, whereas both the agricultural and non-agricultural middle classes and the non-agricultural proletaroids are fairly confident about their future. Further controls indicate that optimism is stronger among those with a higher level of education (78% among those with secondary education compared to 53% among illiterates;  $r=0.14$ ,  $p=0.001$ ), among younger people (66% in the youngest compared to 48% in the oldest age groups;  $r=0.13$ ,  $p=0.001$ ), and among males (68% compared to 57% for females;  $r=0.06$ ,  $p=0.05$ ).

A certain discrepancy apparently exists, however, between the expectations of our respondents as to their personal economic future and their perception of future developments in Kenya in general. Thus about three fifths of them agreed with the statement, "In spite of what some people say, the lot of the average man is getting worse, not better." <sup>57)</sup> But again the variations concerning this statement are more revealing than

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57) Item 45 of question 40.

the absolute figures. The Luo and Luyia (with 67% each) clearly were strongest in their agreement, which in view of the actual situation in their very densely populated home area <sup>58)</sup> may be quite realistic. The Kalenjin, on the other hand, were again relatively less pessimistic (only 52% agreeing). Pessimism also is significantly stronger among those below the age of 30 ( $r=0.010$ ,  $p 0.001$ ). Sex, level of education, place of residence, or religious affiliation of our respondents are not of great importance in this regard.

The concreteness of any expectations concerning the economic future of our respondents became somewhat clearer when we probed whether they had any particular plans to improve their economic situation. <sup>59)</sup> The Kikuyu again stand out in this regard with 65% mentioning a specific project, followed by the Kamba (61%), Kalenjin (69%), and Luyia (57%), while only a considerably lower number of Luo (50%) or Mijikenda (43%) have any particular initiatives in mind. The Maasai (37%) again rank last. The planned projects of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin are most often directed towards the improvement of their shamba or the purchase of more land, while a great number of Luo and Kamba expressed their aspiration towards a better job in town. The desire to start a new business is, comparatively speaking, strongest among the Luyia, Mijikenda and those Maasai who have any plans at all. Whether these plans will actually materialize is, however, a different matter.

Concluding this chapter, we note that the characteristic differences among Kenya's main ethnic groups also extend

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58) See also Part II, chapters 4 and 5 above.

59) Question 15 d.



into the sphere of religious and economic attitudes. The general level of "religiosity", for example, is most pronounced among the Kikuyu, but religious beliefs are considered to be very important by a majority of the other groups as well. This is also reflected in the frequency of attendance at church meetings. The major exception are the Maasai whose more widespread "agnosticism" was confirmed by our findings. The somewhat related attitude of a belief in magic is particularly prevalent among the Kamba as far as the healing powers of a medicine-man are concerned, whereas the Luyia and Kalenjin expressed their belief in the effect of ill wishes of others most strongly. In a more secular vein, the level of "time consciousness" is rather high among all groups, the major exception again being the Maasai. Achievement orientation is remarkably strong among the Kikuyu, while the Kamba, Mijikenda and Luo appear to be much less motivated in this respect. The level of actual economic satisfaction and the perceptions of the economic future vary most strongly among the Kikuyu, who are also the economically most stratified group. Most pessimistic as to their economic future, on the other hand, are, apparently for somewhat different reasons, the Maasai and Luo. Together with the Mijikenda the respondents from these last mentioned groups also are least concrete as to their own plans for the future. Against this background of religious and economic attitudes of the different groups we shall now attempt to assess the kind and magnitude of some basic social and political orientations.

#### CHAPTER 4: SOME BASIC SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

We are now moving closer to the "political culture" of Kenya's ethnic groups. Before we turn to orientations and issues directly related to the present national political system, however, we shall first provide information concerning some basic social and political attitudes. These include ascriptive criteria determining social positions, among which the social and political role accorded to women is a special but important case. Then respondents' attitudes towards social change and socio-economic "conservatism" will be examined. Subsequently, we will discuss "dispositions towards violence" which may become active in certain social and sometimes perhaps political situations. We shall also probe the more general "political authoritarianism" of our respondents and, conversely, their acceptance of "democratic values". These discussions serve as a basis for an analysis of responses more directly associated with Kenya's political system and its main functions and processes which appear in the subsequent chapter.

##### a.) Ascriptive social criteria:

"Ascription" contrasts with "achievement" as mechanisms determining a person's status in society. <sup>1)</sup> The former

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1) This distinction is a part, for example, of Talcott Parsons' famous "pattern variables", cf., e.g., his The Social System. New York: The Free Press, 1951, pp. 58 - 67; or idem, "Pattern Variables Revisited", The American Sociological Review, 25, 1960, pp. 467 - 483.



is an inherited or similarly fixed quality which one cannot escape in a given society. It includes race, sex, caste, or "estate" membership. The latter refers to the way by which status can be acquired through one's own personal efforts. "Achievement" here, however, does not necessarily imply achievement motivation.<sup>2)</sup> Thus in a number of strictly hierarchical societies (such as traditionally among the Amhara in Ethiopia, or the societies of medieval Europe) a fairly high level of achievement motivation may be found, at least within certain groups like the "nobility", where fighting for one's "honor", and a competitive spirit in tournaments etc. was common. A motivation of this kind could not significantly affect one's overall status in these societies. On the other hand, in a society where equality of opportunity exists for practically all members and achievement thus becomes the main criterion for acquiring status, the level of achievement motivation may not be very high when most people are content with their lot.

This distinction must be kept in mind, when we now proceed to the analysis of ascriptive criteria as they exist at the attitudinal level among the respondents in our sample. Practically all of Kenya's ethnic groups traditionally had an "egalitarian-segmentarian" social and political structure based mainly on age and sex as differentiating factors. This fact does not mean, however, that "ascription" was either the only or the dominant criterion determining status. Within each age-set personal qualities and

2) Item 25 of question 40.  
2) Achievement motivation, as a separate issue, is also discussed in chapter 2 e of this part above.

achievements decided one's eventual social and political position and the esteem it would enjoy.

Ascription also was relatively unimportant in determining a person's economic fortune. In the traditional economy very little wealth (e.g. in land or cattle) could be accumulated over a number of generations. The main status symbol and expression of wealth was the number of wives a man could afford. By its very nature this kind of status cannot easily be transmitted to one's heirs, because polygyny usually also means having many children. The laws of inheritance of each society usually provided for dividing the property among the greater number of these children. Thus only in very few instances (such as the position of "ruoth" in some traditional Luo lineages<sup>4)</sup> can inherited wealth as a source of social status be said to have played a major role among the peoples considered here.

In the survey we attempted to probe for an adherence to ascriptive criteria by a number of questions. These included items like "When a man is born the success he is going to have is already decided";<sup>5)</sup> "It is only right that people who belong to a respected family should have to say more than others";<sup>6)</sup> and "It is only natural and right that women should have less freedom than men".<sup>7)</sup>

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4) See Part II, chapter 5 c above.

5) Item 47 of question 40.

6) Item 38 of question 40. The "respect" a family enjoys can, of course, be an acquired property. This item is "ascriptive", however, as far as it concerns the respect accorded to a person's family and not one's own personal merits.

7) Item 25 of question 40.



The inter-item correlations in the pattern of agreement of our respondents to these statements justified putting them together in a separate index of "ascription":<sup>8)</sup>

Table III, 37: Agreement with ascriptive social criteria; by ethnic group:

Agreement with ascriptive criteria (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Low	43	39	42	55	46	17	21	40
Medium	37	38	39	23	29	35	38	36
High	20	23	19	22	15	48	41	24
Total:	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	256	149	96	154	191	92	108	1046

The Kalenjin and Maasai thus clearly have the greatest number of those scoring high, which coincides with the fact that the traditional age-set systems in these societies still have remained relatively intact,<sup>9)</sup> and that traditional social bonds are still strongest in these groups.<sup>10)</sup> The variations between the other groups are not very large. The Luo, who traditionally did not know a fixed age-set

8) For the exact procedures and statistical values see our "Methodological Appendix" below.

9) See chapters 6 c and 7 c in Part II above.

10) See sections c and d of chapter 1 of this part above.

11) See Part II, chapter 1 a above.

organization, have the smallest number of high scorers of all groups. These differences persist across all social classes, age groups, levels of education, religious affiliations, or places of residence. Social class (16% scoring high in the urban middle and upper classes compared to a level of 23% to 28% for the urban proletariat and sub-proletariat and the agricultural classes), level of education (27% agreement among illiterates compared to 14% among those with secondary education), religious affiliation (38% among members of African Independent Churches and 29% among traditionalists compared to 21% among the members of the mission churches and 18% among Muslims), and place of residence (25% in the rural areas compared to 18% in town) also proved to be significant independent factors. An analysis of variance gives the relative weight of these factors as follows (values of beta adjusted for other independent factors and co-variates): Ethnic origin 0.17, religious affiliation 0.17, social class 0.17, and level of education 0.13.

b.) The social and political role of women:

Ascribed positions in society are very often based on sex. Almost all over the world, in varying degrees, women have been subjugated to a socially and even more politically inferior status. This is also true for most of Africa. Except for the mythological period of matriarchal rule among the Kikuyu in times long past,<sup>11)</sup> men have dominated socially and politically in all societies discussed in this study. All the societies considered here traditionally were organized on patrilineal and virilocal principles, which tended to further reinforce the subordinate role of women. In none of them could women participate in the traditional

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11) See Part II, chapter 1 a above.



communal decision-making bodies, and most of the significant economic and social transactions (such as the exchange of bridewealth) were handled by men.<sup>12)</sup> In spite of these numerous restrictions, however, it seems that most African women traditionally were better off than their counterparts in traditional Arab and many Asian societies. They could (and often did) speak their mind quite freely and had their own way of expressing their wishes and getting what they wanted, even if this sometimes meant resorting to the instigation of the fear of witch-craft, which was particularly attributed to women in many African societies.

Today the traditional role of women is changing. Unlike in some parts of West Africa, where the marketing of agricultural produce and the trading of other items by women have accorded many of them a position of relative economic autonomy,<sup>13)</sup> rural women in Kenya remain to a large extent economically dependent on their husbands who tend to monopolize the cash income of the family, particularly when they work in town. Only when women are able to earn money on their own, e.g. through handicrafts or by obtaining a job in town, can they significantly reduce their dependence. During the colonial period some women also became involved in national politics. One of the

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12) For a discussion of the traditional economic position of women in each group and the division of labour between the sexes see also sections b of the respective chapters of Part II above.

13) For this point cf., e.g., Levine, Robert A., "Sex Roles and Economic Change in Africa", in: Middleton, John (ed.), Black Africa - Its Peoples and Their Cultures Today, London: Macmillan, 1970, pp. 174 ff..

earliest and most dramatic incidents occurred when Harry Thuku, the first African nationalist politician in Kenya, <sup>14)</sup> was arrested by the colonial authorities in March 1922. A large crowd gathered in front of the central police station in Nairobi to demand his release:

"Mary Muthoni Nyanjiru (from Weithaga in location 10 of Fort Hall District) leapt to her feet, pulled her dress right up over her shoulders and shouted to the men: 'You take my dress and give me your trousers. You men are cowards. What are you waiting for? Our leader is in there. Let's get him.' The hundreds of women trilled their *ngemi* <sup>15)</sup> in approbation and from that moment on trouble was probably inevitable. Mary and the others pushed on until the bayonets of the rifles were pricking at their throats, and then the firing started. Mary was one of the first to die." <sup>16)</sup>

At a later time, during the "Mau Mau" unrest in the 1950s, many women actively supported the freedom-fighters by providing them with food and other items, or by hiding them when necessary. A great number of "Mama Uhurus", as they were sometimes called, contributed significantly to the struggle for independence.

In spite of these achievements the political role of women on Kenya's post-independence national scene has remained a minor one. Only 4 of the 158 Members of Parliament are women (before the elections of 1974, parliament had only one nominated female member), and no woman holds a

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14) See also Part II, chapter 2 c above.

15) Kikuyu ululation.

16) Report of an eye-witness quoted in Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit., pp. 51 f..



cabinet post. The only major exception, where a woman occupied a position of major political significance, is the case of Margaret Kenyatta, who from 1966 to 1976 was mayor of Nairobi. Organizations like "Maendeleo ya Wanawake" ("Progress for Women"), a rather moderate form of "Women's Lib." mostly concerned with charity affairs and a number of practical matters such as the establishment of workshops and the creation of opportunities for vocational training of women, have made relatively little headway. More important seem to be some neighborhood groups formed among rural women for mutual assistance, but which apparently do not yet extend their activities into the political sphere.

In the survey we asked three questions relating to the position of women. The first one, which is also included in our "ascription index", <sup>17)</sup> probed for the more general social role of women. The second one asked more specifically for their involvement in politics: "Some people say that women should not be active in politics. Others say, that they should have the same political rights and duties as men. What do you think?" <sup>18)</sup> The third one was the most concrete: "Can you imagine a woman becoming president of this country?" <sup>19)</sup> The results are summarized in table III, 38:

Insert Table III, 38

17) See the preceding section above.

18) Question 37 a.

19) Question 37 b.

Table III, 38: Social and Political Role of Women;  
by sex and ethnic group:

Percentage saying:		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo.	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Women should have less freedom	Males	64	75	71	46	55	75	86	65
	Females	60	61	35	36	46	75	76	54
	Total	62	67	56	43	51	75	82	61
Women should be less active in politics	Males	50	39	36	39	34	59	81	47
	Females	31	38	37	19	25	38	44	32
	Total	42	38	36	33	30	53	68	41
Cannot imagine a woman as president	Males	76	52	43	59	48	65	91	62
	Females	54	49	41	45	56	43	68	52
	Total	67	50	42	54	52	60	83	58
Total weighted N:		263	153	96	157	194	92	108	1063

The first question was answered in the negative by a majority of our respondents, both men and women. Its wording ("It's only natural and right") refers to an ascriptive status of women based on biological criteria which extend into the social sphere. It cannot be excluded that our respondents interpreted this statement ("Should have less freedom than men") to be mainly concerned with sexual activities. But even in this more restricted sense the answers remain revealing. The second question, which clearly defines politics as a potential field of action, reverses previous answers to a certain extent, a majority now being in favor of an active political role of women, and only 10% of all respondents saying that women should "not at all" be active in politics. The discrepancy of 15 percentage points on the average between the answers of our male and our female respondents is nevertheless remarkable. Finally, the idea that a woman may become president of Kenya seems strange to a majority of our respondents, of whom a full third stated that they can "not at all" imagine a woman as president. In addition to possible resentment towards women in high political positions, a statement of this kind may also reflect a quite realistic



assessment of a woman's actual chances in view of the fact that at the time of our interviews only three women (Indira Gandhi in India, Sirimavo Bandaranaike in Sri Lanka, and Isabel Peron in Argentina) were heads of government. None of the three had come into office purely on her own merits, but rather through advantage of the position previously held by her husband (Bandaranaike and Peron) or father (Nehru in the case of Indira Gandhi). By summer of 1977 all had been replaced by men. Nowhere in the world were there any potential female contenders of political power except possibly for Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. Another very powerful woman of this period, Chiang Ching, did not politically survive the death of her husband, Mao Tse Tung, either.

In terms of the ethnic origin of our respondents the Maasai and Kalenjin clearly stand out again as those interpreting a woman's social and political role in the most restrictive sense. In contrast, the Luyia, Luo, and, on the average, the Mijikenda are most "liberal" in this regard. The Kikuyu and Kamba fall somewhere in between. The discrepancy between the answers by males and females as far as women's "freedom" is concerned is by far the highest among the Mijikenda. Here the strong influence of Islam in this group seems to be manifested quite clearly: The men strongly expressed their "right of dominance" which excludes their women from contacts with other men. Apparently men often suspect women of conniving behind their "buihuis" 20) to avoid these restrictions. In the political field, the discrepancies between the sexes are also the greatest among the Maasai and Kalenjin, which may be a reflection of the still largely traditional social organization based on the male dominated age-set system in both groups.

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20) See also chapter 3 d of Part II above.

In addition to the sex and ethnic origin of our respondents their level of education proved to be a strong factor influencing these attitudes: Only 46% of those with secondary education agreed that women should have less freedom compared to 63% for illiterates. 68% of those with secondary education also said that women should be active in politics compared to 55% for illiterates ( $r=-0.08$ ,  $p 0.01$ ). Only the chances of a woman becoming president were judged in a similarly skeptical manner by all educational groups. The independent influence of Muslim or traditional religion affecting these attitudes was largely accounted for when we further controlled this variable by sex and ethnic group (in particular among the Mijikenda and Maasai, where religion and ethnic origin tend to coincide). Other factors as age, place of residence, or social class of our respondents were of relatively little significance.

c.) Attitudes towards social change:

Social change has become an all-pervasive phenomenon in the world today. It has become particularly pronounced in many parts of the "Third World". There, on the one hand, the contact with the former colonial powers and the industrialized countries has led to successful innovations improving the conditions of life in certain groups and some "development" in general, but also, in some cases, to the impoverishment of others and increasing "underdevelopment".<sup>21)</sup> Thus today in many of these societies

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21) See also the discussion of different theories of social change and development in Part I above. We have also discussed these problems in the introduction to Berg-Schlosser, Dirk (ed.), Die Politischen Probleme der Dritten Welt, Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1972, pp. 14 ff..



there exist at least four groups of people: Those who still have been left largely untouched in their traditional way of life (a relatively small group in most countries today and quickly disappearing), those who were able to improve the conditions of their material existence, those for whom the negative effects of "development" have been greater than its potential benefits, and those who have undergone social and economic changes but who are economically neither better nor worse off as a result.

At the attitudinal level these changes may be accompanied by the "dynamization" of certain aspects of life, a readiness to accept innovations and similar attitudes, <sup>22)</sup> but also, on the other hand, increasing frustrations, anxieties and a more general "anomie".

For our survey we looked for a number of items relating to different aspects of social change. The main sources available were scales developed in the United States which probed for a more general "political-economic conservatism", <sup>23)</sup> but also for different aspects of

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22) This aspect is, for example, stressed in particular by Behrendt, Richard F., Soziale Strategie für Entwicklungsländer, Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1965; cf. also Rogers, Everett M., The Diffusion of Innovations, loc. cit..

23) Cf., e.g., the scales developed by Adorno, Theodor W. et al., The Authoritarian Personality, New York: Harper and Row, 1950; or McClosky, Herbert, "Conservatism and Personality", American Political Science Review, vol. 52, no. 4, Dec. 1958, pp. 27 - 45.

possible alienation and anomie. <sup>24)</sup> It was not possible to include any of these scales in full, because the original items were too culture-bound or did not seem applicable under Kenya's present conditions. Even the reduced number of items which we finally selected turned out to tap a variety of dimensions. This is also the case with "conservatism" in the United States, which refers to a reluctance towards changes at the economic level, but which can also become an expression of a distinctive political attitude (in a "left-right" sense of the political spectrum), not rarely involving deeper personality aspects and religious orientations as well. <sup>26)</sup>

These different dimensions need not necessarily coincide in the same way in all societies. "Political conservatism", for example, cannot be meaningfully analyzed, in our opinion, without looking at which groups actually exercised political power in any given country. Members of such groups may then be very "conservative" in a political sense of the word, but nevertheless quite receptive to other social or economic changes. Similarly, the persistence

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24) Cf., e.g., the scale developed by McClosky, Herbert and Schaar, J. H., "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy", American Sociological Review, 1965, 30, I, pp. 14 - 40.

26) For a discussion of these aspects of conservatism cf., e.g., also Robinson, John P. et al., Measures of Political Attitudes, Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1968, pp. 79 ff..



of certain traditional economic practices may or may not coincide with certain religious beliefs,<sup>27)</sup> or, at the psychological level, social changes may or may not be accompanied by increasing normlessness or anomie.

At least these four main dimensions (political conservatism, reluctance towards economic changes, religious orientations, and an expression of anomie) are related to our items dealing with different aspects of social change which affect different groups in our sample in different ways. We were not able to cover other dimensions sufficiently at this place.<sup>28)</sup> We shall focus attention here on an expression of a more general "traditionalism" on the one hand, and some of the possible psychological consequences of social change on the other. Among our items two in particular proved to be an expression of a more traditional orientation: "It's better to stick to what you have than to try new things that you really don't know about";<sup>29)</sup> and "A man doesn't really have much wisdom until he is well along in his years".<sup>30)</sup> Table III, 39 gives the combined results:

Insert Table III, 39:

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27) See also the discussion of this aspect in the preceding chapter above.

28) See also the preceding and the following chapter.

29) Item 20 of question 40.

30) Item 43 of question 40.

Table III, 39: Expression of "Traditionalism"; by ethnic group:

Expression of "Traditionalism" (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Low	18	28	11	20	34	3	16	21
Medium	39	45	43	37	32	38	40	39
High	33	25	43	39	33	52	44	36
Don't know	10	2	3	4	1	7	--	4
Total:	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

As might have been expected from some of our other findings, the Kalenjin, Maasai, and Mijikenda have the highest scores on this index. The Kamba, Kikuyu, and Luo, on the other hand, have the smallest number of those scoring high. The Luyia occupy an intermediate position. Controls show that the age of a respondent produces the most pronounced differences (42% of those above the age of 50 scoring high compared to 33% for those below 30;  $r = 0.08$ ;  $p < 0.01$ ). Contrary to some clichés, women expressed a lower level of traditionalism than men (30% of the former scoring high compared to 41% of the latter;  $r = 0.09$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Other factors such as a respondent's level of education, place of residence, or social class accounted for only a relatively small variation on this index.

That social change is not rarely accompanied by some adverse consequences as well becomes apparent from the answers to two other related items: "Everything changes so quickly these days that I often have trouble deciding which are the right rules to follow";<sup>31)</sup> and "people were better off

31) Item 21 of question 40.



in the old days when everyone knew just how he was expected to act".<sup>32)</sup> Here it is not so much the ethnic origin of our respondents (e.g. a difference of only 2 percentage points between the rural proletarioids scoring high among the Kikuyu and Maasai), but rather their social class which accounts for the most pronounced differences:

Table III, 40: Expression of "Anomie"; by class:

Expression of anomie (%)	Non-agric. bourg.	Salar. proletariat	Proletariat	Non-agric. proletarioids	Sub-proletariat	Agric. Bourgeois	Agric. proletarioids	Tot.
Low	(33) 26	17	(19) 19	19	18	18	18	19
Medium	(54) 38	31	(15) 47	47	34	36	36	35
High	-- 31	44	62	28	33	38	38	37
Don't know	(13) (5)	8	(4) (6)	(6)	15	8	8	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	15	61	179	26	57	181	559	1078

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents)

Thus the members of the urban middle and upper classes (non-agricultural bourgeoisie and salariat) clearly have the highest number of low scorers on this index, while the percentage of those scoring high is strongest for the proletariat, and the non-agricultural proletarioids. The sub-proletariat, which includes a number of "better-off" prostitutes and members of similar occupations, has the same low number of low scorers as the non-agricultural

32) Item 32 of question 40

Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Mythologie*, Paris, 1955, pp. 155-156. Also see: Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Le Totémisme aujourd'hui*, Paris, 1963, pp. 155-156. Also see: Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Le Système des Familles*, Paris, 1967, pp. 155-156. Also see: Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Le Genre du Bien*, Paris, 1976, pp. 155-156. Also see: Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Le Sentier des Femmes*, Paris, 1977, pp. 155-156. Also see: Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Le Droit du Genre*, Paris, 1978, pp. 155-156. Also see: Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Le Genre du Bien*, Paris, 1976, pp. 155-156. Also see: Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Le Sentier des Femmes*, Paris, 1977, pp. 155-156. Also see: Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Le Droit du Genre*, Paris, 1978, pp. 155-156.

33) For this point of view, see e.g. Gurr, op. cit., chapter 2, pp. 155-156.

proletariats, but a greater percentage has a "medium" rather than a high score. The differences between the agricultural classes are comparatively small. Our other controls (such as sex, age, level of education, or place of residence of our respondents) produce relatively little variation on this score.

d.) Disposition towards violence:

Violent behavior is intrinsically related to many forms of social and political conflict.<sup>33)</sup> It has a variety of "subjective" and "objective" sources and can serve both "repressive" or "liberating" ends in concrete historical situations. While we cannot discuss here all the potential sources of violence in Kenya, the different forms it may take, or the ends which may be pursued by its proponents, certain attitudinal aspects expressing some of the latent potential for violent action in different social groups must be considered as an important element of this country's political culture. There can be no doubt that attitudes favoring certain forms of violent behavior and concrete acts of violence are more prevalent in some societies and social groups than in others (compare, for example, the higher level of both general social and political violence, for different historical reasons, in the United States or Mexico with, say, the Scandinavian countries today).<sup>34)</sup>

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33) Among the vast number of historical and contemporary studies on this subject Ted R. Gurr's Why Men Rebel, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, stands out as the most comprehensive and recent one, based on a wide array of empirical evidence. It also contains a good bibliography. Discussions of different aspects of revolutionary change can be found, for example, in: Welch, Claude E. and Taintor, Mavis Bunker (eds), Revolution and Political Change, Belmont: Wadsworth, 1972; or von Beyme, Klaus (ed.), Empirische Revolutionsforschung, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1973.

34) For this point cf., e.g., also Gurr, op. cit., chapter 6, pp. 155 ff..



The measurement of attitudes alone, however, does not provide us with an answer as to how and where such a potential may be activated in a concrete situation. This will depend on the actual social and political circumstances.<sup>35)</sup> Our analysis thus refers more to a potential form and intensity rather than the actual kind or reason for a particular conflict. It is also important to note that an analysis of this kind does not imply any more far-reaching assumptions as to the "innate" nature of a disposition towards violence.<sup>36)</sup> Furthermore, a potential of this kind cannot be assumed to have a fixed and permanent magnitude. Rather, it must be considered to be amenable to the usual forces of social change, such as variations in socializing processes or social structural developments. It seems nevertheless useful to assess this potential at the attitudinal level in a given society at a given point in time in order to determine more closely one of the important dimensions of possible conflict.<sup>37)</sup>

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35) For a discussion of the potential conflict groups in this respect see also chapter 1 of Part I above.

36) An assumption of this kind is made, for example, in a part of the extensive literature on "theories of aggression", cf., e.g., Lorenz, Konrad, Das sogenannte Böse - Zur Naturgeschichte der Aggression, Wien: Borotha-Schüler, 1963, which draws very far-reaching analogies between human and observed animal behavior. This approach is strongly criticized, for example, in Plack, Arno (ed.), Der Mythos vom Aggressionstrieb, München: List, 1973.

37) The other more "objective" dimension which, for example, finds its expression in social structural tensions must not be neglected either, cf., e.g., our discussion of the "dimensions" of politics in chapter 1 of Part I above.

In the more general social sphere, the attitudinal potential for violent action can be measured for example by the degree of acceptance of statements approving violent behavior, or of certain norms which imply the forceful redress of a perceived or real insult or injustice. An additional indicator of the frequency of violent behavior in a society is also the current rate of crimes, at least those directed against persons. It is difficult and often impossible to compare measures of this kind on an international level, because the social circumstances are too varied to be meaningfully described by such indicators alone.<sup>38)</sup> Within the Kenyan context and after examining the social background of each of the groups involved, however, comparisons on this basis seems to be justified, if one keeps their limitations in mind.

For this purpose we, included a number of statements in the survey relating to expressions of aggressiveness and possible acts of violent behavior. After testing their interrelationships<sup>39)</sup> we were able to combine four of them into a separate "index of dispositions towards violence". The items finally included are: "Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict";<sup>40)</sup> "it is understandable that men who feel that their honor has been violated take the law into their own hands";<sup>41)</sup> "an insult to your honor

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38) The inherent difficulties in comparisons of this kind are manifested, for example, in the section on political protest and violence in Taylor, Charles Lewis and Hudson, Michael C., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972, pp. 59 ff., where often quite dissimilar events have been compiled in the same categories which without further knowledge of the countries and actual incidents may result in quite misleading interpretations of such data.

39) See also our "Methodological Appendix" below.

40) Item 4 of question 40.

41) Item 30 of question 40.



should not be forgotten"; <sup>42)</sup> and "everybody has the right to defend himself and to use weapons if necessary". <sup>43)</sup> The responses by ethnic groups are summarized in table III, 41:

Table III, 41: Disposition towards violence; by ethnic group:

"Disposition towards violence" (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Low	35	53	44	44	65	42	39	47
Medium	39	31	36	27	28	31	21	33
High	26	16	20	29	7	27	40	23
Total:	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	167	143	96	151	193	85	108	1043

Among those scoring low on this index the Luo clearly stand out as having the highest percentage, thus confirming to a certain extent their general reputation of being peacefully-inclined or, as some of their potential adversaries tend to put it, "cowardly". <sup>44)</sup> The Kikuyu and the Maasai, on the other hand, have

42) Item 54 of question 40.

43) Item 50 of question 40.

44) For this point see also chapter 5 d in Part II above.

the smallest percentage of low scorers, followed by the Kalenjin. Controls show that this attitude is largely independent of social class, level of education, or place of residence. As might have been expected, however, females exhibit a less aggressive attitude than their male counterparts (17% scoring high compared to 27% for males;  $r = 0.08$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). A disposition towards violence is also slightly higher in the middle age groups between 30 and 50 years (25% scoring high compared to 22% for the younger and 20% for the older age groups).

If we look for a possible source of this "disposition towards violence" the expectation that this may lie in the particular child-rearing practices of each group, at least as far as we were able to determine them, <sup>45)</sup> cannot be realized: This index did not prove to be related to the more severe forms of punishment of children either in the generation of our respondents or in that of their parents (the Spearman correlation coefficients in both instances are very low and statistically insignificant).

When we compare these attitudinal data with the current crime rates in Kenya, we find a certain confirmation of their pattern: <sup>46)</sup> Both in Kenya as a whole and in Nairobi as the major urban center the Kikuyu and Maasai stand out as those who commit the greatest number of offenses (in particular against persons) in relation to their total population. In the case of the Maasai this may be an expression of their traditionally more

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45) See also section a of chapter I of this part above.

46) See also table II, "Comparative data..." above.



belligerent orientation and their "fondness" for cattle-raids, which is still reflected in the "nuisance" caused by many il-murrani in traditionally less approved circumstances up to the present day. <sup>47)</sup>

In contrast, the high crime rate of the Kikuyu probably must be interpreted to be a consequence of their relatively high level of social differentiation in particular the large number of those who today have migrated to town often without finding proper employment. Unfortunately the data presented by Muga do not allow for a further analysis in this regard.

As far as the actual conflict potential of the different groups is concerned it thus seems fair to conclude from the evidence presented here, and also if one looks at historical developments in Kenya, <sup>48)</sup> that a greater number of Kikuyu, Maasai, and Kalenjin may react violently if they see their position threatened. In contrast, most Luo and to a certain extent the Mijikenda and Kamba seem to be more likely to avoid a violent confrontation, if possible.

e.) Political authoritarianism:

The concept of the "authoritarian personality" generated an intensive and often quite controversial discussion in the social sciences after World War II. <sup>41)</sup> It relates deep-seated personality aspects to an expression of socially and politically "authoritarian" behavior,

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47) See also Part II, chapter 7 c above.

48) See also Part I, chapter 2 above.

which culminates in the potential "fascism" exhibited by personalities of this type. The main research tool of the original study was the California "F-" (for potential fascism) scale, which attempted to tap different dimensions of authoritarianism with a large number of attitudinal items which could be employed in survey research. By now this concept has been subjected to a thorough substantive (e.g. whether "authoritarianism" is only a characteristic of the extreme political right or perhaps also of the extreme left), and methodological criticism.<sup>50)</sup> The applicability of the original research instrument is also restricted, because a great number of items of these "California F- scale" are dated and culture-bound.

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50) Cf., e.g., Christie, R. and Jahoda, Marie (eds.), Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality", New York;: The Free Press, 1954; or Kirsch, J. P. and Dillehay, R. C., Dimensions of Authoritarianism: A Review of Research and Theory, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967. The methodological criticism was directed against the possible "acquiescence" which might be involved in the answers to the mostly "positively" worded statements of the original F-scale. Attempts to "reverse" some of the original items have, however, often led to quite clumsy results and the reversed scales frequently were only poorly correlated with the original ones, cf., e.g., Bass, B. M., "Authoritarianism or Acquiescence", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1955, 51, pp. 616 - 623.



While it did not make sense, therefore, to use the original F-scale for some of its shorter or "reversed" forms in our survey, we did include a number of attitudinal items designed for a similar purpose. 51) From some of these we were able to construct a separate "political authoritarianism" -index. 52) As this label (and most of the items used) suggest, we did not attempt to cover all of even the most important dimensions of "authoritarian personalities" or authoritarian behavior, but we rather restricted the use of the index to the more direct political sphere. We also believe that the designation of "fascism" for attitudes tapped by this measure does not make sense under Kenya's present socio-economic conditions. It is still highly controversial what the exact links between political attitudes of this kind and actual deeper lying personality patterns are. Since we were not in a position to validate our results by other more directly psychological "personality" measures, we prefer to treat them as expressions of a purely attitudinal nature without implying that they necessarily represent any deeper-rooted personality characteristics:

The items which we have finally selected and put together in our index are : "When the country is in great danger, we may have to force some people even if it violates their rights"; 53) "the government should prohibit books and films which it thinks are harmful

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51) Cf., e.g., Janowitz M. and Marvick, D., "Authoritarianism and Political Behavior", Public Opinion Quarterly, 1953, 17, pp. 185 - 201; or Cane, R. E., "Political Personality and Electoral Choice", APSR, 1955, 49, pp. 173 - 190.

52) For the exact procedures and the statistical properties of this index see also our "Methodological Appendix" below.

53) Item 7 of question 40.

for the public"; 54) "a few strong leaders can make this country better than all the laws and talk"; 55) "almost any unfairness or brutality may be justified when some important political purpose is to be carried out"; 56) and, with a more general content, "What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents". 57)

Table III, 42: Political authoritarianism; by ethnic group;

Expression of "political authoritarianism" (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Meas.	Tot.
Low	14	29	31	39	32	33	23	28
Medium	44	44	37	37	41	40	45	42
High	18	13	8	18	10	17	12	14
Don't know	24	14	24	6	17	10	20	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

Political authoritarianism as expressed in this index is thus strongest among the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin. The Mijikenda, Luo, Kamba, and Maasai, on the other hand, have a very low number of those who agree on most of the items presented here. The Luyia express a strongly bifurcated pattern, scoring quite high on both extremes. Controls indicate that this attitude is not very widespread in the non-agricultural bourgeoisie (only 8% scoring high), and among the urban proletarioids, and

54) Item 8 of question 40.  
 55) Item 11 of question 40.  
 56) Item 34 of question 40.  
 57) Item 33 of question 40.



members of the sub-proletariat (8% ranking high). It reaches intermediate levels in the agricultural bourgeoisie (15%), and among the agricultural proletaroids (14%), and finds its strongest expression in the urban salariat (20%) and proletariat (21%). Education shows a curvilinear pattern: while the number of high scorers is relatively low both among illiterates (12%) and those with some secondary education (13%), it is significantly higher among those with some primary education (18%). Age is another important factor influencing this attitude (21% of those aged over 50 scoring high compared to 13% for the lower age groups), while sex remains relatively insignificant.

It must also be noted that the number of those who answer "don't know" on one of these items is highest in the oldest age groups, among females, agricultural proletaroids, and illiterates. The higher levels of authoritarianism expressed by members of these latter groups may, therefore, be of the more apathetic and passive parochial kind, whereas the high level of authoritarianism in the urban proletariat and the salariat, which have a much higher level of awareness of overall national politics,<sup>59)</sup> may result in more active and aggressive forms of authoritarianism as well.<sup>60)</sup> More authoritarian patterns of family socialization again did not prove to be related to this index in any appreciable way. The relative weight of the different

59) See also section a of the next chapter below.

60) This point will be further discussed in our concluding part below.

factors affecting this attitude as determined by an analysis of variance, is a value of beta of 0.18 for the ethnic group, 0.08 for the social class, 0.08 for the level of education and 0.02 for the sex of our respondents (age being adjusted for as a co-variate).

The willingness to accept authoritarian acts by the government, which is expressed by the majority of our items, is also related, of course, to the legitimacy of the regime concerned.<sup>61)</sup> In fact, our authoritarianism index is strongly related to our measure of "system support" (a Pearson product moment correlation of 0.37).<sup>62)</sup> Controlling for this factor results in the following table:

Table III, 43; Political authoritarianism and system support; by ethnic group:

Political Authoritarianism (%)		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Iuo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Low system support	Low	31	(38)	(53)	66	40	--	84	45
	Medium	47	(33)	(47)	(26)	41	--	(8)	38
	High	(5)	(4)	--	(5)	(7)	--	(8)	6
	Don't know	(17)	(25)	--	(3)	12	--	--	11
Medium system support	Low	(9)	26	39	40	30	36	(13)	26
	Medium	57	52	34	40	34	44	56	46
	High	14	13	(17)	17	17	20	25	17
	Don't know	20	(9)	(10)	(3)	19	--	(6)	11
High system support	Low	(6)	(5)	(14)	(14)	(9)	42	(21)	14
	Medium	44	53	46	37	82	38	79	47
	High	34	(47)	(4)	37	(9)	(10)	--	25
	Don't know	16	(5)	36	(12)	--	(10)	--	14
Total weighted N:		231	139	86	144	170	79	74	923

61) See also section c of the next chapter below.

62) See also our discussion of "system support" in section c of the next chapter below.



The differences between the ethnic groups thus tend to level off somewhat, particularly among those who rank low on system support. Among those scoring high on both indices, the Kikuyu and Luyia keep their leading position. The rank for the Kalenjin among the high scorers is now reversed, which indicates that their originally high political authoritarianism is mainly due to the high degree of legitimacy Kenya's present regime enjoys among them. The Mijikenda, Luo, and Maasai keep their relatively strong low scores within all control groups, while the Luyia preserves their original dichotomous patterns (having both a high number of low/low and high/high scorers). When we apply the same control to the pattern of class stratification on this index, the salariat and proletariat consistently keep their relatively high scores, while the agricultural classes and the sub-proletariat have the highest percentage of low scorers in each group. The influence of education and age on this pattern is also somewhat reduced, but these factors still tend to work in the original direction.

f.) Acceptance of democratic values:

A certain contrast to the agreement with authoritarian attitudes lies in the acceptance of democratic values. As we have already noted above, <sup>64)</sup> a workable democratic system rests not only on the institutionalization of certain democratic procedures (such as regular elections, etc.), but also on the acceptance of some basic democratic values and principles (such as the guarantee of fundamental human rights, and

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64) See the discussion in Part I above.

tolerance of other opinions). But, as has been demonstrated by a number of studies, even in a "stable democracy", as presumably the United States, a greater number of people is apt to exhibit a considerable degree of intolerance towards non-conformists,<sup>65)</sup> or, if they pay lip-service to abstract democratic principles, to think and act quite differently when it comes to the concrete application of such values in their own immediate social and political environment.<sup>66)</sup>

As with some of the other attitudes considered here, it was not possible to employ any of the empirical measures developed in these studies to a greater extent in our own research. But at least some items used in these works seemed to be applicable to the existing conditions in Kenya, so that at least at this most general level some insight into the acceptance of some basic democratic values can be gained. Three of these items could again be combined into a separate index."<sup>67)</sup> These are: "I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views may be";<sup>68)</sup> "everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say in political matters";<sup>69)</sup> and "no matter what a person's political

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65) Cf., e.g., Stouffer, Samuel A., Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties, New York: Doubleday, 1955.

66) For this latter point cf., e.g., Prothro, James W. and Grigg, Charles M., "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement: Journal of Politics, vol. 22, 1960, pp. 276 - 294; or McClosky, Herbert, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics", APSR, 1964, 58, pp. 361 - 382.

67) See also our "Methodological Appendix" below.

68) Item 13 of question 40.

69) Item 19 of question 40.



beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else." 70) The combined results are reported in table III, 44:

Table III, 44: Acceptance of Democratic Values; by ethnic group:

Acceptance of Democratic Values (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Low	21	29	23	30	37	33	34	29
Medium	33	37	35	34	30	29	43	34
High	34	26	29	31	31	35	19	30
Don't know	12	8	13	5	2	3	4	7
Total:	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

The variation between the ethnic groups for the high scorers around the mean thus is not very great, even though it remains statistically significant. The only major exception are the Maasai (only 19% scoring high) among whom in particular the low scores for the "traditionalists" (e.g. 38% of the illiterates scoring low on this index) are responsible for this position. Further controls show that a higher level of education (25% scoring high among illiterates compared to 40% for those with some secondary education), and urban residence (41% scoring high compared to 29% in the rural area) tend to lead to higher scores in all groups. This pattern is also reflected in the "class" membership of our respondents, where 30% of the agricultural-bourgeoisie and 27% of the agricultural proletarioids

70) Item 27 of question 40.

rank high compared to more than 40% for the non-agricultural middle and upper classes, and 34% for the urban proletariat and the non-agricultural proletarioids. The number of high scorers among males (36%) is also distinctly higher than among females (23%), and in the older age groups (41%) compared to the middle (27%) and younger ones (31%). The relative variance explained by these factors is (values of beta) 0.18 for ethnic groups, 0.10 for social class, 0.08 for level of education, and 0.05 for the sex of our respondents.

A judgement on "democracy" is also passed by our respondents in their answers to an additional, reversely worded, <sup>71)</sup> statement: The main trouble with democracy is that most people don't really know what is best for them". <sup>72)</sup>

Table III, 45: Attitude towards democracy; by ethnic group:

"Trouble with Democracy" (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Agree	52	64	62	54	31	46	41	50
Disagree	35	33	19	42	54	51	42	39
Don't know	13	3	19	4	15	3	17	11
Total:	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	254	152	96	158	193	92	108	1053

71) For the problem of acquiescence see also our "Methodological Appendix".

72) Item 16 of question 40.



Here, the Kamba and the Mijikenda clearly stand out for their high level of agreement, while the Luo are particularly adamant in their opposition. The other groups fall somewhere in between these two extremes. Controls by social class do not reveal great differences, except for the fact that the percentage of those answering "don't know" is much higher among the agricultural proletarioids (16%) and in the proletariat (11%) compared to 3% on the average for all the other classes. The differences by level of education, place of residence, age, and sex of our respondents also become very small when the respectively greater percentage of "don't know" for illiterates (18%), people in the rural areas (12%), the older age groups (16%, and females (15% are taken into account.

It would be unrealistic to expect, however, that Kenya's population can be neatly divided into "democrats" and "authoritarians" with the help of such indices. Even in the United States where similar investigations have been conducted on a much larger scale, with more refined sampling techniques, and employing thoroughly tested scales, this is not the case.<sup>73)</sup> In addition to still existing methodological problems, it is still problematical as to which other attitudinal syndromes may be relevant for the characterization of societies, in particular, which dimensions of "authoritarianism" may be compatible with the acceptance of democratic procedures in certain societies and historical situations.<sup>74)</sup>

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73) Cf., e.g., the discussion of "conservatism - liberalism" scales and indices in Robinson et al., op. cit., pp. 79 ff..

74) For this point cf., e.g., also Sniderman, Paul M., Personality and Democratic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, who mainly examined the relationships between a person's "self-esteem" and different aspects of democratic politics.

Furthermore, the degree of "cognitive consistency" of a large part of the population should not be over-estimated.<sup>75)</sup> At a purely logical level, contradictory opinions may be held side by side by many people without their being aware of this fact and without causing any major psychological problems.

In fact, our measures of "authoritarianism" and "acceptance of democratic values" turn out to be correlated significantly ( $r = 0.20$ ;  $p < 0.001$ ). This relationship is reduced somewhat if we control for "system support" as we did with the authoritarianism measure alone ( $r$  then has a value of 0.17). Another factor affecting this relationship is the level of political information of our respondents.<sup>76)</sup> If both "systems support" and level of political information are controlled simultaneously, the correlation drops to 0.15.

Summing up some of the results of this chapter, we can again report some interesting findings: At the most general social level, ascriptive criteria still play an important role in Kenya, but the differences among the ethnic groups, e.g. the Kalenjin and Maasai in contrast to the others, are nevertheless remarkable.

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75) This is emphasized, for example, by Converse, Phillip E., "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics", in: Apter, David Ed. (ed.), Ideology and Discontent, New York: The Free Press, 1964, pp. 206 - 261. For a further discussion of problems of this kind cf. also the volume edited by Feldman, Shel, Cognitive Consistency, New York: Academic Press, 1966.

76) This variable is discussed further in chapter 5 a of this part below.



The social and political role of women, as a special case is also interpreted in the most restricted way by these two groups. The findings for the Mijikenda, where Islam has its greatest stronghold in Kenya, reveals the largest differences between the sexes: Men still mostly are of the opinion that women should have less freedom, while women most vividly oppose this attitude. Our results concerning attitudes towards social change cast a similar light on these groups. Again the Kalenjin and Maasai show the strongest attachment towards traditional orientations, followed by the Mijikenda. When we attempt to analyze some of the psychological consequences of social change not the differentiation by ethnic group but that by social class produces the greatest variations. Here, the proletariat and the non-agricultural proletarioids express by far the highest degree of a feeling of anomie, while the agricultural classes and the urban bourgeoisie remain relatively unaffected.

Our probe for a possible "disposition towards violence" reveals a relatively high level of expression of this attitude by the Kikuyu and Maasai, followed by the Kalenjin. A relatively high level of actually violent behavior is also confirmed by the current crime statistics for the first two groups. "Political authoritarianism" as a further important cultural feature proved to be most prevalent among the Kikuyu, Luyia and Kalenjin. In the case of the last group this factor turns out to be most strongly related to the generally high level of support for Kenya's present regime. The somewhat contrasting "acceptance of democratic values" does not show a great deal of variation among the different ethnic

groups, at least at first sight. When we control both for the level of system support and of actual political information the distinction between "authoritarians" and "democrats" becomes much clearer.

and religious characteristics, and can now move into the directly political sphere. We shall start with the discussion of the levels of political interests and political information of our respondents. These will then be related to their actual level of political participation from which we will derive a typology relevant to the Kenya situation, of different kinds of participants. Among the "inputs" of the political system we shall then analyze the non-material "support" it receives from the different groups and the attitudes relating to the most important "input aggregating" structures. In the absence of inter-party competition, the role of members of parliament deserves our special attention here. Subsequently, the focus will be placed on the central governmental institutions including aspects of the bureaucracy and other "output" structures. In two final sections we shall attempt to evaluate the performance of the system as a whole as seen through the eyes of our respondents, and then turn to some possible alternative orientations which, given the relative fragility of any political system in Africa today, may provide us with some clues concerning the expectations of our respondents in this regard and Kenya's political future as a whole.

### a.) Levels of political interest and political information

In order to lay the foundations for our later analysis of political attitudes and behavior we asked our respondents specifically whether they follow political and governmental affairs, and whether they are at all interested in politics:

1) Questions 19 a. and 33 a.



CHAPTER 5: SPECIFIC ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS THE POLITICAL SYSTEM:

We have discussed some of the more basic social, economic, and religious characteristics, and can now move into the directly political sphere. We shall start with the discussion of the levels of political interests and political information of our respondents. These will then be related to their actual level of political participation from which we will devise a typology relevant to the Kenyan situation, of different kinds of participants. Among the "inputs" of the political system we shall then analyze the non-material "support" it receives from the different groups and the attitudes relating to the most important "input aggregating" structures. In the absence of inter-party competition, the role of members of parliament deserves our special attention here. Subsequently, the focus will be placed on the central governmental institutions including aspects of the bureaucracy and other "output" structures. In two final sections we shall attempt to evaluate the performance of the system as a whole as seen through the eyes of our respondents, and then turn to some possible alternative orientations which, given the relative fragility of any political system in Africa today, may provide us with some clues concerning the expectations of our respondents in this regard and Kenya's political future as a whole.

a.) Levels of political interest and political information:

In order to lay the foundations for our later analysis of political attitudes and behavior we asked our respondents specifically whether they follow political and governmental affairs, and whether they are at all interested in politics:<sup>1)</sup>

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1) Questions 19 e, and 33 a.

Table III, 46; Political Interest; by ethnic group:

Percentage		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Follow political affairs	Regularly	20	3	2	32	6	15	13	14
	From time to time	35	20	28	21	31	11	17	26
	Never	45	77	70	47	63	74	70	60
Interested in politics	Very much	39	20	36	32	17	15	28	27
	Somewhat	28	12	14	15	30	27	10	21
	Not at all	33	68	50	53	53	58	62	52
Total weighted N:		264	155	86	157	188	89	105	1044

The Kikuyu thus clearly have the highest percentage of those who follow political affairs and express an interest in politics. The Kamba, Kalenjin, and Maasai are at the other extreme, followed by the Mijikenda, who, even though a relatively high number of them said they are interested in politics, do not follow political affairs very regularly either. The Luyia and Luo occupy an intermediate position in both respects. Political interest is highest in the agricultural and urban bourgeoisie (approximately two-thirds saying they are somewhat or very much interested). It drops to about one-half among the members of the salariat and the proletariat, and to a level of only 40% among the agricultural and non-agricultural proletarioids and in the sub-proletariat. The level of education of our respondents again proves to be one of the most important factors in raising a person's interest in politics (53% of those with primary or secondary education compared to 40% for illiterates: Pearson's  $r=0.10$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Males are also more interested than females (53% compared



to 42%;  $r = 0.13$ ,  $p 0.001$ ), even if differences in the level of education are controlled for (the partial correlation in this case is  $0.11$ ,  $p 0.001$ ). Age, on the other hand, is of relatively little significance. It is remarkable, however, that interest in politics is generally higher in the rural areas than in town (29% being very much interested compared to 19%;  $r = 0.06$ ,  $p 0.05$ ), particularly in view of the fact that the level of education is much higher in town (if education is controlled for the partial correlation then becomes  $0.09$ ,  $p 0.001$ ). This points to the relatively high salience of rural politics in Kenya which we will discuss in more detail below. <sup>2)</sup>

Beyond the level of political interest expressed by our respondents we also wanted to know their actual level of political information. A number of scales were developed for this purpose. <sup>3)</sup> All of them, however, are necessarily culture-bound, reflecting the particular circumstances in each country. This imposes serious limitations on meaningful international comparisons of this aspect of political culture. Within a particular country, however, scales of this kind can reveal some important relative differences. Even though the questions asked in this regard are usually of the "school Knowledge" type, which may not always be relevant in particular political situations, the responses to our scale seem to indicate some very important variations in the orientations towards politics among the different groups concerned. From the cognitive questions in our survey

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2) See also sections b and e of this chapter below

3) Cf., e.g., Matthews, D. R. and Prothro, J. W., Negroes and the New Southern Politics, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966; or Almond and Verba, op. cit...

we were able to group together eight as a separate "scale" in an approximately ascending order of difficulty. <sup>4)</sup> These are: "Who is the President of Kenya?"; "What is the name of his party?"; "Can you name us a well-known politician?"; "Do you know in which year Kenya became independent?"; "Who is the Member of Parliament for this area?"; "Can you mention some important international events which happened last year?"; "What is the name of the President of the United States of America?"; "Can you mention an important leader of the Soviet Union?" <sup>5)</sup> These were then again grouped into "low" (answering three questions correctly), "medium" (answering five correctly) and "high" (answering at least six correctly) scores. In order to rank "high", at least one correct answer concerning international affairs was required. The results are reported in table III, 47:

Insert Table III, 47:

4) Although a scale of this kind may potentially satisfy the criteria of "Guttman-scaling" (i.e. unidimensionality and a cumulative scoring of consecutively ordered items), we thought the substantive information contained in each item to be more important for our purposes than their perfect "fit" in an ascending scale. For this reason we were content with a purely additive rather than a perfect "Guttman"-scaling of these items. For some further methodological criticism of Guttman-scales cf. also Nunnally, Jum C., Psychometric Theory, New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1967, pp. 63 ff..

5) Questions 21 a - h.



Table III, 47: Political information; by class and ethnic group:

Level of political information (%) :		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Mars.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle + upper classes	None	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Low	(4)	(7)	--	(12)	(25)	--	--	(9)
	Medium	(23)	(26)	(60)	(38)	(33)	(100)	--	30
	High	73	67	(40)	(50)	(42)	--	(100)	61
Proletariat	None	(5)	--	--	--	(6)	--	--	(3)
	Low	28	(17)	(57)	36	(39)	(60)	--	34
	Medium	50	(50)	(43)	50	(22)	(40)	(80)	46
	High	17	(33)	--	(14)	(33)	--	(20)	17
Non-agric. proletaroids + sub-proletariat	None	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
	Low	32	--	(50)	(40)	(25)	(67)	--	30
	Medium	40	(40)	--	(60)	(35)	--	--	36
	High	28	(60)	(50)	--	(40)	(33)	(100)	34
Agric. bourgeoisie	None	--	--	(50)	--	--	--	--	1
	Low	(5)	(50)	--	(16)	50	(23)	(19)	20
	Medium	67	(50)	(50)	(17)	50	46	(19)	45
	High	28	--	--	67	--	31	62	34
Agric. proletaroids	None	(7)	11	25	--	11	(9)	34	14
	Low	31	50	67	36	49	(18)	45	45
	Medium	54	36	(8)	47	30	55	12	33
	High	8	(3)	--	17	10	(18)	(9)	8
Total +)	None	(3)	8	23	--	7	(3)	25	8
	Low	22	40	58	29	44	28	36	35
	Medium	50	37	16	39	31	47	16	36
	High	25	15	(3)	32	18	22	23	21
Total weighted N:		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

+) Including students

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category)

The Maasai and Mijikenda thus clearly have the greatest number of those who do not have any information concerning national, let alone international politics. The fact that almost one-fourth of our respondents in these groups were not able to answer even a single question means, in effect, that they (and 8% of the total!) do not even know the name of the President of the country. The percentage of those without or with very little information is also quite high among the Luo and Kamba (amounting to almost 50% in each group). The Kikuyu, Luyia and Kalenjin, on the other hand, clearly exhibited the highest over-all level of information, the percentage of "medium" and "high" scorers constituting 70% and more of the respondents in these groups. A sizeable minority among the Maasai, however, i.e. predominantly those who have had some formal education and are engaged in modern occupations, have a very high level of political information (23% of the total for this group).

This leads us to a closer look at the class distribution of this variable: The urban middle and upper classes, including the salariat, thus have by far the greatest percentage of "high" scorers (more than 60% among them), followed by the "agricultural bourgeoisie", the "non-agricultural proletaroids" and the "sub-proletariat" with about one-third of the respondents in each of these groups scoring high. This still impressive score for this last category is a reflection of the fact that a number of better-educated jobless people are included here. The members of the proletariat occupy a somewhat lower intermediate position (about one-sixth of them scoring high), while the agricultural proletaroids



clearly are at the lower end (60% of them with no or low scores).

Not surprisingly, because of the informational nature of these questions, the level of education of our respondents proved to be most strongly related (a Pearson correlation of 0.59) to this variable, but, it seems, not quite as strongly as in some industrialized countries. <sup>6)</sup> The number of high scores varies between 5% for illiterates (17% of this group not being able to answer a single question), 20% for those with some primary education, and 62% for those with some secondary education. But even among the illiterates 22% reach a "medium" score, a figure which rises to 52% for those with some primary education. The level of exposure to the modern mass media also shows a strong relationship (a Pearson correlation of 0.35 with our combined scores for radio and newspaper exposure). <sup>7)</sup>

The level of political information is also significantly higher in town (35% scoring high compared to 18% in the countryside;  $r = 0.19$ ) among males (29% scoring high compared to 8% for females;  $r = 0.32$ ), and in the lower age groups (26% of those below the age of 30 scoring high compared to 6% for those above 50;  $r = -0.23$ ). When we control for the level of education in each case the partial correlations for age and place of residence become insignificant, but remain high as far as the sex of our respondents is concerned (partial correlation = 0.22;  $p < 0.001$ ).

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6) Cf., e.g., the findings of Matthews and Prothro in this regard, *op. cit.*, pp. 78 ff..

7) See also chapter 1 c of this part above and our "Methodological Appendix" below.

b.) Political Participation:

The participation of active citizens in the process of political decision-making lies at the core of any democratic system. <sup>8)</sup> But even in non-democratic states participation by the public is often elicited, at least in some demonstrative forms through mass-rallies, in particular campaigns for increased production, charitable purposes, or for some similar goals; and in any regime some kind of participation always takes place in more covert and indirect ways. Participation thus springs from many sources both as far as individual citizens and the respective regime are concerned; it can take a large variety of forms, serves a multitude of real or perceived goals, and may vary widely in its actual effects. <sup>9)</sup>

For our purposes we restrict the use of the term participation to "those voluntary activities by which members of a society share in the selection of rulers and, directly or indirectly, in the formation of public policy". <sup>10)</sup> We thus exclude the more involuntary and purely demonstrative forms of "participation" such as acts of "voting" in countries where there is not at least some choice between different candidates or parties, and participation in less direct political affairs in industrial enterprises or in other private or public

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8) For a discussion of different aspects and theories of "democracy" see also Part I, chapter 1 above.

9) For a summary of some major propositions in this regard cf., e.g., Milbrath, Lester W., Political Participation, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965.

10) This is the definition employed by Herbert McClosky in his article on "Political Participation" in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, New York: Mcmillan, 1968, p. 252.



institutions.<sup>11)</sup> The emphasis on public policy also excludes the more personal and private contacts a citizen may have with government officials at various levels and thus also his relations as a "subject" vis-a-vis the output structures of a political system.<sup>12)</sup>

The operationalization of this concept is difficult, however, and any standardized index or scale which attempts to measure participation does injustice to the many forms and degrees of possible political involvement.<sup>13)</sup>

Each empirical measuring device must also be adapted to the particular cultural traditions and the actual political setting of a country (e.g. traditions of communal decision-making and group organization, the party system, the particular structures of political parties, etc.).

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11) For a discussion of workers' participation and other forms of "Mitbestimmung" (industrial co-determination) cf., e.g., Hondrich, Karl-Otto, Mitbestimmung in Europa, Cologne: Europa Union Verlag, 1970; or Kuda, R.F. and Schneider, F., Mitbestimmung - Weg zur industriellen Demokratie, Munich, 1969. See also Pateman, Carole, Participation and Democratic Theory, London: Cambridge University Press, 1970, chapters III and IV.

12) This latter aspect is partly included, for example, in the category of "citizen-initiated contacts" among the four modes of participatory activities developed by Sidney, Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Joe-On Kim in: The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971.

13) Among the better-known and tested "political participation-scales" are those by Matthews and Prothro, op. cit., and Almond and Verba, op. cit.

In our case we were content with an assessment of some of the more open forms of political participation: We first asked whether our respondents ever discussed any local or national problems with other people.<sup>14)</sup> We then probed for their attendance at public meetings ("barazas") in their area;<sup>15)</sup> among most groups these meetings traditionally date back to pre-colonial times.<sup>16)</sup> Subsequently, we inquired about the actual amount of participation in Kenya's modern political system in terms of voter registration and actual voting.<sup>17)</sup> Our final question then probed for some of the most active forms of political participation, the engagement in local or national campaigns for or against any particular candidate.<sup>18)</sup> We did not ask for party affiliation or party identification of our respondents since Kenya has a de facto one-party system. It seemed equally meaningless to probe for activities within the party because of the rather desolate state of KANU at the time of our interviews.<sup>19)</sup> Where it seemed appropriate, these questions were accompanied by others probing for the details of each activity such as frequency of meetings attended and topics discussed. The combined results for these various activities are summarized in table III, 48:

Insert table III, 48:

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14) Questions 33 b and d.

15) Questions 34 a and b.

16) See also the respective sections on different forms of traditional political participation in Part II above.

17) Question 34 c.

18) Questions 34 d and e.

19) See also chapter 2 of Part I above.



Table III,48: Forms of political participation; by ethnic group:

Percentage	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Discussing local problems	62	59	53	51	55	57	51	56
" national probl.	52	46	33	42	40	25	23	41
Attending meetings	66	65	64	64	69	68	42	63
Registered for elections	51	65	67	61	66	69	17	57
Voting	41	54	57	57	58	65	14	49
Campaigning in local elections	40	5	8	25	27	17	1	21
" national elections	38	4	13	23	35	36	8	25
Weighted N:	175	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

The discussion of local problems thus occurs with almost the same frequency in all groups, no matter what the level of economic "advancement" or formal education of our respondents may be. The majority of the local problems discussed are related to the lack of infrastructure (such as water supplies, roads, educational facilities and, in the urban areas, adequate housing). Approximately another third deal with conditions of production in particular agricultural (unfavorable weather conditions, lack of arable land, cattle diseases, etc.), and economic hardships in general (low income, unemployment, rising prices). About another 10% are problems of a more general social nature (such as crime, broken marriages, alcoholism). Only a very small group (less than 5% of our respondents) discusses more direct political problems (such as the behavior of public officials or politicians, including corruption and nepotism, or ethnic relations. When we asked our respondents how well they think understand these problems, three fourths of those who discussed local affairs replied with great confidence (understand "very well" or "quite well"). This pattern is consistent across all ethnic groups with very little deviations from the mean.

The discussion of national problems shows a more differentiated pattern. While still a majority of the Kikuyu discusses them, the percentages for the Mijikenda and, in particular, the Kalenjin and Maasai are considerably lower, the Kamba, Luyia, and Luo occupy an intermediate position. This pattern is also significantly differentiated according to the social class of our respondents: 58% in the urban middle and upper classes and 50% in the agricultural bourgeoisie discuss national affairs, whereas this figure drops to 45% for the non-agricultural proletarioids and the sub-proletariat, 41% for the proletariat, and 34% for the agricultural proletarioids. The level of understanding of national problems, or the subjective "sense of civic competency" of our respondents, to use Almond and Verba's term,<sup>20)</sup> is also somewhat reduced. Two thirds of those discussing national affairs think they understand these matters "very well" or "quite well". Here the differences between the ethnic groups become more pronounced, too: The Kikuyu head the list again and the Mijikenda, Kalenjin, and Maasai rank somewhat lower than the rest. In terms of social class the understanding of national problems is highest in the non-agricultural middle and upper classes (51%) and the agricultural bourgeoisie (50%). It drops to 37% for the proletariat and 33% for both in the agricultural and non-agricultural proletarioids and the sub-proletariat.

The attendance at public meetings does not show a great deal of variation among the ethnic groups. Only the Maasai have somewhat lower score, but one which is still much higher than for the rest of their participatory activities. The actual number of official public meetings may also be less among the Maasai, in view of their nomadic tradition and the general inaccessibility of the area. In a majority of cases these meetings were convened by local or regional administrative officers (chiefs and sub-chiefs, district commissioners, etc.) Almost another 40% were

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20) Cf. Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, chapter VI. Almond and Verba asked more directly for the perceptions of their respondents concerning the efficacy of their involvement in local or national political affairs. See also section d of this chapter below.



held by local politicians and members of parliament. A relatively small percentage (less than 3% each) were called by church leaders or some "Harambee" organizers not belonging to one of the already mentioned categories. These meetings most often (more than 50%) dealt with developmental projects in the area (improvement of farming, water projects, road construction, etc.), educational matters (about 10%), or other more general administrative announcements (20%). Approximately 5% were concerned with general social problems and communal relations, almost 15% dealt with more direct political matters (such as the campaigning by candidates for political office).

When we now turn to more active forms of political involvement in Kenya's central political system, the differences between the groups become even more apparent. A majority of the respondents from all ethnic groups, except again the Maasai, claimed to have been registered for the last national elections (i.e. in 1969).<sup>21)</sup> The actual election turn-out, as stated by our respondents, then is in conformity with this picture. If we analyze more closely the different factors influencing this reported voting behavior, we find that, apart from ethnic origin, age, level of education, place of residence, and sex are the strongest independent factors: Those who voted represent 62% of those older than 50 years and 65% of those in the middle age group compared to 34% of those below 30 years,  $r = 0.29$ ; 50% of the illiterate and 46% of those with primary education compared to 27% of those with some secondary education,  $r = 0.26$ ; 53% of the rural residents compared to 27% of the urban residents,  $r = 0.21$ ; 53% of the males compared to 43% of the females,  $r = 0.10$ . The influence of these factors remains significant even after their different intercorrelations are controlled for.

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21) Our interviews were conducted between January and April 1974, i.e. before the registration for the elections of October 1974 had started. Those of our respondents who were aged 23 and below at that time thus had not been eligible for registration at the time of the 1969 elections.

Our question concerning active campaigning, whether for local or national elections then produces the most clear-cut differences between the ethnic groups: The Kikuyu still reported a great deal of activity in this respect, while the Luyia, Luo, and Kalenjin occupy an intermediate position. The Mijikenda, Kam-ba, and Maasai rank lowest in both regards.

If we group these questions concerning different forms of political activities to form a "political participation scale" (scoring those with two positive answers as "low", those between three and five positive answers as "medium", and those with six or seven positive answers as "high"), we obtain the following summarized results:

Inser table III,49:

Non-agric. pro- letariats and sub-proletariat	None	(22)	(20)	(30)	(20)	(20)	—	—	21
	Low	25	(60)	—	(40)	50	(67)	(100)	30
	Medium	45	(20)	—	(40)	(30)	—	—	35
	High	(8)	—	(20)	—	—	(33)	—	(6)
Agric. bour- geoisie	None	(3)	—	—	—	(8)	—	—	(3)
	Low	(6)	(50)	(30)	(23)	(25)	—	(75)	20
	Medium	19	(50)	(30)	33	50	69	(25)	45
	High	20	—	—	42	(20)	(23)	—	32
Agric. pro- letariats	None	14	13	(4)	(9)	(5)	(16)	30	12
	Low	23	21	33	45	12	36	4	29
	Medium	33	55	43	39	63	37	21	42
	High	18	—	(8)	(10)	—	(9)	—	10
Total *)	None	14	11	5	8	8	13	28	12
	Low	24	26	34	38	21	22	48	29
	Medium	40	61	43	39	51	45	23	49
	High	22	2	7	17	16	19	1	14
Total weighted N:		249	150	95	120	194	32	100	1079

\*) Including students

(Number in parentheses indicates an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category)



Table III, 49: Over-all political participation score; by class and ethnic group:

Levels of political participation (%):		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Iuo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle + upper classes	None	(23)	(7)	(20)	(12)	(17)	--	--	16
	Low	(19)	(33)	(20)	(38)	(50)	--	--	29
	Medium	39	(53)	(60)	(38)	(25)	--	(50)	41
	High	(18)	(7)	--	(12)	(8)	(100)	(50)	14
Proletariat	None	(5)	(8)	--	(17)	(17)	(20)	--	15
	Low	33	(17)	(43)	(31)	(33)	(40)	(60)	33
	Medium	38	(58)	(57)	(45)	(39)	(20)	(40)	41
	High	(14)	(17)	--	(7)	(11)	(20)	--	11
Non-agric. proletaroids and sub-proletariat	None	(22)	(20)	(50)	(20)	(20)	--	--	21
	Low	25	(60)	--	(40)	50	(67)	(100)	38
	Medium	45	(20)	--	(40)	(30)	--	--	35
	High	(8)	--	(50)	--	--	(33)	--	(6)
Agric. bourgeoisie	None	(5)	--	--	--	--	(8)	--	(3)
	Low	(6)	(50)	(50)	(25)	(25)	--	(75)	20
	Medium	39	(50)	(50)	33	50	69	(25)	45
	High	50	--	--	42	(25)	(23)	--	32
Agric. proletaroids	None	14	13	(4)	(5)	(5)	(18)	38	13
	Low	25	21	39	46	12	36	4	29
	Medium	43	65	49	39	63	37	21	48
	High	18	--	(8)	(10)	20	(9)	--	10
Total +)	None	14	11	5	8	8	13	28	12
	Low	24	26	39	36	23	22	48	29
	Medium	40	61	49	39	53	46	23	45
	High	22	2	7	17	16	19	1	14
Total weighted N:		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

+) Including students

(Number in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category)

This combined score provides an even clearer picture of the situation: The Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luyia, and Luo have the greatest percentage of "high" scorers (i.e. a relatively large group among them which is relatively active in all regards listed in our scale).

The Kamba, Mijikenda, and Maasai, on the other hand, have only a very small number of high scorers. But while the Kamba and Mijikenda are strongly represented among those with intermediate ranks and do not show a great deal of deviation from the "non-scorers" in the other groups, almost one-third of the Maasai did not report any of the participatory acts asked for in the questionnaire. It should also be noted, that a sizeable minority in each of the more "modern" groups, somewhat more than 10% on the average, did not report any of these activities either. This points to the considerable internal differentiation in these groups, which sometimes tends to be overlooked in generalizations of this kind.

The differences by class are very pronounced. Here the "agricultural bourgeoisie" clearly stands out as having the greatest number of high scorers with practically none who is not active in some way or another. In comparison, the non-agricultural middle and upper classes (although our sample of the latter is very small) showed a much higher degree of abstention. Similarly, the over-all degree of involvement of the agricultural proletariats is higher, even though they are generally less "educated", than that of their non-agricultural counterparts and the proletariat.

This points to one of the most remarkable phenomena of Kenyan politics at the "mass" level, namely its distinct rural character. This is in clear contrast to many of the hypotheses of the early "modernization" theorists, many of whom assumed "development", including "political developments", to be a unilinear, steady process leading from illiterate societies, based on subsistence agriculture, to modern states with high levels of education, industrialization, and urbanization, allowing for a



great deal of political participation by their citizens.<sup>22)</sup> Even though the more simplistic of these theories have long been discarded,<sup>23)</sup> the assumptions concerning the modernizing and "democratizing" effects of higher levels of education and urbanization can still be found in much of the current literature. The statement for example, that "the residents of African cities tend to be more interested and informed about politics and participate at a higher rate than their rural counterparts" was presented as a seemingly generally accepted truth. It appeared in a recently published study of political behavior in Nairobi,<sup>24)</sup> although its author did not bother to check this hypothesis by analyzing any rural group in Kenya himself. This author like others might have been alerted by the conclusion reached by other studies dealing with causal models of participation in the developing areas: "Despite what we were tempted to conclude earlier, the city does not seem the place to learn participant citizenship, the big city least of all".<sup>25)</sup>

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22) The names of Lerner (cf., e.g., his The Passing of Traditional Society, loc. cit.), and Deutsch (cf., e.g., his "Social Mobilization and Political Development", APSR, vol. LV, No. 3, Sept. 1961), as some of the more prominent ones, may stand here for many others.

23) Cf., e.g., Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968, who at least also sees the possibility of political and, presumably, more general social and economic "decay".

24) Ross, Marc Howard, Grass Roots in an African City: Political Behavior in Nairobi, Cambridge/Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975, p. 2, although this author did not bother to check this hypothesis by analysing any rural groups in Kenya himself.

25) Inkeles, Alex, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing countries", APSR, No. 4, Dec. 1969, p. 1138, emphasis in the original. A similar statement can also be found in Nie, Norman H.; Powell, G. Bingham; and Prewitt, Kenneth, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships", APSR, No. 3, Sept. 1969, p. 819.

This last statement is borne out by our data, where 15% of the rural respondents have a "high" score of participation and only 11% do not participate at all compared to only 5% scoring high in the city and 24% not participating at all ( $r = 0.21$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). If we control for length of residence in town among our urban respondents the percentage of high scorers increases from two percent for those living in the city for less than two years to 15% for those who have been living there for more than ten years. The correlation between political participation and place of residence in this case drops to 0.13, but still remains highly significant. The effect of a higher level of education, taken as a single factor, is less clear-cut. 10% of the illiterates scored high compared to 16% for those with some primary and 14% for those with some secondary education, and 13% of the illiterates did not participate at all compared to 12% and 13% respectively for the other educational categories;  $r$  is only 0.01 and not significant. This definitely shatters the assumption of a simple, strongly positive unilinear relationship. Other factors like sex (18% of the males scoring high compared to 7% of the females;  $r = 0.27$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), and age (8% of those below the age of 30 scoring high compared to 16% for those above 50 and 20% for those in the middle age groups;  $r = 0.23$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) tend to influence as expected although the relatively lower level of younger (and, in Kenya, on the average better-educated) people does not fare very well with some of the earlier assumptions either. An analysis of variance performed on these different factors indicates their relative strength to be as follows (values of beta adjusted for other independent factors and covariates): Ethnic group 0.29, social class 0.23, sex 0.25, age 0.22, place of residence 0.21. Education does not have a significant independent influence ( $\beta = 0.02$ ).

If we look at some of the potential socializing factors in this case,<sup>26)</sup> we find strong relationship between a high level of political participation and membership in professional

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26) See also chapter 1 of this part above.



(74% of the members having a medium or high score compared to 53% for non-members,  $r = 0.19$ ) and voluntary organizations (72% of the members having higher scores compared to 52% for non-members,  $r = 0.24$ ). The correlation between our measure of political participation and taking part in "Harambee" activities is even more striking: 71% of those taking part in Harambee efforts have higher scores compared to only 29% scoring high among those not engaged in communal self-help activities ( $r = 0.36$ ). Another important factor in the socialization process leading to higher levels of political activity seems to be whether a respondent had been personally affected by some particular political event. 79% of those who reported that their lives had been affected by particular events also showed a high level of participation, compared to 59% among those who were not personally involved in any political affairs ( $r = 0.23$ ).

In view of all these findings contradicting any simple and straightforward relationship between political participation and other presumably "modernizing" factors, we looked for a more differentiated model of participation which better fits this situation. One proposal is that of Ross who speaks of an "independence" and "post-independence" style of political participation in Kenya.<sup>27)</sup> The first term refers to public activities more commonly subsumed under the notion of "political participation" similar to that employed in our own scale, while the second includes contacts and activities on a more personal basis (listening to the radio, talking with family members and friends, writing to government officials, etc.). We do not consider this distinction to be particularly helpful since it seems to suggest that more public forms of participation could only be found in the period preceding independence and are now a thing of the past. This clearly is not the case, as our data, and also the levels of voter registration and actual election turnouts

demonstrate.<sup>28)</sup> The fact that political participation of this kind is stronger in the rural areas (which Ross did not include) than in town may have other reasons. Thus one could perhaps speak of "rural" and "urban" styles of political participation today, but even this dichotomy seems to be too broad and superficial. It remains, therefore, imperative to look for a better model.

We obtained the most convincing results when we stratified the degree of political participation of our respondents by their actual level of political information. In this way we combine one of the directly behavioral aspects with a major cognitive factor based on direct questions and sufficiently "hard" scales. We think this procedure establishes a safer foundation for our following distinctions than, for example, the use of purely attitudinal measures (such as those probing for "authoritarian" or "democratic" dispositions), or more indirect indicators (as the level of education instead of the level of actual political information). In a more simplified form this leads us to one of the common fourfold typologies which help to bring out the different kinds of political participation or abstention more clearly:

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28) For the 1969 elections see for example, the article by Hyden, Goran and Leys, Colin, "Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems: the Case of Kenya and Tanzania", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 2, 1972, pp. 389 - 420; for the 1974 elections, see also Berg-Schlosser, Dirk "Wahlen in Kenia - Demokratie in einem Entwicklungsland?", Afrika Spektrum, No. 1, 1975, pp. 55 - 66.

29) Cf. Idea, op. cit., pp. 76 ff.

30) This is a more general category employed by Milbrath, for example, cf., Idea, op. cit., pp. 76 ff.



Table III, 50: Types of participants

Political participation:	<u>Political information:</u>	
	None or low	Medium or high
None or low	"Genuine parochials"	"Alienated"
Medium or high	"Less informed citizens"	"Active democrats"

The terms employed here should be considered as tentative, but hopefully, illustrative labels for these categories. The term "parochial" (borrowed from Almond and Verba who define it somewhat differently)<sup>29)</sup> thus is meant to designate those respondents who have both little or no information about national political affairs and who do not participate in any way in Kenya's central political system. They are to be distinguished from another kind of "apathetics",<sup>30)</sup> who, even though they have the necessary information to act meaningfully, consciously do not participate in Kenya's political processes. For lack of a better term we call them "alienated". The reasons for this "abstention" may be quite diverse, however, lying both in the personal and more general social and political sphere. Thus personal frustration or plain disinterest, for example, may be cause enough for an individual not to participate in politics. Similarly, the disenchantment of larger social groups such as certain classes or ethnic groups with central political processes, or even the not rarely quite realistic assessment that the actual chances of political participation in a particular political system are

29) Cf. *idem*, op. cit., pp. 16 ff..

30) This is a more general category employed by Milbrath, for example, cf., *idem*, op. cit., pp. 46 ff..

quite illusory and meaningless, may result in high levels of political alienation. It should be kept in mind, however, that we employ this term only in the operational sense defined above and do not imply at this point any of the socio-psychological processes or political and economic factors which may lie behind it.<sup>31)</sup> Only further and much more detailed analysis which we are not able to provide at the present stage would justify its broader and possibly "deeper" use.

The third category of "less informed citizens"<sup>32)</sup> then refers to those who show an active involvement in Kenya's politics, at least at local and intermediate levels and by the act of voting, even though their present level of information would not, in a stricter sense, fully qualify them to carry out actually and meaningfully one of the major political functions themselves. Whether this kind of participant is "aspiring" to become an active well-informed citizen one day or whether he just belongs to the more passive mass of followers in a particular group or of a particular candidate (and thus forms more or less "Stimmvieh", to use a derogatory German term) remains, of course,

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31) For a fuller discussion of this concept and its different dimensions, cf., e.g., Finifter, A.W., "Dimensions of Political Alienation", APSR, vol. 64, 1970, pp. 389 - 410; or Yinger, J. Milton, "Anomie, Alienation, and Political Behavior", in: Knutson, Jeanne N. (ed.), Handbook of Political Psychology, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973, pp. 171 - 202. The discussion of the social and economic causes of alienation ("Entfremdung") goes, of course, back to Marx.

32) The term "spectator" is used by Milbrath to describe a similar group, but which in his terminology also includes a large section of our next category of "active democrats", excluding only the actual "gladiators" in the political arena. We think that the term spectator distinguishes insufficiently between different groups of active participants and does not do justice to the many aspects of political involvement and the multiple levels of interaction between these groups and actual "gladiators".



an open question. Again, only further analysis which takes into account some of the "developmental" aspects will be able to provide us with more definite answers in this respect.

The final category of "active democrats" again bears a tentative and perhaps somewhat euphemistic label, but we think that this term expresses at least some important aspects of this type of political participant, well-informed and active in political affairs in many ways. Another important aspect is, of course, a high level of attachment to democratic values in this category, and, indeed, there is some relationship between our respective index <sup>33)</sup> and our typology (only 25% of the "parochials" scoring high compared to 36% among the "active democrats"). A sub-group of this category then are the actual "gladiators" in Milbrath's sense but we think this further distinction is much more fluid (e.g. between active party members and those actually running for some political office) than he implies and more a matter of degree than substance. Only the real "full-time" or "professional" politicians fall into a more distinct category of their own and are not included in our definition of different forms of political participation by the general public.

Despite their obvious limitations we think that these categories generally provide a useful framework for the description and analysis of different types of participants and non-participants in Kenya's present political system. A closer look at the distribution of these types in Kenya's ethnic groups and social classes may help us to better understand their meaning:

33) See also chapter 4 f of this part above.

Total	13	29	41	15	16	15	53	22
	29	7	3	25	15	20	23	26
	20	30	17	43	35	49	16	37
Total weighted N:	275	176	36	158	194	92	108	1079

\*) Including students  
(Numbers in parentheses indicate 5 or less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category)

Table III, 51: Types of participants; by class and ethnic group:

Types of participants (%):		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle+upper classes	Parochials	--	7	--	--	(17)	--	--	(4)
	Alienated	42	(33)	(40)	(50)	(50)	--	--	41
	Less-informed citizens	(4)	--	--	(12)	(8)	--	--	(4)
	Active democrats:	54	(60)	(60)	(38)	(25)	(100)	(100)	51
Proletariat	Parochials	21	--	(43)	24	(33)	(40)	--	24
	Alienated	27	(25)	--	24	(17)	(20)	(60)	24
	Less-informed	(12)	(17)	(14)	(12)	(11)	(20)	--	13
	Democrats	40	(58)	(43)	40	(39)	(20)	(40)	39
Non-agric. proletaroids	Parochials	(12)	--	--	(50)	--	--	--	(13)
	Alienated	(13)	(100)	--	--	(50)	--	(100)	(22)
	Less-informed	(25)	--	(100)	--	--	--	--	(22)
	Democrats	(50)	--	--	(50)	(50)	--	--	43
Sub-proletariat	Parochials	(25)	--	--	(33)	(28)	(67)	--	26
	Alienated	(38)	(75)	(100)	(34)	(44)	--	(100)	43
	Less-informed	(4)	--	--	--	--	--	--	(2)
	Democrats	(33)	(25)	--	(33)	(28)	(33)	--	29
Agric. bourgeoisie	Parochials	(5)	--	(50)	(8)	(12)	--	(19)	8
	Alienated	(6)	(50)	--	(17)	(13)	(8)	(56)	15
	Less-informed	--	(50)	--	(8)	(37)	(23)	--	13
	Democrats	89	--	(50)	67	(38)	69	(25)	64
Agric. proletaroids	Parochials	14	26	43	(15)	13	(18)	68	28
	Alienated	25	(8)	--	36	(4)	36	(11)	14
	Less-informed	24	35	49	20	47	(9)	(11)	31
	Democrats	37	31	(8)	29	36	37	(10)	27
Total +)	Parochials	13	20	41	15	16	15	53	22
	Alienated	25	17	3	29	15	20	23	20
	Less-informed	12	28	41	13	34	16	8	21
	Democrats	50	35	15	43	35	49	16	37
Total weighted N:		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

+ ) Including students

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category)



The "genuine parochials" thus constitute almost one fourth of our respondents on the average. They form a majority among the Maasai and are very numerous among the Mijikenda, too. The differences between the other groups are not very pronounced. The "alienated" on the other hand, are most strongly represented among the Luyia and the Kikuyu. Among the latter they can be found most often among those living in towns (43% of all urban Kikuyu), while those in the rural areas (18% "alienated" among the rural Kikuyu) do not deviate significantly from the mean for all groups. Only the Mijikenda have a particularly low score in this category. The "less-informed citizens" are most numerous among the Mijikenda the Luo, and the Kamba. The "active democrats", finally, are strongly represented among the Kikuyu, the Kalenjin, and Luyia, reaching almost 50% in these groups. This percentage drops considerably among the Kamba and Luo, and is lowest among the Maasai and the Mijikenda. We think that these figures, regardless of the variety of causal factors which lie behind them in each case, constitute some of the most significant indicators for the political culture of each group.

The differences by class are equally striking: here the agricultural proletarioids, the sub-proletariat, and the proletariat stand out among the parochials while their number is quite small in the non-agricultural and agricultural middle classes. The alienated, on the other hand, are most strongly represented in the sub-proletariat and the non-agricultural middle classes and form still a rather large group in the proletariat and among the non-agricultural proletarioids. As a separate group<sup>34)</sup> they are well represented among students (50% !). The "less-informed citizens", not surprisingly, are found most often among the agricultural proletarioids, but also to a still considerable extent among the non-agricultural proletarioids, in

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34) These are mostly secondary school students, some of whom just having finished school. We did not include them, being a transient group, as a separate category in our general "class" pattern, but we think they should be mentioned separately here.

the proletariat and in the agricultural bourgeoisie. The last together with the urban upper and middle classes also have the highest number of "active democrats".

There is still a sizeable number of members of this last category among the non-agricultural proletaroids and in the proletariat, but they represent only a relatively small minority in the sub-proletariat and among the agricultural proletaroids.

Our more general controls indicate that the parochials can be found most often among the illiterates (35% compared to 17% for those with some primary and 2% of those with some secondary education), in the countryside (22% compared to 20% in town), among females (32% compared to 15% for males), and both in the youngest (23% among those below 30) and oldest age-groups (29% among those above 50 compared to 16% for those in between). The alienated, on the other hand, are strongly represented among those with higher education (42% compared to 24% for those with some primary education and 8% for illiterates), in town (44% compared to 16% in the countryside), in the youngest age-groups (30% for those below 30 compared to 6% for those above the age of 50 and 12% for the middle categories. The number of alienated is also somewhat higher among females (24%) than among males (18%). The "less-informed citizens" are most numerous among illiterates (39% compared to 10% for those with some primary and 1% for those with some secondary education), in the countryside (24% compared to 6% in town), among females (26% compared to 17% for males), and in the older age-groups (35% among those above 50 compared to 12% for those below 30 and 27% for those in between). The "active democrats", finally, are strongly represented among those with higher education (55% among those with some secondary education and 48% among those with some primary education compared to 18% for illiterates), among males (50% compared to 18% among females), in the younger and middle age-groups (34% and 45% respectively compared to 30% among those above the age of 50). The percentage of active democrats in the countryside is also significantly higher (38%) than in town (29%).



c) System Support:

One of the main "inputs" of any kind of political system <sup>35)</sup> is the "support" it receives from the general public. This support can take many material and immaterial, specific and diffuse, overt and covert forms. <sup>36)</sup> It can be directed towards "the system" as a whole, including its social and economic bases, the political system in a narrower sense of the word ("regime" in Easton's terminology), or just the particular incumbents of the most important political roles (Easton: "authorities" ).

We cannot possibly deal with all these aspects of political support and shall limit our discussion to the "subjective" dimension as expressed in some of the attitudes covered by our survey. We shall also restrict our discussion to the more general system support and shall not attempt to differentiate further between the "system", the "regime", and the "authorities" in our operationalization of this concept below.

The most important immaterial and diffuse support of a political system lies in its "legitimacy". According to Max Weber's original classification, <sup>37)</sup> three main sources of legitimacy can be distinguished, the traditional, the rational-legal, and the charismatic one, which in turn reflects the basic kinds of human attachment to institutions or personalities, namely pure custom or habit, rational acceptance, or emotional bonds. In fact Weber's pure or "ideal" types occur, of course, in various combined forms and distinctions can only be made as to the relative dominance of one type of legitimacy or another in a particular society. Whereas in most of the older countries

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35) For a brief discussion how this notion is employed in the present study see also Part I, chapter 1 above.

36) Cf., e.g., the discussion by Easton, David, A System Analysis of Political Life, New York: Wiley, 1965, pp. 153 ff..

37) Weber, Max, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, first edition: Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1922, pp. 122 ff. and pp. 642 ff.; in the English edition, translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, New York: The Free Press, 1964, pp. 324 ff..

in the West a relatively smooth balance of traditional and rational-legal legitimacy has been established, in many of the new systems of the Third World strong elements of personal, often charismatic leadership and legitimacy prevail.<sup>38)</sup> Typically, leaders who have come to power in times of crisis (as in the time immediately prior to the achievement of independence from the colonial powers) work serve as the main focus of orientation for the larger population; the belief in their "gift of grace" (i.e. "charisma") in many cases provides the only, or at least dominant, basis of support.<sup>39)</sup> As Pye observes, for example, in times of crisis, "when the problems of aggression and anxiety colour to a high degree interpersonal relationships, there is a readiness and even eagerness to settle for a leader who is a bit removed, who seems detached from the emotions of personal relationships, who is comforting in words, and who appears concerned only with the good and the ideal"<sup>40)</sup> The more personally founded the legitimacy of a certain regime is, however, the harder the problems of succession to the charismatic leader will be. If such a leader, therefore, does not achieve some kind of "objectification" or "routinization" (Weber) of his charisma by putting it on a more permanent, if possible institutionalized basis, the kind of legitimacy he lends to the political system will only be short-lived.<sup>41)</sup>

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38) Cf., e.g., Friedrich, Carl J., "Political Leadership and the Problems of the Charismatic Power", Journal of Politics, vol. 23, No. 1, February 1961, pp. 3 - 24

39) Cf., e.g., Willner, Ann Ruthm Charismatic Political Leadership, Princeton: Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 32, 1968.

40) Pye, op. cit., p. 126.

41) In addition to the existence or non-existence of legitimacy there are, of course, other factors as well, such as the availability of some means of coercion and the willingness of political leaders to use them which contribute to the maintenance or the downfall of a particular regime. In this study, however, which is mainly concerned with the social bases of Kenya's political system, no complete assessment of the means of survival and the range of choices open to political actors can be made. For such an approach, on a theoretical level, cf., e.g., Ilchman, Warren F. and Uphoff, Norman T., The Political Economy of Change, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.



Unfortunately, none of the studies which deal with the analysis of political culture in a comparative context provide us with an adequate operationalization of this variable.<sup>42)</sup> The only one which gives some kind of a clue is Almond and Verba's variable of "system affect".<sup>43)</sup> But only in cases where governmental or political institutions were mentioned spontaneously as objects of pride in their survey (as often as 85% in the USA and as low as 3% in Italy), can the existence of a certain kind of legitimacy of the political system be inferred. This measure, therefore, remains too crude, and more direct indicators which distinguish sufficiently between the various sources and the objects of legitimacy have to be found. The need for such measures is emphasized for example by Easton, too, but he does not offer any applicable and sufficiently tested indices or scales himself.<sup>44)</sup>

We have not attempted to develop a comprehensive operationalization of this important though somewhat elusive concept either, but at least some indications as to the kind and amount of legitimacy Kenya's present political system enjoys among different groups can be gained from some of our survey responses. Among the attitudinal items included in our questionnaire four related to the acceptance of Kenya's social and economic system in general and its political system in particular: "All groups can live in harmony in this country without changing the system in any way";<sup>45)</sup> "labor gets a fair share of what it produces";<sup>46)</sup> "I usually have confidence that the government will do what is right";<sup>47)</sup> and "most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country".<sup>48)</sup> From these we were able to construct a combined index.<sup>49)</sup>

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42) Cf., e.g., Lipset, Political Man, loc. cit., pp. 65 ff.

43) Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 64 ff..

44) Easton, op. cit., pp. 161 ff..

45) Item 36 of question 40.

46) Item 37 of question 40.

47) Item 6 of question 40.

48) Item 31 of question 40.

49) For the exact procedure and the inter-item correlations see our "Methodological Appendix" below.

Table III, 52: System support; by class and ethnic group:

Level of system support(%)		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric bourgeoisie	Low	(50)	--	--	(33)	--	--	--	20
	Medium	--	--	--	--	(50)	--	--	27
	High	(50)	(100)	--	(67)	--	--	(100)	40
	Don't know	--	--	--	--	(50)	--	--	13
Salarariat	Low	(29)	(23)	--	--	(38)	--	(100)	26
	Medium	58	(62)	(80)	(60)	(38)	(100)	--	58
	High	13	(8)	(20)	(40)	(12)	--	--	15
	Don't know	--	(17)	--	--	(12)	--	--	1
Proletariat	Low	21	(25)	(57)	(19)	(39)	--	(20)	20
	Medium	36	(50)	(29)	(41)	(33)	(60)	(80)	41
	High	38	(25)	(14)	26	(11)	(20)	--	30
	Don't know	(5)	--	--	(14)	(17)	--	--	9
Non-agric. proletaroids	Low	(19)	--	--	--	(50)	--	--	19
	Medium	(38)	--	--	(50)	--	--	(100)	31
	High	(31)	(100)	(100)	(50)	(50)	--	--	38
	Don't know	(12)	--	--	--	--	--	--	12
Sub-pro- letariat	Low	(21)	(50)	--	(33)	(45)	--	--	30
	Medium	(29)	(25)	(100)	(34)	(33)	(34)	--	31
	High	(38)	--	--	--	(11)	(33)	(100)	23
	Don't know	(12)	(25)	--	(33)	(11)	(33)	--	16
Agric. Bourgeoisie	Low	(6)	--	(50)	(17)	63	--	(19)	17
	Medium	33	(100)	--	(8)	(25)	62	56	37
	High	44	--	(50)	58	--	(23)	(19)	33
	Don't know	(17)	--	--	(17)	(12)	(15)	(6)	13
Agric.pro- letaroids	Low	(6)	14	13	30	44	--	(8)	19
	Medium	39	64	45	63	42	45	40	48
	High	24	9	29	(7)	(3)	46	(11)	15
	Don't know	31	13	13	--	9	(9)	41	18
Students	Low	(60)	--	--	(13)	(22)	--	(33)	28
	Medium	(40)	(60)	--	(75)	(45)	--	(67)	53
	High	--	(40)	--	--	(22)	(100)	--	14
	Don't know	--	--	--	(12)	(11)	--	--	5
Total	Low	15	15	18	22	44	--	11	20
	Medium	38	62	43	43	38	53	44	44
	High	31	12	29	26	6	32	13	22
	Don't know	16	11	10	9	12	15	32	14
Total weighted N:		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents in a particular sub-category)



The Kikuyu and Kalenjin (i.e. the ethnic groups to which, it should be remembered, Kenya's present President and Vice-President belong) thus clearly have the greatest percentage of those scoring high on this index, followed by the Mijikenda and the Luyia. The Luo, on the other hand, stand out by far among those expressing a low level of system support, which must be seen as another indication of their relative isolation in present Kenyan politics. The Kamba do not score very high on either extreme. The Maasai, in line with the widespread "parochialism" among them, have by far the greatest number of those saying "don't know" to our question. An analysis by class shows that system support is highest in the non-agricultural and agricultural bourgeoisie, and among the non-agricultural proletarioids. Those scoring low on this index are most numerous in the sub-proletariat, among students, and among the members of the salariat. Members of the proletariat and agricultural proletarioids present a more balanced picture which, however, disappears when we look more closely at the distribution according to the ethnic origin of our respondents in each category. Here it can be seen that more or less the same ethnic distribution prevails as in our over-all sample; the class position of our respondents is apparently over-shadowed in these cases by their ethnic attachment. Not surprisingly, the number of those saying "don't know" is also highest among the agricultural proletarioids and in the sub-proletariat.

As far as our more general controls are concerned, the level of education of our respondents turned out to be significantly related to this index (an over-all  $r$  of 0.11,  $p$  0.001). This relationship is not, however, a clear-cut linear one: The percentage of high scorers, for example, rises from 17% among the illiterates to 27% for those with primary education, but then drops again to 22% for those who have had some secondary schooling. Sex is only weakly related to this attitude (25% of the men scoring high compared to 16% for the women;  $r = 0.05$ ,  $p$  0.05), age and place of residence are not significantly related at all.

Our index of system support is also related to the level of political participation of our respondents (37% of those who participate strongly also score high on this index compared to 17% among those who do not participate at all; ( $r = 0.11$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). A very remarkable relationship also exists between the support our respondents accord to Kenya's economic and political system and their perception of their future economic chances.<sup>50)</sup> 32% of those who think that their economic situation will be better in the future also score high on our index of system support compared to only 7% among those who think the situation will become worse ( $r = 0.28$ ,  $p < 0.001$ )<sup>51)</sup>

Besides the more diffuse "system support" expressed by this index, Kenya's political system also may enjoy a certain amount of "charismatic" legitimacy which centers around the personality and historic role of its first president. Measuring this is an even more intractable matter than assessing a more general system support. Some indirect evidence in this respect is provided by the answers to one of our projective questions "Suppose you were made head of the government. What are some of the first things you would try to do?"<sup>52)</sup> Of those who gave any specific answers at all a sizeable number of respondents across all ethnic groups stated: "The same as Mzee".

If we are to judge this issue in the light of our own knowledge and experience it can probably be said that Kenyatta's "charisma" is still considerable in most parts of Kenya, even though it may have declined somewhat in recent years in the wake of the assassinations of Tom Mboya and J.M. Kariuku.<sup>53)</sup> The negative

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50) See also chapter 3 g of this part above

51) This relationship also illustrates to a certain extent, Lipset's observation concerning the interdependence of the legitimacy and the effectiveness of a political system, cf. Lipset, op. cit., pp. 64 ff.

52) Question 39 c, see also the discussion of some other answers to this question in section g of this chapter below.

53) See also Part I, chapter 2 above.



impact of these events together with the fear of dominance by the Kikuyu and an apparently increasing corruption at very high levels of government all tend to weaken both the more general legitimacy of the system and Kenyatta's personal authority. Yet they have to be weighed against the undisputed leadership he exercised during the struggle for independence, his "martyrdom", and, probably most important today, his role as guarantor of Kenya's relative social and political stability. The balance still seems to be a positive one for most people.

d) Input orientations:

In addition to "supports", "demands" of individuals and groups constitute the most important "inputs" of any political system, often these "demands" are closely related to the "supports" themselves. We are not concerned here with the actual content of these demands in the present Kenyan situation<sup>54)</sup> but rather with the way they are articulated and aggregated by certain structures, and, at least to some extent, how they are absorbed by the system. Political demands can be expressed in a great variety of ways. These range from informal personal contacts with those having some access to the center of power, through groups formed on an ad hoc basis for a particular issue or a particular occasion, to permanently well-structured interest groups (such as professional organizations or other forms of institutionalized "lobbies"), and, as the most specifically political input structure, political parties.<sup>55)</sup> Under present

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54) For a discussion of some substantive aspects of such demands see also section f of this chapter below.

55) It is not possible even to attempt to cite some of the more important works among the vast body of literature on this subject here. As far as Kenya is concerned two more recent studies deal with organized interest groups there: Amsden, Alice H., International Firms and Labour in Kenya 1945 - 1970, London: Frank Cass, 1971; and Sandbrook, Richard, Proletarians and African Capitalism - The Kenyan Case 1960 - 1972, London: Cambridge University Press, 1975.



circumstances in Kenya this potential range of input aggregating structures has been somewhat reduced by certain restrictions imposed on the freedom of expression and organization (e.g. certain de jure or de facto "taboos" in the media, the limited scope of action of unions, etc.), but also in particular by the establishment of a de facto, and apparently permanent, one-party system.<sup>56)</sup>

In order to assess at least the "subjective" perceptions of our respondents concerning the effectiveness of different forms of input structures available to them, we posed the question: "Suppose several men tried to influence a government decision, say about a development project in this area. Here are a number of things you might do:

- 1) Write to the government official concerned or go to see him;<sup>57)</sup>
- 2) Write to the M.P. of your area or go to see him;
- 3) Work through personal or family connections;
- 4) Get other people interested - form groups;
- 5) Work through KANU;
- 6) Organize a protest demonstration.

Which of these methods do you think would be the most effective? Which next? Which least?"<sup>58)</sup>

The results by ethnic group and "type of political participant"<sup>59)</sup> are reported in table III, 53.

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56) For a brief discussion of this political background see also Part I, chapter 2 above.

57) We did not attempt to differentiate between local and national government officials at this level as, for example, Almond and Verba do. Representative institutions of local government exist in Kenya only at the country level and their role has been greatly diminished since the "reform" of 1969.

58) Question 36. An alternative way to present the results of this question would have been to combine the three possible answers by giving them different weights (e. g. a value of 6 for the most effective, a value of 5 for the second effective, and a value of 1 for the least effective of the six offered alternative methods), adding them for each respondent, and then computing the means and standard deviations for the most important groups and demographic categories in our sample. This might have been a somewhat more accurate procedure, but for the sake of readability and to allow for a more easily intuitive interpretation of our results we preferred the listing of percentage distributions at this place.

59) See also section b of this chapter above.



Table III.53: Input orientations; by ethnic group and type of participant:

Input orientations (%):		Kik.		Kam.		Mij.		Luy.		Luo		Kal.		Maas.		Tot.	
		most	least	most	least	most	least	most	least	most	least	most	least	most	least	most	least
Parochials	Contact government official	39	(5)	(29)	(10)	48	--	(21)	(4)	(22)	(3)	(21)	(7)	21	--	31	(3)
	M.P.	(6)	(3)	(23)	--	28	--	42	--	34	(3)	--	(7)	42	--	27	(1)
	Personal connections	--	(3)	(10)	(13)	(8)	(7)	--	(4)	(13)	(9)	(29)	(43)	--	(5)	7	9
	Form group	--	(17)	(10)	--	(8)	(3)	--	--	(6)	(3)	(7)	--	(11)	(16)	6	9
	KANU	(19)	(11)	(9)	(19)	--	(36)	(25)	(29)	--	(10)	(43)	(43)	--	(16)	9	20
	Protest demonstration	(6)	28	(9)	39	--	41	--	50	--	50	--	--	--	31	(2)	36
	Don't know	30	33	(10)	(19)	(8)	(8)	(12)	(13)	(25)	(22)	--	--	26	32	18	22
Alienated	Government official	(11)	16	(30)	(11)	--	(33)	--	(13)	(21)	(17)	--	(33)	(12)	--	11	14
	M.P.	45	(9)	(33)	(3)	(34)	--	44	22	48	--	34	--	52	--	44	7
	Pers. connections	(7)	15	(11)	(4)	--	(33)	(11)	(7)	(3)	(21)	--	(33)	--	--	7	12
	Form group	16	(4)	(7)	--	(33)	--	(7)	29	(3)	(14)	(33)	(17)	--	--	11	10
	KANU	(6)	(4)	--	(26)	--	--	(18)	(7)	(1)	(17)	(33)	--	(12)	48	10	15
	Protest	(6)	42	(4)	41	--	--	(9)	(13)	(14)	(24)	--	(17)	--	(28)	6	30
	Don't know	(9)	(10)	(15)	(15)	(33)	(34)	(11)	(9)	(4)	(7)	--	--	(24)	(24)	11	12
Less informed citizens	Government official	32	--	(7)	36	54	(8)	(34)	(28)	21	(10)	--	(20)	(33)	--	27	15
	M.P.	(15)	--	29	--	31	(8)	(19)	(14)	36	(9)	--	(40)	--	--	25	8
	Pers. connections	--	(12)	(14)	(7)	(8)	--	(19)	--	(11)	18	80	--	--	--	14	8
	Form group	(3)	(9)	23	--	--	--	--	(29)	(9)	(8)	(20)	(20)	(67)	--	11	9
	KANU	(18)	(3)	(7)	--	(7)	(8)	--	--	(9)	24	--	--	--	--	8	9
	Protest	--	44	(7)	43	--	69	(14)	(29)	--	17	--	(20)	--	(100)	(3)	39
	Don't know	32	32	(13)	(14)	--	(7)	(14)	--	(14)	(14)	--	--	--	--	12	12
Active democrats	Government official	38	(2)	18	(15)	(20)	--	25	15	(12)	(18)	(15)	29	(29)	(17)	25	12
	M.P.	15	(4)	39	(5)	73	(7)	40	(4)	66	(2)	22	33	(47)	(6)	36	8
	Pers. connections	(6)	11	(4)	(6)	(7)	(13)	(12)	(12)	--	(9)	(7)	(16)	--	--	5	10
	Form group	19	8	(7)	(9)	--	(27)	(12)	17	(6)	(13)	33	(13)	(6)	--	14	12
	KANU	12	(7)	32	(6)	--	--	(6)	(12)	(12)	18	(7)	(7)	(18)	(6)	13	9
	Protest	--	50	--	57	--	(53)	(1)	40	--	31	(15)	(2)	--	71	(2)	41
	Don't know	10	18	--	(2)	--	--	(4)	--	(4)	(9)	--	--	--	--	5	8
Total	Government official	31	6	19	19	45	(4)	18	15	18	13	11	25	21	(3)	24	11
	M.P.	21	5	32	(3)	37	(4)	39	10	48	(4)	17	24	42	(1)	33	6
	Pers. connections	5	11	9	7	(7)	(6)	11	8	6	14	21	21	--	(3)	8	10
	Form group	14	8	12	(3)	(4)	(7)	7	20	7	10	27	13	12	(8)	11	10
	KANU	12	6	15	10	(3)	18	11	11	8	19	16	10	(6)	20	10	12
	Protest	2	44	(5)	47	--	53	(5)	32	(2)	28	(8)	(7)	--	43	3	38
	Don't know	15	20	8	11	(4)	(8)	9	4	11	12	--	--	19	22	11	13
Total weighted N:		275		156		96		158		194		92		108		1079	

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category)

To contact a Member of Parliament is thus regarded by almost all groups as the most effective method of getting something done by the government.<sup>60)</sup> They consider seeing a government official directly, who in all likelihood is the local "chief" or "sub-chief",<sup>61)</sup> or a member of the district administration as next best. In contrast, protest demonstrations are considered as the least effective method by the greatest number of people. The effectiveness of working through the single political party (KANU), through personal connections, or forming a group is judged in a more ambiguous manner by our respondents, the percentages of those stating these to be the most effective and the least effective methods being almost equal.

The variation by ethnic group shows that a greater percentage of the Kikuyu and Mijikenda consider direct government contacts to be most efficient, while the relatively largest number of the Luo, Luyia, Maasai and, to a lesser extent, also Kamba, all of which tend to be more in opposition to the present regime, emphasize the importance of their elected representatives. The Kalenjin, on the other hand, most often refer to personal or group connections.

We work through KANU is also considered to be efficient by a relatively greater number of Kalenjin, Kamba, and Kikuyu, while the Luo Maasai, and Mijikenda are most adamant in their rejection of this possibility. Open protest, perhaps as a last resort, seems to be acceptable for a sizeable minority among the Kalenjin and Luyia.

If we differentiate this picture according to the "types of political participants" in our sample, some even more clear-cut distinctions emerge which tend to confirm and validate to a certain extent our earlier observation concerning these categories: Among the "parochials" to see a government official

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60) The special role of M. P. s. in Kenya will be further discussed in the section of this chapter below.

61) All of these are purely government-appointed officials and should not be confused with traditional "chiefs", who, in any case, did not exist among Kenya's peoples in the past. See also the respective chapters of Part II above.



clearly is regarded as the most effective method, followed by contacting an M.P. Personal connections, group or party contacts, on the other hand, are not very developed. Not surprisingly the number of those saying "don't know" is also particularly great in this group. The "alienated" distinctly reject government contacts. They thus are the only group with a greater percentage among them who consider this to be the least effective method. Of all groups they put the greatest hope in seeing their elected representative. Relatively speaking they also have the largest number of those who regard a protest demonstration as an effective means to articulate their demands. The "less-informed citizens" put their trust in government officials and M.P.'s in approximately equal parts. They also indicated a relatively high preference for personal or spontaneous group actions. The "active democrats", finally, in addition to seeing M.P.'s or government officials, expressed a comparatively stronger commitment to organizing group initiatives or working through the political party.

Class distinctions also influence this pattern somewhat: While the effectiveness of contacting government officials is judged more or less uniformly across all groups, a significantly greater number of those in the non-agricultural classes would rather see an M.P. (38%) than would those in the agricultural groups (31%). In the latter the willingness to work through KANU is also significantly higher (13% compared to 6% in the non-agricultural classes). The readiness to take group initiatives is particularly pronounced in the agricultural bourgeoisie (22% compared to a mean of 10% for all the other groups). The "agricultural bourgeoisie" also seems to have the greatest possibilities to work through personal connections (13% emphasizing this method compared to a mean of less than 7% for the other group).

Education is another significant factor affecting these attitudes. Seeing an M.P. is considered to be most effective by those

with some secondary schooling (48% favoring this method compared to 32% for those with some primary education, and 29% among illiterates). On the other hand, the reverse of this attitude is shown by the readiness to contact government officials: Only 15% of the best educated sympathize with this approach compared to 26% for those with little or no formal education. The effectiveness of KANU as a means to get things done is also judged differently in each educational category: 12% of those with some primary education expressed their preference for this method compared to 9% among illiterates and only 6% among those with some secondary schooling. The efficiency of open protest is also considered to be much higher by the latter third groups (7% of those with secondary education see this as most effective compared to only 2% in the other educational categories). Sex and age of our respondents did not turn out to affect these orientations in any significant way.

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62) Cf., e. g., Powell, John Duncan, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics", *AFSP*, vol. 64, June 1970; or Sandbrook, Richard, "Patrons, Clients, and Factions: New Dimensions of Conflict Analysis in Africa", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 7, no. 1, March 1972, pp. 104 - 119.

63) For a basic discussion of these more traditional forms see Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, loc. cit., pp. 131 ff. and pp. 679 ff..



e) The role of Members of Parliament:

Among the different input structures discussed in the preceding sections the Members of Parliament occupy a special position with multiple functions. On the one hand, they are, as legislators, a part of the central political system; on the other hand they constitute one of the most important "links" between the government and the general public. In systems where elected parliaments exist, these linkage functions of M.P.s and the more general "patron-client" relations (including high level civil servants, union leaders, and other resourceful high-rankung officials) have received increasing attention in recent years.<sup>62)</sup>

Comparable to patterns of "patrimonial" rule and authority in pre-industrial Europe and large parts of Asia,<sup>63)</sup> these relationships are characterized by unequal status of the partners, reciprocity of obligations and personal contact. One typical example is the traditional "feudalism based on benefices" ("Pfründenfeudalismus, Weber) where, at the lower level, a landlord exercises considerable power over his serfs and is able to extract an economic surplus from them. However, he provides a measure of military and social security for his subjects in return. At a higher level in this system, the landlord enters into a relationship with the traditional political rulers who legalize and guarantee his economic position (e.g. in the form of "tax farming"), and then receive some part of the surplus and often military services in return.

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62) Cf., e. g., Powell, John Duncan, "Peasant Society and Clientlist Politics", APSR, vol. 64, June 1970; or Sandbrook, Richard, "Patrons, Clients, and Factions: New Dimensions of Conflict Analysis in Africa", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. V, no. 1, March 1972, pp. 104 - 119.

63) For a basis discussion of these more traditional forms see Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, loc. cit., pp. 131 ff. and pp. 679 ff..

In a modern context patron-client relationships often involve the exchange of economic benefits (such as patronage over the allocation of jobs, contributions to "development projects" in a certain area, but not rarely also direct personal payments) in return for political support. This is of particular importance where electoral processes decide, at least to a certain extent, over the distribution of positions and resources at the center. Here again several levels of patronage can often be distinguished linking in a hierarchical manner the general public through different intermediaries of the highest level of authority. Not rarely, ascriptive and affective ties (e.g. those of clans and ethnic groups) also play a significant role in these relationships, although in modern environments these tend to become more "contractual" and instrumental.<sup>64)</sup> In Kenya, where elections do play an important though still somewhat restricted role,<sup>65)</sup> patronage by M.P.s is of particular significance;<sup>66)</sup> however, it also exists at locally more restricted levels<sup>67)</sup> and within other types of organizations.<sup>68)</sup>

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64) For a good general discussion of the concept and some distinctions between traditional and more modern forms of patron-client relationships see also Scott, James C., "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia", APSR, vol. 66. no. 1, March 1972, pp. 91 - 113.

65) Cf., e. g., the election article by Hyden and Leys, loc. cit., and Berg-Schlosser, loc. cit.

66) The special role of M. P. s in this regard has also been analyzed by Barkan, Joel D. and Akumu, John J., see, for example, their "Political Linkage in Kenya: Citizens, Local Elites, and Legislators", paper presented at the Annual Meeting of APSA, Chicago, September 1974.

67) Cf., e.g., Stren, Richard, "Factional Politics and central Control in Mombasa 1960 - 1969", loc. cit.

68) Cf., e.g., Sandbrook, Richard, "Patrons, Clients, and Unions: The Labour Movement and Political Conflict in Kenya", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, vol. 9, March 1972, pp. 3 - 27.



As we have seen in the preceding section, this significant role of M.P.s as "brokers" in the national political system is reflected in the answers to our questions concerning the accessibility and efficiency of different forms of input structures (one third of our respondents, the largest single group, stating contacting an M.P. to be the most effective method). In how far this expressed input orientation remains at a hypothetical level or reflects some actual personal knowledge and active participation as well can be assessed by the responses to other questions put at different times in our interviews. These reveal significant variations of the role of M.P.s for different groups of people. The first of these questions,<sup>69)</sup> which also forms a part of our "political information scale",<sup>70)</sup> simply asks for the name of the M.P. of the constituencies of our respondents. The percentages of those answering correctly are reported in table III,54:

Table III,54: Percentage knowing name of M.P.; by class and ethnic group:

Name of M.P. known:	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Iuv.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric.middle+upper classes	65	(60)	(80)	(63)	(33)	(100)	(100)	61
Proletariat+non-agric. proletaroids	53	(54)	(38)	61	(35)	(60)	(100)	54
Sub-proletariat	(38)	(25)	--	--	(22)	(100)	(100)	33
Agric.bourgeoisie	83	(50)	(50)	83	88	85	100	83
Agric. proletaroids	55	46	34	80	73	91	40	57
Total x	60	49	38	73	64	84	56	61
Total weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	103	1079

x) Including students

69) Question 21 d.

70) See also section a of this chapter above.

It seems to be remarkable that, except for the Mijikenda and including even the still largely traditional Maasai, a majority of the respondents from all ethnic groups were able to name their M.P. correctly. This is not a bad score even by international standards!<sup>71)</sup> The variation by ethnic group is more or less in line with that reported for our more comprehensive political information scale, in particular if we look at the agricultural classes alone. For the non-agricultural classes, however, the situation is different: Compared to our previous over-all results the score of the proletariat is lower than that of the agricultural proletarioids and the agricultural bourgeoisie has a higher score than the non-agricultural middle and upper classes.

This difference comes out more clearly if we control for place of residence alone. Here, in fact, the results are reversed: (two thirds of our rural respondents were able to name their M.P. correctly compared to only one third for those living in town; the Pearson correlation coefficient in this case is -0.29 compared to a strong positive correlation of 0.30 between urban residence and the over-all political information scale, if we exclude the item relating to the M.P. from the latter in order not to "contaminate" our comparisons. To a certain extent this is due to the relatively short period of time many urban residents have been living in the city; they have not yet had the chance to develop deeper social roots or political contacts. If we control the responses of our urban respondents by length of residence in town, it turns out that only 19% of those living there for a period of less than 2 years know the name of their M.P. compared to 28% of those living in town for 2 - 5 years, 40% for those living there for 6 - 10 years, and 47% for those living in town for more than 10 years.

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71) In the United States, for example, 53 % could name their representative in Congress in an opinion poll concluded in 1970. Even lower figures are reported for other years. Cf., e. g., Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 58, Princeton: Gallup International, April 1970, p. 20; or Erskine, Hazel Gaudet, "The Polls: The Informed Public", Public Opinion Quarterly, 27, Fall 1963, pp. 491 - 500.



But even the last figure is still considerably lower than the mean of 68% for our rural respondents, irrespective of their length of residence in the same location. The mean rises to 73% for those living there for more than 10 years or "all their lives". The overall Pearson's correlation coefficient between knowing the name of one's M.P. and place of residence drops from 0.29 to 0.21, if we control for length of residence, but still remains highly significant ( $p < 0.001$ ).

To a larger degree this discrepancy between the answers of our rural and urban respondents is also a reflection of the different and usually minor role an urban member of the national parliament can play compared to his rural counterpart; the former has very little direct influence on the city council and the city's bureaucracy which takes care of most of the communal functions affecting the life of townsmen. In the rural areas M.P.s of the take a major part in the initiation of self-help and "Harambee" activities for development purposes; in town<sup>72)</sup> these activities are of relatively little significance (the Pearson correlation between those knowing the name of their M.P. and those taking part in Harambee projects is 0.19,  $p < 0.001$ ).

Similarly, there is a strong positive correlation between those knowing the name of their M.P. and our more general political participation scale ( $r = 0.29$ ). Level of education is also positively related to this variable (55% of the illiterates in our sample know the name of their M.P. compared to 64% for those with some primary and 67% for those with some secondary education"  $r = 0.11$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Sex is another important factor in this respect, 69% of our male and only 47% of our female respondents knowing their M.P.;  $r = 0.22$ . This correlation is reduced but remains significant when we control for level of education and place of residence in this case (the partial correlation then becomes 0.15,  $p < 0.001$ ). Age shows an even weaker relationship ( $r = 0.08$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), and if we look

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72) See also chapter 1 b of this part above.

more closely at the percentage distribution for the different age groups, we can see that this factor is not related in a linear way: 55% of those below the age of thirty knowing their M.P. compared to 62% of those above fifty and 68% of those in the middle age group. An over-all analysis of variance gives the respective strength of these factors as follows (values of beta adjusted for independents and co-variates): Place of residence 0.34; ethnic group 0.22; social class 0.17; level of education 0.10; sex 0.07; age 0.04. The value of beta for political participation and participation in Harambee activities, taken as co-variates, are 0.15 and 0.11 respectively.

If we now compare the number of those stating contacting an M.P. to be the most effective input method with those who know the name of their M.P., it turns out that only 60% of those who hypothetically emphasize the role of an M.P. actually know the name of their own. Again the discrepancy between our rural and urban respondents is most striking: 70% of those stating contacting the M.P. to be most effective among our rural respondents actually know his name, while this figure drops to 26% in our urban sample. When we control for length of residence in town this percentage rises to 43% for those living there for more than 10 years compared to 19% for those residing there for less than 2 years, but still remains significantly below our mean for the rural areas. A similar difference results when we juxtapose the number of those who state contacting an M.P. to be the most effective method with those who have actually attended a public meeting ("baraza") held by him: 73: Only 20% of those who hypothetically emphasized the role of an M.P. had actually attended one of his barazas. Here the rural-urban differences are not as pronounced (18% compared to 27%), but time of residence in town again contributes to a greater contact with the M.P. (40% of those who have been living in town for more than 10 years said they had attended a

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73) Cf. question 34 a, see also section b of this chapter above.



meeting held by the M.P. compared to 16% among those who resided there for less than two years).

The relationship between those who state contacting an M.P. to be one of the two most effective methods and actual participation in the national elections is very weak (64% of those who voted said contacting an M.P. is one of the two most effective methods compared to 59% for those who did not vote; the Pearson correlation between the two variables is 0.04,  $p > 0.05$ ). On the other hand, the correlation between those who voted at the last elections and those who remembered the name of their M.P. is considerably stronger (70% of those who voted knew the name of their M.P. compared to 61% among those who did not vote;  $r = 0.19$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ).

In view of all these findings it seems safe to say that Members of Parliament do constitute an important "link" between the central political system and the public at large. These linkages seem to contribute to a meaningful two-way flow of information and an exchange of demands and resources which potentially can be beneficial for all sides involved. One restricting factor in these "patron-client" relationships, if we may call them so, is the often limited capacity of even a well-motivated and active M.P. to "deliver" all the goods which are expected of him. Indeed, as an analysis of the 1969 and 1974 general elections indicates, when a majority of the incumbent M.P.s including a sizeable number of ministers and assistant ministers lost their seats, expectations often seem to be too high to be satisfied by almost anybody. No doubt, under continuing competitive conditions, in the long run both responsible behavior on the side of the "patrons" and more realistic attitudes among the "clients" will have to emerge.

But a potential danger in this pattern should not be overlooked either: Strongly personalized relationship such as those between patrons and clients, particularly if the former

are able to act under conditions where the possibilities of scrutiny by the public are very limited (e.g. in many government ministries and at other levels of the national and provincial bureaucracy), also tend to favor continuing forms of nepotism and corruption. A "clientelism" of this kind, if it is unbalanced and getting out of hand, then may undermine the long-term legitimacy of the system, at least among the less-favored groups.

Again, as was the case with our more general "political participation-scale" the place of residence of our respondents turns out to be one of the strongest discriminating factors in their relations with their M.P.. The pattern of politics in town indeed seems to be very different from that of the rural areas. Whereas in the latter meaningful, structured relationship between the general population and their representatives seem to exist conditions characteristic for a "mass society" seem to prevail in the former. As we have seen, one element responsible for this difference is the still limited period of time a great number of the urban residents have been living in the city. But even for those who have found their "roots" there now, the involvement in the political process seems to have taken on a different quality. The question whether similarly structured and meaningful relationship will emerge in the future for urban residents will be one of the most decisive ones for the long-term prospects of "democracy" in Kenya. This holds true for at least the most important groups among the urban residents, particularly if we take into account the long-term and continuing demographic and social structural changes which will strongly affect the present rural-urban balance.

used, for example, in the volumes edited by Ryan, Susan; Jackson, Robert; and Okumu, John (eds.), Development Administration - The Kenyan Experience, Nairobi: Oxford University Press 1970; and Leonard, David E. (ed.), Rural Administration in Kenya, Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973.

77) Obtaining a "research clearance" in Kenya can be quite a delicate matter, and order not to forego our research opportunities at all we consciously avoided some direct and potentially "sensitive" question in some parts of our interviews.



f) Orientations towards central government structures the  
bureaucracy:

As we have pointed out before,<sup>74)</sup> seeing public officials or writing to them is considered to be the second most effective method (after contacting M.P.s) to get something done by the government (24% on the average saying so in all groups). Understandably, this attitude is related to the general "support" the government enjoys among respondents (Pearsons  $r = 0.09$ ,  $p = 0.001$  for the combined score of those stating contacting a government official to be the most effective method and our measure of "system support."<sup>75)</sup> On the other hand, according to legitimacy to a political system and considering it to be efficient are two different things, even though the relationships between these two variables can be close.

As was the case our discussion of other variables, we are not so much concerned at this place with the objective performance of Kenya's government and its bureaucracy,<sup>76)</sup> but rather with the subjective orientation of our respondents towards it.

For reasons of "prudence and diplomacy" we had to exercise caution in the selection of questions relating to this aspect of Kenya's political system.<sup>77)</sup> Thus we did not include any explicit questions concerning the performance of the present government and its bureaucracy or matters such as nepotism and

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74) See section d of this chapter above.

75) See also section c and d of this chapter above.

76) Some of its problems are also discussed, for example, in the volumes edited by Hyden, Goran; Jackson, Robert; and Okumu, John (eds.), Development Administration - The Kenyan Experience, Nairobi: Oxford University Press 1970; and Leonard, David K. (ed.), Rural Administration in Kenya, Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973.

77) Obtaining a "research clearance" in Kenya can be quite a delicate matter, and order not to forego our research opportunities at all we consciously avoided some direct and potentially "sensitive" question in some parts of our interviews.

corruption.<sup>78)</sup> Some clues can be gained, however, from the responses to more indirect and open-ended questions. One of these asked, for example: "What do you think are the biggest problems that this country faces today?"<sup>79)</sup> The answers are recorded in table III,55:

Table III,55: Most important national problems; by ethnic group:

Ntional Problems (%):	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Natural disasters	3	28	37	2	16	17	27	15
Lack of infrastructure	9	--	7	2	2	7	6	5
Inflation	6	8	4	2	13	3	2	6
Unemployment	15	12	4	30	8	--	1	12
Inequitable income distribution	8	4	--	9	1	3	4	5
Lack of arable land	6	2	--	5	3	24	1	5
Other economic problems	5	8	4	12	17	8	3	8
Government performance	2	--	1	7	2	3	4	3
Tribalism	1	--	--	4	--	--	--	1
Social problems	10	4	1	8	3	4	8	6
Other	3	--	--	--	1	--	3	1
No problems								
Don't know	32	34	42	19	34	31	41	33
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

78) Almond and Verba, for example, asked their respondents directly whether they thought they were given equal treatment by government officials or the police. Cf. idem, loc. cit., question 34 and 37 a of their questionnaire, pp. 329 and 330.

79) Question 39 b. Commissioners", probably meant to include other District Officers (D.O.s) as well.



In addition to providing a kind of "catalogue" of the most urgent national problems the Kenyan government has to deal with in the eyes of respondents, this table also can serve as an indication of for which groups the performance of the present government seems to be a particularly salient issue. As we can see from this list, natural disasters, in particular droughts and subsequent famine, are foremost in the minds of the Mijikenda, Kamba, and Maasai respondents. This is explained by the often very precarious living conditions in their area of residence<sup>80)</sup> and particularly by the severe drought in spring 1974 (the time of our interviews), when the "long rains" had failed again almost completely. The second problem which was mentioned most often, in particular by the Luyia and Kikuyu but also to a lesser extent by the Kamba and Luo, is unemployment. Inflation, lack of infrastructure (such as water supplies, roads, health and educational facilities), lack of arable land, inequitable distribution of income, and similar economic problems then were mentioned to a varying degree by all groups. Social problems (such as crimes, prostitution, alcoholism, broken marriages) come next in this list of grievances. Political problems, in particular those concerning aspects of present government performance, then were quoted by another sizeable number of our respondents, especially the Luyia. To illustrate this latter point some of the verbatim answers of our respondents may be helpful:<sup>81)</sup>

Some just mentioned "bribery and corruption", "nepotism and tribalism", or "bad governing" in general. Others had more specific grievances: A Maasai school-teacher; "Difficulties with D.C.s<sup>82)</sup> who don't help; most officials are interested

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80) See also the respective chapters of Part II above.

81) For some more direct criticisms see also the next section of this chapter below.

82) I. e. "District Commissioners", probably meant to include other District Officers (D.O.s) as well.

only in their own tummies". A Maasai moran complained about "harassment by the police". A fifty-year-old Kikuyu carpenter said "police arrests of beer brewers are unnecessary". A Luo mechanic considered the problem to lie at some higher level: "The way big people, ministers, treat lower people". A Kamba unemployed school-leaver said outright: "The cabinet should be reshuffled and a president elected democratically". A few see the problem coming from abroad, a Luyia electrician: "We are still very much in the hands of colonists; people like us do not have a chance to prosper".

An analysis by class of our respondents shows that, not surprisingly, natural disasters as a major problem were quoted most often by the rural classes (21% among the agricultural proletarioids and 12% in the agriculture bourgeoisie). Unemployment, on the other hand, was mentioned as a major concern by the members of the urban salariat (20%), the proletariat (15%), and the sub-proletariat (19%). Another sizeable group in the salariat stated inflation to be the biggest national problem (15%), whereas in the proletariat the inequitable distribution of income is the next major concern (cited by 13% of our respondents in this category). Political problems, including "tribalism", were mentioned most often by members of the salariat, the proletariat and by non-agricultural proletarioids (varying between 5% and 15% in these groups). The number of those saying "there is no problem" or "don't know" is highest among the agricultural and non-agricultural proletarioids in the proletariat and the sub-proletariat (amounting to between 32% and 46%), but is only 13% in the salariat.

We then probed further: "Would you say the chances to solve (these problems) are very good, quite good, not very good, very bad?". Among those who had given any specific answer to the previous questions at all, a plurality was still optimistic for the future (48% giving one of the first two responses, compared to 43% being more pessimistic, the rest was undecided).



The optimists are most numerous among the Kalenjin, Kikuyu, and Maasai (varying between 55% and 62%), while the pessimists can be found more often among the Kamba, Mijikenda, and Luo (only between 28% and 43% giving one of the first two answers). In terms of social class the optimists are most numerous in the agricultural bourgeoisie (61%), but also in the proletariat (56%). For the agricultural proletoids this figure drops to 44%, and is only 40% and 36% respectively for the salariat and the sub-proletariat. When asked "can people like you do anything to help solve this problem" only 18% of our respondents answered affirmatively. The relatively greater number of them could be found among the Kalenjin (45%), Luyia (27%), and Kikuyu (19%) and, across all ethnic groups, among the members of the agricultural bourgeoisie (37%).

The responses to one other carefully worded question provide us with some further evidence as to how our respondents assess the performance of the present government: "One sometimes hears some persons say that there are some people or groups who have too much influence over the way the government is run in this country. Do you agree or disagree that there are such groups?"<sup>83)</sup>

Insert table III,56:

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83) Question 35 g

Table III, 56: Percentage stating that government is dominated by certain groups: by class and ethnic group:

Percentage agreeing:	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle + upper classes	38	(33)	(20)	(37)	(42)	--	(100)	37
Proletariat	21	(33)	--	(7)	(39)	--	(80)	17
Non-agric. proletoaroids and sub-proletariat	30	(60)	--	(40)	(40)	--	(50)	35
Agric. bourgeoisie	22	(50)	--	58	(25)	(15)	(25)	29
Agric. proletoaroids	18	19	14	(14)	40	(3)	(11)	20
Total	25	26	13	27	38	10	19	25
Total weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category)

Quite clearly the percentage of Luo who see the government dominated by certain people is by far the highest of any of the ethnic groups, providing further evidence for their widespread disenchantment with Kenya's present leadership. The percentage for the Kalenjin, Mijikenda, and Maasai, on the other hand, are quite low. For the Maasai and Mijikenda this can be attributed to a large extent to the relatively great number of "parochials" in these groups (53% and 41% respectively), while among the Kalenjin this attitude seems to spring from a more general satisfaction with the present government and their position in it (only 15% parochials in this group, but the greatest number of those scoring high on our "system support"-index). The values for the Kikuyu, Kamba, and Luyia do not deviate significantly from the mean.

55) I. e. those coming from Kiambu District in the Central province, the economically most advanced region near Nairobi, which is also the home area of many prominent Kikuyu politicians (including Kenyatta, Gichuru, Mungai, Njonjo, Koinange etc.); see also our "District Development Index" in the appendix below.



An analysis by class, however, shows that these groups are internally very much differentiated according to the economic position of our respondents. The percentages for the agricultural proletarioids are rather low here, too, but the figures for the non-agricultural middle classes, the non-agricultural proletarioids, and the sub-proletariat lie considerably above the mean, reflecting the relatively higher level of political awareness in these groups.<sup>84)</sup> The level of education (16% among the illiterates agreeing compared to 46% among those with secondary education;  $r = 0.17$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and sex (29% of the males agreeing compared to 17% of the females;  $r = 0.07$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) are further factors affecting this attitude. Age, on the other hand, does not exercise a significant influence of its own. Not surprisingly, those who see the government dominated by certain groups also showed a lower level of support for the system (39% agreeing among those indicating little support compared to 22% among those who showed a high level of support;  $r = 0.11$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ).

The kinds of groups our respondents have in mind in this regard form a characteristic pattern, too: Of those who agreed with our statement 34% see the government dominated by a particular ethnic group. Among non-Kikuyu respondents this figure is even higher, 37% of them answering "the Kikuyu". A few Luyia and Kalenjin respondents also attributed this influence to the Luo, apparently perceiving some competition from this side. Among the Kikuyu a minority, from other districts, accused the "Kiambu people"<sup>85)</sup> of having too much power. 40% of all those agreeing attribute this influence over the government to a particular class ("the establishment", "the bureaucracy", "the rich"). These respondents are particularly numerous among

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84) See also section a of this chapter above.

85) I. e. those coming from Kiambu District in the Central province, the economically most advanced region near Nairobi, which is also the home area of many prominent Kikuyu politicians (including Kenyatta, Gichuru, Mungai, Njonjo, Koinange etc.); see also our "District Development Index" in the appendix below.

the agricultural and non-agricultural proletariats and in the proletariat. 5% of our respondents in all groups see some foreign influence at work ("the Europeans", "foreign companies"), the rest is divided among a variety of other factors.<sup>86)</sup>

g) System evaluation:

This assessment of government performance and of some critical aspects of the system as a whole became even more pronounced when we asked our respondents directly: "What, if anything, would you criticize in this country?"<sup>87)</sup> The responses by ethnic group are presented in table III,57:

Insert table III,57:

86) While the findings reported in this and the previous section of this chapter give us some clues concerning the role and performance of the legislative and executive branches of government, we are not in a position to provide any additional information on the attitudes of our respondents towards the judiciary. We had not included any direct questions in our interviews in this regard, and the only attitudinal item indirectly referring to the judicial branch of government ("A poor man doesn't have the chance he deserves in the law courts", item 20 of question 40) did not reveal meaningful distinctions among our respondents, apparently because too few had had any contact with or information about the legal system at all. Rather than reporting "non-attitudes" we decided to drop the matter altogether.

87) Question 38 b.



Table III,57: Criticism of national affairs; by ethnic group:

<u>Percentage criticizing:</u>	<u>Kik.</u>	<u>Kam.</u>	<u>Mij.</u>	<u>Luy.</u>	<u>Luo.</u>	<u>Kal.</u>	<u>Maas.</u>	<u>Tot.</u>
Lack of infrastructure	2	1	4	6	--	--	3	2
Inflation	2	4	2	4	8	3	--	4
Unemployment	3	2	--	2	1	--	--	2
Inequitable distribution of income	9	4	--	2	11	7	7	7
Other economic criticism	7	3	18	6	2	10	--	6
Corruption	5	4	1	5	5	--	3	4
Tribalism	2	7	--	9	8	19	--	6
Other political criticism	5	2	--	3	4	8	1	3
Social problems	12	9	8	8	7	11	1	8
Other	1	2	3	--	1	--	3	1
No criticism (including "Don't know")	52	62	64	55	53	42	82	57
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1,079

The criticism of the Kikuyu and Mijikenda thus is mainly concerned with economic and social problems. The Kalenjin, Luo, and Luyia most often mentioned problems which are of a more directly political nature. The Kamba are in an intermediate position in both respects. The absence of any criticism is particularly striking for the Maasai. Here again this must be interpreted as an indication of their more general parochialism rather than as a sign of a particularly high degree of satisfaction with Kenya's social and political system. The Kalenjin and the Luo, on the other hand, are those who are most critical of certain aspects of social and political life, while the other groups did not show a great deviation from the mean. These major characteristics remain significant even after a number of controls.

A stratification by social class also reveals an interesting pattern: Less than one third of the agricultural proletarioids expressed any particular criticism, while members of the agricultural bourgeoisie (50%), of the proletariat (49%), and the sub-proletariat (66%) were much more critical. Criticism was also very strong among students (61% of them being critical of some aspect) and in the salariat (64%). While the criticism of the salariat and the proletariat was most often directed towards economic matters (39% and 31% respectively), the agricultural bourgeoisie and the students were most critical of political affairs (26% and 31% in these groups). In general, those who expressed their criticism most often tend to be more highly educated (63% of those with some secondary education compared to 28% among illiterates), urbanites (52% compared to 41% in the rural areas), males (50% compared to 33% for females), and members of the younger and middle generations (46% compared to 35% for those above the age of fifty). Respondents with secondary education also were particularly critical of political aspects of life in Kenya (30% compared to 11% for those with some primary education and 9% for those with no formal education).

In terms of our "types of political participants" a similar pattern becomes apparent which tends to lend further support towards this kind of classification. Thus the number of those expressing no criticism at all is highest among the parochials (81%), and among the "less informed citizens" (69%). This figure drops to 59% for the "alienated" and 35% for the "active democrats" who are quite outspoken in their criticism, too. The subjects criticized in all these groups are economically and politically in approximately equal parts (thus 6% of the parochials criticized economic matters and 4% political affairs; the respective figures are 10% and 9% for the "less-informed citizens", 13% and 14% for the "alienated", and 21% and 22% for the "active democrats").



Of those who voiced some specific criticism more than 40% thought the government should act to remedy the present situation. 5% of those who are critical even stated the government itself should be changed. The respondents of this latter category were particularly numerous among the Luo and Luyia (7% and 11% respectively of those who are critical). Another 15% put their hopes in some group action such as Harambee and similar activities, or thought the population at large should increase its efforts. 11% are quite pessimistic and said that nothing can be done. The rest offers a variety of other proposals.

A more indirect form of evaluation is also provided by the answers to the question: "Suppose you were made head of the government. What are some of the first things you would try to do?"<sup>88)</sup> In addition, some of the possible alternatives to present government practices, as they are perceived by our respondents, also become apparent. The responses are summarized in table III, 58:

Insert table III, 58:

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88) Question 39 c. This question is similar to one employed by Lerner, cf. *idem*, op. cit., question 102, p. 430. Lerner was most interested in the projective nature of this question, seeking to find further support for his concept of "empathy", whereas we are concerned only with the actual substance of the responses at this place.

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89) See chapter 2 b of this part above.

Table III,58: Things respondents would do as head of government;  
by ethnic group:

Percentage saying:	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Same as present president	3	4	1	--	2	4	--	2
Improve personal situation	1	5	1	--	2	--	6	2
Improve situation of ethnic group	--	4	--	--	2	--	37	5
Improve economic and social situation of general population	48	42	56	46	55	44	13	44
Improve political situation in the country	18	11	11	18	8	31	10	16
Can't imagine Don't know	30	34	31	36	31	21	34	31
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

While some respondents thus expressed their support of the present government ("would do same as Mzee") in answering this question as well, others had more personal aims in mind ("buy big farms", "get all the money and enjoy before I die"). A third category of people was mostly concerned with the improvement of the living conditions of their own ethnic group (a Luo fisherman: "move the capital to Kisumu"; a Maasai shop-keeper: "help Maasailand, build schools and water supplies"). The percentage of Maasai respondents in this category is particularly striking (more than one-third of them thinking first of improving the living conditions of their own group compared to a mean of 5% for the total sample). This coincides again with the relatively great number of "parochials" among them, but also with a generally lower level of "national identity" which we noted earlier.<sup>89)</sup> A fourth category, by far

89) See chapter 2 h of this part above.



the majority in all groups except for the Maasai, had the improvement of living conditions of all people at heart ("work for Kenya's growth wholeheartedly", "help the poor, make education available to everyone"). A sizeable minority was also concerned with specific political proposals ("stop corruption", "change the landholding system, some people have too much"; "promote unity among tribes"). Among these respondents the Kalenjin, Kikuyu, and Luyia are particularly numerous.

The number of those saying "can't imagine" or "don't know" to our question is particularly high among females (38% compared to 23% for males), and those with no formal education (37% compared to 26% for those with some secondary education). Age, on the other hand, is not a significant factor in this respect. The self-confidence of the younger respondents giving a specific answer is based on their generally better schooling; it is apparently matched in this case by the claim of seniority by the elders in regard to their traditional position and authority. In terms of our "types of participants" the number of those not being able to give a concrete answer to our questions is highest among the "parochials" (45%), compared to 36% and 35% respectively for the "alienated" and the "less informed citizens", and only 17% among the "active democrats".

#### h) Alternative orientations:

In spite of the relative stability of Kenya's political system after independence,<sup>90)</sup> the existing institutions are still fragile (compared for example to most countries in the industrialized world), and the dynamics of social change which have to be absorbed and channelled by them are so enormous that the continued existence of Kenya's present regime cannot

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90) One recent count lists 23 "irregular executive transfers" in Sub-Saharan Africa in the period from 1960 to 1967 alone, cf. Taylor and Hudson, op. cit., pp. 150 ff.

91) See chapter 2 g of this part above.

92) See also Part I, chapter 1 above.

be taken for granted. For this reason some alternative patterns of this country's future development have to be explored as well. The expected "objective" changes in social structure, due to economic and demographic factors, and the resulting dynamics are discussed elsewhere.<sup>91)</sup> Here we are only concerned with the "subjective" aspects of certain alternatives to Kenya's present economic and political system as they are revealed in our interviews.

In the section on "class consciousness"<sup>92)</sup> we have already discussed one significant feature of the economic system, namely the question whether possession of land should be communal or private; which in a rural country like this still is by far the most important means of production. There it turned out that a clear majority of all ethnic groups and classes is indeed in favor of private land ownership; the support of more communal forms of ownership comes not from any more "modern" socialists but from the more traditional sections of the population (the less "advanced" ethnic groups, older and illiterate people), whose significance tends to be further diminished in the future. However, an important limitation of this, if one may call it so, "capitalistic orientation" also became apparent: A sizeable majority of our respondents opted in favor of restricting the size of agricultural land to the area a household or a family can itself cultivate. This, if put into effect, would indeed rule out large-scale forms of plantation agriculture which in any case are alien to most parts of Saharan Africa, except for those areas with former or present European settlement.

To probe further into the preferences of our respondents concerning their country's economic system and possible alternatives, we asked one more question, this time relating to the aspect of foreign dominance which, of course, is very prominent in current "dependence" theories:<sup>93)</sup> "Do you think that

91) Cf. Berg-Schlosser, "Entwicklungstendenzen ...", loc.cit. .

92) See chapter 2 g of this part above.

93) See also Part I, chapter 1 above.



all business firms and companies in Kenya should be owned by Kenyans, or do you think it is necessary to allow foreigners a share in them in order to attract more foreign capital and expertise?"<sup>94)</sup> The responses are reported in table III,59:

Table III,59: Role accorded to foreign capital; by class and ethnic groups:

Percentage saying:		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Iuo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle+upper classes	Kenyanize	58	(47)	(80)	(38)	(33)	(100)	--	50
	Allow foreign shares	42	(53)	(20)	(50)	(67)	--	(100)	49
	Don't know	--	--	--	(12)	--	--	--	(1)
Non-agric. proletarioids+sub-proletariat	Kenyanize	43	(40)	(50)	(60)	(45)	(100)	(50)	48
	Foreign shares	52	(60)	(50)	(20)	55	--	(50)	48
	Don't know	(5)	--	--	(20)	--	--	--	(4)
Proletariat	Kenyanize	50	(67)	(100)	55	(50)	100	(100)	64
	Foreign shares	48	(33)	--	43	(44)	--	--	35
	Don't know	(2)	--	--	(2)	(6)	--	--	(1)
Agric. bourgeoisie	Kenyanize	39	(100)	(100)	92	50	92	75	70
	Foreign shares	61	--	--	(8)	50	(8)	(6)	29
	Don't know	--	--	--	--	--	--	(19)	(1)
Agric. proletarioids	Kenyanize	53	73	78	78	27	100	70	63
	Foreign shares	37	16	(12)	17	70	--	(11)	28
	Don't know	(10)	11	(10)	(5)	(3)	--	19	9
Total*	Kenyanize	48	70	80	70	35	96	70	61
	Foreign shares	48	22	12	25	63	(4)	13	33
	Don't know	4	8	(8)	(5)	(2)	--	17	6
Total weighted N:		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

\* Including students

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category)

94) Question 35 d.

The picture we obtained thus is a rather uneven one: While in the non-agricultural middle classes and among the non-agricultural proletarioids we find the position split into approximately equal parts, in the proletariat and in the agricultural classes a clear majority of about two-thirds of our respondents in these groups expressed its preference towards stronger measures of nationalization or "Kenyanization". An analysis by ethnic group shows that across all classes strong differences persist in this regard. Here, the Kikuyu, and in particular the Luo stand out in their relative openness to the question of foreign capital, even among the still more "backward" agricultural proletarioids. The other groups, on the other hand, took a rather uniform stand against foreign elements in Kenya's economy. This attitude is only marginally affected by age, sex, or place of residence of our respondents (if class positions are controlled for), but the level of education exercises a strong independent influence (e.g. only 23% among the illiterates were in favor of foreign shares in Kenya's economy compared to 37% for those with some primary, and 49% for those with some secondary education; Pearson's  $r = 0.17$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ).

Some caution is certainly appropriate if we are to interpret these results, but it seems that those groups who are in closer contact with outside elements tend to lose their original xenophobia and adopt a more open-minded attitude. This is also confirmed to a certain extent by the responses to separate questions which we had included in a Bogardus-type "social distance"-scale. When asked "would you accept a European as citizen in this country?"<sup>95)</sup> a clear majority of 55% of our respondents across all social classes would do so 39% were against it, and 6% said "don't know". Those in favor of granting citizenship to Europeans are particularly numerous among the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luyia (reaching 73% in the last group), but are least among the

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95) Question 32.



Maasai (only 26% being in favor, 17% saying "don't know"). Education again is a most important factor affecting this attitude (64% of those with primary education, and 63% of those with secondary education being in favor compared to only 43% among illiterates;  $r = 0.16$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Sex (59% of the males in favor compared to 49% of the females;  $r = 0.09$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and place of residence (66% of those living in town in favor compared to 53% among those in the rural areas;  $r = 0.08$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) are additional influences. In the case of Asians the willingness to accept them as citizens is split in approximately equal parts among our respondents (45% for, 48% against citizenship), but the relative position of the ethnic groups and classes and the effects of the demographic factors remain the same.

All this does not necessarily mean, however, that a criticism of neo-colonial aspects of Kenya's economy and society is not justified on the ground that the better-educated and more open-minded groups welcome the involvement by foreigners. Indeed, the responses of the better-informed parts of the population may be an indication of their awareness of the necessity of international exchanges today. This is to a certain extent reflected in the wording of our question ("...allow a share in order to attract more capital and expertise"), but this does not imply any particular forms an involvement of this kind should take such as joint ventures, foreign aid, etc. In any case, this matter has to be judged by applying other criteria as well (such as the objective structural consequences for Kenya's economy, and also by normative standards). However, the kind of consciousness expressed in our response should not be overlooked either, and it certainly constitutes a fact of its own and possibly an important causal factor in Kenya's future relations with the outside world.

The most concrete alternative to Kenya's present economic and social system was explored when we asked directly: "Do you think Kenya should become a more socialist country, like Tanzania for

example, or should the government continue with its present economic policies?"<sup>96)</sup> Table III,60 presents the results by class and ethnic group:

Table III,60: Preference for a more socialist system; by class and ethnic group:

Percentage saying:		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. bourgeoisie	More socialist	--	--	--	--	-(25)	--	--	(8)
	Continue with present system	(100)	(100)	--	(100)	(25)	--	(100)	(75)
	Don't know	--	--	--	--	(50)	--	--	(17)
Salarariat	More socialist	(21)	--	(20)	(60)	(37)	--	(100)	23
	Continue...	75	100	(80)	(40)	(63)	(100)	--	75
	Don't know	(4)	--	--	--	--	--	--	(2)
Proletariat	More socialist	(12)	(8)	(14)	(12)	(22)	(20)	--	12
	Continue...	78	92	(86)	88	72	80	(80)	81
	Don't know	(10)	--	--	--	(6)	--	(20)	7
Non-agric. proletaroids + subproletariat	More socialist	(8)	(40)	--	--	(25)	--	--	13
	Continue...	90	(60)	(100)	(80)	70	(100)	(100)	83
	Don't know	(2)	--	--	(20)	(5)	--	--	(4)
Agric. bourgeoisie	More socialist	(17)	--	--	50	(37)	--	--	20
	Continue...	72	(100)	(100)	50	63	100	63	74
	Don't know	(11)	--	--	--	--	--	(37)	6
Agric. proletaroids	More socialist	(8)	17	13	49	34	--	(4)	19
	Continue...	89	75	70	41	58	100	69	70
	Don't know	(3)	(8)	(17)	(10)	(8)	--	27	11
Total *	More socialist	12	15	12	36	31	(3)	(5)	18
	Continue...	82	79	74	59	62	97	69	74
	Don't know	6	(6)	14	(5)	6	--	26	8
Total weighted N:		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

\* Including students

(Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category)



Here, the relative alienation of the two main peoples of western Kenya, the Luo and the Luyia, from the mainstream of the country's economics and politics becomes again apparent; about one third in each group opted for a more socialist system. That the lower percentages of the Maasai and Mijikenda are in favor of a continuation of the present economic policies finds its explanations, as in some other instances before, in the relatively great number of parochials (saying "don't know") among them. The other ethnic groups deviate very little from each other, the identification of the Kalenjin with Kenya's present system again being particularly pronounced. The differences by class are equally striking; not surprisingly, the number of those being in favor of more socialist policies is smallest in the non-agricultural bourgeoisie while the salariat has the strongest socialistic leanings. The proletariat, the non-agricultural proletaroids, and the sub-proletariat, on the other hand, contrary to what one might have expected in a western European industrial country for example, show very little inclination in this regard. This may be a reflection of the still very early stage of industrialization in Kenya; most workers in this category are unskilled and often illiterate (thus being closer to a "Lumpenproletariat" in Marx' terminology). The agricultural classes do not deviate very much from the mean.

Controls show that age, sex, and place of residence (again independent of the class position) do not significantly affect this attitude. A higher level of education works in two increasing both the number of those in favor of present policies (from 69% among illiterates to 77% for those with secondary education), and those opting for a more socialist system (from 18% to 20%), depending on the class position of the respondents. Thus among the better-educated members of the non-agricultural bourgeoisie the support for the present system remains high (100% in this sub-category), while it decreases

99) See section c of this chapter above.

among the better-educated members of the more class-conscious salariat (to 66%). Among students alone (most of them secondary school students) the percentage of those in favor of socialist policies rises to 25%, the highest percentage for all groups. As expected this attitude is also closely related to our index of "system support": of those scoring low on this index 30% are in favor of a more socialist system compared to 11% among those scoring high ( $r = 0.10, p < 0.001$ ).

Within Kenya's present economic and social system but in the more directly political sphere and in view of the numerous in Kenya's party-system after independence and the continuing discussion in the country,<sup>97)</sup> a further alternative was suggested by asking: "Some people say that it is good to have only one political party in this country. Others say there should be two or more. What is your opinion, should there be several parties or a single one?"<sup>98)</sup>

Insert table III,61:

These results are the most "mixed" ones among the alternatives discussed here, and some of the earlier "affinities" between certain groups on other issues (such as the question of "system support")<sup>99)</sup> do not seem to hold in this case. Thus the group most strongly in favor of a multi-party system are the Kalenjin, followed by the Luo. The Maasai, in spite of their lower absolute percentage of those in favor of several parties, must also be considered to fall into this category since their lower level is entirely due to the great number of those answering "don't know" among them; not a single Maasai respondent expressed his preference for a single-party system. The existing

97) See also Part I, chapter 2 above.

98) Question 35 e.

99) See section c of this chapter above.



Table III,61: Attitude towards Kenya's party system;  
by class and ethnic groups:

Percentage in favor of:		Kik.	Kam.	Mijj.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. bourgeoisie	Several parties	--	--	--	(33)	(25)	--	(100)	(25)
	Single party	(100)	(100)	--	(67)	(75)	--	--	(75)
	Don't know	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Salariat	Several	42	77	(40)	(40)	(38)	(100)	(100)	52
	Single	(33)	(23)	(60)	(40)	(62)	--	--	36
	Don't know	(25)	--	--	(20)	--	--	--	(12)
Proletariat	Several	71	(25)	(43)	67	72	100	(80)	70
	Single	19	(75)	(43)	28	(22)	--	--	23
	Don't know	(10)	--	(14)	(5)	(6)	--	(20)	7
Non-agric. proletaroids +sub-proletariat	Several	(23)	(40)	(50)	--	60	(100)	(100)	38
	Single	60	(60)	(50)	(80)	(40)	--	--	52
	Don't know	(17)	--	--	(20)	--	--	--	(10)
Agric. bourgeoisie	Several	78	(50)	--	75	88	100	81	80
	Single	--	(50)	(50)	(25)	(12)	--	--	10
	Don't know	22	--	(50)	--	--	--	(19)	10
Agric. proletaroids	Several	83	29	24	32	92	91	48	56
	Single	--	52	41	53	--	--	--	22
	Don't know	17	19	35	(15)	8	(9)	52	22
Total *	Several	66	33	25	50	83	97	57	60
	Single	17	54	43	41	12	--	--	24
	Don't know	17	13	32	9	5	3	43	16
Total weighted N:		275	156	96	153	194	92	108	1079

\* Including students  
 (Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category.)

party system finds its greatest support among the Kamba, Mijikenda (the number of those saying "don't know" among them also being quite considerable), and Luyia. The position on this issue among the Kikuyu is neatly split between members of the agricultural classes (all of whom opted for several parties) and the non-agricultural ones (a greater number being in favor of a single party). On the whole, the non-agricultural classes have a greater number of those in favor of the present system, while the agricultural classes, except for the Kamba, Mijikenda and Luyia, strongly prefer a multi-party system.

The differences according to age and sex (females tending to be somewhat more in favor of a single-party system) of our respondents are not very pronounced except for the usual variations of those not being able to give an answer. The influence of education is a very mixed one: the number of those in favor of a multi-party system increased from 53% among illiterates to 68% among those with some primary education (the increase being almost entirely due to the smaller number of those saying "don't know" in the second category), but then decreased to 61% for those with some secondary education (the over-all correlation is, however, still highly significant:  $r = 0.19$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). The place of residence of our respondents on the other hand, affects this attitude in an opposite direction: 66% of the rural respondents were in favor of a multi-party system, while 58% of those in town prefer a single party ( $r = 0.08$ ,  $p = 0.01$ ).

The interpretation of these results calls for a great deal of caution certainly at least two main factors influence this attitude although they cannot always be clearly separated and may work in contradictory ways. One is a tradition of separate political parties in the main ethnic groups: KADU was very important in the past among the Kalenjin, and Maasai, for example, and KPU constituted a main instrument of Luo



politics, the banning of which apparently is still considered as a major injustice by many members of this group. The other factor is a weighing of the more democratic principle of several parties against the actual experiences the members of the different groups have had with intense forms of party competition. In Kenya so far this has almost entirely coincided with ethnic divisions as well. It seems that the more competitive spirit of the agricultural classes has given way to a more careful and perhaps more prudent attitude among a greater number in the non-agriculture groups and those with the highest level of education. The influence of this latter factor can be seen particularly well among the Luo, where 91% of those in the agricultural classes, but only one third of those in the non agricultural middle classes are in favor of a multiparty system.

This interpretation is also supported by the verbatim answers of our respondents to our follow-up question asking for the reason of their stand on this issue. Typically, those in favor of a multi-party system emphasized its democratic value and efficiency: "Democracy calls for argument before agreement", "through opposition government will look more into citizens' problems", parties should check one another, so that they are both careful and active". The opposing view, on the other hand, stressed the theme of social unity and peace: "Many parties will confuse people", "one party makes clear and firm decisions no quarrels", "many parties cause political unrest", "many deaths occur due to conflict between rival parties".

A final alternative was then proposed by another projective question: "If, for some reason, you could no longer live in this country, what other country would you choose to live in?"<sup>100)</sup> Almost half of those asked could not imagine living somewhere else at all ("I will not go anywhere", "I would kill myself"). One of our interviewers reported that "the respondent was very shocked and lost temper, thought government planned to

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100) Question 39 d.

kick him out". Of those who did give a concrete answer about half of our respondents across all ethnic groups and classes named a neighboring country (Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia), 5% another African state, 8% wanted to go to Great Britain or another western European country, 1% to the Soviet Union, and 19% to the United States. The rest gave a variety of other answers. The reasons given ranged from "it is similar to Kenya", "people there are like us, (applied mainly to the neighboring states), to more concrete economic ("I hear they are rich") and political ("people are peaceful there", "it is a democratic country") motives. In the case of the United States one Luo peasant in particular had made up his mind: "I want to join the astronauts".

In concluding this rather extensive chapter some of its highlights should perhaps be brought to mind again. In a first step we attempted to analyze the levels of general political interest and political information. It turned out that the Kikuyu in particular, but also the Mijikenda, Luyia, and Luo expressed a relatively strong interest in politics. This is not always coupled, however, (for example in the case of the Mijikenda) with an equally high level of political information, at least as far as matters emanating from outside our respondents' own ethnic communities are concerned. Thus the Mijikenda and also the Maasai had the lowest over-all scores on this scale. We then looked at the actual level of political participation of the different groups. Here the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luyia, and Luo obtained by far the highest scores. But again knowing about politics and actually participating in it turned out to be different matters. In combining the extremes of these two distinct features we arrived at fourfold typology of political participants grouping them into the categories of "parochials" (low information, low participation), "alienated" (high information, low participation), "less informed citizens" (low information, strong participation), and "active democrats"



(high information, strong participation). The parochials were most numerous among the Maasai and Mijikenda, whereas sizeable groups of alienated people could be found among the Luyia, but also among some sub-groups of the Kikuyu. The Kikuyu, Kalenjin, and Luyia also had the greatest percentages of "active democrats" among them, while the Luo, Kamba, and Mijikenda were more strongly represented among the "less-informed citizens". Our measure of political participation also proved to be significantly related to the "support" our respondents according to Kenya's political system. Particularly the Kikuyu and Kalenjin again had the highest over-all scores.

An analysis of the "input orientations" of our respondents then revealed that contacting a Member of Parliament or a government official is considered to be by far the most effective method to get something done, while personal contacts, working through the political party (KANU), or through groups formed on an ad hoc basis are generally considered to be less efficient. Protest demonstrations are regarded as a particularly inefficient method. These attitudes show some interesting variations, however, depending on the ethnic and class positions of our respondents, the trust they place in the present government, and their "type of participation".

In general, the more "alienated" groups turned out to be more likely to contact their M.P. rather than an official of the government, they were also more inclined to resort to open protest, if necessary. We then looked at the role of M.P.s in particular as important mediators between the central political system and the general public. Truly remarkable in this regard was the extent to which our respondents knew the name of their respective M.P.. More than two thirds of the members of all groups, and still more than 50% of the otherwise very parochial Maasai were able to do so! This question also revealed the greatest differences between our rural and our urban respondents.

In spite of the generally higher level of media exposure and information of the latter, only one third of them actually was able to give the name of their M.P.

We then probed for the orientations of our respondents towards the central government structures. A list of national problems considered to be most important showed what expectations our respondents have in this regard and which political problems in particular they see as affecting the government. When asked more directly whether they think the government is dominated by certain groups, a particularly great number of Luo thought so; also among the Luyia, Kamba, and some Kikuyu sub-groups sizeable minorities were of this opinion. A more general "system evaluation" then brought to light some of the things our respondents are most critical of in Kenya's present system. While some of these such as droughts or natural disasters) are not of the government's making, even though a more efficient famine relief clearly is one of its responsibilities, others, particularly in the economic sphere (such as unemployment, inflation, and the often criticized inequitable distribution of incomes), are more directly amenable to government decisions. The charge of widespread corruption and nepotism in the government itself also was made not infrequently.

When we finally looked for possible alternatives in the minds of our respondents to some aspects of Kenya's present economic system, a considerable number declared favoring stronger measures of Kenyanization and controlling foreign influence more effectively. In the more directly political sphere a majority opted for the return to a multi-parti system even though, particularly in the non-agricultural classes, sizeable groups are also fearful of ensuing social and political unrest in this case "Socialism" of the Tanzanian variety is only favored by very small minorities with some slight variations, in all groups.



understanding of this part of the common cultural heritage of mankind. The second consists in relating these cultural factors to other significant influences which are at work, and evaluating the chances of their contribution to a more democratic political order in which the emancipatory aspirations of individuals and groups can be fulfilled in a meaningful way.

PART IV: SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS:

It is these and in a brief manner here on summary factors over time discussion light of to the ad

"Les moeurs et les lois des Américains ne sont pas les seules qui puissent convenir aux peuples démocratiques; mais les Américains ont montré qu'il ne faut pas désespérer de régler la démocratie à l'aide des lois et des moeurs. Si d'autres peuples, empruntant à l'Amérique cette idée générale et féconde, sans vouloir du reste imiter ses habitants dans l'application particulière qu'ils en ont faite, tentaient de se rendre propres à l'état social que la Providence impose aux hommes de nos jours, et cherchaient ainsi à échapper au despotisme ou à l'anarchie qui les menacent, quelles raisons avons-nous de croire qu'ils dussent échouer dans leurs efforts?"

1) Ethnic Profiles

Alexis de Tocqueville

In the preceding part we have discussed the most important aspects of Kenya's political culture and its main components proceeding dimension by dimension and variable by variable.

The traditional background and the different elements of the contemporary political culture of Kenya's main ethnic groups have been presented in all their diversity above. We have now come to the point where it becomes necessary to step back somewhat from this mosaic and to take a more comprehensive look in order to recognize more clearly its most important features within the total setting. As we have stated in the introduction to this study we are facing a double challenge: The first lies in the description and analysis of a culture very different from our own in some of its most significant aspects in order to provide a basis for a better mutual (!)

understanding of this part of the common cultural heritage of mankind. The second consists in relating these cultural factors to other significant influences which are at work, and evaluating the chances of their contribution to a more democratic, i.e. a more tolerant and peaceful political order in which the emancipatory aspirations of individuals and groups can be fulfilled in a meaningful way.

It is obvious that any single study can cope with these enormous tasks only in a very limited and preliminary manner. In these concluding sections we shall first draw a brief "profile" of each of the ethnic groups considered here on the basis of our data. This will be followed by a summary of the effects of the most important independent factors influencing this cultural pattern and its changes over time. The final section will then be devoted to a discussion of how our findings can be interpreted in the light of different theories of democracy and their relevance to the actual situation in Kenya.

#### 1) Ethnic Profiles:

In the preceding part we have discussed the most important aspects of Kenya's political culture and its main components proceeding dimension by dimension and variable by variable. We shall now summarize our findings in the form of brief "profiles" for each ethnic group highlighting some of the more characteristic features for which "ethnicity" proved to be a significant independent factor. In doing so, it is imperative always to keep in mind that most of the statements that we are making are only of a relative nature (i.e. have to be seen in comparison to the other ethnic groups we are considering here) and that the differences mentioned, if not otherwise noted, are usually only a matter of degree,



although they are statistically significant. The internal differentiation of each ethnic group must not be overlooked either and sometimes the variations within a particular group are even greater than those between the mean values for different groups. Therefore, where some more information is required on a certain aspect, it should always be taken from the respective chapters above as this summary alone will necessarily be incomplete. In emphasizing these points we hope to minimize the always hidden danger that statements of this kind may be quoted out of context, be taken as absolute values by themselves, or be over-generalized to the extent that they may serve to re-enforce existing stereotypes or to create new ones. The prejudices which may then be formed have hardly ever been helpful in social relations, and it is precisely one of the tasks of a differentiated analysis of political culture to shatter many of the customary stereotypes and to reduce them to their actual basis by showing the great variety of existing features and the full scope of their distribution.

The Kikuyu: As has become apparent from our more general discussion in Part II above, the Kikuyu are Kenya's largest, economically most active, and politically dominant ethnic group today. Internally, however, they are also most differentiated along "class" lines. These dominant "objective" characteristics also become apparent in our cultural analysis in a number of ways. They are accompanied by certain idiosyncratic "subjective" features, too. Thus, looking at some aspects of family relations for example, we found that among the Kikuyu the fathers generally assume a relatively less important role in the economic decision-making than in the other groups. Among those engaged in more modern occupations (i.e. in the non-agricultural classes and the agricultural bourgeoisie), however, the economic decisions are more often made by fathers alone, whereas the

importance of mothers for the punishment of children increases, reinforcing the traditionally more limited role of women in this way. Relations with the more extended family are still quite strong, but sharing one's cash income becomes increasingly less acceptable for members of the agricultural bourgeoisie and traditional forms of hospitality often become a heavy burden for those living in town. Further reaching traditional social bonds, such as clan and age-set membership, are least pronounced among the Kikuyu today and clearly seem to be on the decline. Many Kikuyus exhibit a relatively low level of social trust, discriminating quite carefully in this respect on the basis of their family relations and personal friendships. In addition, a sense of ethnic identity is highly developed among a greater proportion of them.

The Kikuyu are also outstanding in their "sense of religiosity" as expressed in our index. A high percentage of them are devout Christians today, with a relatively great number being organized in one of the "African Independent Churches". The more traditional belief in the powers of the "medicine men" has been reduced among the majority of our respondents. The levels of "time consciousness" in a modern sense and of "achievement orientation" are also among the highest values for any of the ethnic groups considered here. The answers to the question whether our respondents are satisfied with their present economic situation again clearly shows the internal stratification of the Kikuyu. While a relatively higher degree of satisfaction can be found among the members of the agricultural bourgeoisie and the non-agricultural middle and upper classes, dissatisfaction is very strong in the proletariat, the subproletariat, and among non-agricultural proletaroids. In terms of the perception of their economic future a still relatively high percentage is optimistic, the greatest number of pessimists being among the members of the proletariat.



Among the Kikuyu a relatively greater number than in all other groups have a specific project in mind to improve their economic position in the future.

In the more general social sphere the Kikuyu do not deviate very much from most of the other groups as far as the attachment to ascriptive social criteria or the acceptance of social and political activities of women are concerned. They rank relatively low on our index of "traditionalism", a stronger sense of "anomie" is only expressed by the members of the proletariat and the non-agricultural proletaroids among them. A greater "disposition towards violence" on the other hand is quite manifest for a substantial minority. The level of "political authoritarianism" is quite high, too, but turns out to be strongly related to the more general support which Kenya's present political system enjoys among them. This latter attitude is also supplemented by the relatively greater proportion of those professing to adhere to some basic democratic values.

The Kikuyu also have by far the highest percentage of those who are interested in politics and actually follow political affairs. Similarly their levels of political information and political participation are particularly high. It could also be shown that this high level of political involvement among them is strongly related to personal political experiences our respondents had (in particular during the time of "Mau Mau" and the "Emergency" for those being in the respective age-group). In terms of our "types of political participants", the Kikuyu have the greatest number of "active democrats" among them, while only minor sections fall into the categories of "parochials" or "less informed citizens". The number of "alienated" persons is relatively great, too, mainly among members of the "salarariat", the proletariat and the sub-proletariat, which once again points to the relatively high degree of internal class differentiation. Together with the Kalenjin the Kikuyu also exhibit the highest level of "system support",

Clan identification is also still relatively strong, while age-sets have lost even more of their traditionally already somewhat reduced importance. A general social trust is expressed by a sizeable plurality of our respondents, and

the expectation that others are helpful and fair in their which, however, tends to be lower among the non-propertied classes. Conversely, the expression of political criticism is relatively low, but also shows some class differentiation. In addition, those from other Kikuyu districts attribute a greater influence over the government to "the Kiambu people". A sense of "national identity" and pride in political achievement is also quite highly developed.

Some suggested alternatives to Kenya's present system such as stronger measures of "Kenyanization", more communal forms of landownership or a "socialism" of the Tanzanian variety are attractive to only relatively small minorities among them. The idea of a multi-party system, on the other hand, found strong support among our rural respondents while a greater proportion of those in town are in favor of the present one-party system and the allegedly higher level of political stability it provides.

The Kamba: The Kamba in many ways occupy an intermediate position in Kenya's society, e.g. as far as their general level of socio-economic "advancement" is concerned, but also in terms of many of the "cultural" features discussed here. One major division among them, which tends to become even more pronounced with further development, is the one between those who live in the climatically more favored parts of Machakos District and those who have to endure in the ecologically much less suitable and more remote parts of Ukambani, most of which are located in Kitui District. Their proximity to Nairobi, but also their ethnic affinity to the Kikuyu, which, however, is not without its tensions, make them an important ally in political coalitions at the center.

As far as some of the idiosyncratic features of the Kamba are concerned an even greater proportion than in the other groups expressed a strong sense of family solidarity. Clan identification is also still relatively strong, while age-sets have lost even more of their traditionally already somewhat reduced importance. A general social trust is expressed by a sizeable plurality of our respondents, and



the expectation that others are helpful and fair in their actions is somewhat more widespread. The general level of "relitiosity", as measured by our index, is lower than in most of the other groups, the more traditional belief in magic and the power of medicine men on the other hand are rather strong. Particularly low, too, is their achievement motivation. Their "disposition towards violence" is, after the Luo, the lowest for all groups. Other religious, economic or social attitudes show relatively little deviation from the mean for all groups in each case.

The interest in politics and the involvement in national political affairs of many Kamba is not very pronounced. Their level of political information and political participation are equally low. Thus they still have considerable numbers of "parochials" and "less informed citizens" among them, particularly in the rural areas. Among members of the non-agricultural classes a higher percentage of "active democrats", but also a certain number of "alienated" can be found. The percentage of those scoring high on our index of "system support" is similarly low, the great majority being in the "medium" category. In terms of their "input orientations" a relatively great number considered working through KANU or contacting a Member of Parliament to be the most efficient method.

When it comes to an evaluation of the political system as a whole, only a relatively small minority is critical of some aspects. Some respondents also see the government as dominated by certain groups, in particular the Kikuyu. A considerable percentage is also in favour of stronger methods of Kenyanization. While a clear majority of our question whether the amount of land an individual family may own should be restricted are about equally divided. A more socialist orientation of the Tanzanian kind is not very popular. A clear majority also express their preference for the existing single-party system. Thus, at least the rural Kamba will probably be a fairly reliable partner

in the existing coalition as long as they feel confident of getting their appropriate share of what it has to offer.

The Mijikenda: The Mijikenda are still the most traditional agricultural group discussed here, both as far as their economic activities and a number of the attitudes expressed in our survey are concerned. In many respects the more "hybrid" nature of some aspects of their culture, influenced for centuries by outside forces, in particular by the Arab world and Islam, also becomes apparent. The more leisurely way of life a larger number of them traditionally could enjoy in the more fertile parts of the coastal strip has become less common because of the mounting population pressure and the greater extent to which an increasing percentage now has to cultivate agriculturally marginal soil further inland. These more crowded conditions have not yet led, however, to a greater amount of out-migration, as e.g. among the Luyia and Luo, or to more highly intensified forms of agriculture as among the Kikuyu or Kisii.

Thus traditional ways of thinking still pervade many aspects of the daily life of the Mijikenda. Traditional family solidarity, for example, is still rather strong and the pattern of family decision - making and the methods of punishment of children (usually rather severe ones) have undergone the least generational changes. The highest percentage among them also says that they trust only members of their family. A great number expect others to look out only for themselves and to take advantage of them if they get a chance. Their sense of ethnic identity, on the other hand, is not very pronounced, and more "national" identifications are also relatively rare.

In the religious sphere, both the influence of Islam and indigenous traditional beliefs (particularly among some sub-groups) are still felt very strongly. Christianity



has made very little headway so far. But even among our Muslim respondents not all seemed to be very devout believers. In contrast to more widespread stereotypes about the "Coast people" we did not find very strong beliefs in magic or the power of medicine men; nor is a sense of achievement very pronounced. Even though a very high percentage is dissatisfied with the economic situation, still a large majority looks more optimistically into the future, not very many of them, however, have any particular plans in this respect.

Again, except for a relatively strong expression of "traditionalism" as measured by our index, the more general social attitudes of the Mijikenda do not deviate very much from those of the other groups. One interesting finding is the fact that the disagreement between the sexes is the greatest of all groups as far as the socio-political role of women is concerned. Here the (Islam-inspired) traditional male dominance is still very much proclaimed by the men, while a relatively great number of women reject this attitude.

Involvement in politics and exposure to the public news media are very low. The Mijikenda have the smallest number of those scoring high on our "political information" scale; their level of political participation is equally very low. In terms of our "types of political participants" the "parochials" and the "less informed citizens" by far constitute the majority. There is a small minority of "active democrats", however, while the number of "Alienated" again is the smallest for all groups. Their "system support" on the other hand, is remarkably strong, and only very few are critical of any aspects of Kenya's political system or of a dominating group. They are also most strongly oriented towards the government bureaucracy in their dealings with matters of public concern. Their activities in more participatory input structures or "Harambee" projects are not very pronounced.

The Mijikenda also see few alternatives to Kenya's present economic and political system, e.g. as far as the question of land ownership or the imposition of a land ceiling are concerned. The support for the present one-party system similarly is very strong. The only minor exception in this regard are stronger measures of Kenyanization which are favored by a majority. Thus the Mijikenda with their still largely traditional attitudes and their relatively remote geographical position are still a faithful ally of the center, at least as far as the rural parts of Coast Province are concerned. The politics of Mombasa and perhaps also of some of the smaller towns along the coast are a somewhat different matter.

The Luyia: The Luyia form a somewhat incoherent cluster of ethnic sub-groups in Western Kenya. The traditional variations among them (as e.g. between the Bukusu, the largest single sub-group in the north, and some of the more southern groups) still persist to a certain extent, but they also have been superseded by more modern developments. Thus an important distinction today must be made between those sub-groups where population pressure still is not so keenly felt (as e.g. in the north) and those groups where processes of "involutionary growth" and outright pauperization prevail (as e.g. in large parts of Kakamega District). Because of the extremely high population density in many areas the percentage of those engaged in migrant labor (usually of the "long-distance" type, which allows husbands to return home only once or twice a year) is also the highest for any ethnic group. At the same time the Luyia have, after the Kikuyu, the highest percentage of adult literacy. These conditions, their relatively widespread poverty and their high level of awareness of the situation, make the Luyia one of the most important factors in future conflicts. This conflict potential has been somewhat



mitigated, however, by some cross-cutting class differences and the traditional internal variations among them.

Thus for many of the variables probed for in our survey the Luyia, taken altogether, occupy an intermediate position and only relatively few features set them apart somewhat more distinctly. Their feelings of family and clan solidarity, for example, seem to be relatively strong. Age-sets, on the other hand, which even traditionally played a relatively minor role for most of them, seem to have lost much of their social and political meaning. The membership in modern non-professional voluntary organizations has become increasingly important. Even though at the most general level most Luyia are somewhat less suspicious of outsiders than members of some of the other groups, they are among those who are most discriminating as to whom they trust; family ties are still particularly important in this regard.

Although the Luyia are the most "Christianized" of all groups considered here (at least in terms of official church affiliation) their level of "religiosity", as expressed in our index, and some specific religious beliefs, for example in a "life after death", do not deviate very much from the mean for the other groups. Some more traditional cultural elements, such as a belief in magic and the power of ill wishes are still relatively strong (which also confirms to a certain extent one of the stereotypes concerning the Luyia in the wider Kenyan society). Time consciousness and achievement orientation seem to be quite pronounced today, the level of economic satisfaction, however, is rather low, which is not surprising in view of the actual situation. But a clear majority is still optimistic about their future economic prospects and a relatively high percentage say they have some concrete plans in mind.

A great number of Luyia also considers social relations to be less determined by ascriptive criteria. This also

applies, relatively speaking, to the social and political role of women. Our measures of "traditionalism", "disposition towards violence", "political authoritarianism", "acceptance of democratic values", "interest in politics", and "political participation" all show the Luyia to occupy intermediate positions. Their exposure to the media and the level of political information, on the other hand, are relatively strong. In terms of our types of participants a sizeable plurality are "active democrats", however, the second largest group is "alienated". Both the percentages of "parochials" and "less informed citizens" are relatively low. A considerable number still expressed their support for Kenya's present political system, but here class differences among them become most apparent: while a clear majority of the agricultural bourgeoisie scored high on this index, very few agricultural proletariats did so, almost one third of whom have only low values on this measure, making the Luyia, taken all together, the group with the second largest percentage (after the Luo) of low scorers. Their input orientation is more directed towards their elected representatives than towards government officials, a few even consider open protest as an effective means.

When it comes to certain alternatives to Kenya's present political system, even though a clear majority is in favor of private forms of land ownership, less than one third think that this should be unrestricted. Further Kenyanization is also quite popular, a relatively greater number than in any of the other groups also expresses their preference for a more socialist system. On all these issues, the class divisions among the Luyia are very pronounced: those in better positions still favor the present system, while considerable percentages of the non-agricultural lower classes and the agricultural proletariats are more oriented towards some alternative possibilities. Only with regard to Kenya's party system, are these positions less clear-cut. Here, a majority of the agricultural proletariats is in

The level of economic satisfaction, on the other hand, is



favor of the present system, while members of the agricultural bourgeoisie, but also of the proletariat express their desire to be able to choose between several parties.

The Luo: As the second largest ethnic group in the country the Luo have always played a special role in Kenyan politics. In the period immediately before and after independence they were the most important ally of the Kikuyu with whom they worked together in KANU. After the foundation and subsequent ban of KPU and the assassination of Tom Mboya many Luo saw themselves isolated from the central political system and became a main focus for the opposition. Their economic position is characterized by a relatively low level of agricultural development in their home area, on the one hand, and a relatively strong engagement in non-agricultural employment elsewhere, often in the form of "long-distance migration", on the other. As the only "Western-Nilotic" ethnic group in Kenya they are also set apart by a number of traditional cultural characteristics, in particular the lack of both male and female circumcision which is still highly valued by many members of the other ethnic groups.

Some of the more dominant contemporary cultural traits also became apparent in our survey. While their family relations and the emphasis put on traditional social bonds, for example, do not show a great deal of variation from the mean for most of the other groups, their general level of trust towards others is somewhat lower and its scope is mainly restricted to personal friends. Those who are members of modern church organizations, many of which are relatively small sects, seem to be particularly devout believers, as expressed in the frequency of worship and their belief in a "life after death". The level of achievement orientation is one of the lowest for all groups. The level of economic satisfaction, on the other hand, in

particular among those still pursuing a more traditional way of life, is rather high. As far as their economic future is concerned, the Luo have the lowest percentage of optimists, but a majority expects that conditions will at least not become worse.

The Luo also have the smallest number of all the ethnic groups considered here who emphasize ascriptive social criteria. This includes the social and political position of women whom a great majority expects to participate in politics on an equal basis. Similarly, the percentage of those who express a "disposition towards violence" is the lowest for all groups. Their level of "political authoritarianism", a measure which also proved to be significantly related to our index of "system support", is equally low, while a sizeable number expresses their acceptance of democratic values. In terms of their levels of political information and political participation the Luo occupy intermediate positions, which are somewhat differentiated according to the social class of our respondents. The "less informed citizens" and the "active democrats" are most numerous among them, while the percentages for both "parochials" and "alienated", except for a larger number of the latter among members of the non-agricultural classes, are relatively low. When it comes to the expression of "support" for Kenya's political system and its leadership, the relative isolation of the Luo and their disenchantment with the present situation become most apparent. They have by far the smallest number of those scoring high on our respective index and the greatest percentage of those who believe the government is dominated by a certain group (most of them naming the Kikuyu). Similarly a sense of "national pride" (almost half of our respondents see nothing to be proud of in Kenya) is the lowest of all groups.

As far as some of the possible alternatives to Kenya's present economic and political system are concerned a somewhat greater number than in most of the other groups favored more communal forms of land ownership and a restriction



as to the amount of land an individual may possess. Stronger measures of Kenyanization, on the other hand, perhaps since they are expecting some assistance from outsiders against the preponderance of certain Kenyan groups, are least favored by them. Tanzania's model of socialist development is approved of by a sizeable minority, the second largest group to do so after the Luyia. A very high percentage also expressed their preference for a return to a multi-party system, only a greater number of members of the non-agricultural middle-classes opting for the present situation.

The Kalenjin: The "Kalenjin" are the most heterogenous of all ethnic groups considered here. They have come to be known by a common name only in recent decades and their sub-groups have remained quite distinct entities. The discrepancy between those groups among them who still largely pursue a pastoralist way of life and those who have successfully adopted modern methods of agriculture is also particularly pronounced. A relatively smaller percentage of them than of the other groups discussed so far have migrated to places outside their original home area and their involvement in economic and political affairs at the center has remained quite low. Today the Kalenjin exhibit many features which are still characteristic of their traditional way of life, but which are coupled with attitudes which reflect their increased economic importance as successful cash-crop farmers and their political significance as an important factor (Daniel arap Moi being Vice-President) in Kenya's present government.

These more general conditions have also become apparent in our survey <sup>1)</sup>. Thus some characteristic aspects of family

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1) Our remarks here must be taken with an even bigger "grain of salt" than is the case for the other groups, because our Kalenjin sample, for some technical and practical reasons, is the smallest of all groups. It only covers those sub-groups which have turned to agriculture or other modern occupations and does not include any pastoralists.

relations, for example, still reflect some of their traditional attitudes. The father has a particularly strong position in the economic decision making in the family in both the generation of our respondents and in that of their parents. Children are subjected to quite strict disciplinary measures, but also traditional forms of hospitality are still very much adhered to. Traditional and social roles such as clan and age-sets have remained very important, too, and only the Maasai surpass the Kalenjin in this respect. The scope of social trust is largely restricted to people they know or who belong to their own ethnic group, but in general they do not seem to be as suspicious of others as members of some of the other groups. Thus they have the lowest percentage saying that they do not trust anybody and by far the greatest number of those who state that they expect others to be fair. Their expression of "ethnic self-centeredness", on the other hand, is also quite strong, again coming after that of the Maasai.

The religious convictions of the Kalenjin do not show any particularly outstanding characteristics. Even among those converted to Catholicism (a relatively high percentage in our sample) the level of "religiosity; and a belief in a "life after death" are not very strong. Some more traditional elements, on the other hand, such as a belief in the power of ill wishes are still relatively widespread. The achievement orientation of our respondents also is about average. Although great number of them are not satisfied with their present economic situation, they have the highest percentage of those who look optimistically into the future. Ascriptive social criteria still play an important role. This also applies to the social and political position of women whose activities are seen, again after those of the Maasai, in the most restrictive way. The score in our index of "traditionalism" is also particularly high. Their "disposition towards violence", "political authoritarianism", but also their acceptance of democratic values are somewhat above the mean.

See also Part I, chapter 2 above.



The interest of many Kalenjin in national politics is not really great, but their levels of political information and political participation are about average. Together with the Kikuyu and the Luyia they have a relatively great number of "active democrats", particularly among the members of the agricultural bourgeoisie. "Less informed citizens" and outright "parochials", on the other hand, are relatively scarce. The percentage of "alienated" conforms to the mean. Their expression of "system support" is very strong. They also have the smallest number of those who see the government as being dominated by any particular group. At the same time they remain quite critical of certain aspects of Kenya's present political system. They have the highest percentage of all groups who favor stronger measures of Kenyanization and a return to a multi-party system. But "socialism à la Tanzania" is completely out.

The Maasai: As we pointed out in our ethnographic characterization in Part II above, the Maasai are one of the most outstanding examples, and the only one included here, of a people who are still mostly dependent on a pastoralist mode of production. In their picturesque appearance they have always raised the special interest of outsiders, whether these were early explorers, colonial administrators, or present-day tourists, but relatively little has transpired about them in the form of more serious ethnographic investigation. Today Maasai culture is at a crossroads and it remains to be seen whether they will actually "go under", as Governor Charles Eliot predicted at the beginning of the century <sup>2)</sup>, or whether some viable alternatives (such as different forms of individual or group ranching) can be found which would allow them to adapt themselves to a more modern way of life while still preserving their ethnic identity and some of the more important elements of their cultural heritage. All in all, given the continuing infringement by members of other groups

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2) See also Part I, chapter 2 above.

on the more fertile parts of their home area and the "grabbing" of individual pieces of land by some Maasai themselves, the prospects seem to be more gloomy than promising.

One feature which clearly became apparent by probing for the "personal identity" of our respondents is a strong expression of self-confidence underlining the almost proverbial "pride" of members of this group. They also place great emphasis on family relations and traditional social bonds, in particular as far as traditional forms of hospitality are concerned, but the scope of their family solidarity seems to be restricted to their more immediate kin. The institutions of clan and age-sets are also still largely intact and define some of the most important aspects of Maasai life. On the other hand, very few of them are members of any modern formal organization or participate in "Harambee" efforts. A higher percentage than for any of the other groups is suspicious of outsiders, their scope of trust being largely confined to members of their family, age-set, or ethnic group. The level of "self-centeredness" of the group as a whole is also higher than for any of the other communities. Conversely, a sense of a Kenyan "national identity" is least developed among them, which is an expression of the more general parochialism of a greater number of them, almost half of our respondents being neither proud nor critical of any aspect of Kenya's national affairs.

Ascriptive social criteria still play a relatively great role, in particular as far as the social and political role of women and the respect for old age are concerned. The expression of "traditionalism" on our index is equally strong. The "disposition towards violence", perhaps reflecting their tradition of warriorhood, is the highest for all ethnic groups. Relatively little importance is, however, attached to their religious beliefs, confirming to some extent their reputation of being quite "agnostic".



By far the lowest percentage of any ethnic group, even including Maasai members of Christian churches today, express their belief in a "life after death". The belief in the art of practitioners of traditional medicine, on the other hand, still persists to a large extent. In terms of their "achievement motivation" the Maasai occupy an intermediate position in our sample, but their aspirations in this regard seem to be more directed towards aspects of more traditional excellence and bravery. The level of "time conscience" in a modern sense, is the lowest for all ethnic groups. A majority of Maasai, again unique among all groups in this regard, are satisfied with their present economic situation, but, together with the Luo, they are also the group which is most pessimistic about their future.

The interest in politics, at least as far as national affairs are concerned, is very low. A majority of them, again the highest percentage in this regard, is not exposed to any of the modern news media. Subsequently their over-all score on our "political information scale" is particularly low, but those who have successfully "made" it to the "modern world" have scores which are even higher than those from members of most of the other groups in the respective classes. For most Maasai active participation in politics is still confined to local affairs. This is partly because a clear majority of them are "parochials", but even among the more "modern" Maasai political participation remains very low, a considerable percentage falling under our "alienated" type of participant. The fact that a majority (which is more than in some of the other groups) know the name of their representative in parliament is all the more remarkable. It appears that Maasai M.P.s do constitute an effective and meaningful "link" between their people and the central government. This is also expressed in the dominant "input orientation" which also very strongly stresses the role of M.P.s. The over-all "system support", however, is quite low, but this must be largely attributed to their more general parochialism rather than to any specific dissatisfaction (as e.g. among the Luo) with

Kenya's present government. Thus, when asked directly, an overwhelming majority state that they are not critical of anything. When it comes to some concrete alternatives to Kenya's present system, a sizeable minority answers "don't know" to many of our questions. More communal forms of land ownership, stronger measures of Kenyanization, and a multi-party system are favoured by a greater number. However, more communal forms of ownership in cattle, as their most important means of production, do not seem to be very popular. In any case, a socialism of the Tanzanian kind, apparently having in mind some unpleasant experiences that some of their brethren across the border have had with the administration there, is strongly disliked.

Sex: Sex is one of the most "independent" factors affecting a person's life in the sense that it is an inherited property which, except under very extraordinary circumstances, cannot be changed. At the same time, the actual roles of men and women are, to a very large extent, socially determined and are influenced by various other factors in the course of time. Thus in Kenya today, the traditional roles of both sexes are undergoing tremendous changes some of which also became manifest in our survey. The most important social position of a woman, for example, still lies in her role as mother. Family relations are of great significance for her and even in less traditional contexts, particularly as far as the sharing of money is concerned, these bonds are strongly emphasized. But this finding also points to the fact, as we were able to document above, that among cash-crop growing farmers and in non-agricultural households in Kenya women tend to become, in contrast to what one might have expected, even more economically dependent on the male head of the family. Today they are generally also less involved in the family's economic decision-making than in



## 2) Important Independent Factors:

In addition to the ethnic origin of our respondents there are other important factors which independently influence their reported attitudes and behavior. Some of these, such as age, sex, place of residence, or level of education are of a more general demographic nature and are at work, to a varying degree, within each ethnic group, whereas others, such as religious affiliation or class membership, may potentially serve as independent bases for conflict groups cutting across the ethnic pattern. The independent influence of each of these factors has already been noticed in the analysis of the variables discussed above where it turned out to be relevant for our concern. Here, we simply want to highlight some of these effects once again, looking at each of the independent factors in a more synoptic manner.

Sex: Sex is one of the most "independent" factors affecting a person's life in the sense that it is an inherited property which, except under very extraordinary circumstances, cannot be changed. At the same time, the actual roles of men and women are, to a very large extent, socially determined and are influenced by various other factors in the course of time. Thus in Kenya today, the traditional roles of both sexes are undergoing tremendous changes some of which also became manifest in our survey. The most important social position of a woman, for example, still lies in her role as mother. Family relations are of great significance for her and even in less traditional contexts, particularly as far as the sharing of money is concerned, these bonds are strongly emphasized. But this finding also points to the fact, as we were able to document above, that among cash-crop growing farmers and in non-agricultural households in Kenya women tend to become, in contrast to what one might have expected, even more economically dependent on the male head of the family. Today they are generally also less involved in the family's economic decision-making than in

their parents' generation. Only as far as the education and punishment of the children are concerned do they seem to be getting a somewhat freer hand.

More formal traditional social bonds, such as clan or age-set membership, have always been less important for women in the societies we are discussing here. This is also confirmed by our present findings. The scope of a person's social trust or their expression of "ethnic identity", on the other hand, do not show great deviations by sex. A feeling of "national identity", however, as expressed by our question probing for pride in some of Kenya's achievements can be found much more often among men than among women. Women are also much less engaged in modern voluntary or professional organizations, even if they are pursuing a modern occupation themselves. The participation in "Harambee" efforts is somewhat more balanced among the sexes, even though a slight preponderance of men can be found here, too. Women are also significantly less exposed to modern news media, even if other factors, like occupation or level of education, are controlled for. Similarly, they have been less affected personally by political events in the past.

The effect of sex on the religious orientations of our respondents is largely negligible. If anything, males seem to have been somewhat more affected by the missionary efforts of the Western churches than females. The belief in the power of medicine men is also expressed somewhat more frequently by men. A strong "achievement motivation" is found less frequently among women. They also have a higher percentage of those who are dissatisfied with their economic situation and who feel they are spending their time uselessly. Similarly, women are somewhat less optimistic about the economic future than men.

As far as some basic social and political attitudes are concerned in most cases the differences between the sexes are not very pronounced. One major exception, confirming our expectation, is the significantly lower "disposition



towards violence" found among women. Their involvement in modern political affairs is also much lower. Both the interest in politics expressed by them and their actual levels of political information and political participation are significantly below that of their male counterparts, even if differences in occupation or level of education are accounted for. Second only to "ethnicity", sex was found to be, the most important factor "explaining" the variance in our political participation scale. According to our typology significantly higher percentages of women could be found among the "parochials", the "less informed citizens", but also the "alienated", whereas men clearly dominate among the "active democrats". The support Kenya's present political system enjoys is also somewhat lower among women than among men. Alternative orientations to Kenya's present system, such as a preference for communal forms of land ownership, stronger measures of Kenyanization, a multi-party system, or socialism of the Tanzanian kind did not show great deviations by sex.

Age: Another factor which can exercise a significant independent influence on attitudes and behaviour is a person's age. It is an "egalitarian" factor in the sense that everybody by necessity goes through the same biological stages, unless, of course, somebody dies prematurely. But again, the social significance attached to a person's age varies widely from society to society. Traditionally, within the "egalitarian - segmentarian" structure of all the ethnic groups considered here, age was, together with sex, the most important factor determining a person's social position. Only within a particular age group did individual achievement play a greater role. Together with the vanishing of the traditional age-set systems in most of Kenya's peoples today the role of age has undergone enormous changes, too. Increasingly, a person's level of formal education and socio-economic "class" tend to determine one's position in society, rather than age. Some of these influences of a

Interest in politics and level of political information,

person's age and the generation differences and changes which can be observed have also become apparent in some of the attitudes expressed in our survey.

One sphere where the declining influence of age has become manifest is the family. In the generation of the parents of our respondents family life, including the education and punishment of children, was still very much controlled by the male head of the household. This is also expressed by a significantly greater number of those who are above the age of 50 compared to those below 30. This difference between age groups is even stronger as far as the more traditional social structures of clans and age-sets are concerned. Membership in both kinds of organization, and in particular the latter, is strongly correlated with age. Other levels of social identity or the scope of social trust are not significantly affected by this factor. Only with regard to a possible "national identity" do younger people much more often express pride in Kenya's achievements. Older people, on the other hand, have been personally affected much more often by political events in the past, in particular those in the colonial period and the time of the Emergency.

Religiosity and church attendance are, in contrast to the situation in many West European countries today, much higher in the younger generation. Belief in the power of medicine men, on the other hand, is more frequent among older people. Time consciousness in a modern sense and achievement orientation are also negatively correlated with age. Life dissatisfaction is higher among older people and members of the older generation are also less optimistic about their economic future. A sense of "traditionalism" as expressed by our index, is quite strong in this age group, too, while a "disposition towards violence" tends to decline with a higher age, those scoring high being most often in the middle category between the ages of 30 and 50.

Interest in politics and level of political information,



if the influence of a higher level of education in the younger generation is controlled for, do not vary significantly with age. This is true also for the level of exposure of our respondents to modern news media like the radio. The level of political participation is generally higher in the middle and older age groups. In terms of our typology, parochials and less informed citizens are most strongly represented among those above the age of 50, while the percentage of alienated is highest among those below 30. Active democrats can be found most often in the middle age groups. The number of those engaged in voluntary organizations and Harambee efforts is also greatest in this category. Alternative orientations to some of Kenya's present institutions are only negligibly influenced by this factor.

Education: In modern times the level of a person's formal education has become one of the most important factors determining one's chances in life, but also many of the concomitant attitudes. In Kenya the desire to give children as much schooling as possible is very widespread today in most of the groups considered here. Parents often make enormous sacrifices to pay for fees, uniforms, books etc. in the hope of later obtaining well-paid positions for their children. Not rarely, however, these hopes are frustrated by the increasing competition at all levels of qualification today, including even university graduates in a variety of fields, and the very limited chance of obtaining jobs in the non-agricultural private or public sectors. In view of the still mostly "academic" school subjects, which are geared only to lead to the next step on the ladder of formal education, school-leavers who are not able to find an adequate position in the official job market often have learned very little which would enable them to become better farmers or qualified craftsmen. Even though the chances of adequate return are thus rapidly diminishing, most parents are still willing, given the lack of more practicable alternatives, to make this kind of investment.

In addition to the economic and social opportunities hoped for by sending children to school, many more subtle attitudes and forms of behavior are shaped as well by higher levels of formal education. Secondary school leavers, for example, report significant changes in their attitudes towards child-rearing and less severe forms of punishment. For a higher percentage of them ethnicity has become less important, while national achievements are emphasized more often. At the same time traditional social bonds such as clan or age-set membership have become weaker and the scope of social trust has been somewhat more reduced now being largely confined to personal friends.

Contrary to the situation of the members of long-established churches in many West European countries, the level of "religiosity" and the frequency of church attendance increase with a person's level of education. But, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, this is also coupled with a somewhat stronger belief in the powers of medicine men among secondary school leavers than among illiterates. Our measure of achievement orientation is positively correlated with a higher level of education, while satisfaction with one's work and economic position decrease. Nevertheless, a higher percentage of school leavers than illiterates are optimistic about their economic future. Emphasis on ascriptive social criteria, including a more limited role of women, is less common among the better educated. A greater number of secondary school leavers also profess to adhere to democratic values, while differences by education concerning our measures of a "disposition towards violence" and "anomie" are not very pronounced.

In the political realm interest in politics and, in particular, the level of a person's political information increase with more advanced levels of schooling, but, remarkably, over-all political participation does not increase. On the contrary, reported election turnout is much lower for secondary school leavers than illiterates. Parochials and less informed citizens are, not surprisingly, more common among illiterates,



Findings.

while both alienated and active democrats can be found more often among those with higher levels of education. The "support" for Kenya's present political system shows a curvilinear relationship: Those with primary education expressing the highest level of support, whereas both among illiterates and those with some secondary education this figure drops significantly. A great number of secondary education this figure drops significantly. A great number of secondary school leavers also consider the government to be dominated by a particular group. Among the alternatives to Kenya's present system, stronger measures of Kenyanization and a return to a multi-party system are favored by those with more education. Tanzania's form of socialism, however, remains quite unpopular in all educational categories.

Place of residence: One of the most important changes in a person's life occurs when one moves from a small-scale, in the case of Kenya usually ethnically homogeneous, rural community to a nearby town or even to a more remote city. Many of the familiar aspects of life change very suddenly: a person's livelihood now is no longer dependent on the soil and its produce and non-agricultural occupations have to be pursued. Social relations become much more anonymous and are based more often on one's own personal choice rather than on kinship ties or relatively permanent neighbourhood relations. Together with this greater independence from natural and social factors the risk of losing one's material base of existence and one's personal and social identity increase as well. Unemployment, personality crises, and many forms of socially deviant behavior thus are often more frequent among those who have moved to town. Many of the chances and problems of urban life have been documented in numerous studies in recent years. As has become quite clear from these efforts, the process of urbanization is a very complex phenomenon with quite divergent results in different actual settings. A part of this complexity has also become apparent in our own

findings.

Thus some of our results point to the often expected "liberating" effects of urban life: Family relations among our respondents in town tend to be more centered around the nuclear family, the obligations of traditional hospitality becoming a heavier burden for them. For those who have come to town only as migrant laborers, however, the sharing of one's cash income with family members up-country still constitutes an important link. The importance of traditional bonds, like clan or age-set membership, is further reduced, and, as far as we were able to measure, expressions of ethnic identity, generally speaking, become less common. The feeling of national identity, on the other hand, is somewhat enhanced. The scope of social trust is significantly reduced, the choice of those who are trusted being made most often on the basis of personal friendships and acquaintances.

The level of religiosity, contrary to what one might expect in a European context, is higher in town than in the countryside, reflecting the relatively recent advent of Christianity in Kenya. Beliefs in the power of medicine men and of ill wishes, on the other hand, are somewhat stronger in the rural areas. Achievement orientation tends to become somewhat higher in town, but the percentage of those who are dissatisfied with their economic situation increases as well. Ascriptive social criteria are less emphasized among urbanites, while our measures of traditionalism, anomie, or a disposition towards violence do not show significant differences.

The most important discrepancies between our rural and urban respondents become apparent in the political realm. Here, contrary to many long-held expectations, the interest in politics is considerably lower among city-dwellers, even though their level of political information, due to their generally higher level of education and greater media exposure, is much higher. Actual participation, both in



political affairs and in more general Harambee efforts, declines rapidly, with a plurality of townsmen now being found among the "alienated". Contact with one's Member of Parliament is reduced drastically, place of residence being by far the most important single factor explaining the variance in this regard. But even though almost half of our urban respondents feel alienated from Kenya's present political life, no clear-cut alternatives seem to have emerged among them. Thus our question concerning changes in the pattern of land ownership, stronger measures of Kenyanization, or a generally more socialist economic and political system do not find a higher level of agreement than in the countryside. Only as far as Kenya's party system is concerned, a greater number of those in the city express their preference for a single-party system and the status quo, apparently having made some unpleasant experiences with competing parties (and their strong ethnic bases!) in the past.

Religious Affiliation: In most parts of Africa the religious belief of a person traditionally coincided with those of one's ethnic group. Only with the advent of Islam and, in Kenya mostly during this century, Christianity, have some intra-ethnic religious differentiations occurred. So far these differences, however, have largely remained at the local and regional level. Some of the attitudinal differences expressed by members of various religious groups in our survey are nevertheless remarkable.

Family relations remain relatively unaffected by the religious beliefs of our respondents, except for the fact, of course, that polygamy, which was traditionally practised by those who could afford it in all the societies considered here, is not acceptable for members of the mission churches. The importance of traditional social bonds, such as clan and age-set membership, not surprisingly, is stressed most often by those who adhere to their traditional beliefs. This

largely coincides with the ethnic origin of our respondents, the Maasai being the largest single group in our sample to do so. Members of the African Independent Churches, on the other hand, tend to emphasize their ethnic identity somewhat more strongly than adherents of other beliefs.

Religiosity is highest among members of the mission churches, a belief in a life after death is significantly lower among Catholics than among members of the other mission churches or among African Independents. The Muslims fall even further behind in this regard while very few of the "Traditionals" express such a conviction. A belief in the power of medicine men and of ill wishes is considerably stronger among Traditionals, but also among members of the African Independent Churches. An expression of achievement orientation is quite low among Traditionals, religious affiliation being one of the most important independent factors explaining the variance in this regard. Life dissatisfaction is also much less widespread in this group. Ascriptive social criteria are emphasized more strongly by members of the African Independent Churches and the Traditionals, religious affiliation again being an important factor contributing to the variance here. On other social and political attitudes the independent influence of religion is less pronounced. It usually coincides with the generally higher level of education attained by members of the mission churches and also, to a certain extent, their class position. Even though the levels of political information and political participation thus tend to be higher among the latter, no significant independent conflict groups based on this factor cutting across class or ethnic ties except in some instances at the local level, seem to have emerged in Kenya.

Social Class: In the long run, the potentially most important factor cutting across Kenya's ethnically stratified society

3) Cf. Dahrendorf, Ralf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957.



is membership in a social "class". Unlike the greatest proportion of current studies based on survey research employing more indirect indicators like a person's income or composite indices of "socio-economic status" to assess this phenomenon, we have chosen the criterion of a person's relations to the means of production (both in the sense of ownership and decision - making power over them), which allows us to devise more strictly defined categories in a theoretical manner with clear, objectively determined dividing lines between them. The kinds of conflict which emerge and their potential scope and form will depend on whether both ethnic and class aspects will be "super-imposed", in Dahrendorf's sense <sup>3)</sup>, in certain instances. If the latter were the case, which to a certain extent already seems to have happened with important sections of the Luyia and Luo who find themselves at the lower end of the socio-economic scale and, conversely, with sizeable proportions of the Kikuyu at the other end, conflicts are likely to become much more pervasive and permanent and to take more violent forms. Even though a "class consciousness" as such is still in a nascent stage in many regards and common class actions can only be expected on an ad hoc basis in most instances, the attitudinal differences by class which became apparent in our survey already seem to be an important indication of things to come.

Some of the trends observed for the other factors also coincide with the class position of our respondents. Thus in the non-agricultural classes the scope of family relations tends to become somewhat reduced. The economic decision-making power of married women in the agricultural bourgeoisie and in the non-agricultural classes is also affected: contrary to some "emancipatory" trends which can be observed in other regards, women in these classes who used to be largely independent in cultivating their separate plots in former times, today have very little say in the planting of

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<sup>3)</sup> Cf. Dahrendorf, Ralf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959.

cash-crops or in the disposal of their husbands' cash income. The scope of social trust is largest among agricultural proletarioids, it is somewhat reduced among members of the agricultural bourgeoisie and the non-agricultural middle and upper classes, who tends to be most discriminating as to whom they trust. It is least extended among the members of the sub-proletariat who have by far the highest percentage of those who say that they do not trust anybody. A sense of ethnic identity is also strongest among to the agricultural proletarioids, whereas a feeling of national identity is expressed most often by members of the agricultural bourgeoisie, with members of the non-agricultural classes falling somewhere in between in both cases.

Also contrary to what one might expect in Europe, religiosity is higher in the non-agricultural classes, whereas, taken altogether, the class differences of those who believe in the power of medicine men or of ill wishes are not very pronounced. A strong sense of time consciousness and of achievement orientation can clearly be discerned among members of the agricultural bourgeoisie and of the non-agricultural middle and upper classes. Dissatisfaction with one's economic situation is greatest in the proletariat, while agricultural proletarioids are most pessimistic about their economic future. Traditional ascriptive social criteria are least important for the non-agricultural middle and upper classes, the class position of our respondents, together with ethnicity, explaining most of the variance here.

Interest in politics is expressed most strongly by members of both the agricultural and non-agricultural bourgeoisie, followed by the salariat, the proletariat, and the agricultural proletarioids. The level of actual political information is, however, relatively low among the two latter groups. Active participation in politics is strongest among members of the agricultural bourgeoisie, followed by the non-agricultural middle classes, and is stronger among



agricultural proletaroids than among their non-agricultural counterparts. Class again contributes considerably to the variance here. In terms of our "types of participants" parochials and less informed citizens are found most often among the agricultural proletaroids, whereas both the salariat and the sub-proletariat have a very high percentage of alienated; the agricultural bourgeoisie are the most strongly represented among the active democrats. Members of the agricultural bourgeoisie also maintain the closest link to Members of Parliament while both the proletariat and the sub-proletariat have the least contact in this regard. System support is strongest in both the agricultural and the non-agricultural bourgeoisie, it drops to an intermediate position among members of the proletariat and, remarkably, is lowest in the salariat. Conversely, the salariat is most strongly in favor of some of the suggested alternatives to Kenya's present economic and political system, such as a limit to land ownership, stronger measures of Kenyanization. A sizeable minority of this group also favors a Tanzanian form of socialism. A return to a multi-party system, on the other hand, is most strongly preferred by the agricultural bourgeoisie, the non-agricultural bourgeoisie being most inclined to the status quo.

- 4) For this terminology see also Part I, chapter 1 above.
- 5) Most aspects of democratic theory are covered, for example, in the readers edited by Gaudde, Charles F. and Neubauer, Deane S., Empirical Democratic Theory, Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969; Kariel, Henry S., Frontiers of Democratic Theory, New York: Random House, 1970; or Grube, Frank and Richter, Gerhard, Demokratietheorien, Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1975. Some critical assessments from their own respective vantage points can also be found in: Bachrach, Peter, The Theory of Democratic Elitism, Boston: Little, Brown, 1967; Pateman, Carole, Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970; Richardson, G.B., Democratic Theory - Essays in Retrieval, London: Oxford University Press, 1973; Hart, Wolf-Dieter and Haschold, Frieder, Theorie der Demokratie, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971; or Scharpf, Fritz W., Demokratiethorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung, Kronberg: Scriptor, 1975.

3) The Prospects for "Democracy":

So far, we have attempted to give a comprehensive account of the "subjective dimension" of the "social bases" of politics<sup>4)</sup> in present-day Kenya, together with an analysis of some of the major independent factors shaping it. In addition to the intrinsic value this presentation has for a more thorough understanding of political life in this country, there are also some further reaching implications our findings may have for an assessment of the chances of different types of political systems in this part of the world and of "democratic" forms of government in particular.

As we noted in the beginning, there is as yet little agreement as to the specific content of any more generally accepted "theory of democracy" and its normative, behavioral, social-structural, and institutional implications. In the vast body of literature on this subject<sup>5)</sup> two main lines of thought can be distinguished. One, which is often labelled the "idealistic" approach, is particularly concerned

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4) For this terminology see also Part I, chapter 1 above.

5) Most aspects of democratic theory are covered, for example, in the readers edited by Cnudde, Charles F. and Neubauer, Deane E., Empirical Democratic Theory, Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969; Kariel, Henry S., Frontiers of Democratic Theory, New York: Random House, 1970; or Grube, Frank and Richter, Gerhard, Demokratiethorien, Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1975. Some critical assessments from their own respective vantage points can also be found in: Bachrach, Peter, The Theory of Democratic Elitism, Boston: Little, Brown, 1967; Pateman, Carole, Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970; Macpherson, C.B., Democratic Theory - Essays in Retrieval, London: Oxford University Press, 1973; Narr, Wolf-Dieter and Naschold, Frieder, Theorie der Demokratie, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971; or Scharpf, Fritz W., Demokratie-theorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung, Kronberg: Scriptor, 1975.



with the normative side of the problem. Embracing the Rousseauian concept of "democratic man" or some of its variants this school of thought seeks to devise a "good" political order in a normative sense providing the basis for the fulfillment of such central values as human liberty, equality and solidarity. Among the different proponents of this approach no agreement has, however, been reached, in view of some of the possible conflicts between these values, as to the specific "mix" which may be desirable and, in particular, in which way their realization may be brought about in any given concrete historical situation. Indeed, as some of the critics of this line of thinking have pointed out <sup>6)</sup>, the normative content of this concept is often posited in an utopian manner which can lead (and has led!) to totalitarian attempts to bring it about. In the very process of doing so (at least for a "period of transition" in the rationalizations of its proponents) such attempts may then completely negate the values they proclaim to achieve.

The second approach, which prides itself on its "realism", focuses instead on some of the requisite institutional mechanisms of democratic political systems. Rather than emphasizing any concrete normative concept or particular qualities of the general population in any given country, it is content with safeguarding some essential feedback procedures between those who govern and those who are governed. In a number of variants the proponents of this approach <sup>7)</sup> see the "intelligence of democracy" <sup>8)</sup>, which consists of these sufficiently

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6) Cf. e.g., Talmon, J.L., The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, New York: Frederick Praeger, 1960.

7) Cf., e.g., Joseph Schumpeter's concept of "elite competition" in idem, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London: Allen and Unwin, 1943; Robert A. Dahl's concepts of "pluralism" and "polyarchy" in idem, Who Governs?, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961; or idem, Polyarchy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971; or Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper and Row, 1957.

8) This is the title of a book by Charles Lindblom, New York: The Free Press, 1965.

established feedback mechanisms such as regular "free" elections, as being responsible for the relatively unproblematical long-term survival of a democratic political system defined in this way. But here again, and in our view rightly so, some critics have pointed to the fact that models of this kind are by no means void of any normative implications and that, even though some of their proponents may deny it, in any given concrete case the mere institutionalization of electoral procedures without any further safeguards tends to support the existing ruling classes and the status quo at the expense of less privileged or less organized but nevertheless sizeable groups of people. As E.E. Schattschneider, for example, put it "The flaw in the pluralistic heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper class accent" 9). Similarly (and significantly!) Dahl in his study on local government in New Haven/Connecticut "over-looked" that the black and other minorities did not (and to a certain extent could not) meaningfully participate in the "pluralist" system he had described 10).

We have overstated the two positions here somewhat in order to bring out their contrasts more sharply. Obviously, there is still enough room for some "common ground" in between. In our view it is imperative to consider both the normative postulates of democratic theory and the possibilities of their institutional realizations in an adequate manner in order to see the chances which may exist but also the possible conflicts and tensions more fully. Neither approach, however, has so far been able to specify more clearly and adequately the particular social conditions which are conducive for democracy in both a normative and an institutional sense. This deficit is most apparent when we look at the countries of the "Third World" today.

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9) Schattschneider, E.E., The Semi-Sovereign People, New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, 1960, p. 35.

10) For this point cf., e.g., also Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S., "The Two Faces of Power", APSR, 56, December 1962, pp. 947 ff.



Even though we do not pretend to be able to close the existing gap and do not want to preclude the ongoing discussion of different theories and their respective merits and failures, an empirical study such as ours can help to provide some more "food" for thought and to locate any theoretical speculation in a more concrete historical and cultural setting. The lessons learned from Kenya may then, perhaps, also be considered helpful for countries finding themselves in comparable circumstances such as the present attempts to return to some form of democratic rule in Nigeria, Ghana or Upper-Volta, for example, or, even though the very complicated external conditions may be overwhelming in these cases, the attainment of independence and majority rule in Namibia or Zimbabwe.

At the most general level we can report one important finding which is in one sense a "negative" one: the evidence presented here indicates that possible restraints on the chances of "democracy" in Kenya, and possibly in other African states, do not so much lie in the lack of "qualifications" of the largest part of the citizenry for a meaningful participation in the decision-making process at different levels of the political system. As we have seen above the levels of political participation even among those parts of the population who still largely pursue their traditional way of life as mostly illiterate "agricultural proletarioids" are remarkably high, the Members of Parliament in particular constituting an important link between them and the central government. The loose forms of "patron-client" relationships which can be observed, i.e. mutually beneficial ties between two parties unequal in status, influence and often wealth, but dependent on a reciprocal exchange of goods and services based on personal contacts <sup>11)</sup>, can in our view be interpreted as an important

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11) For the different elements of this definition see also Powell, John Duncan, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics", loc. cit.

institution of "democratic representation" in this case. In Kenya these relationships, given the traditionally egalitarian-segmentarian social structures and the independent economic position of each peasant small-holder today, are not based on traditional hierarchical bonds or a "tributary" mode of production as in large parts of Asia for example. Among different "candidates for patronage", the individual is thus able to make his own choice, and, indeed, as the results of the last two parliamentary elections show, competition may in many cases be very intense indeed <sup>12)</sup>.

This, in effect, means that, comparable to the "downward" revision of expectations concerning the level of education, information and political participation of an active citizenry by some of the "realistic" theorists of democracy <sup>13)</sup>, the expectations of many external observers of the African scene now must be revised "upwards", at least as far as the "subjective" dimension of the social bases of democracy is concerned. Thus the often given rationalization for only thinly veiled authoritarian "guided democracies", or even for outright dictatorships or racist regimes, which are based on the lack of qualification of "the poor and uneducated masses", can no longer be accepted so easily. This is, of course, in a normative sense, a "positive" finding.

On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that the qualifications of citizens constitute only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the successful functioning of a democratic political system. As has also become apparent in our analysis above, Kenya's over all social structure is characterized by strong tensions both along

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12) See also Part I, chapter 2d above.

13) Cf., e.g., the documentations of this aspect by Prothro, James W. and Grigg, Charles M., "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement", loc. cit.; and McClosky, Herbert, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics", loc. cit..

14) Cf., e.g., Wilson, Robert and Selge, Howard, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism", loc. cit..

15) See also Part I, chapter 2d above.



ethnic and class lines which can lead to conflicts exceeding the "regulatory capacity" of the present system, and to its eventual breakdown. On the ethnic side these conflicts see the dominant groups of the Kalenjin and, in particular, the Kikuyu, together with some of their Kamba allies pitched against the two major peoples from Western Kenya, the Luyia and, in particular, the Luo. The Mijikenda and Maasai, on the other hand, and even more so some of the more remote groups from Northern Kenya, which we could not cover separately in this study, are still standing more or less uninvolved at the "ringside". Their level of support for the present system in a more abstract sense is still relatively high, while they have not been affected so much, given the still widespread reliance on subsistence forms of production, by vital economic and political decisions of the center. In this regard, as in other discussions of the "ethnic" element in the politics of most African countries, it is imperative to keep in mind that these contemporary conflicts are not an expression of any atavistic "tribal" feelings or traditional animosities one group may have had against another, but are transmitted and have to be conceived of as "modern" struggles for economic opportunity and political power in the new "national" entities.

This ethnic or, to use the more general term, "communal" conflict groups <sup>14)</sup> are only activated, however, when entire communities see their position threatened in a particular situation and when economic or in another way politically founded conflicts can be symbolized along these communal lines. This was the case in Kenya, for example, in the unrest following the assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969 <sup>15)</sup>. In more "normal" times intra-ethnic differentiations and class conflicts cutting across ethnic ties have largely prevailed. In this regard clearly both the agricultural and nonagricultural bourgeoisie together with the "state class" and the capitalists, as far as the latter are of indigenous origin, have dominated politics so far. The "germs" for this pattern already had

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14) Cf., e.g., Melson, Robert and Wolpe, Howard, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism", loc. cit..

15) See also Part I, chapter 2d above.

been laid by the colonial administration by favoring the "loyalists" in the independence struggle and the missions which tended to support the "asomi", their early converts <sup>16)</sup>. The important regulations preceding and following independence (such as the land reform of the "Swynnerton-Plan" and the "gradual" transfer of parts of the large-scale farming sector in a commercial manner also gave these groups an independent economic basis.

The opposition to this dominating class coalition has remained relatively unorganized and ineffective. The rural proletaroid groups are not so much in direct conflict with their "bourgeois" counterparts and can sometimes profit from intra-ethnic "patron-client" relationships linking the two, or, in the dominating ethnic groups from "fringe benefits" accorded to them on an ethnic basis such as infra-structural projects carried out by the government in their area. The non-agricultural lower classes, on the other hand, still consist to a large extent of unskilled members of the proletariat, many of whom are maintaining their links with the rural areas which tends to mitigate conflicts both between the urban proletariat and the peasantry (e.g. about food prices) and the proletariat and the non-agricultural bourgeoisie (the former still being subsidised to some extent by food supplies from their families upcountry).

Neither the sub- or "Lumpen- (as Marx called it) proletariat" provide effective conflict potential. The "services" it can deny to the dominating groups are marginal indeed, and except for occasional outbreaks of looting or hooliganism it is hard to see how it can form a permanently organized and effective conflict group of its own. This has occurred, in some minor instances and the increasing rates of burglaries and other crimes in a city like Nairobi are also indications of the swelling ranks of this group. But most of the possible impact has been effectively contained by the police apparatus and private "security forces" and its activities, in any case, have not been of a more directly

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16) Cf. *ibid.* and Part III, chapter 3 e above.



political nature.

This leaves the true "industrial proletariat" of better-skilled workers, who are not yet very numerous, and parts of the "salarariat" as potential sources of class opposition. Indeed, as the results of our survey show, these groups are most critical of many aspects of Kenya's economic and political system and rank lowest in their support for the present government. They are also least integrated by more meaningful links with Kenya's present institutions (the role of M.P.s, for example, being quite negligible in the urban areas). This makes them the most important conflict group on a class basis which may some day challenge the dominating coalition. So far its sheer quantitative force is still very small, and, except for some occasional conflicts in work relations (the trade union structure not being very effective either) and a more or less latent support for some of the programs espoused by the former KPU or the late J.M. Kariuki, its impact has been very muted.

If we look at the longer term social-structural developments which seem likely in the next few decades 17), it is apparent that some of the constraints which presently can be observed will become even more pronounced. One is a continuing very high rate of population growth coupled with a very limited amount of available agricultural land, which can only marginally expanded (e.g. by opening up some of the still existing land reserves in Rift Valley Province or by means of large-scale artificial irrigation such as the huge Tana River project being undertaken at present. This means that an increasing percentage of people will have to seek their basis of existence in the non-agricultural sector. There, even though the over-all average annual rate of economic growth since independence has been remarkable, the opportunities for finding permanent

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17) Cf. Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, "Entwicklungstendenzen der Klassenstruktur Kenias", loc. cit..

wage employment by setting up one's own little workshop or business are very limited, too. Kenya's peripheral position in the capitalist world economy has led to relatively capital-intensive forms of production in the industrial sector (which is still heavily dominated by foreign capital) and a "deformed" over-all economic structure which is mainly geared to produce high level consumer goods for the wealthy few, but very little for the largest part of the population. This pattern has also, to a considerable extent, "pre-empted" the chances for the development of a group of independent craftsmen and small indigenous industrial enterprises providing employment opportunities for a greater number of people <sup>18)</sup>.

This continuing high rates of economic growth and some basic structural changes will be required if the increasing population is to be absorbed in non-agricultural occupations in the future. If this cannot be achieved (and the vicissitudes of the over-all world economy are strongly felt in Kenya, too), the percentage of urban unemployed and the sub-proletariat (which already has become quite visible in places like Mathare Valley in Nairobi) will greatly increase putting heavy pressure on the administration both for some modicum of social welfare and additional measures of internal security. Such a situation may then lead either to a gradually more repressive form of government betraying its erstwhile democratic foundations in a normative sense, or a complete breakdown of existing institutions because of sheer inefficiency opening the way to completely different alternatives.

But even if greater numbers of people can find permanent forms of non-agricultural employment, the over-all class balance will change in the long run, decreasing

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18) An overview of Kenya's economy is given, for example, by Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, and Schneider-Barthold, Wolfgang in: Leifer (ed.), loc. cit.



the influence of the agricultural bourgeoisie and enhancing the weight of the non-agricultural classes, in particular of the salariat and a skilled industrial proletariat. As we have shown in our analysis above, this relative shift from the rural to the urban areas implies new forms of political participation in the latter which have so far been largely lacking. If the high percentage (and probably increasing number!) of "alienated" found in these groups are to be accommodated by Kenya's political system, stronger participatory structures (such as unions and other forms of formal associations, but also, possibly new forms of political organizations) will be required, unless certain aspects of the "politics of mass society" 19) with more authoritarian or relatively unstable forms of government come to prevail.

This leads us to the question of the viability of Kenya's present political institutions and the chances of more concrete applications of democratic forms of government in the light of our findings. In recent years problems of this kind have also been increasingly analyzed by "organization theorists", who have attempted to reconcile the normative postulates of democratic theory with the organizational requisites of modern large-scale states 20). One such model which holds some promise for the Kenyan situation is Arend Lijphart's concept of "consociational democracy" 21), which puts a heavy emphasis on "coalescent elite behavior", if in view of a highly fragmented political culture in the long run political stability is to be maintained.

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19) For this term and some of its social conditions and political consequences cf., e.g., Kornhauser, William, The Politics of Mass Society, New York; The Free Press, 1959.

20) Cf., e.g., Etzioni, Amitai, The Active Society, New York: The Free Press, 1968 and some of his other works; or Naschold, Frieder, Organisation und Demokratie, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969.

21) Cf., e.g., his "Typologies of Democratic Political Systems" in: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 1968, pp. 35 ff.; or his Democracy in Plural Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978

This model was developed taking into account the experiences of some "small" West European democracies, which, for different reasons, have highly fragmented social structures and political cultures such as those in Austria, Switzerland, or the Netherlands, but which have been able to maintain their political stability by means of "grand coalitions", a "proportionate democracy" ("Proporzdemokratie") or similar devices over a considerable period of time.

In Kenya similar attempts can, indeed, be observed and the composition of the cabinet has always shown some kind of balance or an attempt at a "grand coalition" (even if somewhat lopsided in favor of the Kikuyu and, in particular, those from Kiambu) between the main ethnic groups. This political maneuvering at the cabinet level must, however, be accompanied by effective social and structural politics which consciously counteract the tendency towards increased regional and social inequalities implied in the continuing "free play" of economic and political forces.<sup>22)</sup> The "legitimatory needs"<sup>23)</sup> of the ruling groups, in particular in more democratically organized political systems, make such policies necessary, too, and the electoral process in Kenya with a considerable amount of competition at the local level and its very high rate of not re-elected Members of Parliament has had this effect to some extent. These continuing "feedbacks" and the need for M.P.s and members of the government to produce something in return for the electoral support they receive thus can help to "defuse"

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22) For a documentation of some of the regional imbalances see also our "District Development Index" in Appendix III below.

23) For the use of this notion cf., e.g., Habermas, Jürgen, Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973.



some of the existing tensions. This was most visibly the case, for example, after the 1969 parliamentary elections which had been preceded by intense forms of ethnic conflict.

This also brings us to the question of how Kenya's "one- (or, as some critics say, "no-) party" system is to be evaluated in the light of our findings and of certain criteria of "democratic theory". As we have pointed out above, our respondents are very much split on this issue, a clear majority in the rural areas being in favor of multi-party competition, while there is a definite preference for the present situation among urban residents. Most persons in favor of a single-party system emphasize the importance of continued political stability, whereas a majority of those preferring several parties argued for the sake of the maintenance of democratic principles. For some of the more rigid proponents of democratic theory a competitive party system is also an indispensable part of any viable democratic government. While this may be true for Western industrial settings or culturally more homogeneous societies, it can be argued that in most African countries today party organizations still tend to be based more on ethnic affiliations than on any class or other social or ideological elements. "Ethnic" parties, however, tend to exacerbate existing social conflicts, and, in view of their "fixed" membership which hardly changes over time, are less likely to lead to a system of shifting majorities, where one group or coalition can replace another one through the usual electoral procedures giving all groups a fair chance to benefit eventually from the "spoils" of the system. Constitutional provisions that parties must be represented at least in several regions (as is planned in Nigeria) or that they are artificially limited in number attaching to each party, regardless of its social basis or actual program, an ideological label (as in Senegal), in our eyes do not seem to be very efficient devices which can lead out of this dilemma.

Under these circumstances a single-party system which provides for effective competition at the level of each constituency, as is presently the case in Kenya and, in a somewhat more restricted form and under different ideological auspices, in Tanzania, may prove to be more viable and "democratic" in the long run. The question of a reasonably well-functioning system of "intra-party democracy", however, becomes all the more essential in this case. If intra-party elections are truly competitive and do not exclude important individual groups on an arbitrary basis (as was the case when former KPU-members were barred from standing both for the parliamentary elections and KANU elections in recent years) such a system allows for more fluid alliances at the national level taking into account a variety of regional, class and other considerations when a particular issue is to be decided <sup>24)</sup>, and can safeguard important democratic principles at the same time. In Kenya the present situation is complicated by the fact that the constitution explicitly prescribes the nomination of candidates for the national assembly or the presidency to be effected by political parties allowing only a single presidential candidate for each party <sup>25)</sup>. This, of course, gives the actual party leadership a decisive position when a candidate has to be nominated without the possibility of much "democratic" control. If the de facto one party situation will continue,

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24) Such alliances have become clearly visible, for example, in the KANU elections at the local and regional levels in 1976/77, but a final decision over the national party executive was then called off at the last minute, cf., e.g., The Weekly Review of this period for a good coverage of these events.

25) Cf. Republic of Kenya, The Constitution of Kenya, Nairobi: The Government Printer, 1969, chapter II, part 1, articles 3a and 5a.



this may become a disputed clause, but, on the other hand, constitutional provisions in Kenya have been amended very rapidly in the past, when they stood in the way of regulations which seemed more expedient to the existing leadership.

Another area which is vital for the establishment of democratic procedures and forms of behavior is the field of local government. In Kenya elective forms of local government exist only at the intermediate "county" (i.e. usually "district") level. The administrative personnel of both "locations" and "provinces", on the other hand, is centrally appointed without any further control by representative bodies at these levels. But even in the districts the centrally appointed District Commissioners and their staff play the most decisive role, while the functions of the elected "County Councils" have been greatly reduced since the local government "reforms" of 1969. These transferred the responsibilities for primary schools, local health services and road construction to the respective central ministries. With the abolition of the "Graduated Personal Tax" (GPT) in 1972 County Councils also lost their most important single source of revenue which has only been insufficiently replaced by other funds<sup>26)</sup>. Clearly, this situation does not fare well for any democratic procedures and experiences at the "grassroots" level in some of its more modern forms. If the over-all system is to become more "democratic", in the long run certainly some changes in the forms and responsibilities of institutions of local government at different levels are called for.

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26) For a critical evaluation of some aspects of Kenya's system of local government cf. also the lecture given by Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, on "Selected Problems of Local Government in Kenya and the Federal Republic of Germany" during a course on development administration organized for senior Kenyan local government personnel by "Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Zusammenarbeit", Berlin, May 1977 (unpublished manuscript).

In addition to the existing procedural arrangements the present form of "democracy" in Kenya must also be evaluated in a normative sense. Most essential in this regard are the maintenance of the rule of law by an independent judiciary and the protection of fundamental human rights. Both are guaranteed by the constitution<sup>27)</sup>, but, in fact, certain infringements upon these principles have occurred. The regulations of the "Preservation of Public Security Act" of 1966, in particular, which gives very far reaching emergency powers to the president, were used to ban the opposition party, KPU, in 1969, and to novelist, Ngugi wa Thiongo, in January 1978. Similarly, the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press has been somewhat reduced by banning a number of publications and by a certain "self-censorship" by the editors of the main papers concerning some "taboos" in Kenya's political life. All in all, however, even though the criticism of some acts is certainly justified, Kenya has maintained a relatively good human rights record and has one of the freest and best informed presses in Africa. This is also testified to by such organizations as Amnesty International which, though critical of certain incidents, views the Kenyan situation as "generally commendable".<sup>28)</sup>

Our discussion of the conditions for democracy in Kenya has mainly rested on an analysis of the internal political-cultural and, in a more limited way, social-structural factors and some of the present institutionalizations of democratic procedures. This, of course, is only a partial view of reality and a fuller assessment must also attempt to take external factors and international conditions adequately into account. These consist, on the one hand,

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27) Constitution of Kenya, loc. cit., chapters IV and V.

28) The Weekly Review, December 5, 1977, pp. 9f..



of the possibility of direct military confrontation with one of the neighboring states with the subsequent repercussions this may have for the internal political order. Such a development seems relatively unlikely at the present stage, even though a renewed conflict over Kenya's North-Eastern Province with its northern neighbor Somalia (similar to the Ogaden war) or some dispute with Uganda's erratic Idi Amin cannot be completely excluded.

On the other hand, Kenya's position in the global economic and political system is all the more important for its future "development" or "underdevelopment" and the subsequent internal social-structural and political consequences. These cannot possibly be dealt with in any adequate manner here, except for the few hints which have been given above and elsewhere <sup>29)</sup>. Undoubtedly they will constitute one of the most basic factors influencing any further changes. An outright "Latin-Americanization" of Kenya's social structure, however, at least as far as the rural part of the population is concerned, does not seem to be very likely in the more immediate future. <sup>30)</sup>

Similarly, the question whether only more authoritarian regimes, either of a conservative oligarchical or a "mobilizing" socialist type, will be able to effect any far reaching changes in this respect and genuine forms of economic and social development, which are beneficial to the largest part of the population, remains an open one in our eyes.

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29) The Weekly Review, December 5, 1977, pp. 9 f..

30) For a discussion of such tendencies cf., e.g. Tetzlaff, Rainer, "Multinationale Konzerne und politische Systeme in Entwicklungsländern - Die Lateinamerikanisierung der Klassenstrukturen in der Dritten Welt", in: Senghaas, Dieter and Menzel, Ulrich (eds.), Multinationale Konzerne und Dritte Welt, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1976, pp. 145 ff..

It seems at least very doubtful that right-wing dictatorships or military regimes and the very uneven patterns of income distribution and social structure they bring about are really more conducive to long-term economic growth <sup>31)</sup>.

The argument often advanced in favor of such systems that a more rapid accumulation of capital for investment purposes can be achieved by more inegalitarian conditions, is not convincing in view of the fact that in most cases a large proportion of the higher incomes, given the propensity of large parts of the upper classes to imitate the "American way of life", is spent for imported luxury goods, directly transferred abroad, or, for "safety reasons", used to buy expensive military hardware. <sup>32)</sup> The usually existing coalition of interests between parts of the local bourgeoisie and foreign capital in such countries is also least likely to bring about the required structural changes to reduce the impact of the large-scale dependence on outside forces and the "deformed" patterns of growth it implies.

On the other hand, more strongly centralized "socialist" regimes, such as those which existed in Ghana and Mali for some time or which can be found in present-day Guinea or Tanzania, have not been economically very successful either. In these cases the "state class" and a large bureaucracy

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31) This is argued, to some extent, for example, by Emerson, Rupert, "The Prospects for Democracy in Africa", in: Lofchie, Michael F. (ed.), The State of Nations, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, pp.239; and Huntington, Samuel P. and Nelson Joan M., No Easy Choice - Political Participation in Developing Countries, Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976.

32) A study of military regimes in Latin America showed, for example, that these were by no means economically more successful than their civilian counterparts, cf., e.g., Nordlinger, Eric A., "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in Non-Western States", APSR, December 1970, pp. 1131 ff..



tended to absorb much of the surplus and the way the economy was organized both in the agricultural and the non-agricultural sectors was usually not very effective. It should also not be overlooked that a separate "socialist" development of small states surrounded by a dominantly "capitalist" world economy is very difficult and, possibly, unrealistic.

This leaves some room for more balanced and evolutionary patterns of economic growth based on the increasing purchasing power of large parts of the population, particularly in the agricultural sector, and more integrated forms of industrial development catering to the consumption needs of the masses and providing an indigenous supply of, in the initial stages, simple producer goods. In such a setting, continued forms of more democratic government, both in its substantive and, possibly somewhat modified, procedural aspects, do seem to be possible. In Kenya the present situation, particularly in view of the continuing social-structural tensions and some of the long-term aspects of class formation, remains a very fragile one. Unless some other abrupt change occurs, such as a military coup which can never be completely excluded under present conditions in most parts of the Third World, the system will be put to a severe test at the time of the imminent succession to President Kenyatta<sup>33)</sup>. It would be vain to speculate any more about the eventual outcome and the survival of at least limited forms of "democracy" in the longer run. The probability may not be very high, but as our account has, ~~we hope,~~ shown, the chance exists. It deserves to be taken.

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33) The most accurate account which is available sets his year of birth to lie between 1890 and 1897, the latter date being the more likely one, cf. Murray-Brown, Jeremy, Kenyatta, London: Allen and Unwin, 1972, pp. 323 ff..

1) Methodological Appendix:

a) Sample specifications:

The drawing of our samples has been briefly described in the introduction to this study. The following tables reproduce the most important population characteristics of these samples and provide a comparison for the total weighted sample with Kenya's actual population. We are well aware of the obvious limitations of these samples. Yet for most of the variables, the value deviations between our total weighted sample and the actual nation Appendices: are within a range of plus or minus 5%. The only major exception is the variable of sex. We purposely oversampled it in favor of males without adjusting this factor in the weighting procedure. This sampling error of approximately  $\pm 5\%$  corresponds to the estimated sampling error of actual random samples of a size between 400 and 600 respondents for binominal distributions at a confidence level of 95%.<sup>1)</sup>

1) Cf., e.g., Babbie, op. cit., p. 376.



Table IV, 1: Rural Sample (N = 392)

Variable:	Ethnic Group:															
	Kik.		Kam.		Mij.		Luy.		Luo		Kal.		Maas.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Sex: male	27	63	38	70	41	65	36	76	31	70	257	66				
female	33	37	26	44	16	37	16	30	22	35	8	24	13	30	135	34
Age: below	22	51	24	45	34	54	26	59	23	53	203	52				
31-50																
50+																
Education:																
some p																
some																
non																
cash																
subsist																
or part																
farm-																
housew																
studen																
unempl																
high family																
none	1	2	--	--	1	2	--	--	2	6	6	14	10	3		
less than 200	47	59	36	61	35	63	38	70	38	61	21	62	22	53	243	64
201 - 500	29	36	19	32	6	14	12	22	26	32	9	26	8	19	103	27
501 +	4	5	3	5	1	3	3	6	4	7	2	6	6	14	23	6
Class:																
salariat																
agric. bourgeoisie	18	22	2	4	2	5	12	26	8	14	13	40	6	15	61	17
agric. proletaroids	31	38	39	72	30	70	21	46	39	68	11	33	28	69	198	55
non-agr. proletaroids	2	2	--	--	1	2	1	2	1	2	--	--	1	2	6	2
proletariat	18	22	4	7	5	12	8	17	4	7	5	15	3	7	53	14
sub-proletariat	3	4	1	2	1	2	--	--	5	9	3	9	1	2	14	4
Religion:																
Catholics	44	49	17	29	4	9	18	33	25	40	20	61	6	14	137	35
other mission churches	31	35	14	24	8	19	24	44	27	43	5	15	9	20	121	31
African Independents	8	9	20	34	--	--	4	8	6	9	4	12	3	7	43	12
Muslims	1	1	1	2	23	53	6	11	2	3	--	--	--	--	33	8
Traditionals:	5	6	7	12	8	19	2	4	3	5	4	12	26	59	55	14

1) Methodological Appendix:

a) Sample specifications:

The drawing of our samples has been briefly described in the introduction to this study. The following tables reproduce the most important population characteristics of these samples and provide a comparison for the total weighted sample with Kenya's actual population. We are well aware of the obvious limitations of these samples. Yet for most of the variables, the value deviations between our total weighted sample and the actual national averages are within a range of plus or minus 5%. The only major exception is the variable of sex. We purposely oversampled it in favor of males without adjusting this factor in the weighting procedure. This sampling error of approximately  $\pm 5\%$  corresponds to the estimated sampling error of actual random samples of a size between 400 and 600 respondents for binominal distributions at a confidence level of 95%.<sup>1)</sup>

1) Cf., e.g., Babbie, op. cit., p. 376.

4) - Including 6 "others" from Rift Valley Province

Table IV, 1 : Rural Sample ( N = 392 ) - 678 -

Variable:	Ethnic Group:															
	Kik.		Kam.		Mij.		Luy.		Luo		Kal.		Maas.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Sex:</u> male	56	63	33	56	27	63	38	70	41	65	26	76	31	70	257	66
female	33	37	26	44	16	37	16	30	22	35	8	24	13	30	135	34
<u>Age:</u> below 30	44	50	32	54	22	51	24	45	34	54	20	59	23	53	203	52
31-50	26	30	21	36	12	28	19	35	18	29	13	38	11	26	122	31
50+	17	20	6	10	9	21	11	20	11	17	1	3	9	21	64	17
<u>Education:</u> none	19	21	23	39	26	64	20	37	29	46	10	30	27	62	156	40
some primary	48	54	25	42	14	34	18	33	22	35	19	58	8	19	158	41
some secondary	22	25	11	19	1	2	16	30	12	19	4	12	8	19	74	19
<u>Occupation:</u> non-agricultural	19	22	12	20	7	16	5	9	4	6	1	3	4	9	52	13
cash-crop-farmers	23	26	5	9	11	26	14	26	16	25	12	35	6	14	87	22
subsistence farmers or pastoralists	3	3	12	20	8	19	12	22	15	24	4	12	19	43	73	19
farm-laborers	11	12	--	--	1	2	7	13	--	--	5	15	1	2	31	8
housewives	23	26	24	41	15	35	8	15	17	27	8	23	10	23	105	27
students	7	8	5	8	--	--	8	15	6	10	1	3	3	3	30	8
unemployed	3	3	1	2	1	2	--	--	5	8	3	9	1	2	14	3
<u>Cash family income (Kshs/month):</u>																
none	--	--	1	2	--	--	1	2	--	--	2	6	6	14	10	3
less than 200	47	59	36	61	35	83	38	70	38	61	21	62	22	53	243	64
201 - 800	29	36	19	32	6	14	12	22	20	32	9	26	8	19	103	27
801 +	4	5	3	5	1	3	3	6	4	7	2	6	6	14	23	6
<u>Class:</u> salariat	10	12	8	15	4	9	4	9	--	--	1	3	2	5	29	8
agric. bourgeoisie	18	22	2	4	2	5	12	26	8	14	13	40	6	15	61	17
agric. proletaroids	31	38	39	72	30	70	21	46	39	68	11	33	28	69	198	55
non-agr. proletaroids	2	2	--	--	1	2	1	2	1	2	--	--	1	2	6	2
proletariat	18	22	4	7	5	12	8	17	4	7	5	15	3	7	53	14
sub-proletariat	3	4	1	2	1	2	--	--	5	9	3	9	1	2	14	4
<u>Religion:</u>																
Catholics	44	49	17	29	4	9	18	33	25	40	20	61	6	14	137	35
other mission churches	31	35	14	24	8	19	24	44	27	43	5	15	9	20	121	31
African Independents	8	9	20	34	--	--	4	8	6	9	4	12	3	7	45	12
Muslims	1	1	1	1	23	53	6	11	2	3	--	--	--	--	33	8
Traditionals:	5	6	7	12	8	19	2	4	3	5	4	12	26	59	55	14

+) = Including 6 "others" from Rift Valley Province



Table IV, 2 : Nairobi Sample ( N = 180 )

Ethnic group:		Kik.		Kam.		Luy.		Luo		Other		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<u>Variables:</u>													
<u>Sex</u>	male	38	53	8	42	12	43	26	60	11	61	95	53
	female	34	47	11	58	16	57	17	40	7	39	85	47
<u>Age</u>	below 30	51	71	13	68	23	82	30	70	14	78	131	73
	31 - 50	18	25	6	32	4	14	13	30	4	22	45	25
	50 +	3	4	--	--	1	4	--	--	--	--	4	2
<u>Education</u>	none	13	18	3	16	3	11	4	9	3	17	26	14
	some primary	29	40	11	58	16	57	17	40	6	33	79	44
	some secondary	30	42	5	26	9	32	22	51	9	50	75	42
<u>Occupation</u>	professional	5	7	1	5	--	--	1	2	1	5	8	5
	skilled white collar	4	5	2	11	2	7	3	7	3	17	14	8
	skilled blue collar	8	11	2	11	6	21	8	19	2	11	26	14
	unskilled white collar	10	14	1	5	5	18	6	14	2	11	24	13
	unskilled blue collar	5	7	3	16	1	4	--	--	--	--	9	5
	workers in informal sector	7	10	1	5	--	--	1	2	3	17	12	7
	housewives	10	14	6	31	11	39	8	19	4	22	39	22
	students	3	4	--	--	--	--	3	7	--	--	6	3
<u>Income</u>	unemployed	20	28	3	16	3	11	13	30	3	17	42	23
	less than 200 (Kshs/month)	17	25	7	37	3	11	4	10	3	17	34	20
	201 - 800 " "	35	51	9	47	19	68	24	58	6	33	93	53
<u>Class</u>	801 + " "	16	24	3	16	6	21	13	32	9	50	47	27
	non-agric. bourgeoisie	--	--	2	11	2	7	4	10	3	17	11	6
	salariat	15	22	5	26	2	7	8	21	5	27	35	20
	non-agric. proletaroids	14	21	1	5	1	4	1	3	3	17	20	12
	proletariat	18	26	8	42	20	71	13	33	4	22	63	37
<u>Religion</u>	sub-proletariat	21	31	3	16	3	11	13	33	3	17	43	25
	Catholics	38	54	7	37	5	18	19	44	5	28	74	41
	Members of other mission churches	20	28	6	32	23	82	19	44	6	33	74	41
	African Independents	4	6	2	10	--	--	5	12	--	--	11	6
	Muslims	1	1	3	16	--	--	--	--	6	33	10	6
Traditionals	8	11	1	5	--	--	--	--	1	6	10	6	

Table IV, 3: Total weighted Sample (weighted N = 1114)

		Kik.		Kam.		Mij.		Luy.		Luo		Kal.		Maas.		Other		Total		Actual national averages %
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	
Sex	male	156	57	71	46	56	58	102	65	115	59	68	74	71	66	25	71	664	60	50 <sup>2)</sup>
	female	119	43	85	54	40	42	56	35	79	41	24	26	37	34	10	29	450	40	50
Age	16 - 30	143	53	85	55	48	50	69	44	102	53	54	59	53	50	26	74	580	52	49
	31 - 50	78	29	55	35	27	28	57	36	63	32	37	40	27	26	9	26	353	32	32
	50 +	50	18	16	10	21	22	32	20	29	15	1	1	15	24	--	--	174	16	19
Education	none	66	24	68	44	66	73	59	37	85	44	24	27	79	75	9	26	456	41	64
	some primary	151	55	64	41	22	25	64	41	69	36	57	64	16	15	18	51	461	42	6
	some secondary	57	21	23	15	2	2	35	22	40	20	8	9	10	10	8	23	183	17	6
Occupation	professional	15	5	6	4	2	2	5	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	3	33	3	1 <sup>3)</sup>
	skilled white collar	5	2	3	2	1	1	2	1	3	2	--	--	--	--	3	8	17	1	2
	skilled blue collar	8	3	2	1	--	--	6	4	8	4	--	--	--	--	2	6	26	2	2
	unskilled white collar	14	5	7	4	4	4	5	3	8	4	--	--	2	2	1	3	41	4	3
	unskilled blue collar	41	15	3	2	4	4	22	14	2	1	15	16	3	3	18	52	108	10	10
	informal sector	8	3	1	1	--	--	--	--	1	1	--	--	--	--	3	8	13	1	3
	cash-crop-farmers	63	23	11	7	19	20	38	24	42	21	36	39	12	11	--	--	221	20	12
	subsistence farmers	9	3	36	23	24	25	36	23	45	23	12	13	57	52	--	--	219	20	20
	housewives	79	29	78	50	41	43	33	21	57	29	24	26	28	26	4	12	344	31	41
	students	10	4	5	3	--	--	8	5	9	5	1	1	3	3	--	--	36	3	3
unemployed	23	8	4	3	1	1	3	2	18	9	3	4	1	1	3	8	56	5	3	
Income	none	--	--	3	2	--	--	1	1	--	--	2	2	16	16	--	--	22	2	
	200 (Kshs/month)	132	53	95	61	83	87	95	60	100	53	61	66	64	62	21	60	651	61	75 <sup>4)</sup>
	201 - 800 " "	92	37	48	31	10	11	51	32	70	37	23	25	14	14	6	17	314	29	20
	801 + " "	24	10	10	6	2	2	11	7	19	10	6	7	8	8	8	23	88	8	5
Religion	Catholic	142	52	46	29	6	6	49	31	78	40	56	65	12	11	14	40	403	37	28 <sup>5)</sup>
	other mission churches	89	32	42	27	13	14	77	50	82	42	13	15	15	14	14	40	345	31	38
	African Independents	18	7	44	28	--	--	9	6	19	10	7	8	6	6	--	--	102	9	
	Muslims	4	1	6	4	55	57	14	9	6	3	--	--	--	--	6	17	91	8	6
Traditionals	21	8	18	12	22	23	6	4	9	5	10	12	75	69	1	3	162	15	27	
Class	non-agric. bourgeoisie	--	--	2	1	--	--	2	1	4	2	--	--	--	--	3	9	11	1	4 <sup>6)</sup>
	salariat	26	10	13	9	5	5	6	4	8	4	1	1	2	2	4	11	65	6	5
	non-agric. proletaroids	16	6	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	--	--	1	1	3	9	26	2	2
	agric. bourgeoisie	54	20	6	4	6	6	36	24	24	13	39	43	16	15	--	--	181	17	10
	agric. proletaroids	87	33	113	74	76	79	59	40	111	60	33	36	80	76	--	--	559	52	49
	proletariat	58	22	12	8	7	8	42	28	18	10	15	7	5	5	22	2	179	17	28
sub-proletariat	24	9	4	3	1	1	3	2	18	10	3	3	1	1	3	9	57	5	2	
Residence	urban	72	26	19	12	1	1	28	18	43	22	--	--	--	--	17	49	180	16	10
	rural	203	74	137	88	95	99	130	82	151	78	92	100	108	100	18	51	934	84	90

2) The national averages for sex, age, level of education and place of residence are taken from the Kenya Population Census 1969, loc.cit.  
 3) These are rough estimates compiled from data taken from a variety of official sources for the year 1970, cf. also Berg-Schlosser, "Entwicklungstendenzen der Klassenstruktur in Kenia", loc.cit.  
 4) These again are rough estimates taken from International Labour Office, Employment, Incomes and Equality, loc.cit., p. 74; cf. also Berg-Schlosser, The Distribution of Education and Income in Kenya: Causes and Potential Political Consequences, Munich: weltforum-Verlag, 1970  
 5) Cf. Kenya Churches Handbook, loc.cit., p. 181.  
 6) Cf. Berg-Schlosser, Entwicklungstendenzen der Klassenstruktur... ", loc.cit.

8) The exact sources are specified in the following appendix below.  
 9) For a discussion of this problem, which has been most extensively dealt with in relation to different measures of "authoritarianism", cf., e.g., also Robinson and Shaver, op. cit., pp. 214 ff.



b) Index and scale construction:

One of the most convenient ways of tapping particular variables and presenting the result in an efficient manner is to use indices and scales. While many of these have been developed, elaborately tested, and validated in an American context,<sup>7)</sup> only very few have so far been employed for the African science. In view of our limited resources we were not able to develop and sufficiently test such measures ourselves. Instead, we had to be content with selecting a number of items from some already established American scales which did not seem to be too culturebound or which could easily be adapted to the Kenyan context.

As far as some attitudinal measures are concerned, we included 52 items taken from a variety of sources.<sup>8)</sup> These appeared on an experimental basis at the end of our questionnaire. All of these were of the Likert-type response mode with no neutral point provided. These items were dispersed randomly, three of them being repeated towards the end of this section in order to provide us with a check concerning the consistency of the answers of our respondents. Since a majority of these items happened to be "positively" worded and alternative negative formulations were either not available or proved to be too clumsy, we instructed our interviewers always to ask for disagreement with the respective item first. Although we well know that such a procedure alone cannot compensate the more complex problem of acquiescence,<sup>9)</sup> we hoped in this way to make our respondents aware of the possibility of answering negatively.

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7) Cf., e.g., the collections of such measures at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan such as the volumes by Robinson, Rusk, Head, op. cit., and Robinson and Shaver, op. cit..

8) The exact sources are specified in the following appendix below.

9) For a discussion of this problem, which has been most extensively dealt with in relation to different measures of "authoritarianism", cf., e.g., also Robinson and Shaver, op. cit., pp. 214 ff..

From these items we then attempted to construct a number of more comprehensive indices. As a first step we re-grouped the items in their original form and checked their inter-item correlations. It turned out that for a number of items of these rudimentary "scales", the correlations were not sufficient for our purposes to warrant their inclusion in any composite measure. We then eliminated the insufficiently correlated ones step-by-step in each case, until we arrived at a relatively brief, but meaningful index. We then subjected the items of each index to a factor analysis in order to see whether they actually "loaded" on the same factor, thus indicating their unidimensionality.

When we were satisfied by these procedures, we recoded each item by assigning a score of 1 to each negative, a score of 3 to each positive and a score of 2 to each "neutral" reply or "don't know", (even though no explicit neutral point had been provided in our response mode, we had instructed our interviewers to record an answer of "don't know" separately, if the respondent genuinely did not have any information or attitude about a particular item). We then added up the scores of the items selected for each index and regrouped the combined index results into sub-categories of "low", "medium" and "high" for each respondent, choosing the respective cutting points where it seemed most appropriate depending on the number of items and the actual distribution of scores in each index. The resulting indices and their respective inter-item-correlations for our total weighted sample are as follows:

"Religiosity": item no.

	22	23	41
22	--	0.29	0.16
23	--	--	0.12



Achievement orientations:

	item no.			
	10	24	44	48
10	--	0.15	0.10	0.16
24		--	0.16	0.13
44			--	0.10

Agreement with ascriptive social criteria:

"System support":

	item no.		
	25	38	47
25	--	0.18	0.16
38		--	0.17

Expression of "anomie":

	item no.	
	26	43
26	--	0.15

"Disposition towards violence":

	item no.			
	4	30	50	54
4	--	0.14	0.16	0.12
30		--	0.18	0.12
50			--	0.13

"Political authoritarianism":

	item no.				
	7	8	11	33	34
7	--	0.12	0.13	0.16	0.18
8		--	0.06	0.24	0.09
11			--	0.14	0.17
33				--	0.21

Acceptance of democratic values:

inter-item-correlations for this scale, in their actual increasing order of difficulty, are as follows:

	item no.		
	13	19	27
13	--	0.21	0.14
19		--	0.13
			--

"System support":

	item no.			
	6	31	36	37
6	--	0.28	0.27	0.25
31		--	0.32	0.21
36			--	0.25
				--

All these correlations, with a single exception (items 8 and 11 in the "political authoritarianism" index), are significant at the 0.001-level. These over-all correlations generally tended to become stronger among literate respondents and among those (80% of the total) who answered with a higher degree of consistency (i.e. responded in the same way to at least 2 of our 3 repeated items).

In addition to these attitudinal items which we were able to form into indices, we constructed 2 scales, one referring to some political cognitive matters, the other to different forms of actual political behavior. Our "political information scale" includes eight items<sup>10)</sup> which can be grouped into an approximate ascending order of difficulty, thus providing this measure, in contrast to the indices listed above, with some

10) Questions 21 a - 21 h.



internal structure as well.<sup>11)</sup> The inter-item-correlations for this scale, in their actual increasing order of difficulty, are as follows:

"Political information scale":

	item no.							
	21a	21b	21e	21c	21d	21h	21f	21g
21a	--	0.45	0.29	0.35	0.25	0.19	0.20	0.09
21b		--	0.42	0.52	0.25	0.30	0.42	0.18
21e			--	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.46	0.21
21c				--	0.19	0.27	0.46	0.21
21d					--	0.08	0.07	0.06
21h						--	0.40	0.39
21f							--	0.37

All correlations, except those between question 21d and questions 21 f, g, and h, are significant at the 0.001-level.

In the same way we were able to put together seven questions relating to different forms of political involvement in local and national matters to form a "political participation" scale.<sup>12</sup> The inter-item-correlations of these questions are given below:

11) A scale of this kind can potentially satisfy the criteria of "Guttman"-scaling. Even though our items did produce a certain "coefficient of reproducibility", we did not attempt, for a number of substantive and methodological reasons, to make this scale fit these conditions perfectly. Instead we were content with a purely cumulative score, irrespective of the order of the items (see also footnote 4 of Part III, chapter 5 above).

12) Questions 33b,f; 34 a,e,f,g,i.

"Political participation scale":

item no.	33b	33f	34a	34e	34f	34g	34i
33b	--	0.41	0.22	0.14	0.09	0.17	0.16
33f		--	0.15	0.18	0.13	0.23	0.19
34a			--	0.32	0.27	0.26	0.28
34e				--	0.87	0.30	0.36
34f					--	0.27	0.34
34g						--	0.70

Again, all these correlations are significant at the 0.001-level.

A final scale with a more elaborate internal structure was of the "Bogardus"-type.<sup>13)</sup> Questions of this kind serve to measure the "distance" between different social groups, in our case between members of different Kenyan ethnic groups, adherents of different religious denominations, and persons of various non-Kenyan origins. Ideally such questions can be selected and grouped to fit a perfect "Guttman"-model. But again, we were content to employ relatively simple cumulative scores here, because we considered the contents of the questions to be more relevant than their perfect "fit" in any artificial pattern. One reason which lent support to this decision was the fact that one sub-question (the one referring to the acceptance of a member of another group as a neighbor in the area) was answered quite differently in our rural and urban samples: A large proportion of our urban respondents considered living next to a member of another group as relatively impersonal. As expected they did not mind such a relationship. In the countryside, however, with its still largely ethnically segregated pattern of rural settlement in Kenya, this question implied a rather permanent

<sup>14)</sup>See also Part III, chapters 2 e and 2 f above.



intrusion of outsiders in one's own ethnic homeland. With this additional meaning, this proposal was rejected much more often. Strictly speaking then, we had two possibilities for this item: 1) We could have assigned two different rank orders for our urban and rural respondents to fit a Guttman model. This would have made our two samples hardly comparable. Or 2) we could have discarded this question altogether. By constructing purely cumulative scores we were able to avoid the difficulty in a simple way and still obtained, in our view, satisfactory results. The findings of such cumulative social distance scores can be presented in a number of ways. One is the usual procedure of cross-tabulating the score for a single group (in our case values of 0 to 4 or 5 indicating the number of negative responses to our questions) with the other sub-categories (ethnic groups, denominations etc.). The respective percentage distributions can then be compared and their significance can be tested with the usual chi-square statistics. An alternative procedure is to compute the mean and perhaps also the standard deviation for all responses of the members of a particular group in comparison to members of another group of the same kind. The different means then again can be compared and the significance of their differences assessed with the help of "T-tests" of significance. The social distance indicated by these means can then also be presented in a number of graphical ways (e.g. as "histograms", or similar to "mileage charts" etc.). A third, somewhat unusual possibility to employ the results of these Bogardus-type questions is to add up the mean scores of one group against all others of the same kind (and then perhaps compute the average of these means again) to provide us with a measure of "self-centeredness" for each group, i.e. the relative extent to which its members reject relations with members of all other groups. This also turned out to be a statistically significant and in its substantive aspects relevant measure for our purposes.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup>See also Part III, chapters 2 e and 2 f above.

a.) The English version:

Hallo (USE LOCAL GREETINGS). My name is ... We are

2. The Questionnaires:

As we briefly stated in the introduction above, we employed two standardized versions of our questionnaire, one in English and one in Swahili. We attempted to make these versions as equivalent to each other as possible. For those interested in comparing both original research instruments, both versions are reproduced here in their entirety.

The first draft of the English version was made in the summer of 1970 while I was at Berkeley where I had submitted my first research proposal concerning this project.

Professor Herbert McClosky and Peter Marris then generously devoted their time to thoroughly revise this draft in light of their extended and diverse experiences. A further draft, this time in German, was also appended to our study on "Politische Kultur" (Munich, 1972). A renewed English version was then submitted to several pre-tests in Kenya before the final draft emerged. We did not have a chance, however, to process and analyze data obtained during our pre-tests. Even though a number of substantial and editorial corrections were made at this stage a few minor flaws still remained, some of which we only later detected. In any case, probably in every survey some of the possible improvements only become apparent with the advantage of hindsight!

Some of these possible corrections and later considerations are indicated below. These remarks, together with a listing of the main sources used for compiling this questionnaire are appended separately at the end of the English version in order not to interrupt the presentation of the research instrument itself. We also attempted to preserve as much as possible some of the more important aspects of the original layout.

4a. Now, what about other languages? (OTHERS THAN THE ONE IN WHICH INTERVIEW IS CONDUCTED)

Do you speak Swahili? YES ..... NO .....



a.) The English version:

Hallo (USE LOCAL GREETINGS). My name is ... We are conducting interviews for the Institute of African Studies at the University of Nairobi. We are interested in your way of life and some of the problems you may have. All answers you give will remain completely confidential. You even need not give us your name, we are only interested in what people in general in a position like yours are thinking.

- 1a. How many persons over the age of 16 belong to this household ? .....
- b. (IF MORE THAN ONE) How many of these are male persons ? .....  
According to the methods of selection used for this survey, I would like to talk to the oldest / youngest male / female person in this household. (UNDERLINE PERSON CHOSEN, IF THE PERSON IS PRESENT OR IS MET AT AN APPOINTED DATE, CONTINUE AS FOLLOWS).
- 2a. How long have you been living in this place ? .....
- b. And where have you been born ? (DISTRICT AND LOCATION) .....
- c. How old are you now ? (APPROX. AGE WILL DO, IF UNCERTAIN, GIVE YOUR OWN ESTIMATE) .....
- 3a. We also would like to know something about your education. Have you been to school? YES ..... NO .....
- b. (IF "YES"): Up to which standard or form? .....
- c. Was it a government ....., Harambee ....., or missionary ..... school? .....
- d. Did you have any further education or some other training? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "YES", SPECIFY) .....  
Where? ..... How long? .....
- 4a. Now, what about other languages? (OTHERS THAN THE ONE IN WHICH INTERVIEW IS CONDUCTED)  
Do you speak Swahili? YES ..... NO .....

- (IF "YES") How well do you speak it?  
(1) Very well ..... (2) Quite well ..... (3) Not very well.....
- b. Do you speak English? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "YES") How well? (1) ..... (2) ..... (3) .....
- c. Any other languages? ..... How well?  
(1) ..... (2) ..... (3) .....
- ..... How well?  
(1) ..... (2) ..... (3) .....
- 5a. Now, what about your parents? Did your father go to school? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "YES") Up to which standard or form? .....
- b. Did your mother go to school? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "YES") Up to which standard or form? .....
- c. What was your father's main occupation? (PROBE EXACT KIND OF ACTIVITY).....
- d. (IF FARMER) How many acres did he cultivate?.....
- e. Which crops did he grow? .....
- f. Did he have any cattle? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "YES") About how many?..... Grade ..... Local.....
- 6a. What is your main daily occupation? .....  
(PROBE CLOSER TO EXACT KIND OF ACTIVITY, ALSO, WHERE APPLICABLE, RANK)
- b. Do you have any other source of income, even if only occasionally (e.g. money from some relatives, your husband or wife, other things you sell or work for)?  
YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES", PROBE SOURCE AND APPROX. AVERAGE AMOUNT PER MONTH) .....
- c. (IF OCCUPIED) About how many hours do you spend working each day? .....
- d. What, if anything, do you particularly like about your work? .....
- .....
- e. What, if anything, do you particularly dislike? .....
- .....



- (IF "YES") How much is the fee? .....
- f. Are you a member of any professional organization  
(e.g. cooperative, farmer's association, trade union,  
federation of employers, chamber of commerce, etc.,  
as the case may be) YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES", PROBE)  
Which one? .....

(QUESTIONS NO. 7 - 9 FOR THOSE WITH AGRICULTURAL  
OCCUPATION ONLY, PASTORALISTS ONLY QUESTION NO. 8):<sup>1)</sup>

- 7a. Who is the owner of this shamba? (ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIP)  
.....  
(IF NOT OWNER OF SHAMBA HIMSELF, MODIFY QUESTIONS  
7 - 9 ACCORDINGLY):

- b. How many acres do you have? .....
- c. Which crops do you grow? .....
- (GIVE ALSO APPROX. QUANTITY BY ACRES) .....
- d. (IF NOT OBVIOUS) Do you sell some of these crops .....  
or do you use them for your own consumption only? .....  
(IF SOME SOLD) What do you sell? .....  
How much do you sell approximately? .....  
Where do you sell it and to whom? .....

- 8a. Do you have some cattle? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "YES") About how many? .....
- b. Is this grade cattle ..... or local cattle ? .....
- (IF BOTH, FIND OUT APPROX. RESPECTIVE NUMBERS) .....
- c. Do you sell any milk? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "YES") About how much? .....
- (PER DAY OR WEEK ETC.) How is the milk collected? .....
- d. (IF GRADE CATTLE) Do you use artificial insemination?  
YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "NO") Why not? .....
- e. Is there a cattle dip in this area? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "YES") Do you bring your cattle there regularly?  
YES ..... NO .....

- (IF "YES") How much is the fee? .....
- (IF "NO") Why not? .....
- f. Do you have any other animals? Goats ....., sheep .....
- chicken ....., others (SPECIFY) .....
- (GIVE APPROX. NUMBERS) .....

(FOR OWNERS OF A SHAMBA ONLY)<sup>2)</sup>

- 9a. Did you ever attend a course at a Farmers' Training Center? YES ..... NO .....
- (IF "YES") Which course? .....
- b. Did you ever ask for advice from the agricultural extension service? YES ..... NO .....
- (IF "YES") What kind of advice? .....
- c. Do you have a title-deed for your land? YES .... NO ....
- (IF "NO") Why not?.....
- Would you like to get one? YES ..... NO .....
- d. Did you ever take a loan to improve your shamba? YES ..... NO .....
- (IF "YES", PROBE AMOUNT AND PURPOSE) .....
- (ALSO) Have you paid it back already? Fully ..... Partly ..... Not yet .....
- e. Do you plan any improvements on the shamba in the near future? YES ..... NO .....
- (IF "YES") What kind of? .....
- f. Do you think of buying some more land or some grade cattle some time?
- Land: YES ..... NO ..... Grade cattle: YES .... NO ....

(QUESTIONS NO. 10 and 12 FOR THOSE WITH NON-AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATIONS ONLY):

- 10a. Do you also possess a shamba or a share of one upcountry? YES ..... NO .....
- (IF "YES") Where is it located? (DISTRICT).....
- b. What is its size? (ACRES) .....
- c. Who is cultivating it? .....



- 14a. d. Which crops are grown there? (FIND OUT APPROX. RESPECTIVE AMOUNTS BY ACRES) .....
- e. Do you regularly get any food or other supplies from members of your family or friends living upcountry?  
YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES", PROBE APPROX. AMOUNT) .....
- 15a. f. Who is the owner of the house you are living in?  
(e.g. private landlord, company, City Council etc.) .....
- g. (IF NOT OWNER HIMSELF) How much rent do you pay? .....
- c. Do you think your economic situation has improved or become worse ..... shs/month
- h. How many rooms do you have? .....
- (FOR RETIRED OR UNEMPLOYED ONLY):
- YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES", PROBE) Which ones? .....
- 11a. What was the work you previously did? .....
- 16a. b. Who is supporting you now? .....
- In which way? .....
- c. Are you looking for a job right now? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "YES") What kind of job? .....
- d. In which way did they affect you? .....
- (FOR HOUSEWIVES ONLY):
- c. Are there any important political events which affected
12. What does your husband do? (FIND OUT EXACT KIND OF OCCUPATION, RANK etc.) .....
- (PROBE MORE INTENSIVELY, E.G. THE COLONIAL TIME, AFTER EVENTS ETC.) In which way did they affect you? .....
- (FOR ALL RESPONDENTS):
13. Could you please indicate in which of the following categories you would place your average cash family income per month: A: less than 100 shs .....
- 17a. B: 100 - 200 shs ..... C: 201 - 400 shs .....
- b. D: 401 - 800 shs ..... c. member? .....
- c. E: 801 - 1600 shs ..... F: 1601 - 3000 shs .....
- G: more than 3000 shs ..... shs/month

- 14a. When you will be of old age, who will take care of you?  
(e.g. pension scheme etc.) .....
- b. Who will inherit your property one day? .....
- (IF SPLIT UP, FIND OUT APPROX. SHARES OF EACH HEIR)  
.....
- 15a. Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your  
present way of life? Very satisfied .....  
quite satisfied ..... somewhat dissatisfied .....  
very dissatisfied .....
- b. (IF ONE OF THE LATTER TWO, PROBE) Why? .....
- c. Do you think your economic situation will be better  
in the future ....., be about the same .....  
or become worse ..... ?
- d. Do you have any particular plans in this respect? .....
- YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES", PROBE) Which ones? .....
- .....
- 16a.<sup>3)</sup> Looking back at your life as a whole, what would you  
say are some of the most important events that affected  
your life? .....
- .....
- b. In which way did they affect you? .....
- .....
- c. Are there any important political events which affected  
your life? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "YES") Which events? .....
- (PROBE MORE INTENSELY, E.G. THE COLONIAL TIME,  
THE EMERGENCY, UHURU, LATER EVENTS ETC.) In which way  
did they affect you? .....
- .....
- 17a.<sup>4)</sup> Are you a member of any club, organization, society  
or other voluntary association? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "YES", PROBE) which one? .....
- b. How long have you been a member? .....
- c. Do you pay any membership fees? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "YES") How much? ..... shs/month



- d. Do you regularly attend meetings of this organization?  
YES ..... NO .....
- e. Have you ever held any office in this organization? .....  
20a. YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES") Which one? .....  
For how long? .....
- f. Have you ever worked for or contributed in some way  
to a Harambee or other self-help scheme? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "YES") What kind of scheme was it? .....  
What was your contribution? .....
- 18. One of the things we want to know is how you get  
informed about things happening in this country.<sup>5)</sup>
  - a. Do you ever listen to the radio? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "NO", CONTINUE WITH QUESTION 19)
  - b. Where do you usually listen?.....
  - c. How often do you listen? Almost every day .....  
about once or twice a week .....  
less than once a week .....
  - d. What are your favourite programs? .....
- 19. What about newspapers? (IF LITERATE, ACCORDING TO  
QUESTION 3 ABOVE):
  - a. Do you sometimes read a newspaper? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "NO", OR NOT LITERATE):
  - b. Do other people sometimes read to you from a newspaper  
or tell you what they have read? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "NO", CONTINUE WITH QUESTION 19e, IF "YES", MODIFY  
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS)
  - c. How often do you read a newspaper? Almost every day .....  
about once or twice a week ..... less than once a week...
  - 22. d. Which parts of the newspaper do you find most  
interesting? .....
  - e. Do you follow the accounts of political and govern-  
mental affairs? Would you say you follow them regu-  
larly ..... from time to time ..... or never? .....
  - f. Has anyone come to you for advice recently?  
YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES"):  
What in general was it about? .....

f. (IF NONE OF THE ABOVE MEDIA CONTACTS IS REPORTED):

Who keeps you informed about things happening outside this location? .....

20a. Do you have a watch or a clock in your home?

YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES")

b. Do you set it regularly? YES ..... NO .....

c. Do you think it is important for you always to know the right time ..... or don't you care so much? .....

21.<sup>6)</sup> We are trying to see what kind of information people are interested in and remember. It does not matter if you do not know the answers to the following questions, but let us try them, if you don't mind.

a. Who is the President of Kenya? .....

b. What is the name of his party? .....

c. Do you know in which year Kenya became independent?.....

d. Who is the M.P. for this area? .....

e. We would also like to know how well-known politicians are in this country. Can you name us a few? (UP TO 5) .....

f. What is the name of the President of the United States of America? .....

g. Can you name an important leader of the Soviet Union? .....

h. Can you mention some important international political events which happened last year? .....

22a.<sup>7)</sup> Have you gone to anyone seeking some advice recently?

YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES")

What in general was it about? .....

b. What kind of person was this? (RELATIONSHIP, OCCUPATION, AGE) .....

c. Has anyone come to you for advice recently? YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES"):

What in general was it about? .....



d. What kind of person was this? (RELATIONSHIP, OCCU-  
PATION, AGE) .....

23a.<sup>8)</sup> Some people say that most persons can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with other people. How do you feel about it? Can you trust most people ....., only a few people ....., or don't you trust anybody .....

b. (IF MIDDLE CATEGORY CHOSEN, PROBE) Would you say you trust only members of your family ..... only personal friends ..... only members of your age-group ..... only members of your clan ....., only members of your tribe ....., all Kenyans ..... ?

24a.<sup>9)</sup> Speaking generally, would you say that most people are more inclined to help others ..... or more inclined to look out for themselves ..... ?

b. Do you think that most people are trying to get advantage of you if they get the chance ..... or would they try to be fair ..... ?

25. Do you think that people who are successful achieve their success mainly because of friends or family relationships who help them along ....., or mainly because of their own skill and knowledge ..... ?

26. Now we would like to ask you some questions about your family.

a. Are you married? YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES", FIND OUT NUMBER OF WIVES, WHERE APPLICABLE) .....

b. Do you have any children? YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES") What is their age? (WRITE DOWN DIFFERENT AGES)<sup>10)</sup> .....

c. How many of them are girls? .....

d. To which clan<sup>11)</sup> do you belong? .....

- e. Are you a member of a certain age-group?<sup>12)</sup>  
YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES") What is its name?  
.....
- 27a. (IF APPLICABLE) Does any of your children go to school?  
YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "YES", FIND OUT HOW MANY, WHICH SCHOOLS, AND  
STANDARD OR FORM) .....
- b. Do you pay any school fees? YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES")  
How much altogether (p. year) .....
- c. Does any of your children have a regular job?  
YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES") What kind of job is it?  
.....
- d. What are your plans for your children in the future?  
(IF NECESSARY, PROBE E.G., ABOUT KIND OF JOB THEY WOULD  
LIKE THEM TO GET ETC.) .....
28. We are also interested in how decisions are made in  
your family.<sup>13)</sup>
- a. When you were a child, who was making the decisions  
relating to economic matters (e.g. the planting of  
crops, the work different persons do etc.)?  
Your father ....., your mother ....., both of them  
together ....., somebody else (e.g. grandmother, uncle  
etc.) (SPECIFY) .....
- b. When a child was punished for some bad behavior, who  
did it usually? .....
- c. In what way was a child punished? .....
- d. (FOR MARRIED PERSONS ONLY) What about your family today?  
Who usually makes decisions concerning economic matters?  
.....
- e. (IF APPLICABLE) Who punishes the children? .....



f. In what way? .....

29. Here are some opinions which some people have about the obligations to their family, others may be of a different opinion. What do you think about the following statements, do you (1) disagree strongly, (2) disagree somewhat, (3) agree somewhat, or (4) agree strongly?

a. Those who earn money should share it with all members of the family.

(1) ..... (2) ..... (3) ..... (4) .....

b. Hospitality demands always to give food and a place to sleep even to more remote relatives.

(1) ..... (2) ..... (3) ..... (4) .....

c. I only care about myself and my immediate family, the rest must take care of themselves.

(1) ..... (2) ..... (3) ..... (4) .....

30. (IF NOT YET CLEAR) To which tribe do you belong?

.....

31a. To which religious group do you belong?<sup>14)</sup>

Protestant (PROBE EXACT DENOMINATION) .....

Catholic ..... Muslim ....., Other (SPECIFY IF POSSIBLE)

.....

b. How often do you go to your place of religious worship?

Every day ....., once a week ....., once a month ....., rarely ....., never .....

c. In guiding your actions every day, do you personally find that your religious beliefs are very important .....

fairly important ....., not very important .....

d. Do you believe that there is a life after death in some form or other? Believe ....., not sure ....., don't believe .....

32.<sup>15)</sup> Now we would like to know something about the feelings you may have towards members of other tribes, other races,

a Luvya  
a Kamb  
a Kisii  
a Luo  
sb. from  
or Maru  
a Kalenjin  
a Kikuyu  
sb. from  
Coast Prov.  
a Masai  
a Turkana  
a Somali  
a Muslim  
a Catholic  
a Protestant  
sb. of another  
or religion  
a Bur  
an Asian  
a Ugandan  
a Tanzanian

33. 16) other religious groups or other countries. I am going to mention some of these to you. Please tell me what kind of relationship you would be willing to have with an average member of the group - not the best member you have known, not the worst. Answer in terms of your first feeling reaction. (OMIT OWN TRIBAL OR RELIGIOUS GROUP, SKIP A GROUP IF IS NOT KNOWN TO RESPONDENT, IN THIS CASE MARK "U". MARK "X" FOR EACH POSITIVE ANSWER, "O" FOR EACH NEGATIVE ONE. PUT THE LAST QUESTION FOR THE LAST FOUR GROUPS ONLY): Would you accept:

(ONLY LAST 4 GROUPS):

	as neighbours in this area	(RURAL PEOPLE): to buy land in this area (URBANITES): to work with you on your job	as a good personal friend	to close kinship by marriage	to citizenship in this country
a Luyia					
a Kamba					
a Kisii					
a Luo					
sb. from Embu or Meru					
a Kalenjin					
a Kikuyu					
sb. from the Coast Prov.					
a Maasai					
a Turkana					
a Somali					
a Muslim					
a Catholic					
a Protestant					
sb. of another religion					
a European					
an Asian					
a Ugandan					
a Tanzanian					



33. 16) Now we would like to know something about your interest in politics.
- a. Generally speaking, would you say you are very interested ....., somewhat ....., not very much interested in politics .....
  - b. Do you ever talk with other people about problems which Kenya as a country has to face today? YES ..... NO .....
  - c. (IF "YES"): What kind of people are these, for example? .....
  - d. What are some of the problems you are talking about? .....
  - e. How well do you think you understand these problems? Very well ....., quite well ....., not very well ....., not at all .....
  - f. How about important problems in this location or in this part of the country? Do you discuss them sometimes? YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES"):
  - g. With whom? .....
  - h. What are these problems? .....
  - i. How well do you think you understand them? Very well ....., quite well ....., not very well ....., not at all .....
- 34a. Have you ever gone to public meetings in this area? YES ..... NO .....
- b. (IF "YES") Who was holding it? .....
  - c. What was it about? .....
  - d. How often have you gone to such meetings? Many times ....., a few times ....., just once .....
  - e. Have you been registered as a voter in the last elections for the National Assembly? YES ..... NO .....
  - f. (IF "YES") Did you vote at that time .... or did you not have a chance to .....
  - g. Have you ever talked to people to try to get them to vote for or against any candidate in a local election? YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES"):
  - h. Many times ....., a few times .....

i. In a national election? YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES"):

j. Many times ....., a few times ..... (IF NECESSARY):

35. 17) Here are some of the issues people talk about.

What is your opinion in these matters?

a. Do you think people should be allowed to own as much land as they can afford ..... or no more than they can themselves cultivate .....

b. Should property in land be communal ....., that is belong to a tribe, a whole village, the government or a larger group of people, or private ....., that is belong to one person or family only?

c. Some people think business firms make too much money while not paying enough to their workers ..... Others think that they pay fair wages and make a fair profit ..... What is your opinion?

d. Do you think that all business firms and companies in Kenya should be owned by Kenyans ..... or do you think it is necessary to allow foreigners a share in them in order to attract more foreign capital and expertise .....

e. Some people say that it is good to have only one political party in this country. Others say there should be two or more. What is your opinion, should there be several parties ..... or a single one .... ? Why? .....

.....

f. Do you think Kenya should become a more socialist country, like Tanzania for example ....., or should the government continue with its present economic policies .....

g. 18) One sometimes hears some persons say that there are some people or groups who have too much influence over the way the government is run in this country. Do you agree ....., or disagree ..... that there are such groups? (IF AGREEMENT):

Who are these people? .....

36. 19) Suppose several men were trying to influence a government decision, let's say about a development project in

Who else do you think could help you? .....



this area. Here are a number of things they might do  
(READ SLOWLY TO RESPONDENT, REPEAT, IF NECESSARY):

- (1) Write to the government official concerned or go to see him;
- (2) Write to the M.P. of your area or go to see him;
- (3) Work through personal or family connections;
- (4) Get other people interested - form a group;
- (5) Work through KANU;
- (6) Organize a protest demonstration;

Which of these methods do you think would be the most effective? ..... Which next? ..... Which the least? .....

37a. Some people say that women should not be active in politics. Others say, they should have the same political rights and duties as men. What do you think?

Women should be active in the same way as men ....., less than men ....., not at all be active .....

b. Can you imagine a woman becoming president of this country? Not at all ....., not very well ....., quite well ....., very well .....

38a. <sup>20)</sup> As a Kenyan, what are some of the things about this country that you are particularly proud of? .....

b. What, if anything, would you criticize in this country? .....  
(IF SOMETHING IS MENTIONED)

c. What, do you think, should be done about it? .....

39. Now, I have a few other questions:

a. What would you say is the biggest problem that people in circumstances like yours face in life? .....

b. Is there anything that you as an individual can do to solve this problem? YES ..... NO .....

c. (IF "YES") What do you think you can do? .....  
(IF "NO") Why not? .....

d. Who else do you think could help you? .....

- e. What do you think are the biggest problems that this country faces today? .....
- f. Would you say the chances to solve them are very good ....., quite good ....., not very good ....., very bad .....
- g. Can people like you do anything to help solve this problem? YES ..... NO .....  
(IF "YES") What exactly? .....
- h.<sup>21)</sup> Suppose you were made head of the government. What are some of the first things you would try to do? (IF NO SPECIFIC ANSWER, DESCRIBE REACTION) .....
- i.<sup>22)</sup> If, for some reason, you could no longer live in this country, what other country would you choose to live in? (IF NO SPECIFIC ANSWER, DESCRIBE REACTION): .....  
(IF COUNTRY MENTIONED) Why this one? .....

40. Now, I am going to ask you some questions about which we all have certain beliefs and opinions. We all think differently about each matter and there are no right or wrong answers. Just tell me how you feel about these things. Please indicate for each question whether you (1) disagree strongly, (2) disagree somewhat, (3) agree somewhat, (4) agree strongly.

- 1. Just as is true of fine horses or cattle, some breeds of people are just naturally better than others.<sup>23)</sup>  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
- 2. One of the things you should consider in choosing your friends is whether they can help you make your way in the world.<sup>24)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
- 3. Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things.<sup>25)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
- 4. Human nature being what it is there must always be war and conflict.<sup>25)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
- 5. If you start trying to change things very much you usually make them worse.<sup>26)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...



6. I usually have confidence that the government will do what is right.<sup>27)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
7. When the country is in great danger we may have to force some people even if it violates their rights.<sup>28)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
8. The government should prohibit books and films which it thinks are harmful for the public. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
9. One main trouble today is that people talk too much and work too little.<sup>25)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
10. The raising of one's social position is one of the more important things in life.<sup>24)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
11. A few strong leaders can make this country better than all the laws and talk.<sup>25)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
12. Some people have the power to do harm to others just by wishing it may happen. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
13. I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views may be.<sup>28)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
14. I cannot imagine to be anything else than a..... (INSERT RESPONDENT'S OWN TRIBAL GROUP) (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
15. It is better to go without something than to ask a favour.<sup>29)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
16. The main trouble with democracy is that most people don't really know what is best for them.<sup>23)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
17. Not our life on earth, but what happens afterwards is really important. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
18. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.<sup>30)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
19. Everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say in political matters.<sup>28)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
20. A poor man doesn't have the chance he deserves in the law courts.<sup>27)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

21. Everything changes so quickly these days that I often have trouble deciding which are the right rules to follow.<sup>31)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
22. There are things in life men will never fully understand.<sup>25)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
23. It is very important to pay respect to one's ancestors. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
24. I set goals for myself which I attempt to reach.<sup>29)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
25. It is only natural and right that women should have less freedom than men.<sup>25)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
26. It's better to stick to what you have than to try new things you really don't know about.<sup>26)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
27. No matter what a person's political beliefs are he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else.<sup>28)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
28. There is something in the power of a medicine man which really works, even if people do not know how. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
29. I prefer the practical man anytime to the man of ideas.<sup>26)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
30. It is understandable that men who feel that their honour has been violated take the law into their own hands.<sup>28)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
31. Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country.<sup>27)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
32. People were better off in the old days when everyone knew just how he was expected to act.<sup>31)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
33. What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents.<sup>25)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
34. Almost any unfairness or brutality may be justified when some important political purpose is to be carried out.<sup>28)</sup> (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...



35. A child should never be asked to do anything unless he is told why he is asked to do it.<sup>29)</sup>  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
36. All groups can live in harmony in this country without changing the system in any way.<sup>26)</sup>  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
37. Labour gets a fair share of what it produces.<sup>23)</sup>  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
38. It is only right that people who belong to a respected family should have to say more than others.  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
39. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal scale with others.<sup>30)</sup>  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
40. It is nice to have plenty of time and not to work so hard as some people do.  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
41. No matter how we like to talk about it, political authority comes not from us, but from some higher power.<sup>26)</sup>  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
42. Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.<sup>32)</sup>  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
43. A man doesn't really have much wisdom until he is well along in his years.<sup>26)</sup>  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
44. I work like a slave at everything I undertake until I'm satisfied with the results.<sup>29)</sup>  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
45. In spite of what some people say, the lot of the average man is getting worse, not better.  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
46. The government should prohibit books and films which it thinks are harmful for the public.<sup>32)</sup>  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
47. When a man is born, the success he is going to have is already decided.<sup>29)</sup>  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
48. Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough willpower.<sup>25)</sup>  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

49. A man ought not be allowed to speak if he doesn't know what he is speaking about.<sup>28)</sup>

(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

50. Everybody has the right to defend himself and to use weapons if necessary. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

51. I feel I waste time and spend it uselessly.<sup>33)</sup>

(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

52. Capital punishment (= death penalty) is the only way to suppress crime in this country.<sup>34)</sup>

(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

53. I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be.<sup>32)</sup>

(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

54. An insult to your honour should not be forgotten<sup>25)</sup>

(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

55. A happy family life is of more value to me than becoming rich.

(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

Now we have finally come to the end. Thank you very much. You really have helped us a lot. Good bye! (FILL IN AFTER INTERVIEW):

Place of interview:..... Lenght.....hrs.  
Language .....

3) These questions were to give us some clues as to the  
4) Questions concerning media participation were, of course, very prominent in Lerner's original study, too. Cf. Lerner, op. cit.  
5) These questions are modelled along the usual "political information"-scales, cf., e. g., the one constructed by Matthew and Prothro, op. cit.



- 1) This relatively extensive section dealing with agricultural matters turned out to be quite time-consuming. It can, of course, be shortened in further applications of this or similar questionnaires. Besides serving some special interest of the author in this still most significant sector of Kenya's economy, the "down to earth"-character of these questions also contributed to a greater willingness to talk to our interviewers on the part of our respondents and a greater confidence in our undertaking as a whole. For this reason we also included questions inquiring about some personal data of our respondents (education, occupation, income etc.) in this more general economic context rather than placing them at the end as is the rule for many other studies.
- 2) One question which we missed here, to our regret, and which is also important for a discussion of the "kulak" problem is a specific inquiry about paid help farmers may employ on a permanent or temporary basis from outside their own immediate family.
- 3) These questions were to give us some clues as to the "life-histories" of our respondents in order to assess some of the personal and collective formative factors of Kenya's political culture. Explicit extended "life-history" interviews have also been conducted by Almond and Verba, op. cit., for example.
- 4) These questions again are somewhat extensive and could be shortened in future at least in situations similar to that of Kenya. The details we asked for did not yield much additional information for our purposes and probably are of interest for the specialist only. In the Kenyan context explicit questions asking for membership in "tribal welfare organisations" and the political party probably could have yielded some more information on these points than this purely open-ended form.
- 5) Questions concerning media participation were, of course, very prominent in Lerner's original study, too. Cf. Lerner, op. cit.
- 6) These questions are modelled along the usual "political information"-scales, cf., e. g., the one constructed by Matthews and Prothro, op. cit.

- 7) Similar questions inquiring about local persons of respect and influence and opinion leadership in general have also been asked by Lerner, op. cit..
- 8) Social trust was also one of the central categories of Almond and Verba's study, cf. question 7 of their questionnaire.
- 9) These questions, as a further measure of this variable, are adapted from Rosenberg's "Faith in People"-scale, cf. idem, Occupations and Values, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957, pp. 25 - 35. Question 25 is adapted from Lerner, op. cit., question 108.
- 10) In some Kenyan ethnic groups there is a belief that stating the exact number of one's children or of cattle may inflict misfortune upon them. For this reason we rather asked for the different ages of the children of our respondents, which they were willing to report quite eagerly, and established the total number of children in this way.
- 11) Here the appropriate vernacular term was substituted by our interviewers.
- 12) In a pre-text version of this questionnaire we had also included an explicit question on circumcision. This turned out to be somewhat sensitive, however, and we decided to drop it in the end. But membership in an age-set also usually implies to have been circumcised, depending on the customs of the particular ethnic group.
- 13) Cf. Almond and Verba, op. cit., questions 54 and 55.
- 14) Here, given the still large number of adherents of traditional beliefs in some areas, a more open-ended wording like "Are you a member of any church or religious group? (IF YES) Which one?" might have been more appropriate. It is also important to instruct the interviewers carefully to put all the questions about religious beliefs (31 b and 31 c) to all respondents, irrespective of whether they are a member of any formal religious organisation or not.
- 15) This scale has been constructed following Bogardus' example, cf. idem, op. cit.
- 16) Questions 33 and 34 include some items adapted from some of the more common "political participation"-scales, cf., e. g. , Matthews and Prothro, op. cit., or Almond and Verba, op. cit.. Questions 33 e and 33 i also probe to some extent for Almond and Verba's variable of a "sense of civic competence", cf. idem, op. cit., questions 15 and 16.



- 29) Cf. McClosky, op. cit., question 11.
- 17) These are some central issues relevant to the Kenyan situation. In other contexts some of these questions must be modified, of course.
- 18) This is adapted from Almond and Verba's question 18.
- 19) Cf. Almond and Verba, op. cit., question 30. As one further alternative mode of action an explicit statement concerning working through some formally established interest groups, like professional organisations etc., could have been included here. In other countries an explicit distinction between approaching local authorities or the national government may also make more sense than in the present rather centralized Kenyan system. A separate question on "output relations" (cf., e. g., Almond and Verba, op. cit., questions 34 and 37 a) also could have been included in this section of our questionnaire.
- 20) Cf. Almond and Verba, op. cit., question 33.
- 21) Cf. Lerner, op. cit., question 102.
- 22) Cf. ibid., question 92.
- 23) These are items taken from Herbert McClosky's "Belief in Equality"-scale, cf. idem, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics", APSR, 1964, vol. 58, pp. 361 - 382.
- 24) These are items from Kaufmann, W. C., "Status, authoritarianism and anti-semitism", American Journal of Sociology, 1957, vol. 62, pp. 279 - 382.
- 25) These items are adapted from the "California F-scale" developed by Adorno et al., op. cit., Some of these are taken from the shortened ten-item version of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. Item 3 in particular did not turn out to be very useful in the Kenyan context.
- 26) Cf. McClosky, Herbert, "Conservatism and Personality", APSR, 1958, vol. 52, pp. 27 - 45.
- 27) Cf. idem, "Political Cynicism"-scale in: "Consensus and Ideology...", loc. cit.. Item 20 did not generate a great number of meaningful responses.
- 28) Cf. ibid. scales on "free speech", "rules of the game", and procedural rights.

b.) The Swahili version:

- 29) Cf. McClelland, op. cit., Appendix VI.
- 30) Cf. Rosenberg, Morris, Society and the Adolescent Self-Image, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.
- 31) Cf. McClosky, Herbert and Schaar, John H., "Psychological dimensions of anomy", American Sociological Review, vol. 30, 1965, pp. 14 - 40.
- 32) These are the three items which we repeated towards the end of this section in order to assess the consistency of the answers of our respondents.
- 33) Cf. McClelland, op. cit., Appendix VII.
- 34) To get at the problem of capital punishment as such this item should have been transformed into a more balanced separate question.

wangapi wa kiuse? .....

Kulingana na njia za kuchagua zinazotumiwa katika uchunguzi huu, ningependa kuongea na wanaume aliye mzee zaidi / wanaume aliye kijana zaidi / wanaume aliye mzee zaidi / wanaume aliye kijana zaidi. (UNDERLINE PERSON CHOSEN, IF THE PERSON IS PRESENT OR IS MET AT AN APPOINTED DATE, CONTINUE AS FOLLOWS).

2a. Umwishi hapa kwa muda gani? .....

b. Ulizaliwa wapi? (DISTRICT AND LOCATION) .....

c. Una umri gani? (APPROX. AGE WILL DO, IF UNCERTAIN, GIVE YOUR OWN ESTIMATE) .....

3a. Tungependa pia kujua juu ya elimu yako. Je, unakwenda shuleni? YES ..... NO .....

b. (IF "YES") Ulisoma spaka darasa gani? .....

c. Ilikuwa shule ya Serikali ....., ya Harambo ....., au ya Mshani .....

d. Baadaye uliendelea na masomo au mafundisho mengine? YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES", SPECIFY): Wapi ..... Kwā muda gani? .....

4a. Sasa nataka kujua lugha unazoelwa. (OTHERS THAN THE ONE IN WHICH INTERVIEW IS CONDUCTED) Unaoongea Kiswahili? Yes ..... NO ..... (IF "YES") Unaoongea Kiswahili

(1) vizuri sana ..... (2) kutosha ..... (3) kidogo tu .....



b.) The Swahili version:

- Hujambo (USE LOCAL GREETINGS) Jina langu ni .....
- Idara inayojishughulisha katika mafunzo juu ya mambo ya waafrika, na iliyo katika Chuo Kikuu cha Nairobi ingependa kujua mashauri yafuatayo. Tungependa kujua juu ya maisha yako na matatizo mengine ambayo labda unayo. Majibu yote utakayoyatoa yatakuwa siri kabisa. Hata hatuhitaji jina lako, lakini tunachotaka ni kujua kwa jumla fikira za watu wanaoishi katika maisha kama haya yako.
- 1a. Ni watu wangapi waliozidi umri wa miaka 16 ambao ni wa jamaa (nyumba) hii? .....
- b. (IF MORE THAN ONE) Miongoni mwao (kati ya hawa) ni wangapi wa kiume? .....
- Kulingana na njia za kuchagua zinazotumiwa katika uchunguzi huu, ningependa kuongea na mwanaume aliye mzee zaidi / mwanaume aliye kijana zaidi / mwanamke aliye mzee zaidi / mwanamke aliye kijana zaidi. (UNDERLINE PERSON CHOSEN, IF THE PERSON IS PRESENT OR IS MET AT AN APPOINTED DATE, CONTINUE AS FOLLOWS).
- 2a. Umeishi hapa kwa muda gani? .....
- b. Ulizaliwa wapi? (DISTRICT AND LOCATION) .....
- c. Una umri gani? (APPROX. AGE WILL DO, IF UNCERTAIN, GIVE YOUR OWN ESTIMATE) .....
- 3a. Tungependa pia kujua juu ya elimu yako. Je, umekwenda shuleni? YES ..... NO .....
- b. (IF "YES") Ulisoma mpaka darasa gani? .....
- c. Ilikuwa shule ya Serikali ....., ya Harambee ....., au ya Misheni ..... ?
- d. Baadaye uliendelea na masomo au mafundisho mengine? YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES", SPECIFY): Wapi ..... Kwa muda gani? .....
- 4a. Sasa nataka kujua lugha unazoelewa. (OTHERS THAN THE ONE IN WHICH INTERVIEW IS CONDUCTED) Unaongea Kiswahili? Yes ..... NO ..... (IF "YES") Unaongea Kiswahili (1) vizuri sana ..... (2) kutosha ..... (3) kidogo tu .....

- b. Unaongea Kiingereza? YES ..... NO ..... (IF "YES")  
Unaongea (1) ... (2) ... (3) ...
- c. Unaongea lugha nyingine yo yote? .....  
Unaongea (1) ... (2) ... (3) ...  
.....Unaongea (1) ... (2) ... (3) ...
- 5a. Wazazi wako je? Baba yako alikwenda shuleni? YES ... NO ...  
(IF "YES"): Alifika darasa gani? .....
- b. Mama yako alikwenda shuleni? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES"):  
Alifika darasa gani? .....
- c. Baba yako alikuwa akifanya kazi gani hasa? (PROBE EXACT  
KIND OF ACTIVITY) .....
- d. (IF FARMER) Je alikuwa na eka ngapi? .....
- e. Alikuwa nini? .....
- f. Alikuwa na mifugo? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES"):  
Kama wangapi? ..... Walikuwa wa kizungu .....  
au kiasili .....?
- 6a. Je, kazi yako hasa ni nini siku zote? (PROBE CLOSER TO  
EXACT KIND OF ACTIVITY, ALSO, WHERE APPLICABLE, RANK ETC.)  
.....
- b. Je, unayo njia nyingine ya kujipatia pesa, hata kama si  
kila wakati (kwa mfano pesa kutoka kwa jamaa yako, kutoka  
kwa mke wako, au kwa mume wako, vitu vingine unavyouza,  
au kufanya kazi)? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES", PROBE SOURCE  
AND APPROX. AVERAGE AMOUNT PER MONTH) .....
- c. (IF OCCUPIED) Wewe hufanya kazi kwa muda wa saa ngapi  
kila siku? .....
- d. Ni jambo gani hasa unalolipenda katika kazi yako? .....
- e. Ni jambo gani hasa usilolipenda katika kazi yako? .....
- f. Wewe ni mwanachama wa shirika lo lote la kazi (kwa mfano  
shirika la wakulima, la biashara, la wafanyakazi, na  
kadhalika)? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES", PROBE):  
Shirika gani? .....



QUESTIONS NO. 7 - 9 FOR THOSE WITH AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATION ONLY; PASTORALISTS ONLY QUESTIONS NO. 8)

- 7a. Mwenye shamba hili ni nani? (ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIP) .....  
.....  
(IF NOT OWNER OF THE SHAMBA HIMSELF, MODIFY QUESTIONS  
7 - 9 ACCORDINGLY):
- b. Una eka ngapi? .....
- c. Ni mazao gani unayokuza hapa? (GIVE APPROX. QUANTITY BY  
ACRES) .....
- d. (IF NOT OBVIOUS) Mazao haya unauza au unatumia kwa  
chakula tu? .....  
SOME SOLD ..... NONE SOLD ..... (IF SOME SOLD) Unayouza  
ni mazao gani? .....  
Ni kama kiasi gani cha mazao unayouza?.....  
Unauza wapi na ni nani unayeuza? .....
- 8a. Una mifugo yo yote? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Una ng'ombe  
kama wangapi? .....
- b. Ni wa kizungu .... au wa kiasili ....? (IF BOTH, FIND  
OUT APPROX. RESPECT. NUMBERS)
- c. Unauza maziwa yo yote? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES"):  
Kama kiasi gani? ..... (PER DAY, WEEK, ETC.)  
Maziwa hupelekwaje? .....
- d. (IF GRADE CATTLE) Wewe hutumia artificial insemination  
(A.I.) kwa kuwazalisha ng'ombe wako? YES ... NO ... (IF "NO"):  
Ni kwa sababu gani? .....
- e. Hapa pana mahali pa kuogeshea ng'ombe? YES ... NO ...  
(IF "YES"): Wewe huwaleta ng'ombe pale kila mara?  
YES ... NO ... (IF "YES"):  
Ada ni kiasi gani? .....(IF "NO"):  
Kwa nini huwaleti? .....
- f. Je, una wanyama wengine wa mifuga? Mbuzi ..., kondoo ...,  
kuku ..., au wengine (SPECIFY) .... (GIVE APPROX. RESPEC-  
TIVE NUMBERS)
- (FOR OWNERS OF A SHAMBA ONLY):

- 9a. Umehudhuria mafunzo katika Chuo cha Ukulima? YES ... NO....  
(IF "YES"): Mafunzo gani? .....
- b. Umeomba mashauri kutoka kwa watu wa serikali wanaotumika  
Ukulima? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Mashauri gani? .....
- c. Je, una "Hati ya Shamba" lako? YES ... NO ...  
(IF "NO"): Kwa nini? .....  
Ungependa kuwa nayo? YES ... NO ...
- d. Umeomba upewe mkopo wakati wo wote ili ulipanue shamba lako?  
YES ... NO ...  
IF "YES", PROBE AMOUNT, YEAR, PURPOSE) .....  
.....(ALSO):  
Umekwisha kuulipa? Wote ....., Sehemu yake ....., au bado ...?
- e. Umepanga kupanua shamba lako siku zijazo? YES ... NO .....  
(IF "YES"): Una mipango gani? .....
- f. Wafikiria kununua shamba jingine au ng' ombe wengine wa  
kizungu wakati fulani?  
Land YES ... NO ... Grade Cattle: YES ... NO ...  
(QUESTIONS NO. 10 AND 12 FOR THOSE WITH NON - AGRICULTURAL  
OCCUPATIONS ONLY):
- 10a. Unalo shamba au hisa ya shamba moja huko mashambani?  
YES ... NO ... (IF "YES"): Shamba lenyewe liko wapi? (DISTRICT)  
.....
- b. Ukubwa wake ni kiasi gani? (ACRES) .....
- c. Ni nani ambaye hulilima? .....
- d. Ni mazao gani ambayo hukuzwa katika shamba hilo? (FIND  
OUT APPROX. RESPECTIVE AMOUNT BY ACRES) .....
- e. Wewe hupata chakula cho chote au msaada mwingine wo wote  
siku zote kutoka kwa jamaa au rafiki zako wanaoishi huko  
mashambani? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES" PROBE KIND AND  
APPROX. AMOUNT) .....
- f. Ni nani mwenye nyumba unamoishi (kwa mfano mtu binafsi,  
serikali, kampuni etc.)?.....  
(IF NOT OWNER HIMSELF):



- g. Wewe hulipa kodi ya nyumba kiasi gani? .....shs/month.
- h. Una vyumba vingapi? .....

(FOR RETIRED OR UNEMPLOYED ONLY):

- 11a. Ulipoacha kazi, ulikuwa ukifanya kazi gani? .....
- b. Ni nani unayemtegemea sasa? .....Kwa njia gani?....
- c. Je, unatafuta kazi sasa? YES ... NO ...  
(IF "YES") Kazi ya aina gani? .....

(FOR HOUSEWIVES ONLY):

- 12. Je, mumeo hufanya kazi gani? (FIND OUT EXACT KIND OF OCCUPATION, RANK ETC.) .....

(FOR ALL RESPONDENTS):

Waweza kuonyesha kwa wastani kiasi cha mapato ya jamaa yako kwa mwezi?

- A: Je ni chini ya shs 100, - ? .....
- B: shs 100 - 200 ... C: shs 201 - 400 ....
- D: shs 401 - 800 ... E: shs 801 - 1600 ...
- F: shs 1601- 3000 ... G: zaidi ya shs 3000 .....

- 14a. Utakapozeeka, ni nani atakayekutunza (kwa mfano, watoto, bima etc.) ? .....
- b. Nani atarithi mali yako siku moja? (IF SPLIT, FIND OUT APPROX. SHARE OF EACH HEIR) .....
- 15a. Katika maisha yako ya sasa je, umetosheka kabisa ....., au umetosheka kidogo ..., au hutosheki ..., au hutosheki kabisa ... ? (IF ONE OF THE LATTER TWO, PROBE):
- b. Kwa nini? .....
- c. Wadhani mapato yako katika siku zijazo yatakuwa mazuri zaidi kuliko yalivyo sasa ..., au yatakuwa kama yalivyo sasa ..., au yatakuwa mabaya kuliko yalivyo sasa ... ?
- d. Una mipango yo yote ya kuyarekebisha? YES ... NO ...  
(IF "YES"): Mipango gani? .....

d. Unapendelea vipindi vipi? .....

- 16a. Katika maisha yako ya siku zilizopita kwa jumla ni mambo gani hasa yaliyogeuzwa maisha yako? .....
- .....
- b. Mambo hayo yalikugeuzwa kwa njia gani? .....
- .....
- c. Kuna mambo yo yote ya kisiasa yaliyogeuzwa maisha yako? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Ni mambo gani (PROBE MORE INTENSIVELY E.G. THE COLONIAL TIME, THE EMERGENCY, UHURU, LATER EVENTS)? .....
- Yalikugeuzwa kwa njia gani? .....
- .....
- 17a. Wewe ni mwanachama wa chama cho chote hata ingawa ni cha kujitolea mwenyewe? YES ... NO .. (IF "YES"): Kipi? .....
- b. Je, umekuwa mwanachama kwa muda gani? .....
- c. Wewe hulipa malipo yo yote ya uanachama? YES ... NO .. (IF "YES"): Kiasi gani kwa mwezi? ..... shs/ month
- d. Wewe huhudhuria mikutano ya chama hicho kila mara? YES ... NO .....
- e. Umeshachaguliwa kama mmoja wa viongozi katika chama hicho? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Cheo gani? .....
- kwa muda gani? .....
- f. Umpata kufanya kazi au kusaidia katika mipango ya Harambee au ya Kujisaidia? YES ... NO ...
- g. IF "YES") Ulikuwa mpango wa aina gani?.....
- h. Ulifanya kazi gani au ulisaidiaje ? .....
18. Mojawapo ya mambo ambayo twataka kujua ni jinsi unavyopata habari za mambo yanayotukia katika nchi hii.
- a. Wewe husikiliza redio wakati wowote? YES ... NO ... (IF "NO", CONTINUE WITH QUESTION 19)
- b. Wewe husikiliza redio wapi? .....
- c. Wewe husikiliza mafa ngapi? Karibu kila siku ..., kama mara moja au mbili kwa wiki ..., au mara chache kuliko moja kwa wiki ... ?
- d. Unapendelea vipindi vipi? .....



19. Na magazeti je? (IF LITERATE, ACCORDING TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE):
- a. Wewe husoma magazeti wakati wo wote? YES ... NO ...  
(IF "NO" OR ILLITERATE):
  - b. Watu hukusomea magazeti au hukuambia waliyoyasoma wakati wo wote? YES ... NO ...  
(IF "NO", CONTINUE WITH QUESTION 19f., IF "YES", MODIFY THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS):
  - c. Wewe husoma magazeti mara ngapi? Kama kila siku ..., mara moja au mbili kwa wiki ... , au mara chache kuliko mara moja kwa wiki ... ?
  - d. Wapendelea mambo au habari zipi katika gazeti? .....
  - e. Wewe hufuata mambo ya siasa au mambo ya utawala wa serikali? Wewe wafuata mambo hayo kila mara ... , au mara kwa mara ... , au hufuati kamwe ... ?
  - f. (IF NONE OF THE ABOVE MEDIA IS REPORTED): Ni nani anayekujulisha mambo yanayotukia nje ya mtaa huu? .....
- 20a. Je, una saa ya mkono au ya mezani kwako? YES ... NO ...  
(IF "YES"):
- b. Wewe huirekebisha kila mara? YES ... NO ...
  - c. Wadhani ni kitu muhimu siku zote kujua saa iliyo au zilizo sahihi ... , au hujali sana ... ?
21. Tunajaribu kujua ni habari zipi watu wanazopendezwa nazo au wanozoweza kukumbuka. Usipojua majibu ya maswali yafuatayo, haidhuru, lakini hebu tujaribu kuyauliza, usijali.
- a. Ni nani Rais wa Kenya? .....
  - b. Chama chake cha siasa kinaitwaje? .....
  - c. Wajua ni mwaka gani Kenya ilipojipatia Uhuru? .....
  - d. Ni nani Mbunge wa sehemu hii? .....
  - e. Tungependa pia kujua wanasiasa wanaojulikana sana katika nchi hii. Waweza kututajia wachache wao? (UP TO 5) .....
  - f. Rais wa nchi ya Amerika anaitwaje? .....
  - g. Waweza kutaja jina la kiongozi mmoja wapo mashuhuri katika nchi ya Urusi? .....

- h. Waweza kutaja kitu muhimu kuhusu siasa za ulimwengu kilichotukia mwaka uliopita? .....
- 22a. Je, umepata kumwondea mtu yo yote hivi majuzi kwa msaada kumwomba shauri? YES ... NO ... (IF YES") Kwa jumla ulikuwa msaada juu ya shauri gani? .....
- .....
- b. Huyu alikuwa mtu wa namna gani? (RELATIONSHIP, OCCUPATION, AGE) .....
- c. Je, mtu ye yote amepata kukutembelea akiuliza msaada kuhusu mashauri fulani? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Yalikuwa mashauri ya aina gani? .....
- .....
- d. Alikuwa mtu wa aina gani? (RELATION, OCCUPATION, AGE) .....
- .....
- 23a. Watu wengine husema ya kwamba waweza kuwaamini watu wengi. Wengine husema ya kwamba huwezi kuwa mwangalifu sana unaposuhubiana na watu wale wengine. Wewe waonaje? Waweza kuwaamini watu wengi ..., waweza kuwaamini watu wachache ..., humwamini mtu ye yote ...? (IF MIDDLE CATEGORY CHOSEN, PROBE):
- b. Wewe huwaamini wale wa jamaa yako tu ..., au rafiki zako mwenyewe ..., au watu wa rika yako ..., au watu wa ukoo wako ..., au watu wa kabila lako tu ..., au watu wote wa Kenya?
- 24a. Wadhani watu wengi hupenda kuwasaidia wengine ..., au wao hupenda kujisaidia wenyewe ... ?
- b. Unadhani watu wengi wanajaribu kukudanganya wakipata nafasi nzuri ..., au wanajaribu kuwa watu wenye haki? .....
25. Wewe wafikiri watu walioendelea vizuri wamefanya hivyo kwa sababu ya kusaidiwa na marafiki au jamaa zao ..., au wameendelea kutokana na ujuzi na maarifa yao wenyewe ...?
26. Sasa tungependa kuuliza maswali kadha wa kadha juu ya jamaa yako.



- a. Umeoa / Umeolewa? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES", FIND OUT NUMBER OF WIVES, WHERE APPLICABLE) .....
  - b. Una watoto? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Wana umri gani? (WRITE DOWN DIFFERENT AGES) .....
  - c. Ni wangapi walio wasichana? .....
  - d. Wewe u wa ukoo gani? .....
  - e. Wewe u wa rika lo lote? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Rika lako linaitwaje? .....
- 27a. (IF APPLICABLE) Watoto wako wengine huenda shuleni? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES", FIND OUT HOW MANY, WHICH SCHOOLS, AND STANDARD OR FORM) .....
- b. Wewe hulipa ada ya shule? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Kiasi gani kwa jumla kwa mwaka mmoja? .....shs/ year
  - c. Una mtoto ye yote anayefanya kazi ya kuajiriwa? YES ... NO... (IF "YES") Yeye hufanya kazi gani? .....
  - d. Una mipango gani juu ya watoto wako katika siku za usoni? (IF NECESSARY, PROBE ABOUT KIND OF JOB THEY WOULD LIKE THEM TO GET ETC.) .....
28. Pia tunapendezwa kujua jinsi mashauri yanavyokatwa katika jamaa yako.
- a. Ulipokuwa mtoto, ni nani aliyekata mashauri kuhusu mambo ya uchumi (kwa mfano, upandaji wa mimea, ugawaji wa kazi etc.)? Baba yako ..., mama yako ..., wote wawili ..., au mtu mwingine (kwa mfano nyanya, mjomba etc.) (SPECIFY) .....
  - b. Kwa kawaida ni nani aliyemwadhibu mtoto mtukutu? .....
  - c. Mtoto aliadhibiwa kwa njia gani? .....
  - d. (FOR MARRIED PERSONS ONLY) Na jamaa yako sasa jo? Ni nani anayetoa amri na kukata mashauri kuhusu mambo ya uchumi? .....
  - e. (IF APPLICABLE) Ni nani ambayo huwaadhibu watoto? .....
  - f. Kwa njia gani? .....

29. Hapa pana maoni mbali mbali ambayo watu wameyatoa juu wa wajibu wao katika jamaa yao, watu wengine waweza kuwa na maoni tofauti. Je, unaonaje juu ya mambo yafuatayo: (1) Huyakubaliani nayo kabisa, (2) huyakubaliani nayo kwa kiasi, (3) unakubaliana nayo kwa kiasi au (4) unakubaliana nayo kabisa?

a. Wanaopokea mshahara ni lazima watumie pesa hizo pamoja na watu wa jamaa yao.

(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

b. Ukarimu huhitaji sikuzote kuwapa chakula na mahali pa kulala watu hata wa ukoo wa mbali wasio wa jamaa yako?

(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

c. Mimi huwasaidia watu wa jamaa yangu na mimi mwenyewe, wale wengine wajitegemee.

(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

30. (IF NOT YET CLEAR): Wewe u wa kabila gani? .....

31a. Wewe u wa dini gani? Protestanti (PROBE EXACT DENOMINATION)

.....

Katoliki ..., Mwislamu ... au dini nyingine (SPECIFY IF POSSIBLE) .....

b. Wewe huenda kumwabudu Mungu mara ngapi? Kila siku ..., mara moja kwa juma ..., mara moja kwa mwezi ..., mara chache sana ..., au huendi kamwe ...?

c. Unadhani imani yako ya dini ni muhimu sana ..., ni muhimu kidogo ..., si muhimu sana ..., katika kuongoza matendo yako kila siku?

d. Wadhani kuna maisha fulani baada ya kifo? Naamini ..., sina hakika ..., siamini ...

32. Tungependa kujua juu ya jinsi unavyowafikiria wenzako wa makabila mengine mataifa mengine, au dini zingine au nchi zingine. Nitakutajia wengine wao hapa chini. Tafadhali niambie ni uhusiano wa aina gani ungependa kuwa nao baina yako na mtu wa kawaida wa kundi litakalotajwa hapa chini - sio mtu mwema zaidi unayemjua wala, sio mtu mabaya zaidi



ambaye umepata kumjua. Jibu jinsi unavyofikiria ukiulizwa mara ya kwanza. (OMIT OWN TRIBAL OR RELIGIOUS GROUP. SKIP A GROUP IF IT IS NOT KNOWN TO RESPONDENT, IN THIS CASE MARK "U". MARK "X" FOR EACH POSITIVE ANSWER, "O" FOR EACH NEGATIVE ONE. PUT THE LAST QUESTION FOR THE LAST FOUR GROUPS ONLY):

	kama jirani	(RURAL PEOPLE): kununua shamba hapa (URBANITES): kufanya kazi nawe	Kama rafiki yako binafsi	kusuhu-biana naye kwa ndoa	Kuwa raia wa nchi hii
Mluyia					
Mkamba					
Mkisii					
Mluo					
Muembu au Mumeru					
Mkalenjin					
Mkikuyu					
Mtu wa kutoka pwani					
Mmaasai					
Mturukana					
Msomali					
Mwislamu					
Mkatoliki					
Mprotestanti					
Mtu wa dini nyingine					
Mzungu					
Mhindi					
Mganda					
Mtanzania					

1. Na katika uchaguzi wa wanabunge? YES ... NO ... (If "YES")  
 j. Mara nyingi ...., mara chache ... ?

33. Sasa tungependa kujua unavyofikiria mambo ya siasa.
- a. Kusema kwa jumla wewe unapendezwa sana na siasa ..., unapendezwa kiasi ... , au hupendezwi sana ... ?
  - b. Wewe huongea na watu wengine juu ya matatizo ambayo yanaikabili Kenya kama nchi wakati huu? YES ... NO ...
  - c. (IF "YES" ) Watu unavongea nao ni nani kwa mfano? .....
  - d. Ni matatizo gani unayoongea juu yake? .....
  - e. Unafikiri unaelewa na matatizo haya vizuri kabisa ....., au kiasi ... , au huelewi vizuri ... , au huelewi kabisa ...?
  - f. Na sasa kwa mashauri kuhusu mtaa huu au sehemu hii ya nchi: ninyi huongea juu yake wakati mwingine? YES ... NO ...
  - g. (IF "YES"): Huongea na nani? .....
  - h. Mashauri haya ni yapi? .....
  - i. Unafikiri unayafahamu mashauri hayo vizuri kabisa ... , vizuri kiasi ... , huyafahamu vizuri ... , huyafahamu kamwe ... ?
- 34a. Je, umepata kuhudhuria mikutano ya watu wote katika sehemu hii? YES ... NO ...
- b. (IF "YES") Ni nani aliyeiongoza ? .....
  - c. Ilikuwa juu ya nini? .....
  - d. Wewe umehudhuria mikutano ya aina hiyo mara ngapi? Mara nyingi ... , mara chache ... , mara moja tu ...?
  - e. Ulijiandikisha kuwa mpiga kura katika uchaguzi wa wabunge uliopita? YES ... NO ...
  - f. (IF "YES") Je, ulipiga kura wakati huo ... , au hukupata nafasi ya kufanya hivyo ... ?
  - g. Je, umepata kuongea na watu juu ya kumpigia au kutompigia mtu ye yote kura katika uchaguzi mdogo? YES ... NO...
  - h. (IF "YES"): Mara nyingi ... , mara chache ... ?
  - i. Na katika uchaguzi wa wanabunge? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES"):
  - j. Mara nyingi ... , mara chache ... ?



35. Hapa pana mambo ambayo watu huongea juu yake. Je, maoni yako ni nini juu ya mambo haya?
- a. Wewe wadhani watu wangekubaliwa kununua mashamba makubwa kadiri wanavyotaka ... , au kununua mashamba kwa kadiri wanavyoweza kuyaliwa wao wenyewe... ?
  - b. Mali ya mashamba ingefaa kuwa ya watu wote kwa jumla ... , kama ya kabila, au kijiji kizima, au serikali, au kindi kubwa la watu; au iwe kama ya mtu mmoja binafsi au jamaa moja ... ?
  - c. Watu wengi hufikiri kwamba makampuni ya biashara hupata pesa nyingi sana na huku yakiwalipa wafanyakazi wao mishahara isiyo ya kutosha ... Watu wengine hufikiri kwamba makampuni hayo huwalipa wafanyakazi wao mishahara kiasi huku makampuni yakipata faida ya kutosha ... Waonaje?
  - d. Je, wewe wafikiri kwamba makampuni na kazi za biashara katika nchi ya Kenya zingefaa kuwa mali ya Kenya ..., au wafikiri inafaidi kuwakubali wageni wanaotoka nje ya Kenya kurunua hisa katika kazi hizo au makampuni hayo ili kuleta rasilmali na ujuzi zaidi kutoka nchi za nje ... ?
  - e. Watu wengine husema ni vizuri kuwa na chama kimoja cha siasa katika nchi hii. Wengine husema ni heri kuwa na vyama viwili au vingi zaidi. Ni nini maoni yako? Kuwa na vyama vingi ... , au kimoja tu ... . Kwa nini? .....
  - f. Wewe wadhani ingefaa Kenya juwa nchi ya Ujamaa, kama ilivyo katika Tanzania kwa mfano ..., au ingefaa serikali iendelee na mipango yake ya sasa ...?
  - g. Mara kwa mara unasikia watu wakiongea juu ya watu wengine au vikundi vya watu ambavyo vina mvuto mwingi kuhusu uongozi serikalini hii yetu. Unakubali.... , au hukubali..., ati kuna watu au vikundi kama hivyo. (IF AGREEMENT) Watu hawa au vikundi hivi ni vipi? .....

36. Kama watu kadha wa kadha wangeitaka serikali kuwasaidia katika mipango fulani ya maendeleo katika sehemu hii, hapa pana mambo kadha wa kadha ambayo wangeyafanya (READ SLOWLY TO RESPONDENT, REPEAT, IF NECESSARY):
- (1) Kumwandikia ofisa wa serikali anayehusika au kumwendea;
  - (2) Kumwandikia mbunge wa sehemu yako au kumwendea;
  - (3) Kusaidiwa na mtu wa jamaa yenu au mnayejuana kibinafsi;
  - (4) Kuwashawishi watu wengine ili kuunga kundi;
  - (5) Kuiendea KANU;
  - (6) Kuonyesha jambo hili kwa kufanya meandamano ya mvurugo;

Njia zilizotajwa hapo juu, unadhani ni njia gani ingefaa zaidi ... , ya pili yake ... , ni ipi isiyofaa kabisa ... ?

- 37a. Watu wengine husema kwamba wanawake hawafai kushiriki katika mambo ya siasa. Wengine husema kwamba ingefaa washiriki katika siasa na kazi zote sawa na wanaume. Waonaje wewe? Yafaa wanawake wawe sawa sawa na wanaume ... , wawe chini ya wanaume ... , wasishiriki kamwe katika mambo ya siasa ... ?
- b. Wewe waweza kufikiria mwanamke kama Rais wa nchi hii? Sifikirii kamwe ... , sifikirii vizuri ... , nafikiri ni vizuri ... , nafikiri ni vizuri kabisa ... .

- 38a. Newe kama mwananchi wa Kenya, ni mambo gani ya nchi hii unajivunia hasa? .....
- b. Ni mambo gani ambayo ungependa yarekebishwe katika nchi hii? .....
- (IF SOME ARE MENTIONED):

- c. Wewe wadhani ni jambo gani lingefanywa juu ya mambo hayo ili kuyarekebisha ? .....

39. Sasa ninayo maswali mengine machache:

- a. Ni matatizo gani makubwa zaidi yanayowakabili watu wanaoishi maisha kama haya yako? .....
- .....



- b. Kuna jambo lo lote ambalo ungeweza kufanya wewe binafsi ili kusuluhisha matatizo hayo? YES ... NO ...
- c. (IF "YES") Wewe wafikiri waweza kufanya nini? .....  
..... (IF "NO") Kwa nini huwezi kufanya jambo lo lote? .....
- d. Ni nani mwingine unayedhani angeweza kukusaidia? .....
- e. Ni matatizo gani makubwa zaidi unayofikiri yameikabili nchi hii sasa? .....
- f. Ungesema kwamba kunazo nafasi za kusuluhisha matatizo hayo? Kunazo nafasi nyingi ..., Kunazo chache ..., hakuna nafasi zo zote ... ?
- g. Watu kama wewe waweza kusuluhisha matatizo hayo? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES"): Waweza kufanyaje hasa? .....
- h. Kama ungefanywa Rais wa nchi hii, ni mambo gani ambayo ungefanya kwanza? (IF NO SPECIFIC ANSWER, DESCRIBE REACTION) .....
- i. Kama kwa sababu fulani hungeweza kuishi katika nchi hii, ungechagua kuhamia kuishi nchi gani? (IF NO SPECIFIC ANSWER, DESCRIBE REACTION) .....
- ..... (IF COUNTRY MENTIONED) Kwa nini ungependa kuishi katika nchi hiyo? .....
40. Sasa nitakuuliza maswali mengine ambayo kwayo sisi sote tunayo mawazo na maoni fulani. Sisi sote tunayo mawazo mbali mbali juu ya kila jambo, kwa hiyo hakuna jawabu lililo sahihi wala lililo makosa. Niambie tu unavyofikiria juu ya mambo yafuatayo. Tafadhali onyesha katika kila swali kama (1) hukubaliani nayo kabisa, (2) hukubaliani nayo kwa kiasi, (3) unakubaliana nayo kwa kiasi, (4) unakubaliana nayo kabisa.
1. Kama ilivyo kwamba kuna wanyama kama ng'ombe walio bora, watu wengine walizaliwa wakiwa wa kizazi kilicho bora kuliko wengine (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

2. Unapowachagua marafiki zako, njia mojawapo ni kufikiria kama wanaweza kukusaidia katika maisha yako ulimwenguni. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
3. Labda wakati mmoja itaonekana kwamba elimu ya zamani ya nyota itaweza kueleza vitu vingi. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
4. Katika maisha ya wanadamu, ni lazima sikuzote kuwe na vita na kutopatana. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
5. Ukianza kujaribu kuyabadilisha mambo sana, kwa kawaida huyafanya yawe mabaya zaidi. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
6. Kwa kawaida ninayo matumaini kwamba serikali itafanya na kutenda yaliyo haki. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
7. Nchi ikiwa katika hatari kubwa, twaweza kuwalazimisha watu, hata ikiwa haki zao zitavunjwa. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
8. Yailazimu serikali kuzipiga marufuku sinema na vitabu inazofikiria kuwa zinaweza kuwaharibu wananchi. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
9. Siku hizi shida moja iliyo kubwa ni kwamba watu husema zaidi kuliko wanavyotenda. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
10. Kupandishwa cheo chako ni jambo mojawapo ya yale mambo muhimu katika maisha yako. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
11. Viongozi hodari wachache waweza kuiongoza nchi hii vyema zaidi kuliko sheria zote na majadiliano. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
12. Watu wengine wana uwezo wa kuwadhuru wengine kwa kuwatakia na kufikiria tu jambo hilo litendeko. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
13. Mimi naamini uhuru wa kusema kwa wote hata ikiwa maoni yao yakoje. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
14. Siwezi kufikiria kuwa mtu wa kabila jingine ila..... (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...  
(INSERT RESPONDENT'S OWN TRIBAL GROUP)
15. Ni afadhali kukaa bila kitu kuliko kuuliza upendelewe. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
16. Shida kubwa ya demokrasi ni kwamba watu wengi hawajui kwa hakika lililo bora kwao. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...



17. Kitu kilicho muhimi si maisha yetu duniani bali ni kile kitakachotukia baadaye. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
18. Kwa jumla mimi mwenyewe najitosha. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
19. Ingefaa watu wote wapewe nafasi na uhuru wa kusema sawa, katika mambo ya siasa. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
20. Maskini hana uwezo unaompasa kuwa nao katika korti za sheria. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
21. Mara nyingi nina shida siku hizi kuamua amri zilizo halali kuzifuata kwa sababu kila kitu hubadilika upesi. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
22. Kuna mambo katika maisha ambayo mtu hawezi kuyafahamu kabisa. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
23. Ni kitu cha maana sana kuwaheshimu akina jadi. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
24. Ninalo lengo langu ninalojaribu kulifikia. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
25. Ni kitu cha kawaida na halisi kwa wanawake kuwa na uhuru unaopungua ule wa wanaume. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
26. Afadhali kushika uliyo nayo kuliko kujaribu mambo mapya usiyoyajua. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
27. Kila mtu ana haki na analindwa kama mwingine ye yote hata ikiwa ana mawazo gani juu ya mambo ya siasa. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
28. Kuna ukweli katika uwezo wa mganga wa kienyeji hata ikiwa watu hawajui uwezo huo ukoje. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
29. Ningependa mtu wa vitendo sikuzote wala si mtu wa mawazo. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
30. Inafahamika kwamba watu wanaojisikia kwamba heshima yao imevunjwa, wao huzichukua sheria mikononi mwao. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
31. Kwa jumla wanasisia wanawoza kuaminiwa kufanyia nchi lo lote wanalofikiri kuwa ni bora zaidi. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
32. Watu zamani walikuwa bora kuliko siku hizi kwa sababu kila mtu alijua alilotakiwa kufanya. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

33. Vijana wanahitaji zaidi ya mambo yote kuadibishwa na wazazi wao. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
34. Kusudi muhimu la siasa linapotakiwa kufanywa, udanganyifu au ukatili wo wote huwa wa haki. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
35. Mtoto asiombwe kufanya jambo lo lote kamwe asipoambiwa sababu ya kulifanya jambo lile. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
36. Makundi yote ya watu wa nchi hii yanaweza kuishi kwa umoja bila kugeuza taratibu iliyopo sasa. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
37. Wafanyakazi hupata haki yao kulingana na kazi yao (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
38. Ni kweli kwambo watu wa jamaa zilizoheshimiwa ndio yawapasa kuwa na muto mwingi kuliko wale wengine. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
39. Najisikia kwamba mimi ni mtu anayestahili kutendewa sawa sawa na wengine. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
40. Ni afadhali kuwa na wakati mwingi kwa kupumsika kuliko kufanya kazi nyingi kama watu wengine wafanyavyo. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
41. Hata watu wakisemaje hatuna uwezo katika mambo ya siasa bali uwezo kutoka kwa aliye juu. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
42. Katika maisha ya wanadamu, ni lazima sikuzote kuwe na vita na kutopatana. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
43. Mtu asipokuwa na umri mkubwa hawezi kuwa na hekima nyingi. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
44. Mimi hufanya kazi kama mtumwa katika kila jambo nifanyale mpaka ninapotosheka na matokeo yake. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
45. Hata ingawaje watu husema hali ya watu wa kawaida inaendelea kuwa mbaya wala haiendelei kuwa nzuri. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
46. Yailazimu serikali kuzipiga marufuku sinema na vitabu inazofikiria kuwa zinaweza kuwaharibu wananchi. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...



47. Azaliwapo mtu bahati yake huwa imeamuliwa.  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
48. Walo wasiofanyikiwa hawana moyo wa kufanya mambo.  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
49. Mtu asiyejua analosema yambidi asikubaliwe kusema.  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
50. Yampasa kila mtu ajilinde mwenyewe na kutumia silaha ikiwa ni lazima.  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
51. Najisikia ya kwamba mimi hupoteza wakati na kuutumia kwa njia zisizofaa.  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
52. Hukumu ya kife tu ndiyo inayoweza kukomesha uhalifu katika nchi hii.  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
53. Mimi naamini uhuru wa kusema kwa wote hata ikiwa maoni yao yakoje.  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
54. Matusi yanayovunja heshima yako yafaa yasisahauliwe.  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
55. Maisha ya furaha katika jamaa ni ya thamani kubwa kwangu kuliko kuwa tajiri.  
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

Sasa tumefikia mwisho. Asante sana. Kwa hakika umetusaidia sana.  
Kwa heri !

(FILL IN AFTER INTERVIEW): Place of interview:.....  
Length .....hrs. Language in which interview was conducted: .....





3. District Development Index:

Districts (excluding Nairobi and Mombasa)	Population:		Agriculture:			Employment:		Infra-structure:		Education:			Health-services:		over-all rank sums									
	total land area <sup>1</sup> in km <sup>2</sup>	number in '000 (1969)	density pers./km <sup>2</sup>	average annual rate of growth 1962-1969 <sup>2</sup> (%)	urbanisation 1969 in % (3)	potential high agric. land <sup>9</sup> in '000 ha	ha of high pot. land equivalents <sup>12</sup>	land registration in % of potential <sup>13</sup>	area under cash crops 1969/70 <sup>14</sup> (%) or cultivated area	persons in non-agric. occupations as % of population	km of road per 1000 km <sup>2</sup> 1969 <sup>17</sup>	% of pop. served with rural water supplies 1974 <sup>18</sup>	% of adult pop. with minimal literacy 1969 <sup>19</sup>	primary school enrolment as % of pop. 1969 <sup>20</sup>		sec. school enrolment as % of pop. 1969 <sup>21</sup>	pers./hospital bed 1968 <sup>22</sup>	pers./health unit 1968 <sup>23</sup>	contributions to self-help projects 1972 <sup>24</sup> Kt/pers.					
Central Prov																								
Kiambu	2,448	476	194	1.2 <sup>3</sup>	4.45	181 <sup>10</sup>	-	0.4	100	56	41	5.65	0.40	267.3	15.0	54	90.6	20.0	583	8,815	0.71	41	1	
Murang'a	2,476	445	180	1.2 <sup>3</sup>	1.07	210 <sup>10</sup>	-	0.5	100	40	18	2.78	0.13	204.1	13.7	47	91.9	10.0	697	5,779	0.40	67	6	
Nyeri	3,284	361	110	c	3.45	160	4	0.4	100	57	37	3.25	0.31	130.5	31.3	53	101.8	15.3	673	7,078	0.50	47	2	
Kirinyaga	1,437	217	181	5.0 <sup>4</sup>	-	98	10	0.5	97.6	42	23	2.24	0.11	151.2	17.26	33	65.5	10.3	927	5,293	0.58	65	5	
Nyandarua	3,528	177	50	c	4.29	265	-	1.5	n.a.	108 <sup>15</sup>	86	3.40	0.21	127.6	14.4	50	77.2	4.0	1,957	9,464	0.89	73	9	
Rift Valley																								
Baringo	10,627	162	15	1.0	1.66	166	84	1.2	10.6	n.a.	n.a.	1.18	-	61.2	10.7	10	33.9	2.9	1,670	3,176	0.21	141	27	
Elgeyo-Marakwet	2,722	159	59	-0.1	-	104	-	0.7	55.1	60	23	0.87	-	99.8	6.5	27	33.4	4.7	1,060	5,679	0.43	130	22	
Kajiado	20,963	86	4	3.3	-	22	-	-	33.4	p.p.	p.p.	3.61	0.15	29.0	14.0	20	37.6	4.8	570	6,143	0.13	112	15	
Kenicho	4,890	479	98	4.9	3.28	380	-	0.8	30.1	41	16	1.80	0.16	139.3	8.8	33	51.7	4.8	1,216	4,025	0.48	86	11	
Laikipia	9,718	66	7	1.2	17.62	130	-	2.1	1.f.	1.f.	1.f.	7.48	0.86	55.3	37.1	36	54.9	9.6	943	5,077	0.22	75	10	
Nakuru	7,024	291	41	3.5	24.36	291	39	1.0	1.f.	1.f.	1.f.	8.77	1.04	127.1	2.4	44	55.7	12.2	690	7,175	0.20	49	3	
Kadai	2,745	209	76	3.2	1.10	234	-	1.1	89.8	69	8	1.56	0.02	133.7	11.0	29	48.6	4.5	1,274	7,741	0.27	115	16	
Marok	18,513	125	7	1.8	2.09	908	-	7.3	10.1	p.p.	p.p.	1.34	-	46.3	12.6	20	22.4	1.9	1,068	3,049	0.10	147	28	
Samburu	20,809	70	3	2.9	12.73	140	-	2.2	16.2	p.p.	p.p.	2.72	-	20.2	31.9	24	15.0	0.5	1,129	6,364	0.04	132	24	
Trans-Nzoia	2,468	124	50	5.2	9.33	208	-	1.7	1.f.	1.f.	1.f.	4.10	0.77	134.6	7.3	38	47.3	6.2	832	11,273	0.13	72	8	
Turkana	60,823	165	3	0.5	2.46	12	-	-	-	p.p.	p.p.	0.65	-	13.2	9.6	12	3.1	0.2	1,460	18,333	0.01	194	32	
Uasin-Gishu	3,784	191	50	11.0	9.53	327	-	1.7	1.f.	1.f.	6.61	0.67	135.8	4.7	37	38.9	6.0	1,144	6,486	0.21	67	6		
West-Pokot	5,076	82	16	4.8	-	103	-	1.3	18.9	n.a.	n.a.	1.59	-	71.8	20.1	37	16.7	2.2	539	8,200	0.06	131	23	
Nyanza																								
Kisii	2,196	675	307	4.8	0.90	220	-	0.3	95.8	68	31	1.10	0.12	212.1	6.1	36	51.5	6.0	2,987	12,500	0.25	121	18	
Kisumu	2,093	401	193	4.0	8.09	432	29	0.6	45.4	54	21	5.91	0.65	173.4	7.6	34	49.4	7.2	683	10,740	0.25	86	11	
Siaya	2,523	383	151	2.4	-	432	29	0.6	69.6	26	9	0.52	0.05	18.0	18.0	28	57.4	5.6	1,479	-	0.16	121	18	
South-Nyanza	5,714	663	116	4.6	0.80	566	5	0.9	38.7	26	20	1.05	0.19	149.5	11.0	30	32.8	5.8	1,402	12,055	0.11	134	25	
Western Prov																								
Bungoma	3,074	345	112	6.4	1.28	253	-	0.7	92.0	64	13	1.34	0.14	138.0	15.9	49	77.5	7.5	964	11,500	0.26	88	12	
E-sia	1,629	200	123	2.4	-	163	-	0.8	96.2	27	20	1.64	0.48	186.9	19.3	30	48.3	7.0	671	11,111	0.14	97	14	
Kakamega	3,520	783	222	3.8	0.80	325	-	0.4	98.1	61	13	1.17	0.15	176.1	7.2	44	56.9	7.4	1,223	14,236	0.09	127	20	
Coast Prov.																								
Kilifi	12,114	308	25	3.1	4.36	104	247	0.3	9.6	66	24	1.77	0.22	56.7	10.4	17	29.4	2.7	1,289	7,700	0.05	140	26	
Kwale	8,257	206	25	3.9	1.19	126	162	0.8	26.2	53	18	1.13	0.03	60.7	14.3	12	25.7	2.4	746	7,630	0.11	141	27	
Lamu	6,506	22	3	-0.3	33.65	7	319	3.3	-	n.a.	n.a.	3.77	0.15	22.2	40.9	5	19.4	-	579	1,333	0.49	96	13	
Taita-Gaveta	16,959	111	7	2.8	8.73	12	10	0.5	9.2	66	33	5.33	0.2	22.5	27.0	38	84.3	6.8	597	3,469	0.83	62	4	
Tana River	38,694	51	1	3.6	7.08	73	58	2.4	-	n.a.	n.a.	2.15	-	14.1	18.6	9	33.1	1.2	357	2,217	0.15	123	21	
Eastern Prov																								
Rubu	2,714	179	66	5.0 <sup>4</sup>	2.19	66	186	0.6	78.5	35	7	2.88	0.28	123.3	36.3	37	76.7	9.5	463	4,590	0.28	70	7	
Meru	9,922	597	60	3.9	0.75	241	95	0.4	45.2	55	35	1.52	0.15	69.0	8.8	32	60.8	5.4	734	7,024	0.16	116	17	
Kitui	29,389	343	12	2.9	0.90	67	1137	0.9	1.9	63	16	1.04	0.1	40.8	5.8	20	49.2	4.1	769	8,795	0.25	152	29	
Machakos	14,178	707	50	4.0	1.65	125	771	0.4	61.0	57	24	1.69	1.1	65.6	4.7	36	84.3	7.1	1,247	12,855	0.25	124	19	
Isiolo	25,605	30	1	-5	27.34	-	-	-	-	p.p.	p.p.	6.60	0.07	13.6	37.3	16	35.2	1.3	2,143	7,500	0.31	112	15	
Marsabit	72,732	52	1	-5	12.76	4	-	-	-	p.p.	p.p.	2.86	-	13.7	28.8	9	16.4	2.2	251	5,200	0.01	132	24	
North-East- Prov.																								
Garissa	43,931	64 <sup>d</sup>	1	-6	-	-	-	-	-	p.p.	p.p.	1.79	-	11.8	10.3	4	9.7	-	2,667	9,142	0.27	164	30	
Mandera	26,470	95	4	-6	-	-	-	-	-	p.p.	p.p.	0.90	-	10.6	4.2	2	4.6	-	1,173	3,750	0.12	200	33	
Wajir	56,501	86	2	-6	-	-	-	-	-	p.p.	p.p.	1.12	-	17.9	5.2	4	6.0	1.4	1,433	10,750	0.14	182	31	
National totals and averages:	509,249	10,943	19	3.0	9.87	3,157	6,785	0.72	39.6	50.83 <sup>e</sup>	22.65	4.39	0.36	73.2	10.6	36	55.8	8.8	791	7,918	0.25			

(including all kinds of hospitals)

abbreviations: n.a. = not available  
 - = magnitude negligible  
 p.p. = predominantly pastoralist area  
 e.f. = large scale farming sector



Sources and Remarks:

- 1) Statistical Abstract, 1973, p. 2.
- 2) Population Census , 1969 , cf. Statistical Abstract , 1973 , p. 14
- 3) Since the former Thika district was divided between Murang'a and Kambu districts in 1966, the rate of growth given was calculated as the average of both districts.
- 4) Since the former Embu district was divided into Embu and Kirinyaga districts, these figures are calculated as the average for both districts.
- 5) Due to changes in district boundaries, there are no comparable figures available.
- 6) The 1969 census for the population of North-Eastern Province shows some anomalies, e.g. a probable female under-enumeration, uncertainties caused by the frequent migrations across the Somali border etc. which make these figures less reliable than others, cf. Regional Physical Development Plan, North-Eastern Province, Nov. 71, p. 4 ff. Since the basis of enumeration for the former Northern Province (including also, among others, Isiolo and Marsabit districts), was different in the 1962 census, no useful comparisons are possible.
- 7) The rates of growth are based from the censuses taken in 1962 and 1969. Not always, however, are useful comparisons possible, due to changes in district boundaries and in the basis of enumeration, see separate remarks. The figures for Rift Valley, Nyanza and Coast Provinces were taken from the respective Regional Physical Development Plans. The others were, as far as possible, computed by us.



- 8) Kenya Population Census, 1969, Vol. II, Data on Urban Population, April 1971, Table 1, p. 1.  
These figures represent the percentage of the population living in towns of more than 2.000 inhabitants.
- 9) Statistical Abstract, 1973, p. 99, Definitions: high potential = annual rainfall of 857,5 mm or more (over 980 mm in Coast Prov.), medium potential = annual rainfall of 735 mm - 857,5 mm ( 735 mm - 980 mm in Coast Prov. and 612,5 mm - 857,5 mm in Eastern Prov. ).
- 10) These figures include the approximate respective area of the former Thika district which was divided in 1966 in almost equal parts between Murang'a and Kiambu.
- 11) The former Kisumu ("Central Nyanza") district was divided into Kisumu and Siaya districts in 1967. Separate figures are in some cases not available.
- 12) These figures have been calculated on the assumption that 5 hectares of medium-potential and 100 hectares of low potential land are equivalent to 1 hectare of high-potential land. cf. ILO - Report, loc. cit. p. 35.
- 13) Economic Survey, 1974, p. 78, Includes total land registered, adjudicated or under adjudication as % of total registrable land as at December 31<sup>st</sup> 1973, except for the former scheduled areas (large farms).
- 14) cf. ILO-Report, p. 338 and Statistical Abstract, 1973 , Table 90, p. 106-108, and Table 95a, p. 112f. These figures include only small farms and settlement schemes. Where there are no data available (e.g. for Baringo, Lamu and Tana River), the actual production of cash crops can be considered to be very small. In the pastoralist areas the production of cash crops is close to nothing, except for some experimental schemes (like in Turkana), or some agricultural development on the fringes of the area ( like in Narok ).

Definition A includes as cash crops: improved maize, wheat, all pulses other than beans; all temporary industrial crops (including cotten, sugar-cane, pyrethrum, ground-nuts and oil-seeds), English potatoes, cabbages, certain other vegetables and other temporary crops and all permanent crops (including coffee, tea, coconuts, cashew nuts, paw-paws, bananas and other fruit).

Definition B includes as cash crops: wheat, all temporary industrial crops, English potatoes, cabbages, certain other vegetables, coffee tea and cashew nuts, but not

Where there is a considerable difference in the cash crop acreage, depending on the respective definition e. g. in Machakos, Bungoma, Kakamega or Nandi districts), this is larlely accounted for by the planting of improved maize in these areas. Since, however, this is also a food crop, only a very amount of it may actually be sold, particularly in districts with a very high population density ( like Kakamega or Kisni ). This difference may therefore indicate a pattern of "involutianory growth" in these areas.

- 15) A Cash crop area can exceed the indicated cultivated area because of double cropping because crops grown in mixtures are double-counted.
- 16) Employment and Earnings in the Modern Sector, 1971, p. 29/30
- 17) ILO-Report, p. 78/79
- 18) Ministry of Agriculture, Water Department, Rural Water Supplies Programme I and II, Progress Reports, Feb. and June 1974, Tables 3.1, 3.2, 4.2 and 4.2.2, and Ministry of Health, Proposed Environmental Sanitation Programme, Phase I - IX, 1960/61 - 1971/72. These figures include only those rural water supplies which have been planned



21) *Ibid.*, Table 18, p. 60f.

and executed by the Water Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, and by the Ministry of Health under the WHO/Unicef environmental sanitation programme, phases I - IX (1960 - 1972), as the two most important programmes. It was not possible to obtain reliable more comprehensive data including water projects initiated by other authorities like County Councils, the Ministry of Lands and Settlement, or local self-help groups. In some cases only rough estimates were available. The figures for the large-farm areas understate the actual number of people served in these districts, since these farms usually had their own water supplies.

19) Kenya Population Census, 1969, vol. III, Table 1 Minimal adult literacy is defined to include all persons aged 15 and above who reported having attended school at some time, even if only for one year. This definition is, of course, arbitrary, as are many others. Thus it may include people who never quite achieved literacy or who may have lost in the meantime. On the other, there may be some more people who can be termed "literate" even though they have never attended an ordinary school, but who may have taken adult literacy classes or are self-taught in one way or another.

20) Calculated from Ministry of Education, Annual Report 1969, Table 5, p. 38f. The potential primary school population is assumed to be 21% of the total population. Again these assumption is arbitrary, but it is the one which is used in some of the Regional Physical Development Plans and corresponds approximately to the national average for the corresponding age-groups. In the case of Nyeri there seem to be more students in this age-group than the national average. Since we use these figures only for purposes of inter-district comparisons this apparent paradoxy need not worry us.

- 21) Ibid. Table 18, p. 6of.

The potential secondary school population is assumed to be 12% of the total population.

- 22) Ministry of Health, Annual Report, 1968, (published 1974), Appendix VI p. 125 ff. These figures include only government and mission hospitals.

- 23) Ibid., App. IX, p. 130 ff. These figures include health centers, sub-health centers and dispensaries supported by either government, mission or self-help efforts.

- 24) Ministry of Co-operatives and Social Services, Department of Social Services, A Statistical Analysis of Self-Help Projects 1972, Table K, p. 57 ff. These figures include contributions of labour and material as well as cash donations.

- 25) This over-all ranking of districts was established by first computing rank orders for each of the variables of the table which have some kind of relationship with economic development and the improvement of the quality of life in general, i. e. columns 9 (cash crops - in this case the more rigorous Definition B which comprises only actually marketed crops was preferred as an indicator), 10 (non-agricultural employment), 11 (roads), 12 (water supplies), 13, 14 and 15 (education), 16 and 17 (health), and 18 (self-help efforts). Where there were several columns for one indicator (e.g. for education and health), a compound index was computed by adding up the rank orders for each district and then establishing an over-all rank order for this indicator. Then the rank orders for all indicators were added up and a single over-all index was established. In this way only ordinal numbers were computed and the obvious fallacy of adding up "apples and pears" was avoided. This method, in effect, assigns an equal weight to all indicators, which is, of course, arbitrary.



But so would be any other way of weighting. In this way at least a rough rank order of development for the various districts can be obtained. It would have been desirable to include some more indicators of development as, despite all its limitations, "per capite income per district", but no reliable data were available in this respect. Other indicators, like "consumption of electricity" or similar ones which may be useful for more industrialised countries do not make sense for a country like Kenya, where there is hardly any rural electrification at all. The first column in this section shows the added rank totals for each district. In this way at least some of the relative distances between districts can be shown. It would be misleading, however, to infer from the rank total of 35 e.g. for Kiambu that this district is almost 6 times more "developed" than Mandera (rank total : 200). Such conclusions can only be drawn from the actual material differences in each column (e.g. primary school enrolment in Kiambu is almost 20 times higher than in Mandera). The second column then gives the over-all district rankings.

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
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• Map: 1


### Distribution of Population in Kenya by Provinces and Tribal Areas, 1962



Source: Kenya Government 1965



# Distribution of Population in Kenya by Provinces and Tribal Areas, 1962



Source: Kenya Government 1962

