

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BASES OF
POLITICS IN KENYA: A STRUCTURAL
PART 2

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Part II

CHAPTER VII

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

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From the analysis of some of the more important political elements in France's political system, we shall discuss the more direct and indirect effects of the political system on the economy. This will be followed by an analysis of their respective contributions to the development of the political system today. This will be followed by an analysis of their respective contributions to the economy as a further function. Finally, we shall discuss their level of political interest and actual political participation will then be discussed. This will also be related to their actual level of political participation. From this we shall derive a typology, relevant to the French situation, of different types of participants. From the "input" of the political system, the governmental "output" will be derived from different groups and the attitudes relating to the most important "input aggregative" structures will then be analyzed. In the absence of interparty competition, the role of members of Parliament deserves our special attention here. Subsequently, the focus will be placed on the central governmental institutions including aspects of the

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CHAPTER XVI

SPECIFIC ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

From the analysis of some of the more general basic elements in Kenya's political culture we can now move into the more directly political sphere. First, we shall point out some of the common historical experiences, as seen through the eyes of the respondents to our survey, which contributed to the shaping of their political attitudes today. This will be followed by an analysis of their exposure to the modern mass media as a further formative factor. Against this background their level of political interest and actual political information will then be discussed. This will also be related to their actual level of political participation from this we shall devise a typology, relevant to the Kenyan situation, of different kinds of participants. Among the "inputs" of the political system the non-material "support" it receives from different groups and the attitudes relating to the most important "input aggregating" structures will then be analyzed. In the absence of inter-party competition, the role of members of Parliament deserves our special attention here. Subsequently, the focus will be placed on the central governmental institutions including aspects of the

bureaucracy and other "output" structures. In two final sections we shall then attempt to evaluate the performance of the system as a whole and also discuss some possible alternative orientations which, given the relative fragility of any political system in Africa today, may provide us with some clues concerning the expectations of respondents in this regard and Kenya's political future as a whole.

Common historical experiences

Certain historical events may have a lasting influence on the political attitudes and behavior of large numbers of people. Even generations later such events may still be reflected in the "collective memory" of a society which thus constitutes one of the most important aspects of its political culture. In particular, economic crises, revolutions, wars, or political assassinations may leave their "scars" in the life history of a society. Some authors contend, for example, that there still is a revolutionary consciousness in France dating back to the events which followed the seizure of the Bastille in 1789,¹ and certainly crises like the depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s, or the experience of the two World Wars in this century have left their marks in the minds of men and thus in the political culture of the societies concerned. Recent experiences in the United States with the war in Vietnam or the effects of "Watergate" are also

cases in point.

The impact of such events, as far as they are not personally experienced, is transmitted both in its cognitive and its evaluative and possibly also affective aspects by stories told by parents or other influential figures, or is contained in the history or civic lessons which are part of a person's formal education. Recent and current events are, of course, are, transmitted by the news media and other personal and impersonal communications structures; they contribute to a socializing factor which sometimes vaguely has been termed "Zeitgeist" (the "spirit of the times").² However subtle or imperceptible influences of this kind may be, their importance for the total picture of a society's political culture can hardly be denied.

In Kenya the most important collective formative experiences have been the events of the colonial period, the "emergency", the attainment of independence, and some of the post-independence crises, such as the assassinations of influential politicians. The impact of these events has been documented by historians³ and in noteworthy literary accounts.⁴ In addition to certain hermeneutical and other idiographic procedures the impact of such experiences is also amenable to the quantitative methods of survey analysis. For this purpose we had included two sets of open-ended questions in our interviews, one asking for important events in general which affected the lives of respondents,⁵ the other probing more specifically for political events.⁶ The answers to the first, more general

question already revealed some significant distinctions:

TABLE IV, 25
IMPORTANT PERSONAL EXPERIENCES;
BY ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage of events named	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Events concerning respondent's:								
family	25	17	20	29	19	14	17	21
health	2	6	8	6	3	14	-	5
education	12	3	-	6	6	-	2	6
economic position	13	4	20	10	14	13	25	13
Political events	10	4	-	2	4	-	4	4
Other	7	14	17	11	6	3	24	11
No particular event	31	52	35	36	48	56	28	40
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

The majority of respondents thus, not surprisingly, mentioned events of a largely personal nature. Some of these, however, point to more general calamities as they are expressed in some of the verbatim answers:⁷ A 35-year old Kamba peasant: "Whenever there is drought, life is not okay"; or an older Maasai pastoralist: "Great hunger, cattle died." Other responses reflect significant features of the traditional life of these peoples. A 32-year old Keyo peasant's wife reported, for example: "The Suk had raided

us and took the cattle." A 22-year old Maasai woman stated: "When I had my first-born I was respected more." A Maasai moran boasted: "My cattle raids have always been successful, I have become famous among my colleagues" and "another time I speared a lion dead." Not all events of this kind had a similarly happy ending, however. Another Maasai moran: "I was sent to jail for stealing cattle." And an approximately 60-year old Maasai woman complained bitterly: "I'm old now but no help comes. I have no way of supporting myself. My only two sons died in warrior fights."

Table IV, 25 also indicates one directly political phenomenon, namely the exceptionally high percentage of Kikuyu respondents (one-seventh of those who mentioned any particular event at all), who spontaneously mentioned some political event as having been most important in their lives. This relatively high salience of politics for the Kikuyu as well as specific events they were involved in became even more apparent in the responses to the more directly political set of questions:

/ Insert table IV, 26 /

TABLE IV, 26
 IMPORTANT POLITICAL EVENTS AFFECTING RESPONDENTS;
 BY ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage of events mentioned	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Colonial rule in general	4	1	-	4	-	7	-	-
State of Emergency ("Mau Mau")	31	12	-	11	3	26	5	14
Attainment of independence ("Uhuru")	13	5	-	4	1	-	3	5
Post-independence crises	1	-	-	-	5	-	-	1
Other events	3	2	5	3	2	4	-	3
Total percentage mentioning political events	52	20	5	22	11	37	8	25
Weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

Again the Kikuyu have the greatest percentage of those who state that their lives were affected by some particular political event. The Kalenjin, Luyia, and Kamba occupy an intermediate position, followed by the Luo, while the Maasai and Mijikenda rank last. The degree to which respondents were affected by historical events of the period is also a function of their age, sex and place of residence. Members of the older age groups, for example, mentioned political events much more often than younger people (37 % among those aged 50 and above, i.e. who were at about the age of 30 at the time of the emergency, compared to 18 % for

those who at the time of our interviews were below the age of 30, and 30 % for those in the intermediate age groups). Males are also much more often affected than females (29 % compared to 19 %), and those living in the rural areas (27 %) compared to 17 % for those in town. Level of education and social class, on the other hand, do not seem to have any clear-cut influence when these other factors are controlled for.

More interesting even than these more general responses are the specific political events mentioned by the different groups. Thus among the Kikuyu the "Mau Mau" period clearly was most often referred to as particularly important. These experiences can again be illustrated by some of the verbatim responses. A 56-year old Kikuyu peasant: "During the emergency I was deported for 6 years and ten months to Kajiado. All my property and land were destroyed. I had to start all over." A 40-year old peasant's wife: "I was in prison for 6 months on pretext that I had fed the terrorists." A 30-year old farm laborer: "I was unable to move to Nairobi to seek for a job. I have never earned enough money to go to school." A 24-year old unemployed: "I could not start school, because father was a freedom fighter." The attainment of independence ("Uhuru") was also praised most often by the Kikuyu respondents. An 80-year old Kikuyu peasant: "We Africans are liberated now." A 44-year old Kikuyu cash cropp farmer's wife: "We have more chances, freedom of speech and movement. We can own shops."

"Mau Mau" and the period preceding independence were not perceived, however, by all groups in the same way, and some of its side-effects left somewhat different marks. A 45-year old Kamba peasant: "We were forced to take oath, some of us were beaten to death." Or a 38-year old Kamba peasant's wife: "Many people lost possession. Maasai took a lot of cattle, because Kamba heroes were in the war."

Significantly, too, post-independence "crises", i.e. mainly the formation and banning of the opposition party "Kenya People's Union" (KPU), the detention of its leaders, the assassination of Tom Mboya with the ensuing widespread unrest, and the somewhat mysterious death of C.M.G. Argwings-Kodhek, were mentioned most often as particular events affecting their lives by the Luo respondents. A 27-year old cash crop farmer stated, for example: "After the killings of Mboya and Kodhek our tribe is now politically backward because of the losses." A 54-year old peasant: "My cousin was killed as a result of Mboya's death." A 36-year old laborer: "Tom Mboya would have helped me to secure a job."

Media Exposure

Another important factor responsible for shaping personalities and social and political attitudes is exposure to the modern media of mass communication.⁸ But, as some proponents had to realize in recent years,⁹ early

"communications theories" often were overly optimistic as to the "developmental" effects of modern means of communication, and they tended to overstate the implications of media exposure for the personalities and social and political attitudes of the people involved. Our survey data, however, show that exposure to media does have some effect.

The most important means of mass communication in Kenya, as in most Third World countries, is the radio, in particular the transistorized "pocket" type.¹⁰ Official statistics do not keep track of all radio sets in the country, but the figure of approximately 500,000 licenses issued by 1974¹¹ indicates a rough order of magnitude. In comparison, the approximately 25,000 T.V. licenses issued by 1974 indicate the very limited impact of this medium; television remains largely restricted to the cities and towns and has made very little headway in rural Kenya.¹² The frequency of listening to the radio among respondents was as follows:¹³

/ Insert table IV, 27 /

TABLE IV, 27
RADIO EXPOSURE; BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage ever listening	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle and upper classes	100	80	(40)	(100)	90	(100)	(100)	90
Non-agric. proletariat	80	100	(75)	76	78	-	(100)	81
Non-agric. proletaroids and sub-proletariat	76	(100)	(50)	(75)	(100)	(67)	(100)	81
Agric. bourg.	82	(100)	-	67	-	92	100	71
Agric. proletaroids	50	63	37	58	47	73	22	49
Agric. proletariat	54	-	(100)	71	-	60	(100)	64
Total ^a	70	71	39	68	55	79	42	63
Frequency:								
Almost daily	4	17	3	3	7	6	9	7
Once or twice a week	12	20	13	16	10	28	12	15
Less than once a week	54	34	23	49	38	45	21	41
Weighted N:	269	156	93	158	186	92	104	1058

^a Including students

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents in a particular sub-category.

Those who never listen thus are most strongly represented among the Maasai and Mijikenda, followed by the Luo. This reflects the great number of people still following a largely traditional way of life in these groups. The distribution by class shows that those never listening are most frequent among the agricultural proletaroids (51 %),

followed by the agricultural proletariat (36 %), compared to 29 % for the agricultural bourgeoisie, 19 % for the non-agricultural proletariat and non-agricultural proletarians and 10 % for the non-agricultural middle and upper classes. The relative frequency of listening also conforms to this pattern, the Maasai and Mijikenda having very few, even if only occasional, listeners.

The overall rural-urban ratio of those never listening to the radio is 41 % to 14 %; ($r = 0.08$, $p < 0.01$). Those with a higher level of education also listen much more often (only 12 % among those with secondary education never listening compared to 60 % for the illiterates; $r = 0.18$, $p < 0.001$). Sex (28 % of males never listening compared to 49 % for females; $r = 0.16$, $p < 0.01$) is an additional factor influencing this pattern, even when level of education and place of residence are controlled for (the partial correlation then is 0.12, $p < 0.001$). The effect of age, on the other hand, becomes insignificant after these controls.

Of those listening to the radio almost three-fourths do so at home, another fifth at a friend's or neighbor's place, the rest at some public locality. News and political information (44 %), educational programs (10 %), and general entertainment are the favorite features mentioned most often by the respondents. In addition to programs broadcast either in English or Swahili, transmissions in the vernacular often proved to be very popular (favored by 12 % of respondents).

The second most important mass medium is the press. The three main daily newspapers ("Daily Nation", its Swahili sister "Taifa Leo", and "The Standard") have a combined circulation of about 120,000 copies. In addition, a large variety of weekly and monthly papers and magazines are published by different social, economic, religious and other organizations. The frequency of newspaper exposure of respondents (either by reading themselves or by having it read to them by somebody else) ¹⁴ is reported in table IV, 28:

/ Insert Table IV, 28 /

Thus again more or less the same pattern prevails; The Maasai and Mijikenda clearly have the lowest numbers of those exposed to newspapers, this time followed by the Kamba. The variation among the rest is not very great.

Similarly the percentage never reading a newspaper is highest among the agricultural proletarioids (68 %), followed by the agricultural proletariat (64 %) and the agricultural bourgeoisie (42 %), but it goes down to 27 % in the non-agricultural proletariat and 12 % in the urban middle and upper classes. Exposure is also lower in the countryside (57 % of those in rural areas never read a paper compared to 24 % of those in town; $r = 0.11$, $p < 0.001$), among females (71 % never exposed compared to 39 % for males; $r = 0.21$, $p < 0.001$), and in the higher age groups (71 % of those aged 50 and above never read a newspaper compared to 46 % for those below the age of 30; $r = 0.10$,

TABLE IV, 28
 NEWSPAPER EXPOSURE, BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage ever reading	Kik.	Kan.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle and upper classes	91	37	(80)	(100)	(75)	(100)	(100)	88
Non-agric. proletariat	79	(73)	(75)	68	71	-	(50)	73
Non-agric. proletaroids and sub-proletariat	53	(67)	(50)	(50)	(100)	(33)	(100)	62
Agric. bourg.	56	-	-	(83)	57	61	(44)	58
Agric. proletaroids	27	25	18	54	47	60	13	32
Agric. proletariat	40	-	-	(17)	-	(50)	(100)	36
Total ^a	62	37	26	63	59	56	26	48
Frequency:								
Almost daily	12	12	12	17	15	17	6	13
Once or twice a week	19	15	4	19	19	35	10	17
Less than once a week	21	10	10	27	25	4	10	18
Weighted N:	153	153	96	153	172	89	105	1026

^a Including students

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents in a particular sub-category.

$p < 0.001$). Only 16 % of the illiterates are ever exposed to news reported in the papers which is read to them or told by others.

About half of those who read a newspaper said they find the political parts most interesting. About one-third is most interested in sports, cultural features, and other kinds of entertainment. About 5 % each look for economic news and the letters to the editor. The rest are most interested in a variety of smaller items ("Your lucky stars", etc.), and the advertisements.

Among those who did not report any exposure to the mass media, about 40 % said that they are kept informed by family members, friends, or neighbors. Another fourth stated that they get their information from public officials (such as local chiefs or sub-chiefs), or at public meetings ("barazas") organized by government officials or Members of Parliament. A few other minor sources (local traders, bar owners, etc.) were also mentioned. Slightly more than one-fifth of those not exposed to the media (11 % of our total sample) stated that they are not informed about things happening outside their location at all, which includes almost one-third each of the Maasai and Mijikenda respondents, 13 % of the Kamba, 7 % of the Luo and between 3 and 5 % of the other groups.

Levels of political interest and political information

In order to lay the foundations for our later analysis of political attitudes and behavior we asked respondents specifically whether they follow political and governmental affairs, and whether they are at all interested in politics: 15

TABLE IV, 29
POLITICAL INTEREST; BY ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage		Kik.Kam.Mij.Luy.Luo Kal.Maas.Tot.							
Following political affairs	Regularly	20	3	2	32	6	15	13	14
	From time to time	35	20	28	21	31	11	17	26
	Never	45	77	70	47	63	74	70	60
Interested in politics	Very much	39	20	36	32	17	15	28	27
	Somewhat	28	12	14	15	30	27	10	21
	Not at all	33	69	50	53	53	58	62	52
Weighted N:		264	155	86	157	188	89	105	1044

The Kikuyu thus clearly have the highest percentage of those who follow political affairs and express an interest in politics. The Kamba, Kalenjin, and Maasai are at the other extreme, followed by the Mijikenda, who, even though a relatively high number of them said they are interested in politics, do not follow political affairs very regularly either. The Luyia and Luo occupy an intermediate position in both respects. Political interest is highest in the agri-

cultural and urban bourgeoisie (approximately two-thirds saying they are somewhat or very much interested). It drops to about one-half among the members of the salariat and the proletariat, and to a level of only 40 % among the agricultural and non-agricultural proletaroids and in the sub-proletariat. The level of education of respondents again proves to be one of the most important factors in raising a person's interest in politics (53 % of those with primary or secondary education compared to 40 % for illiterates: Pearson's $r = 0.10$, $p < 0.001$). Males are also more interested than females (53 % compared to 42 %; $r = 0.13$, $p < 0.001$), even if differences in the level of education are controlled for (the partial correlation in this case is 0.11, $p < 0.001$). Age, on the other hand, is of relatively little significance. It is remarkable, however, that interest in politics is generally higher in the rural areas than in town (29 % being very much interested compared to 19 %; $r = 0.06$, $p < 0.05$), particularly in view of the fact that the level of education is much higher in town (if education is controlled for the partial correlation becomes 0.09, $p < 0.001$). This points to the relatively high salience of rural politics in Kenya which we will discuss in more detail below.

Beyond the level of political interest expressed by respondents we also wanted to know their actual level of political information. A number of scales have been developed for this purpose. ¹⁶ All of them, however, are necessarily culture-bound, reflecting the particular

circumstances in each country. This imposes serious limitations on meaningful international comparisons of this aspect of political culture. Within a particular country, however, scales of this kind can reveal some important relative differences. Even though the questions asked in this regard are usually of the "school knowledge" type, which may not always be relevant in particular political situations, the responses to our scale indicate some important variations in the orientations towards politics among the different groups concerned.

From the cognitive questions in our survey we were able to group eight together as a separate "scale" in an approximately ascending order of difficulty.¹⁷ These are: "Who is the President of Kenya?"; "what is the name of his party?"; "can you name us a well-known politician?"; "do you know in which year Kenya became independent?"; "who is the Member of Parliament for this area?"; "can you mention some important international events which happened last year?"; "what is the name of the President of the United States of America?"; "can you mention an important leader of the Soviet Union?"¹⁸ These were then again grouped into "low" (answering three questions correctly), "medium" (answering five correctly) and "high" (answering at least six correctly) scores. In order to rank "high" thus at least one correct answer concerning international affairs was required. The results are reported in table IV,30:

TABLE IV,30
POLITICAL INFORMATION; BY CLASS AND
ETHNIC GROUP

Level of political information (%):	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
None	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Non-agric. middle Low and upper classes	(4)	(7)	--	(12)	(25)	--	--	(9)
Medium	(23)	(26)	(60)	(38)	(33)	(100)	--	30
High	73	67	(40)	(50)	(42)	--	(100)	61
Non-agric. proletariat	--	--	--	--	(6)	--	--	(1)
Low	(28)	(17)	(25)	(43)	(39)	--	--	33
Medium	44	(50)	(75)	(29)	(22)	--	(50)	37
High	(28)	(33)	--	(28)	(33)	--	(50)	29
Non-agric. proletaroids and sub-proletariat	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Low	32	--	(50)	(40)	(25)	(67)	--	31
Medium	40	(40)	--	(60)	(35)	--	--	40
High	28	(60)	(50)	--	(40)	(33)	(100)	29
Agric. bourgeoisie	--	--	(50)	--	--	--	--	1
Low	(5)	(50)	--	(16)	50	(23)	(19)	20
Medium	67	(50)	(50)	(17)	50	46	(19)	45
High	28	--	--	67	--	31	62	34
Agric. proletaroids	(7)	11	25	--	11	(9)	34	14
Low	31	50	67	36	49	(18)	45	15
Medium	54	36	(8)	47	30	55	12	33
High	8	(3)	--	17	10	(18)	(9)	8
Agric. proletariat	(9)	--	--	--	--	--	--	3
Low	(27)	--	(100)	(29)	--	(60)	(100)	42
Medium	55	--	--	71	--	(40)	--	52
High	(9)	--	--	--	--	--	--	3

TABLE IV,30 - Continued

Level of political information (%):		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Total ^a	None	(3)	8	23	--	7	(3)	25	8
	Low	22	40	58	29	44	28	36	35
	Medium	50	37	16	39	31	47	16	36
	High	25	15	(3)	32	18	22	23	21
Total weighted N		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

^aIncluding students

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category.

The Maasai and Mijikenda thus clearly have the greatest number of those who do not have any information concerning national, let alone international politics. The fact that almost one-fourth of the respondents in these groups were not able to answer even a single question means, in effect, that they (and 8 % of the total!) do not even know the name of the President of the country. The percentage of those without or with very little information is also quite high among the Luo and Kamba (amounting to almost 50 % in each group). The Kikuyu, Luyia and Kalenjin, on the other hand, clearly exhibit the highest overall level of information, the percentage of "medium" and "high" scorers constituting 70 % and more of the respondents in these groups. A sizeable minority among the Maasai, however, i.e. predominantly those who have had some formal education and are engaged in modern occupations, have a very high level of political information (23 % of the total for this group).

This leads to a closer look at the class distribution of this variable: the urban middle and upper classes, including the salariat, have by far the greatest percentage of "high" scorers (more than 60 % among them), followed by the "agricultural bourgeoisie" (one-third scoring high). The non-agricultural proletarioids and the members of the non-agricultural proletariat and the sub-proletariat occupy a somewhat lower intermediate position (29 % scoring high in these categories), while the agricultural proletarioids and the members of the agricultural proletariat

clearly are at the lower end (only 8 and 3 % respectively scoring high).

Not surprisingly, because of the cognitive nature of these questions, the level of education of respondents proved to be most strongly related (a Pearson correlation of 0.59) to this variable, but, it seems, not quite as strongly as in some industrialized countries.¹⁹ The number of high scores varies between 5 % for illiterates (17 % of this group not being able to answer a single question), 20 % for those with some primary education, and 62 % for those with some secondary education. But even among the illiterates 22 % reach a "medium" score, a figure which rises to 52 % for those with some primary education. The level of exposure to the modern mass media also shows a strong relationship (a Pearson correlation of 0.35 with our combined scores for radio and newspaper exposure).

The level of political information is also significantly higher in town (35 % scoring high compared to 18 % in the countryside; $r = 0.19$) among males (29 % scoring high compared to 8 % for females; $r = 0.32$), and in the lower age groups (26 % of those below the age of 30 scoring high compared to 6 % for those above 50; $r = 0.23$). When we control for the level of education in each case the partial correlations for age and place of residence become insignificant, but remain high as far as the sex of respondents is concerned (partial correlation = 0.22; $p < 0.001$).

Political participation

The participation of active citizens in the process of political decision-making lies at the core of any democratic system. But even in non-democratic states participation by the public is often elicited, at least in some demonstrative forms, through mass rallies, or in particular campaigns for increased production, charitable purposes, or for some similar goals. Also in any kind of regime some kind of participation always takes place in more covert and indirect ways. Participation thus springs from many sources both as far as individual citizens and the respective political systems are concerned; it can take a large variety of forms, serves a multitude of real or perceived goals, and may vary widely in its actual effects.²⁰

For our purposes we restrict the use of the term participation to "those voluntary activities by which members of a society share in the selection of rulers and, directly or indirectly, in the formation of public policy".²¹ We thus exclude the more involuntary and purely demonstrative forms of "participation" such as acts of "voting" in countries where there is not at least some choice between different candidates or parties, and participation in less direct political affairs in industrial enterprises or in other private or public institutions.²² The emphasis on public policy also excludes the more personal and private contacts a citizen may have with government officials at various levels and thus also his relations as a "subject" vis-à-vis the output structures of a political system.²³

The operationalization of this concept is difficult, however, and any standardized index or scale which attempts to measure participation does injustice to the many forms and degrees of possible political involvement.²⁴ Each empirical measuring device must also be adapted to the particular cultural traditions and the actual political setting of a country (e.g. traditions of communal decision-making and group organization, the party system, the particular structures of political parties, etc.).

In our case we were content with an assessment of some of the more open forms of political participation: We first asked whether respondents ever discussed any local or national problems with other people.²⁵ We then probed for their attendance at public meetings ("barazas") in their area; among most groups such meetings traditionally have taken place also in pre-colonial times. Subsequently, we inquired about the actual amount of participation in Kenya's modern political system in terms of voter registration and actual voting. The final question then probed for some of the most active forms of political participation, the engagement in local or national campaigns for or against any particular candidate.²⁶ We did not ask for party affiliation or party identification of respondents since Kenya has a de facto one-party system. It seemed equally meaningless to probe for activities within the party because of the rather desolate state of KANU at the time of our interviews. Where it seemed appropriate, these questions were accompanied by others probing for the details of each

activity such as frequency of meetings attended and topics discussed. The combined results for these various activities are summarized in table IV, 31:

TABLE IV, 31

FORMS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: BY ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage	Kik.Kam.Mij.Luy.Luo Kal.Maas. Tot.							
Discussing local problems	62	59	53	51	55	57	51	56
Discussing national problems	52	46	33	42	40	25	23	41
Attending meetings	66	65	64	64	69	68	42	63
Registered for elections	51	65	67	61	66	69	17	57
Voting	41	54	57	57	58	65	14	49
Campaigning in local elections	40	5	8	25	27	17	1	21
Campaigning ⁱⁿ national elections	38	4	13	23	35	36	8	25
Weighted N:	175	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

The discussion of local problems thus occurs with almost the same frequency in all groups, regardless of the level of economic "advancement" or formal education of respondents. The majority of the local problems discussed are related to the lack of infrastructure (such as water supplies, roads, educational facilities and, in the urban areas, adequate housing). Approximately another third deal with conditions of production, in particular agricultural matters (unfavorable weather conditions, lack of arable

land, cattle diseases, etc.), and economic hardships in general (low income, unemployment, rising prices). About another 10 % are problems of a more general social nature (such as crime, broken marriages, alcoholism). Only a very small group (less than 5 % of the respondents) discusses more directly political problems (such as the behavior of public officials or politicians, including corruption and nepotism, or ethnic relations). When we asked the respondents how well they think ^{they} understand these problems, three-fourths of those who discussed local affairs replied with great confidence (understand "very well" or "quite well"). This pattern was consistent across all ethnic groups with very little deviations from the mean.

The discussion of national problems showed a more differentiated pattern. While still a majority of the Kikuyu discusses them, the percentages for the Mijikenda and, in particular, the Kalenjin and Maasai are considerably lower, the Kamba, Luyia, and Luo occupying an intermediate position. This pattern is also significantly differentiated according to the social class of respondents: 58 % in the urban middle and upper classes and 50 % in the agricultural bourgeoisie discuss national affairs, whereas this figure drops to 45 % for the non-agricultural proletarioids and the sub-proletariat, 41 % for the proletariat, and 34 % for the agricultural proletarioids. The level of understanding of national problems, or the subjective "sense of civic competence", to use Almond and Verba's term, ²⁷ is also

somewhat reduced. Two-thirds of those discussing national affairs think they understand these matters "very well" or "quite well". Here the differences between the ethnic groups become more pronounced, too: The Kikuyu head the list again and the Mijikenda, Kalenjin, and Maasai rank somewhat lower than the rest. In terms of social class the understanding of national problems is highest in the non-agricultural middle and upper classes (51 %) and the agricultural bourgeoisie (50 %). It drops to 37 % for the proletariat and 33 % for both the agricultural and non-agricultural proletariats and the sub-proletariat.

The attendance at public meetings did not show a great deal of variation among the ethnic groups. Only the Maasai had a somewhat lower score, but one which is still much higher than for the rest of their participatory activities. The actual number of official public meetings may also be less among the Maasai, in view of their nomadic tradition and the general inaccessibility of the area. In a majority of cases these meetings were convened by local or regional administrative officers (chiefs and subchiefs, district commissioners, etc.). Almost another 40 % were held by local politicians and Members of Parliament. A relatively small percentage (less than 3 % of each) were called by church leaders or some "Harambee" organizers not belonging to one of the already mentioned categories. These meetings most often (more than 50 %) dealt with developmental projects in the area (improvement

of farming, water projects, road construction, etc.), educational matters (about 10 %), or other more general administrative announcements (20 %). Approximately 5 % were concerned with general social problems and communal relations, almost 15 % dealt with more directly political matters (such as the campaigning by candidates for political office).

When we then turned to more active forms of political involvement in Kenya's central political system, the differences between the groups became even more apparent. A majority of the respondents from all ethnic groups, except again the Maasai, claimed to have been registered for the last national elections (i.e. in 1969).²⁸ The actual election turn-out, as stated by respondents, then conformed to this picture. Significant variations by class became, however, apparent: while 62 % of the members of the agricultural bourgeoisie and even 53 % of the agricultural proletarioids and 52 % of the members of the agricultural proletariat voted, only 38 % of the non-agricultural proletarioids and the members of the non-agricultural proletariat and the sub-proletariat did so. Reported voting turn-out in the non-agricultural middle and upper classes was the lowest for all groups (only 30 % on the average).

When we analyzed the different factors influencing this reported voting behavior more closely, we found that (apart from class and ethnic origin) age, level of education, place of residence, and sex are the strongest independent factors. Those who voted represent 62 % of those older than

50 years and 65 % of those in the middle age group compared to 34 % of those below 30 years, $r = 0.29$; 50 % of the illiterate and 46 % of those with primary education compared to 27 % of those with some secondary education, $r = 0.26$; 53 % of the rural residents compared to 27 % of the urban residents, $r = 0.21$; 53 % of the males compared to 43 % of the females, $r = 0.10$. The influence of these factors remained significant even after their different intercorrelations were controlled for. An analysis of variance indicated the relative weight of these factors (adjusted values of beta) to be as follows: ethnic group 0.15; social class 0.18; sex 0.14; age 0.17; education 0.10.

Our question concerning active campaigning, whether for local or national elections then produced the most clear-cut differences between the ethnic groups: The Kikuyu still reported a great deal of activity in this respect, while the Luyia, Luo, and Kalenjin occupied an intermediate position. The Mijikenda, Kamba, and Maasai ranked lowest in both regards.

If we group these questions concerning different forms of political activities to form a "political participation scale" (scoring those with two positive answers as low, those between three and five positive answers as "medium", and those with six or seven positive answers as "high"), we obtain the following summarized results:

/ Insert Table IV, 32 /

TABLE IV,32

OVERALL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION SCORE; BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Levels of political participation (%):		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle and upper classes	None	(23)	(7)	(20)	(12)	(17)	--	--	16
	Low	(19)	(33)	(20)	(38)	(50)	--	--	29
	Medium	39	(53)	(60)	(38)	(25)	--	(50)	41
	High	(18)	(7)	--	(12)	(8)	(100)	(50)	14
Non-agric. proletariat	None	(24)	(8)	--	(33)	(17)	--	--	22
	Low	(40)	(17)	--	(34)	(33)	--	--	31
	Medium	(28)	(58)	(100)	(33)	(39)	--	(100)	40
	High	(8)	(17)	--	--	(11)	--	--	(7)
Non-agric. proletaroids and sub-proletariat	None	(22)	(20)	(50)	(20)	(20)	--	--	17
	Low	25	(60)	--	(40)	50	(67)	(100)	33
	Medium	45	(20)	--	(40)	(30)	--	--	41
	High	(8)	--	(50)	--	--	(33)	--	(9)
Agric. bourgeoisie	None	(5)	--	--	--	--	(8)	--	(3)
	Low	(6)	(50)	(50)	(25)	(25)	--	(75)	20
	Medium	39	(50)	(50)	33	50	69	(25)	45
	High	50	--	--	42	(25)	(23)	--	32
Agric. proletaroids	None	14	13	(4)	(5)	(5)	(18)	38	13
	Low	25	21	39	46	12	36	4	29
	Medium	43	66	49	39	63	37	21	48
	High	18	--	(8)	(10)	20	(9)	--	10
Agric. proletariat	None	(9)	--	--	--	--	(20)	--	13
	Low	(27)	--	(100)	(29)	--	(40)	(100)	35
	Medium	46	--	--	57	--	(20)	--	39
	High	(18)	--	--	(14)	--	(20)	--	13
Total ^a	None	14	11	5	8	8	13	28	12
	Low	24	26	39	36	23	22	48	29
	Medium	40	61	49	39	53	46	23	45
	High	22	2	7	17	16	19	1	14
Weighted N		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

^aIncluding students

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category.

This combined score provides an even clearer picture of the situation: The Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luyia, and Luo have the greatest percentage of "high" scorers (i.e. a relatively large group among them which is relatively active in all regards listed in our scale).

The Kamba, Mijikenda, and Maasai, on the other hand, have only a very small number of high scorers. But while the Kamba and Mijikenda are strongly represented among those with intermediate ranks and do not show a great deal of deviation from the "non-scorers" in the other groups, almost one-third of the Maasai did not report any of the participatory acts asked for. It should also be noted, that a sizeable minority in each of the more "modern" ethnic groups, somewhat more than 10 % on the average, did not report any of these activities either. This points to the considerable internal differentiation in these groups, which sometimes tends to be overlooked in generalizations of this kind.

The differences by class are very pronounced, too. Here the "agricultural bourgeoisie" clearly stands out as having the greatest number of high scorers with practically nobody not being active in some way or another. In comparison, the non-agricultural middle and upper classes (although our sample of the latter is very small) showed a much higher degree of abstention.

Similarly, the overall degree of involvement of the agricultural proletariats is higher, even though they

are generally less "educated", than that of their non-agricultural counterparts. And even in the agricultural proletariat a higher level of participation can be found than in the non-agricultural one.

This points to one of the most remarkable phenomena of Kenyan politics at the "mass" level, namely its distinctly rural character. This is in clear contrast to many of the hypotheses of the early "modernization" theorists, many of whom assumed "development", including "political development", to be a unilinear, steady process leading from illiterate societies, based on subsistence agriculture, to modern states with high levels of education, industrialization, and urbanization, allowing for a great deal of political participation by their citizens.²⁹ Even though the more simplistic of these theories have long been discarded,³⁰ the assumptions concerning the modernizing and "democratizing" effects of higher levels of education and urbanization can still be found in much of the current literature. The statement for example, that "the residents of African cities tend to be more interested and informed about politics and participate at a higher rate than their rural counterparts" was presented as a seemingly generally accepted truth in a recently published study of political behavior in Nairobi,³¹ although its author did not bother to check this hypothesis by analyzing any rural group in Kenya himself. This author like others might have been alerted by the conclusion reached by

previous studies dealing with causal models of participation in the developing areas: "Despite what we were tempted to conclude earlier, the city does not seem the place to learn participant citizenship, the big city least of all." ³²

This last statement is borne out by our data, where 15 % of the rural respondents have a "high" score of participation and only 11 % do not participate at all compared to only 5 % scoring high in the city and 24 % not participating at all ($r = 0.21, p < 0.001$). If we control for length of residence in town among the urban respondents the percentage of high scorers increases from 2 % for those living in the city for less than two years to 15 % for those who have been living there for more than ten years. The correlation between political participation and place of residence in this case drops to 0.13, but still remains highly significant. The effect of a higher level of education, taken as a single factor, is less clear-cut. 10 % of the illiterates scored high compared to 16 % for those with some primary and 14 % for those with some secondary education, and 13 % of the illiterates did not participate at all compared to 12 % and 13 % respectively for the other educational categories; r is only 0.01 and not significant. This definitely shatters the assumption of a simple, strongly positive unilinear relationship. Other factors like sex (18 % of the males scoring high compared to 7 % of the females; $r = 0.27, p < 0.001$), and age (8 % of those below the age of 30 scoring high compared to 16 %

for those above 50 and 20 % for those in the middle age groups; $r = 0.23$, $p < 0.001$) tend to show the expected influence although the relatively lower level of younger (and, in Kenya, on the average better-educated) people does not fare very well with some of the earlier assumptions either. An analysis of variance performed on these different factors indicates their relative strength to be as follows (values of beta adjusted for other independent factors and covariates): Ethnic group 0.29, social class 0.23, sex 0.25, age 0.22, place of residence 0.21. Education does not have a significant independent influence (beta = 0.02).

If we look at some of the potential socializing factors in this case, we find strong relationship between a high level of political participation and membership in professional (74 % of the members having a medium or high score compared to 53 % for non-members, $r = 0.19$) and voluntary organizations (72 % of the members having higher scores compared to 52 % for non-members, $r = 0.24$). The correlation between our measure of political participation and taking part in "Harambee" activities is even more striking: 71 % of those taking part in Harambee efforts have higher scores compared to only 29 % scoring high among those not engaged in communal self-help activities ($r = 0.36$). Another important factor in the socialization process leading to higher levels of political activity seems to be whether a respondent had been personally affected by some particular political event. 79 % of those

who reported that their lives had been affected by particular events also showed a high level of participation, compared to 59 % among those who were not personally involved in any political affairs ($r = 0.23$).

In view of all these findings contradicting any simple and straight forward relationship between political participation and other presumably "modernizing" factors, we looked for a more differentiated model of participation which better fits this situation. One proposal is that of Ross who speaks of an "independence" and "post-independence" style of political participation in Kenya.³³ The first term refers to public activities more commonly subsumed under the notion of "political participation" similar to that employed in our own scale, while the second includes contacts and activities on a more personal basis (listening to the radio, talking with family members and friends, writing to government officials, etc.). We do not consider this distinction to be particularly helpful since it seems to suggest that more public forms of participation could only be found in the period preceding independence and are now a thing of the past. This clearly is not the case, as our data, and also the levels of voter registration and actual election turnouts, demonstrate.³⁴ The fact that political participation of this kind is stronger in the rural areas (which Ross did not include in his study) than in town may have other reasons. Thus one could perhaps speak of "rural" and "urban" styles of political participation today, but even this dichotomy seems to be too broad and

superficial. It remains, therefore, imperative to look for a better model.

We obtained the most convincing results when we stratified the degree of political participation of respondents by their actual level of political information. In this way we combined one of the directly behavioral aspects with a major cognitive factor based on direct questions and sufficiently "hard" scales. We think this procedure establishes a safer foundation for our following distinctions than, for example, the use of purely attitudinal measures (such as those probing for "authoritarian" or "democratic" dispositions), or more indirect indicators (as the level of education instead of the level of actual political information). In a more simplified form this leads us to one of the common fourfold typologies which helps to bring out the different kinds of political participation or abstention more clearly:

TABLE IV, 33
TYPES OF PARTICIPANTS

<u>Political participation:</u>	<u>Political information:</u>	
	None or low	Medium or high
None or low	"Genuine parochials"	"Alienated"
Medium or high	"Less informed citizens"	"Active democrats"

The terms employed here should be considered as tentative, but, hopefully, illustrative labels for these categories. The term "parochial" (borrowed from Almond and Verba who define it somewhat differently)³⁵ thus is meant to designate those respondents who have both little or no information about national political affairs and who do not participate in any way in Kenya's central political system. They are to be distinguished from another kind of "apathetics",³⁶ who, even though they have the necessary information to act meaningfully, consciously do not participate in Kenya's political processes. For lack of a better term we call them "alienated". The reasons for this "abstention" may be quite diverse, however, lying both in the personal and more general social and political sphere. Thus personal frustration or plain disinterest, for example, may be cause enough for an individual not to participate in politics. Similarly, the disenchantment of larger social groups such as certain classes or ethnic groups with central political processes, or even the often quite realistic assessment that the actual chances of political participation in a particular political system are quite illusory and meaningless, may result in high levels of political alienation. It should be kept in mind, however, that we employ this term only in the operational sense defined above and do not imply at this point any of the socio-psychological processes or political and economic factors which may lie behind it.³⁷ Only further and much more detailed analysis which we are not able to provide

at the present stage would justify its broader and possibly "deeper" use.

The third category of "less informed citizens" ³⁸ then refers to those who show an active involvement in Kenya's politics, at least at local and intermediate levels and by the act of voting, even though their present level of information would not, in a stricter sense, fully qualify them to carry out actually and meaningfully one of the major political functions themselves. Whether this kind of participant is "aspiring" to become an active well-informed citizen one day or whether he just belongs to the more passive mass of followers in a particular group or of a particular candidate (and thus forms more or less "Stimmvieh", to use a derogatory German term) remains, of course, an open question. Again, only further analysis which takes into account some of the "developmental" aspects, will be able to provide us with more definite answers in this respect.

The final category of "active democrats" also bears a tentative and perhaps somewhat euphemistic label, but we think that this term expresses at least some important aspects of this type of political participant, who is well-informed and active in political affairs in many ways. Another important aspect is, of course, a high level of attachment to democratic values in this category, and, indeed, there is some relationship between our respective index and this typology (only 25 % of the "parochials" scoring high compared to 36 % among the "active democrats").

A sub-group of this category then are the actual "gladiators" in Milbrath' sense, but we think this further distinction is much more fluid (e.g. between active party members and those actually running for some political office) than he implies and more a matter of degree than substance. Only the real "full-time" or "professional" politicians fall into a more distinct category of their own and are not included in our definition of different forms of political participation by the general public.

Despite their obvious limitations we think that these categories generally provide a useful framework for the description and analysis of different types of participants and non-participants in Kenya's present political system. A closer look at the distribution of these types in Kenya's ethnic groups and social classes may help us to better understand their meaning:

/ Insert Table IV, 34 /

The "genuine parochials" thus constitute almost one-fourth of the respondents on the average. They form a majority among the Maasai and are very numerous among the Mijikenda, too. The differences between the other groups are not very pronounced. The "alienated", on the other hand, are most strongly represented among the Luvia and the Kikuyu. Among the latter they can be found most often among those living in towns (43 % of all urban Kikuyu),

TABLE IV, 34

TYPES OF PARTICIPANTS; BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Types of participants (%):		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle and upper classes	Parochials	--	7	--	--	(17)	--	--	(4)
	Alienated	42	(33)	(40)	(50)	(50)	--	--	41
	Less-informed citizens	(4)	--	--	(12)	(8)	--	--	(4)
	Active democrats	54	(60)	(60)	(38)	(25)	(100)	(100)	51
Non-agric. proletariat	Parochials	(24)	--	--	(33)	(33)	--	--	25
	Alienated	40	(25)	--	(33)	(17)	--	--	29
	Less-informed	(4)	(17)	(25)	(10)	(11)	--	--	(9)
	Democrats	(32)	(58)	(75)	(24)	(39)	--	(100)	37
Non-agric. proletaroids	Parochials	(12)	--	--	(50)	--	--	--	(13)
	Alienated	(13)	(100)	--	--	(50)	--	(100)	(22)
	Less-informed	(25)	--	(100)	--	--	--	--	(22)
	Democrats	(50)	--	--	(50)	(50)	--	--	43
Sub-prole- tariat	Parochials	(28)	--	--	(50)	(25)	(67)	--	(28)
	Alienated	(22)	(100)	(100)	(50)	(50)	--	(100)	35
	Less-informed	(6)	--	--	--	--	--	--	(3)
	Democrats	(44)	--	--	--	(25)	(33)	--	(34)
Agric. bourgeoisie	Parochials	(5)	--	(50)	(8)	(12)	--	(19)	8
	Alienated	(6)	(50)	--	(17)	(13)	(8)	(56)	15
	Less-informed	--	(50)	--	(8)	(37)	(23)	--	13
	Democrats	89	--	(50)	67	(38)	69	(25)	64

TABLE IV, 34 - Continued

Types of participants (%):		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Agric. pro- letaroids	Parochials	14	26	43	(15)	13	(18)	68	28
	Alienated	25	(8)	--	36	(4)	36	(11)	14
	Less-informed	24	35	49	20	47	(9)	(11)	31
	Democrats	37	31	(8)	29	36	37	(10)	27
Agric. pro- letariat	Parochials	(18)	--	(100)	(14)	--	(40)	--	29
	Alienated	(18)	--	--	(15)	--	(20)	(100)	19
	Less-informed	(18)	--	--	(14)	--	(20)	--	16
	Democrats	46	--	--	57	--	(20)	--	36
Total ^a	Parochials	13	20	41	15	16	15	53	22
	Alienated	25	17	3	29	15	20	23	20
	Less-informed	12	28	41	13	34	16	8	21
	Democrats	50	35	15	43	35	49	16	37
Weighted N		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

^aIncluding students

Numbers in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category.

while those in the rural areas (18 % "alienated" among the rural Kikuyu) do not deviate significantly from the mean for all groups. Only the Mijikenda have a particularly low score in this category. The "less-informed citizens" are most numerous among the Mijikenda, the Luo, and the Kamba. The "active democrats", finally, are strongly represented among the Kikuyu, the Kalenjin, and Luvia, reaching almost 50 % in these groups. This percentage drops considerably among the Kamba and Luo, and is lowest among the Maasai and the Mijikenda. We think that these figures, regardless of the variety of causal factors which lie behind them in each case, constitute some of the most significant indicators for the political culture of each group.

The differences by class are equally striking: Here the agricultural proletarioids, the proletariat and the sub-proletariat stand out among the parochials while their number is quite small in the non-agricultural and agricultural middle classes. The alienated, on the other hand, are most strongly represented in the sub-proletariat and the non-agricultural middle classes and form still a rather large group in the non-agricultural proletariat and among the non-agricultural proletarioids. As a separate group they are well represented among students (50 %!).³⁹ The "less-informed citizens", not surprisingly, are found most often among the agricultural proletarioids, but also to a still considerable extent among the non-agricultural proletarioids, in the agricultural proletariat and in the agricultural

bourgeoisie. The last category, together with the urban upper and middle classes, also has the highest number of "active democrats". There is still a sizeable number of members of this type among the non-agricultural proletarioids and in the proletariat and sub-proletariat, but they represent only a relatively small minority among the agricultural proletarioids.

Our more general controls indicate that the parochials can be found most often among the illiterates (35 % compared to 17 % for those with some primary and 2 % of those with some secondary education), in the countryside (22 % compared to 20 % in town), among females (32 % compared to 15 % for males), and both in the youngest (23 % among those below 30) and oldest age groups (29 % among those above 50 compared to 16 % for those in between). The alienated, on the other hand, are strongly represented among those with higher education (42 % compared to 24 % for those with some primary education and 8 % for illiterates), in town (44 % compared to 16 % in the countryside), in the youngest age groups (30 % for those below 30 compared to 6 % for those above the age of 50 and 12 % for the middle categories). The number of alienated is also somewhat higher among females (24 %) than among males (18 %). The "less-informed citizens" are most numerous among illiterates (39 % compared to 10 % for those with some primary and 1 % for those with some secondary education), in the countryside (24 % compared to 6 % in town), among females (26 % compared to 17 % for males), and in the older age groups

(35 % among those above 50 compared to 12 % for those below 30 and 27 % for those in between). The "active democrats", finally, are strongly represented among those with higher education (55 % among those with some secondary education and 48 % among those with some primary education compared to 18 % for illiterates), among males (50 % compared to 18 % among females), in the younger and middle age groups (34 % and 45 % respectively compared to 30 % among those above the age of 50). The percentage of active democrats in the countryside is also significantly higher (38 %) than in town (29 %).

System support

One of the main "inputs" of any kind of political system is the "support" it receives from the general public. This support can take many material and immaterial, specific and diffuse, overt and covert forms.⁴⁰ It can be directed towards "the system" as a whole, including its social and economic bases, the political system in a narrower sense of the word ("regime" in Easton's terminology), or just the particular incumbents of the most important political roles (Easton: "authorities"). We cannot possibly deal with all these aspects of political support and shall limit our discussion to the "subjective" dimension as expressed in some of the attitudes covered by our survey. We shall also restrict our discussion to the more general system support and shall not attempt to differentiate further between the

"system", the "regime", and the "authorities" in our operationalization of this concept below.

The most important immaterial and diffuse support of a political system lies in its "legitimacy". According to Max Weber's original classification,⁴¹ three main sources of legitimacy can be distinguished, the traditional, the rational-legal, and the charismatic one, which in turn reflect the basic kinds of human attachment to institutions or personalities, namely pure custom or habit, rational acceptance, or emotional bonds. In fact Weber's pure or "ideal" types occur, of course, in various combined forms, and distinctions can only be made as to the relative dominance of one type of legitimacy or another in a particular society. Whereas in most of the older countries in the West a relatively smooth balance of traditional and rational-legal legitimacy has been established, in many of the new systems of the Third World strong elements of personal, often charismatic leadership and legitimacy prevail.⁴²

Typically, leaders who have come to power in times of crisis (as in the time immediately prior to the achievement of independence from the colonial power) serve as the main focus of orientation for the larger population; the belief in their "gift of grace" (i.e. "charisma") in many cases provides the only, or at least dominant, basis of support.⁴³ As Pye observed, for example, in times of crisis, "when the problems of aggression and anxiety color to a high degree interpersonal relationships, there is a

readiness and even eagerness to settle for a leader who is a bit removed, who seems detached from the emotions of personal relationships, who is comforting in words, and who appears concerned only with the good and the ideal".⁴⁴

The more personally founded the legitimacy of a certain regime is, however, the harder the problems of succession to the charismatic leader will be. If such a leader, therefore, does not achieve some kind of "objectification" or "routinization" (Weber) of his charisma by putting it on a more permanent, if possible institutionalized basis, the kind of legitimacy he lends to the political system will only be shortlived.⁴⁵

Unfortunately, none of the studies which deal with the analysis of political culture in a comparative context provide us with an adequate operationalization of this variable. The only one which gives some kind of a clue is Almond and Verba's variable of "system affect".⁴⁶ But only in cases where governmental or political institutions were mentioned spontaneously as objects of pride in their survey (as often as 85 % in the USA and as low as 3 % in Italy), can the existence of a certain kind of legitimacy of the political system be inferred. This measure, therefore, remains too crude, and more direct indicators which distinguish sufficiently between the various sources and objects of legitimacy have to be found. The need for such measures is emphasized, for example, by Easton, but he does not offer any applicable and sufficiently tested indices or scales himself.⁴⁷

We have not attempted to develop a comprehensive operationalization of this important though somewhat elusive concept, but at least some indications as to the kind and amount of legitimacy Kenya's present political system enjoys among different groups can be gained from some of the survey responses. Among the attitudinal items included in the questionnaire four related to the acceptance of Kenya's social and economic system in general and its political system in particular: "All groups can live in harmony in this country without changing the system in any way"; "labor gets a fair share of what it produces"; "I usually have confidence that the government will do what is right"; and "most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country".⁴⁸ From these we were able to construct a combined index:

TABLE IV, 35
SYSTEM SUPPORT; BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Level of system support (%):		Kik.	Kan.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. bourg.	Low	(50)	-	-	(33)	-	-	-	20
	Medium	-	-	-	-	(50)	-	-	27
	High	(50)	(100)	-	(67)	-	-	(100)	40
	Don't know	-	-	-	-	(50)	-	-	13
Salarariat	Low	(29)	(23)	-	-	(38)	-	(100)	26
	Medium	58	(62)	(80)	(60)	(38)	(100)	-	58
	High	13	(8)	(20)	(40)	(12)	-	-	15
	Don't know	-	(17)	-	-	(12)	-	-	1

TABLE IV, 35 CONTINUED

Non-agric. proletariats	Low	(12)	(25)	(25)	(24)	(39)	-	(50)	25
	Medium	60	(50)	(50)	52	(33)	-	(50)	51
	High	(16)	(25)	(25)	(24)	(11)	-	-	17
	Don't know	(12)	-	-	-	(17)	-	-	7
Non-agric. proletaroids	Low	(19)	-	-	-	(50)	-	-	19
	Medium	(38)	-	-	(50)	-	-	(100)	31
	High	(31)	(100)	(100)	(50)	(50)	-	-	38
	Don't know	(12)	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
Sub-proletariats	Low	(11)	-	-	(50)	-	-	-	13
	Medium	(28)	(50)	(100)	-	(50)	(34)	-	31
	High	(44)	-	-	-	(25)	(33)	(100)	34
	Don't know	(17)	(50)	-	(50)	(25)	(33)	-	22
Agric. bourgeois.	Low	(6)	-	(50)	(17)	63	-	(19)	17
	Medium	33	(100)	-	(8)	(25)	62	56	37
	High	44	-	(50)	58	-	(23)	(19)	33
	Don't know	(17)	-	-	(17)	(12)	(15)	(6)	13
Agric. proletaroids	Low	(6)	14	13	30	44	-	(8)	19
	Medium	39	64	45	63	42	45	40	48
	High	24	9	29	(7)	(3)	46	(11)	15
	Don't know	31	13	13	-	9	(9)	41	18
Agric. proletariats	Low	27	-	(100)	(14)	-	-	(100)	16
	Medium	18	-	-	(29)	-	(60)	-	32
	High	55	-	-	(28)	-	(20)	-	42
	Don't know	-	-	-	(29)	-	(20)	-	(10)
Students and school-leavers	Low	(56)	(29)	-	(11)	(43)	-	(33)	38
	Medium	(38)	(43)	-	(78)	(35)	-	(67)	44
	High	(6)	(28)	-	-	(13)	(100)	-	11
	Don't know	-	-	-	(11)	(9)	-	-	7

TABLE IV, 35 CONTINUED

Total	Low	15	15	18	22	44	-	11	20
	Medium	38	62	43	43	38	53	44	44
	High	31	12	29	26	6	32	13	22
	Don't know	16	11	10	9	12	15	32	14
Weighted N:		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents in a particular sub-category.

The Kikuyu and Kalenjin (i.e. the ethnic groups to which, it should be remembered, Kenya's President and Vice-President belong) thus clearly have the greatest percentage of those scoring high on this index, followed by the Mijikenda and the Luyia. The Luo, on the other hand, stand out by far among those expressing a low level of system support, which must be seen as another indication of their relative isolation in present Kenyan politics. The Kamba do not score very high on either extreme. The Maasai, in line with the widespread "parochialism" among them, have by far the greatest number of those saying "don't know" to our question. An analysis by class shows that system support is highest in the non-agricultural and agricultural bourgeoisie, among the non-agricultural proletarioids, but also in the agricultural proletariat which in our sample mostly consisted of members of the "supporting" ethnic groups. Those scoring low on this index are most numerous in the salariat, the non-agricultural proletariat and among students. The agricultural proletarioids present a more balanced picture which, however,

disappears when we look more closely at the distribution according to the ethnic origin of respondents. Here it can be seen that more or less the same ethnic distribution prevails as in our overall sample; the class position of respondents is apparently over-shadowed in these cases by their ethnic attachment. Not surprisingly, the number of those saying "don't know" is also highest among the agricultural proletariats and in the sub-proletariat.

As far as our more general controls are concerned, the level of education of respondents turned out to be significantly related to this index (an overall r of 0.11, $p < 0.001$). This relationship is not, however, a clear-cut linear one: the percentage of high scorers, for example, rises from 17 % among the illiterates to 27 % for those with primary education, but then drops again to 22 % for those who have had some secondary schooling. Sex is only weakly related (25 % of the men scoring high compared to 16 % for the women; $r = 0.05$, $p < 0.05$), age and place of residence are not significantly related at all.

Our index of system support is also related to the level of political participation of respondents (37 % of those who participate strongly also score high on this index compared to 17 % among those who do not participate at all; $r = 0.11$, $p < 0.001$). A very remarkable relationship also exists between the support the respondents accord to Kenya's economic and political system and their perception of their future economic chances. 32 % of those who think that their economic situation will be better in the future

score high on our index of system support compared to only 7 % among those who think the situation will become worse ($r = 0.28$, $p < 0.001$).⁴⁹

Besides the more diffuse "system support" expressed by this index, Kenya's political system also may enjoy a certain amount of "charismatic" legitimacy which centers around the personality and historic role of its first president. Measuring this is an even more intractable matter than assessing a more general system support. Some indirect evidence in this respect was provided by the answers to one of our projective questions: "Suppose you were made head of the government. What are some of the first things you would try to do?"⁵⁰ Of those who gave any specific answers at all a sizeable number of respondents across all ethnic groups stated: "The same as Mzee."

If we are to judge this issue in the light of our own knowledge and experience it can probably be said that Kenyatta's "charisma" at the time of his death was still considerable in many parts of Kenya, even though it probably had declined somewhat during the last years in the wake of the assassinations of Tom Mboya and J.M. Kariuki. The negative impact of these events together with the fear of dominance by the Kikuyu and an apparently increasing corruption at very high levels of government all tended to weaken both the more general legitimacy of the system and Kenyatta's personal authority. His successor, Daniel arap Moi, attempted to "routinize" some of this charisma by emphasizing that he was following very closely in the

"footsteps" ("nyayo", a new watchword in Kenya) of the late president. Whether he succeeds in doing so remains to be seen.

Input orientations

In addition to "supports", "demands" of individuals and groups constitute the most important "inputs" of any political system. Often these demands are dosely related to the supports themselves. We are not concerned here with the actual content of these demands in the present Kenyan situation, but rather with the way they are articulated and aggregated by certain structures, and, at least to some extent, how they are absorbed by the system. Political demands can be expressed in a great variety of ways. These range from informal personal contacts with those having some access to the center of power, through groups formed on an ad hoc basis for a particular issue or a particular occasion, to permanently well-structured interest groups (such as professional organizations or other forms of institutionalized "lobbies"), and, as the most specifically political input structure, political parties.⁵¹ Under present circumstances in Kenya this potential range of input aggregating structures has been somewhat reduced by certain restrictions imposed on the freedom of expression and organization (e.g. certain de jure or de facto "taboos" in the media, the limited scope of action of unions, etc.), but also in particular by the establishment of a de facto, and apparently permanent, one-party system.

In order to assess at least the "subjective" perception of respondents concerning the effectiveness of different forms of input structures available to them, we posed the question: "Suppose several men tried to influence a government decision, say about a development project in this area. Here are a number of things you might do:

- 1) Write to the government official concerned or go to see him; ⁵²
- 2) Write to the M.P. of your area or go to see him;
- 3) Work through personal or family connections;
- 4) Get other people interested - form a group;
- 5) Work through KANU;
- 6) Organize a protest demonstration.

Which of these methods do you think would be the most effective? Which next? Which least?" ⁵³

The results by ethnic group and "type of political participant" are reported in table IV, 36:

/ Insert table IV, 36 /

To contact a Member of Parliament is thus regarded by almost all groups as the most effective method of getting something done by the government. They consider seeing a government official directly, who in all likelihood is the local "chief" or "sub-chief", ⁵⁴ or a member of the district administration as next best. In contrast, protest demonstrations are considered as the least effective method

TABLE IV, 35

INPUT ORIENTATIONS; BY ETHNIC GROUP AND TYPE OF PARTICIPANT

Input orientations (†):	Kik.		Kan.		Mij.		Luy.		Luo		Kal.		Maa.		Tot.		
	most effective	least effective	most effective	least effective	most effective	least effective	most effective	least effective	most effective	least effective	most effective	least effective	most effective	least effective	most effective	least effective	
Parochial	Contact government official	29 (5)	(20)	(10)	48 --	(21)	(4)	(22)	(3)	(21)	(7)	21 --	31 (3)				
	M.P.	(6)	(3)	(23)	--	28 --	42 --	34 (3)	--	(7)	42 --	27 (1)					
	Personal connections	--	(3)	(10)	(13)	(8)	(7)	--	(4)	(13)	(9)	(29)	(43)	--	(5)	7	9
	Form group	--	(17)	(10)	--	(8)	(8)	--	--	(6)	(3)	(7)	--	(11)	(15)	6	9
	KANU	(19)	(11)	(9)	(19)	--	(36)	(25)	(29)	--	(10)	(13)	(43)	--	(16)	9	20
	Protest demonstration	(6)	23	(9)	39	--	41	--	50	--	50	--	--	--	31	(2)	36
Don't know	30	33	(10)	(19)	(8)	(8)	(12)	(13)	(25)	(22)	--	--	26	32	18	22	
Alienated	Government official	(11)	16	(30)	(11)	--	(33)	--	(13)	(21)	(17)	--	(33)	(12)	--	11	14
	M.P.	(4)	(9)	(33)	(3)	(34)	--	41	22	48	--	34	--	52	--	44	7
	Personal connections	(7)	15	(11)	(4)	--	(33)	(11)	(7)	(3)	(21)	--	(33)	--	--	7	12
	Form group	16	(4)	(7)	--	(33)	--	(7)	29	(3)	(14)	(33)	(17)	--	--	11	10
	KANU	(6)	(4)	--	(26)	--	--	(18)	(7)	(7)	(17)	(33)	--	(12)	43	10	15
	Protest	(6)	42	(4)	41	--	--	(9)	(13)	(14)	(24)	--	(17)	--	(23)	6	30
Don't know	(5)	(10)	(15)	(15)	(33)	(34)	(11)	(9)	(4)	(7)	--	--	(24)	(24)	11	12	
Less informed citizens	Government official	32	--	(7)	36	54	(8)	(31)	(28)	21	(10)	--	(20)	(33)	--	27	15
	M.P.	(15)	--	29	--	31	(8)	(19)	(14)	36	(9)	--	(50)	--	--	25	8
	Personal connections	--	(12)	(14)	(7)	(8)	--	(19)	--	(11)	13	80	--	--	--	14	8
	Form group	(3)	(9)	23	--	--	--	--	(29)	(9)	(8)	(20)	(20)	(67)	--	11	9
	KANU	(18)	(3)	(7)	--	(7)	(8)	--	--	(9)	24	--	--	--	--	8	9
	Protest	--	44	(7)	43	--	69	(14)	(29)	--	17	--	(20)	--	(100)	(3)	39
Don't know	32	32	(13)	(14)	--	(7)	(14)	--	(14)	(14)	--	--	--	--	12	12	
Active democrat	Government official	38	(2)	18	(15)	(20)	--	25	15	(12)	(18)	(16)	29	(29)	(17)	25	12
	M. P.	15	(4)	39	(5)	73	(7)	40	(4)	66	(2)	22	33	(47)	(6)	36	8
	Personal connections	(6)	11	(4)	(6)	(7)	(13)	(12)	(12)	--	(9)	(7)	(16)	--	--	5	10
	Form group	19	8	(7)	(9)	--	(27)	(12)	17	(6)	(13)	33	(13)	(6)	--	14	12
	KANU	12	(7)	32	(6)	--	--	(6)	(12)	(12)	18	(7)	(7)	(18)	(6)	12	9
	Protest	--	50	--	57	--	(53)	(1)	40	--	31	(15)	(2)	--	71	(2)	41
Don't know	10	18	--	(2)	--	--	(4)	--	(4)	(9)	--	--	--	--	5	8	
Total	Government official	31	6	19	19	45	(4)	18	13	11	25	11	25	21	(3)	24	11
	M. P.	21	5	32	(3)	37	(4)	39	10	48	(4)	17	24	42	(1)	33	6
	Personal connections	5	11	9	7	(7)	(6)	11	8	6	14	21	21	--	(3)	8	10
	Form group	14	8	12	(3)	(4)	(7)	7	20	7	10	27	13	12	(8)	11	10
	KANU	12	6	15	10	(3)	18	11	11	8	19	16	10	(6)	20	10	12
	Protest	2	44	(5)	47	--	53	(5)	32	(2)	28	(8)	(7)	--	43	3	38
Don't know	15	20	86	11	(4)	(8)	9	4	11	12	--	--	19	22	11	13	
Weighted N	275		156		96		158		194		92		103		1079		

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents in a particular sub-category.

by the greatest number of people. The effectiveness of working through the single political party (KANU), through personal connections, or ^{of} forming a group is judged in a more ambiguous manner by the respondents, the percentage of those stating these to be the most effective and the least effective methods being almost equal.

The variation by ethnic group shows that a greater percentage of the Kikuyu and Mijikenda consider direct government contacts to be most efficient, while the relatively largest number of the Luo, Luyia, Maasai and, to a lesser extent, also Kamba, all of which tend to be more in opposition to the present regime, emphasize the importance of their elected representatives. The Kalenjin, on the other hand, most often refer to personal or group connections.

To work through KANU is also considered to be efficient by a relatively greater number of Kalenjin, Kamba, and Kikuyu, while the Luo, Maasai, and Mijikenda are most adamant in their rejection of this possibility. Open protest, perhaps as a last resort, seems to be acceptable for a sizeable minority among the Kalenjin and Luyia.

If we differentiate this picture according to the "types of political participants" in our survey, some even more clearcut distinctions emerge which tend to confirm and validate to a certain extent our earlier observations concerning these categories: Among the "parochials" to see a government official clearly is regarded as the most effective method, followed by contacting an M.P. In contrast,

personal connections, group or party contacts are not very developed. Not surprisingly the number of those saying "don't know" is also particularly great in this group. The "alienated", on the other hand, distinctly reject government contacts. They thus are the only group with a greater percentage among them who consider this to be the least effective method. Of all groups they put the greatest hope in seeing their elected representative. Relatively speaking they also have the largest number of those who regard a protest demonstration as an effective means to articulate their demands. The "less-informed citizens" put their trust in government officials and M.P.'s in approximately equal parts. They also indicated a relatively high preference for personal contacts or spontaneous group actions. The "active democrats", finally, in addition to seeing "M.P.'s or government officials, expressed a comparatively stronger commitment to organizing group initiatives or working through the political party.

Class distinctions also influence this pattern somewhat: while the effectiveness of contacting government officials is judged more or less uniformly across all groups, a significantly greater number of those in the non-agricultural classes would rather see an M.P. (38 %) than would those in the agricultural groups (31 %). In the latter the willingness to work through KANU is also significantly higher (13 % compared to 6 % in the non-agricultural classes). The readiness to take group initiatives is particularly pronounced in the agricultural bourgeoisie (22 % compared

to a mean of 10 % for all the other groups). The "agricultural bourgeoisie" also seems to have the greatest possibilities to work through personal connections (13 % emphasizing this method compared to a mean of less than 7 % for the other groups).

Education is another significant factor affecting these attitudes. Seeing an M.P. is considered to be most effective by those with some secondary schooling (48 % favoring this method compared to 32 % for those with some primary education and 29 % among illiterates). On the other hand, the reverse of this attitude is shown by the readiness to contact government officials: only 15 % of the best educated sympathize with this approach compared to 26 % for those with little or no formal education. The effectiveness of KANU as a means to get things done is also judged differently in each educational category: 12 % of those with some primary education express their preference for this method compared to 9 % among illiterates and only 6 % among those with some secondary schooling. The efficiency of open protest is also considered to be much higher by the latter group (7 % of those with secondary education see this as most effective compared to only 2 % in the other educational categories). Sex and age of respondents did not turn out to affect these orientations in any significant way.

The role of Members of Parliament

Among the different input structures discussed in the preceding section the Members of Parliament occupy a special position with multiple functions. On the one hand they are, as legislators, a part of the central political system; on the other hand they constitute one of the most important "links" between the government and the general public. In systems where elected parliaments exist, these linkage functions of M.P.s and the more general "patron-client" relations (including high level civil servants, union leaders, and other resourceful high-ranking officials) have received increasing attention in recent years. ⁵⁵

Comparable to patterns of "patrimonial" rule and authority in pre-industrial Europe and large parts of Asia, ⁵⁶ these relationships are characterized by unequal status of the partners, reciprocity of obligations, and personal contact. One typical example is the traditional "feudalism based on benefices" ("Pfründenfeudalismus", Weber) where, at the lower level, a landlord exercises considerable power over his serfs and is able to extract an economic surplus from them. However, he provides a measure of military and social security for his subjects in return. At a higher level in this system, the landlord enters into a relationship with the traditional political rulers who legalize and guarantee his economic position (e.g. in the form of "tax farming"), and then receive some part of the surplus and often military services in return.

In a contemporary context patron-client relationships often involve the exchange of economic benefits (such as patronage over the allocation of jobs, contributions to "development projects" in a certain area, but not rarely also direct personal payments) in return for political support. This is of particular importance where electoral processes decide, at least to a certain extent, over the distribution of positions and resources at the center. Here again several levels of patronage can often be distinguished linking in a hierarchical manner the general public through different intermediaries to the highest level of authority. Not rarely, ascriptive and affective ties (e.g. those of clans and ethnic groups) also play a significant role in these relationships, although in modern environments these tend to become more "contractual" and instrumental.⁵⁷ In Kenya, where elections do play an important though somewhat restricted role, patronage by M.P.s is of particular significance;⁵⁸ however, it also exists at locally more restricted levels⁵⁹ and within other types of organizations.⁶⁰

As we have seen in the preceding section, this significant role of M.P.s as "brokers" in the national political system is reflected in the answers to our questions concerning the accessibility and efficiency of different forms of input structures (one-third of the respondents, the largest single group, stated contacting an M.P.s to be the most effective method). In how far this expressed input orientation remains at a hypothetical level or reflects some actual personal knowledge and active

participation as well can be assessed by the responses to other questions put at different times in our interviews. These reveal significant variations of the role of M.P.s for different groups of people. The first of these questions, ⁶¹ which also forms a part of our "political information scale", simply asks for the name of the M.P. for the respondent's constituency. The percentage of those answering correctly are reported in table IV, 37:

TABLE IV, 37
PERCENTAGE KNOWING NAME OF M.P.;
BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Name of M.P. known (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle and upper classes	65	(60)	(90)	(63)	(33)	(100)	(100)	61
Non-agric. proletariat	(32)	(50)	(75)	(19)	(33)	-	(100)	34
Non-agric. proletaroids	(44)	(100)	-	(100)	(50)	-	(100)	54
Sub-proletariat	(44)	(50)	-	-	-	(100)	(100)	44
Agric. bourgeoisie	83	(50)	(50)	83	88	85	100	83
Agric. proletaroids	55	46	34	80	73	91	40	57
Agric. proletariat	73	-	-	100	(100)	(60)	(100)	74
Total ^a	60	49	38	73	64	84	56	61
Weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

^a Including students

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents in a particular sub-category.

It seems to be remarkable that, except for the Mijikenda and including even the still largely traditional

Maasai, a majority of the respondents from all ethnic groups were able to name their M.P. correctly. This is not a bad score even by international standards! ⁶² The variation by ethnic group is more or less in line with that reported for our more comprehensive political information scale, in particular if we look at the agricultural classes alone. For the non-agricultural classes, however, the situation is different: compared to our previous overall results the score of the non-agricultural proletariat is considerably lower than that of the agricultural one and of the agricultural proletariats; the agricultural bourgeoisie also has a higher score than the non-agricultural middle and upper classes.

This difference comes out more clearly if we control for place of residence alone. Here, in fact, the results of the overall political information scale are reversed: (two-thirds of the rural respondents were able to name their M.P. correctly compared to only one-third for those living in town). The Pearson correlation coefficient in this case is -0.29 compared to a strong positive correlation of 0.30 between urban residence and the overall political information scale, if we exclude the item relating to the M.P. from the latter in order not to "contaminate" our comparisons. To a certain extent this is due to the relatively short period of time many urban residents have been living in the city; they have not yet had the chance to develop deeper social roots or political contacts. If we control the responses of urban respondents by length of residence in town, it

turns out that only 19 % of those living there for a period of less than 2 years know the name of their M.P. compared to 28 % of those living in town for 2 - 5 years, 40 % for those living there for 6 - 10 years, and 47 % for those living in town for more than 10 years.

But even the last figure is still considerably lower than the mean of 68 % for the rural respondents, irrespective of their length of residence in the same location. The mean rises to 73 % for those living there for more than 10 years or "all their life". The overall Pearsons correlation coefficient between knowing the name of the M.P. and place of residence drops from 0.29 to 0.21, if we control for length of residence, but still remains highly significant ($p < 0.001$).

To a larger degree this discrepancy between the answers of the rural and urban respondents is thus a reflection of the different and usually minor role an urban member of the national parliament can play compared to his rural counterpart; the former has very little direct influence on the city council and the city's bureaucracy which takes care of most of the communal functions affecting the life of townsmen. In the rural areas M.P.s often take a major part in the initiation of self-help and "Harambee" activities for development purposes; in town these activities are of relatively little significance (the Pearson correlation between those knowing the name of their M.P. and those taking part in Harambee projects is 0.19, $p < 0.001$).

Similarly, there is a strong positive correlation between those knowing the name of their M.P. and our more general political participation scale ($r = 0.29$). Level of education is also positively related to this variable (55 % of the illiterates in our survey know the name of their M.P. compared to 64 % for those with some primary and 67 % for those with some secondary education; $r = 0.11$, $p < 0.001$). Sex is another important factor in this respect, 69 % of the male and only 47 % of the female respondents knowing their M.P.; $r = 0.22$. This correlation is reduced but remains significant when we control for level of education and place of residence in this case (the partial correlation then becomes 0.15, $p < 0.001$). Age shows an even weaker relationship ($r = 0.08$, $p < 0.01$), and if we look more closely at the percentage distribution for the different age groups, we can see that this factor is not related in a linear way: 55 % of those below the age of thirty know their M.P. compared to 62 % of those above fifty and 63 % of those in the middle age group. An overall analysis of variance gives the respective strength of these factors as follows (values of ^{beta:} residence 0.34, ethnic group 0.22, social class 0.17, level of education 0.10, sex 0.07, age 0.04. The values of beta for political participation and participation in Harambee activities, taken as co-variates, are 0.15 and 0.11 respectively.

If we now compare the number of those stating contacting an M.P. to be the most effective input method with those who know the name of their M.P., it turns out that

only 60 % of those who hypothetically emphasize the role of an M.P. actually know his name. Again the discrepancy between the rural and urban respondents is most striking: 70 % of those who stated contacting the M.P. to be most effective among the rural respondents actually know his name, while this figure drops to 26 % in our urban sample. When we control for length of residence in town this percentage rises to 43 % for those living there for more than 10 years compared to 19 % for those residing there for less than 2 years, but still remains significantly below our mean for the rural areas. A similar difference results when we juxtapose the number of those who state contacting an M.P. to be the most effective method with those who have actually attended a public meeting ("baraza") held by him: only 20 % of those who hypothetically emphasize the role of an M.P. had actually attended one of his barazas. Here the rural-urban differences are not as pronounced (18 % compared to 27 %), but time of residence in town again contributes to a greater contact with the M.P. (40 % of those who have been living in town for more than 10 years said they had attended a meeting held by the M.P. compared to 16 % among those who resided there for less than two years).

The relationship between those who state contacting an M.P. to be one of the two most effective methods and actual participation in the national elections is very weak (64 % of those who voted said contacting an M.P. to be one of the two most effective methods compared to 59 %

for those who did not vote; the Pearson correlation between the two variables is 0.04, $p < 0.05$). On the other hand, the correlation between those who voted in the last elections and those who remembered the name of their M.P. is considerably stronger (70 % of those who voted knew the name of their M.P. compared to 61 % among those who did not vote; $r = 0.19$, $p < 0.001$).

In view of all these findings it seems safe to say that Members of Parliament do constitute an important "link" between the central political system and the public at large. These linkages seem to contribute to a meaningful two-way flow of information and an exchange of demands and resources which potentially can be beneficial for all sides involved. One restricting factor in these "patron-client" relationships, if we may call them so, is the often limited capacity of even a well-motivated and active M.P. to "deliver" all the goods which are expected of him. Indeed, as an analysis of the 1969 and 1974 general elections indicates, when a majority of the incumbent M.P.s including a sizeable number of ministers and assistant ministers lost their seats, expectations often seem to be too high to be satisfied by almost anybody. No doubt, under continuing competitive conditions, in the long run both responsible behavior on the side of the "patrons" and more realistic attitudes among the "clients" will have to emerge.

But a potential danger in this pattern should not be overlooked either: Strongly personalized relationships such as those between patrons and clients, particularly if

the former are able to act under conditions where the possibilities of scrutiny by the public are very limited (e.g. in many government ministries and at other levels of the national and provincial bureaucracy), also tend to favor continuing forms of nepotism and corruption. A "clientelism" of this kind, if it is unbalanced and getting out of hand, then may undermine the long-term legitimacy of the system, at least among the less-favored groups.

Again, as was the case with our more general "political participation-scale" the place of residence of respondents turned out to be one of the strongest discriminating factors in their relations with their M.P. The pattern of politics in town indeed seems to be very different from that of the rural areas. Whereas in the latter meaningful, structured relationship between the general population and their representatives seem to exist, conditions characteristic for a "mass society" seem to prevail in the former. As we have seen, one element responsible for this difference is the still limited period of time a great number of the urban residents have been living in the city. But even for those who have found their "roots" there now, the involvement in the political process seems to have taken on a different quality. The question whether similarly structured and meaningful relationship will emerge in the future for urban residents will be one of the most decisive ones for the long-term prospects of "democracy" in Kenya. This applies at least for the most important groups among the urban residents, particularly if

we take into account the long-term and continuing demographic and social structural changes which will strongly affect the present rural-urban balance.

Orientations towards central government structures and the bureaucracy

As we have pointed out before, seeing public officials or writing to them is considered to be the second most effective method (after contacting M.P.s) to get something done by the government (24 % on the average saying so in all groups). Understandably, this attitude is related to the general "support" the government enjoys among respondents (Pearson's $r = 0.09$, $p < 0.001$ for the combined score of those stating contacting a government official to be the most effective method and our measure of "system support"). On the other hand, according legitimacy to a political system and considering it to be efficient are two different things, even though the relationship between these two variables can be close.

As was the case with the discussion of other variables, we are not so much concerned at this place with the objective performance of Kenya's government and its bureaucracy,⁶³ but rather with the subjective orientation of respondents towards it.

For reasons of "prudence and diplomacy" we had to exercise caution in the selection of questions relating to this aspect of Kenya's political system.⁶⁴ Thus we did not include any explicit questions concerning the performance

of the present government and its bureaucracy or matters such as nepotism and corruption.⁶⁵ Some clues can be gained, however, from the responses to more indirect and open-ended questions. One of these asked, for example: "What do you think are the biggest problems that this country faces today?"⁶⁶ The answers are recorded in table IV, 38:

TABLE IV, 38
MOST IMPORTANT NATIONAL PROBLEMS; BY ETHNIC GROUP

National problems (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Natural disasters	3	28	37	2	16	17	27	15
Lack of infrastructure	9	-	7	2	2	7	6	5
Inflation	6	8	4	2	13	3	2	6
Unemployment	15	12	4	30	8	-	1	12
Inequitable income distribution	8	4	-	9	1	3	4	5
Lack of arable land	6	2	-	5	3	24	1	5
Other economic problems	5	8	4	12	17	8	3	8
Government performance	2	-	1	7	2	3	4	3
Tribalism	1	-	-	4	-	-	-	1
Social problems	10	4	1	8	3	4	8	6
Other	3	-	-	-	1	-	3	1
No problems, Don't know	32	34	42	19	34	31	41	33
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

In addition to providing a kind of "catalogue" of the most urgent national problems the Kenyan government has to deal with in the eyes of respondents, this table also can serve as an indication for which groups the performance of the present government seems to be a particularly salient issue. As we can see from this list, natural disasters, in particular droughts and subsequent famine, are foremost in the minds of the Mijikenda, Kamba, and Maasai respondents. This is explained by the often very precarious living conditions in their areas of residence and particularly by the severe drought in spring 1974 (the time of our interviews), when the "long rains" had failed again almost completely. The second problem which was mentioned most often, in particular by the Luyia and Kikuyu, but also to a lesser extent by the Kamba and Luo, is unemployment. Inflation, lack of infrastructure (such as water supplies, roads, health and educational facilities), lack of arable land, inequitable distribution of income, and similar economic problems then were mentioned to a varying degree by all groups. Social problems (such as crimes, prostitution, alcoholism, broken marriages) come next in this list of grievances. Political problems, in particular those concerning aspects of present government performance, then were quoted by another sizeable number of respondents, especially among the Luyia.

To illustrate this latter point some of the verbatim answers may be helpful: Some just mentioned "bribery and corruption",

"nepotism and tribalism", or "bad governing" in general. Others had more specific grievances: A Maasai school-teacher: "Difficulties with D.C.s ⁶⁷ who don't help; most officials are interested only in their own turmies". A Maasai moran complained about "harassment by the police". A fifty year old Kikuyu carpenter said "police arrests of beer brewers are unnecessary". A Luo mechanic considered the problem to lie at some higher level: "The way big people, ministers, treat lower people". A Kamba unemployed school-leaver said outright: "The cabinet should be reshuffled and a president elected democratically". A few see the problem coming from abroad, a Luyia electrician: "We are still very much in the hands of colonists; people like us do not have a chance to prosper".

An analysis by class shows that, not surprisingly, natural disasters as a major problem were quoted most often by the rural classes (21 % among the agricultural proletarioids and 12 % in the agricultural bourgeoisie). Unemployment, on the other hand, was mentioned as a major concern by the members of the urban salariat (20 %), the proletariat (15 %), and the sub-proletariat (19 %). Another sizeable percentage of the salariat stated inflation to be the biggest national problem (15 %), whereas in the proletariat the inequitable distribution of income is the next major concern (cited by 13 % of respondents in this category). Political problems, including "tribalism", were mentioned most often by members of the salariat, the proletariat and by non-agricultural proletarioids (varying between

5 % and 15 % in these groups). The number of those saying "there is no problem" or "don't know" is highest among the agricultural and non-agricultural proletarioids, in the proletariat and the sub-proletariat (amounting to between 32 % and 46 %), but is only 13 % in the salariat.

We then probed further: "Would you say the chances to solve (these problems) are very good, quite good, not very good, very bad?" Among those who had given any specific answer to the previous questions at all, a plurality was still optimistic for the future (48 % giving one of the first two responses, compared to 43 % being more pessimistic, the rest was undecided). The optimists are most numerous among the Kalenjin, Kikuyu, and Maasai (varying between 55 % and 62 %), while the pessimists can be found more often among the Kamba, Mijikenda, and Luo (only between 29 % and 43 % giving one of the first two answers). In terms of social class the optimists are most numerous in the agricultural bourgeoisie (61 %), but also in the proletariat (56 %). For the agricultural proletarioids this figure drops to 44 %, and is only 40 % and 36 % respectively for the salariat and the sub-proletariat. When asked "can people like you do anything to help solve this problem" only 18 % answered affirmatively. A relatively greater number of these persons could be found among the Kalenjin (45 %), Luyia (27 %), and Kikuyu (19 %) and, across all ethnic groups, among the members of the agricultural bourgeoisie (37 %).

The responses to are other carefully worded question

provide us with some further evidence as to how respondents assess the performance of the present government: "One sometimes hears some persons say that there are some people or groups who have too much influence over the way the government is run in this country. Do you agree or disagree that there are such groups?"⁶⁸

TABLE IV, 39
PERCENTAGE STATING THAT GOVERNMENT IS DOMINATED
BY CERTAIN GROUPS; BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage agreeing	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle and upper classes	38	(33)	(20)	(37)	(42)	-	(100)	37
Non-agriculture proletariat	(36)	(33)	-	(14)	(39)	-	(50)	28
Non-agric. proletaroids and sub-proletariat	30	(50)	-	(40)	(40)	-	(50)	35
Agric. bourgeoisie	22	(50)	-	58	(25)	(15)	(25)	29
Agric. proletaroids	18	19	14	(14)	40	(3)	(11)	20
Agric. proletariat	(9)	-	-	-	-	-	(100)	(7)
Total ^a	25	26	13	27	38	10	19	25
Weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

^a Including students

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents in a particular sub-category.

Quite clearly the percentage of Luo who see the government dominated by certain people is by far the highest

of any of the ethnic groups, providing further evidence for their widespread disenchantment with Kenya's present leadership. The percentages for the Kalenjin, Mijikenda, and Maasai, on the other hand, are quite low. For the Maasai and Mijikenda this can be attributed to a large extent to the relatively great number of "parochials" in these groups (53 % and 41 % respectively), while among the Kalenjin this attitude seems to spring from a more general satisfaction with the present government and their position in it (only 15 % parochials in this group, but the greatest number of those scoring high on our "system support"-index). The values for the Kikuyu, Kamba, and Luyia do not deviate significantly from the mean.

An analysis by class, however, shows that these groups are internally very much differentiated according to the economic position of respondents. The percentage for the agricultural proletarioids and the agricultural proletariat are rather low here, too, but the figures for the non-agricultural middle classes, the non-agricultural proletarioids, and the sub-proletariat lie considerably above the mean, reflecting the relatively higher level of political awareness in these groups. The level of education (16 % among the illiterates agreeing compared to 46 % among those with secondary education; $r = 0.17$, $p < 0.001$) and sex (29 % of the males agreeing compared to 17 % of the females; $r = 0.07$, $p < 0.01$) are further factors affecting this attitude. Age, on the other hand, does not exercise a significant influence of its own. Not surprisingly,

those who see the government dominated by certain groups also showed a lower level of support for the system (39 % agreeing among those indicating little support compared to 22 % among those who showed a high level of support; $r = 0.11$, $p < 0.001$).

The kinds of groups the respondents have in mind in this regard form a characteristic pattern, too: Of those who agreed with our statement 34 % see the government dominated by a particular ethnic group. Among non-Kikuyu respondents this figure is even higher, 37 % of them answering "the Kikuyu". A few Luvia and Kalenjin respondents also attributed this influence to the Luo, apparently perceiving some competition from this side. Among the Kikuyu a minority, from other districts, accused the "Kiambu people"⁶⁹ of having too much power. 40 % of all those agreeing attribute this influence over the government to a particular class ("the establishment", "the bureaucracy", "the rich"). These respondents are particularly numerous among the agricultural and non-agricultural proletarioids and in the proletariat. 5 % of respondents in all groups see some foreign influence at work ("the Europeans", "foreign companies"), the rest is divided among a variety of other factors.⁷⁰

System evaluation

This assessment of government performance and of some critical aspects of the system as a whole became even

more pronounced when we asked directly: "that, if anything, would you criticize in this country?"⁷¹ The responses by ethnic group are presented in table IV, 40:

TABLE IV, 40
CRITICISM OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS; BY ETHNIC GROUPS

Percentage criticizing:	Kik.	Kan.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Lack of infrastructure	2	1	4	6	-	-	3	2
Inflation	2	4	2	4	8	3	-	4
Unemployment	3	2	-	2	1	-	-	2
Inequitable distribution of income	9	4	-	2	11	7	7	7
Other economic criticism	7	3	18	6	2	10	-	6
Corruption	5	4	1	5	5	-	3	4
Tribalism	2	7	-	9	9	19	-	6
Other political criticism	5	2	-	3	4	8	1	3
Social problems	12	9	2	3	7	11	1	9
Other	1	2	3	-	1	-	3	1
No criticism (including "don't know")	52	62	64	55	53	42	32	57
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	275	156	96	152	194	92	108	1079

The criticism of the Kikuyu and Mijikenda thus is mainly concerned with economic and social problems. The Kalenjin, Luo, and Luyia most often mentioned problems which are of a more directly political nature. The Kamba are in an intermediate position in both respects. The absence of any criticism is particularly striking for the

Maasai. Here again this must be interpreted as an indication of their more general parochialism rather than as a sign of a particularly high degree of satisfaction with Kenya's social and political system. The Kalenjin and the Luo, on the other hand, are those who are most critical of certain aspects of social and political life, while the other groups do not show a great deviation from the mean. These major characteristics remain significant even after a number of controls.

A stratification by social class also reveals an interesting pattern: less than one-third of the agricultural proletarioids express any particular criticism, while members of the agricultural bourgeoisie (50 %), of the proletariat (49 %), and the sub-proletariat (66 %) are much more critical. Criticism is also very strong among students (61 % of them being critical of some aspect) and in the salariat (64 %). While the criticism of the salariat and the proletariat is most often directed towards economic matters (39 % and 31 % respectively), the agricultural bourgeoisie and the students are most critical of political affairs (26 % and 31 % in these groups). In general, those who expressed their criticism most often tend to be more highly educated (63 % of those with some secondary education compared to 28 % among illiterates), urbanites (52 % compared to 41 % in the rural areas), males (50 % compared to 33 % for females), and members of the younger and middle generations (46 % compared to 35 % for those above the age of fifty). Respondents with secondary

education also were particularly critical of political aspects of life in Kenya (30 % compared to 11 % for those with some primary education and 9 % for those with no formal education).

In terms of our "types of political participants" a similar pattern becomes apparent which tends to lend further support towards this kind of classification. Thus the number of those expressing no criticism at all is highest among the parochials (81 %), and among the "less informed citizens" (69 %). This figure drops to 59 % for the "alienated" and 35 % for the "active democrats" who are quite outspoken in their criticism, too. The subjects criticized in all these groups are economic and political in approximately equal parts (thus 6 % of the parochials criticized economic matters and 4 % political affairs; the respective figures are 10 % and 9 % for the "less-informed citizens", 13 % and 14 % for the "alienated", and 21 % and 22 % for the "active democrats").

Of those who voiced some specific criticism more than 40 % thought the government should act to remedy the present situation. 5 % of those who are critical even stated that the government itself should be changed. The respondents of this latter category were particularly numerous among the Luo and Luvia (7 % and 11 % respectively of those who are critical). Another 15 % put their hopes in some group action such as Harambee and similar activities, or thought the population at large should increase its efforts. 11 % are quite pessimistic and said that nothing can be done.

The rest offers a variety of other proposals.

A more indirect form of evaluation is also provided by the answers to the question: "Suppose you were made head of the government. What are some of the first things you would try to do?"⁷² In addition, some of the possible alternatives to present government practices, as they are perceived by the respondents, also become apparent. The responses are summarized in table IV, 41:

TABLE IV, 41
THINGS RESPONDENTS WOULD DO AS HEAD OF GOVERNMENT; BY ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage saying	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Same as present president	3	4	1	-	2	4	-	2
Improve personal situation	1	5	1	-	2	-	6	2
Improve situation of ethnic group	-	4	-	-	2	-	37	5
Improve economic and social situation of general population	48	42	56	46	55	44	13	44
Improve political situation in the country	18	11	11	18	8	31	10	16
Can't imagine, Don't know	30	34	31	36	31	21	34	31
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

While some respondents thus expressed their support of the present government ("would do same as Mzee"), others

had more personal aims in mind ("buy big farms", "get all the money and enjoy before I die"). A third category of people was mostly concerned with the improvement of the living conditions of their own ethnic group (a Luo fisherman: "move the capital to Kisumu"; a Maasai shopkeeper: "help Maasailand, build schools and water supplies"). The percentage of Maasai respondents in this category is particularly striking (more than one-third of them thinking first of improving the living conditions of their own group compared to a mean of 5 % for the total sample). This coincides again with the relatively great number of "parochials" among them, but also with a generally lower level of "national identity" which we noted earlier. A fourth category, by far the majority in all groups except for the Maasai, had the improvement of living conditions of all people at heart ("work for Kenya's growth wholeheartedly", "help the poor, make education available to everyone"). A sizeable minority was also concerned with specific political proposals ("stop corruption", "change the landholding system, some people have too much"; "promote unity among tribes"). Among these respondents the Kalenjin, Kikuyu, and Luyia are particularly numerous.

The number of those saying "can't imagine" or "don't know" to our question is particularly high among females (33 % compared to 23 % for males), and those with no formal education (37 % compared to 26 % for those with some secondary education). Age, on the other hand, is not a significant factor in this respect. The self-confidence

of the younger respondents giving a specific answer based on their generally better schooling is apparently matched in this case by the claim of seniority of elders in regard to their traditional position and authority. In terms of our "types of participants" the percentage of those not being able to give a concrete answer to this question is highest among the "parochials" (45 %), compared to 36 % and 35 % respectively for the "alienated" and the "less informed citizens", and only 17 % for the "active democrats".

Alternative orientations

In spite of the relative stability of Kenya's political system after independence,⁷³ the existing institutions are still fragile (compared for example to most countries in the industrialized world), and the dynamics of social change which have to be absorbed and channelled by them are so enormous that the continued existence of Kenya's present regime cannot be taken for granted. For this reason some alternative patterns of the country's future development have to be explored as well. The expected "objective" changes in social structure, due to economic and demographic factors, and the resulting dynamics are discussed elsewhere.⁷⁴ Here we are only concerned with the "subjective" aspects of certain alternatives to Kenya's present economic and political system as they are revealed in our interviews.

In the section on "class consciousness" we have

already discussed one significant feature of the economic system, namely the question whether possession of land should be communal or private; which in a rural country like this still is by far the most important means of production. There it turned out that a clear majority of all ethnic groups and classes is indeed in favor of private land ownership; the support of more communal forms of ownership comes not from any more "modern" socialists but from the more traditional sections of the population (the less "advanced" ethnic groups, older and illiterate people), whose significance tends to be further diminished in the future. However, an important limitation of this, if one may call it so, "capitalistic orientation" also became apparent; a sizeable majority of respondents opted in favor of restricting the size of agricultural land to the area a household or a family can cultivate. This, if put into effect, would indeed rule out large-scale forms of plantation agriculture which in any case are alien to most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, except for those areas with former or present European settlement.

In order to assess the preferences concerning Kenya's economic system and some possible alternatives, we asked one more question, this time relating to the aspect of foreign dominance: "Do you think that all business firms and companies in Kenya should be owned by Kenyans, or do you think it is necessary to allow foreigners a share in them in order to attract more foreign capital and expertise?" ⁷⁵ The responses are reported in table IV, 42:

TABLE IV,42

ROLE ACCORDED TO FOREIGN CAPITAL; BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage saying:		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle and upper classes	Kenyanize	58	(47)	(80)	(38)	(33)	(100)	--	50
	Allow foreign shares	42	(53)	(20)	(50)	(67)	--	(100)	49
	Don't know	--	--	--	(12)	--	--	--	(1)
Non-agric. proletaroids and sub-pro- letariat	Kenyanize	43	(40)	(50)	(60)	(45)	(100)	(50)	48
	Foreign shares	52	(60)	(50)	(20)	55	--	(50)	48
	Don't know	(5)	--	--	(20)	--	--	--	(4)
Non-agric. proletariat	Kenyanize	56	(67)	(100)	52	(50)	--	(100)	59
	Foreign shares	40	(33)	--	43	(44)	--	--	37
	Don't know	(4)	--	--	(5)	(6)	--	--	(4)
Agric. bour- geoisie	Kenyanize	39	(100)	(100)	92	50	92	75	70
	Foreign shares	61	--	--	(8)	50	(8)	(6)	29
	Don't know	--	--	--	--	--	--	(19)	(1)
Agric. pro- letaroids	Kenyanize	53	73	78	78	27	100	70	63
	Foreign shares	37	16	(12)	17	70	--	(11)	28
	Don't know	(10)	11	(10)	(5)	(3)	--	19	9
Agric. proletariat	Kenyanize	46	--	(100)	57	--	100	(100)	68
	Foreign shares	54	--	--	(43)	--	--	--	32
	Don't know	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Total ^a	Kenyanize	48	70	80	70	35	96	70	61
	Foreign shares	48	22	12	25	63	(4)	13	33
	Don't know	4	8	(8)	(5)	(2)	--	17	6
Weighted N		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

^aIncluding students
 Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents in a
 particular sub-category.

The picture we obtained thus is a rather uneven one: While in the non-agricultural middle classes and among the non-agricultural proletarioids we find the position split into approximately equal parts, in the proletariat and in the agricultural classes a clear majority of about two-thirds of respondents in these groups express their preference towards stronger measures of nationalization or "Kenyanization". An analysis by ethnic group shows that across all classes strong differences persist in this regard. Here, the Kikuyu, and in particular the Luo stand out in their relative openness to the question of foreign capital, even among the still more "backward" agricultural proletarioids. The other groups, on the other hand, take a rather uniform stand against foreign elements in Kenya's economy. This attitude is only marginably affected by age, sex, or place of residence of respondents (if class positions are controlled for), but the level of education exercises a strong independent influence (e.g. only 23 % among the illiterates are in favor of foreign shares in Kenya's economy compared to 37 % for those with some primary, and 49 % for those with some secondary education; Pearson's $r = 0.17$, $p < 0.001$).

Some caution is certainly appropriate if we are to interpret these results, but it seems that those groups who are in closer contact with outside elements tend to lose

their original xenophobia and adopt a more open-minded attitude. This is also confirmed to a certain extent by the responses to separate questions which we had included in a Bogardus-type "social distance"-scale. When asked "would you accept a European as citizen in this country?"⁷⁶ a clear majority of 55 % of respondents across all social classes would do so, 39 % were against it, and 6 % said "don't know". Those in favor of granting citizenship to Europeans are particularly numerous among the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luyia (reaching 73 % in the last group), but are least among the Maasai (only 26 % being in favor, 17 % saying "don't know"). Education again is a most important factor affecting this attitude (64 % of those with primary education, and 63 % of those with secondary education being in favor compared to only 43 % among illiterates; $r = 0.16$, $p < 0.001$). Sex (59 % of the males in favor compared to 49 % of the females; $r = 0.09$, $p < 0.001$) and place of residence (66 % of those living in town in favor compared to 53 % among those in the rural areas; $r = 0.08$, $p < 0.01$) are additional influences. In the case of Asians the willingness to accept them as citizens is split in approximately equal parts among the respondents (45 % for, 48 % against citizenship), but the relative position of the ethnic groups and classes and the effects of the demographic factors remain the same.

All this does not necessarily mean, however, that a criticism of neo-colonial aspects of Kenya's economy and society is not justified on the ground that the better-

educated and more open-minded groups welcome the involvement by foreigners. Indeed, the responses of the better-informed parts of the population may be an indication of their awareness of the necessity of international exchanges today. This is to a certain extent reflected in the wording of our question ("... allow a share in order to attract more capital and expertise"), but this does not imply any particular forms an involvement of this kind should take such as joint ventures, foreign aid, etc. In any case, this matter has to be judged by applying other criteria as well (such as the objective structural consequences for Kenya's economy, and also normative standards). However, the kind of consciousness expressed in these responses should not be overlooked either, and it certainly constitutes a fact of its own and possibly an important causal factor in Kenya's future relations with the outside world.

The most concrete alternative to Kenya's present economic and social system was explored when we asked directly: "Do you think Kenya should become a more socialist country, like Tanzania for example, or should the government continue with its present economic policies?"⁷⁷ Table IV, 43 presents the results by class and ethnic group:

/ Insert table IV, 43 /

TABLE IV, 43
PREFERENCE FOR A MORE SOCIALIST SYSTEM;
BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage saying		Kik.	Kan.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. bourg.	More socialist	-	-	-	-	(25)	-	-	(8)
	Continue with present system	(100)	(100)	-	(100)	(25)	-	(100)	(75)
	Don't know	-	-	-	-	(50)	-	-	(17)
Sala-riat	More socialist	(21)	-	(20)	(60)	(37)	-	(100)	23
	Continue	75	100	(80)	(40)	(63)	(100)	-	75
	Don't know	(4)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(2)
Non-agric. proletariat	More socialist	(4)	(8)	(25)	(10)	(22)	-	(50)	12
	Continue	34	92	(75)	90	72	-	-	81
	Don't know	(12)	-	-	-	(6)	-	(50)	7
Non-agric. proletaroids and sub-proletariat	More socialist	(8)	(40)	-	-	(25)	-	-	13
	Continue	90	(60)	(100)	(80)	70	(100)	(100)	33
	Don't know	(2)	-	-	(20)	(5)	-	-	(4)
Agric. bourgeoisie	More socialist	(17)	-	-	50	(37)	-	-	20
	Continue	72	(100)	(100)	50	63	100	63	74
	Don't know	(11)	-	-	-	-	-	(37)	6

TABLE IV, 43 CONTINUED

Agric. proletarioids	More socialist	(8)	17	13	49	34	-	(4)	19
	Continue	89	75	70	41	58	100	69	70
	Don't know	(3)	(8)	(17)	(10)	(8)	-	27	11
Agric. proletariat	More socialist	(18)	-	-	(14)	-	(20)	-	13
	Continue	73	-	-	86	-	80	(100)	81
	Don't know	(9)	-	(100)	-	-	-	-	(6)
Total ^a	More socialist	12	15	12	36	31	(3)	(5)	18
	Continue	82	79	74	59	62	97	69	74
	Don't know	6	(6)	14	(5)	6	-	26	8
Weighted N:		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

^a Including students

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category.

Here, the relative alienation of the two main peoples of western Kenya, the Luo and the Luvia, from the mainstream of the country's economy and political system again becomes apparent, about one-third in each group opting for a more socialist system. The lower percentages of the Maasai and Mijikenda being in favor of a continuation of the present economic policies find their explanation, as in some other instances before, in the relatively great number of parochials (saying "don't know") among them. The other ethnic groups deviate very little from each other, the identification of

the Kalenjin with Kenya's present system again being particularly pronounced. The differences by class are also striking: not surprisingly, the number of those being in favor of more socialist policies is smallest in the non-agricultural bourgeoisie, but among the salariat there is a sizeable minority with socialistic leanings. The proletariat, the non-agricultural proletaroids, and the sub-proletariat, on the other hand, contrary to what one might have expected in a western European industrial country for example, show very little inclination in this regard. This may be a reflection of the still very early stage of industrialization in Kenya; most workers in this category are unskilled and often illiterate (thus being closer to a "Lumpenproletariat" in Marx' terminology). The agricultural classes do not deviate very much from the mean.

Controls show that age, sex, and place of residence (again independent of the class position) do not significantly affect this attitude. A higher level of education works in two ways increasing both the number of those in favor of present policies (from 69 % among illiterates to 77 % for those with secondary education), and those opting for a more socialist system (from 18 % to 20 %), depending on the class position of the respondents. Thus among the better-educated members of the non-agricultural bourgeoisie the support for the present system remains high (100 % in this sub-category), while it decreases among the better-educated members of the more class-conscious salariat (to 66 %). Among students alone (most of them secondary school

students) the percentage of those in favor of socialist policies rises to 25 %, the highest percentage for all groups. As expected this attitude is also closely related to our index of "system support" : of those scoring low on this index 30 % are in favor of a more socialist system compared to 11 % among those scoring high ($r = 0.10$, $p < 0.001$).

Within Kenya's present economic and social system, but in the more directly political sphere and in view of the numerous changes in Kenya's party-system after independence and the continuing discussion in the country, a further alternative was suggested by asking: "Some people say that it is good to have only one political party in this country. Others say there should be two or more. What is your opinion, should there be several parties or a single one?" 78

/ Insert table IV, 44 /

These results are the most "mixed" ones among the alternatives discussed here, and some of the earlier "affinities" between certain groups on other issues (such as the question of "system support") do not seem to hold in this case. Thus the group most strongly in favor of a multi-party system are the Kalenjin, followed by the Luo. The Maasai, in spite of their lower absolute percentage of those in favor of several parties, must also be considered

TABLE IV,44

ATTITUDE TOWARDS KENYA'S PARTY SYSTEM; BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage in favor of:		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. bourgeoisie	Several parties	--	--	--	(33)	(25)	--	(100)	(25)
	Single party	(100)	(100)	--	(67)	(75)	--	--	(75)
	Don't know	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Salarariat	Several	42	77	(40)	(40)	(38)	(100)	(100)	52
	Single	(33)	(23)	(60)	(40)	(62)	--	--	36
	Don't know	(25)	--	--	(20)	--	--	--	(12)
Non-agric. proletariat	Several	44	(25)	--	48	72	--	(50)	45
	Single	44	(75)	(75)	43	(22)	--	--	44
	Don't know	(12)	--	(25)	(9)	(6)	--	(50)	(11)
Non-agric. proletaroids +sub-prole- tariat	Several	(23)	(40)	(50)	--	60	(100)	(100)	38
	Single	60	(60)	(50)	(80)	(40)	--	--	52
	Don't know	(17)	--	--	(20)	--	--	--	(10)
Agric. bour- geoisie	Several	78	(50)	--	75	88	100	81	80
	Single	--	(50)	(50)	(25)	(12)	--	--	10
	Don't know	22	--	(50)	--	--	--	(19)	10
Agric. pro- letaroids	Several	83	29	24	32	92	91	48	56
	Single	--	52	41	53	--	--	--	22
	Don't know	17	19	35	(15)	8	(9)	52	22
Agric. pro- letariat	Several	91	--	(100)	86	--	100	(100)	94
	Single	--	--	--	(14)	--	--	--	3
	Don't know	(9)	--	--	--	--	--	--	3
Total ^a	Several	66	33	25	50	83	97	57	60
	Single	17	54	43	41	12	--	--	24
	Don't know	17	13	32	9	5	3	43	16
Weighted N		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

^aIncluding students

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category.

to fall into this category since their lower level is entirely due to the great number of those answering "don't know" among them; not a single "laasai respondent expressed his preference for a single-party system. The existing party system finds its greatest support among the Kamba, "Mijikenda (the number of those saying "don't know" among them also being quite considerable), and Luvia. The position on this issue among the Kikuyu is neatly split between members of the agricultural classes (all of whom opted for several parties) and the non-agricultural ones (a greater number being in favor of a single party). On the whole, the non-agricultural classes have a greater number of those in favor of the present system, while the agricultural classes, except for the Kamba, "Mijikenda and Luvia, strongly prefer a multiparty system.

The differences according to age and sex (females tending to be somewhat more in favor of a single-party system) of respondents are not very pronounced except for the usual variations of those not being able to give an answer. The influence of education is a very mixed one: the number of those in favor of a multi-party system increased from 53 % among illiterates to 69 % among those with some primary education (the increase being almost entirely due to the smaller number of those saying "don't know" in the second category), but then decreased to 61 % for those with some secondary education (the overall correlation is, however, still highly significant: $r = 0.19$, $p < 0.001$). The place of residence of respondents, on the

other hand, affects this attitude in an opposite direction: 66 % of the rural respondents were in favor of a multi-party system, while 58 % of those in town prefer a single party ($r = 0.08$, $p < 0.01$).

The interpretation of these results calls for a great deal of caution. Certainly at least two main factors influence this attitude although they cannot always be clearly separated and may work in contradictory ways. One is a tradition of separate political parties in the main ethnic groups: KADU was very important in the past among the Kalenjin, and Maasai, for example, and KPU constituted a main instrument of Luo politics, the banning of which apparently is still considered as a major injustice by many members of this group. The other factor is a weighting of the more democratic principle of several parties against the actual experience the members of the different groups have had with intense forms of party competition. In Kenya so far this has almost entirely coincided with ethnic divisions as well. It seems that the more competitive spirit of the agricultural classes has given way to a more careful and perhaps more prudent attitude among a greater number in the non-agriculture groups and those with the highest level of education. The influence of this latter factor can be seen particularly well among the Luo, where 91 % of those in the agricultural classes, but only one-third of those in the non-agricultural middle classes are in favor of a multi-party system.

This interpretation is also supported by the verbatim answers to our follow-up question asking for the reason of the respondents' stand on this issue. Typically, those in favor of a multi-party system emphasized its democratic value and efficiency: "Democracy calls for argument before agreement"; "through opposition government will look more into citizens' problems"; "parties should check one another, so that they are both careful and active". The opposing view, on the other hand, stressed the theme of social unity and peace: "Many parties will confuse people"; "one party makes clear and firm decisions, no quarrels"; "many parties cause political unrest"; "many deaths occur due to conflict between rival parties".

A final alternative was then proposed by another projective question: "If, for some reason, you could no longer live in this country, what other country would you choose to live in?"⁷⁹ Almost half of those asked could not imagine living somewhere else at all ("I will not go anywhere", "I would kill myself"). One of our interviewers reported that "the respondent was very shocked and lost temper, thought government planned to kick him out". Of those who did give a concrete answer about half of the respondents across all ethnic groups and classes named a neighboring country (Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia), 5 % another African state, 8 % wanted to go to Great Britain or another western European country, 1 % to the Soviet Union, and 19 % to the United States. The rest gave a variety of other answers. The reasons given ranged from "it is similar

to Kenya", "people there are like us" (applying mainly to the neighboring states), to more concrete economic ("I hear they are rich") and political ("people are peaceful there", "it is a democratic country") motives. In the case of the United States one Luo peasant in particular had made up his mind: "I want to join the astronauts".

PART FIVE:

DYNAMIC ASPECTS OF SOCIETY

"Events strikingly analogous but taking place in different historical surroundings /lead/ to totally different results. By studying each of these forms of evolution separately and then comparing them one can easily find the clue to this phenomenon, but one will never arrive there by using as one's master key a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical".

Karl Marx

After examining the static aspects of Kenya's most important horizontal and vertical conflict-groups in both their "objective" and "subjective" dimensions, our analysis has come to the point where the dynamic forces affecting their pattern of interaction and future developments have to be considered. These include the relations between racial and ethnic groups, religious communities, and social classes, the extent of existing geographical and class mobility, and the structural changes caused by demographic and economic factors. This analysis again is mainly based on our survey material and available official statistics.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN:

CONFLICT-GROUP RELATIONS

This chapter starts with a brief analysis of race relations. Even though they have taken on a somewhat different quality after independence, they signal potential economic and political conflicts. This is followed by an examination of potential inter-ethnic conflicts. A third section deals with relationships between different religious communities, another potential source of social fragmentation and political conflict even though this aspect is less salient in Kenya. The fourth level of potential conflicts is that of Kenya's classes. Their interactions can be of an antagonistic, complementary or largely autonomous nature.¹

Race relations

As pointed out in the historical introduction² Kenya's society during the colonial era was characterized by a clear-cut, almost caste-like compartmentalization of the three main racial groups which occupied very distinct economic and political positions. The relatively small number of Europeans³ (56,000 in 1962) at the top of the social ladder were the masters in almost every regard. They controlled large-scale

agriculture, most industrial enterprises, large export-import companies, and the top administrative positions. Most members of the different Asian communities (177,000 persons in 1962) were active in wholesale and retail trading, a number of crafts, and many middle-level administrative and clerical positions in both the public and private sectors. The African population came last in practically all respects, either still pursuing traditional subsistence agriculture, as laborers on the large farms, or as low-level employees in commerce and industry, private households or the public sector.

With the attainment of independence this rigid social hierarchy began to erode when Africans were able to move into the leading political positions, and also into more important economic roles.⁴ Only about 10 % of the resident Europeans and approximately one-third of the Asians opted for Kenyan citizenship at this time. Only a minority of both groups therefore could expect a more permanent position in Kenya's future development, if the constitutional provisions were adhered to. With the transfer of most large-scale "mixed" farms into African hands under various forms of organization and ownership an important area of conflict in European-African relations has largely disappeared. The European domination of plantations and other large-scale commercial, financial and industrial enterprises, usually controlled by multi-national corporations, remains relatively untouched, ^{however,} within Kenya's increasingly "neo-colonial" economy. Measures of "Kenyanization" initiated by the government by acquiring capital shares of some companies through

"joint ventures" and by "Africanizing" a certain amount of management positions have had relatively little impact on the total number of Europeans in the country.⁵

The remaining Asian population was affected more dramatically. Many of the positions occupied by this group, requiring only a limited amount of skill and capital, were within the reach of aspiring Africans. In the commercial sector this pressure was increasingly felt and many of the traditional rural "dukawallahs" (shopkeepers) and many small urban commercial enterprises closed or were taken over by Africans. The "Trade Licensing Act" of 1967 and the subsequent "quit notices" to many non-citizen Asian traders were particularly instrumental in this regard. Approximately one-third of the original Asian population were forced or decided to leave during this period, about half of the remainder having acquired citizenship. But even Asian citizens employed in the public service or large commercial and industrial institutions were affected by the policy of "corrective equity" pursued by the government. They were assigned to less responsible positions or were not considered for promotions at the expected time. The position of many members of the Asian community was difficult and uneasy as they were caught between deteriorating opportunities in Kenya and a very uncertain future elsewhere.⁶

The rigid pattern of economic and political segregation during the colonial period fostered prejudices and resentment. While we cannot deal with all the stereotypes and resentful attitudes,⁷ some insight concerning the "social distance"

expressed by different sectors of the African population can be gained from responses to our survey.⁸ We included a Bogardus-type "social distance"-scale.⁹ Responses to this scale, including a question about citizenship, are summarized in Table V,1:

/Insert Table V,1/

Personal friendships with members of other racial groups are acceptable for a majority of the African respondents. Acceptance of kinship by marriage is a different matter. Minorities said they were willing to accept either Europeans or Asians. On citizenship opinion is divided approximately equally. In all instances the acceptance of Europeans is significantly higher than for Asians. When we compare the mean social distance expressed by the first four items in our rural sample with those for members of different ethnic groups,¹² the total distances for both racial groups are considerably above those for ethnic groups. In a few instances the distance between two particular ethnic groups (e. g. between the Kikuyu and Luo) may be greater than the one between the respective group and Europeans or Asians.

Social distance varies by ethnic group. While Luyia, Luo and Kikuyu seem to be relatively open-minded, the Kalenjin and, in particular, the Maasai are most restricted in their acceptance. Distinctions by class are also remarkable. A majority of the salariat would accept Europeans for marriage.

TABLE V, 1
RACE RELATIONS

Percentage accepting	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Oth.	Tot.
<u>Europeans as:</u>									
personal friends	67	58	63	81	74	65	51	53	67
close kin	42	53	50	55	45	26	26	24	43
fellow citizen	62	52	54	75	64	49	26 ¹¹⁾	49	57
Mean social distance (last three items) ^a	1.19	1.35	1.32	0.88	1.11	1.54	1.80	1.69	1.27
Mean social distance (first 4 items, rural sample only)	1.62	1.59	1.79	0.93	1.13	2.15	2.32	--	1.60
<u>Asians as:</u>									
personal friends	54	52	54	75	67	62	26	50	57
close kin	36	39	40	39	36	11	9	21	32
fellow citizen	52	35	46	65	56	43	16 ¹¹⁾	49	47
Mean social distance (last 3 items)	1.48	1.71	1.59	1.19	1.24	1.78	2.32	1.74	1.55
Mean social distance (first 4 items)	2.03	2.05	2.14	1.37	1.32	2.44	3.16	--	2.67
Weighted N:	269	156	96	157	194	89	108	34	1103

^a The last three items, which are comparable for both samples and which include a question about citizenship, were added here and the mean was computed in each case. This can range from a possible value of 0 (i.e. saying "yes" to all questions) to a value of 3 (saying "no" on all items).

Only 45 % of the agricultural bourgeoisie, 41 % of agricultural proletarioids and 32 % of the agricultural proletariat would do so (the respective values for Asians are considerably lower). The mean social distance expressed by our last three items differs as follows: 1.01 for members of the salariat, 1.20 for the agricultural bourgeoisie, 1.36 for agricultural proletarioids, and 1.61 for the agricultural proletariat (the values for Asians are 1.51, 1.49, 1.59, and 1.84 respectively). Education (56 % of those with some secondary education accepting Europeans for marriage compared to 43 % for those with some primary education and 39 % for illiterates), place of residence (48 % for those living in town compared to 44 % in the rural areas), and sex (46 % for males compared to 39 % for females) are also important. The Pearson correlation between the aggregated scores for the last three items concerning Europeans and education is -0.20 , $p < 0.001$ (Asians: -0.08 , $p < 0.01$) compared to values of 0.09 , $p < 0.01$ (Asians: 0.04 , $p < 0.05$) for place of residence, and 0.11 , $p < 0.001$ (Asians 0.06 , $p < 0.05$) for sex. Age is of relatively less importance ($r = -0.06$, $p < 0.05$; Asians: -0.06 , $p < 0.05$). An analysis of variance for the responses on our last three items shows the variance explained by each factor to be as follows (values of beta): ethnic group 0.20 ; class 0.12 ; education 0.12 ; sex 0.11 . The values for Asians are 0.28 , 0.13 , 0.01 , and 0.09 respectively.

What do these results mean for the future of race relations in Kenya? They demonstrate, on the attitudinal level,

a decrease of racial distance expressed by African members of the non-agricultural middle and upper classes and those with higher levels of education, even though the absolute levels are still considerable. This is not surprising if we look at Kenya's historical development. After independence a certain identity of interests developed between the indigenous dominant classes and members of the expatriate communities. But even within the same class the cultural gaps between members of different races and the relative isolation of each are still remarkable, as any perceptive observer of Kenya's post-independence era will testify.

In addition to attitudinal aspects "structural" ones have to be considered. The decrease in total numbers of Europeans from 58,000 in 1962 to 41,000 in 1969 and of Asians from 177,000 in 1962 to 139,000 in 1969 has alleviated the situation somewhat, in particular because most of the emigrants came from sectors where the racial domination of their respective group had been most conspicuous.¹³ Greater occupational differentiation¹⁴ has worked in the same direction. A greater number of Asians, for example, can now be found among members of the professions in both the private and public sectors, in management positions and in manufacturing. Here their qualifications are more objectively defined and their success can not be attributed so easily to discriminatory practices. They also find themselves in individually competitive situations in each of these sectors and are far from being the sole dominating group. Most Europeans now also consider their position as a

temporary one (only about 4,000 having become citizens). They are employees of multinational companies or members of international organizations or some foreign aid institutions.

Thus the more immediate racial tensions have been somewhat reduced. Nevertheless there can be no doubt that measures like the forceful expulsion of Asians from Uganda during President Amin's "economic war" in 1972 have been popular among considerable parts of Kenya's African population. The subsequent chaos and Amin's tyrannic rule over other foreigners (including Africans from Kenya) and his own countrymen, however, may have given a greater number of people second thoughts. The Asians in Kenya remain in a very vulnerable position, in particular because their internal divisions along linguistic, religious and caste ("jati") lines have never allowed them to act as a homogenous group. They cannot count on any significant support from abroad either. On the other hand, a majority of this group is dependent on staying in Kenya because in view of the very restrictive immigration policies of most countries, they have hardly anywhere else to go. A mutual, even if tacit, arrangement between the Asian and African members of the urban middle and upper classes thus may be in the best interest of each. This is what in fact seems to have happened in recent years, at least for the time being.

The position of the Europeans is somewhat different. They have been relatively little affected so far by any measures of "corrective equity" initiated by the government. Public resentment has not been so strong in the post-indepen-

dence period. This is evident from our survey. Apparently a greater number of people have learned to distinguish between the "good" and the "bad" ones among the "Wazungu". In any competitive situation "European" interests are represented in a more or less unified manner. They receive strong support from foreign sources, most notably from the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and other Western countries. This carries considerable weight under Kenya's still largely neo-colonial circumstances. In any case, most Europeans can be quickly absorbed in their home countries without much material or personal loss if things should turn to the worse. Thus they continue to live quite comfortably, "provided they keep their mouths shut and a suitcase packed" as one observer noted.¹⁵ If the internal criticism of Kenya's economic dependence on the outside world should become stronger in the course of time,¹⁶ the position of many Europeans will be affected, too. One finding in our survey also points into this direction. While on the whole those with higher levels of education tended to express a lower social distance, students in our sample showed a clear division between attitudes concerning friendship or marriage (which most of them favored) and the question of citizenship (to which a majority was opposed). If such a position were translated into actual politics, a major shift in Kenya's present pattern of government and its ruling coalition would be required.

Ethnic Relations

While the salience of racial issues has decreased somewhat in the years after independence, the relations between the different ethnic groups have been of foremost concern. Unlike traditional "tribal" relations (which mainly consisted of occasional cattle-raids between some groups and other forms of traditional warfare, as e. g. between sub-groups of the Maasai and their Kamba, Kikuyu or "Kalenjin" neighbors, a limited amount of trade, and, in some instances, also inter-marriage,¹⁷ contemporary "tribalism"¹⁸ is a new phenomenon in a modern context. It is mainly concerned with the distribution of economic benefits and positions of political influence in the new "nation-state", the frontiers of which were solely determined by the colonial powers, creating interaction among groups which had little or nothing to do with each other in the past or transforming entirely their former relations. As we have pointed out before,¹⁹ none of the ethnic groups discussed in this study constituted a single coherent social and political unit in the past. But there can be no doubt that identifications with a perceived common ethnic origin, even if these refer to newly created units such as the "Abaluyia" and the "Kalenjin", form the basis of some of the most salient and, it seems, most persistent horizontal conflict-groups in Kenya today. These conflict-groups must be seen within the overall economic and political context.


One set of questions in the survey was concerned with the "social distance" expressed in terms of acceptance or re-

jection of a number of attitudinal statements. In a Bogardus type scale²⁰ we asked respondents whether they would accept a . . . (11 of Kenya's main ethnic groups, except the one of the respondent, were to be inserted here) as a neighbor in the area, to buy land in the area (for rural people only), to work together on the same job (for urbanites), as a good personal friend, or to close kinship by marriage.²¹ The results for the rural sample are presented in the histograms of Table V, 2:

/ Insert Table V, 2 /

These histograms show a number of features to be expected from our discussion in Part Two. They also seem plausible in the light of available ethnographic literature. Thus the distance expressed between Kikuyu and Embu-Meru is very small. The attitudes of Kikuyu and Kamba also reflect their perceived similarity and their traditionally relatively friendly relations. The greatest mutual distance is shown by the Kamba and Maasai. This undoubtedly is a reflection of their long history of mutual cattle-raids and warfare. The high degree of mutual rejection expressed by the Kikuyu and Luo is also noteworthy. This must be largely attributed, not living traditionally in adjacent areas, to the politically competitive situation between the two groups in post-independence Kenya, in particular after the secession from KANU of a major Luo group led by Oginga Odinga in 1966 and the assassination in 1969 of Tom Mboya, the last remaining prominent Luo politician

TABLE V, 2

ETHNIC DISTANCE HISTOGRAMS; SELF-ASSESSMENT^a^aFour items, rural sample only.

in the government. ²² For the Kikuyu the traditional lack of both male and female circumcision among the Luo also plays a role in their rejection, in particular as far as marriage is concerned. This also became evident in a number of their verbatim statements. Some other groups, like the Mijikenda and Luyia, indicate relatively little variation in preferences towards other groups.

As we have noted previously, ²³ the relatively high level of rejection of almost all other groups by the Kalenjin, and particularly by the Maasai, seems to be an indication of their traditional and contemporary "self-centeredness". The total "outgroup rejection", on the other hand, i.e. the total mean of the social distance expressed towards one group by all the others, shows a somewhat different pattern:

TABLE V, 3
OUTGROUP REJECTION ^a

	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Embu	Kisii	Som.	Turk.
Total mean	0.92	1.09	1.03	1.06	1.32	0.99	1.25	0.86	1.17	1.45	1.37

^a Rural sample only, mean of 4 items.

Here the relatively high degree of rejection expressed towards the Luo (only the geographically very remote Turkana and Somali receive higher scores) is remarkable. Again the fact that they are the only "Western Nilotic" people living in Kenya who traditionally do not practice circumcision seems


to be the most plausible explanation for this rejection. The Maasai, a mostly pastoral group with a traditional reputation for fierce warriorhood and a number of other customs alien to present-day agriculturalists, come next in the level of rejection. Differences for most other groups are not very pronounced, the central peoples of the Embu, Kikuyu, and Kalenjin being least rejected by others.

Responses given by members of different ethnic groups also show a substantial degree of overall reciprocity. Correlations between total received and total given ratings range between a value of 0.83 for the Kikuyu and 0.20 for the Mijikenda, the average for all groups being 0.51.²⁴ An analysis of some of the factors contributing to these ratings reveals that expressed social distance in our rural sample is strongly correlated with objective similarity between the different groups as established by a number of ethnographers and with the level of economic advancement reached by these groups.²⁵ Thus the correlations for similarity and the given ratings range between 0.24 for the Maasai and 0.72 for the Kamba, the average being 0.56. Only the correlation for the Kalenjin (-0.79) deviates from this pattern. The average correlation between group similarity and received ratings is 0.42. Level of advancement has an average correlation of 0.46 for the given ratings and a correlation of 0.36 for the received ones. The actual physical distance between the traditional settlement areas of each group, on the other hand, is not significantly related to either the given or the received social distance ratings. This latter finding probably

is due to the fact that all groups considered here today interact (and compete!) on Kenya's national scene irrespective of the distance between their respective home areas and the kind of contacts they may have had traditionally. ²⁶

These findings can be graphically presented in the form of a "cluster analysis". ²⁷ Even though a presentation of this kind has to be treated with a great deal of caution, ²⁸ it has the advantage of being readily intelligible even for untrained observers. The basic results of this analysis are summarized in the following table:

TABLE V,4
ETHNIC GROUP CLUSTERING



This pattern seems to be in line with what could have been expected from the "objective" similarities of these

groups and their relationships in former times. 29

In our survey we could not possibly deal with all aspects of "ethnocentrism" and ethnic relations which may be relevant in the Kenyan situation. A few more insights, however, can be gained from the last two items of our scale, which were equally relevant for rural and urban respondents and which included the "hardest" item, intermarriage. The results of the mutual perceptions in this case are reported in Table V, 5:

TABLE V, 5
ETHNIC DISTANCE CHART; MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS^a

	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.
Kik.	--						
Kam.	0.15 ^b 0.47	--					
Mij.	0.71 0.59	0.52 0.41	--				
Luy.	0.51 0.65	0.38 0.33	0.45 0.33	--			
Luo	0.92 0.90	0.53 0.37	0.46 0.65	0.45 0.56	--		
Kal.	0.24 0.67	0.97 0.19	0.75 0.28	0.62 0.43	1.21 0.56	--	
Maas.	0.96 0.67	1.57 0.86	0.88 0.73	1.32 0.57	1.42 0.72	1.07 0.67	--

^a Last two items only, total weighted sample.

^b The upper figure in each case represents the distance expressed by the ethnic group marked on the vertical line, the lower figure the one expressed by the group on the horizontal line.

On the whole, the relative distances do not diverge very much from the pattern observed for the rural sample alone.³¹ When we analyze some of the independent factors influencing these results we find that, taken altogether, age is not significant. Level of education and place of residence, on the other hand, do show a weak but still significant relationship, higher education ($r = 0.08$, $p < 0.01$), and urban residence ($r = 0.07$, $p < 0.01$) both decrease the distance expressed by respondents. Sex is similarly related ($r = 0.08$, $p < 0.01$), females indicating a somewhat greater social distance towards members of other ethnic groups than males. One additional interesting finding is the fact that on the third item in our scale (personal friendship) females, on the average, expressed a significantly greater distance than males ($r = 0.10$, $p < 0.001$). This is a stronger difference than the one expressed on the fourth item ("intermarriage"; $r = 0.05$, $p < 0.05$). The socially restricted role of women, particularly in the rural areas, which did not allow for contacts with people from outside one's own restricted community seems to be responsible for this attitude, even though the sex of a prospective "friend" was not specified in our question. An analysis of variance performed on the results for all groups shows that "ethnicity" remains by far the strongest single explanatory factor affecting social distance (the average value of beta, when the other independent factors are adjusted for, is 0.41). Social class (beta = 0.15), sex (beta = 0.09), and level of education (beta = 0.06) are of comparatively less importance.

A section of the population which has become of increasing importance within the overall pattern of ethnic relations in recent years ³² is composed of "non-Kenyan Africans". These consist of more or less permanent immigrants from the neighboring countries who have been attracted to Kenya for a number of reasons such as the apparent economic prosperity (this is probably true for many Tanzanians, Somali, and Sudanese), or who had to leave their countries for political reasons (as people from Rwanda or a considerable number of Ugandans). They numbered approximately 60,000 persons altogether at the time of the last census, by far the highest percentage coming from Tanzania and Uganda. Many are "non-registered aliens" who are not allowed to enter legal employment or obtain official licenses. They therefore can be found in the urban "informal" sector, including a number of prostitutes and people engaged in criminal activities.

In our social distance scale we probed for the kind of relationship the respondents were willing to have with Tanzanians and Ugandans. Even though these attitudes are not necessarily an expression only of attitudes towards non-citizen Africans living in Kenya, but probably also reflect the more general perception of people living in the neighboring countries, our findings can serve as an indication for internal Kenyan ethnic relations in this regard. It turned out that the mean social distance expressed towards Tanzanians and Ugandans is of about the same order of magnitude as that for the relatively more isolated groups within Kenya such as the Turkana or Maasai (the overall mean for the first four items in our rural sample is 1.24 for Tanzanians and 1.28 for Ugandans), but

considerably lower than that for members of other races. For the last three items (including the question on citizenship) the mean social distance for our total weighted sample is 0.95 for Tanzanians and 1.00 for Ugandans, compared to values of 1.27 and 1.55 for Europeans and Asians respectively. The independent factors influencing this pattern are more or less of the same order of magnitude reported for the other groups. As far as the acceptance of citizenship alone is concerned 62 % of the respondents expressed a favorable attitude towards Tanzanians and 58 % towards Ugandans, compared with values of 57 % for Europeans and 47 % for Asians.

Even though data presented here cover only some aspects of the more general problem of "ethnicity" and ethnic relations in Kenya, we think the information concerning the "distance" expressed between the various groups and the analytical insight as to the independent factors influencing this pattern are significant. As we have shown above, higher levels of education and urban residence influence this pattern in only a limited way. In some instances better-educated urbanites may be more ethnicity-oriented and "tribalistic" in modern competitive situations than their less-educated counterparts in the rural areas. Undoubtedly, ethnicity, as expressed in the reported attitudes, is a persistent phenomenon which combines aspects of traditional relations with a competitive situation under Kenya's modern conditions in a very peculiar way.

The kind of conflict potential which may be mobilized along this line can well be illustrated by a reported incident

among the Kipsigis, a sub-group of the Kalenjin, in 1961, i.e. two years before Kenya became independent and which deserves to be quoted at some lengths:

Late one afternoon in October of 1961, an old Kipsigis woman climbed to the top of a hill some 200 yards above her hut. Facing south, she uttered a short, loud cry, repeating it until it was picked up by another woman on a hill about a quarter of a mile away who, in turn, faced south and aimed the same cry at a hill almost half a mile from where she stood. Before morning, the ancient war-cry of the Kipsigis had travelled 75 miles from Lumbwa on the northern edge of the Reserve to Kapkimolwa on the south. Before nightfall, 10,000 warriors were massed at several hundred points on roads and tracks throughout the Reserve. Many of them carried shields and spears and had their faces daubed with paint, others had only a bow and poisoned arrows, a short sword, or a club. Except for a few Kipsigis who lived near to the place where the cry had originated, none knew what had caused the alarm. But the warriors stayed and milled around, speculating excitedly about whether "the day" had come, until the tribal police explained that a young European farmer had fired his gun "in the air" in order to encourage some Kipsigis to get off his land, and that one of the men seemed to have been wounded slightly in the shoulder. This was not the news they had expected (in fact a rumor had already begun to go around to the effect that some Kikuyu laborers had burned down 14 Kipsigis huts). When it came they revealed a mixture of relief and disappointment as they broke up and returned to their homes. This was the first time since the Pax Britannica that the war-cry had rocketed from one end of Kipsigis country to the other. In fact, it was the first time since 1936 - when the theft of a few cattle led to a small, localized mobilization against the Luo in the border village of Sondu - that the cry had been heard at all. Yet ten thousand men, many of them born after the Sondu incident, rushed out of their homes prepared to defend themselves or to attack an unknown enemy.

While this form of mobilization is dependent on existent social structure (which is still largely operative among the Maasai and some other pastoralist groups), it may also take new forms in a different context. Oathing ceremonies among large sections of the Kikuyu in fall 1969 when the country was

rife with ethnic tensions, ³⁴ which imitated earlier practices of the "Mau Mau" era, certainly are a case in point.

"Social distance" expressed by responses to our scale does not necessarily coincide with the "political distance" between groups at any given point in time. This may change much more quickly under Kenya's system of shifting coalitions, at both the ethnic and the class level. Thus the main support for KANU in the late 1950s and early sixties came from the Kikuyu and Luo communities, even though "social distance" as expressed in rates of inter-marriage and similar aspects probably was not much smaller at that time. KADU, on the other hand, was mainly based on the smaller and more geographically dispersed groups of the Mijikenda, Kalenjin, Maasai, and some sections of the Luyia which "socially" did not have very much in common. These alliances changed rapidly after KADU merged with KANU in 1964, also including now the Kamba-based APP, and again with the split of the Luo-led KPU in 1966. After the dissolution of KPU in 1969 an alliance based on support from the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Kamba and Maasai areas has dominated the government as a, even if somewhat lop-sided, "grand coalition" under Kenya's de facto one-party system, including also some representatives from the Luo, Luyia and Mijikenda communities. The social distance between these groups or some of their important parts did not disappear under these circumstances. The fuller implications of these manifestations of ethnicity in modern Kenya can only be grasped when we confront them with the class situation.

Religious relations

A third possible formation of conflict-groups at the "communalistic" level is the religious one. We are not concerned here with any theological issues or with the specific relations of particular church organizations. Religious affiliation, in particular where different communities are regionally segregated, is an important source of conflict in many countries. The historic cases of the Netherlands^{and} Germany, or contemporary conflicts in Northern Ireland, Lebanon or India are only a few examples where this factor plays a distinct and important role.

In Kenya "churches" in the modern sense were established only with the advent of colonialism beginning in the second half of last century, except for the older influence of Islam along the coast. In 1900 there were approximately 5,000 professing Christians and 100,000 professing Muslims out of a total population of about 3 million. Today these figures have changed dramatically and approximately 70 % of the total population belong to some kind of Christian organization, compared to 6 % for Muslims. The rest still follow traditional beliefs.³⁵ The impact of missionizing efforts has been uneven. Some groups, such as the Luyia or Luo, have been almost entirely christianized, others, such as the Maasai and other pastoralist groups, have remained largely untouched.³⁶ The great variety of missions and the large number of local "African Independent Churches" which have sprung up in recent years (there are more than 200 (!) different churches and sects in Kenya today) have been responsible for the fact that

in almost all areas a great diversity of religious organizations can be found, irrespective of existing regional or ethnic boundaries. The only major exception is the traditional concentration of Muslims along the coast. Religious affiliation thus is a "cross-cutting" factor which in most instances does not coincide with conflict-groups based on other major forms of social identification.

One exception in this regard seems to have occurred, however, at the local and intra-ethnic level, where, as Gideon Mutiso emphasizes,³⁷ some important "seeds" of present-day social stratification have been laid by the missions through the early economic and political support of converts. These "asomi" (literally: the "learned ones", even though many of them remained only semi-literate) initially were recruited often, according to Mutiso, among the "pariahs" or at least from some of those more marginal to their own societies. Their new, though rather rudimentary skills of reading, writing and speaking English or Swahili made them useful to the missionaries and the colonial administrators as intermediaries between the new authorities and the masses. Soon they were able to apply their new knowledge and support to adopting improved methods of agriculture for the establishing of small trading posts and other businesses. In these endeavors they often enjoyed preferential treatment by the colonial authorities (e.g. when land rights or business licenses were to be granted). In this way and within a relatively short period of time there emerged a new indigenous economically successful group of persons most of whom were loyal to the colonial regime. Compared to the pre-colonial period their status had been

reversed. This line of reasoning provides a plausible explanation for one of the structural aspects of the impact of Christianity in Kenya and possibly in other parts of Africa as well, but it still needs more empirical evidence. In Kenya it seems to apply fairly well to the situation among the Kikuyu and perhaps among some Kamba in parts of Machakos district, but not to the people of western Kenya who were missionized in the same way and where a social differentiation of this kind has not become equally apparent.

Local class differences which coincide with religious lines, given the great diversity of churches in almost all districts, cannot be readily transformed into the mobilization of conflict-groups at the national level. The overall conflict potential of groupings of this kind thus seems to be relatively weak. The impact of rival religious organizations on the pattern of Kenya's post-independence politics has been a rather minor one.

This observation is confirmed by responses obtained in our survey. The most important findings in this regard are summarized in Table V, 6:

/ Insert Table V, 6 /

TABLE V, 6
RELIGIOUS RELATIONS^a

	<u>Ratings given to:</u>			
	Catholics	Protestants	Muslims	Other
Catholics	-	0.34	1.08	0.85
Anglicans	0.42	-	0.83	0.50
African Indep.	0.63	-	1.06	0.66
Other Christians	0.40	-	1.09	0.67
Muslims	0.90	0.94	-	0.92
Traditionals	1.17	1.14	1.89	-
Total:	0.40	0.34	1.05	0.81

^a 4 items, total weighted sample.

The average mean social distance expressed between the different religious groupings thus is low compared to that between most ethnic and racial groups. This is true in particular for members of the Catholic and the different Protestant communities which are dispersed over most parts of the country, whereas the somewhat higher figure for Muslims and Traditionalists coincides with the stronger ethnic concentration of these groups. Of the independent factors affecting these ratings sex proves, as was the case for our findings concerning racial and ethnic relations, to be only weakly related, females expressing a somewhat greater distance ($r = 0.08$, $p < 0.01$). Urban residence ($r = 0.10$, $p < 0.001$) and higher level of education ($r = 0.16$, $p < 0.001$), on the other hand, both tend to decrease the expressed distance. Age is not significantly related. An analysis of variance indicates

that, on the average, the relative influence of the most important non-interval and non-dichotomous independent variables on this measure is a beta of 0.24 for religious affiliation, 0.25 for ethnic group and 0.13 for social class.

Class Relations

Class relations potentially cut across the relations between different forms of communalistic groups. As we have emphasized we prefer to define social "class" in an "objective" manner by taking a person's relationship to the means of production in the different sectors of the economy as the most important criterion. In this way objectively defined and theoretically meaningful borderlines can be drawn between a society's most important economic conflict-groups. Relations between these classes can then be determined in an equally objective manner based on their respective economic interests and the exchanges taking place between them. Not in all instances, however, will members of these classes be aware of their objective conditions. Many other factors may intervene, for example those derived from more communalistic identities, which prevent the emergence of a clear-cut "objective" class consciousness. It is usually only in very particular situations, such as wide-spread economic or political unrest or when a class has achieved a very high level of organization, that the objective interests and the level of consciousness of most class members coincide.

In the case of the agricultural classes no immediate

intrinsic conflict of interest exists between the agricultural bourgeoisie and the agricultural proletarioids. Both groups stand, as owners, in a similar relationship to the means of production and have a common interest vis-à-vis the non-agricultural classes, e.g. as far as the level of prices for agricultural products is concerned. One possible conflict may arise, however, when the agricultural bourgeoisie attempt to acquire more land and threaten to displace the proletarioids. If the latter are members of pastoral groups who are pushed further into the less fertile grazing areas (as has happened already in some parts of Narok district, for example), this may constitute an important conflict potential. Conflicts which arise in such instances then very often are further aggravated by different ethnic identities, so that vertical and horizontal conflict groups may become "super-imposed", making this relationship all the more antagonistic and, possibly, violent.

If the displacement concerns neighboring agricultural proletarioids who usually are members of the same ethnic group, the conflict, when the proletarioids are made completely landless, strictly speaking becomes one between the agricultural bourgeoisie and the agricultural proletariat. The relationships between these classes (one being owners of the means of production and the others not) are antagonistic, by definition, but within the small-scale farming sector conflicts along this line tend to be relatively muted due to traditional attitudes and relationships which tend to prevail here, and due, in some instances, to the chance for some individual

social mobility. Instead the major line of conflict runs between the agricultural proletariat on large-scale farms and plantations and the capitalist owners of these enterprises. Here some class action indeed seems not unlikely.

For the rest a more general conflict exists between the propertied agricultural classes, as far as they sell some of their produce, and the other food consuming groups of society. The exact distributive mechanisms in this regard are influenced by a number of factors such as official pricing regulations, cooperative organizations, marketing boards, other trading institutions, and, for exported products, general world market conditions. During most years of the post-independence period a definite deterioration of the agricultural "terms of trade" vis-à-vis the non-agricultural classes has taken place. Thus the price index for agricultural products shows a decrease of 12.8 % between 1964 and 1969, while the cost of living index for farmers and the prices for agricultural inputs rose by 13.3 % in the same period.³⁸ This negative trend continued until 1975 (there was another decline of 12 % in the farmers' terms of trade between 1972 and 1975). Only in 1976 and 1977, due to favorable tea and coffee prices on international markets, was a substantial improvement recorded.³⁹ It is doubtful whether this development will be of long duration. As far as domestic food prices are concerned, a long term deterioration of the income position of the agricultural classes compared to that of the non-agricultural ones seems to be evident.

These objective conflicts of interest between the

agricultural and the non-agricultural classes have not led so far to any widespread dissatisfaction, except for some occasional discussions of specific price regulations by the government, as e.g. those for maize flour ("posho") or milk. One main reason for this is the very close link which still exists between substantial parts of Kenya's agricultural and non-agricultural population. Thus one survey, conducted in Nairobi in the spring of 1971, revealed that almost 89 % of all males who had some income regularly remitted money to members of their family in the countryside. The average sum remitted amounted to approximately 20 % of the urban wage bill.⁴⁰ In our sample 24 % of the agricultural bourgeoisie and 27 % of the agricultural proletarioids reported that they receive some cash income from secondary sources such as remittances by relatives. On the other hand, 40 % of the members of the non-agricultural classes stated that they regularly receive food supplies from the rural areas.⁴¹

A further link between agricultural producers and members of the non-agricultural bourgeoisie in the countryside lies in the fact that about 75 % of the owners of Kenya's non-agricultural rural enterprises still derive some part of their income from agriculture and often investments into non-agricultural activities are made from profits derived from successful cash-crop farming.⁴² The agricultural/non-agricultural and rural/urban divisions between Kenya's classes thus are by no means clear-cut. This cross-cutting influence has made their potentially antagonistic relationship a rather muted one so far. In the longer run, however, given the continuing

formation of landless groups in the rural areas and of a more permanent urban proletariat, ⁴³ more pronounced conflicts between the agricultural and the non-agricultural classes may become possible.

Among the non-agricultural classes the classic conflict situation is that between capitalists (or the bourgeoisie in general, in a wider sense of the term) and the proletariat. Its most common manifestations concern the regular fixing of wage rates and agreements on work conditions. The workers' ultimate weapon in this regard is the strike. The frequency of the use of this weapon in the most important sectors in Kenya's post-independence period can be gleaned from Table V, 7:

TABLE V, 7
WORK RELATIONS

Work stoppages	1963	'64	'65	'66	'67	'68	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76
Man-Days Lost ('ooo)														
Agriculture	63	99	24	33	28	23	15	15	6	10	15	11	3	1
Priv. Industry	161	48	312	38	35	17	23	34	9	29	24	101	6	23
Public Serv.	11	21	10	57	56	8	40	1	18	3	3	16	-	2
Total	235	168	346	128	109	48	88	50	33	42	42	128	9	26
No. of Disputes	230	267	200	155	138	93	124	84	246	466	83	123	26	44
No. of Workers involved ('ooo)	54	56	106	43	30	20	38	19	14	28	14	22	4	13

Source: Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1972, p. 253, and Statistical Abstract 1977, p. 315.

As we can see, there is a general decline of the number of man-days lost and the number of workers involved from the

immediate post-independence years to the period of the mid-1970s. This decline is particularly pronounced in agriculture, indicating some of the structural changes in the large-scale farming sector, but it can also be observed, with minor fluctuations, in private industry and the public services. One reason for this trend is the fact that union activities increasingly have come under government control since the late sixties.⁴⁴ Another more general reason must be seen to lie in the situation of a general and increasing labor surplus, in particular as far as unskilled workers are concerned.⁴⁵ The swelling ranks of this "industrial reserve army" thus contribute to the generally low wage level putting Ricardo's "iron law of wages" into effect once more. This is particularly remarkable since real wages, which tended to increase slightly in all sectors during the sixties,⁴⁶ show a marked decline since the early 70's in face of continuing high rates of inflation. Thus wage income in real terms declined by almost 20 % on the average between 1971 and 1976, only employees in the public sector being slightly better off.⁴⁷ What this means in all its consequences for future conflicts remains to be seen.

These two basic conflict-groups, capitalists and proletariat, in the non-agricultural sectors are supplemented by a number of others who stand in a somewhat different relationship towards the means of production. There is first of all the managerial class which under modern industrial conditions exercises most of the day-to-day decision-making functions in large-scale enterprises. Even though the members of this group are not the owners of the means of production themselves, or only in a relatively minor way, their interests can be considered to be largely identical with those of

the capitalists proper. One conceivable level of conflict, however, given the dominance of multi-national corporations in many Third World countries today, lies between the interests of national (which is often in the hands of local owner-entrepreneurs) and international capital (which is mostly controlled by managers seconded from abroad). In Kenya, even though the role of local capital still is minor, this line of conflict is exacerbated by the differing racial composition of both groups. The continuing discussion of the role of "expatriates" in Kenya reflects some of this conflict potential. ⁴⁸

A second group which has to be differentiated from the more general capitalist-proletarian pattern is the salariat. Exercising an intermediate decision-making function both in the private and public sectors it often becomes an important factor of its own. Its general position is characterized by the fact that, even though the members of this group are not owners of any means of production, they often exhibit a consciousness different from that of the proletariat proper. ⁴⁹ This does not mean, however, that this consciousness necessarily reflects only the interests of national or international capital in the sense of a pure "auxiliary bourgeoisie". In Kenya this group is composed almost entirely of local people so that at least a conflict between more national interests and those of international companies is conceivable. The relatively high level of political awareness in this group combined with its still relatively poor living conditions (compared to those of the

capitalists proper or of expatriate managers and those of their counterparts in western countries to which they aspire) does make the members of this group an important potential ally of other parts of the work force in certain situations.

The third major non-agricultural class is that of the bourgeoisie proper, in our more restricted use of the term. The owner-entrepreneurs in this group do stand in an objective conflict situation with the workers they employ, but frequently this conflict is somewhat mitigated by the more personal and often familial nature of these relations in mostly small-scale enterprises. Even when persons coming from outside the owner's family or network of personal connections are employed, the degree of union-organization of workers of small enterprises of this kind is usually low, which makes their bargaining position a rather weak one. Another objective conflict situation, which sometimes tends to be overlooked, exists between the members of this class and large-scale corporations, in particular those from abroad. The economically much stronger position of the latter often makes it very hard for small independent enterprises to survive in competitive situations. The tendency of further capital concentration and monopolization which can be observed in many branches of industry, but also in trading and more general service institutions, thus in the long run works against the interests of the small bourgeoisie. Nevertheless its support can often be obtained by large-scale national and even international capitalists when the institution of "private property" is allegedly threatened, e.g. by measures

of socialization propagated by some groups.

This latter argument also applies to a certain extent to our fourth category, the non-agricultural proletaroids. They are the owners of their means of production, too, even if these are minimal, and may be induced to identify "upwards" when the chance of social mobility into the ranks of the small bourgeoisie seems to be sufficiently promising. On the other hand, in situations of economic crisis when their skills are no longer required or cannot be afforded by others, this group quickly loses its independent material base. An absorption into some kind of "proletarian" employment in such situations is not very likely, so that members of this category join the ranks of the urban unemployed, or, if they have maintained the links with the countryside, they may go "back to the land" even if they find themselves in a rather redundant position there.

The sub-proletariat, by definition, does not have any economic links or "objective interests" with the other classes, being "marginal" to the rest of society. In actual fact, however, numerous family and other personal relations may exist, particularly for younger people, which "cushion" their situation somewhat. Others may be able to make their living in some form of semi-legal activity, e.g. as beggars, prostitutes, petty thieves and the like. Politically these latter may have adjusted themselves to the status quo, "eating the crumbs falling from the table of the rich". In times of social unrest many of them are likely to join the "crowd" in the streets demanding more jobs, political change or, at least, "bread and circuses".

One final class has a peculiar relationship with all the others: the state class. Exercising the most important decision-making functions in the political sphere members of this class stand only in an indirect relationship to the means of production. They decide, however, the economic "rules of the game". Where there is a large sector of para-statal organizations, they also control some means of production. At the same time this class, at least to some extent and in the long run, needs to legitimize its position by giving the appearance of contributing to the welfare of others.⁵⁰ This is most apparent in democratic political systems where regular feed-back mechanisms exist to translate the demands articulated by different social classes into some kind of public policy, but even in authoritarian or military regimes some popular demands must be fulfilled to secure at least tacit continuing support of important groups. Thus some redistributive measures are usually adopted to take some of the surplus away from the most prosperous classes and reallocate it to groups which are important for the maintenance of the regime. In Kenya the state class today is closely linked with both national and international capital, so that lines are somewhat blurred. Under the existing democratic procedures, which have been relatively well maintained so far, the state class remains nevertheless dependent on continuously legitimizing its position by measures directed at providing at least a modicum of regional and overall social equity.

What these different class relations mean and how they may develop will also become clearer when we discuss the

extent of social mobility and some of the longer-term structural changes to be expected in Kenya's society.

CHAPTER XVIII

SOCIAL MOBILITY

The chance of an individual or group to change position in society is one of the most important factors cutting across any given pattern of social stratification. Through mobility strong social tensions may be defused, but other tensions, both individual and social, may be created. One basic form of social mobility takes place in a "horizontal" ¹ direction. The chance of changing geographical placement is often perceived as a major way of opening up new social avenues and of beginning a new life. Thus the large waves of emigration from Europe and other countries into the "New World" often alleviated existing conditions in poverty-stricken home areas and created a strong social impetus in the receiving countries. Within the New World, as long as "open frontiers" existed, a strong horizontal movement continued which, as Werner Sombart observed for the United States, ² significantly contributed to the defusion of class tensions. The consequences of this kind of social mobility, however, were not the same for all open frontier states. ³ Today, with most parts of the globe permanently settled and most national frontiers quite impermeable for large groups of immigrants, the greatest number of regular horizontal movements (excluding wars and other major political

upheavals or natural catastrophes) occurs within existing political units, usually in a rural-urban direction in the process of industrialization and as a consequence of continuing population growth. This horizontal form of social mobility will be dealt with in the first section of this chapter.

Vertical mobility is more difficult to define and to assess empirically. The conceptualization of this process is dependent on the particular kind of structural model of a society employed in any given study. Thus a number of approaches have been developed depending on which factors are used as principle criteria : rankings of status, prestige, wealth, occupation. In contrast to these current "multi-dimensional" concepts we prefer to conceive of vertical social mobility in terms of our class model. ⁴

Vertical social mobility in this sense is dependent on continuing changes in the overall economic structure of a society. The particular kind of economic system (e.g. involving the institution of private or public property of the means of production and of market or planning mechanisms) and its actual sectoral differentiation and stage of "development" determine the degree of vertical mobility. For this reason vertical social mobility need not necessarily consist of a "zero-sum-game". In times of general economic advancement, for example, the middle and upper classes may expand more rapidly, allowing more people to move "upwards" than downwards at a particular stage. The reverse process of continuing pauperization of an increasing number of people during

prolonged periods of depression or severe economic and political crises, is equally conceivable.

Vertical mobility may occur on an individual basis both within and between generations. In this regard it is dependent both on the existing mechanisms of individual advancement, e.g. in the educational sphere, and on the possibilities of transferring a person's own social position to his descendants, e.g. when ascriptive social criteria such as caste, "noble" status, etc. are applied or by means of inheritance laws, measures of taxation, and the like. In addition to the actual extent of vertical mobility, how various classes perceive it, ^{is} important for class conflict. As long as "rags to riches" or "shoe-shine boy to millionaire" stories are believed by large parts of the population, ⁵ social conflict may be less severe, even if the actual chance of upward social mobility is low or, in some instances, almost non-existent. ⁶

Geographical mobility

While traditional areas of rural settlement for each ethnic group in Kenya have been maintained to a large extent, two major changes affected the pattern of residence as a result of the colonial period. The creation of the "White Highlands" for European settlers, mainly in Rift Valley Province, and the growth of urban administrative and commercial centers. The departure of a large number of settlers in the years after independence led to an opening of the former

scheduled areas and an ethnically more mixed pattern of African settlement there. ⁷ Kalenjin and Maasai who traditionally dominated the Rift Valley were joined by significant numbers of Kikuyu (e.g. dominating almost all of Nyandarua district), Luyia (e.g. in Trans Nzoia district), Luo, and others. ⁸

A similar movement was directed towards the rapidly growing urban centers, in particular the large cities of Mombasa and Nairobi. In both cases chance of economic success exerted a "pull", while the exceedingly crowded homelands of some peoples (mostly in Central, Western, and Nyanza provinces) "pushed", in particular younger and male, migrants out of their traditional locations. Most of the resettlement which has taken place in rural areas can now be considered as permanent, whereas significant proportions of the newly arrived townspeople are maintaining important links with their home areas. The permanency of residence in town is dependent on the political conditions there as well as on such individual factors as age, sex, occupation, etc. Thus in 1969 a considerable migration of Luo back to their home areas occurred, following the assassination of Tom Mboya, ⁹ when they felt threatened in Kikuyu-dominated parts of the country such as Central Province, Nairobi, and even parts of Rift Valley Province.

In our survey, which covered parts of the settlement areas in Rift Valley Province and the city of Nairobi, we included questions concerning place of birth and duration of residence at present home. ¹⁰ The pattern of geographical mobility shown by those in the survey is represented in Table V, 8:

TABLE V, 8
GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY; BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage living	Rik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
<u>Non-agric. middle and upper classes:</u>								
Place of birth	38	(46)	(50)	(37)	(8)	(100)	(50)	36
Within ethnic area	(4)	(7)	(25)	--	--	--	(50)	5
Outside ethnic area:								
Up to 1 year	(15)	(7)	(25)	(25)	(42)	--	--	23
1 to 5 years	(35)	(20)	--	(25)	(25)	--	--	24
More than 5 years	(8)	(20)	--	(13)	(25)	--	--	12
<u>Non-agric. proletariat:</u>								
Place of birth	(36)	(33)	(100)	--	(11)	--	(100)	24
Ethnic area	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Outside - 1 year	(32)	(17)	--	52	(33)	--	--	33
1 - 5 years	(20)	(33)	--	(14)	(28)	--	--	22
More than 5 years	(12)	(17)	--	(34)	(28)	--	--	21
<u>Non-agric. proletarians and sub-proletariat:</u>								
Place of birth	(7)	(40)	(100)	(20)	(25)	(66)	(100)	22
Ethnic area	--	--	--	--	--	(33)	--	2
Outside - 1 year	25	--	--	(20)	(30)	--	--	22
1 - 5 years	38	(20)	--	(60)	(25)	--	--	29
More than 5 years	30	(40)	--	--	(20)	--	--	25
<u>Agric. bourgeois:</u>								
Place of birth	50	--	(100)	67	63	69	63	60
Ethnic area	(11)	(50)	--	--	(12)	23	(37)	15
Outside - 1 year	(11)	--	--	--	--	--	--	3
1 - 5 years	(11)	--	--	--	--	--	--	4
More than 5 years	(17)	(50)	--	33	(25)	(8)	--	18
<u>Agric. proletarians:</u>								
Place of birth	93	89	96	95	92	100	89	93
Ethnic area	--	(8)	--	(5)	(5)	--	(7)	4
Outside - 1 year	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1 - 5 years	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
More than 5 years	(7)	(3)	(4)	--	(3)	--	(4)	3
<u>Agric. proletariat:</u>								
Place of birth	91	(50)	(100)	(43)	(39)	(60)	(100)	64
Ethnic area	(9)	--	--	--	--	(20)	--	7
Outside - 1 year	--	--	--	(14)	(11)	--	--	10
1 - 5 years	--	(50)	--	(29)	--	(20)	--	13
More than 5 years	--	--	--	(14)	--	--	--	6
<u>Totals:</u>								
Place of birth	60	74	95	64	68	79	83	69
Ethnic area	4	9	1	2	5	15	12	6
Outside - 1 year	11	2	1	11	9	--	--	7
1 - 5 years	13	7	--	9	7	3	1	8
More than 5 years	12	8	3	14	11	3	4	10
Weighted N	274	152	89	158	194	89	106	1062

Both ethnic background and present social class strongly affect the pattern. The greatest number of migrants comes from the Kikuyu, Luyia, and Luo areas while the rate of migration among the Mijikenda, Maasai, and Kalenjin is very low, or their mobility remains largely contained within their home districts. The Luyia also have the greatest percentage of long-term migrants among the respondents. The division by class is similarly clear-cut. Here, not surprisingly, the percentage of agricultural proletarioids who have remained at their place of birth is the highest for all categories. Among members of the agricultural bourgeoisie and the agricultural proletariat a considerable migration to new areas of economic activity has taken place. The highest percentage of migrants then, expectedly, can be found in the non-agricultural classes. Here the non-agricultural proletarioids and members of the sub-proletariat have the highest percentage of those living away from their place of birth for a period of more than five years. Among members of the non-agricultural middle and upper classes a considerable number were born at their present place of residence.

Significantly greater percentages of those who were living outside their home area were males (33 % compared to 26 % for females; $r = 0.07$, $p < 0.01$), younger persons (37 % of those below the age of 30 compared to 11 % for those aged 50 and above; $r = 0.13$, $p < 0.001$), and better educated (51 % of those with some secondary education compared to 20 % for

illiterates; $r = 0.20$, $p < 0.001$). Those who had moved also, on the average, earned significantly higher incomes ($r = 0.23$, $p < 0.001$). A higher geographical mobility also tends to decrease the social distance expressed towards members of other ethnic groups. The average correlation for the eleven ethnic groups assessed in our survey is relatively weak, but still significant ($r = 0.06$, $p < 0.05$), the sign being the same for all groups.

Class mobility

As we stated before, we prefer to treat vertical social mobility on the basis of our class model. Mobility in this sense thus refers to the movement of individuals across objectively defined class lines both in an upward or downward direction and between classes at the same level. While this kind of movement may occur within a person's life-span, we are mainly interested here in the inter-generational aspects of mobility. The class position of the respondents compared to that of their fathers (whose position is taken to define the class situation of their households) is presented in Table V, 9: ¹¹

/ Insert Table V, 9 /

TABLE V, 9
 INTER-GENERATIONAL CLASS MOBILITY (2)

Respondent's class: Father's class:	Agricultural		Non-agricultural				Total ^a
	bourgeoisie proletariats	proletariats	bourgeoisie and upper classes	bourgeoisie proletariats	proletariats	bourgeoisie proletariats	
Agric. bourgeoisie	24	17	20	27	38	26	20
Agric. proletariat	52	65	47	27	24	31	53
Agric. proletariat	8	1	4	-	-	1	3
Non-agric. bourgeoisie and upper classes	3	4	3	-	9	7	4
Salariat	9	9	3	20	16	14	10
Non-agric. proletariat	2	4	17	13	10	13	7
Non-agric. proletariat	2	1	3	13	3	5	2
Sub-proletariat	-	-	3	-	-	3	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	178	549	90	15	58	84	1029

^a Excluding students and school-leavers still supported by family.

As becomes apparent from this table, the rate of "social reproduction" is the highest among the agricultural proletarioids, almost two-thirds of the respondents remaining in the same class as their fathers. The non-agricultural classes, on the other hand, have the lowest rates of reproduction, which is not surprising in view of the rapid structural change of Kenya's society from agricultural to non-agricultural occupations for a considerable proportion of people only during the last few decades.¹² This table also shows the changes which have taken place within agriculture itself, more than half of the agricultural bourgeoisie coming from agricultural proletarioid backgrounds. A high proportion of members of the agricultural proletariat, on the other hand, also have come from agricultural proletarioid families. The agricultural bourgeoisie, in turn, has been the major breeding ground for the non-agricultural middle and upper classes, while the relatively greatest percentage of the members of the non-agricultural proletariat come from an agricultural proletarioid background. So far, the movements between the non-agricultural classes have been on a relatively lower scale, even though certain preliminary trends become apparent. Thus the greatest percentage of those coming from non-agricultural bourgeois and upper class families are now members of the salariat, possibly still at relatively early points in their careers. A great proportion of those with a salariat background also managed to enter the non-agricultural bourgeoisie or the upper classes, but a considerable percentage, consisting mostly of younger

unemployed persons, now belong to the sub-proletariat, possibly because their parents were not able to pay for their further education, but also reflecting the increasing problems of urban unemployment even for better-educated school-leavers. For persons hailing from the non-agricultural proletariat there is still a certain possibility of going "back to the land" or to be upwardly mobile in the non-agricultural sector, even though a majority remains in the non-agricultural lower classes. A relatively high number of persons from non-agricultural proletaroid families also manage, perhaps having learned a craft or a trade, to enter the non-agricultural bourgeoisie, but a majority, too, remain among the lower classes. The evidence for people coming from the sub-proletariat, in view of the very recent emergence of this class, is relatively inconclusive. The fact, however, that none of the persons in our sample coming from this background was able to move beyond the lower classes seems to be indicative for possible future developments.

We also attempted to document inter-generational class movements by information concerning the economic and educational background of the respondents in order to demonstrate some of the mechanisms lying behind this pattern. As might have been expected, both the property situation of the parents of the respondents and their level of educational achievement were significantly related to the present class positions of their children. Some of the relevant data are summarized in Table V, 10: ¹³

TABLE V,10
 FURTHER ASPECTS OF INTER-GENERATIONAL MOBILITY

Respondents' class	Agricultural			Non-agricultural					Total
	bourgeoisie	pro-leta-roids	pro-leta-roids	bourgeoisie + upper classes	salaried + upper classes	pro-leta-roids	pro-leta-roids	Sub-pro-leta-roids	
<u>Father's acreage:</u>									
None	17	25	29	13	22	21	29	32	23
Don't know (but agr.occup.)	6	18	7	27	12	5	13	9	13
Less than 2	5	4	4	7	2	4	4	8	4
2 - 5	23	24	25	27	22	26	25	25	26
6 - 10	19	19	14	13	16	21	12	15	18
11 - 20	14	7	11	--	12	9	13	7	9
more than 20	16	3	10	13	14	4	4	4	7
No. of father's cattle (mean)	6-10	3-5	3	6-10	3-5	3	3-5	3	3-5
<u>Father's education</u>									
None	88	92	77	46	66	72	83	66	79
Some primary	12	8	23	54	29	27	13	24	19
Some secondary	--	--	--	--	5	11	4	10	2
<u>Mother's education</u>									
None	95	96	90	67	81	84	84	71	87
Some primary	5	4	10	33	17	16	12	29	13
Some secondary	--	--	--	--	2	--	4	--	--
Weighted N	178	549	90	15	58	84	24	55	1053 ^a

^aExcluding students

The fathers of members of the non-agricultural middle and upper classes and the agricultural bourgeoisie had, relatively speaking, both the greatest amount of land (e.g. the highest percentages in our 20+acres category) and the highest average number of cattle. The fathers of the members of the agricultural proletariat, the non-agricultural proletaroids, and the sub-proletariat, on the other hand, had the lowest acreage (e.g. the highest percentage of those having no land at all) and the lowest average number of cattle. The relative wealth of parents thus evidently is an important criterion for securing a better class position for their offspring even in the non-agricultural sphere. One important means by which this can be achieved is through a better formal education of children, especially in view of the fact that school fees still are, relatively speaking, exorbitantly high for some of the best ("high cost") schools in Kenya, particularly at the secondary level. This creates a differential access to the most important institution of social advancement in modern society according to the class position of a person's parents. ¹⁴

Another important factor influencing children's chances of social advancement, working both at the cognitive and the attitudinal level, is the level of their parents' educational achievement. Here again our data show that the relative percentage of both mothers and fathers obtaining some schooling was highest for respondents in the non-agricultural middle and upper classes, while the level of parents' schooling is lowest for members of the propertied agricultural classes.

Members of both the agricultural and the non-agricultural proletariat are in an intermediate position. That parents' education alone is no guarantee for a person's own success is documented by the relatively high proportion of the members of the sub-proletariat who have parents who had been at school. Nevertheless, the correlations between a person's present income situation and the level of education of his or her parents are strong and highly significant ($r = 0.25$, $p < 0.001$ for the level of educational achievement of the father and $r = 0.23$, $p < 0.001$ for the level of education of the mother). Similarly a person's own educational achievements are strongly related to that of his parents ($r = 0.37$, $p < 0.001$ for the education of the father; $r = 0.31$, $p < 0.001$ for the education of the mother).

In an additional step we computed the overall changes which have taken place between the class positions of the respondents and that of their fathers in order to document the extent to which movements have taken place in an upward or downward direction or have remained at the same level (e.g. a move from the agricultural to the non-agricultural proletariats or to the non-agricultural proletariat). These results are summarized in Table V, 11:

/ Insert Table V, 11 /

This table shows that almost half of ^{the} respondents have remained in the same class as their fathers, another sixth has stayed at the same level. While a significant proportion

RATES OF VERTICAL MOBILITY: BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Social class	Kik.	Kas.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot. ^a
<u>Non-agric. middle and upper classes:</u>								
Same as father	(27)	--	--	--	(25)	--	--	15
Same level	42	(47)	--	(50)	(100)	--	--	42
1 level upwards	(23)	(53)	(100)	(50)	(25)	--	(50)	39
2 or 3 levels upw.	(2)	--	--	--	--	--	(50)	(4)
1 level downwards	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2 or 3 levels downw.	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
<u>Proletariat and non-agric. proletarioids:</u>								
Same as father	(13)	(15)	(12)	(21)	(5)	(40)	(50)	17
Same level	43	(23)	(63)	36	55	(40)	(33)	42
1 level up	(1)	--	--	(2)	(5)	--	--	(1)
2 levels up	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1 level down	43	(54)	(25)	41	(35)	(20)	(17)	39
2 levels down	--	(8)	--	--	--	--	--	(1)
<u>Sub-proletariat:</u>								
Same as father	(8)	--	--	--	(6)	--	--	(6)
Same level	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1 level up	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2 levels up	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1 level down	59	(50)	(100)	(33)	61	(67)	--	57
2 levels down	(33)	(50)	--	(67)	(33)	(33)	(100)	37
<u>Agric. bourgeoisie:</u>								
Same as father	22	--	--	42	(25)	(15)	(33)	25
Same level	11	--	--	(25)	(25)	--	(6)	12
1 level up	67	(100)	(100)	33	50	85	(56)	63
2 levels up	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1 level down	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2 levels down	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
<u>Agric. proletarioids:</u>								
Same as father	45	83	67	36	72	(27)	95	66
Same level	(10)	(5)	(1)	(15)	(3)	(9)	(1)	6
1 level up	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
2 levels up	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1 level down	45	12	32	49	25	55	(4)	27
2 levels down	--	--	--	--	--	(9)	--	(1)
<u>Total:</u>								
Same as father	26	64	54	30	49	23	81	44
Same level	21	10	(6)	25	14	11	(3)	15
1 level up	16	9	12	11	9	36	10	14
2 levels up	(1)	--	--	--	--	--	(1)	--
1 level down	33	15	28	33	25	25	4	25
2 levels down	(3)	(2)	--	(1)	3	(5)	(1)	2
<u>Weighted N</u>								
	265	151	96	150	185	91	105	1043

^aStudents excluded

managed to move "upwards", approximately one-fourth also were mobile in a downward direction. When we analyze these data more closely, it becomes apparent that most of the upward mobility has occurred for members of the agricultural bourgeoisie and the non-agricultural middle and upper classes, but a high proportion of the latter have moved only at the same level, e.g. from the agricultural to the non-agricultural bourgeoisie or the salariat. The level of "self-recruitment" is highest for the agricultural proletarioids, but it seems noteworthy that about one-fourth of the members of this group has been downwardly mobile compared to the class position of their fathers as a result of the continuing subdivision of agricultural holdings in densely populated areas. The Luyia, Kikuyu, and parts of Kalenjin in our sample have been particularly affected in this regard. Members of the proletariat and the non-agricultural proletarioids have been recruited most often from groups at the same level, but a strong section of them also have moved downwards (e.g. from the agricultural bourgeoisie or the salariat). Not surprisingly, almost all members of the sub-proletariat, in view of the very recent origin of this class in Kenya, also have experienced a social decline compared to the position of their parents.

Class stability (in the sense of inter-generational continuity) is greatest among the Maasai, followed by the Kamba and Mijikenda. The Kikuyu, Kalenjin, and Luyia, on the other hand, have the highest proportions of those who have changed their class. While a considerable percentage of

Kalenjin managed to move upwards, mostly into the agricultural bourgeoisie, large sections of the Kikuyu and Luyia in particular experienced a downward movement. The Luo, on the whole, are in a more intermediate position, a relatively high percentage of them remaining stable, but a significantly greater proportion of them also being downwardly rather than upwardly mobile.

That social mobility tends to reduce class tensions became evident when we correlated our measure of the rate of social mobility with the answers to some "class"-related items. Thus moderately strong but highly significant correlations showed those persons who have experienced a higher rate of upward mobility to agree more often that business firms pay fair wages ($r = 0.09, p < 0.01$), that it is necessary to allow foreigners a share in Kenyan companies ($r = 0.09, p < 0.01$), and that the government should continue with its present economic policies ($r = 0.07, p < 0.01$).¹⁵

A final aspect of Kenya's present pattern of social stratification and its future inter-generational developments was touched in our survey when we asked respondents whether they had any particular plans for the future of their children and, if the answer was positive, what kind of job they would like them to get.¹⁶ The responses are summarized in Table V, 12:

/ Insert Table V, 12 /

TABLE V, 12
SOCIAL ASPIRATIONS FOR CHILDREN; BY CLASS

<u>Vocational plans</u>	Non-agricultural			Agricultural			Total
	middle and upper classes	proletariat	proletaroids and sub-proletariat	bourgeoisie	proletaroids	proletariat	
Up to children to decide	(6)	(7)	-	8	20	(18)	9
Get good education	41	47	(32)	26	33	24	33
Get particular job:							
high-level white collar	(14)	(13)	(23)	28	16	29	19
low level white collar	(4)	(5)	(9)	(6)	6	-	5
skilled blue collar	(2)	(2)	-	(2)	-	(12)	2
cash-crop farming	(2)	-	(4)	-	-	-	(1)
Same occupation as respondent	(2)	(2)	-	9	5	-	5
No plans	29	24	32	21	30	(17)	26
Weighted N:	49	55	22	142	409	51	728

As we can see, apart from those who have no particular plans, a good education for their children is foremost in the minds of respondents. Those who name a particular occupation whose a high level white-collar job (such as doctor, manager, teacher) most often. But even low level white-collar

positions (such as office employees, typists, etc.) are named more often than skilled blue-collar jobs (such as skilled craftsmen, foremen, etc.). Successful cash crop farming is seen as a career alternative by only a small minority of respondents. Relatively few respondents want their children to follow in their own footsteps.

This distribution by class shows that a good education is valued most highly by the non-agricultural classes. The members of the agricultural proletariat and the agricultural proletoids, on the other hand, most often either had no particular career plans or leave the decision to their children. The members of the agricultural bourgeoisie are most specific in their job expectations. The relatively highest percentage of respondents in this group also want their children to follow their own occupation.

CHAPTER XIX

THE PROCESS OF STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION

One of the most important dynamic forces shaping Kenya's society is the process of further differentiation within its vertical structures. These are mainly shaped by economic and demographic factors, the consequences of which we briefly outline in this chapter. First we give an account of changes in Kenya's overall vertical social structures during the crucial period of transition between the years 1950 (i.e. at the heyday of colonialism still before the "Mau Mau" events), 1960 (when the arrangements for independence were negotiated), and 1970 (when the newly created political system had become somewhat more settled after the first general elections after independence). The choice of these years was determined to a certain extent by the availability of relevant statistical materials, in particular the population censuses of 1948, 1962, and 1969, supplemented by a variety of other sources. The "metamorphosis" from an almost "caste-like" social order, where economic and social positions were largely determined by racial criteria with almost impermeable borderlines between the different groups, to a society increasingly structured along class lines becomes apparent in this analysis.

In a second section we attempt to project some of these developments into the future within a relatively realistic and "foreseeable" medium-term time period of 30 years. For this purpose we make certain assumptions concerning expected demographic changes and possible future rates of economic growth and their social structural consequences.

Class Formation 1950 - 1970

Increasing division of labor and occupational differentiation during this period have affected all major racial groups in Kenya. ¹

Statistical material available for this analysis (occupation and income statistics, agricultural census, population censuses, etc.) varies greatly in quality and shows considerable gaps. Because of the scarcity of data, we refer here to members of the male labor force alone, i.e. all "able-bodied" men between the ages of 16 and 60, excluding only those who are still attending school or some other institution of higher learning. These data should be supplemented with information concerning marital status, family size etc., but no adequate statistics exist. Under these circumstances comparisons could only be drawn on the basis of the male labor force. The results of our compilations are summarized in Table V, 13:

/ Insert Table V, 13 /

TABLE V,13
CHANGES IN KENYA'S CLASS STRUCTURE 1950 - 1970

Class	1950		1960		1970	
	no. ('000)	%	no.	%	no.	%
<u>State class</u>	0.3	--	1.2	0.1	12.0	0.5
Of whom: Africans	--	--	0.3	--	7.9	0.3
Asians	--	--	0.2	--	2.5	0.1
Europeans	0.3	--	0.7	0.1	1.6	0.1
<u>Capitalists</u>	1.3	0.1	3.5	0.2	2.9	0.1
Of whom: Africans	--	--	--	--	0.4	--
Asians	0.3	--	1.0	0.1	2.0	0.1
Europeans	1.0	0.1	2.5	0.1	0.5	--
<u>Large-scale farmers</u>	2.0	0.1	2.0	0.1	1.8	0.1
Of whom: Africans	--	--	--	--	0.9	--
Asians	--	--	--	--	--	--
Europeans	0.7	0.1	2.0	0.1	0.9	--
<u>Managerial class</u>	1.0	0.1	4.2	0.2	13.0	0.5
Of whom: Africans	--	--	0.1	--	3.1	0.1
Asians	0.3	--	1.6	0.1	6.0	0.3
Europeans	0.7	0.1	2.5	0.1	3.9	0.1
<u>Non-agricultural bourgeoisie</u>	22.1	1.5	23.2	1.2	110.9	4.5
Of whom: Africans	5.0	0.3	10.0	0.5	101.4	4.1
Asians	16.1	1.1	12.2	0.6	8.8	0.4
Europeans	1.0	0.1	1.0	0.1	0.7	--
<u>Salariat</u>	55.5	3.8	91.6	4.9	127.2	5.2
Of whom: Africans	32.8	2.2	49.2	2.7	110.0	4.5
Asians	17.1	1.1	29.9	1.5	13.0	0.5
Europeans	6.6	0.5	12.5	0.7	4.2	0.2

TABLE V,13 - Continued

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<u>Agric. bourgeoisie</u> (Africans only)	71.9	4.8	97.2	5.3	234.2	9.5
<u>Non-agricultural</u> <u>proletaroids</u>	3.5	0.2	1.7	0.1	37.8	1.5
Of whom: Africans	--	--	--	--	30.8	1.2
Asians	3.5	0.2	1.7	0.1	7.0	0.3
<u>Agric. proletaroids</u>	1,035.7	68.9	1,203.2	64.9	1,202.3	48.8
<u>Non-agricultural</u> <u>proletariat</u>	173.0	11.5	232.2	12.5	345.3	14.0
Of whom: Africans	167.2	11.1	228.4	12.3	341.3	13.9
Asians	5.8	0.4	3.8	0.2	4.0	0.1
<u>Non-agricultural</u> <u>proletariat</u>	173.0	11.0	232.2	12.5	345.3	14.0
Of whom: Africans	167.2	11.1	228.4	12.3	341.3	13.9
Asians	5.8	0.4	3.8	0.2	4.0	0.1
<u>Agric. proletariat</u> (Africans only)	136.9	9.1	176.6	9.5	343.6	13.9
<u>Sub-proletariat</u>	--	--	18.0	1.0	34.8	1.4
Total (male labour force)	1,504.2	100	1,853.6	100	2,465.8	100

Sources: See Appendix IV below.

In addition to the conceptual definitions given above we have chosen, where these are not self-evident, the following operational definitions on the basis of the available data:

Capitalists: All self-employed in charge of enterprises with 10 or more employ^{ees} were taken to fall into this category. Since there are no separate data available for ownership by race and size of establishment, it has been assumed that 50 % of all European, 20 %

of all Asian and 10 % of all African non-agricultural self-employed in the modern sector - excluding members of the professions - belong to this group. The total figure obtained in this way corresponds approximately to the total number of establishments with 10 or more employees outside the government sector or other public services. Cf. Employment and Earnings 1968 - 70, loc. cit. Table 3, pp. 9 ff..

Non-agricultural bourgeoisie: Includes all non-agricultural self-employed not listed elsewhere. For the African population this includes all farmers-cum-businessmen and all other non-agricultural rural enterprises and 10 % of the urban informal sector, which can be considered to consist of better off, although unlicensed, craftsmen and traders.

Non-agricultural proletarioids: 80 % of the self-employed in the urban informal sector and all not-accounted-for Asians have been included here.

Salariat: Includes all employed members of the professions and all middle level employees (e.g. technical sales representatives, technicians in the private and public sectors etc.).

Non-agricultural proletariat: Consists of all unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers, domestic servants, shop and office boys etc.

Agricultural bourgeoisie: Includes the "progressive" small-scale African farmers cultivating more than 5 acres (2 ha).

Agricultural proletarioids: Includes all "poor" or subsistence farmers and all pastoralists.

Sub-proletariat: Includes the open unemployed and 10 % of the urban informal sector, which may be considered to be of a more truly criminal nature.

The racial composition of the upper classes thus shows a distinctive change.² The state class, which was composed of Europeans in 1950, is dominated by Africans in 1970, even though the absolute number of Europeans and Asians in this category have increased somewhat because of the very rapid expansion of the public sector as a whole. The proportion of Africans among the large-scale farmers has greatly increased, too. The Asians, whose position in the commercial sector was negatively affected by trade-licensing regulations and similar measures, dominate among the local capitalists, but the percentage of Africans is rising. The comparatively much larger proportion of foreign capital is reflected by the relatively large size of the managerial class among whom Europeans and Asians still dominate.

In the middle classes the racial composition of the non-agricultural bourgeoisie has been affected most strongly by the structural changes in Kenya's society. Here the dominating position of Asians as independent craftsmen and traders has been considerably reduced, while the number of Africans has increased tenfold between 1960 and 1970. This latter figure also includes about 10 % of the more successful members of the so-called "informal sector", e.g. unlicensed craftsmen and traders, operators of small transport business etc. In the salariat similar though less spectacular changes have taken place. The number of Africans more than doubled between 1960 and 1970, while the share of Asians and Europeans decreased considerably. It also should be noted that a very high percentage of this class is employed in the public sector

(approximately 75 % in 1970). The agricultural bourgeoisie, i.e. those cash crop producing small-scale farmers who cultivate more than five acres (2 ha) of high potential land, a group which consists entirely of Africans, also has more than trebled in the two decades. A special case in this category are the so-called "farmers cum businessmen", i.e. cash crop producing small-scale farmers who own a small shop or local bar or who operate other businesses. This sub-group amounts to approximately one-fifth of the total bourgeoisie.

The non-agricultural proletarioids, e.g. petty craftsmen who are dependent on their own labor alone, street hawkers etc. include a high percentage of Africans in 1970, many of whom are working in the "informal" sector. The changes affecting the Asian members in this category reflect to a certain extent an inter-generational mobility. With the help of parents, who were economically relatively successful, they were able to obtain a better education and to move into the ranks of the salariat and the professions in the period between 1950 and 1960. The later increase of the number of Asians then was due to the revocation of trade licenses and work permits for non-citizens after independence. They then had to work more "informally" or help out with more remote members of their families. The proletariat somewhat more than doubled in absolute numbers in these two decades. Among the agricultural workers the number of those employed on large-scale farms decreased significantly after independence, reflecting the structural change and the departure of many Europeans in this sector. This was

compensated, however, by a strong increase of agricultural wage employment in the small-scale farming areas so that the total share of the agricultural proletariat of approximately 50 % remained about the same.




The absolute number of agricultural proletarioids (i.e. those pursuing subsistence agriculture, members of the pastoralist groups, and those "progressive" farmers who cultivate less than five acres) remained almost constant, in spite of the high general population growth. Their relative share thus declined from almost two-thirds to less than one-half of the male labor force. This development thus is the reverse of the relatively strong increase of the middle classes and the proletariat. It must also not be overlooked that in the observed period a considerable and apparently still strongly increasing sub-proletariat of landless and openly unemployed persons has emerged. The notorious "Mathare Valley" in Nairobi is one example of the big city slum areas where these groups gather.

The changes in Kenya's class structure between 1950 and 1970, both in absolute size and in the relative proportions of the individual classes and racial groups, are also indicated in the following diagrams:

/ Insert Table V, 14 /

TABLE V, 14
DIAGRAMS OF KENYA'S SOCIETY 1950, 1960, 1970

- Europeans - [diagonal lines]
- Asians - [horizontal lines]
- Africans - [empty box]



1 cell = 15,00

These diagrams illustrate more clearly the most important changes which have taken place. They show that racial tensions existing before independence have been greatly reduced by granting Africans a greater share in the upper and middle classes, the only (still significant!) exception being in the capitalist and managerial classes. The change from a colonial to a more "neo-colonial" and from an almost "caste-like" to a class society thus becomes apparent. The relative increase in the size of the non-agricultural middle classes and the changes within the agricultural sector in particular (the rise of a strong agricultural bourgeoisie coupled with an increase of the agricultural proletariat in the small-scale farming areas and, also, the emergence of an urban sub-proletariat) point to important further dynamic factors affecting Kenya's social and political development.

Projected developments 1970 - 2000

We have taken the best available estimates concerning Kenya's future population growth³ and possible rates of economic development.⁴ In each case we selected the most negative and the most positive alternative within a still realistic range of potentialities and combined them to form the basis of a more "optimistic" and a more "pessimistic" scenario. The pessimistic scenario rests on the assumption of an average annual rate of economic growth of 5 % in real terms (still very high by international standards!) under more or less the same overall national and international economic

conditions. The corresponding demographic projections are based on a continuing fertility rate of 7.6 children born alive to a woman who survives to the age of fifty and a declining mortality rate with a life expectancy at birth of 60 years for both sexes in the year 2000, i.e. an average annual rate of population growth of 3.78 %. In comparison, life expectancy in 1970 was 51 years for females and 47 years for males.

The more optimistic scenario implies an overall average rate of GDP growth of 7.7 % in real terms and some important changes in factor prices (i.e. of the rate of foreign exchange and the rate of interest) and a more self-reliant, agriculturally-oriented strategy of economic development. The demographic changes in this case are based on a fertility rate gradually declining to a level of 4.0 live births per woman in the year 2000 (i.e. almost half of the present rate!) with the mortality rate declining as before. The average annual rate of population growth in this case amounts to 3.10 %.

These assumptions also make it possible to arrive at the overall size of the male labor force in each case,⁵ and, to a certain extent, its occupational differentiation. The latter is determined by assumptions concerning total employment by sector and the ratios of the required high and middle level manpower compared to unskilled labor.⁶ Since there are no other comparative figures available we have taken the ratios existing in Kenya in 1972 as some sort of technological constant in this regard. If we assume

furthermore, taking clues from Kenya's present pattern of social stratification, that approximately 20 % of the skilled labor force will belong to Kenya's "upper classes" of the future, regardless of their respective property base, further differentiations between these groups and the remaining salariat become possible. In this way we are able to arrive at a rough overall occupational differentiation in the non-agricultural sectors. The remaining "rest" of the population (still the largest part in each case!) will continue to make their living in small-scale agriculture or by means of some other "informal" activity, which includes the "hidden" unemployed in the rural areas. A considerable proportion, however, will become part of a permanent urban sub-proletariat with almost no regular means of subsistence.

The results of these projections for the years 1985 and 2000⁷ are given in Table V, 15:

/ Insert Table V, 15 /

As we can see, the more optimistic assumptions concerning the rate of future population growth have relatively little effect on the total size of the labor force during this period. Even under these more favorable

TABLE V, 15
PROJECTIONS OF FURTHER SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

Class	1970		1985 (1)		1985 (2)		2000 (1)		2000 (2)	
	number ('000)	%	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Upper classes	29.7	1.2	26.1	0.5	39.9	0.9	43.5	0.6	113.5	1.5
Salariat	127.2	5.2	104.0	2.2	159.6	3.6	174.1	2.2	454.2	6.0
Non-agric. bourgeoisie	110.9	4.5								
Non-agric. proletaroids	37.8	1.5	738.0	15.3	1258.0	28.2	1255.2	18.0	3709.2	49.3
Non. agric. proletariat	345.3	14.0								
Agricultural bourgeoisie	234.2	9.5								
Agricultural proletaroids	1202.3	48.8	3951.1	82.0	2997.2	67.3	6351.9	81.2	3255.4	43.2
Agricultural proletariat	343.6	13.9								
Sub-prole- tariat	34.8	1.4								
Total (male labor force)	2465.8	100	4819.2	100	4454.7	100	7824.7	100	7532.3	100

For comparison:	1970	1985 (1)	1985 (2)	2000 (1)	2000 (2)
High potential land per male person in agriculture (ha)	4.32	1.99	2.5	1.24	2.1
Income per person in agriculture (US \$ per year in constant prices)	120.0	99.7	170.1	82.9	324.3

circumstances which imply considerable changes in attitudes and behavior and comprehensive family planning and other social services, the total labor force will treble between the years 1970 and 2000. Only at a later stage can significant results of any family planning efforts be expected!

The different assumptions concerning prospective rates of economic growth, on the other hand, have a more marked effect. In our pessimistic scenario the non-agricultural occupations only about double during this period although increases in productivity have to be expected as well. At the same time the number of those who make their living in agriculture increases almost fourfold. The average available high potential land per able-bodied male is similarly reduced to one-fourth, even if all still "hidden" reserves are included such as not yet fully utilized land in the large-farm sector and high potential land in the pastoralist areas (e. g. in parts of Maasai-country in Narok district).⁸ The available income per person in agriculture would then be reduced to two-thirds of its already very low present level, despite considerable productivity increases.



The results of our more optimistic scenario, which is based on rather high expectations, are somewhat more

favorable. Here the present share of the agricultural and residual sector is reduced by half in the year 2000 to a level of approximately 40 % of the total population (compared to an almost constant level of more than 80 % for our more pessimistic assumptions). In this case available high potential agricultural land per person still will be only about half of the present amount, but average real incomes in this sector will rise to almost three times the present level because of the expected productivity increases. Under these circumstances the population in the non-agricultural sectors will increase both in its absolute numbers and in its relative proportion. These sectors, if our assumptions concerning the level of the required skilled manpower in this case are reliable, will also become more and more differentiated internally.

A graphic illustration of these developments is provided in the following diagrams:

/ Insert Table V, 16 /

It must be noted, however, that these projections only determine the range of potentialities within certain limits. They only set the stage, so to speak, on which the most important vertical conflict groups in Kenya's society will act. Aside from the social differentiation



indicated above it is not possible in our two scenarios to determine the expected size of these classes more closely. This would require further assumptions as to possible changes in Kenya's overall economic system, the property situation of the different groups, the distributive mechanisms involved, possible changes in the role of foreign capital and other external factors. Such projections would be purely speculative and arbitrary at present. But in all likelihood, conflicts will take place within the indicated range of potentialities.

If the projections of our more pessimistic scenario should come closer to reality and if the existing "peripheral-capitalist" situation with all its inequitable internal and external distributive aspects continues unabated, then there can be no doubt that an increasing polarization will take place between the propertied classes (particularly in the still largely foreign-owned industrial sector) and the great impoverished mass of the population. Within the agricultural sector the existing regional inequalities, i.e. between Kenya's main ethnic groups, also will be intensified. Distributive struggles, e.g. those concerning still existing land reserves in the Rift Valley or the allocation of plots in large-scale irrigation projects (as at the Tana River) will increase.

If the more optimistic but less likely scenario should come true, the scope and importance of the middle classes (i.e. of the salariat and, if the institution of

private property in small-scale industry and agriculture is maintained, of the non-agricultural and the agricultural bourgeoisie) undoubtedly will rise. This may temper some of the inevitable conflicts, in particular if the ethnic and other social inequalities are also somewhat remedied. But in this scenario the non-agricultural proletariat (now in the form of the better organized "true" industrial proletariat) will become the most important class, numerically. In either case, no steady and "smooth" development is to be expected and there will be a wide range of actual conflicts within the structural limits indicated by our two scenarios.

PART SIXSUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS

"Les moeurs et les lois des Américains ne sont pas les seules qui puissent convenir aux peuples démocratiques; mais les Américains ont montré qu'il ne faut pas désespérer de régler la démocratie à l'aide des lois et des moeurs. Si d'autres peuples, empruntant à l'Amérique cette idée générale et féconde, sans vouloir du reste imiter ses habitants dans l'application particulière qu'ils en ont faite, tentaient de se rendre propres à l'état social que la Providence impose aux hommes de nos jours, et cherchaient ainsi à échapper au despotisme ou à l'anarchie qui les menacent, quelles raisons avons-nous de croire qu'ils dussent échouer dans leurs efforts?"

Alexis de Tocqueville

The politically relevant aspects of both the objective and subjective dimensions of Kenya's most important potential social conflict groups, mainly the ethnic groups and classes, have been presented in all their diversity. In addition we have analyzed some significant features of their respective inter-relationships and the dynamic forces shaping their future size and potential impact. We have now come to the point where it becomes necessary to step back somewhat from this mosaic and to take a more comprehensive view in order to recognize more

clearly the most important features within the total setting. This will be done by first drawing brief summary "profiles" of each ethnic group and class on the basis of the data presented above. The relationships between these more general social forces and Kenya's actual political system will then be discussed in a final chapter. In particular the question how our findings have to be interpreted in the light of different theories of democracy will be of interest here.

In this way we hope to be able to cope with the double challenge we are facing: First, to give a thorough description and theoretically meaningful analysis of a society very different from our own which may help to provide a basis for a better mutual (!) understanding of this part of the common heritage of mankind. Second, to relate these common forces to the existing political conditions and to evaluate the chances of their contribution to a more democratic, i.e. a more tolerant and peaceful political order in which the emancipatory aspirations of individuals and groups can be fulfilled in a meaningful way. If the particular combination of theoretical concepts and empirical methods employed in this study has proved to be adequate for this purpose, it may perhaps also serve as a reference for much-needed further historical and comparative investigations.

CHAPTER XX

ETHNIC PROFILES

In the preceding parts we have discussed the most important aspects of Kenya's society. We shall now summarize our findings in the form of brief "profiles" for each ethnic group highlighting some of the more characteristic features for which "ethnicity" proved to be a significant independent factor. In doing so, it is imperative always to keep in mind that most of the statements that we are making are only of a relative nature (i.e. have to be seen in comparison to the other groups we are considering here) and that the differences mentioned, if not otherwise noted, are usually only a matter of degree, although they are statistically significant. In particular, the internal differentiation of each group must not be overlooked. Sometimes the variations within a particular group are greater than those between the mean values for different groups. Therefore, where additional information is required, it should be taken from the respective chapters as this summary alone will necessarily be incomplete. In emphasizing these points we hope to minimize the always hidden danger that statements of this kind may be quoted out of context, be taken as

absolute values by themselves, or be overgeneralized to the extent that they may serve to re-enforce existing stereotypes or to create new ones. The prejudices which may then be formed have hardly ever been helpful in social relations, it is one of the tasks of a differentiated analysis of political culture to shatter customary stereotypes and to reduce them to their actual basis by showing the great variety of existing features and the full scope of their distribution.

The Kikuyu

The Kikuyu are the largest and economically most advanced ethnic group in Kenya. In terms of social institutions and culture they form a relatively homogeneous community. Differences in vertical social stratification have, however, become the most pronounced among them of all the peoples considered here. In particular, the cleavages which are emerging between the accumulating "agricultural bourgeoisie", the poor "proletaroid" farmers and the swelling ranks of completely landless people provide the basis for increasing conflict potentials at this level. To a certain extent these potential internal conflicts are further accentuated by the geographical divisions into the main districts of Nyeri, Murang'a and Kiambu, and in particular the advantages some people from the latter area enjoy due to their proximity to the economic and political center of Nairobi. On the national scene the Kikuyu are clearly the dominant ethnic group, both

economically and politically. Their active involvement in the struggle for independence has served as a justification for many of them "to keep the flag (i.e. the presidency) in the house of Muumbi". The representation of their interests through groups like GEMA has been effectively organized, in addition they enjoy many informal contacts with the "center". Their very economic success and political dominance makes them, therefore, a target of envy and political hostility for some of the other groups.

These more general characteristics also became apparent in our cultural analysis in a number of ways. Thus, looking at some aspects of family relations for example, we found that among the Kikuyu the fathers generally assume a relatively less important role in the economic decision-making than in the other groups. Among those engaged in more modern occupations (i.e. in the non-agricultural classes and the agricultural bourgeoisie), however, the economic decisions are more often made by fathers alone, whereas the importance of mothers for the punishment of children increases, in this way reinforcing the traditionally more limited role of women. Relations with more extended kin are still quite strong, but sharing one's cash income becomes increasingly less acceptable for members of the agricultural bourgeoisie and traditional forms of hospitality often become a heavy burden for those living in town. Further reaching traditional social bonds, such as clan and age-set membership, are least pronounced among the Kikuyu today and clearly seem to be on

the decline. Many Kikuyus exhibit a relatively low level of social trust, discriminating quite carefully in this respect on the basis of their family relations and personal friendships. In addition, a sense of ethnic identity is highly developed among a greater proportion of them.

In the more general social sphere the Kikuyu do not deviate very much from most of the other groups as far as the attachment to ascriptive social criteria or the acceptance of social and political activities of women are concerned. They rank relatively low on our index of "traditionalism", a stronger sense of "anomie" is expressed only by members of the proletariat and the non-agricultural proletarioids. The answers to the question whether respondents are satisfied with their present economic situation again clearly show the internal stratification of the Kikuyu. While a relatively higher degree of satisfaction can be found among the members of the agricultural bourgeoisie and the non-agricultural middle and upper classes, dissatisfaction is very strong in the proletariat, the sub-proletariat, and among non-agricultural proletarioids. In terms of the perception of their economic future a relatively high percentage is optimistic, the greatest number of pessimists being among the members of the proletariat. A greater "disposition towards violence" is exhibited by a substantial minority. The level of "political authoritarianism" is quite high, too, but turns out to be strongly related to the more general support which Kenya's present political system enjoys among

them. This latter attitude is also supplemented by the relatively greater proportion of those professing to adhere to some basic democratic values.

The Kikuyu also have by far the highest percentage of those who are interested in politics and actually follow political affairs. Similarly their levels of political information and political participation are particularly high. It could also be shown that this high level of political involvement is strongly related to personal political experiences the respondents have had (in particular during the time of "Mau Mau" and the "Emergency" for those in the respective age-group). In terms of our "types of political participants", the Kikuyu have the greatest number of "active democrats", while only minor sections fall into the categories of "parochials" or "less informed citizens". The number of "alienated" persons is relatively great, too, mainly among members of the salariat, the proletariat and the sub-proletariat, which once again points to the relatively high degree of internal class differentiation. Together with the Kalenjin the Kikuyu exhibit the highest level of "system support", which, however, tends to be lower among the non-propertied classes. Conversely, the expression of political criticism is relatively low, but also shows some class differentiation. In addition, those from other Kikuyu districts attribute a greater influence over the government to "the Kiambu people".

Some suggested alternatives to Kenya's present

system such as stronger measures of "Kenyanization", more communal forms of land ownership or a "socialism" of the Tanzanian variety are attractive to only relatively small minorities among them. The idea of a multi-party system, on the other hand, finds strong support among the rural respondents while a greater proportion of those in town are in favor of the present one-party system and the allegedly higher level of political stability it provides.

The Kamba

The Kamba in many ways occupy an intermediate position in Kenya's society. In terms of their economic and educational achievements they clearly fall behind the dominating Kikuyu, but they can be ranked at approximately the same level as the other major ethnic groups: the Luo, Luyia, or Kalenjin. They are distinctly more "advanced" than most of the Coast peoples or those in the pastoral areas. One major division among them, which tends to become even more pronounced with further economic differentiation, is the one between those who live in the climatically more favored parts of Machakos District and those who have to endure in the ecologically much more adverse and more remote parts of Ukambani, most of which are located in Kitui District. Their proximity to Nairobi, but also their ethnic affinity to the Kikuyu, which, however, is not without its tensions, make them an important ally in political coalitions at

the center.

As far as some of the cultural features of the Kamba are concerned an even greater proportion than in the other groups expressed a strong sense of family solidarity. Clan identification is also still relatively strong, while age-sets have lost even more of their traditionally already somewhat reduced importance. A general social trust is expressed by a sizeable plurality of respondents, and the expectation that others are helpful and fair in their actions is somewhat more widespread than in most of the other groups. Their level of ethnic "self-centeredness" is the lowest for all groups. A relatively smaller percentage also express their dissatisfaction with the present way of life. The "disposition towards violence" is, after the Luo, the lowest for all groups. In terms of most other basic social or political attitudes discussed above the Kamba show relatively little deviation from the mean.

The interest in politics and the involvement in national political affairs of many Kamba is not very pronounced. Their levels of political information and political participation are equally low. Thus they still have considerable numbers of "parochials" and "less informed citizens" among them, particularly in the rural areas. Among members of the non-agricultural classes a higher percentage of "active democrats", but also a certain number of "alienated", can be found. The percentage of those scoring high on our index of "system support" is

similarly low, the great majority being in the "medium" category. In terms of their "input orientations" a relatively great number considered working through KANU or contacting a Member of Parliament to be the most efficient method.

When it comes to an evaluation of the political system as a whole, only a relatively small minority is critical of some aspects. Some respondents see the government as dominated by certain groups, in particular the Kikuyu. A considerable percentage is in favor of stronger methods of Kenyanization. While a clear majority of respondents prefer private forms of land ownership, the answers to our question whether the amount of land an individual family may own should be restricted are about equally divided. A more socialist orientation of the Tanzanian kind is not very popular. A clear majority also express their preference for the existing single-party system. Thus, at least the rural Kamba will probably be a fairly reliable partner in the existing coalition as long as they feel confident of getting an appropriate share of what it has to offer.

The Mijikenda

The Mijikenda are still the most traditional agricultural group discussed here, both as far as their economic activities and a number of the attitudes expressed in our survey are concerned. In many respects

the more "hybrid" nature of some aspects of their culture, influenced for centuries by outside forces, in particular by the Arab world and Islam, also became apparent. The more leisurely way of life a larger number of them traditionally enjoyed in the more fertile parts of the coastal strip has become less common because of the mounting population pressure and the greater extent to which an increasing percentage now has to cultivate agriculturally marginal soil further inland. These more crowded conditions have not yet led, however, to a greater amount of out-migration, as e.g. among the Luyia and Luo, or to more highly intensified forms of agriculture as among the Kikuyu or Kisii.

Thus traditional ways of thinking still pervade many aspects of the daily life of the Mijikenda. Traditional family solidarity, for example, is still rather strong and the pattern of family decision-making and the punishment of children have undergone few changes. The largest percentage claim that they trust only members of their family. A great number expect others to look out only for themselves and to take advantage of others if they get a chance. Their sense of ethnic identity is not very pronounced, more "national" identifications also are relatively rare. Even though a very high percentage is dissatisfied with their economic situation, still a large majority looks optimistically into the future. Except for a relatively strong expression of "traditionalism", as measured by our index,

social attitudes of the Mijikenda do not deviate very much from those of the other groups. One interesting finding is the fact that the disagreement between the sexes is the greatest of all groups as far as the socio-political role of women is concerned. Here the (Islam-inspired) traditional male dominance is still very much proclaimed by the men, while a relatively great number of women reject this attitude.

Involvement in politics and exposure to the public news media are very low. The Mijikenda have the smallest number of those scoring high on our "political information" scale; their level of political participation is equally very low. In terms of our types of political participants the "parochials" and the "less informed citizens" by far constitute the majority. There is a small minority of "active democrats", however, while the number of "alienated" again is the smallest for all groups. Their "system support" on the other hand, is remarkably strong, and only very few are critical of some aspects of Kenya's political system or of a dominating group. They are also most strongly oriented towards the government bureaucracy in their dealings with matters of public concern. Their activities in more participatory input structures or "Harambee" projects are not very pronounced.

The Mijikenda also see few alternatives to Kenya's present economic and political system, e.g. as far as the question of land ownership or the imposition of a land ceiling are concerned. The support for the present one-

party system similarly is very strong. The only minor exception in this regard are stronger measures of Kenyanization which are favored by a majority. Thus the Mijikenda with their still largely traditional attitudes and their relatively remote geographical position are still a faithful ally of the center, at least as far as the rural parts of Coast Province are concerned. The politics of Mombasa and perhaps also of some of the smaller towns along the coast are a somewhat different matter.

The Luyia

The Luyia form a somewhat incoherent cluster of ethnic sub-groups in Western Kenya. The traditional variations among them (as e.g. between the Pukusu, the largest single sub-group in the north, and some of the more southern groups) still persist, but they also have been superseded by more modern developments. Thus an important distinction today must be made between those sub-groups where population pressure is not so keenly felt (as e.g. in the north) and those groups where processes of "involutionary growth" and outright "underdevelopment" and pauperization prevail (as e.g. in large parts of Kakamega District). Because of the extremely high population density in many areas the percentage of those engaged in migrant labor (usually of the "long-distance" type, which allows husbands to return

home only once or twice a year) is also the highest for any ethnic group. At the same time the Luyia have, after the Kikuyu, the highest percentage of adult literacy. These conditions together with their relatively widespread poverty and their marked awareness of their unfavorable situation make the Luyia one of the most important factors in future conflicts. Not surprisingly, therefore, the percentage of those in our sample who stated that they were "somewhat" or "very dissatisfied" with their present way of life was the highest for any of the ethnic groups discussed here. This conflict potential still has been somewhat mitigated, however, by cross-cutting class differences and traditional internal variations among them.

Thus for many of the variables the Luyia occupy an intermediate position with only relatively few features making them quite distinct. Their feelings of family and clan solidarity, for example, seem to be relatively strong. Age-sets, on the other hand, which even traditionally played a relatively minor role for most of them, have lost much of their social and political meaning. The membership in modern non-professional voluntary organizations has become increasingly important. Even though at the most general level Luyia are somewhat less suspicious of outsiders than members of some of the other groups, they are among those who are most discriminating as to whom they trust. Family ties are still particularly important in this regard.

A great number of Luyia consider social relations not to be determined by ascriptive criteria. This also applies, relatively speaking, to the social and political role of women. Our measures of "traditionalism", "disposition towards violence", "political authoritarianism", "acceptance of democratic values", "interest in politics", and "political participation" all show the Luyia to occupy intermediate positions. Their exposure to the media and the level of political information, on the other hand, are relatively strong. In terms of our types of participants a sizeable plurality are "active democrats", the second largest group is "alienated", however. Both the percentages of "parochials" and "less informed citizens" are relatively low. A considerable number express their support for Kenya's present political system. But here class differences among them became most apparent: while a clear majority of the agricultural bourgeoisie scores high on this index, very few agricultural proletarioids did so, almost one-third of whom have only low values on this measure, making the Luyia the group with the second largest percentage (after the Luo) of low scorers. Their input orientation is more directed towards their elected representatives than towards government officials, a few even consider open protest.

When it comes to certain alternatives to Kenya's political system, even though a clear majority is in favor of private forms of land ownership, less than one-third think that this should be unrestricted. Further

Kenyanization is also quite popular, a relatively greater number than in any of the other groups expressed their preference for a more socialist system. On all these issues the class divisions among the Luyia are very pronounced: those in better positions still favor the present system, while considerable percentages of the non-agricultural lower classes and the agricultural proletarioids are more oriented towards some alternative possibilities. Only with regard to Kenya's party system are these positions less clear-cut. Here, a majority of the agricultural proletarioids is in favor of the present system, while members of the agricultural bourgeoisie, but also of the proletariat, express their desire to be able to choose between several parties.

The Luo

As the second largest ethnic group in the country the Luo have played an important role in Kenyan politics. In the period immediately before and after independence they were the ally of the Kikuyu in KANU. After the foundation and subsequent ban of KPU and the assassination of Tom Mboya many Luo saw themselves alienated from the central political system and became a main focus for the opposition. Their economic position is characterized by a relatively low level of agricultural development in their home area and

a relatively strong engagement in non-agricultural employment elsewhere, often in the form of "long-distance migration". A considerable number of them today have become members of Kenya's "intellectual elite". As the only "Western-Nilotic" ethnic group in Kenya the Luo are also set apart by a number of traditional cultural characteristics, in particular the lack of both male and female circumcision, which is still highly valued by many members of the other ethnic groups.

Some of the more dominant contemporary cultural traits also became apparent in our survey. While their family relations and the emphasis put on traditional social bonds, for example, do not show a great deal of variation from the mean for most of the other groups, their general level of trust towards others is somewhat lower and its scope is mainly restricted to personal friends. The level of economic satisfaction, in particular among those still pursuing a more traditional way of life, is rather high. As far as their economic future is concerned, the Luo have the lowest percentage of optimists, but a majority expects that conditions at least will not become worse.

The Luo also have the smallest number of all the ethnic groups considered here who emphasize ascriptive social criteria. This includes the social and political position of women whom a great majority expects to participate in politics on an equal basis. Similarly, the percentage of those who express a "disposition towards

violence" is the lowest for all groups. Their level of "political authoritarianism", a measure which also proved to be significantly related to our index of "system support", is equally low, while a sizeable number express their acceptance of democratic values. In terms of their levels of political information and political participation the Luo occupy intermediate positions, which are somewhat differentiated according to the social class of respondents. The "less informed citizens" and the "active democrats" are most numerous among them, while the percentages for both "parochials" and "alienated", except for a larger number of the latter among members of the non-agricultural classes, are relatively low. When it comes to the expression of "support" for Kenya's political system and its leadership, the relative isolation of the Luo and their disenchantment with the present situation become most apparent. They have by far the smallest number of those scoring high on our respective index and the greatest percentage of those who believe the government is dominated by a certain group (most of them naming the Kikuyu). Similarly a sense of "national pride" (almost half of the respondents see nothing to be proud of in Kenya) is the lowest of all groups.

As far as some of the possible alternatives to Kenya's present economic and political system are concerned a somewhat greater number than in most of the other groups favor more communal forms of land ownership and a restriction as to the amount of land an individual may

possess. Stronger measures of Kenyanization, on the other hand, perhaps since they are expecting some assistance from outsiders against the preponderance of certain Kenyan groups, are least favored by them.

Tanzania's model of socialist development is approved by a sizeable minority, the second largest group to do so after the Luyia. A very high percentage also express their preference for a return to a multi-party system, only a greater number of members of the non-agricultural middle classes opting for the present situation.

The Kalenjin

The "Kalenjin" are the most heterogenous of all ethnic groups considered here. They have come to be known by a common name only in recent decades and their sub-groups have remained quite distinct entities. The discrepancy between those groups among them who still largely pursue a pastoralist way of life and those who have successfully adopted modern methods of agriculture is particularly pronounced. A relatively smaller percentage of them than of the other groups discussed have migrated to places outside their original home area and their involvement in economic and political affairs at the center has remained quite low. Today the Kalenjin exhibit many features which are still characteristic of their traditional way of life, but which are coupled with attitudes which reflect their increased economic importance

as successful cash-crop farmers and their political significance as an important factor (Daniel arap Moi having become the second President) in Kenya's present government.

These more general conditions have also become apparent in our survey. Thus some characteristic aspects of family relations, for example, still reflect traditional attitudes. The father has a particularly strong position in the economic decision-making in the family in both the generation of our respondents and in that of their parents. Traditional forms of hospitality also are still very much adhered to. Traditional social bonds such as clan and age-set relationships have remained very important,

and only the Maasai surpass the Kalenjin in this respect. The scope of social trust is largely restricted to people they know or who belong to their own ethnic group, but in general they do not seem to be as suspicious of others as members of some of the other groups. Thus they have the lowest percentage saying that they do not trust anybody and by far the greatest number of those who state that they expect others to be fair. Their expression of "ethnic self-centeredness", on the other hand, is also quite strong, again coming after that of the Maasai.

Although a great number of them are not satisfied with their present economic situation, they have the highest percentage of those who look optimistically into the future. Ascriptive social criteria still play an

important role. This also applies to the social and political position of women whose activities are seen, again after those of the Maasai, in the most restrictive way. The score in our index of "traditionalism" is also particularly high. Their "disposition towards violence", "political authoritarianism", but also their acceptance of democratic values are somewhat above the mean.

The interest of many Kalenjin in national politics is not really great, but their levels of political information and political participation are about average. Together with Kikuyu and Luyia they have a great number of "active democrats", particularly among the members of the agricultural bourgeoisie. "Less informed citizens" and outright "parochials", on the other hand, are relatively scarce. The percentage of "alienated" conforms to the mean. Their expression of "system support" is very strong. They also have the smallest number of those who see the government as being dominated by any particular group. At the same time they remain quite critical of certain aspects of Kenya's present political system. They have the highest percentage of all groups who favor stronger measures of Kenyanization and a return to a multi-party system. But "socialism à la Tanzania" is completely out.

The Maasai

The Maasai are an outstanding

example , and the only one included here, of a people who are still mostly dependent on a pastoralist mode of production. Their commitment to a pastoralist form of existence is even more extreme than that of some of the other groups (as e.g. the Samburu, Turkana, or some of the other peoples in northern Kenya), who supplement their diet with some subsistence agriculture or fishing. In their picturesque appearance they have attracted the interest of outsiders, whether these were early explorers, colonial administrators, or present-day tourists. But relatively little has transpired about them in the form of more serious ethnographic investigation. Today Maasai culture is at a crossroads and it remains to be seen whether they will actually "go under", as Governor Charles Eliot predicted at the beginning of the century, or whether some viable alternatives (such as different forms of individual or group ranching) can be found which would allow them to adapt themselves to a more modern way of life while still preserving their ethnic identity and some of the more important elements of their cultural heritage. All in all, given the continuing infringement by members of other groups on the more fertile parts of their home area and the "grabbing" of individual pieces of land by some Maasai themselves, the prospects seem to be rather gloomy. But at least many Maasai still live up to their reputation, that they are not afraid to speak their mind and to take action, if necessary.

One feature which clearly became apparent in our survey is a strong expression of self-confidence underlining the almost proverbial "pride" of members of this group. They also place great emphasis on family relations and traditional social bonds, in particular as far as traditional forms of hospitality are concerned, but the scope of their family solidarity seems to be restricted to their more immediate kin. The institutions of clans and age-sets are still largely intact and define some of the most important aspects of Maasai life. On the other hand, very few of them are members of any modern formal organization or participate in "Harambee" efforts. A higher percentage than for any of the other groups is suspicious of outsiders, their scope of trust being largely confined to members of their family, age-set, or ethnic group. The level of "self-centeredness" of the group as a whole is also higher than for any of the other communities. Conversely, a sense of a Kenyan "national identity" is least developed among them, which is an expression of the more general parochialism of a greater number of them, almost half of the respondents being neither proud nor critical of any aspect of Kenya's national affairs.

Ascriptive social criteria still play a great role, in particular as far as the social and political role of women and the respect for old age are concerned. The expression of "traditionalism" on our index is equally strong. The "disposition towards violence",

perhaps reflecting their tradition of warriorhood, is the highest for all ethnic groups. A majority of Maasai, again unique among all groups in this regard, are satisfied with their present economic situation, but, together with the Luo, they are also the group which is most pessimistic about the future.

The interest in politics, at least as far as national affairs are concerned, is very low. A majority of them, again the highest percentage in this regard, is not exposed to any of the modern news media. Subsequently their overall score on our "political information scale" is particularly low, but those who have successfully "made" it to the "modern world" have scores which are even higher than those from members of most of the other groups in the respective classes. For most Maasai active participation in politics is still confined to local affairs. This is partly because a clear majority of them are "parochials", but even among the more "modern" Maasai political participation remains very low, a considerable percentage falling under our "alienated" type of participants. The fact that a majority (which is more than in some of the other groups) know the name of their representative in parliament is all the more remarkable. It appears that Maasai M.P.s do constitute an effective and meaningful "link" between their people and the central government. This is also expressed in the dominant "input orientation" which also very strongly stresses the role of M.P.s. The overall "system support", however, is quite low, but

this must be largely attributed to their more general parochialism rather than to any specific dissatisfaction (as e.g. among the Luo) with Kenya's present government. Thus, when asked directly, an overwhelming majority state that they are not critical of anything. When it comes to some concrete alternatives to Kenya's present system, a sizeable minority answered "don't know" to many of our questions. More communal forms of land ownership, stronger measures of Kenyanization, and a multi-party system are favoured by a greater number. However, more communal forms of ownership in cattle, as their most important means of production, do not seem to be very popular. In any case, a socialism of the Tanzanian kind, apparently having in mind some unpleasant experiences that some of their brethren across the border have had with the administration there, is strongly disliked.

CHAPTER XXI

CLASS PROFILES

In the long run, the potentially most important factor cutting across Kenya's ethnically stratified society is membership in a social "class". Unlike the greatest proportion of current studies based on survey research, which employ more indirect indicators like a person's income or composite indices of "socio-economic status" to assess this phenomenon, we have chosen the criterion of a person's relationship to the means of production (both in the sense of ownership and decision-making power over them), which allows us to devise more strictly defined categories in a theoretical manner. The kinds of conflict which emerge and their potential scope and form will depend on whether both ethnic and class aspects will be "super-imposed". If this is the case, which to a certain extent already seems to have happened with important sections of the Luyia and Luo who find themselves at the lower end of the socio-economic scale and, conversely, with sizeable proportions of the Kikuyu at the other end, conflicts are likely to become much more pervasive and permanent and to take more violent forms. Actual "class consciousness" is still in a nascent stage in many

regards. Common class actions thus can only be expected on an ad hoc basis in most instances. But the objective differences of interest of these classes and certain attitudinal differences which became apparent in our survey are an important indication of things to come.

The non-agricultural upper and middle classes

The non-agricultural upper and middle classes in Kenya are characterized by interests and attitudes which set them apart from each other but they also share some common features. The most clear-cut dividing lines among them concern conflicts of interest between large-scale international and national capital and the small bourgeoisie: these lines still tend to coincide to a certain extent with racial lines. But increasingly economic differences of interest also become apparent between African members of the upper classes (i.e.

the "capitalists", the "managerial class" and the "state class" in our terminology), the local non-agricultural bourgeoisie, and the salariat. At the same time these classes are subject to a number of common influences concerning more general social and cultural changes.

Thus family relations in these classes tend to become more restricted under the conditions of urban life and some traditional forms of hospitality are declining, even though financial obligations towards members of the extended family in the countryside often remain strong. Traditional social bonds such as clan and age-set relationships also tend to

become weaker. Similarly, ascriptive social criteria are adhered to less often, but, contrary to some expectations, the involvement of women in the economic decision-making of their families decreases as well. Social trust in these classes has become less widespread and they have become most discriminating as to whom they trust.

Life satisfaction, not surprisingly, is highest in the upper classes and the non-agricultural bourgeoisie. Attitudes of estrangement and anomie, on the other hand, are relatively rare. Members of these classes are most exposed to the mass media, have a high level of political information and express a strong interest in politics. They show a high level of acceptance of democratic procedures and think they understand national problems. The actual election turnout of these classes, as reported in our survey, is, however, considerably lower than among the rural classes. Thus, together with a high proportion of "active democrats" a considerable number of the "alienated" type of political participants can be found among them. A somewhat smaller percentage than in the agricultural bourgeoisie, for example, actually knew their M.P. "System support" is nevertheless very high and few members of these classes are in favor of economic and political alternatives such as more communal forms of ownership, a more general socialist orientation, or a multi-party system.

The members of the salariat, however, even though they are grouped with the middle classes, show a somewhat different pattern of political orientation. They have a

similarly high level of media exposure and political information, but they are much more dissatisfied with their present economic situation. This is also reflected in the very low level of system support among members of this category, the much more widespread criticism of some key aspects of Kenya's present economic and political system, such as the low level of wages, the lack of a ceiling on large-scale land ownership, insufficient measures of Kenyanization, and the one-party system. Socialism of the Tanzanian kind is also, relatively speaking, most popular among the members of this class. On the whole, it thus can be said that this class constitutes a strong potential for further political changes: its objective position as a "dependent" class is comparable to that of the proletariat proper, but its level of consciousness in the present situation is much higher. If the salariat can find some efficient means of organization, this class with its, if one can say so, "social-democratic", reform-oriented outlook can become, in conjunction with some potential "allies", one of the most important forces in Kenyan politics.

The non-agricultural lower classes

The non-agricultural lower classes consist, in our terminology, of the non-agricultural proletaroids, the non-agricultural proletariat and, as a mostly urban-based group, the sub-proletariat. Even though the members of these classes share relatively similar (mostly very poor!) living conditions, there are some important differences concerning

their objective interests and political orientations.

The non-agricultural proletarioids, engaged in small-scale commodity production, repairs, certain services or petty trading, are as small owners of their means of production the most independent of these classes. They also have severed their links with the countryside to the largest extent. This relative independence is reflected in their more general social and political attitudes. Thus the scope of their traditional family relations has been considerably reduced and other traditional social bonds such as clan and age-set relationships are of relatively little importance among them. Their scope of social trust is centered around their immediate personal relations. An expression of anomie, on the other hand, is very high in this group and dissatisfaction with the present economic situation is very widespread. This actual dissatisfaction is coupled, however, with what seems to be the most outstanding characteristic of this class at the present time, namely a very high level of optimism concerning their economic future.

In the political sphere, the non-agricultural proletarioids are relatively well exposed to the public news media but their political information and actual political interest and election turnout reach only intermediate levels. "Active democrats", "less informed citizens" and "alienated" are well represented in this category. The level of support for the present economic and political system is remarkably high and only relatively few members of this class are in favor of stronger measures of Kenyanization, a more socialist

orientation, or changes in the party system.

A permanent non-agricultural proletariat has been formed in Kenya only during the last few decades. Many members of this class still maintain intensive links with the rural areas both because of still existing close family relationships and other social bonds, and as a measure of social security in case of unemployment or retirement. Actual living conditions are poor, but a lower percentage of the members of this class express their dissatisfaction with their present life than among the non-agricultural proletarioids or in the agricultural proletariat. A feeling of anomie similarly is not as widespread among them, but their optimism towards a better economic future is also less pronounced. In terms of exposure to the mass media and levels of political interest and information, the members of the non-agricultural proletariat occupy an intermediate position. Actual political participation, however, is the lowest of all classes. Together with considerable numbers of "active democrats" and "alienated" persons a relatively high proportion of "parochials" can be found among the members of this class. Their "system support" is, together with that of the salariat, the lowest of all categories, and the smallest number among them actually know their M.P. When it comes to some concrete alternatives to Kenya's present system, however, the criticism of this class is not very pronounced. Except for higher wages relatively few changes are demanded, e.g. as far as a more socialist orientation or a multi-party system are concerned. The non-agricultural proletariat thus presently is not very likely

to form a vanguard in any more comprehensive class struggles.

The sub-proletariat, finally, is, as we have emphasized before, a very heterogeneous category. This is also reflected in the social and political attitudes expressed by a majority of its members. Thus many of them still maintain close relations with their more immediate family, but traditional social bonds, e.g. as far as clans and age-sets are concerned, have become very weak. This class also has the highest percentage of those who say that they do not trust anybody. Not surprisingly, a great majority of the members of this category are dissatisfied with their present situation, but very many of them apparently do not consider their plight to be a permanent one and a high percentage express their optimism towards the future. Politically the situation in this category is not very clear-cut either. A relatively large proportion of its members are exposed to the modern media, but political interest, and, in particular, political participation remain low. Together with a considerable number of "parochials", the highest percentage of "alienated" can be found in this category. "System support" still is at an intermediate level, however, and alternatives to Kenya's present economic and political system are perceived and supported only by a relatively small minority among them. The sub-proletariat thus cannot be expected to become a clear-cut factor of its own in future political conflicts or to play an important role in any more permanent class coalition. Except for perhaps joining the urban "crowd" at a few

occasions it is more likely to remain at the sidelines of most political actions.

The agricultural classes

Agriculture not only is still by far the dominating sector in Kenya's economy, but the rural population, contrary to some expectations, ^{also} has maintained a significant influence on national politics. Increasing economic differentiation has led to the emergence of at least three distinct classes in this sector: the successful cash-crop growing agricultural bourgeoisie, the agricultural proletarioids, who are either still dependent on subsistence agriculture or who cultivate plots too small for continuing accumulation, and the landless agricultural proletariat of farm-workers who are employed either on large-scale farms and estates or, at least on a temporary basis, by successful small-scale agricultural producers. This increasing economic differentiation also begins to be reflected in differences of social and political attitudes.

Thus in the agricultural bourgeoisie traditional social bonds have tended to become somewhat less important. Family relations on the whole are still strong, but support in monetary terms is more reduced to one's immediate family. Economic decision-making is now increasingly reserved to the male head of the household alone. Feelings of anomie are relatively unknown in this category. Together with the upper classes and the non-agricultural bourgeoisie this class

shows the highest level of life satisfaction, and it is also most optimistic as far as its economic future is concerned. A majority of the members of the agricultural bourgeoisie are regularly exposed to the news media, political participation is the highest of all classes. Almost two-thirds of the members of this category can be classified as "active democrats", the proportions of the other types of political participants all being very small. System support is relatively high, but not as high as in the non-agricultural bourgeoisie, for example, and criticism of certain features of Kenya's system remains quite strong. Thus a majority are in favor of a land ceiling (i.e. for large-scale farmers!), stronger measures of Kenyanization and a multi-party system. This class will undoubtedly play a very important role when a shift towards more self-reliant but not necessarily socialist policies may be considered.

The agricultural proletarioids make up the majority of households. They have been least affected by socio-economic changes. Except for those among them who are enmeshed in a pattern of involutory growth or even outright pauperization (as in some parts of Luyia country), their traditional mode of production has remained largely intact. Similarly, many traditional attitudes, e.g. as far as family relations, traditional social bonds,^{or} the role of women are concerned, still have been maintained. An expression of anomie also is relatively low. Life satisfaction on the whole still is quite high, but this class has the lowest percentage of those who are optimistic towards the future.

This class has been least exposed to modern media so far and the overall level of political information is the lowest of all classes. Their election turnout and overall political participation is somewhat higher, however, than in the non-agricultural lower classes. A majority also know their M.P.. The "less informed citizens" and the "parochials" prevail in this class and only relatively few "alienated" can be found among them. System support is rather low, too, but this is accounted for to a large extent by the more general parochialism. Ethnic identification and the respective representation in the present government still tend to prevail in this regard. Criticism of some concrete aspects of the economic or political system is relatively muted, many issues, such as stronger measures of Kenyanization or a change in the party system, are not of any immediate concern to the majority. In the long run further changes affecting this class either towards an increasing embourgeoisement of significant segments or towards growing pauperization certainly will be decisive for Kenya's overall class balance. As long as the basic position of independent self-supporting producers of the vast majority of this category is not significantly threatened and if conflicts are not aroused on an ethnic basis, any "revolutionary" tendencies among the peasants, however, seem highly unlikely.

The final class to be considered here is that of the agricultural proletariat. It has emerged as an almost completely landless category with the exception of certain squatting rights on large farms both as a result of measures

taken by the colonial government and, in more recent decades, the continuing population pressure in very densely populated areas such as Central and Western Provinces and parts of Nyanza. Taken altogether, the members of this class certainly have the most miserable living conditions. Only some sections of the sub-proletariat living in big city slums are in a comparable situation.

The economic changes experienced by this class also have affected some of their attitudes. Thus some more traditional social bonds, e.g. concerning extended family or age-set relations have been considerably weakened. A sense of anomie is very widespread, dissatisfaction with their present situation is the highest of all classes. Nevertheless, a majority express their hope for a better economic future. Media exposure is higher than among the agricultural proletarioids, but lower than in the other classes. Political information similarly is very low. Political participation is lower than in the other agricultural classes, but not as low as among the non-agricultural ones. Both significant numbers of "parochials" and of "active democrats" can be found among them. System support on the whole is surprisingly high, criticism of more general aspects of Kenya's system is not very pronounced. Socialism à la Tanzania in particular is favored only by a very small minority. More hope is put into better wages, a ceiling on individual landholdings and a return to a multiparty system. Some of the discontent of this class probably can still be channelled by the further subdivision or transformation into more co-operative forms of

remaining large-scale farms. Except for increased organization on large commercial estates, the dispersed living conditions of the members of this class who remain in the small-scale agricultural sector make any more common actions quite unlikely.

CHAPTER XXII

SOCIETY AND STATE

We now have to pull together the various threads of our argument and see in which way the social forces analyzed so far actually determine the present and possibly also the future pattern of politics in Kenya. Unfortunately, there is as yet no single coherent theory which would allow us to do so in a clear-cut and straightforward manner. At the most general level, the "structural-functional" school of thought, which has influenced much "Western" writing on these matters, has remained too abstract and too devoid of actual empirical content, except superficially as e.g. by identifying "social indicators" and the like, to be really helpful for our purposes. Marxist writers, on the other hand, at least the more orthodox ones, often have been content with "deriving" the general functions of "the" capitalist state from an abstract analysis of its economic conditions. Little attention is then paid to the multitude of empirical variations in concrete social formations and the different "paths" of social and political development which may occur.¹ In any case, in our view, no deterministic interpretation of history assuming a preconceived eschatological final state can do justice to the phenomenon we are observing. This does

not mean that carefully reflected normative criteria should not guide us in our thinking.²

Among the more general comparative historical studies Barrington Moore's "Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy"³ comes closest to what we have in mind. It combines the careful "historical-materialistic" assessment of crucial social forces during certain decisive phases of history in a number of countries and the subsequent developments they have taken with a more general normative orientation seeking to understand the chances or failures of "democracy" in each case. Much of the criticism which has been levelled against Moore's study is justified: both a number of empirical modifications in the analysis of each case and a somewhat more systematic formulation of the overall theoretical framework are required.⁴ We also cannot agree with Moore's categorical assertion with respect to Third World countries that "the decisive causes of their politics lie outside their own boundaries".⁵

In our view it is rather the particular interaction of external forces with specific internal social formations which deserve special attention in these cases: the potential scope of comparative investigations cannot be precluded in an a priori fashion. Furthermore, we think that we cannot be content with simply accepting the "givens" of the past; a future-oriented perspective, including normative considerations, has to be developed. Even though we remain sceptical about the chances of certain kinds of "futuresology"⁶, the rational analysis of medium-term potentialities can at least enhance

our consciousness and sensitivity of these matters and thus, hopefully, also improve our actual choices.

The present situation

As has become apparent in our analysis above, Kenya's overall social structure is characterized by strong tensions along both ethnic and class lines. Thus the "social distance" expressed by members of different ethnic groups reveals the relatively isolated position of the Luo, for example. The Kikuyu, on the other hand, are most often envied for the economic success of a great number of them and criticized for the dominant position representatives of this group (and in particular those from Kiambu) have had in the post-independence governments. The Kalenjin, at least the successful agricultural groups among them, also profited greatly from Kenya's post-independence economic and political conditions, but, staying mostly in their traditional home areas, meet with less resentment in this regard. The Kamba and Luyia remain both economically and politically in a more intermediate position, at least some parts of them doing quite well economically (e.g.

some Kamba in Machakos District and the more northern Luyia groups), but considerable parts of the Luyia, most notably in Kakamega District, also are enmeshed in a pattern of increasing pauperization due to the enormous population pressure in their home area. The Mijikenda and Maasai, finally, and even more so some of the more remote groups from Northern Kenya which we could not cover separately in this study, are still standing more or less uninvolved at the

"ringside". Their level of support for the present system in a more abstract sense is still relatively high, while they have not been affected so much, given the still widespread reliance on subsistence forms of production, by vital economic and political decisions of the center.

A person's ethnic identification also turned out to be the strongest independent factor in influencing the attitudes expressed on most of the politically relevant scales in our survey. Thus "ethnicity", at least at the level of consciousness and actual behavior, certainly still is a crucial factor concerning many aspects of Kenya's politics. Conflict groups on an ethnic basis are only activated, however, when entire communities see their position threatened in a particular situation and when economic or other political conflicts can be symbolized along these communal lines. This was the case in Kenya, for example, in the unrest following the assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969.

In more "normal" times intra-ethnic differentiations and class conflicts cutting across ethnic ties have largely prevailed. In this regard clearly both the agricultural and non-agricultural bourgeoisie together with the managerial class and the capitalists, as far as the latter are of indigenous origin, have dominated politics so far. The seeds for this pattern of class formation had already been laid by the colonial administration, which favored the "loyalists" in the independence struggle, and the missions, which tended to support the "asomi", their early converts.

The important regulations preceding and following independence (such as the land reform of the "Swynnerton-Plan" and the "gradual" transfer of parts of the large-scale farming sector in a commercial manner) then further strengthened these groups. As our analysis of social mobility has shown members of the present non-agricultural bourgeoisie and upper classes were also recruited to a large extent from these early "bourgeois" elements in the rural areas.

The "state class", as the most immediate agent of political power, has also been clearly interwoven with the interests of these dominant classes. Many of its members have acquired either their own private business, large farms or considerable urban real estate, or they occupy lucrative positions in para-statal organizations or on boards of private local or multi-national corporations. The state class nevertheless has shown a certain responsiveness to other interests as well, e.g. towards rural groups (which are often expressed on an ethnic, regional or local basis) and some segments of the poorer urban classes, mostly because of the continuing need to "legitimize" its position which is emphasized by the existing electoral procedures affecting the top levels of government. In spite of Kenya's close links with the capitalist world economy the state class has also maintained a certain (relative!) autonomy towards the interests of multi-national corporations, if these were in conflict with perceived national interests or important local groups.⁷

The opposition to this dominating class coalition has remained relatively unorganized and ineffective. The rural

proletaroid groups are not so much in direct conflict with their "bourgeois" counterparts and can sometimes profit from intra-ethnic "patron-client" relationships linking the two, or, in the dominating ethnic groups, from "fringe benefits" accorded to them on an ethnic basis such as infra-structural projects carried out by the government in their area.

More widespread "peasant revolts" (except perhaps among some subgroups of the Luyia and among the Luo which then will be articulated more on an ethnic basis) thus also seem relatively unlikely given the still largely independent economic basis of this class which in Kenya has not been permanently exploited either by feudal overlords (as for example in Ethiopia before the 1974 revolution) or by commercial money lenders (as in many parts of Asia).⁸

The non-agricultural lower classes, on the other hand, still consist to a large extent of unskilled members of the proletariat, many of whom are maintaining their links with the rural areas which tends to mitigate conflicts both between the urban proletariat and the peasantry (e.g. about food prices) and the proletariat and the non-agricultural bourgeoisie (the former still being subsidised to some extent by food supplies from their families upcountry). The sub- or "Lumpenproletariat" does not constitute any effective conflict potential. The "services" it can deny to the dominating groups are marginal indeed, and except for occasional outbreaks of looting or hooliganism it is hard to see how it can form a permanently organized and effective conflict-group of its own. This has occurred in some minor instances

and the increasing rates of burglaries and other crimes in a city like Nairobi are indications of the swelling ranks of this group. But most of the possible impact has been effectively contained by the police apparatus and private "security forces" and its activities, in any case, have not been of a more directly political nature.

This leaves the true "industrial proletariat" of better-skilled workers, who are not yet very numerous, and parts of the "salaried" as potential sources of class opposition. Indeed, as the results of our survey show, these groups are most critical of many aspects of Kenya's economic and political system and rank lowest in their support for the present government. They are also least integrated by meaningful links with Kenya's present institutions (the role of M.P.s, for example, being negligible in the urban areas). This makes them the most likely conflict group on a class ^{to} basis challenge the dominating coalition. So far its sheer quantitative force is still very small, and, except for occasional conflicts in work relations (the trade union structure not being very effective either) and a more or less latent support for some of the programs espoused by the former KPU or the late J.M. Kariuki, its impact has been very muted.

Classificatory attempts

If we now compare this more general social situation with a number of attempts to "classify" Kenya's present

political system in terms of more conventional categories of contemporary political science we encounter a number of problems. At the present stage there is no generally accepted typology of political systems which is sufficiently exhaustive and sufficiently differentiated at the same time to cover all concrete cases of political systems. Attempts made so far are either purely enumerative and lack stringent analytical distinctions, or they are so limited and rigid in their analytical dimensions that a large number of cases cannot be included in any satisfactory manner. The crux of the matter essentially lies in the fact that political systems and their relationships with their societal and international environments are of such a complex nature that any attempt at reducing ^{them} by means of analytic categories almost by necessity emphasizes certain features at the expense of others, which in some cases may be the more relevant ones. Faced with this dilemma many authors prefer to search for meaningful "labels" for a limited number of in some ways similar political systems and some of their more prominent features, rather than attempting to group them into all-comprehensive categories of a universal nature. The attempts to classify Kenya's political system have been mostly of this kind.

One basic distinction used for the classification of political systems is that between "constitutional" and "non-constitutional" governments.⁹ In this respect Kenya clearly belongs into the former category although the mere existence of a constitution without further knowledge of its

actual contents and functioning does not lead us very far. A further qualification then would be to call Kenya's political system a "democracy", or taking into account some of its limitations, a "tutelary democracy".¹⁰ Again, this notion does not seem to be very helpful, because its theoretical meaning remains vague and because in many instances where this term or similar ones (e.g. "guided democracy" in Indonesia, or "basic democracies" in Pakistan) have been used, it has only served as a euphemistic and largely apologetic description of in fact rather authoritarian and oligarchical systems.

It would be equally misleading, however, to call the Kenya system a "mobilization system" instead, which is characterized by an explicit developmental ideology and an effective hierarchically structured party organization.¹¹ At present Kenya's only party possesses neither quality and it would be more correct to speak of a "no party"- rather than of a "single-party state", as some critics have rightly noted,^{because} for most of the post-independence period KANU has not been much more than an empty shell. For a similar reason the analogy of "machine politics", which has been drawn to characterize some other African one-party states¹², cannot, in our view, be meaningfully applied to the Kenyan case. Although a system of this kind does not require any explicit ideological orientation and is merely based on the distribution of "spoils", it still supposes the existence of some kind of permanent and well functioning organization, which, again, we do not find in Kenya. Closer to reality comes the description of Kenya's system as one of "patrons" and "clients" where

the spoils are distributed not by means of a single "machine", but by many smaller or bigger "bosses" each with its particular "clientele". In Kenya these comprise not only Members of Parliament and other elected representatives, but they include significant parts of the "state class". Most of these relationships are still based on the common ethnic and, more narrowly, local geographical backgrounds of the individuals concerned, but in some cases also on more specific economic or other interests.

Useful as this latter term may be for the characterization of some features of Kenya's political life, it should not be overlooked that it describes only a partial aspect of Kenya's political system. Other interpretations, for example, have focused more on the great constitutional powers of the head of the executive and in particular the enormous personal influence of Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta. Although it may be difficult to assess the extent and the duration of what has been called his "charisma" ¹³ in any straightforward empirical way, there is no doubt that for many Kenyans and for a considerable period of time he seemed to possess this "gift of grace". It certainly had been attenuated during the last years of his life, but he still exercised a patrimonial kind of leadership which was most vividly manifested by the way he was "holding court" at his home in Gatundu or at one of his other residences. ¹⁴

Another element which has been used to classify Kenya's political system is the nature of its foreign relations and the degree to which it is dependent on outside

forces. Again, in our eyes, it would be wrong to speak of a "puppet-regime" or a "satellite" of a foreign power, but there is no doubt, on the other hand, that Kenya as a part of the "periphery" of the international system is dependent to a large extent on forces from abroad and that, as we have stated before at least a certain "congruence" of interests exists between Kenya's ruling groups and some of their foreign counterparts. To characterize this situation, however, as a relationship between a local "governing" class, which remains dependent on the "ruling" class of "the international bourgeoisie", does not seem to be very helpful.¹⁵ In our view, it is quite misleading to speak of a homogeneous, anonymous international bourgeoisie which dominates all Third World countries, irrespective of their internal structures and policies, in more or less the same way. At least the actual kind and degree of involvement of the different metropolitan powers and multi-national corporations and the activities of their "handymen" on the spot, i.e. mainly members of the "managerial class" and parts of the "state class", must be specified in each case for a meaningful analysis of this factor.

Much of the debate in recent years has centered around the question whether the state in post-colonial societies such as Kenya's, having inherited much of its apparatus from the former metropolitan power, must be considered to be "over-developed".¹⁶ The argument of the relatively low degree of political institutionalization in Third World countries, advanced by some earlier authors¹⁷,

has thus been reversed complaining now about "too strong" state institutions and a widespread bureaucracy. Without entering into all the details of this debate, it is essential, in our opinion, to distinguish carefully in relation to what or whom the state may be considered to be too weak or too strong. There certainly is no doubt that practically all states of the Third World are in a relatively weak position, both economically and militarily, vis-à-vis the major metropolitan powers. As far as their internal position is concerned, however, many state bureaucracies do have a relatively large measure of autonomy vis-à-vis organized pressure groups based on class or other more specific interests, given the low level of overall social differentiation and generally low degree of effective organization of these groups. Whether the state bureaucracy then must be considered to be of a largely parasitical nature mostly serving its own interests alone can only be answered when its actual size and composition is compared to the tasks performed and the level of efficiency shown. The bureaucracy in Kenya is engaged in a wide range of activities and, in spite of a certain amount of nepotism and corruption in some branches, on the whole does seem to have been relatively effective (compared to countries like the Sudan, for example, but probably also Tanzania). The preponderance of institutions of the central government (in relation to more local or regional forms of organization) is a somewhat different matter which does not necessarily affect the overall number of the members of the bureaucracy.

All these attempts to categorize and classify some

important aspects of Kenya's political system thus only cover some partial aspects of reality. They only are meaningful, if they contribute to our understanding of the underlying dynamic factors in Kenya's political development and her prospects for the future. In this theoretically more demanding sense none of the descriptions of Kenya's system of government given so far seems to be really satisfactory.

Prospects for "democracy"

As we noted in the beginning, there is as yet little agreement as to the specific content of any more generally accepted "theory of democracy" and its normative, behavioral, social-structural, and institutional implications. In the vast body of literature on this subject ¹³ two main lines of thought can be distinguished. One, which is often labelled the "idealistic" approach, is particularly concerned with the normative side of the problem. Embracing the Rousseauian concept of "democratic man" or some of its variants this school of thought seeks to devise a "good" political order in a normative sense providing the basis for the fulfillment of such central values as human liberty, equality, and solidarity. Among the different proponents of this approach no agreement has, however, been reached, in view of some of the possible conflicts between these values, as to the specific "mix" which may be desirable and, in particular, in which way their realization may be brought about in any given concrete historical situation. Indeed, as some of the critics of this

line of thinking have pointed out ¹⁹, the normative content of this concept is often posited in an utopian manner which can lead (and has led!) to totalitarian attempts to bring it about. In the very process of doing so (at least for a "period of transition" in the rationalizations of its proponents) such attempts may then completely negate the values they proclaim to achieve.

The second approach, which prides itself on its "realism", focuses instead on some of the requisite institutional mechanisms of democratic political systems. Rather than emphasizing any concrete normative concept or particular qualities of the general population in any given country, it is content with safeguarding some essential feedback procedures between those who govern and those who are governed. In a number of variants the proponents of this approach ²⁰ consider the "intelligence of democracy" ²¹, which consists of these sufficiently established feedback mechanisms such as regular "free" elections, as being responsible for the relatively unproblematical long-term survival of a democratic political system defined in this way. But here again, and in our view rightly so, some critics have pointed to the fact that models of this kind are by no means void of any normative implications and that, even though some of their proponents may deny it, in any given concrete case the mere institutionalization of electoral procedures without any further safeguards tends to support the existing ruling classes and the status quo at the expense of less privileged or less organized but nevertheless sizeable groups of people. As E.E. Schattschneider,

for example, put it: "The flaw in the pluralistic heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper class accent".²² Similarly (and significantly!) Dahl in his study on local government in New Haven/Connecticut "over-looked" that the black and other minorities did not (and to a certain extent could not) meaningfully participate in the "pluralist" system he had described.²³

We have overstated the two positions here somewhat in order to bring out their contrasts more sharply. Obviously, there is still enough room for some "common ground" in between. In our view it is imperative to consider both the normative postulates of democratic theory and the possibilities of their institutional realizations in an adequate manner in order to see the chances which may exist but also the possible conflicts and tensions more fully. Neither approach, however, has so far been able to specify more clearly and adequately the particular social conditions which are conducive for democracy in both a normative and an institutional sense. This deficit is most apparent when we look at the countries of the "Third World" today.

Even though we do not pretend to be able to close the existing gap and do not want to preclude the ongoing discussion of different theories and their respective merits and failures, an empirical study such as ours can help to provide some more "food" for thought and to locate any theoretical speculation in a more concrete historical and cultural setting. The lessons learned from Kenya may then, perhaps, also be considered helpful for countries finding

themselves in comparable circumstances such as the present attempts to return to some form of democratic rule in Nigeria, Ghana or Upper-Volta, for example, or, even though the very complicated external conditions may be overwhelming in these cases, the attainment of independence and majority rule in Namibia or Zimbabwe.

At the most general level we can report one important finding which is in one sense a "negative" one: the evidence presented here indicates that possible restraints on the chances of "democracy" in Kenya, and possibly in other African states, do not so much lie in the lack of "qualifications" of the largest part of the citizenry for a meaningful participation in the decision-making process at different levels of the political system. As we have seen above the levels of political participation even among those parts of the population who still largely pursue their traditional way of life as mostly illiterate "agricultural proletarioids" are remarkably high, the Members of Parliament in particular constituting an important link between them and the central government. The loose forms of "patron-client" relationships which can be observed, i.e. mutually beneficial ties between two parties unequal in status, influence and often wealth, but dependent on a reciprocal exchange of goods and services based on personal contacts ²⁴, can in our view be interpreted as an important institution of "democratic representation" in this case. In Kenya these relationships, given the traditionally egalitarian-segmentarian social structures and the largely independent economic position of

each peasant small-holder today, are not based on traditional hierarchical bonds (as, e.g., in Uganda or some parts of West Africa) or on a "tributary" mode of production (as in Ethiopia and large parts of Asia). Among different "candidates for patronage" the individual is thus able to make his own choice and, as the results of all parliamentary elections conducted so far show, competition may in many cases be very intense indeed.

This, in effect, means that, comparable to the "downward" revision of expectations concerning the level of education, information and political participation of an active citizenry by some of the "realistic" theorists of democracy²⁵, the expectations of many external observers of the African scene now must be revised "upwards", at least as far as the "subjective" dimension of the social bases of democracy is concerned. Thus the often given rationalization for only thinly veiled authoritarian "guided democracies", or even for outright dictatorships or racist regimes, which are based on the lack of qualification of "the poor and uneducated masses", can no longer be accepted so easily. This is, of course, in a normative sense, a "positive" finding.

On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that the qualifications of citizens and the more general acceptance of democratic values and procedures constitute only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the successful functioning of a democratic political system. The maintenance of relatively equalitarian social structures, equality of opportunity, and chances of upward social mobility based on achievement criteria are at least equally important. This leads us to

the question of the viability of Kenya's present political institutions and the chances of more concrete applications of democratic forms of government in the light of our findings.

In recent years problems of this kind have increasingly been analyzed by "organization theorists", who have attempted to reconcile the normative postulates of democratic theory with the organizational requisites of modern large-scale states.²⁶ One such model which holds some promise for the Kenyan situation is Arend Lijphart's concept of "consociational democracy"²⁷, which puts a heavy emphasis on "coalescent elite behavior", if in the long run political stability is to be maintained in view of a highly fragmented social structure and political culture.

This model was developed taking into account the experiences of some "small" West European democracies, which, for different reasons, have highly fragmented societies (such as those of Austria, Switzerland, or the Netherlands), but which have been able to maintain their political stability by means of "grand coalitions", a "proportionate democracy" ("Proporzdemokratie") or similar devices including measures of distributive equity over a considerable period of time.

In Kenya similar efforts can, indeed, be observed and the composition of the cabinet has always shown some kind of balance or an attempt at a "grand coalition" (even if somewhat lopsided in favor of the Kikuyu and, in particular, those from Kiambu) between the main ethnic groups. This political maneuvering at the cabinet level must, however, be accompanied by effective social and structural politics

which consciously counteract the tendency towards increased regional and social inequalities implied in the continuing "free play" of economic and political forces.²⁸ The "legitimatory needs"²⁹ of the ruling groups, in particular in more democratically organized political systems, make such policies necessary, too, and the electoral process in Kenya with a considerable amount of competition at the local level and its very high rate of not re-elected Members of Parliament has had this effect to some extent. These continuing "feedbacks" and the need for M.P.s and members of the government to produce something in return for the electoral support they receive thus can help to "defuse" some of the existing tensions. This was most visibly the case, for example, after the 1969 parliamentary elections which had been preceded by intense forms of ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, much more equitable economic policies certainly are called for.

This also brings us to the question of how Kenya's "one- (or, as some critics say, "no-) party" system is to be evaluated in the light of our findings and of certain criteria of "democratic theory". As we have pointed out above, our respondents are very much split on this issue, a clear majority in the rural areas being in favor of multi-party competition, while there is a definite preference for the present situation among urban residents. Most persons in favor of a single-party system emphasize the importance of continued political stability, whereas a majority of those preferring several parties argued for the sake of the maintenance of democratic principles. For some of the more rigid proponents of democratic

theory a competitive party system is an indispensable part of any viable democratic government. While this may be true for Western industrial settings or culturally more homogeneous societies, it can be argued that in most African countries today party organizations still tend to be based more on ethnic affiliations than on any class or other social or ideological elements. "Ethnic" parties, however, tend to exacerbate existing social conflicts, and, in view of their "fixed" membership which hardly changes over time, are less likely to lead to a system of shifting majorities, where one group or coalition can replace another one through the usual electoral procedures giving all groups a fair chance to benefit eventually from the "spoils" of the system. Constitutional provisions that parties must be represented at least in several regions (as is in Nigeria) or that they are artificially limited in number attaching to each party, regardless of its social basis or actual program, an ideological label (as in Senegal), in our eyes are not likely to be very efficient devices which can lead out of this dilemma.

Under these circumstances a single-party system which provides for effective competition at the level of each constituency, as is presently the case in Kenya and, in a somewhat more restricted form and under different ideological auspices, in Tanzania, may prove to be more viable and "democratic" in the long run. The question of a reasonable well-functioning system of "intra-party democracy" and other forms of open control such as a free press becomes, however, all the more essential in this case. If intra-party elections

are truly competitive and do not exclude important individuals or groups on an arbitrary basis (as was the case when former KPU-members were barred from standing both for the parliamentary elections and KANU elections in recent years), such a system allows for more fluid alliances at the national level taking into account a variety of regional, class and other considerations when a particular issue is to be decided.³⁰

In Kenya, as far as the actual (and most decisive!) presidential elections are concerned, the present situation is complicated by the fact that the constitution explicitly prescribes the nomination of candidates for the presidency to be effected by political parties, allowing only a single candidate for each party.³¹ This, of course, gives the actual party leadership a decisive position when a candidate has to be nominated without the possibility of much "democratic" control. If the de facto one party situation continues, certainly some kind of open intra-party "primary" elections of the presidential candidate on a nation-wide basis would be desirable in a democratic sense.

Another area which is vital for the successful maintenance of democratic procedures and forms of behavior is the field of local government. In Kenya elective forms of local government exist only at the intermediate "county" (i.e. usually "district") level. The administrative personnel of both "locations" and "provinces", on the other hand, is centrally appointed without any further control by representative bodies at these levels. But even in the

districts the centrally appointed District Commissioners and their staff play the most decisive role, while the functions of the elected "County Councils" have been greatly reduced since the local government "reforms" of 1969. These transferred the responsibilities for primary schools, local health services and road construction to the respective central ministries. With the abolition of the "Graduated Personal Tax" (GPT) in 1972 the County Councils also lost their most important single source of revenue, which has only been insufficiently replaced by other funds.³² Clearly, this situation does not fare well for any democratic procedures and experiences at the "grassroots" level in some of its modern forms. If the overall system is to become more "democratic", in the long run certainly some changes in the forms and responsibilities of institutions of local government at different levels are called for.

In addition to the existing procedural arrangements the present form of "democracy" in Kenya must also be evaluated in a normative sense. Most essential in this regard are the maintenance of the rule of law by an independent judiciary and the protection of fundamental human rights. Both are guaranteed by the constitution³³, but, in fact, certain infringements upon these principles have occurred. The regulations of the "Preservation of Public Security Act" of 1966, in particular, which gives very far reaching emergency powers to the President, were used, for example, to ban the opposition party, KPU, in 1969, and to detain a number of "maverick" politicians and even novelist Ngugi wa Thiongo in

January 1978. Similarly, the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press has been somewhat reduced by banning a number of publications and by a certain "self-censorship" by the editors of the main papers concerning some "taboos" in Kenya's political life. All in all, however, even though the criticism of some acts was certainly justified, Kenya has maintained a relatively good human rights record and has one of the freest and best informed presses in Africa. This is also testified by such organizations as Amnesty International which, though critical of certain incidents, views the Kenyan situation as "generally commendable".³⁴

Future dynamics

Our discussion of the conditions for democracy in Kenya has mainly rested on an analysis of the internal political-cultural and social-structural factors and some of the present institutionalizations of democratic procedures. This, of course, is only a partial view of reality and a fuller assessment must also attempt to take external factors and international conditions adequately into account. These consist, on the one hand, of the possibility of direct military confrontation with one of the neighboring states with the subsequent repercussions this may have for the internal political order. Such a development seems relatively unlikely at the present stage, even though a renewed conflict over Kenya's North-Eastern Province with Somalia (similar to the Ogaden war) or disputes with her other neighbors cannot

be completely excluded. On the other hand, Kenya's position in the global economic and political system is all the more important for its future "development" or "underdevelopment" and the subsequent internal social-structural and political consequences.

If we look at the longer term social-structural developments which seem likely in the next few decades, it is apparent that some of the constraints which presently can be observed will become even more pronounced. One is a continuing very high rate of population growth coupled with a very limited amount of available agricultural land, which can ^{be} expanded only marginally (e.g. by opening up some of the still existing land reserves in Rift Valley Province or by means of large-scale artificial irrigation such as the huge Tana River project being undertaken at present). This means that an increasing percentage of people will have to seek their basis of existence in the non-agricultural sector. There, even though the overall average annual rate of economic growth since independence has been remarkable, the opportunities for finding permanent wage employment by setting up one's own little workshop or business are very limited, too. Kenya's peripheral position in the capitalist world economy has led to relatively capital-intensive forms of production in the industrial sector (which is still heavily dominated by foreign capital) and a "deformed" overall economic structure which is mainly geared to produce high level consumer goods for the wealthy few, but very little for the largest part of the population. This pattern has also, to a

considerable extent, "pre-empted" the chances for the development of a group of independent craftsmen and small indigenous industrial enterprises providing employment opportunities for a greater number of people.

Thus continuing high rates of economic growth and some basic structural changes including a more "dissociative" pattern of further industrialization will be required if the increasing population is to be absorbed in non-agricultural occupations in the future. Internal support for such measures can probably be obtained, as our analysis has shown, from the urban salariat and proletariat and even, as far as more "self-reliant" forms of development are concerned, from the small non-agricultural and agricultural bourgeoisie. If this cannot be achieved (and the vicissitudes of the world economy are strongly felt in Kenya, too), the percentage of urban unemployed and the total size of the sub-proletariat (which already has become quite visible in places like Mathare Valley in Nairobi) will greatly increase putting heavy pressure on the administration both for some modicum of social welfare and additional measures of internal security. Such a situation may then lead either to a gradually more repressive form of government betraying its erstwhile democratic foundations in a normative sense, or a complete breakdown of existing institutions because of sheer inefficiency opening the way to completely different alternatives.

But even if greater numbers of people can find permanent forms of non-agricultural employment, the overall class balance will change in the long run, decreasing the

influence of the agricultural bourgeoisie and enhancing the weight of the non-agricultural classes, in particular of the salariat and a skilled industrial proletariat. As we have shown in our analysis above, this relative shift from the rural to the urban areas implies new forms of political participation in the latter which have largely been lacking so far. If the high percentage (and probably increasing number!) of "alienated" found in these groups are to be accomodated by Kenya's political system, stronger participatory structures (such as unions and other forms of formal associations, but also, possibly new forms of political organizations) will be required, unless certain aspects of the politics of "mass society"³⁶ with more authoritarian or relatively unstable forms of government shall come to prevail.

The question whether only more authoritarian regimes, either of a conservative oligarchical or a "mobilizing" socialist type, will be better able to effect any of the required far reaching changes and genuine forms of economic and social development, which are beneficial to the largest part of the population, also remains an open one in our eyes.

It seems at least very doubtful that right-wing dictatorships or military regimes and the very uneven patterns of income distribution and social structure they bring about are really more conducive to long-term economic growth.³⁷ The argument often advanced in favor of such systems, that a more rapid accumulation of capital for investment purposes can be achieved by more inegalitarian conditions, is not convincing in view of the fact that in most cases a large

proportion of the higher incomes, given the propensity of large parts of the upper classes to imitate the "American way of life", is spent for imported luxury goods, directly transferred abroad, or, for "safety reasons", used to buy expensive military hardware.³⁸ The usually existing coalition of interests between parts of the local bourgeoisie and foreign capital in such countries is also least likely to bring about the required structural changes to reduce the impact of the large-scale dependence on outside forces and the "deformed" patterns of growth it implies.

On the other hand, more strongly centralized "socialist" regimes, such as those which existed in Ghana and Mali for some time or which can be found in present-day Guinea or Tanzania, have not been economically very successful either. In these cases the "state class" and a large bureaucracy tend to absorb much of the surplus and the way the economy is organized both in the agricultural and the non-agricultural sectors has not been very effective in most cases so far. It should also not be overlooked that a separate "socialist" development of small "peripheral" states surrounded by a dominantly "capitalist" world economy is very difficult and, possibly, unrealistic.

This leaves some room for more balanced and evolutionary patterns of economic growth based on the increasing purchasing power of large parts of the population, particularly in the agricultural sector, and more integrated forms of industrial development catering to the consumption needs of the masses and providing an indigenous supply of, in the initial

stages, simple producer goods. In such a setting, continued forms of more democratic government, both in its substantive and, possibly somewhat modified, procedural aspects, do seem to be possible. Thus a fourth more evolutionary and democratic "route to modernity", in Moore's sense, does seem to exist, even under present "Third World" conditions. The exact forms it may take will, of course, be subject to a great deal of variation.

In Kenya the present situation, particularly in view of the continuing social-structural tensions and some of the long-term aspects of class formation, certainly remains a very fragile one. No further "forecasts", in the sense of a more precise listing of different outcomes and their relative probability, or more detailed scenarios can be provided at this place. ³⁹

Some abrupt changes such as a military coup or an external intervention also can never be completely excluded under present conditions in most parts of the Third World. It would similarly be vain to speculate any more about the eventual outcome and the survival of at least limited forms of "democracy" in the longer run. The overall probability may not be very high, but as our account has shown, the chance exists. It deserves to be taken.

APPENDICES

I: METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

Sample specifications

The drawing of our samples has been briefly described in the introduction to this study. The following tables reproduce the most important population characteristics of these samples and provide a comparison for the total weighted sample with Kenya's actual population. We are well aware of the obvious limitations of these samples. Yet for most of the variables the deviations between our total weighted sample and the actual national averages are within a range of plus or minus 5 %. The only major exception is sex. We purposely oversampled this variable in favor of males without adjusting this factor in the weighting procedure. This sampling error of approximately ± 5 % corresponds to the estimated sampling error of actual random samples of a size between 400 and 600 respondents for binominal distributions at a confidence level of 95 %. ¹

TABLE VI, 1
RURAL SAMPLE (N = 392)

Variable:		Ethnic group:		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Total ^a						
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%				
<u>Sex:</u>	Male	56	63	33	56	27	63	38	70	41	65	26	76	31	70	257	66
	Female	33	37	26	44	16	37	16	30	22	35	8	24	13	30	135	34
	Total	89	100	59	100	43	100	44	100	63	100	34	100	44	100	392	100
<u>Age:</u>	Below 30	44	50	32	54	22	51	24	45	34	54	20	59	23	53	203	52
	31 - 50	26	30	21	36	12	28	19	35	18	29	13	38	11	26	122	31
	50 +	17	20	6	10	9	21	11	20	11	17	1	3	9	21	64	17
<u>Education:</u>	None	19	21	23	39	26	64	20	37	29	46	10	30	27	62	156	40
	Some primary	48	54	25	42	14	34	18	33	22	35	19	58	8	19	158	41
	Some secondary	22	25	11	19	1	2	16	30	12	19	4	12	8	19	74	19
<u>Occupation:</u>	Non-agricultural	19	22	12	20	7	16	5	9	4	6	1	3	4	9	52	13
	Cash-crop-farmers	23	26	5	9	11	26	14	26	16	25	12	35	6	14	87	22
	Subsistence farmers or pastoralists	3	3	12	20	8	19	12	22	15	24	4	12	19	43	73	19
	Farm-laborers	11	12	--	--	1	2	7	13	--	--	5	15	1	2	31	8
	Housewives	23	26	24	41	15	35	8	15	17	27	8	23	10	23	105	27
	Students	7	8	5	8	--	--	8	15	6	10	1	3	3	3	30	8
	Unemployed	3	3	1	2	1	2	--	--	5	8	3	9	1	2	14	3
<u>Cash family income (Kshs/month):</u>	None	--	--	1	2	--	--	1	2	--	--	2	6	6	14	10	3
	Less than 200	47	59	36	61	35	83	38	70	38	61	21	62	22	53	243	64
	201 - 800	29	36	19	32	6	14	12	22	20	32	9	26	8	19	103	27
	801 +	4	5	3	5	1	3	3	6	4	7	2	6	6	14	23	6
<u>Class:</u>	Salariat	10	11	8	14	4	9	4	7	--	--	1	3	2	5	29	7
	Agric. bourgeoisie	18	20	2	3	2	5	12	22	8	13	13	38	6	13	61	15
	Agric. proletaroids	31	35	39	66	30	71	21	39	39	62	11	32	28	64	199	51
	Agric. proletariat	11	13	--	--	1	2	7	13	--	--	5	15	1	2	31	8
	Non-agr. proletaroids	2	2	--	--	1	2	1	2	1	2	--	--	1	2	6	2
	Non-agr. proletariat	7	8	4	7	4	9	1	2	4	6	--	--	2	5	22	6
	Sub-proletariat (Students and school-leavers)	2	2	--	--	1	2	--	--	--	--	3	9	1	2	7	2
<u>Religion:</u>	Catholics	44	49	17	29	4	9	18	33	25	40	20	61	6	14	137	35
	Other mission churches	31	35	14	24	8	19	24	44	27	43	5	15	9	20	121	31
	African Independents	8	9	20	34	--	--	4	8	6	9	4	12	3	7	45	12
	Muslims	1	1	1	1	23	53	6	11	2	3	--	--	--	--	33	8
	Traditionals	5	6	7	12	8	19	2	4	3	5	4	12	26	59	55	14

^aIncluding 6 "others" from Rift Valley Province.

TABLE VI,2
NAIROBI SAMPLE (N = 180)

		<u>Ethnic group:</u>					Total
		Kik.	Kam.	Luy.	Luo	Other	
<u>Variables:</u>		N %	N %	N %	N %	N %	N %
<u>Sex</u>	Male	38 53	8 42	12 43	26 60	11 61	95 53
	Female	34 47	11 58	16 57	17 40	7 39	85 47
	Total	72 100	19 100	28 100	43 100	18 100	180 100
<u>Age</u>	Below 30	51 71	13 68	23 82	30 70	14 78	131 73
	31 - 50	18 25	6 32	4 14	13 30	4 22	45 25
	50 +	3 4	-- --	1 1	-- --	-- --	4 2
<u>Education</u>	None	13 18	3 16	3 11	4 9	3 17	26 14
	Some primary	29 40	11 58	16 57	17 40	6 33	79 44
	Some secondary	30 42	5 26	9 32	22 51	9 50	75 42
<u>Occupation</u>	Professional	5 7	1 5	-- --	1 2	1 5	8 5
	Skilled white collar	4 5	2 11	2 7	3 7	3 17	14 8
	Skilled blue collar	8 11	2 11	6 21	8 19	2 11	26 14
	Unskilled blue collar	5 7	3 16	1 4	-- --	-- --	9 5
	Unskilled white collar	10 14	1 5	5 18	6 14	2 11	24 13
	Workers in informal sector	7 10	1 5	-- --	1 2	3 17	12 7
	Housewives	10 14	6 31	11 39	8 19	4 22	39 22
	Students	3 4	-- --	-- --	3 7	-- --	6 3
<u>Income</u>	Unemployed	20 28	3 16	3 11	13 30	3 17	42 23
	Less than 200 (Kshs/month)	17 25	7 37	3 11	4 10	3 17	34 20
	201 - 800 " "	35 51	9 47	19 68	24 58	6 33	93 53
801 + " "	16 24	3 16	6 21	13 32	9 50	47 27	
<u>Class</u>	Non-agric. bourgeoisie	-- --	2 11	2 7	4 9	3 17	11 6
	Salariat	15 22	5 26	2 7	8 19	5 27	35 20
	Non-agric. proletoaroids	14 20	1 5	1 4	1 3	3 17	20 11
	Non-agric. proletariat	18 25	8 42	20 72	14 32	4 22	64 36
	Sub-proletariat	16 22	2 11	2 7	4 9	1 6	25 14
	(Students and school-leavers)	8 11	1 5	1 3	12 28	2 11	24 13
<u>Religion</u>	Catholics	38 54	7 37	5 18	19 44	5 28	74 41
	Members of other mission churches	20 28	6 32	23 82	19 44	6 33	74 41
	African Independents	4 6	2 10	-- --	5 12	-- --	11 6
	Muslims	1 1	3 16	-- --	-- --	6 33	10 6
	Traditionals	8 11	1 5	-- --	-- --	1 6	10 6

TOTAL WEIGHTED SAMPLE (WEIGHTED N = 1114)

		Kik.	Kan.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Nal.	Maai.	Other	Total	Actual National Average ^a									
		N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	%									
Sex	Male	156	57	71	46	56	58	102	65	115	59	63	74	71	66	25	71	694	60	56 ^b
	Female	119	43	85	54	40	42	56	35	70	41	24	26	37	34	10	21	450	40	50
	Total	275	100	156	100	96	98	153	100	104	100	92	100	108	10	35	92	1144	100	100
Age	16 - 30	143	53	85	55	45	50	69	44	102	51	54	59	53	50	26	74	580	52	49
	31 - 50	78	29	55	35	27	28	57	35	63	32	37	40	27	26	9	26	354	32	32
	50 +	50	18	16	10	21	22	32	20	29	15	1	1	15	24	-	-	174	16	19
Educ cation	None	66	24	68	44	66	73	53	37	85	44	24	27	79	75	9	26	198	41	64
	Some primary	151	55	64	41	22	25	64	51	69	36	57	61	16	15	18	51	461	42	6
	Some secondary	57	21	23	15	2	2	35	22	40	20	8	9	10	10	8	23	183	17	6
Occup ation	Professional	15	5	6	4	2	2	5	3	1	1	1	2	2	1	3	33	3	1 ^b	
	Skilled white collar	5	2	3	2	1	1	2	1	3	2	-	-	-	-	2	6	26	2	2
	Skilled blue collar	8	3	2	1	-	-	6	4	8	4	-	-	-	-	2	6	26	2	2
	Unskilled white collar	14	5	7	4	4	4	5	3	8	4	-	-	2	2	1	3	41	4	3
	Unskilled blue collar	41	15	3	2	4	4	22	14	2	1	15	16	3	3	18	52	108	10	10
	Informal sector	8	3	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	3	8	13	1	3
	Cash-crop farmers	63	23	11	7	19	20	36	24	42	21	36	39	12	11	-	-	221	20	12
	Subsistence farmers	9	3	36	23	24	25	36	25	45	23	12	13	57	52	-	-	219	20	20
	Housewives	79	29	78	50	41	43	35	21	57	29	24	26	28	26	4	12	34	31	41
	Students	10	4	5	3	-	-	8	5	9	5	1	1	3	3	-	-	36	3	3
	Unemployed	23	8	4	3	1	1	3	2	18	9	3	4	1	1	3	8	56	5	3
	Income	None	-	-	3	2	-	-	1	1	-	-	2	1	6	-	-	22	2	-
		(Ksha/month) - 200	132	53	95	61	83	87	95	60	100	53	61	66	64	62	21	60	651	61
" " 201 - 800		92	37	48	31	10	11	51	32	70	37	23	25	14	14	6	17	314	29	20
" " 801 -		24	10	10	6	2	2	11	7	19	10	6	7	8	8	8	23	89	8	5
Religion	Catholic	142	52	46	29	6	6	43	21	78	40	26	32	12	11	14	40	403	37	25 ^d
	Other mission churches	89	32	42	27	13	14	77	50	82	42	13	15	14	14	40	345	31	-	
	African Independents	18	7	44	28	-	-	9	6	19	10	7	8	6	6	-	-	102	9	38
	Muslims	4	1	6	4	55	57	14	9	6	3	-	-	-	-	5	17	91	8	6
	Traditionals	21	8	18	12	22	23	6	4	9	5	10	12	75	59	1	3	162	15	27
Class	Non-agric. bourgeoisie	-	-	2	1	-	-	2	1	4	2	-	-	-	-	3	9	11	1	4 ^e
	Salariat	26	9	13	8	5	5	6	3	8	4	1	1	2	2	4	11	65	6	5
	Non-agric. proletariat	25	9	12	8	4	4	21	13	18	9	-	-	2	2	4	11	86	8	14
	Non-agric. proletoaroids	16	6	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	-	-	1	1	3	9	26	2	2
	Agric. bourgeoisie	54	20	6	4	6	7	36	23	24	13	39	41	16	14	-	-	181	17	10
	Agric. proletoaroids	67	21	113	73	75	72	59	39	111	52	15	35	89	3	13	51	93	8	49
	Agric. proletariat	33	12	-	-	3	3	21	13	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
	Sub-proletariat	18	7	2	1	1	1	2	2	4	2	3	3	1	1	1	3	32	3	2
	(Students and school-leavers	16	6	7	4	-	-	9	6	23	12	1	1	3	3	2	6	61	5	10
	Urban	72	26	19	12	1	1	24	18	43	23	-	-	-	-	17	49	180	16	10
Resid ence	Pural	201	74	137	28	95	99	130	82	151	78	72	100	101	100	18	51	934	84	90

^aThe national averages for sex, age, level of education and place of residence are taken from the Kenya Population Census 1962, loc. cit.

^bCf. Appendix IV below.

^cThese are rough estimates taken from International Labour Office, Employment, Incomes and Equality, loc. cit., p. 74; cf. also Berg-Schlosser, The Distribution of Education and Income in Kenya: Causes and Political Implications (Geneva: Walters-Verlag, 1970).

^dCf. Kenya Churches Handbook, loc. cit., p. 181.

^eCf. chapter XIX above.

Index and scale construction

One of the most convenient ways of tapping particular variables and presenting the result in an efficient manner is the use of indices and scales. While many of these have been developed, elaborately tested, and validated in an American context,² only very few have so far been employed on the African scene. In view of our limited resources we were not able to develop and sufficiently test such measures ourselves. Instead, we had to be content with selecting a number of items from some already established American scales which did not seem to be too culture-bound or which could easily be adapted to the Kenyan context.

As far as some attitudinal measures are concerned, we included 52 items taken from a variety of sources.³ These appeared on an experimental basis at the end of our questionnaire. All of these were of the Likert-type response mode with no neutral point provided. These items were dispersed randomly, three of them being repeated towards the end of this section in order to provide us with a check concerning the consistency of the answers of the respondents. Since a majority of these items happened to be "positively" worded and alternative negative formulations were either not available or proved to be too clumsy, we instructed our interviewers always to ask for disagreement with the respective item first. Although we well know that such a procedure alone cannot compensate

for the more complex problem of acquiescence, ⁴ we hoped in this way to make the respondents more strongly aware of the possibility of answering in the negative.

From these items we then attempted to construct a number of more comprehensive indices. As a first step we re-grouped the items in their original form and checked their inter-item correlations. It turned out that for a number of items of these rudimentary "scales" the correlations were not sufficient for our purposes to warrant their inclusion in any composite measure. We then eliminated the insufficiently correlated ones step-by-step in each case, until we arrived at a relatively brief, but meaningful index. We then subjected the items of each index to a factor analysis in order to see whether they actually "loaded" on the same factor, thus indicating their unidimensionality.

When we were satisfied by these procedures, we recoded each item by assigning a score of 1 to each negative, a score of 3 to each positive and a score of 2 to each "neutral" reply or "don't know" (even though no explicit neutral point had been provided in our response mode, we had instructed the interviewers to record an answer of "don't know" separately, if the respondent genuinely did not have any information or attitude about a particular item). We then added up the scores of the items selected for each index and regrouped the combined index results into sub-categories of "low", "medium" and "high" for each respondent, choosing the respective

cutting points where it seemed most appropriate depending on the number of items and the actual distribution of scores in each index. The resulting indices and their respective inter-item-correlations for our total weighted sample are as follows:

Agreement with ascriptive social criteria:

	item no.		
	25	38	47
25	-	0.18	0.16
38		-	0.17

Expression of "anomie":

	item no.	
	21	32
21	-	0.18

"Disposition towards violence":

	item no.			
	4	30	50	54
4	-	0.14	0.16	0.12
30		-	0.18	0.12
50			-	0.13

"Political authoritarianism":

	item no.				
	7	8	11	33	34
7	-	0.12	0.13	0.16	0.18
8		-	0.06	0.24	0.09
11			-	0.14	0.17
33				-	0.21

Acceptance of democratic values:

	item no.		
	13	19	27
13	-	0.21	0.14
19		-	0.13
			-

"System support":

	item no.			
	6	31	36	37
6	-	0.28	0.27	0.25
31		-	0.32	0.21
36			-	0.25
				-

All these correlations, with a single exception (items 8 and 11 in the "political authoritarianism" index), are significant at the 0.001-level. These overall correlations generally tended to become stronger among literate respondents and among those (80 % of the total) who answered with a higher degree of consistency (i.e. responded in the same way to at least 2 of our 3 repeated items).

In addition to these attitudinal items which we were able to form into indices, we constructed two scales, one referring to some political cognitive matters, the other to different forms of actual political behavior. Our "political information scale" includes eight items⁵ which can be grouped into an approximately ascending order of difficulty, thus providing this measure, in contrast to the indices listed above, with some internal structure as well.⁶

The inter-item-correlations for this scale, in their actual increasing order of difficulty, are as follows:

"Political information scale":

item no.		21a	21b	21e	21c	21d	21h	21f	21g
21a	-	0.45	0.29	0.35	0.25	0.19	0.20	0.09	
21b		-	0.42	0.52	0.25	0.30	0.42	0.18	
21e			-	0.40	0.22	0.27	0.46	0.21	
21c				-	0.19	0.27	0.46	0.21	
21d					-	0.08	0.07	0.06	
21h						-	0.40	0.39	
21f							-	0.37	

All correlations, except those between question 21d and questions 21f, g, and h, are significant at the 0.001-level. A test of reliability for this scale produced a (satisfactory) coefficient alpha of 0.75.

In the same way we were able to put together seven questions relating to different forms of political involvement in local and national matters to form a "political participation" scale.⁷ The inter-item-correlations of these questions are as follows:

"Political participation scale":

item no.		33b	33f	34a	34e	34f	34g	34i
33b	-	0.41	0.22	0.14	0.09	0.17	0.16	
33f	-	0.15	0.18	0.13	0.23	0.19		
34a	-	0.32	0.27	0.26	0.28			
34e	-	0.87	0.30	0.36				
34f	-	0.27	0.34					
34g	-	0.70						

Again, all these correlations are significant at the 0.001-level. Coefficient alpha for this scale is 0.75.

A final scale with a more elaborate internal structure was of the "Bogardus"-type.⁸ Questions of this kind serve to measure the "distance" between different social groups, in our case between members of different Kenyan ethnic groups, adherents of different religious denominations, and persons of various non-Kenyan origins. Ideally such questions can be selected and grouped to fit a perfect "Guttman"-model. But again we were content to employ relatively simple cumulative scores here, because we considered the contents of the questions to be more relevant than their perfect "fit" in any artificial pattern. One reason which lent support to this decision was the fact that one sub-question (the one referring to the acceptance of a member of another group as a neighbor in the area) was answered quite differently in our rural and urban samples: A large proportion of the urban respondents considered living next to a member

of another group as relatively impersonal. As expected, most of them did not mind such a relationship very much. In the countryside, however, with its still largely ethnically segregated pattern of settlement, this question implied a rather permanent intrusion of outsiders into one's own ethnic homeland. With this additional meaning, this proposition was rejected much more often. Strictly speaking, then, we had two possibilities for this item: 1. We could have assigned two different rank orders for the urban and the rural respondents to fit a Guttman model. This would have made our two samples hardly comparable. 2. We would have to discard this item altogether. By constructing purely cumulative scores we were able to avoid this difficulty in a simple way and still obtained, in our view, satisfactory results.

The findings of such cumulative social distance scores can be presented in a number of ways. One is the usual procedure of crosstabulating the score for a single group (in our case values of 0 to 4 or 5 indicating the number of negative responses to our questions) with the other sub-categories (ethnic groups, denominations etc.). The respective percentage distributions can then be compared and their significance can be tested with the usual chi-square statistics. An alternative procedure is to compute the mean and perhaps also the standard deviation for all responses of the members of a particular group in comparison to members of another group of the same kind. The different means then again can be compared and the significance of their differences

assessed with the help of "T-tests" of significance. The social distance indicated by these means can then also be presented in a number of graphical ways (e.g. as "histograms", or similar to "mileage charts" etc.).⁹

A third, somewhat unusual possibility to employ the results of these Bogardus-type questions is to add up the mean scores of one group against all others of the same kind (and then perhaps compute the average of these means again) to provide us with a measure of "self-centeredness" for each group, i.e. the relative extent to which its members reject relations with members of all other groups. This also turned out to be a statistically significant and in its substantive aspects relevant measure for our purposes.¹⁰

II: THE QUESTIONNAIRES

As briefly stated in the introduction above, we employed two standardized versions of the questionnaire, one in English and one in Swahili. We attempted to make these versions as equivalent to each other as possible. For those interested in comparing both original research instruments, both versions are reproduced here in their entirety. The first draft of the English version was made in the summer of 1970 while I was at Berkeley where I had submitted my first research proposal concerning this project. Professors Herbert McClosky and Peter Marris then generously devoted their time to thoroughly revise the draft in light of their extended and diverse experiences. A further draft, this time in German, was also appended to my study on "Politische Kultur" (Munich: 1972). A renewed English version was then submitted to several pre-tests in Kenya before the final draft emerged. We did not have a chance, however, to process and analyze data obtained during our pre-tests. Even though a number of substantial and editorial corrections were made at this stage a few minor flaws still remained, some of which we only detected later. In any case, probably in every survey some of the possible improvements only become apparent with the advantage of hindsight!

Some of these possible corrections and later considerations are indicated below. These remarks, together with a listing of the main sources used for compiling this questionnaire, are included separately in the notes below in order not to interrupt the presentation of the research instrument itself. We also attempted to preserve as much as possible some of the more important aspects of the original layout.

Hallo (USE LOCAL GREETINGS). My name is ... We are conducting interviews for the Institute of African Studies at the University of Nairobi. We are interested in your way of life and some of the problems you may have. All answers you give will remain completely confidential. You even need not give us your name, we are only interested in what people in general in a position like yours are thinking.

- 1a. How many persons over the age of 16 belong to this household ?
- b. (IF MORE THAN ONE) How many of these are male persons ?
- According to the methods of selection used for this survey, I would like to talk to the oldest / youngest male / female person in this household. (UNDERLINE PERSON CHOSEN, IF THE PERSON IS PRESENT OR IS MET AT AN APPOINTED DATE, CONTINUE AS FOLLOWS).
- 2a. How long have you been living in this place ?
- b. And where have you been born ? (DISTRICT AND LOCATION)
- c. How old are you now ? (APPROX. AGE WILL DO, IF UNCERTAIN, GIVE YOUR OWN ESTIMATE)
- 3a. We also would like to know something about your education. Have you been to school? YES NO
- b. (IF "YES"): Up to which standard or form?
- c. Was it a government, Harambee, or missionary school?
- d. Did you have any further education or some other training? YES NO
- (IF "YES", SPECIFY)
- Where? How long?
- 4a. Now, what about other languages? (OTHERS THAN THE ONE IN WHICH INTERVIEW IS CONDUCTED)
- Do you speak Swahili? YES NO

- (IF "YES") How well do you speak it?
 (1) Very well (2) Quite well(3) Not very well....
- b. Do you speak English? YES NO
- (IF "YES") How well? (1) (2) (3)
- c. Any other languages? How well?
 (1) (2) (3)
- How well?
 (1) (2) (3)
- 5a. Now, what about your parents? Did your father go to school? YES NO
- (IF "YES") Up to which standard or form?
- b. Did your mother go to school? YES NO
- (IF "YES") Up to which standard or form?
- c. What was your father's main occupation? (PROBE EXACT KIND OF ACTIVITY).....
- d. (IF FARMER) How many acres did he cultivate?.....
- e. Which crops did he grow?
- f. Did he have any cattle? YES NO
- (IF "YES") About how many?..... Grade Local.....
- 6a. What is your main daily occupation?
- (PROBE CLOSER TO EXACT KIND OF ACTIVITY, ALSO, WHERE APPLICABLE, BANK)
- b. Do you have any other source of income, even if only occasionally (e.g. money from some relatives, your husband or wife, other things you sell or work for)?
 YES NO (IF "YES", PROBE SOURCE AND APPROX. AVERAGE AMOUNT PER MONTH)
- c. (IF OCCUPIED) About how many hours do you spend working each day?
- d. What, if anything, do you particularly like about your work?
-
- e. What, if anything, do you particularly dislike?
-

- f. Are you a member of any professional organization
(e.g. cooperative, farmer's association, trade union,
federation of employers, chamber of commerce, etc.,
as the case may be) YES NO (IF "YES", PROBE)
Which one?

(QUESTIONS NO. 7 - 9 FOR THOSE WITH AGRICULTURAL
OCCUPATION ONLY, PASTORALISTS ONLY QUESTION NO. 8):¹⁾

- 7a. Who is the owner of this shamba? (ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIP)
.....
(IF NOT OWNER OF SHAMBA HIMSELF, MODIFY QUESTIONS
7 - 9 ACCORDINGLY):
- b. How many acres do you have?
- c. Which crops do you grow?
- (GIVE ALSO APPROX. QUANTITY BY ACRES)
- d. (IF NOT OBVIOUS) Do you sell some of these crops
- or do you use them for your own consumption only?
- (IF SOME SOLD) What do you sell?
- How much do you sell approximately?
- Where do you sell it and to whom?
- 8a. Do you have some cattle? YES NO
(IF "YES") About how many?
- b. Is this grade cattle or local cattle ?
- (IF BOTH, FIND OUT APPROX. RESPECTIVE NUMBERS)
-
- c. Do you sell any milk? YES NO
(IF "YES") About how much?
- (PER DAY OR WEEK ETC.) How is the milk collected?
-
- d. (IF GRADE CATTLE) Do you use artificial insemination?
YES NO
- (IF "NO") Why not?
- e. Is there a cattle dip in this area? YES NO
- (IF "YES") Do you bring your cattle there regularly?
YES NO

- (IF "YES") How much is the fee?
- (IF "NO") Why not?
- f. Do you have any other animals? Goats, sheep
- chicken, others (SPECIFY)
- (GIVE APPROX. NUMBERS)
- (FOR OWNERS OF A SHAMBA ONLY)²⁾

- 9a. Did you ever attend a course at a Farmers' Training Center? YES NO
- (IF "YES") Which course?
- b. Did you ever ask for advice from the agricultural extension service? YES NO
- (IF "YES") What kind of advice?
- c. Do you have a title-deed for your land? YES NO
- (IF "NO") Why not?
- Would you like to get one? YES NO
- d. Did you ever take a loan to improve your shamba? YES NO
- (IF "YES", PROBE AMOUNT AND PURPOSE)
- (ALSO) Have you paid it back already? Fully Partly Not yet
- e. Do you plan any improvements on the shamba in the near future? YES NO
- (IF "YES") What kind of?
- f. Do you think of buying some more land or some grade cattle some time? Land: YES NO Grade cattle: YES NO

(QUESTIONS NO. 10 and 12 FOR THOSE WITH NON-AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATIONS ONLY):

- 10a. Do you also possess a shamba or a share of one upcountry? YES NO
- (IF "YES") Where is it located? (DISTRICT).....
- b. What is its size? (ACRES)
- c. Who is cultivating it?

- d. Which crops are grown there? (FIND OUT APPROX. RESPECTIVE AMOUNTS BY ACRES)
- e. Do you regularly get any food or other supplies from members of your family or friends living upcountry?
YES NO (IF "YES", PROBE APPROX. AMOUNT)
.....
- f. Who is the owner of the house you are living in?
(e.g. private landlord, company, City Council etc.)
.....
- g. (IF NOT OWNER HIMSELF) How much rent do you pay?
..... shs/month
- h. How many rooms do you have?

(FOR RETIRED OR UNEMPLOYED ONLY):

- 11a. What was the work you previously did?.....
- b. Who is supporting you now?
- In which way?
- c. Are you looking for a job right now? YES NO
- (IF "YES") What kind of job?

(FOR HOUSEWIVES ONLY):

12. What does your husband do? (FIND OUT EXACT KIND OF OCCUPATION, RANK etc.)

(FOR ALL RESPONDENTS):

13. Could you please indicate in which of the following categories you would place your average cash family income per month: A: less than 100 shs
- B: 100 - 200 shs C: 201 - 400 shs
- D: 401 - 800 shs
- E: 801 - 1600 shs F: 1601 - 3000 shs
- G: more than 3000 shs

- 14a. When you will be of old age, who will take care of you?
(e.g. pension scheme etc.)
- b. Who will inherit your property one day?
- (IF SPLIT UP, FIND OUT APPROX. SHARES OF EACH HEIR)
.....
- 15a. Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your
present way of life? Very satisfied
- quite satisfied somewhat dissatisfied
- very dissatisfied
- b. (IF ONE OF THE LATTER TWO, PROBE) Why?
- c. Do you think your economic situation will be better
in the future, be about the same
- or become worse ?
- d. Do you have any particular plans in this respect?
YES NO (IF "YES", PROBE) Which ones?
-
- 16a. ³⁾ Looking back at your life as a whole, what would you
say are some of the most important events that affected
your life?
-
- b. In which way did they affect you?
-
- c. Are there any important political events which affected
your life? YES NO
- (IF "YES") Which events?
- (PROBE MORE INTENSELY, E.G. THE COLONIAL TIME,
THE EMERGENCY, UHURU, LATER EVENTS ETC.) In which way
did they affect you?
-
- 17a. ⁴⁾ Are you a member of any club, organization, society
or other voluntary association? YES NO
- (IF "YES", PROBE) which one?
- b. How long have you been a member?
- c. Do you pay any membership fees? YES NO
- (IF "YES") How much? shs/month

- d. Do you regularly attend meetings of this organization?
YES NO
- c. Have you ever held any office in this organization?
YES NO (IF "YES") Which one?
For how long?
- f. Have you ever worked for or contributed in some way
to a Harambee or other self-help scheme? YES NO
(IF "YES") What kind of scheme was it?
What was your contribution?
13. One of the things we want to know is how you get
informed about things happening in this country.⁵⁾
- a. Do you ever listen to the radio? YES NO
(IF "NO", CONTINUE WITH QUESTION 19)
- b. Where do you usually listen?.....
- c. How often do you listen? Almost every day
about once or twice a week
less than once a week
- d. What are your favourite programs?
19. What about newspapers? (IF LITERATE, ACCORDING TO
QUESTION 3 ABOVE):
- a. Do you sometimes read a newspaper? YES NO
(IF "NO", OR NOT LITERATE):
- b. Do other people sometimes read to you from a newspaper
or tell you what they have read? YES NO
(IF "NO", CONTINUE WITH QUESTION 19e, IF "YES", MODIFY
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS)
- c. How often do you read a newspaper? Almost every day
about once or twice a week less than once a week...
- d. Which parts of the newspaper do you find most
interesting?
- e. Do you follow the accounts of political and govern-
mental affairs? Would you say you follow them regu-
larly from time to time or never?

f. (IF NONE OF THE ABOVE MEDIA CONTACTS IS REPORTED):
Who keeps you informed about things happening outside this location?

20a. Do you have a watch or a clock in your home?

YES NO (IF "YES")

b. Do you set it regularly? YES NO

c. Do you think it is important for you always to know the right time or don't you care so much?

21. 6) We are trying to see what kind of information people are interested in and remember. It does not matter if you do not know the answers to the following questions, but let us try them, if you don't mind.

a. Who is the President of Kenya?

b. What is the name of his party?

c. Do you know in which year Kenya became independent?

d. Who is the M.P. for this area?

e. We would also like to know how well-known politicians are in this country. Can you name us a few? (UP TO 5)
.....

f. What is the name of the President of the United States of America?

g. Can you name an important leader of the Soviet Union?
.....

h. Can you mention some important international political events which happened last year?

22a. 7) Have you gone to anyone seeking some advice recently?

YES NO (IF "YES")

What in general was it about?

b. What kind of person was this? (RELATIONSHIP, OCCUPATION, AGE)

c. Has anyone come to you for advice recently?

YES NO (IF "YES"):

What in general was it about?

- d. What kind of person was this? (RELATIONSHIP, OCCUPATION, AGE)
- 23a. 8) Some people say that most persons can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with other people. How do you feel about it? Can you trust most people, only a few people, or don't you trust anybody
- b. (IF MIDDLE CATEGORY CHOSEN, PROBE) Would you say you trust only members of your family only personal friends only members of your age-group only members of your clan, only members of your tribe, all Kenyans
- 24a. 9) Speaking generally, would you say that most people are more inclined to help others or more inclined to look out for themselves
- b. Do you think that most people are trying to get advantage of you if they get the chance or would they try to be fair
25. Do you think that people who are successful achieve their success mainly because of friends or family relationships who help them along, or mainly because of their own skill and knowledge
26. Now we would like to ask you some questions about your family.
- a. Are you married? YES NO (IF "YES", FIND OUT NUMBER OF WIVES, WHERE APPLICABLE)
- b. Do you have any children? YES NO (IF "YES") What is their age? (WRITE DOWN DIFFERENT AGES)¹⁰⁾
- c. How many of them are girls?
- d. To which clan¹¹⁾ do you belong?

- c. Are you a member of a certain age-group?¹²⁾
 YES NO (IF "YES") What is its name?

- 27a. (IF APPLICABLE) Does any of your children go to school?
 YES NO
 (IF "YES", FIND OUT HOW MANY, WHICH SCHOOLS, AND
 STANDARD OR FORM)
- b. Do you pay any school fees? YES NO (IF "YES")
 How much altogether (p. year)
- c. Does any of your children have a regular job?
 YES NO (IF "YES") What kind of job is it?

- d. What are your plans for your children in the future?
 (IF NECESSARY, PROBE E.G., ABOUT KIND OF JOB THEY WOULD
 LIKE THEM TO GET ETC.)
28. We are also interested in how decisions are made in
 your family.¹³⁾
- a. When you were a child, who was making the decisions
 relating to economic matters (e.g. the planting of
 crops, the work different persons do etc.)?
 Your father, your mother, both of them
 together, somebody else (e.g. grandmother, uncle
 etc.) (SPECIFY)
- b. When a child was punished for some bad behavior, who
 did it usually?
- c. In what way was a child punished?
- d. (FOR MARRIED PERSONS ONLY) What about your family today?
 Who usually makes decisions concerning economic matters?

- e. (IF APPLICABLE) Who punishes the children?

f. In what way?

29. Here are some opinions which some people have about the obligations to their family, others may be of a different opinion. What do you think about the following statements, do you (1) disagree strongly, (2) disagree somewhat, (3) agree somewhat, or (4) agree strongly?

a. Those who earn money should share it with all members of the family.

(1) (2) (3) (4)

b. Hospitality demands always to give food and a place to sleep even to more remote relatives.

(1) (2) (3) (4)

c. I only care about myself and my immediate family, the rest must take care of themselves.

(1) (2) (3) (4)

30. (IF NOT YET CLEAR) To which tribe do you belong?
.....

31a. To which religious group do you belong?¹⁴⁾

Protestant (PROBE EXACT DENOMINATION)

Catholic Muslim, Other (SPECIFY IF POSSIBLE)
.....

b. How often do you go to your place of religious worship?

Every day, once a week, once a month, rarely, never

c. In guiding your actions every day, do you personally find that your religious beliefs are very important fairly important, not very important

d. Do you believe that there is a life after death in some form or other? Believe, not sure, don't believe

32.¹⁵⁾ Now we would like to know something about the feelings you may have towards members of other tribes, other races,

other religious groups or other countries. I am going to mention some of these to you. Please tell me what kind of relationship you would be willing to have with an average member of the group - not the best member you have known, not the worst. Answer in terms of your first feeling reaction. (OMIT OWN TRIBAL OR RELIGIOUS GROUP, SKIP A GROUP IF IS NOT KNOWN TO RESPONDENT, IN THIS CASE MARK "U". MARK "X" FOR EACH POSITIVE ANSWER, "O" FOR EACH NEGATIVE ONE. PUT THE LAST QUESTION FOR THE LAST FOUR GROUPS ONLY): Would you accept:

(ONLY LAST 4 GROUPS):

	as neighbours in this area	(RURAL PEOPLE): to buy land in this area (URBANITES): to work with you on your job	as a good personal friend	to close kinship by marriage	to citizenship in this country
a Luria					
a Kamba					
a Kikui					
a Luo					
sb. from Ebu or Haru					
a Kalenjin					
a Kikuyu					
sb. from the Coast Prov.					
a Maasai					
a Turkana					
a Somali					
a Muslim					
a Catholic					
a Protestant					
sb. of another religion					
a European					
an Asian					
a Ugandan					
a Tanzanian					

33. 16)

- How we would like to know something about your interest in politics.
- a. Generally speaking, would you say you are very interested, somewhat, not very much interested in politics
 - b. Do you ever talk with other people about problems which Kenya as a country has to face today? YES NO
 - c. (IF "YES"): What kind of people are these, for example?
.....
 - d. What are some of the problems you are talking about?
.....
 - e. How well do you think you understand these problems?
Very well, quite well, not very well,
not at all
 - f. How about important problems in this location or in this part of the country? Do you discuss them sometimes?
YES NO (IF "YES"):
 - g. With whom?
 - h. What are these problems?
 - i. How well do you think you understand them? Very well,
quite well, not very well, not at all
- 34a. Have you ever gone to public meetings in this area?
YES NO
- b. (IF "YES") Who was holding it?
 - c. What was it about?
 - d. How often have you gone to such meetings? Many times,
a few times, just once
 - e. Have you been registered as a voter in the last elections for the National Assembly? YES NO
 - f. (IF "YES") Did you vote at that time or did you not have a chance to
 - g. Have you ever talked to people to try to get them to vote for or against any candidate in a local election?
YES NO (IF "YES"):
 - h. Many times, a few times

- i. In a national election? YES NO (IF "YES"):
- j. Many times, a few times
35. 17) Here are some of the issues people talk about.
What is your opinion in these matters?
- a. Do you think people should be allowed to own as much land as they can afford or no more than they can themselves cultivate
- b. Should property in land be communal, that is belong to a tribe, a whole village, the government or a larger group of people, or private, that is belong to one person or family only?
- c. Some people think business firms make too much money while not paying enough to their workers Others think that they pay fair wages and make a fair profit What is your opinion?
- d. Do you think that all business firms and companies in Kenya should be owned by Kenyans or do you think it is necessary to allow foreigners a share in them in order to attract more foreign capital and expertise
- e. Some people say that it is good to have only one political party in this country. Others say there should be two or more. What is your opinion, should there be several parties or a single one ? Why?
- f. Do you think Kenya should become a more socialist country, like Tanzania for example, or should the government continue with its present economic policies
- g. 18) One sometimes hears some persons say that there are some people or groups who have too much influence over the way the government is run in this country. Do you agree, or disagree that there are such groups? (IF AGREEMENT):
Who are these people?
36. 19) Suppose several men were trying to influence a government decision, let's say about a development project in

this area. Here are a number of things they might do
(READ SLOWLY TO RESPONDENT, REPEAT, IF NECESSARY):

- (1) Write to the government official concerned or go to see him;
- (2) Write to the M.P. of your area or go to see him;
- (3) Work through personal or family connections;
- (4) Get other people interested - form a group;
- (5) Work through KANU;
- (6) Organize a protest demonstration;

Which of these methods do you think would be the most effective? Which next? Which the least?

37a. Some people say that women should not be active in politics. Others say, they should have the same political rights and duties as men. What do you think?

Women should be active in the same way as men,
less than men, not at all be active

- b. Can you imagine a woman becoming president of this country? Not at all, not very well, quite well, very well

38a. ²⁰⁾ As a Kenyan, what are some of the things about this country that you are particularly proud of?

- b. What, if anything, would you criticize in this country?

(IF SOMETHING IS MENTIONED)

- c. What, do you think, should be done about it?

39. Now, I have a few other questions:

- a. What would you say is the biggest problem that people in circumstances like yours face in life?

- b. Is there anything that you as an individual can do to solve this problem? YES NO

- c. (IF "YES") What do you think you can do?

(IF "NO") Why not?

- d. Who else do you think could help you?

- e. What do you think are the biggest problems that this country faces today?
- f. Would you say the chances to solve them are very good, quite good, not very good, very bad
- g. Can people like you do anything to help solve this problem? YES NO
(IF "YES") What exactly?
- h. ²¹) Suppose you were made head of the government. What are some of the first things you would try to do? (IF NO SPECIFIC ANSWER, DESCRIBE REACTION)
- i. ²²) If, for some reason, you could no longer live in this country, what other country would you choose to live in? (IF NO SPECIFIC ANSWER, DESCRIBE REACTION):
- (IF COUNTRY MENTIONED) Why this one?

40. Now, I am going to ask you some questions about which we all have certain beliefs and opinions. We all think differently about each matter and there are no right or wrong answers. Just tell me how you feel about these things. Please indicate for each question whether you (1) disagree strongly, (2) disagree somewhat, (3) agree somewhat, (4) agree strongly.

1. Just as is true of fine horses or cattle, some breeds of people are just naturally better than others. ²³
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
2. One of the things you should consider in choosing your friends is whether they can help you make your way in the world. ²⁴
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
3. Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things. ²⁵
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
4. Human nature being what it is there must always be war and conflict. ²⁵
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
5. If you start trying to change things very much you usually make them worse. ²⁶
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

6. I usually have confidence that the government will do what is right.²⁷⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
7. When the country is in great danger we may have to force some people even if it violates their rights.²⁸⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
8. The government should prohibit books and films which it thinks are harmful for the public. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
9. One main trouble today is that people talk too much and work too little.²⁵⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
10. The raising of one's social position is one of the more important things in life.²⁴⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
11. A few strong leaders can make this country better than all the laws and talk.²⁵⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
12. Some people have the power to do harm to others just by wishing it may happen. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
13. I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views may be.²⁸⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
14. I cannot imagine to be anything else than a.....
(INSERT RESPONDENT'S OWN TRIBAL GROUP)
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
15. It is better to go without something than to ask a favour.²⁹⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
16. The main trouble with democracy is that most people don't really know what is best for them.²³⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
17. Not our life on earth, but what happens afterwards is really important. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
18. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.³⁰⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
19. Everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say in political matters.²⁸⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
20. A poor man doesn't have the chance he deserves in the law courts.²⁷⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

21. Everything changes so quickly these days that I often have trouble deciding which are the right rules to follow. ³¹⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
22. There are things in life men will never fully understand. ²⁵⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
23. It is very important to pay respect to one's ancestors. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
24. I set goals for myself which I attempt to reach. ²⁹⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
25. It is only natural and right that women should have less freedom than men. ²⁵⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
26. It's better to stick to what you have than to try new things you really don't know about. ²⁵⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
27. No matter what a person's political beliefs are he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else. ²³⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
28. There is something in the power of a medicine man which really works, even if people do not know how. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
29. I prefer the practical man anytime to the man of ideas. ²⁶⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
30. It is understandable that men who feel that their honour has been violated take the law into their own hands. ²³⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
31. Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is best for the country. ²⁷⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
32. People were better off in the old days when everyone knew just how he was expected to act. ³¹⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
33. What young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents. ²⁵⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
34. Almost any unfairness or brutality may be justified when some important political purpose is to be carried out. ²⁸⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

35. A child should never be asked to do anything unless he is told why he is asked to do it.²⁹⁾
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
36. All groups can live in harmony in this country without changing the system in any way.²⁵⁾
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
37. Labour gets a fair share of what it produces.²³⁾
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
38. It is only right that people who belong to a respected family should have to say more than others.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
39. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal scale with others.³⁰⁾
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
40. It is nice to have plenty of time and not to work so hard as some people do.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
41. No matter how we like to talk about it, political authority comes not from us, but from some higher power.²⁶⁾
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
42. Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict.³²⁾
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
43. A man doesn't really have much wisdom until he is well along in his years.²⁶⁾
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
44. I work like a slave at everything I undertake until I'm satisfied with the results.²⁹⁾
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
45. In spite of what some people say, the lot of the average man is getting worse, not better.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
46. The government should prohibit books and films which it thinks are harmful for the public.³²⁾
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
47. When a man is born, the success he is going to have is already decided.²⁹⁾
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
48. Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough willpower.²⁵⁾
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

49. A man ought not be allowed to speak if he doesn't know what he is speaking about.²³⁾
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
50. Everybody has the right to defend himself and to use weapons if necessary. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
51. I feel I waste time and spend it uselessly.³³⁾
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
52. Capital punishment (= death penalty) is the only way to suppress crime in this country.³⁴⁾
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
53. I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be.³²⁾ (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
54. An insult to your honour should not be forgotten.²⁵⁾
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
55. A happy family life is of more value to me than becoming rich. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

Now we have finally come to the end. Thank you very much. You really have helped us a lot. Good bye! (FILL IN AFTER INTERVIEW):

Place of interview:..... Lenght.....hrs.
Language

Hujambo (USE LOCAL GREETINGS) Jina langu ni
 Idara inayojishughulisha katika mafunzo juu ya mambo ya
 waafrika, na iliyo katika Chuo Kikuu cha Nairobi inge-
 penda kujua mashauri yafuatayo. Tungependa kujua juu ya
 maisha yako na matatizo mengine ambayo labda unayo.
 Majibu yote utakayoyatoa yatakuwa siri kabisa. Hata
 hatuhitaji jina lako, lakini tunashotaka ni kujua kwa
 jumla fikira za watu wanaoishi katika maisha kama haya
 yako.

- 1a. Ni watu wangapi waliozidi umri wa miaka 15 ambao ni wa
 jamaa (nyumba) hii?
 b. (IF MORE THAN ONE) Miongoni mwao (kati ya hawa) ni
 wangapi wa kiume?

Kulingana na njia za kuchagua zinazotumiwa katika
 uchunguzi huu, ningependa kuongea na mwanume aliye
 mzee zaidi / mwanume aliye kijana zaidi / mwanake aliye
 mzee zaidi / mwanake aliye kijana zaidi. (UNDERLINE
 PERSON CHOSEN, IF THE PERSON IS PRESENT OR IS MET AT AN
 APPOINTED DATE, CONTINUE AS FOLLOWS).

- 2a. Umeishi hapa kwa muda gani?
 b. Ulizaliba wapi? (DISTRICT AND LOCATION)
 c. Una umri gani? (APPROX. AGE WILL DO, IF UNCERTAIN, GIVE
 YOUR OWN ESTIMATE)
- 3a. Tungependa pia kujua juu ya elimu yako. Ja, unekwenda
 shuleni? YES NO
 b. (IF "YES") Ulisoma mpaka darasa gani?
 c. Ilikuwa shule ya Serikali, ya Harambee,
 au ya Miseni ?
 d. Baadaye uliendelea na masomo au mafundisho mengine?
 YES NO (IF "YES", SPECIFY): Wapi
 Kwa muda gani?
- 4a. Sasa nataka kujua lugha unazoelewa. (OTHERS THAN THE ONE
 IN WHICH INTERVIEW IS CONDUCTED) Unaongea Kiswahili?
 Yes NO (IF "YES") Unaongea Kiswahili
 (1) vizuri sana (2) kutosha (3) kidogo tu

- b. Unaongea Kiingereza? YES NO (IF "YES")
 Unaongea (1) ... (2) ... (3) ...
- c. Unaongea lugha nyingini yo yote?
 Unaongea (1) ... (2) ... (3) ...
Unaongea (1) ... (2) ... (3) ...
- 5a. Wazazi wako je? Baba yako alikwenda shuleni? YES ... NO ...
 (IF "YES"): Alifika darasa gani?
- b. Mama yako alikwenda shuleni? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES"):
 Alifika darasa gani?
- c. Daba yako alikuwa akifanya kazi gani hasa? (PROBE EXACT
 KIND OF ACTIVITY)
- d. (IF FARMER) Je alikuwa na eka ngapi?
- e. Alikuza nini?
- f. Alikuwa na mifugo? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES"):
 Kama wangapi? Walikuwa wa kizungu
 au kiasili'
- 6a. Je, kazi yako hasa ni nini siku zote? (PROBE CLOSER TO
 EXACT KIND OF ACTIVITY, ALSO, WHERE APPLICABLE, RANK ETC.)

- b. Je, unayo njia nyingine ya kujipatia pesa, hata kama si
 kila wakati (kwa mfano pesa kutoka kwa jamaa yako, kutoka
 kwa mko wako, au kwa mume wako, vitu vingine unavyouza,
 au kufanya kazi)? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES", PROBE SOURCE
 AND APPROX. AVERAGE AMOUNT PER MONTH)
- c. (IF OCCUPIED) Wewe hufanya kazi kwa muda wa saa ngapi
 kila siku?
- d. Ni jambo gani hasa unalolipenda katika kazi yako?
- e. Ni jambo gani hasa usilolipenda katika kazi yako?
- f. Wewe ni mwanachama wa shirika lo lote la kazi (kwa mfano
 shirika la wakulima, la biashara, la wafanyakazi, na
 kadhalika)? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES", PROBE):
 Shirika gani?

QUESTIONS NO. 7 - 9 FOR THOSE WITH AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATION ONLY; PASTORALISTS ONLY QUESTION\$ NO. 8)

- 7a. Mwenye shamba hili ni nani? (ESTABLISH RELATIONSHIP)
-
- (IF NOT OWNER OF THE SHAMBA HIMSELF, MODIFY QUESTIONS 7 - 9 ACCORDINGLY):
- b. Una oka ngapi?
- c. Ni mazao gani unayokuza bapa? (GIVE APPROX. QUANTITY BY ACRES)
- d. (IF NOT OBVIOUS) Mazao haya unauza au unatumia kwa chakula tu?
- SOME SOLD NONE SOLD (IF SOME SOLD) Unayouza ni mazao gani?
- Ni kama kiasi gani cha mazao unayouza?.....
- Unauza wapi na ni nani unayeuzia?
-
- 8a. Una mifugo yo yote? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Una ng'ombe kama wengapi?
- b. Ni wa kizungu au wa kiasili?? (IF BOTH, FIND OUT APPROX. RESPECT. NUMBERS)
- c. Unauza maziwa yo yote? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES"):
Kama kiasi gani? (PER DAY, WEEK, ETC.)
Maziwa hupelekwa?
- d. (IF GRADE CATTLE) Wewe hutumia artificial insemination (A.I.) kwa kuwazalisha ng'ombe wako? YES ... NO ... (IF "NO"):
Ni kwa sababu gani?
- e. Hapa pana mahali pa kuogeshea ng'ombe? YES ... NO ...
(IF "YES"): Wewe huwaleta ng'ombe pale kila mara?
YES ... NO ... (IF "YES"):
Ada ni kiasi gani?(IF "NO"):
Kwa nini huwaleti?
- f. Je, una wanyama wengine wa mifuga? Mbuzi, kondoo, kuku, au wengine (SPECIFY) (GIVE APPROX. RESPECTIVE NUMBERS)
- (FOR OWNERS OF A SHAMBA ONLY):

- 9a. Unehudhuria nafunzo katika Chuo cha Ukulima? YES ... NO....
(IF "YES"): Nafunzo gani?
- b. Uneonba mashauri kutoka kwa watu wa serikali wanaotumika
Ukulima? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Nashauri gani?
- c. Je, una "Hati ya Shamba" lako? YES ... NO ...
(IF "NO"): Kwa nini?
- Ungependa kuwa nayo? YES ... NO ...
- d. Uneonba upewe mkopo wakati wa wote ili ulipanne shamba lako?
YES ... NO ...
IF "YES", PROBE AMOUNT, YEAR, PURPOSE)
-(ALSO):
Umekwisha kuulipa? Wote, Sehemu yake, au bado ...?
- e. Umepanga kupanua shamba lako siku zijazo? YES ... NO
- (IF "YES"): Una mipango gani?
- f. Wafikiria kumunua shamba jingine au ng'ombe wengine wa
kizungu wakati fulani?
Land YES ... NO ... Grade Cattle: YES ... NO ...
(QUESTIONS NO. 10 AND 12 FOR THOSE WITH NON - AGRICULTURAL
OCCUPATIONS ONLY):
- 10a. Unalo shamba au hisa ya shamba moja huko mashambani?
YES ... NO ... (IF "YES"): Shamba lenyewe liko wapi? (DISTRICT)
.....
- b. Ukubwa wake ni kiasi gani? (ACRES)
- c. Ni nani ambayo hulilima?
- d. Ni mazao gani ambayo hukuzwa katika shamba hilo? (FIND
OUT APPROX. RESPECTIVE AMOUNT BY ACRES)
-
- e. Wewe hupata chakula cho chote au maada mwingine wa wote
siku zote kutoka kwa jamaa au rafiki zako wanaoishi huko
mashambani? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES" PROBE KIND AND
APPROX. AMOUNT)
- f. Ni nani mwenye nyumba unambishi (kwa mfano mtu binafsi,
serikali, kampuni etc.)?
- (IF NOT OWNER HIMSELF):

- g. Wewe hulipa kodi ya nyumba kiasi gani?shs/month.
 h. Una vyumba vingapi?

(FOR RETIRED OR UNEMPLOYED ONLY):

- 11a. Ulipoucha kazi, ulikuwa ukifanya kazi gani?

 b. Ni nani unayentegemea sasa?Kwa njia gani?....

 c. Je, unatafuta kazi sasa? YES ... NO ...
 (IF "YES") Kazi ya aina gani?

(FOR HOUSEWIVES ONLY):

12. Je, mumeo hufanya kazi gani? (FIND OUT EXACT KIND OF
 OCCUPATION, RANK ETC.)

(FOR ALL RESPONDENTS):

Waweza kuonyesha kwa wastani kiasi cha mapato ya jamaa yako
 kwa mwezi?

- A: Je ni chini ya shs 100, - ?
 B: shs 100 - 200 ... C: shs 201 - 400
 D: shs 401 - 800 ... E: shs 801 - 1500 ...
 F: shs 1601- 3000 ... G: zaidi ya shs 3000

- 14a. Utakapozeeka, ni nani atakayekutunza (kwa mfano, watoto,
 bima etc.) ?
- b. Nani atarithi mali yako siku moja? (IF SPLIT, FIND OUT
 APPROX. SHARE OF EACH HEIR)
- 15a. Katika maisha yako ya sasa je, unetosheka kabisa,
 au unetosheka kidogo, au hutosheki, au hutosheki
 kabisa ... ? (IF ONE OF THE LATTER TWO, PROBE):
- b. Kwa nini?
- c. Wadhani mapato yako katika siku zijazo yatakuwa mazuri
 zaidi kuliko yalivyo sasa, au yatakuwa kama yalivyo sasa
, au yatakuwa mabaya kuliko yalivyo sasa ... ?
- d. Una mipango yo yote ya kuyarekebisha? YES ... NO ...
 (IF "YES"): Mipango gani?

- 16a. Katika maisha yako ya siku zilizopita kwa jumla ni mambo gani hasa yaliyogeza maisha yako?
- b. Mambo hayo yalikujeza kwa njia gani?
- c. Kuna mambo yote ya kisiasa yaliyogeza maisha yako? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Ni mambo gani (PROBE MORE INTENSIVELY E.G. THE COLONIAL TIME, THE EMERGENCY, UHURU, LATER EVENTS)?
- Yalikujeza kwa njia gani?
- 17a. Wewe ni mwanachama wa chama cho chote hata ingawa ni cha kujitolea mwenyewe? YES ... NO .. (IF "YES"): Kipi?
- b. Ja, umekuwa mwanachama kwa muda gani?
- c. Wewe hulipa malipo yote ya uanachama? YES ... NO .. (IF "YES"): Kiasi gani kwa mwezi? shs/ month
- d. Wewe huhudhuria mkutano ya chama hicho kila mara? YES ... NO
- e. Umeshachaguliwa kama mmoja wa viongozi katika chama hicho? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Cheo gani?
- kwa muda gani?
- f. Umepata kufanya kazi au kusaidia katika mipango ya Harambee au ya Kujisaidia? YES ... NO ...
- g. IF "YES") Ulikuwa moango wa aina gani?
- h. Ulifanya kazi gani au ulisaidiaje?
18. Hojawapo ya mambo ambayo twataka kujua ni jinsi unavyopata habari za mambo yanayotukia katika nchi hii.
- a. Wewe husikiliza radio wakati wowote? YES ... NO ... (IF "NO", CONTINUE WITH QUESTION 19)
- b. Wewe husikiliza radio wapi?
- c. Wewe husikiliza mafa ngapi? Karibu kila siku ..., kama mara moja au mbili kwa wiki ... , au mara chache kuliko moja kwa wiki ... ?
- d. Unapendelea vipindi vipi?

19. Na magazeti je? (IF LITERATE, ACCORDING TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE):
- Wewe husoma magazeti wakati wa wote? YES ... NO ...
(IF "NO" OR ILLITERATE):
 - Watu hukusomea magazeti au hukumbia waliyoyasoma wakati wa wote? YES ... NO ...
(IF "NO", CONTINUE WITH QUESTION 19f., IF "YES", MODIFY THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS):
 - Wewe husoma magazeti mara ngapi? Kama kila siku ..., mara moja au mbili kwa wiki ..., au mara chache kuliko mara moja kwa wiki ... ?
 - Wapendelea mambo au habari zipi katika gazeti?
 - Wewe hufuata mambo ya siasa au mambo ya utawala wa serikali? Wewe wafuata mambo hayo kila mara ..., au mara kwa mara ..., au hufuati kamwe ... ?
 - (IF NONE OF THE ABOVE MEDIA IS REPORTED): Ni nani ameyekujulisha mambo yanayotukia nje ya mtaa huu?
- 20a. Je, una saa ya mkono au ya mezani kwako? YES ... NO ...
(IF "YES"):
- Wewe huirekebisha kila mara? YES ... NO ...
 - Wadhari ni kitu muhimu siku zote kujua saa iliyo au zilizo sahihi ..., au hujali sana ... ?
21. Tunajaribu kujua ni habari zipi watu wanazopendezwa razi au wanazoweza kukumbuka. Usipojua majibu ya maswali yafuatayo, baidhuru, lakini hebu tujaribu kujauliza, usijali.
- Ni nani Rais wa Kenya?
 - Chama chake cha siasa kinaitwaje?
 - Wajua ni mwaka gani Kenya ilipojipatia uhuru?
 - Ni nani Mbunge wa sehemu hii?
 - Tungependa pia kujua wanasiasa wanaojulikana sana katika nchi hii. Waweza kututajia wachache wao? (UP TO 5)
 - Rais wa nchi ya Amerika anaitwaje?
 - Waweza kutaja jina la kiongozi moja wapo mashuhuzi katika nchi ya Urusi?

- h. Waweza kutaja kitu muhimu kuhusu siara za ulimwengu kilichotukia mwaka uliopita?
- 22a. Je, unepata kumwondea mtu yo yote hivi majuzi kwa msaada kumwamba shauri? YES ... NO ... (IF YES") Kwa jumla ulikuwa msaada juu ya shauri gani?
-
- b. Huyo alikuwa mtu wa namna gani? (RELATIONSHIP, OCCUPATION, AGE)
- c. Je, mtu ye yote anepata kukutembelea akiuliza msaada kuhusu mashauri fulani? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Yalikuwa mashauri ya aina gani?
-
- d. Alikuwa mtu wa aina gani? (RELATION, OCCUPATION, AGE)
-
- 23a. Watu wengine husema ya kwamba waweza kuwaamini watu wengi. Wengine husema ya kwamba huwezi kuwa mwangelifu sana unaposuhubiana na watu wale wengine. Wewe waonaje? Waweza kuwaamini watu wengi ..., waweza kuwaamini watu wachache ..., humamini mtu ye yote ...? (IF MIDDLE CATEGORY CHOSEN, PROBE):
- b. Wewe huwaamini wale wa jamaa yako tu ..., au rafiki zako mwenyewe ..., au watu wa rika yako ..., au watu wa ukoo wako ..., au watu wa kabila lako tu ..., au watu wote wa Kenya?
- 24a. Wadhani watu wengi hupenda kuwasaidia wengine ..., au wao hupenda kujisaidia wenyewe ... ?
- b. Unadhani watu wengi wanajaribu kukudanganya wakipata nafasi nzuri ..., au wanajaribu kuwa watu wenye haki?
25. Wewe wafikiri watu walioendelea vizuri wamefanya hivyo kwa sababu ya kusaidiwa na marafiki au jamaa zao ..., au wameendelea kutokana na ujuzi na maarifa yao wenyewe ...?
26. Sasa tungependa kuuliza maswali kadha wa kadha juu ya jamaa yako.

- a. Umeoa / Umeolewa? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES", FIND OUT NUMBER OF WIVES, WHERE APPLICABLE)
- b. Una watoto? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Wana wari gani? (WRITE DOWN DIFFERENT AGES)
- c. Ni wangapi walio wasichana?
- d. Wewe u wa ukoo gani?
- e. Wewe u wa rika lo lote? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Rika lako linaitwaje?
- 27a. (IF APPLICABLE) Watoto wako wengine huenda shuleni? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES", FIND OUT HOW MANY, WHICH SCHOOLS, AND STANDARD OR FORM)
- b. Wewe hulipa ada ya shule? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES") Kiasi gani kwa jumla kwa mwaka umoja?shs/ year
- c. Una mtoto ye yote anayefanya kazi ya kuujiirwa? YES ... NO... (IF "YES") Yeye hufanya kazi gani?
- d. Una mipango gani juu ya watoto wako katika siku za usoni? (IF NECESSARY, PROBE ABOUT KIND OF JOB THEY WOULD LIKE THEM TO GET ETC.)
28. Pia tunapendezwa kujua jinsi mashauri yanavyokatwa katika jamaa yako.
- a. Ulipokuwa mtoto, ni nani aliyekata mashauri kuhusu mambo ya uchuzi (kwa mfano, upandaji wa mizaa, ugawaji wa kazi etc.)? Baba yako ..., mama yako ..., wote wawili ..., au mtu mwingine (kwa mfano nyanya, mjomba etc.) (SPECIFY)
- b. Kwa kawaida ni nani aliyemwadhibu mtoto mtukutu?
- c. Mtoto aliadhibiwa kwa njia gani?
- d. (FOR MARRIED PERSONS ONLY) Na jamaa yako sasa jo? Ni nani anayetoa amri na kukata mashauri kuhusu mambo ya uchuzi?
- e. (IF APPLICABLE) Ni nani ambayo huwadhibu watoto?
- f. Kwa njia gani?

29. Hapa pana maoni mbali mbali ambayo watu wanayatoa juu
wajibu wao katika jamaa yao, watu wengine wawazu kuwa
na maoni tofauti. Je, unaonaje juu ya mambo yafuatayo:
(1) Huyakubaliani nayo kabisa, (2) huyakubaliani nayo
kwa kiasi, (3) unakubaliana nayo kwa kiasi au (4) una-
kubaliana nayo kabisa?
- a. Wanaopokea mshahara ni lazima watumie pesa hizo pamoja
na watu wa jamaa yao.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
- b. Ukarimu huhitaji sikuzote kuwapa chakula na mahali pa
kulala watu hata wa ukoo wa mbali wasio wa jamaa yako?
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
- c. Mimi huwasaidia watu wa jamaa yangu na mimi mwenyewe,
wale wengine wajitegeme.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
30. (IF NOT YET CLEAR): Wewe u wa kabila gani?
- 31a. Wewe u wa dini gani? Protestant (PROBE EXACT DENOMINATION)
.....
Katoliki ..., Mwisjama ... au dini nyingine (SPECIFY IF
POSSIBLE)
- b. Wewe huenda kumwabudu Mungu mara ngapi? Kila siku ...,
mara moja kwa jua ..., mara moja kwa mwezi ..., mara
chache sana ..., au huendi kamwe ...?
- c. Unadhani imani yako ya dini ni muhimu sana ..., ni muhimu
kidogo ..., si muhimu sana ..., katika kuongoza matendo
yako kila siku?
- d. Wadhani kuna maisha fulani baada ya kifo? Naamini ...,
sina hakika ..., siamini ...
32. Tungependa kujua juu ya jinsi unavyowafikiria wenzako wa
makabila mengine mataifa mengine, au dini zingine au nchi
zingine. Nitakutajia wengine wao hapa chini. Tafadhali niaa-
bia ni uhusiano wa aina gani ungependa kuwa nao baina
yako na mtu wa kawaida wa kundi litakalotajwa hapa chini -
sio mtu mwema zaidi unayejua wala, sio mtu mbaya zaidi

ambaye unepata kumjua. Jibu jinsi unavyofikiria ukiulizwa
 mara ya kwanza. (OMIT OWN TRIBAL OR RELIGIOUS GROUP.
 SKIP A GROUP IF IT IS NOT KNOWN TO RESPONDENT, IN THIS CASE
 MARK "U". MARK "X" FOR EACH POSITIVE ANSWER, "O" FOR
 EACH NEGATIVE ONE. PUT THE LAST QUESTION FOR THE LAST
 FOUR GROUPS ONLY):

	kama jirani	(RURAL PEOPLE): kununua chamba hapa (URBANITES): kufanya kazi naye	Kama rafiki yako binafsi	kusuhu- biana naye kwa ndoa	Kuwa raia wa nchi hii
Mluvia					
Mkamba					
Misigi					
Mlao					
Mwamba au Mumera					
Mkalenjin					
Mkikuyu					
Mtu wa ku- toka pwani					
Mwasai					
Mburukana					
Msonali					
Mwisilamu					
Mkatoliki					
Mprotestanti					
Mtu wa dini nyingine					
Mzungu					
Mhindi					
Mganda					
Mtanzania					

33. Sasa tungependa kujua unavyofikiria mambo ya siasa.
- Kusema kwa jumla wewe unapendezwa sana na siasa ..., unapendezwa kiasi ... , au hupendezwi sana ... ?
 - Wewe huongea na watu wengine juu ya matatizo ambayo yanaikabili Kenya kama nchi wakati huu? YES ... NO ...
 - (IF "YES") Watu unavongea nao ni nani kwa mfano?
 - Ni matatizo gani unayoongea juu yake?
 - Unafikiri unaelewa na matatizo haya vizuri kabisa, au kiasi ... , au huolewi vizuri ... , au huolewi kabisa ...?
 - Na sasa kwa mashauri kuhusu mtu huu au sehemu hii ya nchi: ninyi huongea juu yake wakati mwingine? YES ... NO ...
 - (IF "YES"): Huongea na nani?
 - Mashauri haya ni yapi?
 - Unafikiri unayafahamu mashauri hayo vizuri kabisa ... , vizuri kiasi ... , huyafahamu vizuri, huyafahamu kamwe ... ?
- 34a. Je, umepata kuhudhuria mikutano ya watu wote katika sehemu hii? YES ... NO ...
- (IF "YES") Ni nani aliyelongoza ?
 - Ilikuwa juu ya nini?
 - Wewe umehudhuria mikutano ya aina hiyo mara ngapi? Mara nyingi ... , mara chache, mara moja tu ...?
 - Ulijiandikisha kuwa upiga kura katika uchaguzi wa wabunge uliopita? YES ... NO ...
 - (IF "YES") Je, ulipiga kura wakati huo, au hukupata nafasi ya kufanya hivyo ... ?
 - Je, umepata kuongea na watu juu ya kumpigia au kutompigia mtu ye yote kura katika uchaguzi mdogo? YES ... NO...
 - (IF "YES"): Mara nyingi, mara chache ... ?
 - Na katika uchaguzi wa wanabunge? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES"):
 - Mara nyingi, mara chache ... ?

39. Hapa pana mambo ambayo watu huongea juu yako. Je, maoni yako ni nini juu ya mambo haya?
- Wewe wadhani watu wangekubaliwa kurunua mashamba nakubwa kadiri wanavyotaka ... , au kurunua mashamba kwa kadiri wanavyoweza kuyalipa wao wenyewe... ?
 - Mali ya mashamba ingefaa kuwa ya watu wote kwa jumla ... , kama ya kabila, au kijiji kizima, au serikali, au kindi kubwa la watu; au iwe kama ya mtu mmoja binafsi au jamaa moja ... ?
 - Watu wengi hufikiri kwamba makampuni ya biashara hupata pesa nyingi sana na huku yakiwalipa wafanyakazi wao mishahara isiyo ya kutosha ... Watu wengine hufikiri kwamba makampuni hayo huwalipa wafanyakazi wao mishahara kiasi huku makampuni yakipata faida ya kutosha ... Waonaaje?
 - Je, wewe wafikiri kwamba makampuni na kazi za biashara katika nchi ya Kenya zingefaa kuwa mali ya Kenya ... , au wafikiri inafaidi kuwakubali wageni wanaotoka nje ya Kenya kurunua hisa katika kazi hizo au makampuni hayo ili kuleta rasilmali na ujuzi zaidi kutoka nchi za nje ... ?
 - Watu wengine husema ni vizuri kuwa na chama kimoja cha siasa katika nchi hii. Wengine husema ni heri kuwa na vyama viwili au vingi zaidi. Ni nini maoni yako? Kuwa na vyama vingi ... , au kimoja tu Kwa nini?
 - Wewe wadhani ingefaa Kenya juwa nchi ya Ujamaa, kama ilivyo katika Tanzania kwa mfano ... , au ingefaa serikali iendeleo na mipango yake ya sara ... ?
 - Mara kwa mara unasikia watu wakiiongea juu ya watu wengine au vikundi vya watu ambavyo vina mvuto mwingi kuhusu uongozi serikalini hii yetu. Unakubali.... , au hukubali.... , ati kuna watu au vikundi kana hivyo. (IF AGREEMENT) Watu hawa au vikundi hivi ni vipi?

36. Kama watu kadha wa kadha wangeitaka serikali kuwasaidia katika mipango fulani ya maendeleo katika sehemu hii, hapa pana mambo kadha wa kadha ambayo wangeyafanya (READ SLOWLY TO RESPONDENT, REPEAT, IF NECESSARY):

- (1) Kumwandikia ofisa wa serikali anayehusika au kumwendea;
- (2) Kumwandikia mbuga wa sehemu yako au kumwendea;
- (3) Kusaidiwa na mtu wa jamaa yenu au unayejuana kibinafsi;
- (4) Kuwashawishi watu wengine ili kuunga kundi;
- (5) Kuliendea KANU;
- (6) Kuonyesha jambo hili kwa kufanya maandamano ya mvurugo;

Njia zilizotajwa hapo juu, unadhani ni njia gani ingefaa zaidi ... , ya pili yake , ni ipi isiyofaa kabisa ... ?

37a. Watu wengine husema kwamba wanawake hawafai kushiriki katika mambo ya siasa. Wengine husema kwamba ingefaa washiriki katika siasa na kazi zote sawa na wanaume. Waonaje wewe? Yafaa wanawake wawe sawa sawa na wanaume ... , wawe chini ya wanaume, wasishiriki kawe katika mambo ya siasa ... ?

b. Wewe waweza kufikiria mwananke kama Rais wa nchi hii? Sifikirii kamwe, sifikirii vizuri, nafikiri ni vizuri, nafikiri ni vizuri kabisa

38a. Wewe kama mwananchi wa Kenya, ni mambo gani ya nchi hii unayojivunia hasa?

b. Ni mambo gani ambayo ungependa yarekebishwe katika nchi hii?

(IF SOME ARE MENTIONED):

c. Wewe wadhani ni jambo gani lingefanywa juu ya mambo hayo ili kuyarekebisha ?

39. Sasa ninayo maswali mengine machache:

a. Ni matatizo gani makubwa zaidi yanayowakabili watu wanaoishi maisha kama haya yako?

.....

- b. Kuna jambo lo lote ambalo ungeweza kufanya wewe binafsi ili kusuluhisha matatizo hayo? YES ... NO ...
- c. (IF "YES") Wewe wafikiri waweza kufanya nini?
 (IF "NO") Kwa nini huwezi kufanya jambo lo lote?
- d. Ni nani mwingine unayedhani ungeweza kukusaidia?
- e. Ni matatizo gani makubwa zaidi unayofikiri yameikaabili nchi hii sasa?
- f. Ungesema kwamba kurazo nafasi za kusuluhisha matatizo hayo? Kurazo nafasi nyingi ..., Kurazo chache ..., hakuna nafasi zo zote ... ?
- g. Watu kama wewe waweza kusuluhisha matatizo hayo? YES ... NO ... (IF "YES"): Waweza kufanya je hasa?
- h. Kama ungefanywa Rais wa nchi hii, ni mambo gani ambayo ungefanya kwanza? (IF NO SPECIFIC ANSWER, DESCRIBE REACTION)
- i. Kama kwa sababu fulani ungeweza kuishi katika nchi hii, ungechagua kuhamia kuishi nchi gani? (IF NO SPECIFIC ANSWER, DESCRIBE REACTION)
- (IF COUNTRY MENTIONED) Kwa nini ungependa kuishi katika nchi hiyo?
40. Sasa nitakuuliza maswali mengine ambayo kwayo sisi sote tunayo mawazo na msoni fulani. Sisi sote tunayo mawazo mbali mbali juu ya kila jambo, kwa hiyo hakuna jawabu lililo sahihi wala lililo ukosa. Hiambie tu unavyofikiria juu ya mambo yafuatayo. Tafadhali onyesha katika kila swali kama (1) hukubaliani nayo kabisa, (2) hukubaliani nayo kwa kiasi, (3) unakubaliana nayo kwa kiasi, (4) unakubaliana nayo kabisa.
1. Kama ilivyo kwamba kuna wanyama kama ng'ombe walio bora, watu wengine walizaliwa wakiwa wa kizazi kilicho bora kuliko wengine (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

2. Unapowachagua marafiki zako, njia mojawapo ni kufikiria kama wanaweza kukusaidia katika maisha yako ulimwenguni.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
3. Labda wakati mmoja itaonekana kwamba elimu ya zamani ya nyota itaweza kusleza vitu vingi.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
4. Katika maisha ya wanadamu, ni lazima sikuzote kuwe na vita na kutopatana.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
5. Ukianza kujaribu kuyabadilisha mambo sana, kwa kawaida huyafanya yawe mabaya zaidi. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
6. Kwa kawaida ninayo matumaini kwamba serikali itafanya na kutenda yaliyo haki. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
7. Nchi ikiwa katika hatari kubwa, twaweza kuwalazimisha watu, hata ikiwa haki zao zitavunjwa.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
8. Yalilazimu serikali kuzipiga marufuku sinema na vitabu inazofikiria kuwa zinaweza kuwaharibu wananchi.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
9. Siku hizi shida moja iliyo kubwa ni kwamba watu husema zaidi kuliko wanavyotenda. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
10. Kupandishwa cheo chako ni jambo mojawapo ya yale mambo muhimu katika maisha yako. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
11. Viongozi hodari wachache waweza kuiongoza nchi hii vyema zaidi kuliko sheria sote na majadiliano.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
12. Watu wengine wana uwezo wa kuwadhuru wengine kwa kuwatakia na kufikiria tu jambo hilo litendeko.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
13. Mimi naamini uhuru wa kusema kwa wote hata ikiwa maoni yao yakoje. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
14. Siwezi kufikiria kuwa mtu wa kabila jingine ila.....
(INSERT RESPONDENT'S OWN TRIBAL GROUP)
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
15. Ni afadhali kukaa bila kitu kuliko kuuliza upendelewa.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
16. Shida kubwa ya demokrasi ni kwamba watu wengi hawajui kwa hakika lililo bora kwao. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

17. Kitu kilicho muhimu ni maisha yetu duniani bali ni kile kitakachotukia baadaye. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
18. Kwa jumla mimi mwenyewe najitoshia. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
19. Ingefua watu wote wapowe nafasi na uhuru wa kisema sawa, katika maabo ya siasa. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
20. Mwakini hana uwezo unaompasa kuwa nao katika korti za sheria. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
21. Mara nyingi nina shida siku hizi kuamua amri zilizo halali kuzifuata kwa sababu kila kitu hubadilika upesi. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
22. Kuna mambo katika maisha ambayo mtu hawazi kuyafahamu kabisa. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
23. Ni kitu cha maana sana kuwahashimu akina jadi. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
24. Ninalo lengo langu ninalojaribu kulifikia. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
25. Ni kitu cha kawaida na halisi kwa wanawake kuwa na uhuru unaopungua ule wa wanaume. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
26. Afadhali kushika uliyo nayo kuliko kujaribu mambo mapya usiyoyajua. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
27. Kila mtu ana haki na au alindwa kama mwingine ye yote hata ikiwa ana mawazo gani juu ya mambo ya siasa. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
28. Kuna ukweli katika uwezo wa mganga wa kienyeji hata ikiwa watu hawajui uwezo huo ukoje. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
29. Ningependa mtu wa vitendo sikuzote wala si mtu wa mawazo. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
30. Inafahamika kwamba watu wanaojisikia kwamba hesina yao imevunjwa, wao huzichukua sheria mikononi mwao. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
31. Kwa jumla wanastiasa wanawoza kuaminiwa kufanyia nchi lo lote wanalifikiri kuwa ni bora zaidi. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
32. Watu zamani walikuwa bora kuliko siku hizi kwa sababu kila mtu alijua alilotakiwa kufanya. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

33. Vijana wanahitaji zaidi ya mambo yote kuadibishwa na wazazi wao. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
34. Kusudi muhimu la siasa linapotakiwa kufanywa, udanganyifu au ukatili wa wote huwa wa haki. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
35. Mtoto asiombwe kufanya jambo lo lote kamwe asipoambiwa sababu ya kulifanya jambo lile. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
36. Makundi yote ya watu wa nchi hii yanaweka kuishi kwa umoja bila kugeuza taratibu iliyopo sasa. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
37. Wafanyakazi hupata haki yao kulingana na kazi yao (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
38. Ni kweli kwamba watu wa jamaa zilizoheshiniwa ndio yawapasa kuwa na muto mwingi kuliko wale wengine. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
39. Najisikia kwamba mimi ni mtu anagestahili kutendewa sawa sawa na wengine. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
40. Ni afadhali kuwa na wakati mwingi kwa kupamsika kuliko kufanya kazi nyingi kama watu wengine wafanyavyo. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
41. Hata watu wakisemaje hatuna uwezo katika mambo ya siasa bali uwezo kutoka kwa aliye juu. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
42. Katika maisha ya wanadamu, ni lazima sikuzote kuwe na vita na kutopatana. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
43. Mtu asipolauwa na umri alubwa hawezi kuwa na hekima nyingi. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
44. Mimi hufanya kazi kama mtunwa katika kila jambo nifanyale mpaka ninapotoshaka na matokeo yake. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
45. Hata ingawaje watu husema hali ya watu wa kawaida inaendelea kuwa mbaya wala haiendelei kuwa nzuri. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
46. Yailazimu serikali kuzipiga marufuku sinema na vitabu inazofikiria kuwa zinaweza kuwaharibu wananchi. (1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

47. Azaliwapo mtu bahati yake huwa imeamuliwa.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
48. Walo wasiofanyikiwa hawana moyo wa kufanya mambo.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
49. Mtu asiyejua analosana yambidi asikubaliwa kusema.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
50. Yampasa kila mtu ajilinde mwaneyewe na kutumia silaha ikiwa ni lazima.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
51. Najisikia ya kwamba mimi hupoteza wakati na kuutumia kwa njia zisizofaa.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
52. Hukumu ya kife tu ndiyo inayoweza kukomesha uhalifu katika nchi hii.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
53. Mimi naamini uhuru wa kusema kwa wote hata ikiwa maoni yao yakoje.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
54. Matusi yanayovunja heshima yako yafaa yasisahauliwa.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...
55. Maisha ya furaha katika jamas ni ya tharuni kubwa kwangu kuliko kuwa tajiri.
(1) ... (2) ... (3) ... (4) ...

Sasa tumefikia mwisho. Asante sana. Kwa hakika umetusaidia sana.
Kwa heri !

(FILL IN AFTER INTERVIEW): Place of interview:.....
Lengthhrs. Language in which interview was conducted:

III: DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT INDEX

Nyanza																							
Kisii	2,196	675	367	4.8	0.90	220	-	0.3	95.6	68	31	1.10	0.12	212.1	6.1	36	51.5	6.0	2,987	12,500	0.25	121	13
Risumu	2,093	401	193	4.0	8.09	-	45.4	54	21	5.9	0.65	173.4	7.8	34	49.4	7.2	683	10,740	0.25	86	1		
Siaya	2,523	332	151	2.4	-	432	29	0.6	69.6	26	9	0.52	0.05	18.0	428	57.4	5.6	1,479	0.16	121	12		
South-Nyanza	7,714	663	116	4.5	0.80	566	5	0.9	38.7	26	20	1.05	0.19	149.5	11.0	30	32.8	5.3	1,502	12,055	0.11	134	25
Western Prov.																							
Burgoma	3,074	345	112	6.4	1.28	253	-	0.7	92.0	64	13	1.34	0.14	138.0	15.3	49	77.5	7.5	964	11,500	0.26	98	12
Busia	1,629	200	123	2.4	-	163	-	0.5	96.2	27	20	1.64	0.48	196.9	19.3	30	48.3	7.0	671	11,111	0.14	97	14
Kakamega	3,520	783	222	3.8	0.80	325	-	0.4	98.1	61	13	1.17	0.15	176.1	7.2	41	56.9	7.4	1,223	14,236	0.09	127	20
Coast Prov.																							
Kilifi	12,114	308	25	3.1	4.36	104	247	0.3	5.6	66	24	1.77	0.22	56.7	10.4	17	29.4	2.7	1,289	7,700	0.05	140	26
Kwala	8,257	206	25	3.9	1.19	126	162	0.8	20.2	53	18	1.13	0.03	60.7	14.3	12	25.7	2.4	746	7,630	0.11	141	27
Lamu	6,506	22	3	0.3	33.65	7	319	3.3	-	n.a.	-	3.77	0.15	22.2	40.9	5	18.4	-	579	1,333	0.49	96	13
Taita-Taveta	6,959	111	7	2.8	8.73	12	10	0.5	9.2	66	33	5.33	0.2	22.5	27.0	36	74.6	6.8	597	3,469	0.63	62	4
Tana River	38,694	51	1	3.6	7.08	73	58	2.4	-	n.a.	-	2.15	-	14.1	18.6	9	33.1	1.2	357	2,217	0.15	123	21
Eastern Prov.																							
Embu	2,714	179	66	5.0	2.19	66	186	0.6	78.5	35	7	2.88	0.28	123.3	36.3	37	76.7	9.5	463	4,590	0.28	70	7
Meru	9,922	597	60	3.9	0.75	241	95	0.4	45.2	55	35	1.52	0.15	69.0	8.8	32	60.8	5.4	734	7,024	0.16	116	17
Kitui	29,389	343	12	2.9	0.90	67	437	0.9	1.9	63	16	1.04	0.1	40.8	5.8	20	49.2	4.1	769	8,795	0.25	152	29
Machakos	14,178	707	50	4.0	1.65	125	771	0.4	61.0	57	24	1.69	1.1	65.6	4.7	36	84.3	7.1	1,247	12,855	0.25	124	18
Isiolo	25,605	30	1	5	27.34	-	-	-	-	P.P.	-	6.60	0.07	13.6	37.3	16	35.2	1.3	2,143	7,500	0.31	112	15
Narsabiti	72,732	52	1	5	12.76	4	-	-	-	P.P.	-	2.86	-	13.7	28.8	9	16.4	2.2	251	5,260	0.01	132	24
North-East Prov.																							
Garissa	43,931	64	1	6	-	-	-	-	-	P.P.	-	1.79	-	11.8	10.3	4	9.7	-	2,667	9,142	0.27	164	30
Mandera	26,470	95	4	6	-	-	-	-	-	P.P.	-	0.90	-	10.6	4.2	2	4.6	-	1,173	23,750	0.12	200	33
Wajir	56,501	86	2	6	-	-	-	-	-	P.P.	-	1.12	-	17.9	5.2	4	6.0	1.4	1,433	10,750	0.14	182	31
National totals and averages:																							
	559,249	10,943	19	3.0	9.87	3,157	39.6	50.83/	4.39	0.36	73.2	10.6	36	53.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	791	7,918	0.25		
						6,785	0.72	22.65															

Abbreviations: n. a. = not available
 - = magnitude negligible
 P. P. = predominantly pastoralist area
 l. f. = large-scale farming sector

SOURCES AND REMARKS

¹Statistical Abstract 1973, p. 2.

²Population Census 1969, cf. Statistical Abstract 1973, p. 14.

³Since the former Thika district was divided between Murang'a and Kiambu districts in 1966, the rate of growth given was calculated as the average of both districts.

⁴Since the former Embu district was divided into Embu and Kirinyaga districts, these figures are calculated as the average for both districts.

⁵Due to changes in district boundaries, there are no comparable figures available.

⁶The 1969 census for the population of North-Eastern Province shows some anomalies, e.g. a probable female under-enumeration, uncertainties caused by the frequent migrations across the Somali border etc. which make these figures less reliable than others, cf. Regional Physical Development Plan, North-Eastern Province, Nov. 71, p. 4 ff.. Since the basis of enumeration for the former Northern Province (including also, among others, Isiolo and Marsabit districts), was different in the 1962 census, no useful comparisons are possible.

⁷The rates of growth are based on the censuses taken in 1962 and 1969. Not always, however, are useful comparisons possible, due to changes in district boundaries and in the basis of enumeration. The figures for Rift Valley, Nyanza and Coast Provinces were taken from the

respective Regional Physical Development Plans. The others were, as far as possible, computed by us.

⁸Kenya Population Census, 1969, Vol. II, Data on Urban Population, April 1971, Table 1, p. 1.

These figures represent the percentage of the population living in towns of more than 2,000 inhabitants.

⁹Statistical Abstract, 1973, p. 99. Definitions: high potential = annual rainfall of 857.5 mm or more (over 980 mm in Coast Prov.), medium potential = annual rainfall of 735 mm - 857.5 mm (735 mm - 980 mm in Coast Prov. and 612.5 mm - 857.5 mm in Eastern Prov.).

¹⁰These figures include the approximate respective area of the former Thika district which was divided in 1966 in almost equal parts between Murang'a and Kiambu.

¹¹The former Kisumu ("Central Nyanza") district was divided into Kisumu and Siaya districts in 1967. Separate figures are in some cases not available.

¹²These figures have been calculated on the assumption that 5 hectares of medium-potential and 100 hectares of low potential land are equivalent to 1 hectare of high-potential land. Cf. ILO-Report, loc. cit., p. 35.

¹³Economic Survey, 1974, p. 78, includes total land registered, adjudicated or under adjudication as % of total registrable land as at December 31st 1973, except for the former scheduled areas (large farms).

¹⁴Cf. ILO-Report, p. 338 and Statistical Abstract, 1973, Table 90, p. 106-108, and Table 95 a, p. 112 f. These figures include only small farms and settlement schemes. Where there

are no data available (e.g. for Baringo, Lamu and Tana River), the actual production of cash crops can be considered to be very small. In the pastoralist areas the production of cash crops is close to nothing, except for some experimental schemes (like in Turkana), or some agricultural development on the fringes of the area (like in Narok).

Definition A includes as cash crops: improved maize, wheat, all pulses other than beans, all temporary industrial crops (including cotton, sugar-cane, pyrethrum, ground-nuts and oil-seeds), English potatoes, cabbages, certain other vegetables and other temporary crops and all permanent crops (including coffee, tea, coconuts, cashew nuts, paw-paws, bananas and other fruit). Definition B includes as cash crops: wheat, all temporary industrial crops, English potatoes, cabbages, certain other vegetables, coffee, tea and cashew nuts, but not, as is often done, coconuts in the case of Coast Province, because these can be considered to be a traditional subsistence crop in this area. Where there is a considerable difference in the cash crop acreage, depending on the respective definition (e.g. in Machakos, Bungoma, Kakamega or Nandi districts), this is largely accounted for by the planting of improved maize in these areas. Since, however, this is also a food crop only a very limited amount of it may actually be sold, particularly in districts with a very high population density (like Kakamega or Kisii). This difference may, therefore, indicate a pattern of "involutionary growth" in these areas.

¹⁵ A cash crop area can exceed the indicated cultivated area because of double cropping or because crops grown in mixtures are double-counted.

¹⁶ Employment and Earnings in the Modern Sector 1971,
op. cit., pp. 29/30.

¹⁷ ILO-Report, pp. 78/79

¹⁸ Ministry of Agriculture, Water Department, Rural Water Supplies Programme I and II, Progress Reports (Feb. and June 1974), Tables 3.1, 3.2, 4.2 and 4.2.2, and Ministry of Health, Proposed Environmental Sanitation Programme, Phase I - IX, 1960/61 - 1971/72. These figures include only those rural water supplies which have been planned and executed by the Water Department of the Ministry of Agriculture, and by the Ministry of Health under the WHO/Unicef environmental sanitation programme, phases I - IX (1960 - 1972), as the two most important programmes. It was not possible to obtain reliable more comprehensive data including water projects initiated by other authorities like County Councils, the Ministry of Lands and Settlement, or local self-help groups. In some cases only rough estimates were available. The figures for the large-farm areas understate the actual number of people served in these districts, since these farms usually have their own water supplies.

¹⁹ Kenya Population Census 1969, vol. III, Table 1. Minimal adult literacy is defined to include all persons aged 15 and above who reported having attended school at some time, even if only for one year. This definition is, of course, arbitrary, as are many others. Thus it may include people who never quite achieved literacy or who may have lost it in the meantime. On the other hand, there may be some more people who can be termed "literate", even though they have never

attended an ordinary school, but who may have taken adult literacy classes or are self-taught in one way or another.

²⁰Calculated from Ministry of Education, Annual Report 1969, Table 5, pp. 38 f.. The potential primary school population is assumed to be 21 % of the total population. Again this assumption is arbitrary, but it is the one which is used in some of the Regional Physical Development Plans and corresponds approximately to the national average for the corresponding age-groups. In the case of Nyeri there seem to be more students in this age-group than the national average. Since we use these figures only for purposes of inter-district comparisons this apparent paradoxy need not worry us.

²¹Ibid., Table 18, p. 60 f.. The potential secondary school population is assumed to be 12 % of the total population.

²²Ministry of Health, Annual Report 1968 (published 1974), Appendix VI, p. 125 ff.. These figures include only government and mission hospitals.

²³Ibid., App. IX, p. 130 ff.. These figures include health centers, sub-health centers and dispensaries supported by either government, mission or self-help efforts.

²⁴Ministry of Co-operatives and Social Services, Department of Social Services, A Statistical Analysis of Self-Help Projects 1972, Table K, p. 57 ff.. These figures include contributions of labor and material as well as cash donations.

²⁵This overall ranking of districts was established by first computing rank orders for each of the variables

of the table which have some kind of relationship with economic development and the improvement of the quality of life in general, i.e. columns 9 (cash crops - in this case the more rigorous Definition B which comprises only actually marketed crops was preferred as an indicator), 10 (non-agricultural employment), 11 (roads), 12 (water supplies), 13, 14 and 15 (education), 16 and 17 (health), and 18 (self-help efforts). Where there were several columns for one indicator (e.g. for education and health), a compound index was computed by adding up the rank orders for each district and then establishing an overall rank order for this indicator. Then the rank orders for all indicators were added up and a single overall index was established. It would have been desirable to include some more indicators of development as, despite all its limitations, "per capita income per district", but no reliable data were available. The first column in this section shows the added rank totals for each district. In this way at least some of the relative distances between districts can be shown. The second column then gives the overall district rankings.

²⁶ Including all kinds of hospitals.

IV: OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION IN KENYA, 1950 - 1970

Africans 1950 (in '000)								
Occupation	Adult males				% of African male labor force			
	Priv. agri-culture	Priv. indus-try + com-merce	Public sector	Total	Priv. agr.	Priv. ind.+ comm.	Publ. sect.	Total
<u>Employees</u>								
Unskilled laborers	119.1	47.8	52.1	219.0	8.2	3.3	3.6	15.1
Domestic servants	8.5	20.4	2.0	30.9	0.6	1.4	0.1	2.1
Skilled and semi-skilled workers	9.3	21.4	12.0	42.7	0.6	1.5	0.8	2.9
Clerks	1.1	1.6	3.6	6.3	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.5
Shop+office boys	-	8.6	2.9	11.5	-	0.6	0.2	0.8
Teachers + instructors	-	2.8	0.4	3.2	-	0.2	-	0.2
Other employees	0.5	1.8	21.0	23.3	-	0.1	1.4	1.6
Total employees ^a	138.5	104.4	94.0	336.9	9.5	7.2	6.5	23.2
<u>Self-employed</u>								
"Progressive farmers" ^b	71.9	-	-	71.9	5.2	-	-	5.2
Subsistence farmers ^c	809.7	-	-	809.7	55.4	-	-	55.4
Pastoralists ^d	230.0	-	-	230.0	15.8	-	-	15.8
Farmers-cum-businessmen ^e	-	4.0	-	4.0	0.3	-	-	0.3
Other non-agric. self-employed ^f	-	1.0	-	1.0	-	-	-	-
Total self-employed	1111.6	5.0	-	1116.6	76.7	-	-	76.7

Africans 1950 (continued)

Occupation	Adult males				% of African male labor force			
	Priv. agriculture	Priv. industry + commerce	Public sector	Total	Priv. agr.	Priv. ind. comm.	Publ. sect.	Total
"Open unemployed"	no significant number							
Secondary school stud. ⁹	-	-	-	1.0	0.1	-	-	0.1
Total				1754.5 ^h	86.3	7.2	6.5	100.0

Europeans 1950 (in '000)

Occupation	Adult males			% of European m. l. f.		
	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total
<u>Employees</u> ⁱ						
Lower level ^j	1.5	0.8	2.3	12	6.4	18.4
Middle level ^k	2.4	1.9	4.3	19.2	15.2	34.4
High level ^l	0.7	0.3	1.0	5.6	2.4	8.0
Total	4.6	3.0	7.6	36.8	24.0	60.8
<u>Self-employed</u> ^m						
Small businessmen + agents	0.7	-	0.7	5.6	-	5.6
Members of professions	0.3	-	0.3	2.4	-	2.4
Bigger businessmen + industrialists	0.3	-	0.3	2.4	-	2.4
Large farmers ⁿ	2.0	-	2.0	16.0	-	16.0
Company directors	0.7	-	0.7	5.6	-	5.6
Total	4.0	-	4.0	32.0	-	32.0
Secondary school students ^o	0.9	-	0.9	-	-	7.2
Total ^p	9.5	3.0	12.5	68.8	24.0	100.0

Asians and other Non-Africans, 1950 (in '000)

Occupation	Adult males			% of Asian + Non-Afr.		
	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total	Priv. sect. ^{m.1}	Publ. sect. ^{f.}	Total
<u>Employees</u>						
Lower level	11.7	6.2	17.8	25.5	13.3	38.8
Middle level	3.1	2.0	5.1	6.7	4.3	11.0
High level	0.3	-	0.3	0.7	-	0.7
Total	15.0	8.1	23.2	32.9	17.6	50.5
<u>Self-empl.</u>						
Small crafts-men+traders	1.3	-	1.3	2.8	-	2.8
Middle level businessmen	0.6	-	0.6	1.3	-	1.3
High busi-nessmen+in-dustrialists, members of professions	0.3	-	0.3	0.7	-	0.7
Total	2.2	-	2.2	4.8	-	4.8
Not account-ed for ^d	-	-	17.7	-	-	38.6
Secondary students	-	-	2.8	-	-	6.1
Total	17.3	8.1	45.9	76.3	17.6	100.0

Occupation	Adult males ^b				% of African m. l. f.			
	Priv. agr.	Priv. ind.	Publ. sect.	Total	Priv. agr.	Priv. ind.	Publ. sect.	Total
<u>Employees</u> ^a								
Unskilled laborers	176.6	98.0	78.0	353.2	9.9	5.5	4.4	19.8
Semi-skilled laborers + low-skilled office workers, untrained primary schoolteach.	--	39.2	46.1	85.3	--	2.2	2.6	4.8
Accountants, highly skilled "modern crafts", technicians, middle level civil servants, secondary school teach.	--	0.9	2.2	3.1	--	0.1	0.1	0.2
Managers, high level public servants	--	0.1	0.3	0.4	--	--	--	--
Total	176.6	143.5	134.5	454.6	9.9	8.1	7.5	25.5
<u>Self-empl.</u>								
"Progressive farmers" ^c	97.2	--	--		5.9	--	--	5.9
Subsistence farmers ^d	962.8	--	--		53.8	--	--	53.8
Pastoralists ^e	240.4	--	--		13.4	--	--	13.4
Farmers-cum-businessmen ^f	--	7.5	--					
Non-agric. self-empl. (e.g. craftsmen, traders)	--	2.5	--		--	0.1	--	0.1
Total	1300.4	10.0	--	1310.4	73.1	0.1	--	73.2
Students ^g	--	--	--	5.2	--	--	--	0.3
Open unempl. ^h	--	--	--	18.0	--	--	--	1.0
Total	1477.0	153.5	134.5	1788.2	83.0	8.2	7.5	100.0

Occupation	Adult males			% of European m.l.f.		
	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total
<u>Employees</u> ⁱ						
Service+related workers (incl.transp.)	0.7	--	0.7	3.2	--	3.2
Manual workers+laborers	--	0.9	0.9	--	4.1	4.1
Craftsmen, production process workers and related occupations		1.7	--	1.7	7.7	--
Salesmen+related occup.	0.8	--	0.8	3.6	--	3.6
Clerical, office+related occ.	1.4	4.4	5.0	6.4	20.0	26.4
Professional, technical+related occ.	1.6	--	1.6	7.3	--	7.3
Administrative, executive+managerial occ.	2.5	0.7	3.2	11.3	3.2	14.5
Total	8.7	6.0	14.7	39.5	27.3	66.8
<u>Self-empl.</u> ^j						
Small craftsmen+businessmen	0.5	--	0.5	2.3	--	2.3
Members of professions	0.5	--	0.5	2.3	--	2.3
Bigger businessmen	0.5	--	0.5	2.2	--	2.2
Large farmers	2.0	--	2.0	9.1	--	9.1
Non-salaried company directors	2.0	--	2.0	9.1	--	9.1
Total	5.5	--	5.5	25.0	--	25.0
<u>Secondary students</u> ^k	--	--	1.8	--	--	8.2
Total	14.2	6.0	22.0			100.0

Occupation	Adult males			% of Asian +Non-Afr.m.l.f.		
	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total
<u>Employees</u>						
Other occ. not listed elsewhere	1.3	--	1.3	2.3	--	2.3
Service+related workers (incl. transport)	1.3			2.3		
Agric. empl.	0.8			1.4		
Manual workers+laborers	0.4	6.2	16.0	0.7	10.8	27.9
Craftsmen, production, process workers+rel.occ.	7.3			12.7		
Salesmen+rel. occupations	2.8	4.4	15.0	4.9	7.7	26.1
Clerical, office+rel.occ.	7.8			13.5		
Professional, technical+related occ.	0.7			1.2		
Administrat. executive, managerial+related occ.	1.6	0.2	2.5	2.8	0.3	4.3
Total	24.0	10.8	34.8	4.8	18.8	60.6
<u>Self-empl.</u>						
Small craftsmen+businessmen not assessed by income tax	8.3	--	8.3	14.5	--	14.5
Same:assessed by income tax	5.6	--	5.6	9.8	--	9.8
Bigger businessmen	0.7	--	0.7	1.2	--	1.2
Members of professions	0.7	--	0.7	1.2	--	1.2
Company directors	0.3	--	0.3	0.5	--	0.5
Total	15.6	--	15.6	27.2	--	27.2
Secondstud.	--	--	7.0	--	--	12.2
Total	63.6	10.8	57.4	32.0	18.8	100.0

Africans 1970

Occupation	Adult males				% of African m. l. f.			
	Priv. agr.	Priv. ind.	Publ. sect.	Total	Priv. agr.	Priv. ind.	Publ. sect.	Total
Employees (mod.sect.) ^a								
Casual lab's	59.0	10.5	--	69.5	2.4	2.8	--	5.2
Unskilled laborers	77.6	78.2	53.1	208.9	3.1	3.2	2.1	8.4
Skilled+semi-skilled lab's not incl. elsewhere	8.3	45.3	59.4	113.0	0.4	1.8	2.4	4.6
Shop assistants	--	2.3	0.9	3.2	--	0.1	--	0.1
Techn. sales-representat.+brokers	--	1.1	0.3	1.4	--	0.1	--	0.1
Operators of office mach.	--	0.7	2.1	2.8	--	--	0.1	0.1
Book keepers cashiers + book keeping clerks	0.2	1.8	4.1	6.1	--	0.1	0.2	0.3
Clerks	2.3	7.2	29.8	39.3	0.1	0.3	1.2	1.6
Secretaries, stenograph., typists	0.1	0.2	1.9	2.2	--	--	0.1	0.1
Teachers	--	1.6	31.2	32.8	--	0.1	1.2	1.3
Technicians, work managers (foremen+ other supervisory person)	2.1	3.0	14.4	19.5	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.8
Members of professions	0.2	0.4	3.0	3.6	--	--	0.1	0.1
Executives + managers	0.7	0.8	6.3	7.8	--	--	0.3	0.3
Directors + top level administrators	0.5	1.1	1.5	3.1	--	--	0.1	0.1
Total	151.0	154.2	208.0	513.2	6.1	8.6	8.4	23.1

Africans 1970 (continued)

Occupation	Adult males				% of African m. l. f.			
	Priv. agr.	Priv. ind.	Publ. sect.	Total	Priv. agr.	Priv. ind.	Publ. sect.	Total
<u>Employees</u> <u>(inform.sect.)</u>								
In urban in- form.sect. ^b	--	31.4	--	31.4	--	1.3	--	1.3
On small farms ^c	198.7	--	--	198.7	8.0	--	--	8.0
Of non-agr. rural enter- prises ^d	--	58.4	--	58.4	--	2.4	--	2.4
Total	198.7	92.8	--	288.5	8.0	3.7	--	11.7
Total (all employees)	349.7	244.0	208.0	801.7	11.7	12.3	8.4	34.8
<u>Self-empl.</u> ^e <u>(mod.sect.)</u>								
Large farmers	0.8	--	--	0.8	--	--	--	--
Other self- empl. on large farms (e.g. co- op members, partners etc.)	1.3	--	--	1.3	0.1	--	--	0.1
Processing co-ops	1.2	--	--	1.2	--	--	--	--
Manufactur- ers+repairers	--	3.1	--	3.1	--	0.1	--	0.1
Contractors	--	0.2	--	0.2	--	--	--	--
Wholesale+re- tail traders	--	10.6	--	10.6	--	0.4	--	1.3
Transport operators	--	0.2	--	0.2	--	--	--	--
Members of professions	--	0.1	--	0.1	--	--	--	--
Other services	--	2.1	--	2.1	--	0.1	--	0.1
Forestry + logging	--	6.5	--	6.5	--	0.3	--	0.3
Total	3.3	22.7	--	26.0	0.1	0.9	--	1.0

Africans 1970 (continued)

Occupation	Adult males				% of African m. l. f.			
	Priv. agr.	Priv. ind.	Publ. sect.	Total	Priv. agr.	Priv. ind.	Publ. sect.	Total
<u>Self-empl. (inform.sect.)</u>								
Farmers-cum-businessmen	--	47.3	--	47.3	--	1.9	--	1.9
Non-agr.rur. al enterpr. ^f	--	15.7	--	15.7	--	0.6	--	0.6
Family work- ers in non- agr. rural enterprises	--	9.0	--	9.0	--	0.4	--	0.4
In the urban inform.sect. ^g	--	30.6	--	30.6	--	1.2	--	1.2
"Progressive" small-scale farmers ^h	234.2	--	--	234.2	9.5	--	--	9.5
"Poor" and subsistence farmers ⁱ	882.4	--	--	882.4	37.9	--	--	37.9
Pastoralists ^j	260.9	--	--	260.9	10.5	--	--	10.5
Total	1377,5	102,6	--	1480.1	55.5	4.1	--	59.6
Total (all self-empl.)	1439.8	125.3	--	1565.1	58.0	5.0	--	63.0
Students ^k	--	--	--	87.0	--	--	--	3.5
Open un- empl. ^l	--	--	--	28.0	--	--	--	1.1
Total	1789.5	369.3	208.0	2481.0	69.7	17.3	8.4	100.0

Europeans 1970

Occupation	Adult males			% of Europeans m. l. f.		
	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total
<u>Employees</u>						
Skilled+semi-skilled laborers not incl.elsewhere	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.7	1.4
Shop assist.	--	--	--			0.1
Techn. sales-representat.+brokers	0.1	--	0.1	0.7	--	0.7
Operators of office mach.	--	--	--	--	--	--
Bookkeepers, cashiers+book-keeping clerks	--	--	--	--	--	--
Clerks	0.1	--	0.1	0.7	--	0.7
Secretaries, typists+stenographers	0.1	--	0.1	0.7	--	0.7
Teachers	0.2	0.9	1.1	1.4	6.4	7.8
Technicians, work managers, foremen+ other supervisory personnel	0.9	0.3	1.2	6.4	2.1	8.5
Members of professions	0.8	0.6	1.4	5.7	4.3	10.0
Executives+ managers	1.7	1.3	3.0	12.1	9.2	21.3
Directors+ top level administrators	2.2	0.3	2.5	15.6	2.1	17.7
Total	6.2	3.5	9.7	44.0	24.8	68.8

Europeans 1970 (continued)

Occupation	Adult males			% of Europeans m. l. f.		
	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total
<u>Self-empl.</u>						
Large scale farmers	0.9	--	0.9	6.4	--	6.4
Manufacturers + repairers	0.2	--	0.2	1.4	--	1.4
Wholesale + retail traders, owners of financial institutions	0.5	--	0.5	3.6	--	3.6
Members of professions	0.2	--	0.2	1.4	--	1.4
Other services	0.3	--	0.3	2.1	--	2.1
Total	2.1	--	2.1	14.9	--	14.9
Students	--	--	1.5	--	--	10.6
Not accounted for	--	--	0.8	--	--	5.7
Total	8.3	3.5	14.1	58.9	24.8	100.0

Asians and other Non-Africans 1970

Occupation	Adult males			% of Asian +non-Afr.		
	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total
<u>Employees</u>						
Casual laborers	1.3	--	1.3	2.6	--	2.6
Unskilled laborers	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.6
Skilled + semi-skilled not included elsewhere	1.8	--	1.8	3.6	--	3.6
Shop assist.	0.7	--	0.7	1.4	--	1.4
Technic. or sales repres.	0.6	--	0.6	1.2	--	1.2
Operators of office mach.	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.6
Bookkeepers, cashiers + book keeping clerks	1.1	1.2	2.3	2.2	2.4	4.6
Clerks	1.8	1.0	2.8	3.6	2.0	5.6
Secretaries, typists+stenographers	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.8
Teachers	0.5	0.8	1.3	1.0	1.6	2.6
Technicians, work managers +other supervisory person.	3.1	0.9	4.0	6.1	1.8	7.9
Members of professions	0.6	0.6	1.2	1.2	1.2	2.4
Executives+ managers	2.0	2.4	4.4	3.9	4.7	8.6
Directors + top level administrators	4.0	0.1	4.1	7.9	0.2	8.1
Total	18.0	7.5	25.5	34.3	16.3	50.6

Asians and other Non-Africans 1970 (continued)

Occupation	Adult males			% of Asian + Non-Afr. m. l. f.		
	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total
<u>Self-empl.</u>						
Large farmers	0.1	--	0.1	0.2	--	0.2
Mines+quar- ries operat.	0.1	--	0.1	0.2	--	0.2
Manufactur- ers+repairers	3.0	--	3.0			
Contractors	0.3	--	0.3	0.6	--	0.6
Retail+whole- sale traders	6.2	--	6.2	12.3	--	12.3
Transport operators	0.1	--	0.1	0.2	--	0.2
Members of professions	0.2	--	0.2	0.4	--	0.4
Other services	0.9	--	0.9	1.8	--	1.8
Total	10.9	--	11.9	21.6	--	21.6
Students	--	--	7.0	--	--	13.9
Not account- ed for (i.e. unempl. or in inform. sect.)	--	--	7.0	--	--	13.9
Total	28.9	7.5	50.4	55.9	16.3	100.0

Non-Kenyan Africans 1970^m

Occupation	Adult males			% of Non-Kenyan Afr. m. l. f.		
	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total
<u>Employees</u>						
Unskilled laborers	0.8	--	0.8	5.1	--	5.1
Skilled + semi-skilled not included elsewhere	0.5	0.5	1.0	3.2	3.2	6.4
Tech. sales representatives+brokers	0.1	--	0.1	0.6	--	0.6
Bookkeepers cashiers + book keeping clerks	--	0.3	0.3	--	1.9	1.9
Clerks	0.1	0.6	0.7	0.6	3.8	4.4
Secretaries typists	--	--	--	--	--	0.1
Teachers	--	0.1	0.1	--	0.6	0.6
Technicians, work managers +other supervisory person.	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.6	1.3	1.9
Members of professions	0.1	0.6	0.7	0.6	3.8	4.4
Executives+ managers	--	0.1	0.1	--	0.6	0.6
Directors+ top level administrators	0.1	--	0.1	0.6	--	0.6
Total	1.8	2.4	4.2	11.3	15.2	26.5
<u>Self-empl.</u>						
Agriculture	0.2	--	0.2	1.3	--	1.3
Manufacturers +repairers	0.2	--	0.2	1.3	--	1.3
Commerce	0.2	--	0.2	1.3	--	1.3
Services	0.1	--	0.1	0.6	--	0.6
Total	0.7	--	0.7	4.5	--	4.5

Non-Kenyan Africans (continued)

Occupation	Adult males			% of Non-Kenyan Afr.		
	Priv. sect.	Publ. sect.	Total	m. Priv. sect.	f. Publ. sect.	Total
Self-empl. in urban inform. al sector	8.0	--	8.0	50.6	--	50.6
Open unem- ployed	--	--	2.9	--	--	18.4
Total	10.5	2.4	15.8	66.4	15.2	100.0

Sources and remarks:

1950:

^aEast African Economic and Statistical Bulletin, No. 9 (Sept. 1950), Supplement, Appendix Table II; cf. also: East African Economic and Statistical Bulletin, No. 8 (June 1950), Employment and Earnings, Table E 7.

^bCf. East African Statistical Department, Kenya-Report on the Analysis of the Sample Census of African Agriculture 1950/51 (Nairobi: March 1954, restricted), Appendix I - III: and, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report (1950), p. 16 (marketed production from African areas). For a definition of "progressive" farmers see note h for the year 1970 below.

^cThis is taken as a residual figure after the number of "progressive farmers" has been deducted.

^dCf. Population Census 1948. The numbers given in the population census for Maasai, Turkana, Somali, Tugen, Pokot, Marakwet, Sabaot, Samburu, Rendille and Boran have been added up here to get an approximation of the number of pastoralists in Kenya. Some members of these groups may have been settled now or are pursuing modern occupations. This is probably cancelled out by the fact that some members of other groups, like the Elgeyo and some smaller similar ones, not included here, are still pursuing a pastoralist way of life.

^eThis is a rough estimate based on research on market centres etc. in different areas for this period, personal communication by Mr. Reinhard Henkel.

^fCf. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Report of the Committee on African Wages (Nairobi 1954), p. 8 ff.; the urban informal sector was almost non-existent at this time.

^gCf., Statistical Abstract 1955, p. 106.

^hCf., Population Census 1948, taking into account an estimated increase p. a. of 2 %.

ⁱThe data on the occupational differentiation of Europeans, Asians and other non-African in Kenya for this year are very incomplete. Cf., e. g., Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Report on Non-Native Employment (1949), App. I, Table II; only occupations with more than 10 practitioners are listed in this table, no mention is made of the kind of skill required for the others which are still a sizable number. For this reason we preferred to use the available and more complete information on income distribution as an indicator for the distribution of occupational skills and for the assessment of the class position of the individual concerned. It should not be forgotten, however, that this more indirect method is only used because of the lack of other more relevant data in this case, and that the direct assessment of a person's economic role and subsequent class status is still preferable for our analytic purposes.

^jThis group includes craftsmen, mechanics, clerks, storekeepers, typists etc.

^kThis group includes managers of small enterprises, foremen, accountants, middle level civil servants, teachers etc.

^lThis group includes managers of larger enterprises, high level civil servants etc..

^mThese figures are again taken from data on income distribution. This time from income tax statistics, cf. East African Income Tax Department Report (1950), Assessments raised up to 1953, Appendix A, Schedule No. 5. Whereas the coverage of Europeans by the income tax assessment is quite complete, that for the Asian and other non-African population does not comprise a large part of the lowest income group. The assignment of occupational characteristics is only approximative and there is, of course, a considerable overlap between these groups.

ⁿStatistical Abstract 1955, p. 51.

^oIbid., p. 104.

^pIbid., Table 12, population mid-year estimates, the age-group composition is assumed to be the same as at the time of the 1948 census.

^qE. g. small self-employed not assessed by income tax, like small traders and craftsmen, Arab fishermen etc..

1960:

^aAgain no direct occupational data are available for this year and the indirect method had to be used, taking the distribution of income as an indicator for the different occupational skills. Cf. East African Statistical Department, Kenya Unit, Reported Employment and Earnings in Kenya, 1948 - 60 (Nairobi, Aug. 1961), pp. 5 ff. The distribution of income for these employees is assumed to be the same as in 1963, the first year for which such figures are available. Some minor adjustments have been made for the higher income groups which probably were still less numerous in 1960. Additional information on the stock of occupational skills of high and middle level manpower is, however, available for the year 1964, cf. Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, High-Level Manpower, Requirements and Resources in Kenya 1964 - 70 (Nairobi, 1965), Table A, pp. 16 ff.. Although these, again, are not directly comparable with the year 1960, the different groupings of occupations and their relative order of magnitude were kept in mind when we compiled this table from the other sources.

^bSeparate figures for sex and age-groups are not available for 1960. They are assumed to be proportionately the same as for the 1962 census cf. Statistical Abstract 1965, tables 11 and 17.

^cCf. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Kenya African Agricultural Sample Census 1960/61, Part I, pp. 16 ff. and

62 ff.; and Department of Agriculture, Annual Report 1960, pp. 11 and 18 f. For a definition of "progressive farmers" see note h for the year 1970 below.

^dCf. ibid..

^eCf., Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Advance Report of Kenya Population Census 1962, volumes I + II (Nairobi, Jan. 1964), p. 45. The figure given there has been adjusted to the year 1960. It is assumed that the proportion of the male labor force of this group is the same as for the African population as a whole (i. e. 46.1 %).

^fSince there are no data available pertaining to this group, the figures given here are only a very rough estimate based on "impressionistic evidence" from various sources. The "net" figure is arrived at by assuming 75 % of these self-employed also to be small-scale farmers at the same time. (Cf. also figures for 1970 and remarks there.)

^gStatistical Abstract 1965, table 54, p. 120.

^hCf. A. G. Dalgleish, Survey of Unemployment (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1960), particularly pp. 11 ff. Since Dalgleish arrived at his estimates of the total number of unemployed or underemployed in Kenya (120,000) by means of a residual method, for our figure of "open unemployed" only his estimate for the urban areas (18,000) has been taken into account here.

ⁱEmployment and Earnings 1948 - 1960, loc. cit. A more detailed account of occupations is available for private industry

and commerce only, cf. ibid., Appendix, Table VII. For agriculture and the public sector recourse had again to be taken to figures on income distribution, cf. ibid., p. 17 ff..

^jEast African Income Tax Department, Year of Income 1960, Assessments raised to June 30th, 1962; Schedule No. 5. There are no figures by race available, some rough adjustments, therefore, had to be made in this respect, taking into account the respective proportions of the last available racially separated income tax statistics (cf. also the figures for 1950/51), and the total number of large European farms (cf. Statistical Abstract 1955, p. 51) and companies (cf. East African Income Tax Department, Year of Income 1960, loc. cit.).

^kStatistical Abstract 1965, p. 120 f.. Since there are no separate figures available for secondary school and university enrolment by race, a rough adjustment has been made here, taking into account the size of the 15 - 19 years age-group for the European and Asian communities.

1970:

^aRepublic of Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Statistical Division, Employment and Earnings in the Modern Sector 1968 - 70 (Nairobi, June 1972), Table 28, p. 78 and Table 31, pp. 87 ff. The number of casual employees is computed from the difference between the total number of employees in Table 31 and those which are listed separately by occupation in Table 28. The figures given for the public sector represent the difference between the total and the available figures for the private sector in Table 34, pp. 99 ff.. There is, however, some variation in the total numbers given for each occupation in the different tables of this report, for the sake of consistency the totals given in Table 28 have been used here when this occurred.

^bInternational Labour Office, Employment, Income and Equality - A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya (Geneva: 1972). Since there are no other reliable data in the urban informal sector, we followed the estimates of the ILO-mission in this respect which assumed the proportion of males and females and of employees and self-employed to be the same as in the survey of non-agricultural rural enterprises.

^cStatistical Abstract 1973, p. 249, based on annual small farm sample census.

^dRepublic of Kenya, Central Bureau of Statistics, Survey of Non-Agricultural Rural Enterprises 1969 (unpublished). The data contained in this survey should be treated with caution, since there are some strong doubts about their accuracy. They are, however, the only ones available.

^eEmployment and Earnings 1968 - 70, loc. cit. pp. 45 - 48.

^fSurvey of Non-Agricultural Rural Enterprises 1969, loc. cit..

^gILO-Report, loc. cit..

^hStatistical Abstract 1973, p. 105; see also ILO-Report, op. cit.; pp. 35 ff.. The total number of small-scale agricultural holdings in Kenya in 1969/70 can be estimated to be about 1,230,000. This figure, which differs slightly from those given in the ILO-Report and in the Development Plan 1974 - 78, has been arrived at by computing the number of farms contained in the "Survey of Distribution of Small-scale Farms by Size in Specified Districts", Statistical Abstract 1970, p. 81, comparing them - and slightly correcting them where necessary (e. g. in the cases of Embu and Kirinyaga) - with the number of farms adjudicated and registered in these districts (cf. Economic Survey 1974, p. 78 f.), and then supplementing them with figures for the remaining small-scale agricultural districts (excluding the former scheduled and the pastoralist areas) taking into account the rural population of these districts (cf. Population Census 1960, vol. I, p. 1 f), assuming an average household size of 7.0, and adding the number of farms on settlement schemes in the former scheduled areas (cf. Development Plan 1974 - 78, p. 57). The estimate of the number of "progressive", better-off farmers has been made on the basis of the total acreage of "pure" cash-crops (cf. Statistical Abstract 1973, p. 105)

on small-scale farms in Kenya. "Pure" cash-crops have been defined in this context to include all temporary and permanent industrial crops. Wheat, English potatoes, cabbages, other vegetables and fruits, other cereals, pulses, other temporary crops, coconuts and bananas, which often are listed as cash-crops in a different context, have been excluded here. This method comes fairly close to estimates made on a different basis by others (cf. ILO-Report, p. 35). It has the advantage that in this way comparisons can be made also with earlier periods for which detailed surveys are not available. Although it is obvious that even "progressive" farmers do not only plant cash-crops, but also some food crops, fodder plants etc., and that some of the cash-crops are also grown by the "poor" farmers (in these cases on very small plots), it can be argued that these two "deviations" are cancelling out each other to a large extent. This indicator, therefore, seems to come fairly close to the actual figure, as far as this can be assessed at all, in this category.

ⁱILO-Report, op. cit., p. 35.

^j"Poor" farmers are those who cultivate less than 2 ha (i. e. approx. 5 acres) even if in a partially "modernized" way (cf. "Distribution of Small-scale Farms by Size in Specified Districts", Statistical Abstract 1970, p. 81).

^kRepublic of Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Statistics Division, Population Census 1969, Vol. I

(Nairobi: Government Printer, Nov. 1970), p. 69; and Development Plan 1974 - 78, p. 63.

^lStatistical Abstract 1970, pp. 135 and 138 f..

^mILO-Report, op. cit., pp. 51 ff.. This figure includes only persons who are openly and totally unemployed, which is defined as those who are "actively seeking work and having zero income in the previous week". The figure given here has been computed from those available for Kenya's three largest towns, i. e. Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu, assuming that the proportion is roughly the same for other urban centres with a population of 5,000 and over (cf. Statistical Abstract 1973, Table 20, p. 20). The actual number of unemployed or largely under-employed people in Kenya is, however, much higher, and they are to a large extent "hidden" in the figures for the informal urban sector, where large numbers are pursuing only marginally productive occupations (like street-hawkers, shoe-shine-boys etc. who are eking out only their bare existence), and also in the figures for "poor" farmers and employees of small-scale farms and rural enterprises. The actual number of people seeking work or better work in Kenya is indicated by the response to the tripartite agreement between employers, trade unions and the government in 1970, when 291,000 people applied for the jobs which became available (cf. Economic Survey 1971, p. 153) out of which only about 46,000 could be placed.

ⁿThe group of Non-Kenyan Africans which comprises almost 60,000 people altogether, the major groups being Tanzanians

(26,400) and Ugandans (17,300) has been listed separately here because it seems as if this group may become a distinct factor in Kenya's economic and political life. Although the proportions are not comparable with those of some West-African countries like Ghana or the Ivory Coast, deteriorating relations in East-Africa and the increasing employment problem in Kenya may one day lead to some measures directed against this group. The compulsory registration of aliens, which has taken place from August to October 1974, may be a first step in this direction.

NOTES

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

¹No extensive review of the development of "comparative government" can be undertaken at this place. One of the best short accounts is Harry Eckstein's "A Perspective On Comparative Politics, Past and Present", in Harry Eckstein and David Apter (eds.), Comparative Politics - A Reader (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 3-32.

²For a comprehensive review of developments during the first decade of independence cf., e.g., Donald G. Morrison, et al., Black Africa - A Comparative Handbook (New York: The Free Press, 1972). Up-to-date reports for each country can be found, for example, in Colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record (London: Rex Collings), which appears annually.

³A number of concepts are discussed, for example, in Henry S. Kariel (ed.), Frontiers of Democratic Theory (New York: Random House, 1970); or Fritz W. Scharpf, Demokratietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung (Kronberg: Scriptor, 1975).

⁴Again, no attempt to review these efforts can be made here. Some of the better discussions of earlier approaches can be found in Fred W. Riggs, "The Theory of Political Development", in James Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 317-349; and Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change - Modernization, Development and Politics", Comparative Politics, 3, no. 3 (1971), pp. 283-322.

⁵Cf. Ann Ruth Willner, "The Underdeveloped Study of Development", World Politics, XVI, no. 3 (1964), pp. 468-482; or R. S. Milne, "The Over-developed Study of Political Development", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. V, no. 4 (Dec. 1972), pp. 560-568.

⁶Sidney Verba, "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture", in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 515.

⁷David E. Apter and Samuel S. Mushi, "Social Sciences and Development: The Role of Political Science", paper presented to VIIIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich (1970).

⁸Andre Gunder Frank's Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969) has stimulated most discussions in this regard; see also James D. Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank and Dale L. Johnson (eds.), Dependence and Underdevelopment (New York: Anchor Books, 1972).

⁹Cf., e.g., Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972); or

Samir Amin L'Afrique de l'Ouest Bloquéé (Paris: Edition de Minuit, 1971).

¹⁰Cf., e.g., Ernesto Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America", New Left Review, No. 67 (May-June 1971), pp. 19-38; or Hans-Juergen Puhle (ed.), Lateinamerika-Historische Realitaet und Dependencia-Theorien (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1977).

¹¹As far as Africa is concerned, a good collection of studies of this kind is, for example, the volume edited by Peter C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976). The journal Review of African Political Economy, founded in 1974, also has served as a main forum of discussion in this regard.

¹²In the East African context the major ones are: Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Mahmood Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda (London: Heinemann, 1976); and Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1976).

CHAPTER I

¹This is an old distinction in philosophy and the social sciences, for an application to political science cf., e.g., Theo Stammen, "Zur Geschichte der modernen demokratischen Institutionen", in Leonhard Reinisch (ed.), Politische Wissenschaft heute (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1971), p. 55.

²Our own epistemological position is discussed more fully in Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Herbert Maier and TheoStammen, Einfuehrung in die Politikwissenschaft (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1974), Part B; and Dirk Berg-Schlosser, "Zur Werturteilsproblematik der Sozialwissenschaften-Versuch einer Synopse" (forthcoming).

³In this point we concur with Karl R. Popper's later thinking on these matters, cf. his "Of Clouds and Clocks: An Approach to the Problem of Rationality and the Freedom of Man", in idem, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). See also the discussion of this concept by Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen J. Genco, "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics", World Politics, vol. 29, no. 4 (July 1977), pp. 489-522.

⁴For this point cf., e.g., Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), pp. 136 ff.

⁵The use of the terms "horizontal" and "vertical" varies somewhat in the sociological literature depending on whether one looks at the position of the structural groups themselves in relation to each other or at the direction of the dividing "lines" between them. We prefer to speak of "vertical" stratification when we refer to socially "higher" or "lower" groups, and of "horizontal" stratification when we speak of groups which are juxtaposed to each other.

⁶Cf. Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective", APSR (Dec. 1970), p. 1112.

⁷These approaches are well described in the common introductions and textbooks, cf., e.g., Melvin M. Tumin, Social Stratification (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), or Karl Martin Bolte, et al., Soziale Ungleichheit (3rd ed., Opladen: Leske, 1974).

⁸These are discussed, for example, in Helmut Seiffert, Einfuehrung in die Wissenschaftstheorie (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1970), vol. 2, pp. 43 ff.

⁹Different Marxist approaches are discussed, for example, in Margarete Tjaden-Steinhauer and Karl Hermann Tjaden, Klassenverhaeltnisse im Spaetkapitalismus (Stuttgart: Enke, 1973), pp. 22 ff. A fuller discussion of Marx' own class theory which remained incomplete in his writings is provided by Michael Mauke, Die Klassentheorie von Marx and Engels (Frankfurt: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1970).

¹⁰See in particular his Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte (5th ed., Berlin: Dietz, 1947).

¹¹Theodor Geiger, Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes (Stuttgart: Enke, 1932).

¹²Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

¹³Three attempts of this kind have been undertaken, for example, by different Marxist groups of authors in the Federal Republic of Germany, cf. Tjaden-Steinhauer and Tjaden, op. cit.; Institut fuer Marxistische Studien und Forschungen (IMSF), Klassen- und Sozialstruktur der BRD 1950 - 1970 (3 vols., Frankfurt: Verlag Marxistische Blaetter, 1973 ff.);

Projekt Klassenanalyse, Materialien zur Klassenstruktur der BRD (2 vols., Berlin: Verlag fuer das Studium der Arbeiterbewegung, 1973 ff.). Nicos Poulantzas also attempts a more differentiated Marxist class analysis, cf. his Les classes sociales dans le capitalisme aujourd'hui (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1974).

¹⁴The authors of the "Projekt Klassenanalyse" give a figure of 65.5% of the total labor force as the size of the working class in the FRG in 1970, while the IMSF study or the Tjadens arrive at values of 75.6% and 83.3% respectively, even though all groups used largely identical statistical materials.

¹⁵This is done, for example, by Shivji, loc. cit..

¹⁶A possible economic conflict of interest between both groups, e.g. as far as food prices are concerned, is simply rejected by Shivji without giving any further reasons (op. cit., pp. 116 ff.). If he refers, which is somewhat unclear, only to peasants at the subsistence level and not to those producing cash crops, at least the question remains whether Marx' characterization of the ability to organize and the conflict potential of this group ("a sack of potatoes", Brumaire, loc. cit., p. 117) is not a more realistic one.

¹⁷This, it is usually claimed, goes back to Max Weber, cf., e.g., his Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1st ed., Tuebingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1922), pp. 177-180. Unfortunately Weber's discussion of the concept of class also remained incomplete. Many current approaches, however, which use multiple indices

reduce them again to a few central ones among which "occupation" usually is the most important, cf., e.g., Erwin K. Scheuch, "Sozialprestige und soziale Schichtung", in D. V. Glass and R. Koenig (eds.), Soziale Schichtung und soziale Mobilitaet (Koeln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1961). But the occupational qualification of a person alone still insufficiently defines his economic and social position. It is important to know, for example, whether a medical doctor is employed or self-employed, head of a large private hospital, or a member of the public health administration etc.

¹⁸The most comprehensive account of this process is, of course, Emile Durkheim's, De la Division du Travail Social (first published: Paris, 1893). But we do not imply here, as he does, any specific all-encompassing forms of "mechanical" or "organic" solidarity for different types of society which evolve in this process.

¹⁹The common distinction between "primary", "secondary" and "tertiary" sectors, which lumps together such diverse activities as agriculture and mining and quarrying in the first category, is not very useful for our purposes.

²⁰This is the term used, though in a somewhat different sense, by Gaetano Mosca, Elementi di Scienza Politica (1st ed., Bari, 1895), chapter XII.

²¹Cf. Hartmut Elsenhans, "Zur Rolle der Staatsklasse bei der Ueberwindung von Unterentwicklung", in Alfred Schmidt (ed.), Strategien gegen Unterentwicklung (Frankfurt: Campus, 1976), pp. 250-265.

²²Cf. Shivji, op. cit.

²³This is the term used by Geiger, loc. cit.

²⁴This is discussed, of course, in much of the "dependencia" literature. For a review of the African situation cf., e.g., Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, "The Political Economy of the African Peasantry and Modes of Production", in Gutkind and Wallerstein (eds.), op. cit., pp. 90-111.

²⁵These aspects are discussed, for example, by Claus Offe, "Politische Herrschaft und Klassenstrukturen", in Gisela Kress and Dieter Senghaas (eds.), Politikwissenschaft (Frankfurt: Europaeische Verlaganstalt, 1969), pp. 155-189.

²⁶For this point cf., e.g., Frank Parkin, "Strategies of Social Closure in Class Formation", in idem (ed.), The Social Analysis of Class Structure (London: Tavistock, 1974), pp. 1-18.

²⁷The sources and operationalizations employed for our analysis of the structural changes of Kenya's society are indicated in Chapter XIX and Appendix IV below.

²⁸The latter discusses, for example, some "typical" characters of certain ethnic groups, cf. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, book I, chapter 6, edition used here: (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1954), translation by Rex Warner.

²⁹Cf., e.g., Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (first edition: Cambridge/Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1954); or William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, How Nations See Each Other (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953).

³⁰Reviews of this literature can be found, e.g., in Burkart Holzner, Voelkerpsychologie (Wuerzburg: Holzner-Verlag, 1960); or Jean Miroglia, La Psychologie des Peuples (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958).

³¹Some studies in Germany before and after the "Third Reich" dealing with topics such as "Volkscharakter" and "Rassenseele" are particularly infamous in this respect. But writings of this kind were not unknown in other countries either.

³²More recent interpretations of these concepts are discussed, for example, by Alex Inkeles and Daniel J. Levinson, "National Character: The Study of Modal Personality and Socio-Cultural Systems", in Lindzey Gardner, Handbook of Social Psychology (Cambridge/Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969) vol. 4, pp. 418-506.

³³Cf., e.g., Herbert H. Hyman, Political Sozialization (New York: The Free Press, 1959); David Easton and Jack Dennis, Children in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969); or Kenneth Prewitt and Richard E. Dawson, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968).

³⁴For more comprehensive discussions of this subject cf. also Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Politische Kultur - Eine neue Dimension politikwissenschaftlicher Analyse (Munich: Verlag Ernst Voegel, 1972); Dennis Kavanagh, Political Culture (London: Macmillan, 1972); or Walter A. Rosenbaum, Political Culture (New York: Praeger, 1975).

³⁵Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", The Journal of Politics, vol. 18, no. 3 (Aug. 1956), pp. 391-409.

³⁶Ibid., p. 396.

³⁷Kroeber and Kluckhohn, for example, found 164 different definitions; cf. Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (New York: Random House, 1952).

³⁸Peter Nettl, Political Mobilization - A Sociological Analysis of Methods and Concepts (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 42 ff.

³⁹Cf. Lucian W. Pye, "Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture", Social Science Quarterly, vol. 53, no. 2 (Sept. 1972), pp. 285-296.

⁴⁰This definition thus excludes artifacts and other man-made or man-used objects of a more concrete nature which usually are included in the way the term "culture" has come to be used in anthropology, cf. Clyde Kluckhohn, "The Study of Culture" in Daniel Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell (eds.), The Policy Sciences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951), pp. 86-101.

⁴¹Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1969).

⁴²Ibid., p. 112.

⁴³Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics", in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261.

⁴⁴Cf. M. J. Rosenberg, "An Analysis of Affective-Cognitive Consistency", in M. J. Rosenberg, et al., (eds.), Attitude Organization and Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960).

⁴⁵Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (eds.), Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 58 ff..

⁴⁶For a discussion of this point cf. Martin Fischbein, "The Relationships Between Beliefs, Attitudes and Behavior", in Shel Feldman (ed.), Cognitive Consistency (New York: Academic Press, 1966), pp. 200-226.

⁴⁷Some very cogent points of criticism concerning both the more general concept of political culture and some specific studies dealing with the German case can be found, for example, in Jakob Schissler, Politische Kultur und Politische Struktur, unpublished ms. A critique of some aspects of Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963; paperback edition, Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), can be found in Stein Rokkan, "Cross-national survey research: historical, analytical and substantive contexts", in idem et al., Comparative Survey Analysis (The Hague: Mouton, 1969), in particular pp. 37 ff..

⁴⁸For this distinction cf. also Berg-Schlosser, Politische Kultur..., loc. cit., chapter 1.

⁴⁹This is also one of the main points of criticism raised against some implicit assumptions in the study by Almond and Verba who tend to equate the somewhat idealized

concept of the "civic culture" with the concrete American situation.

⁵⁰This is largely done, for example, by Seymour M. Lipset, The First New Nation (New York: Doubleday, 1963) with regard to the values of "achievement" and "equality" in the political development of the United States, or with regard to a "Lockean" concept of "liberty" by Donald J. Devine, The Political Culture of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).

⁵¹Pye, "Culture and Political Science", loc.cit., p. 296.

⁵²Seymour M. Lipset, The First New Nation, loc. cit.; and Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy - A Study of Norway (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

⁵³Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 14 ff.. A similar distinction is taken up by Rosenbaum when he speaks of some "core components" of the concept of political culture, cf. idem, op. cit., pp. 6 ff..

⁵⁴Cf. their questionnaires which are appended to the hardbound edition.

⁵⁵Our substitution.

⁵⁶Inkeles and Levinson, op. cit., p. 447.

⁵⁷We have discussed this more extensively in Berg-Schlosser, et al., Einfuehrung ..., loc. cit., pp. 21 ff..

⁵⁸This definition combines elements from Max Weber, cf., e.g., his Politics as a Vocation, (in the edition we used, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1958), p. 8; David Easton, cf. his "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems", World Politics, vol. IX (April 1957), p. 383 ff.; and some conflict theorists such as Georg Simmel, Lewis Coser and Ralf Dahrendorf; for Dahrendorf cf. "Zur Theorie und Analyse von Konflikten", in idem, Konflikt und Freiheit, (München: Piper, 1972), pp. 11 ff.

⁵⁹Cf., e.g., Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution - Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in New States", in idem (ed.) Old Societies and New States (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 105-157.

⁶⁰Cf. Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics", APSR, vol. 58 (June 1964), pp. 361-381.

⁶¹Cf., e.g., D. R. Matthews and J. W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966).

⁶²Cf. Almond and Verba, op. cit.; or Matthews and Prothro, op. cit.

⁶³This is a major variable discussed in most of the American election studies: cf. Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960).

⁶⁴Cf. Almond and Verba, op. cit.

⁶⁵In addition to the sources mentioned here, some more "operational" measures of different kinds of variables can be found in the collections of attitude scales published by the Institute of Social Research of the University of

Michigan; cf. John P. Robinson, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Kendra S. Head, Measures of Political Attitudes (1968); John P. Robinson, Robert Athanasiou, and Kendra S. Head, Measures of Occupational Attitudes and Occupational Characters (1969); and John P. Robinson, and Philipp R. Shaver, Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes (1969).

⁶⁶Cf. Erwin K. Scheuch, "The Cross-Cultural Use of Sample Surveys: Problems of Comparability", in Stein Rokkan (ed.), Comparative Research across Cultures and Nations (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), pp. 176-209; or Frederick W. Frey, "Cross-Cultural Survey Research in Political Science", in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner (eds.), The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 173-294.

⁶⁷Similar procedures are discussed, for example, in William M. O'Barr, David H. Spain, and Mark A. Tessler (eds.), Survey Research in Africa (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

⁶⁸Our total operating budget in Kenya (excluding our own living expenses, but including all costs for translations, interviewers, travels within the country, board and lodging outside Nairobi for the interviewers and us, paper, printing costs, photocopying, clip-boards, office material, etc.) amounted to DM 13,200.00, financed by a grant from the "Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft" (DFG), Bonn-Bad Godesberg. Compared with similar undertakings (an inclusion of questions amounting to 15 minutes of interview time on the average in the "ZUMA-BUS", the joint annual survey conducted by the Survey Research Center at Mannheim, presently costs DM 39,000.00, this

really was a "shoestring"-budget. The processing of our data at the Survey Research Center of the University of California at Berkeley then was supported by a further grant of \$ 2,000.00 from the Dean of the Graduate Division there. This was to cover all expenses for coding, keypunching, "cleaning" of the data, etc., but it still made necessary the active and "free" full-time engagement of my wife for several months. The actual computer time was provided free of charge by the Department of Political Science at Berkeley and the University of Augsburg.

⁶⁹ For further specifications of our sample see the "Methodological Appendix" below.

⁷⁰ See also the introductory remarks to Appendix II below.

⁷¹ More detailed comments on different procedures of variable transformation and analysis, index and scale construction, etc. are also given in the "Methodological Appendix".

CHAPTER II

¹ Cf., e.g., Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method", APSR (Sept. 1971), pp. 682-693.

² Cf. ibid., p. 691.

³ For a description of the social organization of Kenya's main ethnic groups see Part Two below.

⁴ For a definition of "caste" cf., e.g., Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1922), pp. 636 f.

⁵See also our discussion of the "objective" dimension of the social bases of politics in Chapter I above.

⁶Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1974 (Nairobi, 1974), pp. 2 ff..

⁷Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1974 (Nairobi, 1975), p. 2.

⁸Ibid., p. 117.

⁹Cf., e.g., Roland Oliver, and Gervase Matthew (eds.), History of East Africa, vol. I (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), chapter VI, in particular pp. 171 ff..

¹⁰Strictly speaking, these terms only designate common linguistic features of these groups and not necessarily any further-reaching social or political bonds. Among linguists there has been a considerable controversy about the proper use of the term "Nilotic" and the corresponding notion of "Nilo-Hamitic" which is used, e.g., for the Kalenjin peoples, the Maasai, etc.. Tucker and Bryan maintain the usefulness of this distinction (cf. Archibald N. Tucker and Margaret A. Bryan, Linguistic Analysis: The Non-Bantu Languages of North-Eastern Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), whereas Greenberg regards both "Nilotic" and "Nilo-Hamitic" as a common "Nilotic" sub-group of the "Eastern-Sudanic" category in his classification of African languages, cf. Joseph H. Greenberg, "The Languages of Africa", International Journal of American Linguistics, Part II, 29, I (1963). In recent years, Greenberg's usage, who further distinguishes between "Western Nilotic" (e.g. the Luo), "Southern Nilotic" (e.g. the Kalenjin), and "Eastern Nilotic" (e.g. the Maasai) sub-groups, seems to

have become the more accepted one. For this point cf. also Bernd Heine, "Sprachen und Sprachprobleme in Kenia", in Walter Leifer (ed.), Kenia (Tuebingen: Erdmann-Verlag, 1977), pp. 251-267.

¹¹For the sake of convenience we employ here and in the rest of this study only the roots of the common names for Kenya's linguistic and ethnic groups and thus omit the more correct, but for an unprepared reader somewhat complicated prefixes of the different African languages.

¹²Cf. C.W.B. Huntingford, "The Peopling of the Interior of East Africa by its Modern Inhabitants", in Oliver and Matthew (eds.), loc. cit., chapter III, pp. 58-93.

¹³The use of the term "tribe" also has been disputed in recent years both by anthropologists who want to give it a more precise analytical meaning, cf. J. Helm (ed.), Essays on the Problem of Tribe: Proceedings of the 1967 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Society (Seattle: University Press, 1968), and by members of these groups who resent the notion of "primitiveness" which it often implies. For our purposes we, therefore, prefer the terms "ethnic groups" or "peoples" in most instances where we refer to "traditional ethnic-linguistic units", even though these groups may differ greatly in terms of their internal cohesion and the delineation of their outside boundaries.

¹⁴Republic of Kenya, Population Census 1969, vol. I (Nairobi, 1970), pp. I f..

¹⁵Cf., e.g., the respective "country profiles" in Donald G. Morrison et al., Black Africa - A Comparative Handbook (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 177 ff.

¹⁶See also the projections in Part Five below.

¹⁷See also our "District Development Index" in Appendix III below.

¹⁸In this formula the means of the two highest values on four indices of modernity (radio audience, literacy, work force in non-agricultural occupations, and urbanization) are multiplied by 1.25 to obtain a single measure for "exposure to modernity". Rates of change in this index over time then give a measure for the annual average rate of "social mobilization". Although this kind of measurement is somewhat arbitrary and the quality of its statistical bases remains doubtful for many countries, it can serve, faute de mieux, as a useful index for purposes of international comparisons. Cf. Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilisation and Political Development", APSR (Sept. 1961), pp. 493-514.

¹⁹Ibid, p. 508.

²⁰Ibid, pp. 509 ff..

²¹A good summary of this aspect is provided, for example, by Steve Langdon, "The Political Economy of Dependence: Note toward Analysis of Multinational Corporations in Kenya", Journal of Eastern African Research and Development, 4, (2), 1974. The most comprehensive account focusing on this problem is Leys, op. cit..

²²Republic of Kenya, Development Plan 1966-70, p. 118.

²³Idem, Development Plan 1970-74, p. 163

²⁴Idem, Development Plan 1974-78, p. 167.

²⁵Idem, Statistical Abstract 1976, p. 247.

²⁶Ibid., p. 243.

²⁷National Christian Council of Kenya, Who Controls

Industry in Kenya? (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), p. 135.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 144 ff..

²⁹See also our respective "class analysis" for the year 1970 in Part Five below.

³⁰The available figures show that post-tax profits are in the vicinity of 20% per year for a great number of foreign-owned companies, in particular those which employ relatively capital-intensive methods of production and which enjoy protected, often monopolistic, market conditions. For further data cf., e.g., William J. House, "Market Structure and Industry Performance: the Case of Kenya", Discussion Paper No. 116 (Department of Economics, University of Nairobi, 1971, mimeo); or Leys, op. cit., pp. 136 ff..

³¹International Labour Office, Employment, Incomes and Equality - A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya (Geneva, 1972), pp. 454 ff..

³²These criteria of "underdevelopment" are particularly emphasized by Samir Amin, for example, cf. his Le developpement inegal - Essai sur les formations sociales du capitalisme peripherique (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1973).

³³Cf., e.g., the Input-Output Table 1967, the only one available, Republic of Kenya (Central Bureau of Statistics, Nairobi, 1972).

³⁴Cf. in particular the writings of L.S.B. Leakey and of his wife and son, e.g. his Stone Age Africa (Oxford, 1936).

³⁵Cf., e.g., Periplus of the Erythrean Sea dating

probably from A.D. 110, edited by M. Frisk (Goteborg, 1927).

³⁶An account of this period is given by G.S.P. Freeman-Grenville, "The Coast, 1498-1840", in Oliver and Mathew, op. cit., pp. 129-168

³⁷Cf. Roland Oliver, "Discernible Developments in the Interior c. 1500-1840", ibid., pp. 169-211.

³⁸The political events of this period are described in Oliver and Mathew, op. cit., chapters IX and XI; for developments along the coast cf. also A. I. Salim, The Swahili-Speaking Peoples of Kenya's Coast 1895-1965 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973).

³⁹The later claims on large parts of western Kenya by President Amin of Uganda are also based on these previously existing colonial administrative divisions, cf. The Weekly Review, February 23, 1976, p. 3. Maps showing the evolution of these boundaries can be found in Survey of Kenya, National Atlas of Kenya (third edition, Nairobi: 1970), p. 85.

⁴⁰Accounts of this period can be found in Vincent Harlow and E. M. Chilver (eds), History of East Africa (vol. 2, London: Oxford University Press, 1962), chapters I, V, and VI; George Bennett, Kenya - A Political History - The Colonial Period (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); or Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. and John Nottingham, The Myth of Mau-Mau - Nationalism in Kenya (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1966), chapter I.

⁴¹Sir Charles Eliot, The East Africa Protectorate (London: 1905), p. 302.

⁴²For this episode cf. Bennet, op. cit., p. 13.

⁴³Statistical Abstract 1974, loc. cit., p. 13.

⁴⁴Figures by district are given in ibid., p. 117, see also our "District Development Index" in Appendix III below.

⁴⁵Cf. Report of the Kenya Land Commission, Cmd. 4556 (1934), chapter VI.

⁴⁶Cf. also Dirk Berg-Schlosser, The Distribution of Income and Education in Kenya: Causes and Potential Political Consequences (Munich: Weltforum-Verlag, 1970), pp. 12 ff..

⁴⁷The most comprehensive account of the development of Christianity in Kenya is still Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa (London: Longmans, 1952).

⁴⁸Cf. National Christian Council of Kenya, Kenya Churches Handbook (Kisumu: Evangel Publishing House, 1973), p. 160.

⁴⁹Practically all of East Africa's "Asians" have immigrated from the Indian sub-continent and thus they used to be called "Indians". Only after the separation of India and Pakistan in 1947 did the more general term "Asian" come into use.

⁵⁰Cf. Dharam P. Ghai and Yash P. Ghai (eds), Portrait of a Minority -Asians in East Africa (London: Oxford University Press, revised edition, 1970), p. 3.

⁵¹Statistical Abstract 1974, loc. cit., p. 12.

⁵²Strictly speaking, this was never a clearly defined

legal restriction. At least since 1908, however, under strong pressure from the European settlers, it was effectively carried out administrative policy (cf. Bennet, op. cit., p. 24).

⁵³Survey of Distribution 1966, in Statistical Abstract 1974, loc. cit., p. 68.

⁵⁴See also Part Five and Appendix IV below.

⁵⁵The extent of British penetration up to this time is illustrated in Map I in Harlow und Chilver, op. cit., facing p. 1.

⁵⁶Cf., e.g., John F. Middleton and D. Tait (eds.), Tribes without Rulers: Studies in African Segmentary Systems (London: Routledge, 1958); see also Part Five below.

⁵⁷Quoted in Bennett, op. cit., p. 14.

⁵⁸Quoted in Harlow and Chilver, op. cit., p. 35.

⁵⁹Quoted in Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit., p. 15.

⁶⁰Cf. Colonel R. Meinertzhagen, Kenya Diary: 1902-1906 (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1957).

⁶¹Cf. F. D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (first edition, London, 1922).

⁶²Quoted in Harlow and Chilver, op. cit., p. 39.

⁶³Cf. C.W. Hobley, Bantu Beliefs and Magic: With Particular Reference to the Kikuyu and Kamba Tribes of Kenya Colony (London: Frank Cass, 1967, first published 1922).

⁶⁴Harlow and Chilver, op. cit., p. 48

⁶⁵Quoted in ibid., p. 23.

⁶⁶The rupee was replaced by the East African shilling in 1919, cf. "A Note on East African Currency Equivalents",

in Harlow and Chilver, op. cit., Appendix III, p. 696.

⁶⁷Harlow and Chilver, op. cit., p. 231.

⁶⁸Cf. ibid., pp. 355 ff..

⁶⁹Quoted in ibid., p. 246.

⁷⁰Bennet, op. cit., pp. 45 ff..

⁷¹Norman Leys, Kenya (London, 1924), p. 195.

⁷²Harlow and Chilver, op. cit., pp. 226 and 238.

⁷³Harlow and Chilver, op. cit., p. 353.

⁷⁴Harry Thuku, An Autobiography of Harry Thuku

(London: Oxford University Press, 1970).

⁷⁵See also Part Two below.

⁷⁶Cf., e.g., the description of this custom and the discussion of its social function in Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mt. Kenya (London: Mercury Books, 1961; first published 1938), chapter VII, pp. 130 ff..

⁷⁷Cf. Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit., pp. 181 ff..

⁷⁸Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit., pp. 203 ff..

⁷⁹Statistical Abstract 1974, loc. cit., p. 13.

⁸⁰Bennett, op. cit., p. 127.

⁸¹Cf. Jeremy Murray-Brown, Kenyatta (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), chapter 20, pp. 255 ff.; or Montagu Slater, The Trial of Jomo Kenyatta (London, 1955).

⁸²Bennett, op. cit., p. 127

⁸³First-hand accounts of "Mau Mau" activities are, for example, Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, Mau Mau Detainee (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); and Waruhiu Itote, Mau Mau General (Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1967). The official report prepared for the government of the United Kingdom was F.D. Corfield, Historical Survey of the Origins

and Growth of Mau Mau, Cmnd. 1030 (1960).

⁸⁴Corfield, op. cit., p. 316.

⁸⁵Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit., p. 303.

⁸⁶R.J.M. Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1955).

⁸⁷Cf. M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

⁸⁸Bennet, op. cit., pp. 106 ff..

⁸⁹Cf. G. Engholm, "African Elections in Kenya", in Five Elections in Africa (Oxford, 1960).

⁹⁰A comprehensive account of these elections is George Bennett and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960-1961 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

⁹¹Bennett, op. cit., p. 157.

⁹²Republic of Kenya, The Constitution of Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1969), chapter VI, sections 87-98.

⁹³Statistical Abstract 1974, loc. cit., p. 13. See also chapter XVII below.

⁹⁴Republic of Kenya, Development Plan 1974-1978, Part I (Nairobi, 1974), pp. 56 ff., cf. also Colin Leys, op. cit., chapter 3, pp. 63 ff..

⁹⁵Cf. Leys, Colin, op. cit., pp. 57 ff..

⁹⁶This process is also discussed by Gary Wasserman, Politics of Decolonization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

⁹⁷Kenya African National Union, What a KANU Government Offers You (Nairobi, 1963).

⁹⁸Republic of Kenya, African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya, Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 (Nairobi: 1965).

⁹⁹In the "Manifesto" statements such as "we aim to build a country where men and women are motivated by a sense of service and not driven by a greedy desire for personal gain" (p. 1) and "we intend following a liberal policy with regard to foreign capital" (p. 21), each qualified by sentences as "the Marxist theory of class warfare has no relevance to Kenya's situation" (p. 11) and "investments must be made in accordance to Kenya's interests" (p. 21) still can be found side by side.

¹⁰⁰There have been three major development plans so far, covering the periods 1966-1970, 1970-1974 and 1974-1978; a first preliminary version for the period 1964-1970 was soon discarded.

¹⁰¹Statistical Abstract 1974, loc. cit., pp. 42 and 46.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 49.

¹⁰³Ibid., pp. 242 ff..

¹⁰⁴Cf. Richard Sandbrook, "The State and the Development of Trade Unionism" in Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson and John Okumu (eds.) Development Administration - The Kenyan Experience (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 252-295; or for a more personal account of one of the main actors, Clement K. Lubembe, The Inside of Labor Movement in Kenya (Nairobi: Equatorial Publishers, 1968).

¹⁰⁵A comparative analysis of economic policies in

East Africa also can be found in Ann Seidman, Comparative Development Strategies in East Africa (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972).

¹⁰⁶For the use of this term cf. John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (revised edition, New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1967).

¹⁰⁷See Parts Three and Five.

¹⁰⁸Kenyatta's statement on the 1964 mutiny is reprinted in the useful collection of documents by Cherry Gertzel, Maure Goldschmidt and Donald Rothchild (eds), Government and Politics in Kenya (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), pp. 562 ff..

¹⁰⁹In 1972 Kenya's total armed forces numbered 6,730 of whom 6,000 were in the army, 250 in the navy, and 480 in the air force. The para-military "General Service Unit" counted 1,800 members at this time, cf. Colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record 1972-73 (London: Rex Collings, 1973), p. B 156.

¹¹⁰In particular Act Nr. 18 of 1966 including amendments to the "Preservation of Public Security Act" (Chap. 57).

¹¹¹The terms "radical" and "conservative" are also employed by Cherry Gertzel in her account of this period, The Politics of Independent Kenya (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1970), in particular pp. 54 ff..

¹¹²Some interesting insights into these relationships are provided by the account of the then United States Ambassador to Kenya, William Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), the very title of which already indicates some of the preoccupations of American

foreign policy at this time.

¹¹³For an analysis of this "Little General Election" cf. Gertzel, op. cit., chapters 3 and 4 (the latter is written with John Okumu).

¹¹⁴Cf. Goran Hyden and Colin Leys, "Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems: The Case of Kenya and Tanzania", British Journal of Political Science, Vol II, No. 4 (1972), pp. 261-292.

¹¹⁵Among the 21 members of the cabinet there were 7 Kikuyu (including the President and, as an ex officio member, the Attorney General), 4 Luo (although of somewhat lower stature than their predecessors), 2 Kalenjin (including the Vice President), 2 Kamba, 2 from Embu/Meru, 1 Giriama, 1 Taita, and 1 Luyia. If the assistant ministers were also included, this "coalition" would be even more widespread, comprising also representatives of the pastoralist peoples and the Arab and Asian communities, cf. Africa Contemporary Record 1970-71, loc. cit., p. B 116.

¹¹⁶See also Chapter III below.

¹¹⁷Africa Contemporary Record 1972-73, loc. cit., pp. B 153 f..

¹¹⁸The Sunday Times, September 29, 1974.

¹¹⁹Official reports speak of only one student who was injured when "he jumped from a window", but some reliable eyewitnesses can confirm this fact.

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¹²⁰These elections are also discussed in Berg-Schlosser, "Wahlen in Kenia - Demokratie in einem Entwicklungsland?", Afrika Spektrum, no. 1 (1975), pp. 55-66.

121Kariuki, op. cit..

122Cf., e.g., the revealing interview he gave to the Sunday Nation in November 1966, reprinted in Gertzel et. al. (eds.), op. cit., pp. 78 ff..

123The Weekly Review (Kenya's newly founded weekly news magazine, edited by Hilary Ng'weno), March 24, 1975.

124These events are well covered, providing a great deal of background information as well, by The Weekly Review for this period.

125The background of these developments is discussed, for example, by Volker Matthies, Der Grenzkonflikt Somalias mit Aethiopien und Kenia - Analyse eines zwischenstaatlichen Konflikts in der Dritten Welt (Hamburg: Institut fuer Afrika-Kunde, 1977).

126Bennett, op. cit., chapters 6 and 7.

127A documentation of the efforts leading to a more integrated East African Community (up to 1967) can be found in Donald Rothchild (ed.), The Politics of Integration (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968).

128For the use of this term cf., e.g., Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

129Cf. The Weekly Review, September 15, 1975.

PART TWO: THE HORIZONTAL PATTERN OF SOCIETY

¹Among the better ones are, for example, Charles W. Hobley, Ethnology of the Akamba and Other East African Tribes

(London: Cambridge University Press, 1910); or M. Merker, Die Maasai - Ethnographische Monographie eines ostafrikanischen Semitenvolkes (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1904).

²These include, for example, C. Cagnolo, The Akikuyu - Their Customs, Traditions and Folklore (English Translation, Nyeri Kenya: The Mission Printing School, 1933); or Pasquale Crazzolaro, The Lwoo (3 vols., Verona: Museum Combonianum, 1950).

³Cagnolo, op. cit., p. VIII.

⁴Ibid., p. 189.

⁵Cf. e.g., Gerhard Lindblom, The Akamba in British East Africa (Uppsala: Appelberg, 1920); Guenther Wagner, The Bantu of North Kavirondo (2 vols., London: Oxford University Press, 1944 and 1956); or J.G. Peristiany, The Social Institutions of the Kipsigis (London: George Routledge, 1939).

⁶This method is described more fully in the common textbooks, cf., e.g., Claire Selltiz, et. al., Research Methods in Social Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1959), pp. 200 ff..

⁷Daryll Ford (ed.), Ethnographic Survey of Africa (London: International African Institute, various years). In the series on East Central Africa Parts III, IV, V, VIII, and XII contain material on peoples living in Kenya.

⁸Part XI of the Ethnographic Survey, The Eastern Lacustrine Bantu by Margaret Chase Fallers deals mainly with the Ganda, Soga and some smaller groups in neighboring Uganda.

⁹The section on the Kenya Luo in part IV of the Ethnographic survey, The Nilotes of the Sudan and Uganda by Audrey J. Butt is rather short and incomplete, based on very little first-hand material.

¹⁰Cf., e.g., Ngugi wa Thiongo's novels Weep not, Child (London: Heinemann, 1964); and The River Between (London: Heinemann, 1965); or Henry ole Kulet, Is it Possible? (Nairobi: Longman, 1971); and To Become a Man (Nairobi: Longman, 1972).

¹¹The first Kenyan to do so was, of course, Jomo Kenyatta, cf. his Facing Mt. Kenya, loc. cit. Kenyatta is also author of a brief booklet My people of Kikuyu (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1966). More recent authors are, for example, Simeon H. Ominde, cf. his early booklet The Luo Girl (London: Macmillan, 1952); Bethwell A. Ogot, A History of the Southern Luo (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967); or Kivuto Ndeti, Elements of Akamba Life (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972).

¹²This is true for example, for the studies by Merker, Cagnolo, etc. mentioned above.

¹³Cf., e.g., the article by C. W. Hobley, "Anthropological Studies in Kavirondo and Nandi", Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. XXXIII (1903), pp. 324-354; Gerhard Lindblom, "Kamba Riddles, Proverbs and Songs", Archives d'Etudes Orientales, Vol. 20, 3, Uppsala (1934); or E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "Luo Tribes and Clans", Rhodes-Livingstone

Journal, 7 (1949), pp. 24-40.

¹⁴As, e.g., the important dissertation on the Maasai by Alan H. Jacobs, "The Traditional Political Organization of the Pastoral Maasai" (Nuffield College, Oxford, 1965); and most of the conference and research papers issued on various occasions.

¹⁵For specifications of our sample and a discussion of other methodological aspects of our survey see also Chapter I above and the "Methodological Appendix" below.

¹⁶Cf. Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday, 1960); or Deutsch, op. cit.

¹⁷Cf., e.g., United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), "The concept of development and its measurement", International Social Science Review, No. 2 (New York: 1970), pp. 1 ff..

CHAPTER III

¹The correct designations, in their own language, are Mugikuyu (pl. Agikuyu) for the people, Ugikuyu for the country and Gikikuyu for the language. These prefixes are very similar to the corresponding ones in Swahili: Mkikuyu (pl. Wakikuyu), Ukikuyu and Kikikuyu.

²See the next chapter below.

³W.S. and K. Routledge, With a Prehistoric People: The Akikuyu (London, 1910), p. 2.

⁴For the exact specifications of this sample see also our "Methodological Appendix" below. In order to avoid an

impression of "false accuracy" by quoting percentages, etc. up to the last decimal point we report only rounded figures wherever this seems appropriate. Despite the limitations of our sample, we do feel that the reported results by and large reflect a correct order of magnitude for the total population.

⁵For any kind of agricultural holding, even if only a garden, this is the common Swahili term which has come into use in most parts of Kenya.

⁶The truly large farms of the former "scheduled areas", some of which are also situated in the present districts of Kiambu and Nyandarua, are, of course, a different matter.

⁷Cf., e.g., Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul (eds), Socialism in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: East African Publishing House, 2 vols, 1972).

⁸Kenyatta, op. cit., p. 21.

⁹See also chapter II above.

¹⁰Cf. John Middleton and Gretha Kershaw, The Kikuyu and Kamba of Kenya: The Central Tribes of the North-Eastern Bantu (London: International African Institute, revised edition: 1965), pp. 46 ff.. This study is part of the ethnographic survey of Africa, loc. cit.

¹¹Cf. ibid., pp. 20 f.

¹²There are also a number of minor ones which seem to be branches of the original clans.

¹³Kenyatta, op. cit., p. 6. The spelling of these names differs somewhat among the various authors, but they all agree that these are the main clans. These clan-names were also mentioned most often by our respondents. A tenth

main clan, Aicakamuyu, seems to have been added at a later time, bringing the total number of main clans to "full nine" ("kenda muiyuru") i.e. ten, as the Kikuyu put it.

¹⁴Routledge, op. cit., p. 20

¹⁵Kenyatta, op. cit., pp. 33 ff..

¹⁶Middleton and Kershaw, op. cit., p. 64.

¹⁷Descriptions of social and political structures of this kind can also be found, for example, in M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.), African Political Systems (London: Oxford University Press, first edition, 1940); Middleton and Tait, op. cit.; or Lucy Mair, Primitive Government, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962). For the Kikuyu cf. also H.E. Lambert, Kikuyu Social and Political Institutions (London: Oxford University Press, 1956); Louis S.B. Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu (London: Methuen, 1952); or Godfrey Muriuki, A History of the Kikuyu 1500 - 1900 (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1974).

¹⁸This term has become the standard expression in social anthropology for a status-group based on age, i.e. the abstract "rank" of such a group. An "age-set", on the other hand, is the concrete community of co-equals passing through the different "age-grades", while an "age-group" is a somewhat looser term used by some authors for either of the above meanings.

¹⁹Kenyatta, op. cit., pp. 140 f.

²⁰See also chapter XVII below.

²¹Cf. the account by Kenyatta in his My People of Kikuyu, loc. cit., pp. 27 ff..

CHAPTER IV

¹ The correct designations, in their own language, are Mukamba (pl. Akamba) for the people, Ukamba or Ukambani for the country and Kikamba for the language.

² The most important sources on traditional Kamba society are: Charles W. Hobley, Ethnology of the Akamba and other East African Tribes (London: Cambridge University Press, 1910); idem, Bantu Beliefs and Magic (first edition, London, 1922); new edition, London: Frank Cass, 1967); Gerhard Lindblom, The Akamba in British East Africa (Uppsala: Appelberg, 1920); Middleton and Kershaw, op. cit.; Kivuto Ndeti, Elements of Akamba Life, op. cit.; D.J. Penwill, Kamba Customary Law (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, first printed 1951, reprinted 1972).

³ Cf. Republic of Kenya, Regional Physical Development Plan, Eastern Province (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1970).

⁴ Middleton and Kershaw, op. cit., pp. 78 f.

⁵ Ndeti, op. cit., pp. 68 ff.

⁶ This information was obtained from a number of reliable sources, but there are no official statistics (for understandable reasons) of the actual ethnic composition of the armed forces or of the civil service.

⁷ John S. Mbiti, Akamba Stories, p. 8; other sources give 25 as an approximate number, cf. Middleton and Kershaw, op. cit., p. 72; or Ndeti, op. cit., p. 70. The latter also makes a distinction between "major" mbai which he calls "clans" and "minor" ones which he refers to as "lineages".

⁸ Major collections of such stories are "biti, op. cit.

and Gerhard Lindblom, Kamba Folklore (2 vols., Uppsala: Appelberg, 1928 and 1935).

⁹Emile Durkheim, Les Formes Elementaires de la Vie Religieuse (first edition, Paris, 1912); some of the limitations and shortcomings of Durkheim's theory are discussed, for example, by E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Theories of Primitive Religion (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965); or William J. Goode, Religion Among the Primitives (New York: The Free Press, first edition, 1951).

¹⁰H.E. Lambert, "Land Tenure among the Akamba", African Studies, 6, 3 (1947), p. 131.

¹¹Ndeti, op. cit., p. 74.

¹²Cf. Middleton and Kershaw, op. cit., pp. 74 f.; or Ndeti, op. cit., pp. 84 ff..

¹³Ndeti, op. cit., p. 104.

¹⁴Cf. Gideon Cyrus Mutiso, "Machakos: Intra-Ethnic Political Evolution", in idem Kenya - Politics, Policy and Society (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975), pp. 212 ff.

CHAPTER V

¹Some of the most important early sources on these peoples are E. Damman, Beitraege aus arabischen Quellen zur Kenntnis des negerischen Afrika (Kiel, 1929); C. Dundas, "Native Laws of some Bantu tribes of East Africa", Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, L I (1921), pp. 217-278; J.B. Griffiths, "Glimpses of a Nyika Tribe: Waduruma",

Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (1935), pp. 85-97; J.L. Krapf, Reisen in Ost-Afrika (2 vols., Stuttgart, 1858); Alice Werner, "The Bantu Coast Tribes of the East African Protectorate", Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 45 (1915) pp. 326-354. The most comprehensive account is A.H.J. Prins, The Coastal Tribes of the North-Eastern Bantu, Ethnographic Survey of Africa, Part III (London: International African Institute, 1952). Two more recent studies are Arthur M. Champion, The Agiryama of Kenya (London: Royal Anthropological Institute, Occasional paper no. 25, 1967); and David J. Parkins, Palms, Wine and Witnesses (San Francisco: Chandler, 1972).

²This designation can be interpreted to be a reference to the traditional form of fortified settlements ("kaya") of these groups, see also below.

³For classifications of this kind cf. P.G. Murdock, Africa: Its Peoples and their Culture and History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959); or Joseph H. Greenberg, Studies in African Linguistic Classifications (New Haven: Compass, 1955).

⁴This is the official census figure of 1969 for those who identify themselves as members of this category. Other estimates of the size of this group are much higher (e.g. 45,000 in Kenya for 1948, about half of which were of Arab extraction, cf. Prins, Swahili-speaking Peoples..., loc cit., pp. 20 ff.). These may also include some other "de-tribalized" and "swahili-ized" members of other ethnic groups.

⁵The best account of these groups is A.H.J. Prins,

The Swahili-speaking Peoples of Zanzibar and the East African Coast, Ethnographic Survey of Africa, East Central Africa, Part XII (London: International African Institute, 1967).

A recent history of these peoples is A.I. Salim, Swahili-speaking Peoples of Kenya's Coast 1895-1965 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973).

⁶Again, for the sake of clarity and convenience, we employ only the most common designations, using only the roots and not the proper prefixes of the names of these groups here. Thus the Giriama, for example, are called more correctly "Agiriama" (sing: "Mgiriama"), their language "Kigiriama" and their area of residence "Ugiriama".

⁷Kenya Population Census 1969, vol. I, op. cit... Since these groups are not listed separately in the census, the approximate order of magnitude for the size of each group has been derived from the listings by location.

⁸For these relationships cf., e.g., also the "linguistic tree of the Bantu languages" in Ndeti, op. cit., p. 37.

⁹Cf. Republic of Kenya, Regional Physical Development Plan, Coast Province (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1971), chapter I.

¹⁰Cf. V. Baumann, Usambara und seine Nachbargebiete, (Berlin, 1891), pp. 148 ff..

¹¹Cf. Regional Physical Development Plan..., op. cit., pp. 44 ff..

¹²Among the Giriama this term refers to the single family homestead.

¹³Regional Physical Development Plan ..., op. cit., pp. 80 ff..

¹⁴Prins, The Coastal Tribes..., op. cit., pp. 84 ff..

¹⁵Cf. Regional Physical Development Plan ..., op. cit., pp. 86 ff..

¹⁶Prins, op. cit., p. 87.

¹⁷Prins, op. cit., pp. 60 ff..

¹⁸There is, however, a certain diffuseness of reference in the use of this term. In some cases it may include a "clan" or even a whole "tribe", in others it comprises only sub-lineages or even just single homesteads, cf. Parkins, op. cit., pp. 22 f..

¹⁹Prins, op. cit., pp. 63 ff..

²⁰Parkins, op. cit., pp. 21 f..

²¹W.E. Taylor, Vocabulary of the Giriama language (London, 1887), pp. V ff..

²²Cf. Parkins, op. cit..

²³On this subject there is even less information in the available literature than on some of the other aspects of the lives of the Mijikenda peoples. For this reason we can only give a very broad outline here. Cf. also Prins, op. cit., pp. 78 ff..

²⁴Prins, op. cit., p. 82.

²⁵For political developments in this area, cf. also Salim, op. cit.; or Richard Stren, "Factional Politics and Central Control in Mombasa, 1960-1969", Canadian Journal of African Studies (Winter 1970), pp. 33-56.

CHAPTER VI

¹The "Bantu of North-Kavirondo" has formerly been the most common name for these peoples, which is also the title of the most comprehensive anthropological study of this group so far, cf. Guenther Wagner, The Bantu of North-Kavirondo (2 vols., London: Oxford University Press, 1949 and 1956). This name, however, apparently coined by Swahili traders, has no meaning in any of the Luyia dialects.

²The correct designations, in their own language, are: Omuluyia or Muluyia (sing.) and Abaluyia (pl.) for the people, Luluyia for the language, and Buluyia for the country. The term "Abaluyia" literally means "those of the same tribe". Different spellings of this word (e.g. Luhyia, Luya, etc.) are also in use. As was the case with the other peoples, here again we employ the spelling which has become most commonly accepted in recent years.

³The Weekly Review, February 23, 1976, pp. 3 ff..

⁴These figures are taken from the listings by location of the 1969 census and give an approximate order of magnitude for each group. They do not include those who have migrated to other parts of Kenya, so that the total number for each group is still somewhat higher.

⁵Cf. Republic of Kenya, Regional Physical Development Plan, Nyanza Province (which also includes an assessment of Western Province, Nairobi: Government Printer, 1970), pp. I-1 ff..

⁶Wagner, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 75 ff..

⁷Ibid., vol. I, pp. 41 f..

⁸Wagner counted more than 60 among the Bukusu, but only 9 among the Idhako, cf. Wagner, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 58 ff.. The Bukusu are the only sub-group among whom clans and lineages did not constitute a territorial unit. For this point cf. also Jan J. De Wolf, Differentiation and Integration in Western Kenya (The Hague: Mouton, 1977), p. 129.

⁹Wagner lists 45 lineages for the 9 clans of the Idakho who in 1932 numbered 6,837 persons, which thus means an average of 762 per clan and of 152 per lineage.

¹⁰Wagner, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 334 ff.. Some of the special features of the Tiriki are also discussed by Walter H. Sangree, "The Bantu Tiriki of Western Kenya", in James L. Gibbs (ed.), Peoples of Africa (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 41-79; and idem, Age, Prayer and Politics in Tiriki, Kenya (London: Oxford University Press, 1966).

¹¹cf. Wagner, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 76 ff., see also his contribution "The Political Organization of the Bantu of Kavirondo" in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, op. cit., pp. 197 ff..

¹²cf. John Osogo, The Baluyia (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 63 ff.

¹³Gideon S. Were, A History of the Abaluyia of Western Kenya, c. 1500-1930 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), pp. 131 ff..

¹⁴cf. Lucy Mair, op. cit.; or Lloyd A. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).

CHAPTER VII

¹The proper designation in their own language is Joluo (sing: Jaluo) for the people and Dholuo for the language.

²For a more comprehensive discussion of these groups cf. Audrey Butt, The Nilotes of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Uganda (London: International African Institute, 1952), which is part IV of the section on East Central Africa of the Ethnographic Survey of Africa, op. cit. The most comprehensive bibliography on the Kenya Luo is Carole DuPre, The Luo of Kenya - An Annotated Bibliography (ICR Studies 3, Washington, D.C.: Institute for Cross-Cultural Research, 1968). Other major studies are: J. Pasquale Crazzolaro, The Lwoo, loc. cit.; Okot p' Bitek, Religion of the Central Luo (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1971); and Bethwell A. Ogot, History of the Southern Luo (vol. I, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967).

³Cf. also Republic of Kenya, Physical Regional Development Plan - Nyanza Province (Nairobi, 1970).

⁴Cf. E.E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer (London: Clarendon Press, 1941).

⁵Cf. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1974, op. cit., p. 125.

⁶A good assessment of the problems and prospects of ^{be} agricultural development in Luo country can found in John C. De Wilde, Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), vol. II, pp. 121 ff.. The earlier period is well covered in Hugh Fearn,

An African Economy: A Study of the economic Development of the Nyanza Province of Kenya, 1903 - 1953 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

⁷ Cf. Gordon Wilson, Luo Customary Law (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1956).

⁸ Cf. William L. Sytek, "A History of Land Consolidation in Central Nyanza, 1956 - 1962", Conference Papers, East African Institute of Social Research (Makerere University College, Kampala, 1966).

⁹ Cf. also Michael Whisson, Change and Challenge - A Study of the Social and Economic Changes among the Kenya Luo (Nairobi: National Christian Council of Churches, 1964), pp. 96 ff..

¹⁰ Cf. Fearn, op. cit., in particular tables 18 and 19, pp. 197 f. .

¹¹ de Wilde, op. cit., p. 141.

¹² Cf. Fearn, op. cit., or Whisson, op. cit..

¹³ Cf. Simeon H. Ominde, The Luo Girl - From Infancy to Marriage (London: Macmillan, 1952), p. 55.

¹⁴ Cf. also S.H. Ominde, Land and Population Movements in Kenya (London: Heinemann, 1968). For a discussion of social problems caused by long distance migration cf. also Whisson, op. cit., pp. 75 ff..

¹⁵ The "air lift" of Kenyan students to the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which was financed by American funds and which was mainly organized by Tom Mboya on the Kenyan side, was an important factor in this regard.

¹⁶ For this point cf. Aidan W. Southall, "Lineage

Formation Among the Luo", Memorandum XXVI, International African Institute (London: Oxford University Press, 1952).

¹⁷ Cf. also E.E. Evans-Pritchard, "Luo Tribes and Clans", Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, 7 (1949), pp. 24 - 40, reprinted in idem, The Position of Women in Primitive Societies and Other Essays in Social Anthropology (London: Farber & Farber, 1965), pp. 205 - 227.

¹⁸ Cf. Southall, op. cit., pp. 24 f..

¹⁹ Cf. E.E. Evans-Pritchard, "The Nuer of the Southern Sudan", in Fortes and Evans Pritchard, op. cit., pp. 272 ff..

²⁰ Cf., e.g., the conflicting statements by Evans-Pritchard in his "Luo Tribes and Clans", loc. cit. and Bethwell A. Ogot, "British Administration in the Central Nyanza District of Kenya, 1900 - 60", Journal of African History, 4 (2, 1963), pp. 249 - 273.

²¹ Cf. the statement by Michael Whisson quoted in DuPré, op. cit., p. 42.

²² Cf. Evans Pritchard, "The Nuer of the Southern Sudan", loc. cit..

²³ Whisson in DuPré, loc. cit..

CHAPTER VIII

¹ For a short description of the genesis of this term cf. Benjamin E. Kipkorir, The Marakwet of Kenya (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973), pp. 70 ff..

² Cf. G.W.B. Huntingford, "The Nilo-Hamites: General Introduction", in idem, The Northern Nilo-Hamites (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, East Central Africa, Part VI, London: International African Institute, 1953), pp. 9 - 21. Cf. also Ian Q. Orchardson, The Kipsigis (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1961), or A.C. Hollis, The Nandi - Their Language and Folklore (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1909).

³ This term was used synonymously with the present term of "Kalenjin" during colonial times.

⁴ Cf. Republic of Kenya, Population Census 1969, vol. I, p. 69; the "Terik" are not listed separately by the census and the figure for Nyangori location of Western Province has been used here as an indication for the order of magnitude of this group, cf. ibid., p. 68.

⁵ Kipsigis (sing: Kipsigisin) is the correct (and their own!) designation for this people. In colonial times they were often referred to as "Lumbwa", a corruption of a Maasai nickname for this group.

⁶ The Nandi (sing: Nandiin) have accepted this name since the end of the last century. Before that time they called themselves Chemwal (sing: Chemwalin).

⁷ The Tugen (sing: Tugenin) have also become known as Kamasia, which is derived from their Maasai name "Il Kamasia".

⁸ Keyo (sing: Keyin) is the proper name for this group. From the Maasai version "Il Keyio" the modern geographical and administrative designation of "Elgeyo"

has been derived.

⁹ The Pokot (sing: Pocon) also have been known by the term "Suk" which again is derived from the corresponding designation of the Maasai "Il Suk".

¹⁰ The term "Marakwet" (sing: Marakwetin) is a corruption of "Markweta" which originally referred to only one subgroup of the people who (together with the other subgroups of the Almo, Cherang'any, Endo and Kiptani) are known under this name today. It is not quite clear whether these subgroups should be considered as distinct ethnic units or merely as geographical divisions designating variations in dialect and customs among some of them, since their clans and age-sets are also common to all subgroups. At any rate, in the absence of any other common designation, the term "Marakwet" as a pars pro toto has come into use to refer to all of these groups.

¹¹ The term Sabaot (sing: Sabaotin) is also an artificial creation of fairly recent times. It comprises the four principal groups of the Bok, Bongom, Sabiny (or "Sebei") and Kony who live on the Kenyan side of the Mt. Elgon area (the name of this mountain was derived from the Maasai name for the last mentioned group, "Il Kony"). Some parts of these groups (as is the case with the Sebei) and apparently two other smaller subgroups (Mbai and Kipsorai) live across the border in Uganda. We have no further information on them.

¹² The Terik (sing: Terikin) are sometimes also called Nyangori which has become the name of their present administrative location.

¹³ Cf. G.W.B. Huntingford, The Southern Nilo-Hamites (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, East Central Africa, Part VIII, London: International African Institute, 1953), pp. 12 ff..

¹⁴ There is, as yet, very little information on this group, the most comprehensive account is still Huntingford's description in The Southern Nilo-Hamites, loc. cit., pp. 54 - 70.

¹⁵ For an assessment of the economic potential of this area cf. Republic of Kenya, Regional Physical Development Plan, Rift Valley Province (Nairobi: 1970).

¹⁶ This estimate has been derived from population figures for the locations concerned.

¹⁷ Cf. de Wilde, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 157 ff..

¹⁸ 5 sheep or goats are counted as one "unit" of livestock in this case, cf. ibid., p. 180.

¹⁹ Cf. Huntingford, The Southern Nilo-Hamites, op. cit., pp. 20 ff..

²⁰ Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1974, p. 78.

²¹ For this system of traditional irrigation and land tenure, which is unique in Kenya, cf., e.g., Kipkorir, op. cit., pp. 26 ff..

²² Cf. Huntingford, The Southern Nilo-Hamites, loc. cit., Kipkorir, op. cit., pp. 30 f.; or G.S. Snell, Nandi Customary Law (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1954).

²³ Huntingford, The Southern Nilo-Hamites, op. cit., pp. 23, 42 etc..

²⁴ The information on these variations, particularly for the smaller or more remote subgroups, is still rather scanty in the available literature. For this reason we shall mainly refer to the two largest and better researched groups of the Kipsigis and Nandi below. But even for the Kipsigis it is not quite clear what actually constitutes a "clan" or one of its subdivisions. Thus Manners reports, for example, that he found more than 60 exogamous totemic clans ("orotinuek") among them, cf. Robert A. Manners, "The Kipsigis of Kenya: Culture Change in a 'Model' East African Tribe", in Julian H. Steward (ed.), Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967), vol. I, pp. 245 ff..

²⁵ This term is used, for example, by Evans-Pritchard in his introduction to J.G. Peristiany, The Social Institutions of the Kipsigis (London: George Routledge and Sons Ltd., 1939).

²⁶ Huntingford translates this term as "parish" cf. The Southern Nilo-Hamites, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

²⁷ There is no special term for this unit among the Kipsigis, Peristiany simply speaks of "the group", Evans-Pritchard calls it a "shire", cf. Evans-Pritchard in Peristiany, *op. cit.*, p. XX.

²⁸ The sixth traditional Nandi "emet" was made a part of the "scheduled areas" in 1907.

²⁹ Only the terms for the male age-grades are given here. They are, together with the system of age-sets which is also mainly based on males, of the greatest significance

for the structure of Kalenjin society.

³⁰The custom of clitoridectomy is somewhat on the decline among more "modern" Kalenjin, but it is still practiced much more often here than among the other groups discussed so far and who also have this custom.

³¹Kipkorir mentions eight age-sets (op. cit., p. 9), but the names and the order of the other seven correspond to those given by other sources.

³²The name of the eighth among the Marakwet, which also exists among the Keyo and Pokot, is "Korongoro" which comes between Kipkoimet and Sawe.

³³Cf. Huntingford, The Southern Nilo-Hamites, op. cit., pp. 84 ff.. It is likely that the "sapana" ceremony has been adopted by the Pokot from one of the neighboring Central Nilo-Hamitic groups, possibly the Karamojong, at a rather late stage. Peristiany dates the adoption of this procedure at about the year 1870, cf. his "The age-set system of the Pastoral Pokot", Africa (1951), XXI, pp. 138- 206, 279 - 302.

³⁴For this point cf. also Kipkorir, op. cit., p. 50.

³⁵Cf. Evans-Pritchard in Peristiany, The Social Institutions..., op. cit., pp. XXIV f..

³⁶For a comprehensive discussion of the historical origin and the functions of the "orkoiyot" among the Nandi cf. also G.B.W. Huntingford, The Nandi of Kenya - Tribal Control in a Pastoral Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953), pp. 38 ff.. See also his Nandi Work and

Culture (London: H.M.S.O., 1950), and some of his numerous articles.

³⁷For a brief assessment of how these developments were seen at this time by many Kalenjin cf. also Manners, op. cit., pp. 323 ff..

CHAPTER IX

¹The correct designations in their own language are "Il Maasai" for the people and "Ol Maasai" for an individual member of the group (ol and il being the definite masculine article). "Ol Maa" is the Name of their language. The spelling of "Maasai" varies widely (e.g. Masai, Massai, Maasae etc.), but as in the case of the other ethnic groups presented above, we prefer to employ the term in the form which has become most widely accepted today in Kenya, both by the people themselves and by members of other ethnic groups.

²This term probably contains an etymological reference to the "ground" ("enkop"), cf. Alan H. Jacobs, "The Traditional Political Organization of the Pastoral Masai" (unpublished D. Phil. thesis, Nuffield College, Oxford, 1965), pp. 30 ff..

³Cf., e.g., Johann L. Krapf, "Kurze Beschreibung der Masai- und Wakuafi-Stämme im südöstlichen Afrika", Ausland (1857), No. 19 - 20; Joseph Thomson, Through Masailand (1883-1884) (London: 1885); Sir Harry H. Johnston, The Kilimanjaro Expedition (London: 1886); L. von Höhnel,

Discovery of Lakes Rudolf and Stefanie (2 vols., London: 1894); A.C. Hollis, The Masai - Their Language and Folklore (first published Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1905, reprinted by Negro Universities Press, Westport/Conn.: 1970); or M. Merker, Die Masai - Ethnographische Monographie eines ostafrikanischen Semitenvolkes (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1904).

⁴This means "farmers" in a literal sense of the word. This term has also been used by the pastoral Maasai, in a derogatory sense, to describe some of the Kalenjin peoples, e.g. the Kipsigis.

⁵The ruthlessness of these "movements" is clearly expressed, for example, in Kenneth J. King's account "The Kenya Maasai and the Protest Phenomenon", Journal of African History, III, 1 (1971) and his "A Biography of Molonket Olokorinya ole Sempole", in idem and Ahmed I. Salim (eds.) Kenya Historical Biographies (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971), pp. 1 - 18.

⁶Cf. the temperature and rainfall maps in Republic of Kenya, National Atlas of Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, 3rd edition, 1970), pp. 15 and 21.

⁷Cf. Republic of Kenya, Regional Physical Development Plan. Rift Valley Province (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1970), p. 5.

⁸Cf. Republic of Kenya, Kenya Population Census 1969, vol. I, loc. cit.; and The United Republic of Tanzania, 1967 Population Census (vol. 3, Dar-es-Salaam: 1971).

⁹These figures are based on the listings by location

in the Kenya Population Census 1969, loc. cit., table I. They reflect about the same order of magnitude for these groups as is given in Jacobs' thesis op. cit., figure X, p. 177, which, however, is based on the Kenya Census of 1948 when the total Maasai population was grossly underestimated. (A total of only 60,000 was counted then, cf. Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1955, table 17, p. 12, compared with a total figure of 154,000 at the time of the 1962 census.)

¹⁰For the widespread legend recounting the original gift by Enk-ai, cf. Hollis, op. cit., reprinted edition, pp. 266 ff..

¹¹For a similar estimate cf. Huntingford, The Southern Nilo-Hamites, op. cit., pp. 107 f..

¹²Jacobs, op. cit., p. 147.

¹³The term "kraal" or "kraal-camp" is used most often by English-speaking authors as a translation of this word, which, however, being of South African origin, has some derogatory connotations as well.

¹⁴The number of families living in the same enkanq has been considerably reduced with the decline of traditional warfare and cattle raids. Some of the early travelers reported settlements of sometimes several hundred huts at a time, cf. von Höhnel, loc. cit.

¹⁵For these rules of inheritance cf., e.g., Merker, op. cit., pp. 192 ff.; or Jacobs, op. cit., p. 192.

¹⁶The ecological factor has been strongly emphasized, for example, by P.H. Gulliver; cf. his analysis of "The

conservative commitment in Northern Tanzania: the Arusha and Masai", in idem (ed.), Tradition and Transition in East Africa - Studies of the Tribal Element in the Modern Era (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 223 - 242. The access to communications as a major factor determining the chances of economic and social development is highlighted, for example, by Edward W. Soja in his study on The Geography of Modernization in Kenya (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968).

¹⁷ One of the characteristic failures in these efforts in the latter country was, for example, the attempt to persuade the Maasai men to give up their traditional dress ("en joriba", also known as "shuka") of a piece of cloth or (in former days) skin wrapped around their shoulders and to wear European-type trousers instead. More significantly, any effort by the Tanzanian government to induce the Maasai to abandon their traditional "private" ownership of cattle and to integrate them into a more socialist "ujamaa" framework has also met with very little success.

¹⁸ UNDP/FAO Range Management Project, Pre-Investment Survey Report of Ranching Potential, Kaputiei Section, Kajiado District (unpublished manuscript, Nairobi, not dated).

¹⁹ Cf. John M. Halderman, "An Analysis of Continued Semi-Nomadism on the Kaputiei Maasai Group Ranches: Sociological and Ecological Factors", Discussion Paper No. 152 (University of Nairobi, Institute for Development Studies, 1972).

²⁰For a discussion of this problem cf. also Alan H. Jacobs, "Maasai pastoralism in historical perspective", in Theodore Monod (ed.), Pastoralism in Tropical Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 406-425.

²¹This unit is also, in a somewhat stricter sense of the word, called "tribe" by some authors. Today in Kenya the term "tribe", in a somewhat looser sense, is mostly used to refer to all Maasai as a social unit, a meaning for which we prefer to employ the term "ethnic group".

²²Since there is some confusion in the literature concerning the clan system of the Maasai and the terminology used by the different authors (cf., e.g., Hollis, op. cit., pp. 260 ff., Merker, op. cit., pp. 16 ff.; H.A. Fosbrooke, "An Administrative Survey of the Masai Social System", Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 26 (1948), pp. 1 - 50; or Huntingford, The Southern Nilo-Hamites, op. cit., pp. 119 f., we mainly follow Jacobs' account at this place (op. cit., pp. 194 ff.), which is the most recent and which seems to be the most accurate. Jacobs is also largely in agreement with the description given by S.S. Ole Sankan, The Maasai (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973), pp. 1 - 7, except for the fact that Sankan lists only three original clans (leaving out Mamasita) for the Loodomongi moiety.

²³For this point cf. also Jacobs, The Traditional Political Organization..., op. cit., pp. 216 ff..

²⁴Ole Sankan, op. cit., p. 91.

²⁵Unfortunately, however, there was some confusion among our interviewers as to the correct meaning of the

term "clan" (Swahili: "ukoo") in Maasai society. We were not able to detect this immediately, the result being that section ("olosho"), clan ("en-kishomi") and subclan membership have been reported intermittently.

²⁶For this term cf. P.H. Gulliver, Social Control in an African Society: A Study of the Arusha, the Agricultural Masai of Northern Tanganyika (Boston: Boston University Press, 1963), pp. 209 ff..

²⁷The term "ol porror" (pl. "il porrori") is, according to Jacobs, op. cit., p. 24), only a local variation for the name of this institution and does not constitute, as e. g. Fosbrooke has suggested (cf. H.A. Fosbrooke, "The Masai Age-Group System as a Guide to Tribal Chronology", African Studies, no. 15, dt. 4, p. 3), a special notion for "age-sets" in a narrower sense of the word, which then form a "generation-set" ("olaji" in Fosbrooke's terminology).

²⁸Cf., e.g., Jacobs' chronological listing of age-sets, op. cit., p. 49.

²⁹Cf. ibid. the table of "age-set maturation cycles" for the last 80 years, p. 254.

³⁰Senior elders may actually be the physical fathers of junior warriors as well, but in most cases their sons belong to later age-sets, cf., e.g., Jacobs, op. cit., p. 293.

³¹Cf. the legend rendered in Ole Sankan, op. cit., pp. 73 ff..

³²Cf., e.g., Fosbrooke, "An Administrative Survey...", op. cit., pp. 13 - 15.

³³The resistance, as shown in a number of minor rebellions, by the "Il-murran" towards innovations initiated by the colonial government, is also considered by one author to be one of the main factors for Maasai "conservatism" on the whole. Cf. Robert L. Tignor, "The Maasai warriors: pattern maintenance and violence in colonial Kenya", Journal of African History, XIII, 2 (1972), pp. 271 - 290.

³⁴Cf. Hans G.B. Hedlund, "The Impact of Group Ranches on a Pastoral Society", Staff Paper No. 100 (University of Nairobi, Institute for Development Studies, June 1971), pp. 27 ff.. A recent example is the clash between two leading Maasai politicians, Stanley Oloitiptip and John Keen, the M.P.s for Kajiado South and Kajiado North, cf. The Weekly Review, Nov. 15, 1976, pp. 3 - 6.

CHAPTER X

¹Cf. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1974, p.42.

²For a discussion of this type and some of the more common political consequences cf. Kenneth Good, "Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class Formation", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 14, 4 (1976), pp. 597 - 620.

³See also our more general discussion of Kenya's colonial history and some of the choices made at the time of independence in chapter II above.

⁴Cf. Republic of Kenya, Development Plan 1974 - 1978, op. cit., pp. 56 f., and idem, Agricultural Census of Large Farms 1970 and 1971 (Nairobi: 1973).

⁵It is difficult to assess the number of individual African large-scale farmers, because, even if a holding is registered under a single owner or only very few partners, ownership and actual cultivation may in fact be much more divided. For this point cf. German Agricultural Team in Kenya, Extension Service Kitale, "Rehabilitation of Problem Farms" (unpublished memorandum, 1973). There it is estimated that in Trans Nzoia district of the 115 farms with a single registered owner at least 59 have several hidden partners. Of the 122 "partnership" farms with up to 6 registered partners a great majority has unregistered partners numbering several hundred persons in some instances.

⁶Some of it is implicitly described, for example, in such accounts as Elspeth Huxley, White Man's Country (London: Macmillan, 1935); or Karen Blixen, Out of Africa (London: Putnam, 1937).

⁷This is the term coined by Colin Leys, cf. *idem*, op cit., p. 91.

⁸Cf. the report of the German Agricultural Team, loc. cit.; or Republic of Kenya, An Economic Survey of African Owned Large Farms in Trans Nzoia, 1967/68 - 1970/71 (Nairobi: 1972).

⁹This is our impression gathered from a series of informal talks and interviews in Trans Nzoia district, one of the most important large-scale "mixed" farming areas.

¹⁰Cf., e.g., the apparently quite successful but somewhat controversial Ngwataniro Company in Nakuru, formed by Kihika Kimani, the M.P. for Nakuru North, cf. The

Weekly Review, Dec. 12, 1977, pp. 41 ff..

¹¹ See also the responses to our respective question discussed in chapter XIV below.

¹² Development Plan 1974 - 78, op. cit., p. 56.

¹³ Cf. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1970, p. 57; and idem, Economic Survey 1977, p. 76.

¹⁴ Our sample included 7 respondents from the Nyandarua settlement area and 46 members of co-operative, partnership or company farms in Trans Nzoia district.

¹⁵ This fact, of course, also gave rise to Marx' notion of an "Asiatic mode of production", cf. the discussion of this concept by Gianni Sofri, Il modo di produzione asiatico (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1969).

¹⁶ This is done, for example, by Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, cf. her contribution "The Political Economy of the African Peasantry and Modes of Production" to the volume edited by Peter Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976), pp. 90 - 111.

¹⁷ Cf. Lloyd A. Fallers, "Are African Cultivators to be Called Peasants?", Current Anthropology, no. 2 (1961), pp. 108 - 110.

¹⁸ In this point we agree, for example, with the arguments presented by John Saul and Roger Woods in their article "African Peasantries" in Teodor Shanin (ed.), Peasants and Peasant Societies (London: Penguin, 1971), pp. 103 - 113. For a general discussion of peasantries see also Eric R. Wolf, Peasants (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-

Hall, 1966).

¹⁹This point of view is also very strongly expressed by Teodor Shanin, cf. his The Awkward Class - Political Sociology of Peasantry in a Developing Society, Russia 1910 - 1925 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972), in particular his Appendix A "The Peasantry as a Political Factor", pp. 203 - 218.

²⁰See also Table II sections 4, 5 and 6 above and our "District Development Index" in the appendix below.

²¹This is a rather "generous" estimate, operationalizing this category as all those who grow a substantial proportion of cash crops and who own more than 10 ha of high potential land. A farm size of 10 ha still is not very large by international standards, the minimum size in the E.E.C. which is considered by official planners to be "economical" as a full-time family enterprise is 20 ha for example.

²²See also the respective sections of Part II above.

²³These factors have also been strongly emphasized by Shanin, op. cit., pp. 207 ff..

²⁴Cf. Guy Hunter, Modernizing Peasant Societies (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

²⁵For a further discussion of the perceptions of our respondents of their economic future see also chapter XV below.

²⁶The fees for the first four years of primary school have been officially waived in December 1973, but these have been partly replaced by contributions to local "building funds" and similar expenses. These measures were not yet

in effect, however, at the time of our interviews.

²⁷ Arthur Hazlewood, for example, rightly emphasizes this point, cf. *idem*, "Kenya: Income Distribution and Poverty - an Unfashionable View", The Journal of Modern African Studies, 16, 1 (1978), pp. 81 - 95.

²⁸ Cf. International Labour Office, Employment, Incomes and Equality, op. cit., pp. 73 ff..

²⁹ See table II "Comparative Data..." above. If an urban market value for agricultural products is used for purposes of comparison instead of the farm gate price, the yearly income of the poorest group in this table may rise to approximately Kshs. 700,-- per year. But it should be remembered that these originally are average values for large regions which include a considerable portion of better-off families as well.

CHAPTER XI

¹For this notion cf. Claude Ake, "Explanatory Notes on the Political Economy of Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies, 14, 1 (1976), pp. 1 - 23.

²See also chapter II above. The specific Kenyan situation is also further discussed by Gavin Kitching "Modes of Production and Kenyan Dependency", Review of African Political Economy, no. 8 (January - April 1977), pp. 56 - 74. The increase of an indigenous class of capitalists is also well documented by Nicola Swainson, "The Rise of a National Bourgeoisie in Kenya", ibid. pp. 39 - 55.

³See also table V, 13 below.

⁴This term originally referred to local intermediaries of foreign business establishments in China before the revolution. It also has come into use in some of the more recent literature on the political economy of Latin America, cf. James D. Cockroft, André Gunder Frank, and Dale L. Johnson, Dependence and Underdevelopment - Latin America's Political Economy (New York: Doubleday, 1972). A particularly outspoken critic of the auxiliary bourgeoisie is, of course, also Frantz Fanon, cf. his Les Damnés de la Terre (Paris: François Maspero Editeur, first edition, 1961).

⁵This term is employed, for example, by Issa G. Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1976).

⁶Cf., e.g., the job groups "M" and upwards listed in Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry - Public Service Structure and Remuneration Commission ("Ndegwa-Commission") (Nairobi: 1971), Part VI, pp. 334 ff..

⁷Thus the Ndegwa-commission report, for example, explicitly sanctioned these activities, provided some rather general "code of ethics" was adhered to, cf. ibid., pp. 13 ff..

⁸This is at least one of the conclusions drawn by Peter Marris and Anthony Somerset, African Businessmen - A Study of Entrepreneurship and Development in Kenya (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971), in their analysis of a group of ICDC-supported African businessmen in this sector. Their respective sample was taken in 1966, i.e. relatively early after independence.

⁹For this point cf., e.g., some of the papers edited by Frank C. Child and Mary E. Kempe (eds.), Small Scale Enterprise (Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, Occasional Paper No. 16, 1973); or David Steele, "The Theory of the Dual Economy and African Entrepreneurship in Kenya", Journal of Development Studies, 12 (October 1975), pp. 18 - 38.

¹⁰Cf. Morris and Somerset, op. cit., pp. 60 ff..

¹¹See also some of the respective data in Table III, 1 above.

¹²For the use of this term cf. Amin, op. cit.; or Dieter Senghaas, Weltwirtschaftsordnung und Entwicklungspolitik - Plädoyer für Dissoziation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977).

¹³A more specific listing by occupation is given in Appendix IV below.

¹⁴Leys, op. cit., p. 178.

CHAPTER XII

¹The locus classicus for this concept is Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supply of Labor", The Manchester School (May 1954).

²Cf., e.g., International Labour Office ("ILO-Report"), op. cit.; Child and Kempe (eds.) op. cit.; or Steele, loc. cit.

³ILO-Report, p. 6.

⁴See also Appendix IV below.

⁵For all these data see also table III,1 above.

⁶For the use of this latter term cf. Frank Furedi, "The African Crowd in Nairobi: Popular Movements and Elite Politics", Journal of African History, XIV, 2 (1973), pp. 275 - 290.

⁷The most succinct statement in this regard is that of Frantz Fanon, cf. his Les Damnés de la Terre (first edition, François Maspero Editeur, Paris, 1961), in particular chapter 3. Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul also were among the most forceful proponents of this argument, cf. their "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa", The Journal of Modern African Studies, no. 2 (1968), pp. 141 - 169.

⁸For this point cf. Richard Sandbrook, Proletarians and African Capitalism - The Kenyan Case 1960 - 1972 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 18 f.. John Saul also has reconsidered his earlier position somewhat, cf. his "The Labour Aristocracy Thesis Reconsidered", in Richard Sandbrook and Robin Cohen (eds.), The Development of an African Working Class: Studies in Class Formation and Action (London: Longman, 1975), pp. 303 - 310.

⁹See also our brief discussion of this period in chapter II above.

¹⁰This period is also described, for example, by Sharon Stichter, "The Formation of a Working Class in Kenya", in Sandbrook and Cohen (eds.), op. cit., pp. 21 - 48.

¹¹For all these data see also Appendix IV below.

¹²Cf. Republic of Kenya, Employment and Earnings in

the Modern Sector 1968 - 1970 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1972), table 6, pp. 21 ff..

¹³For these data see also Table III, 1 above.

¹⁴For this point cf. Alice H. Amsden, International Firms and Labour in Kenya 1945 - 1970 (London: Frank Cass, 1971).

¹⁵An account of the early trade union movement in Kenya is given, for example, by one of its most important leaders, cf. Makhan Singh, History of Kenya's Trade Union Movement to 1952 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969). Developments in the 1960s are reported in Amsden, op. cit., and Sandbrook, op. cit.. Some additional information can also be gained from Clement K. Lubembe, The Inside of Labour Movement in Kenya (Nairobi: Equatorial Publishers, 1968).

¹⁶Cf. Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1972, p. 235.

¹⁷For a discussion of some of the potential developments in this regard see also Part V below.

CHAPTER XIII

¹Among the very few studies on mental and psychic disorders in East Africa are, for example, R.B. Edgerton, "Conceptions of Psychosis in Four East African Societies", American Anthropologist (1966), pp. 408 - 425; and John H. Orley, Culture and Mental Illness (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1970). Erasto Muga's study Crime and

Delinquency in Kenya (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975), which is the only one dealing with this aspect so far, remains largely at the level of simple statistical enumerations.

²Some of the problems concerning the racial minority groups are also discussed in chapter XVII below.

Economically these groups, however, are still very much at the center of affairs. The marginality of some of the pastoral groups or those agriculturalists who experience an increasing pauperization or are enmeshed in a pattern of involutory growth is briefly referred to in chapter X above.

³For a separate enumeration of Non-Kenyan Africans by occupation for the year 1970 see also Appendix IV below. Not all foreign African nationals belong, of course, to the sub-proletariat, but they have an unusually high percentage of members of this group among them amounting to more than 10 % of the total of this class.

⁴For such estimates cf. ILO-Report, op. cit., chapter 3, pp. 51 ff.; or E. Whitelaw, "Survey of Nairobi Households" (1971, unpublished).

⁵For these more dynamic aspects see also chapter XVIII.

⁶In order not to confound this class with the category of the still "classless" students we have only included those school-leavers without any previous employment here who are no longer living with their families.

⁷For these data see also table III, 1 above.

⁸Cf. Muga, op. cit..

⁹This is the characterization of the "Lumpen-proletariat" given in the "Manifesto of the Communist Party" in the translation of the edition by Lewis S. Feuer, Marx and Engels - Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, 1959), p. 18.

CHAPTER XIV

¹Cf., e.g., William Buchanan's discussion of "Political Identification", International Encyclopedia for the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

²This was stressed, for example, by Erik H. Erikson, who is the author of some pioneering studies in this field, cf. his Childhood and Society (New York: Norton, 1950); or Identity, Youth and Crisis (New York: Norton, 1968).

³Cf., e.g., the "ethnocentrism-scale" developed by Theodor W. Adorno, et al., in idem, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950); or some of the scales reported in Robinson and Shaver, op. cit..

⁴Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 64.

⁵See chapter VII and IX above.

⁶Questions no. 29 a, b and c.

⁷The inter-item correlations are 0.21 between the first two statements, -0.06 between the first and the third, and -0.17 between the second and the third one.

⁸Question 39 a, see also chapter XV below.

⁹Questions 26 d and e, see also the respective

chapters of Part II above.

¹⁰Question no. 22, cf. also question no. 109 by Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: The Free Press, 1958), pp. 431 f.. The advice sought was related to economic and financial affairs for more than 40 % of the respondents, about one-fourth was concerned with personal or health problems, and about one-fifth with educational matters.

¹¹Question no. 23.

¹²Only the first answer was recorded in each case, multiple responses were not provided for.

¹³It is likely, however, that the term "tribe" in our question was understood by most of them to refer to the different sub-groups, as the Nandi, Keyo etc., and not to "the Kalenjin" as a whole. The same is probably true for the "Mijikenda" and "Maasai" who come next in this respect.

¹⁴The exact percentages are:

Respondents with	Trusting only: family members	personal friends
no formal education	22	14
primary "	18	16
secondary "	17	23
rural residence	21	15
urban "	11	20

¹⁵Questions no. 24 a and b, these are somewhat similar to those employed by Morris Rosenberg in his "Faith in People"-scale, cf. his "Misanthropy and Political Ideology", American Sociological Review, XXI, pp. 690 - 695; and "Misanthropy and Attitudes Toward International Affairs",

Journal of Conflict Resolution, I (1957), pp. 340 - 345.

The associations between these questions were rather strong in our survey, too (a value of gamma of 0.24 for questions 23 a and 24 a, and a value of -0.12 for questions 23 a and 24 b). We did not attempt, however, to construct a separate coherent scale in this regard.

¹⁶Cf. Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 213.

¹⁷Cf., e.g., the studies by James C. Mitchell, Tribalism and the Plural Society (London: Oxford University Press, 1960); and Aidan Southall (ed.), Social Change in Modern Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1960).

¹⁸For a similar point of view cf. also I.M. Lewis, "Nationalism, Urbanism and Tribalism in Contemporary Africa", Proceedings of the Meeting of the East African Academy, held in Kampala, September 1966 (mimeo), partly reprinted in Cherry Gertzel et al. (eds.), Government and Politics in Kenya, op. cit., pp. 51 f..

¹⁹See also chapter XVII below.

²⁰These are based on the answers to our bogardus-type "social distance-scale" (question 32), see also the "Methodological Appendix" below.

²¹Cf., e.g., Adorno et al., op. cit..

²²Cf. the section of question 32 relating to religious groups. See also chapter XVII below.

²³See also chapter I above.

²⁴Question no. 35 c.

²⁵Question no. 35 b.

²⁶This question, perhaps, should have been modified referring to private or communal ownership of cattle for the pastoralists among the respondents in order to see their position towards private property of their means of production more clearly.

²⁷Question no. 35 a.

²⁸See also Part Five below.

²⁹We have given a short account of this problem, mostly referring to the Kenyan case, in our article on "Die Problematik des 'nation-building' in Afrika", Internationales Afrika Forum (July/August 1968), pp. 457 ff..

³⁰Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 5.

³¹See also chapter II above.

³²Question no. 38 a, cf. also Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 64 ff..

³³Question no. 38 b.

³⁴The specific issues criticized by our respondents are discussed in chapter XV below.

CHAPTER XV

¹This distinction is a part, for example, of Talcott Parson's well-known "pattern variables", cf. his The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 58-67; or idem, "Pattern Variables Revisited", The American Sociological Review, 25 (1960), pp. 467 - 483.

²This is the main concern of David C. McClelland,

for example, cf. his The Achieving Society (Princeton: van Nostrand, 1961).

³Item 47 of question 40.

⁴Item 38 of question 40. The "respect" a family enjoys can, of course, be an acquired property. This item is "ascriptive", however, as far as it concerns the respect accorded to a person's family and not one's own personal merits.

⁵Item 25 of question 40.

⁶For the exact procedures and statistical values see our "Methodological Appendix" below.

⁷Cf. Kenyatta, op. cit., pp. 6 ff..

⁸For this point cf. also Robert A. Levine, "Sex Roles and Economic Change in Africa", in John Middleton (ed.), Black Africa - Its Peoples and Their Cultures Today (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 174 ff..

⁹Question 28.

¹⁰Kikuyu ululation.

¹¹Report of an eye-witness quoted in Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit., pp. 51 f..

¹²Cf. also Judith Heyer, Dunstan Ireri, and Jon Moris, Rural Development in Kenya (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971), pp. 93 ff.; or Gideon C. Mutiso, "Rural Women in Socio-Political Change", in idem, op.cit., pp. 249 - 286.

¹³Item 25 of question 40.

¹⁴Question 37 a.

¹⁵Question 37b.

¹⁶ See also the brief discussion of different theories of social change and development in Part One above. We have also discussed these problems in the introduction to Dirk Berg-Schlosser (ed.), Die Politischen Probleme der Dritten Welt (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1972), pp. 14 ff..

¹⁷ This aspect is, for example, stressed in particular by Richard F. Behrendt, Soziale Strategie für Entwicklungsländer (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1965); cf. also Everett M. Rogers, The Diffusion of Innovations (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

¹⁸ Cf., e.g., the scales developed by Theodor W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Row, 1950); or Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality", American Political Science Review, vol. 52, no. 4 (Dec. 1958), pp. 27 - 45.

¹⁹ Cf. the scale developed by Herbert McClosky and J.H.Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy", American Sociological Review, 1965, 30, I, pp. 14 - 40.

²⁰ E.G. items 5, 21, 22, 23, 26, 29, 32, 36, 41 and 43 of question 40.

²¹ For a discussion of these aspects of conservatism cf. also John P. Robinson et al., op. cit., pp. 79 ff..

²² Items 20 and 43 of question 40.

²³ Items 21 and 32 of question 40.

²⁴ Question 15 a.

²⁵ Question 39 a.

²⁶ Question 15 c.

²⁷ Item 45 of question 40.

²⁸ Among the vast number of historical and contemporary studies Ted R. Gurr's Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970) stands out as the most comprehensive and recent one, based on a wide array of empirical evidence. It also contains a good bibliography. Discussions of different aspects of revolutionary change also can be found, for example, in Claude E. Welch and Mavis Bunker Taintor (eds.), Revolution and Political Change (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1972); or Klaus von Beyme (ed.), Empirische Revolutionsforschung (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1973).

²⁹ For this point cf. also Gurr, op. cit., chapter 6, pp. 155 ff..

³⁰ An assumption of this kind is made, for example, in a part of the extensive literature on "theories of aggression", cf., e.g., Konrad Lorenz, Das sogenannte Böse - Zur Naturgeschichte der Aggression (Wien: Borotha-Schüler, 1963), which draws very far-reaching analogies between human and observed animal behavior. This approach is strongly criticized, for example, in Arno Plack (ed.), Der Mythos vom Aggressionstrieb (München: List, 1973).

³¹ The inherent difficulties in comparisons of this kind are manifested, for example, in the section on political protest and violence in Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 49 ff., where often quite dissimilar events have been compiled in the same categories which without further knowledge of the

countries and actual incidents may result in quite misleading interpretations of such data.

³²Items 4, 30, 54, and 50 of question 40. See also the "Methodological Appendix" below.

³³Question 28.

³⁴See also table II above.

³⁵The main point of reference for this discussion is, of course, the pioneering study by Adorno et al., loc. cit.

³⁶Cf. R. Christie and Marie Jahoda (eds.), Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality" (New York: The Free Press, 1954); or J.P. Kirsch, and R.C. Dillehay, Dimensions of Authoritarianism: A Review of Research and Theory (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967). The methodological criticism was directed against the possible "acquiescence" which might be involved in the answers to the mostly "positively" worded statements of the original F-scale. Attempts to "reverse" some of the original items have, however, often led to quite clumsy results and the reversed scales frequently were only poorly correlated with the original ones, cf. B.M. Bass, "Authoritarianism or Acquiescence", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, (1955), 51, pp. 616 - 623.

³⁷Cf. also M. Janowitz and D. Marvick, "Authoritarianism and Political Behavior", Public Opinion Quarterly (1953), 17, pp. 185 - 201; or R.E. Cane, "Political Personality and Electoral Choice", APSR (1955), 49, pp. 173 - 190.

³⁸Items 7, 8, 11, 34, and 33 of question 40, see also the "Methodological Appendix" below.

³⁹All items included in the final section of our questionnaire are of the Likert-type response mode without providing a neutral point. We had instructed our interviewers to record a "don't know" only in cases where respondents genuinely had no information or attitude on a certain item. In contrast to most of the questions and indices presented so far, which are related to more general aspects of economic and social life on which almost all of the respondents were able to express their attitudes, for questions concerning the more directly political sphere we think it appropriate to include the "don't know" and other missing answers in our presentation here. In these cases a genuine "parochialism" of some respondents is reflected in these answers (we obtained, for example, many "don't knows" among the responses to the item asking about government censorship of books and films, because a considerable number of respondents was illiterate or had never seen a film).

⁴⁰See also the discussion of this point in the next chapter below.

⁴¹Cf. Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties (New York: Doubleday, 1955).

⁴²For this latter point cf. James W. Prothro, and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement", Journal of Politics, vol. 22 (1960), pp. 276 - 294; or Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics", APSR (1964), 58, pp. 361 - 382.

⁴³Items 13, 19, and 27 of question 40.

⁴⁴Item 16 of question 40.

⁴⁵Cf., e.g., the discussion of "conservatism - liberalism" scales and indices in Robinson et al., op. cit., pp. 79 ff..

⁴⁶For this point cf. also Paul M. Sniderman, Personality and Democratic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), who mainly examined the relationships between a person's "self-esteem" and different aspects of democratic politics.

⁴⁷This is emphasized, for example, by Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics", in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 206 - 261. For a further discussion of problems of this kind cf. also the volume edited by Shel Feldman, Cognitive Consistency (New York: Academic Press, 1966).

CHAPTER XVI

¹Some aspects of the upheaval in France in May 1968 have, for example, been attributed to this latent "revolutionary tradition" and consciousness in this country's political culture, cf. Lucien Rioux and René Backmann, L'explosion de mai (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1968).

²Cf. Hans-Joachim Schoeps, Was ist und was will die Geistesgeschichte - Über Theorie und Praxis der Zeitgeistforschung (Göttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1959).

³The most comprehensive work covering Kenya's

preindependence political development is Rosberg and Nottingham, op. cit.; see also chapter II above.

⁴Cf., e.g., Ngugi wa Thiongo, Weep not, Child (London: Heinemann, 1964); or idem, The River Between (London: Heinemann, 1965).

⁵Questions 16 a and b.

⁶Question 16 c.

⁷Most of the interviews were conducted in a vernacular language, we reproduce here the verbatim English transcriptions of our interviewers.

⁸One of the earliest empirical studies of the effects of mass communications in the developing areas is Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society - Modernizing the Middle East (New York: The Free Press, 1958). Other important works in communications theory include: Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication (New York: The Free Press, 1960); Everett M. Rogers, The Diffusion of Innovations (New York: The Free Press, 1962); Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Development (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); and Lucian W. Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

⁹Cf. Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner (eds.), Communication and Change: Ten Years After (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976); or Everett M. Rogers (ed.), Communication and Development-Critical Perspectives (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976).

¹⁰For a brief review of the history and development of the mass media in Kenya see also the section on "Presse,

Rundfunk und Fernsehen", in Walter Leifer (ed.), Kenia,
op. cit., pp. 162 - 176.

¹¹ Cf. Statistical Abstract 1974, op. cit., p.198.

¹² The use of a TV set is usually also dependent, of course, on a permanent supply of electricity, which is not yet available in most parts of rural Kenya.

¹³ Question 18.

¹⁴ Question 19.

¹⁵ Question 19 e and 33 a.

¹⁶ Cf., e.g., D.R. Matthews and J.W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966); or Almond and Verba, op. cit..

¹⁷ Although a scale of this kind may potentially satisfy the criteria of "Guttman-scaling" (i.e. unidimensionality and a cumulative scoring of consecutively ordered items), we thought the substantive information contained in each item to be more important for our purposes than their perfect "fit" in an ascending scale. For this reason we were content with a purely additive rather than a perfect "Guttman"-scaling of these items. For some further methodological criticism of Guttman-scales cf. also Jum C. Nunnally, Psychometric Theory (New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1967), pp.63 ff..

¹⁸ Questions 21 a - h.

¹⁹ Cf., e.g., the findings of Matthews and Prothro in this regard, op. cit., pp. 78 ff..

²⁰ For a summary of some major propositions in this regard cf. Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

²¹This is the definition given by Herbert McClosky in his article on "Political Participation", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968, p. 252.

²²For a discussion of workers' participation and other forms of "Mitbestimmung" (industrial co-determination) cf., e.g., Karl-Otto Hondrich, Mitbestimmung in Europa (Cologne: Europa Union Verlag, 1970); or R.F. Kuda and F. Schneider, Mitbestimmung - Weg zur industriellen Demokratie (Munich: 1969). See also Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), chapters III and IV.

²³This latter aspect is partly included, for example, in the category of "citizen-initiated contacts" among the four modes of participatory activities developed by Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Joe-On Kim, The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971).

²⁴Among the better-known and tested "political participation-scales" are those by Matthews and Prothro, op. cit., and Almond and Verba, op. cit..

²⁵Questions 33 b and d.

²⁶Question 34.

²⁷Cf. Almond and Verba, op. cit., chapter VI. Almond and Verba asked more directly for the perceptions of their respondents concerning the efficacy of their involvement in local or national political affairs.

²⁸Our interviews were conducted between January and

April 1974, i.e. before the registration for the elections of October 1974 had started. Those respondents who were aged 23 and below at that time thus had not been eligible for registration at the time of the 1969 elections.

²⁹The names of Lerner (cf. his The Passing of Traditional Society, loc. cit.) and Deutsch (cf. his "Social Mobilization and Political Development", loc. cit.), as some of the more prominent ones, may stand here for many others.

³⁰Cf., e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968), who at least also sees the possibility of political and, presumably, more general social and economic "decay".

³¹Marc Howard Ross, Grass Roots in an African City: Political Behavior in Nairobi (Cambridge/Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975), p. 2.

³²Alex Inkeles, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries", APSR, No. 4 (Dec. 1969), p. 1138, emphasis in the original. A similar statement can also be found in Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships", APSR, No. 3 (Sept. 1969), p. 819.

³³Cf. Ross, op. cit..

³⁴For the 1969 elections see, for example, the article by Goran Hyden and Colin Leys, "Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems: the Case of Kenya and Tanzania", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 2 (1972), pp. 389 - 420; for the 1974 elections, see also Dirk Berg-Schlosser, "Wahlen in Kenia - Demokratie in

einem Entwicklungsland?", Afrika Spektrum, no. 1 (1975), pp. 55 - 66.

³⁵Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 16 ff..

³⁶This is a more general category employed by Milbrath, for example, cf. idem, op. cit., pp. 46 ff..

³⁷For a fuller discussion of this concept and its different dimensions, cf., e.g., A.W. Finifter, "Dimensions of Political Alienation", APSR, vol. 64 (1970), pp. 389 - 410; or J. Milton Yinger, "Anomie, Alienation, and Political Behavior", in Jeanne N. Knutson (ed.), Handbook of Political Psychology (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973), pp. 171 - 202. The discussion of the social and economic causes of alienation ("Entfremdung") goes, of course, back to Marx.

³⁸The term "spectator" is used by Milbrath to describe a similar group, but which in his terminology also includes a large section of our next category of "active democrats", excluding only the actual "gladiators" in the political arena. We think that the term spectator distinguishes insufficiently between different groups of active participants and does not do justice to the many aspects of political involvement and the multiple levels of interaction between these groups and actual "gladiators".

³⁹These were mostly secondary school students, some of whom just had finished school. We did not include them, being a transient group, as a separate category in our general "class" pattern, but we think they should be mentioned separately here.

⁴⁰Cf., e.g., the discussion by David Easton,

A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965), pp. 153 ff..

⁴¹Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (first edition, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1922), pp. 122 ff. and pp. 642 ff.; English edition, translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 324 ff..

⁴²Cf. Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Leadership and the Problems of the Charismatic Power", Journal of Politics, vol. 23, No. 1 (February 1961), pp. 3 - 24.

⁴³Cf. Ann Ruth Willner, Charismatic Political Leadership (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 32, 1968).

⁴⁴Pye, op. cit., p. 126.

⁴⁵In addition to the existence or non-existence of legitimacy there are, of course, other factors as well, such as the availability of some means of coercion and the willingness of political leaders to use them which contribute to the maintenance or the downfall of a particular regime. In this study, however, which is mainly concerned with the social bases of Kenya's political system, no complete assessment of the means of survival and the range of choices open to political actors can be made. For such an approach, on a theoretical level, cf. Warren F. Ilchman and Norman T. Uphoff, The Political Economy of Change (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

⁴⁶Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 64 ff..

⁴⁷Easton, op. cit., pp. 161 ff..

⁴⁸Items 36, 37, 6 and 31 of question 40.

⁴⁹This relationship also illustrates, to a certain extent, Lipset's observation concerning the interdependence of the legitimacy and the effectiveness of a political system, cf. Lipset, op. cit., pp. 64 ff..

⁵⁰Question 39 c.

⁵¹It is not possible even to attempt to cite some of the more important works among the vast body of literature on this subject here. As far as Kenya is concerned two more recent studies deal with organized interest groups: Alice H. Amsden, International Firms and Labour in Kenya 1945 - 1970 (London: Frank Cass, 1971); and Richard Sandbrook, Proletarians and African Capitalism - The Kenyan Case 1960 - 1972 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

⁵²We did not attempt to differentiate between local and national government officials at this point as, for example, Almond and Verba do. Representative institutions of local government exist in Kenya only at the county level and their role has been greatly diminished since the "reform" of 1969.

⁵³Question 36. An alternative way to present the results of this question would have been to combine the three possible answers by giving them different weights (e. g. a value of 6 for the most effective, a value of 5 for the second effective, and a value of 1 for the least effective of the six offered alternative methods), adding them for each respondent and then computing the means and standard deviations for the most important groups and demographic

categories in our sample. This might have been a somewhat more accurate procedure, but for the sake of readability and to allow for a more easily intuitive interpretation of our results we preferred the listing of percentage distributions at this place.

⁵⁴All of these are purely government-appointed officials and should not be confused with traditional "chiefs", who, in any case, did not exist among Kenya's peoples in the past. See also the respective chapters of Part Two above.

⁵⁵Cf. John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics", APSR, vol. 64. (June 1970); or Richard Sandbrook, "Patrons, Clients, and Factions: New Dimensions of Conflict Analysis in Africa", Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol. V, no. 1 (March 1972), pp. 104 - 119.

⁵⁶For a basic discussion of these more traditional forms see Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, op. cit., pp. 131 ff. and pp. 679 ff..

⁵⁷For a good general discussion of the concept and some distinctions between traditional and more modern forms of patron-client relationships see also James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia", APSR, vol. 66, no.1 (March 1972), pp. 91 - 113.

⁵⁸The special role of M.P.s in this regard has also been analyzed by Joel D. Barkan and John J. Okumu, see, for example, their "Political Linkage in Kenya: Citizens, Local Elites, and Legislators", paper presented at the Annual

Meeting of APSA in Chicago (September 1974).

⁵⁹Cf. Richard Stren, "Factional Politics and Central Control in Mombasa 1960 - 1969", loc. cit..

⁶⁰Cf. Richard Sandbrook, "Patrons, Clients, and Unions: The Labour Movement and Political Conflict in Kenya", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, vol. 9 (March 1972), pp. 3 - 27.

⁶¹Question 21 d.

⁶²In the United States, for example, 53 % could name their representative in Congress in an opinion poll concluded in 1970. Even lower figures are reported for other years. Cf. Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 58 (Princeton: Gallup International, April 1970), p. 20; or Hazel Gaudet Erskine, "The Polls: The Informed Public", Public Opinion Quarterly, 27 (Fall 1963), pp. 491 - 500.

⁶³Some of its problems are also discussed, for example, in the volumes edited by Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson and John Okumu (eds.), Development Administration - The Kenyan Experience (Nairobi: Oxford University Press 1970); and David K. Leonard (ed.), Rural Administration in Kenya (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973).

⁶⁴Obtaining a "research clearance" in Kenya can be quite a delicate matter, and in order not to forego our research opportunities at all we consciously avoided some direct and potentially "sensitive" questions in some parts of our interviews.

⁶⁵Almond and Verba, for example, asked their respondents directly whether they thought they were given equal treat-

ment by government officials or the police. Cf. *idem*, op. cit., questions 34 and 37 a of their questionnaire, pp. 329 and 330.

⁶⁶Question 39 b.

⁶⁷I.e. "District Commissioners", probably meant to include other District Officers (D.O.s) as well.

⁶⁸Question 35 g.

⁶⁹I.e. those coming from Kiambu District in Central Province, the economically most advanced region near Nairobi, which is also the home area of many prominent Kikuyu politicians (including Kenyatta, Gichuru, Mungai, Njonjo, Koinange etc.); see also our "District Development Index" in the appendix below.

⁷⁰While the findings reported in this and the previous section of this chapter give us some clues concerning the role and performance of the legislative and executive branches of government, we are not in a position to provide any additional information on the attitudes of respondents towards the judiciary. We had not included any direct questions in our interviews in this regard, and the only attitudinal item indirectly referring to the judicial branch of government ("A poor man doesn't have the chance he deserves in the law courts", item 20 of question 40) did not reveal meaningful distinctions among respondents, apparently because too few had had any contact with or information about the legal system at all. Rather than reporting "non-attitudes" we decided to drop the matter altogether.

⁷¹Question 38 b.

⁷²Question 39 c. This question is similar to one employed by Lerner, cf. *idem*, op. cit., question 102, p.430. Lerner was most interested in the projective nature of this question, seeking to find further support for his concept of "empathy", whereas we are concerned only with the actual substance of the responses at this place.

⁷³One recent count lists 23 "irregular executive transfers" in Sub-Saharan Africa in the period from 1960 to 1967 alone, cf. Taylor and Hudson, op. cit., pp. 150 ff..

⁷⁴See chapter XIX below.

⁷⁵Question 35 d.

⁷⁶Question 32, see also chapter XVII below.

⁷⁷Question 35 f.

⁷⁸Question 35 e.

⁷⁹Question 39 d.

CHAPTER XVII

¹See also our discussion of this point in chapter I above.

²Cf. chapter II.

³In common Kenyan usage this term refers to all persons of European origin, irrespective of whether they acutally come from America, Australia or other parts of the world.

⁴See also chapter XIX and Appendix IV below.

⁵Cf. also NCKK, Who controls Industry in Kenya?, loc. cit..

⁶For an account of this situation cf. also Dharam P.

Ghai and Yash P. Ghai (eds.), Portrait of a Minority - Asians in East Africa (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, revised edition, 1970).

⁷Some of these aspects concerning the European and Asian communities have been documented, for example, by Donald Rothchild, Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya. (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).

⁸Since we were interested in the African part of Kenya's population, mostly at its "mass" level, we did not include any persons of European or Asian origin in our sample.

⁹Cf. question 32, see also the "Methodological Appendix" below.

¹⁰Because items 1 and 2 are not quite comparable for our rural and urban samples (see also the "Methodological Appendix" below), we only report the findings concerning the last three items for the total weighted sample here.

¹¹Another 17 % answered "don't know about citizenship". It was the only major grouping in our sample to do so.

¹²See also the following section of this chapter below.

¹³See also the changes in the size and racial composition of the dominant classes discussed in chapter XIX.

¹⁴See also Appendix IV below.

¹⁵Blackwoods Magazine, March 1971, p. 273; also quoted in Leys, op. cit., p. XI.

¹⁶This position is represented, for example, by

novelist and playwright Ngugi wa Thiongo who was detained in December 1977 and a number of other intellectuals at the University of Nairobi, cf. also Gideon Cyrus Mutiso, "The Structure of Inter-Ethnic and Inter-Racial Relations", in idem, Kenya - Politics, Policy and Society (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975), pp. 46 - 59.

¹⁷ See also the respective sections of Part II above; traditional external relations of some groups in Western Kenya are discussed, for example, in the chapter by Günther Wagner in M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.), African Political Systems, loc. cit., pp. 224 ff..

¹⁸ See also our brief discussion of the current use of this term in chapter XIV above.

¹⁹ See Part Two above.

²⁰ A measure of this kind was originally developed by E.S. Bogardus, cf. his "Measuring social distances", Journal of Applied Sociology (1925), 9, pp. 299 - 308; and idem, Immigration and Race Attitudes (Lexington/Mass.: Heath, 1928). More recent applications of social distance scales are also discussed by Harry C. Triandis and Leigh Minturn Triandis, "A Cross-Cultural Study of Social Distance", Psychological Monographs, Vol. 76, no. 21 (1962); and idem, "Some Studies of Social Distance", in Ivan D. Steiner and Martin Fishbein (eds.), Current Studies in Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 207 - 217.

²¹ The statistical properties of this scale are further discussed in the "Methodological Appendix" below.

²² See also our brief historical account in

chapter II above.

²³See also chapter XIV above.

²⁴This order of magnitude is comparable to that found by Marylinn B. Brewer and Donald T. Campbell for 10 Kenyan ethnic groups, cf. *idem*, Ethnocentrism and Intergroup Attitudes - East African Evidence (New York: John Wiley, 1976), p. 37; and Marylinn B. Brewer, "Determinants of Social Distance Among East African Tribal Groups", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 10, no. 3 (1968), pp. 279 - 289. Regrettably, however, these authors in many instances do not identify the specific ethnic groups so that no more direct cross-validations of their findings are possible. Their sample, taken in 1965 by "Marco Surveys" in Nairobi, a somewhat dubious organization which ceased operation in 1970, also strongly overrepresented younger, male, literate respondents living in towns, so that meaningful comparisons with our more general, mostly rural based sample are hardly possible.

²⁵In these regards we concur with the judgements reported by Brewer and Campbell, op. cit., pp. 161 ff. and p. 179.

²⁶This is in contrast to what Brewer and Campbell report for their sample, cf. *idem*, op. cit., pp. 45 ff.

²⁷There are a number of somewhat differing procedures available for this purpose. For the sake of convenience we employed Guttman-Lingoes' smallest space analysis which happened to be available to us and which produced fairly plausible results.

²⁸This presentation is based on the four item social distance scale for our rural sample. Because all cluster analyses of this kind require symmetric scores we had to transform our original data by calculating averages for each pair of ratings (Brewer and Campbell, for example, employ a similar procedure, cf. *idem*, pp. 40 ff.). Where only a single value was available (we had interviewed 7 groups giving ratings for 11 others), we assumed the distance to be reciprocal.

²⁹See Part Two above.

³⁰A wide range of hypotheses in this regard has been compiled, for example, by Robert A. Levine and Donald T. Campbell, Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior (New York: John Wiley, 1972). Some of the political consequences of "ethnicity" are discussed in Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).

³¹See table V, 2 above.

³²Cf. also our class analysis for the year 1970 in chapter XIX and the pattern of occupational stratification for the same year in Appendix IV below.

³³Robert A. Manners, "The Kipsigis of Kenya: Culture Change in a 'Model' East African Tribe", in Julian H. Steward (ed.), Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967), vol. I, pp. 327/328.

³⁴See also chapter II above.

³⁵Cf. Kenya Churches Handbook, *op. cit.*, in particular

Part II, pp. 157 - 191.

³⁶Cf. also table II above.

³⁷Cf. Mutiso, op. cit., pp. 3 ff..

³⁸Cf. Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry ("Ndegwa-Commission"), op.cit., p. 42.

³⁹Cf. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1978, p. 101.

⁴⁰Cf. G.E. Johnson and W.E. Whitelaw, "Urban-Rural Income Transfers in Kenya: An Estimated Remittances Function", Discussion Paper No. 137 (Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, 1972), p. 2.

⁴¹See table III, 1, above.

⁴²Cf. Republic of Kenya, Central Bureau of Statistics Survey of Non-Agricultural Rural Enterprises (1969, unpublished); cf. also Philip M. Mbithi and Fred E. Chege, "Linkages between Agriculture and Rural Small-scale Enterprises", Occasional Paper No. 6 (Institute of Development Studies, University of Nairobi).

⁴³See also chapter XIX below.

⁴⁴See also chapter XII above.

⁴⁵See also Appendix IV below.

⁴⁶Cf. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1972, pp. 134 ff..

⁴⁷Cf. Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey 1975, p. 44 and Economic Survey 1978, p. 59.

⁴⁸Cf. e.g., The Weekly Review, September 19, 1977 and some of the letters to the editor in the following issues.

⁴⁹This is also reflected, for example, in many of

the attitudes expressed by this group which we discussed in Part Four above.

⁵⁰Cf., e.g., Hartmut Elsenhans, "Zur Rolle der Staatsklasse bei der Überwindung von Unterentwicklung", in Alfred Schmidt (ed.), Strategien gegen Unterentwicklung (Frankfurt: Campus, 1976), pp. 250 - 265.

CHAPTER XVIII

¹The distinction between horizontal and vertical forms of social mobility is discussed, for example, in Pitirim Sorokin's fundamental study Social Mobility (New York: Harper, 1927).

²Cf. his famous essay "Warum gibt es in den Vereinigten Staaten keinen Sozialismus?" (first published Tübingen: 1906).

³Some of the differences in this regard between Australia, Canada, and the United States are discussed by Seymour M. Lipset, The First New Nation (New York: Basic Books, 1963), chapter 7.

⁴See chapter I above.

⁵The influence of, for example, Horatio Alger's novels in this regard in the United States is discussed by Richard R. Wohl, "The 'Rags to Riches Story' - An Episode of Secular Idealism", in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset (eds.), Class, Status, and Power - Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective (2nd edition, New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 501 - 506.

⁶The long lasting overestimation of the chances of social mobility in the United States compared to Western European countries is also emphasized by Seymour M. Lipset and Hans Zetterberg, "A Theory of Social Mobility", in Bendix and Lipset (eds.), op. cit., pp. 561 - 573.

⁷See also chapter II above.

⁸The exact migration streams, based on the 1962 census, are illustrated by Simeon E. Ominde, Land and Population Movements in Kenya (London: Heinemann, 1968), pp. 122 ff.. Further information, based on the results of the 1969 census, is also provided by Henry Rempel, "The Extent and Nature of the Population Movement into Kenya's Towns", Institute for Development Studies, Working Paper No. 160 (Nairobi, May 1976).

⁹See also chapter II above.

¹⁰Questions 2 a and b.

¹¹Strictly speaking, we should have asked respondents for the occupation of their fathers when these were at about the same age as they themselves in order to account for the possibility that the fathers had reached the peak of their career only at a later age which was not yet comparable to that of our respondents (for this point cf., e.g., also Lipset and Zetterberg, op.cit., p. 565). In the Kenyan situation, however, where almost three-fourths of respondents came from agricultural backgrounds with only very limited "career" opportunities during a person's lifetime, we could afford to neglect this aspect.

¹²For more detailed data concerning this objective overall structural change see also the subsequent chapter below.

¹³We were able to assess the property situation of the parents of respondents in any more simple manner only as far as the most important agricultural means of production in Kenya (land and cattle) are concerned. This covered, however, the background of three-fourths of respondents. Some more information on these aspects can also be gained from an earlier monograph: Dirk Berg-Schlosser, The Distribution of Income and Education in Kenya - Causes and Potential Political Consequences (Munich: Weltforum-Verlag, 1970).

¹⁴Cf., e.g., also the table showing the better performance of pupils at Nairobi high cost schools compared to low cost and rural schools presented by Anthony Somerset, "Who goes to Secondary School? Relevance, Reliability and Equity in Secondary School Selection", in David Court and Dharam Ghai (eds.), Education, Society and Development - New Perspectives from Kenya (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 162, and some of the other articles in this volume. The importance of a central institution of higher learning for social stratification and elite formation in Kenya in an earlier period is also documented by B. Kipkorir, "The Alliance High School and the Origins of the Kenya African Elite 1926 - 1962" (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Cambridge University, 1969).

¹⁵Questions 35 c, d and f.

¹⁶Question 27 d.

CHAPTER XIX

¹See also Appendix IV below.

²For a brief historical account of this period, which also points to some of the causal factors affecting Kenya's social structure, see also chapter II above.

³Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Kenya Statistical Digest (June 1970).

⁴International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Kenya: Into the Second Decade (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1975), Part II, pp. 85 ff.

⁵The assumptions concerning the annual sectoral rates of growth, the increases in labor productivity and employment are as follows:

Sector	sectoral rate of growth (%)	growth of labor productivity (%)	growth of employment (%)
Modern agriculture	3.5	3.5	-
Mining and quarrying	4.8	3.5	1.3
Manufacturing and repairs	9.47	2.5	6.97
Building and construction	4.5	4.5	-
Electricity and water	5.0	6.0	1.0
Transport and communications	5.0	3.5	1.5
Trade	5.0	3.5	1.5
Services	5.0	3.5	1.5

⁶The required skilled manpower as a percentage of wage employment in each sector is as follows: Modern

agriculture 3.48; mining 9.66; manufacturing 20.58;
 construction 13.76; electricity 24.96; transportation 17.0;
 trade 29.91; services 19.49.

⁷The projections of the world bank model end with the year 1985. We have carried them forward, using the same assumptions and sectoral interrelationships, until the year 2000.

⁸The full utilization of these reserves, which is very costly in the case of artificial irrigation, can be expected to absorb approximately 200,000 additional families at the most, i.e. the population growth of about 5 to 6 years.

PART SIX: SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS

¹This point is also emphasized by Nicos Poulantzas, for example, cf. his L'Etat, le Pouvoir, le Socialisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1977), in particular chapter I.

²We have discussed this problem more fully in our essay "Zur Werturteilsproblematik der Sozialwissenschaften" (forthcoming).

³Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy - Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).

⁴For a comprehensive discussion of the critical reception of this study cf. Jonathan M. Wiener, "Review of Reviews", History and Theory, vol. XV (1976), pp. 146-175.

⁵Moore, op. cit., p. XIII. Moore is actually referring here to "small countries" in general, including European and North Asian ones as well.

⁶An assessment of some basic approaches of this school of thought is given, for example, by Herman Kahn, "On Studying the Future", in Fred I Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds.), Strategies of Inquiry, Handbook of Political Science (New York, 1975), vol. 7, pp. 405 - 442.

⁷This point is also emphasized by Steven Langdon, who provides some good case studies illustrating the mediating and regulative role of the state vis-à-vis these different interests. Cf. his "The State and Capitalism in Kenya", Review of African Political Economy, no. 8 (Jan. 1977), pp. 90 - 98.

⁸In this point we do not agree with Langdon's otherwise quite thoughtful assessment, cf. ibid., p. 97. Henry Bernstein in his "Notes on Capital and Peasantry", Review of African Political Economy, no. 10 (Dec. 1977), is also more skeptical in this regard.

⁹Cf. Karl Loewenstein, Political Power and the Governmental Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

¹⁰For the use of this term cf. Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States (The Hague: Mouton, 1968).

¹¹David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), chapter 10.

¹²Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order -

The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

¹³For this notion cf. Weber, op. cit., chapters IX and X, a more recent discussion is, for example, Ann Ruth Willner Charisma and Political Leadership - A Theory (Princeton: Research Monograph No. 32, May 1968).

¹⁴For a description of his style of leadership cf. Henry Bienen, Kenya - The Politics of Participation and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 73 ff..

¹⁵Cf. Michaela von Freyhold, "The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version", Review of African Political Economy, no. 8 (Jan. 1977), pp. 75 - 89.

¹⁶Cf., e.g., Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh", New Left Review, 74 (1972), pp. 59 - 81; John S. Saul, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania", The Socialist Register (1974), pp. 349 - 372; or Colin Leys, "The 'Over-developed' Post-Colonial State: A Re-evaluation", Review of African Political Economy, no. 5 (1976), pp. 39 - 48.

¹⁷Cf., e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

¹⁸Most aspects of contemporary democratic theory are covered, for example, in the readers edited by Charles F. Cnudde and Deane E. Neubauer, Empirical Democratic Theory (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969); Henry S. Kariel, Frontiers of Democratic Theory (New York, Random House, 1970);

or Frank Grube and Gerhard Richter, Demokratietheorien (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1975). Some critical assessments from their own respective vantage points can also be found in Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1970); C.B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory - Essays in Retrieval (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Wolf-Dieter Narr and Frieder Maschold, Theorie der Demokratie (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1971); or Fritz W. Scharpf, Demokratietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung (Kronberg: Scriptor, 1975).

¹⁹Cf. e.g., J.L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1960).

²⁰Cf., e.g., Joseph Schumpeter's concept of "elite competition" in idem, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1943); Robert A. Dahl's concepts of "pluralism" and "polyarchy" in idem, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); and idem, Polyarchy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); or Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

²¹This is the title of a book by Charles Lindblom (New York: The Free Press, 1965).

²²E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 35.

²³For this point cf., e.g., also Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power", APSR, 56

(December 1962), pp. 947 ff..

²⁴For the different elements of this definition see also John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics", loc. cit..

²⁵Cf., e.g., the documentations of this aspect by James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement", loc. cit.; and Herbert McClosky "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics", loc. cit..

²⁶Cf. Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society (New York: The Free Press, 1968) and some of his other works; or Frieder Naschold, Organisation und Demokratie (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969).

²⁷Cf. his "Typologies of Democratic Political Systems", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (April 1968), pp. 35 ff.; or his Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).

²⁸For a documentation of some of the regional imbalances see also our "District Development Index" in Appendix III below.

²⁹For the use of this notion cf., e.g., Jürgen Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973).

³⁰Such alliances have become clearly visible, for example, in the KANU elections conducted at different levels in 1977/78, cf. The Weekly Review of this period for a good coverage of these events.

³¹Republic of Kenya, The Constitution of Kenya

(Nairobi: The Government Printer, 1969), chapter II, part 1, articles 3a and 5a.

³²For a critical evaluation of some aspects of Kenya's system of local government cf. also the lecture given by Dirk Berg-Schlosser on "Selected Problems of Local Government in Kenya and the Federal Republic of Germany" during a course on development administration organized for senior Kenyan local government personnel by "Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Zusammenarbeit", Berlin, May 1977 (unpublished manuscript).

³³Constitution of Kenya, op. cit., chapters IV and V.

³⁴The Weekly Review, December 5, 1977, pp. 9 f..

³⁵For a discussion of this problem cf. also Dieter Senghaas, Weltwirtschaftsordnung und Entwicklungspolitik - Plädoyer für Dissoziation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977).

³⁶For this term and some of the alleged social conditions and political consequences cf. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (New York: The Free Press, 1959).

³⁷This is argued, to some extent, for example, by Rupert Emerson, "The Prospects for Democracy in Africa", in Michael F. Lofchie (ed.), The State of Nations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 239; and Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice - Political Participation in Developing Countries (Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).

³⁸A study of military regimes in Latin America showed, for example, that these were by no means economically

more successful than their civilian counterparts, cf. Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in Non-Western States", APSR (December 1970), pp. 1131 ff..

³⁹For these notions cf. Kahn, op. cit..

APPENDIX I

¹Cf., e.g., Babbie, op. cit., p. 376.

²Cf., e.g., the collections of such measures at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan such as the volumes by Robinson, Rusk, Head, op. cit., and Robinson and Shaver, op. cit..

³The exact sources are specified in Appendix II below.

⁴For a discussion of this problem, which has been most extensively dealt with in relation to different measures of "authoritarianism", cf., e.g., also Robinson and Shaver, op. cit., pp. 214 ff..

⁵Questions 21 a - 21 h.

⁶A scale of this kind can potentially satisfy the criteria of "Guttman"-scaling. Even though our items did produce a certain "coefficient of reproducibility", we did not attempt, for a number of substantive and methodological reasons, to make this scale fit these conditions perfectly. Instead we were content with a purely cumulative score, irrespective of the order of the items. For a more general criticism of Guttman-scales cf. also Jum C. Nunnally,

Psychometric Theory (New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1967), pp. 64 ff..

⁷Questions 33 b, f; 34 a, e, f, g, i.

⁸Cf. E. Bogardus, Immigration and Race Attitudes (Boston: Heath, 1928). Later applications include Harry C. Triandis and Leigh Minturn Triandis, "A Cross-Cultural Study of Social Distance", Psychological Monographs (1962), vol. 76, no. 21; or idem, "Some Studies of Social Distance" in Martin Fishbein (ed.), Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement (New York: Wiley, 1967).

⁹See chapter XVII above.

¹⁰See chapter XIV above.

APPENDIX II

¹This relatively extensive section dealing with agricultural matters turned out to be quite time-consuming. It can, of course, be shortened in further applications of this or similar questionnaires. Besides serving some special interest of the author in this still most significant sector of Kenya's economy, the "down to earth"-character of these questions also contributed to a greater willingness to talk to our interviewers on the part of the respondents and a greater confidence in our undertaking as a whole. For this reason we also included questions inquiring about some personal data of respondents (education, occupation, income etc.) in this more general economic context rather than placing them at the end as is the rule for many other studies.

²One question which we missed here, to our regret, and which is also important for a discussion of the "kulak" problem is a specific inquiry about paid help farmers may employ on a permanent or temporary basis from outside their own immediate family.

³These questions were to give us some clues as to the "life-histories" of respondents in order to assess some of the personal and collective formative factors of Kenya's political culture. Explicit extended "life-history" interviews have also been conducted by Almond and Verba, op. cit., for example.

⁴These questions again are somewhat extensive and could be shortened in future at least in situations similar to that of Kenya. The details we asked for did not yield much additional information for our purposes and probably are of interest for the specialist only. In the Kenyan context explicit questions asking for membership in "tribal welfare organisations" and the political party probably could have yielded some more information on these points than this purely open-ended form.

⁵Questions concerning media participation were, of course, very prominent in Lerner's original study, too. Cf. Lerner, op. cit..

⁶These questions are modelled along the usual "political information"-scales, cf., e.g., the one constructed by Matthews and Prothro, op. cit..

⁷Similar questions inquiring about local persons of respect and influence and opinion leadership in general

have been asked by Lerner, op. cit..

⁸ Social trust was also one of the central categories of Almond and Verba's study, cf. question 7 of their questionnaire.

⁹ These questions, as a further measure of his variable, are adapted from Rosenberg's "Faith in People"-scale, cf. idem, Occupations and Values (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 25 - 35. Question 25 is adapted from Lerner, op. cit., question 103.

¹⁰ In some Kenyan ethnic groups there is a belief that stating the exact number of one's children or of cattle may inflict misfortune upon them. For this reason we rather asked for the different ages of the children of respondents, which they were willing to report quite eagerly, and established the total number of children in this way.

¹¹ Here the appropriate vernacular term was substituted by our interviewers.

¹² In a pre-test version of this questionnaire we had also included an explicit question on circumcision. This turned out to be very sensitive and we decided to drop it in the end. But membership in an age-set also usually implies to have been circumcised, depending on the customs of the particular ethnic group.

¹³ Cf. Almond and Verba, op. cit., questions 54 and 55.

¹⁴ Here, given the still large number of adherents of traditional beliefs in some areas, a more open-ended wording like "Are you a member of any church or religious

group? (IF YES) Which one?" might have been more appropriate. It is also important to instruct the interviewers carefully to put all the questions about religious beliefs (31 b and 31 c) to all respondents, irrespective of whether they are a member of any formal religious organization or not.

¹⁵This scale has been constructed following Bogardus' example, cf. *idem*, op. cit..

¹⁶Questions 33 and 34 include some items adapted from some of the more common "political participation"-scales, cf., e.g., Matthews and Prothro, op. cit., or Almond and Verba, op. cit.. Questions 33e and 33 i also probe to some extent for Almond and Verba's variable of a "sense of civic competence", cf. *idem*, op. cit., questions 15 and 16.

¹⁷These are some central issues relevant to the Kenyan situation. In other contexts some of these questions must be modified, of course.

¹⁸This is adapted from Almond and Verba's question 18.

¹⁹Cf. Almond and Verba, op. cit., question 30. As one further alternative mode of action an explicit statement concerning working through some formally established interest groups like professional organizations etc. could have been included here. In other countries an explicit distinction between approaching local authorities or the national government may also make more sense than in the present rather centralized Kenyan system. A separate question on "output relations" (cf., e.g., Almond and Verba, op. cit., questions 34 and 37 a) also could have been included in this section of our questionnaire.

²⁰Cf. Almond and Verba, op. cit., question 33.

²¹Cf. Lerner, op. cit., question 102.

²²Cf. ibid., question 92.

²³These are items taken from Herbert McClosky's "Belief in Equality"-scale, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics", APSR (1964), vol. 58, pp. 361 - 382..

²⁴These are items from W.C. Kaufmann, "Status, authoritarianism and anti-semitism", American Journal of Sociology (1957), vol. 62, pp. 279 - 382.

²⁵These items are adapted from the "California F-scale" developed by Adorno et al., op. cit.. Some of these are taken from the shortened ten-item version of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. Item 3 in particular did not turn out to be very useful in the Kenyan context.

²⁶Cf. Herbert McClosky, "Conservatism and Personality", APSR (1958), vol. 52, pp. 27 - 45.

²⁷Cf. idem, "Political Cynicism"-scale in: "Consensus and Ideology...", loc. cit.. Item 20 did not generate a great number of meaningful responses.

²⁸Cf. ibid. scales on "free speech", "rules of the game", and procedural rights.

²⁹Cf. McClelland, op. cit., Appendix VI.

³⁰Cf. Morris Rosenberg, Society and the Adolescent Self-Image (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

³¹Cf. Herbert McClosky and John H. Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy", American Sociological Review, (1965), vol. 30, pp. 14 - 40.

³²These are the three items which we repeated towards the end of this section in order to assess the consistency of the answers of respondents.

³³Cf. McClelland, op. cit., Appendix VII.

³⁴To get at the problem of capital punishment as such this item should have been transformed into a more balanced separate question.

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
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MAP

Distribution of Population in Kenya by Provinces and Tribal Areas, 1962



Source: Kenya Government 1965

Distribution of Population in Kenya by Provinces of 1955



Map of Kenya 1955

