

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BASES OF
POLITICS IN KENYA: A STRUCTURAL
PART I

BERG-SCHLOSSER, DIRK 1979

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THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BASES OF POLITICS IN KENYA: A STRUCTURAL
AND CULTURAL ANALYSIS

University of California, Berkeley

PH.D.

1979

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The Social and Economic Bases of Politics in Kenya
A Structural and Cultural Analysis

By

Dirk Berg-Schlosser

Grad. (University of Munich, Germany) 1968

DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

Political Science

in the

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

Approved:

<i>Carl H. Roth</i>	<i>Oct. 30, 1979</i>
..... Chairman Date
<i>Robert M. Jensen</i>	<i>Oct. 30, 1979</i>
.....
<i>Elizabeth Colson</i>	<i>Oct. 30, 1979</i>
.....

GRADUATE DIVISION DECEMBER 9, 1979

PREFACE

Each major scientific undertaking has its own little "biography". The history of the present study is a particularly long one, having had both its very rewarding and also quite dramatic moments. It has extended over a period of almost 14 years now and has always centered around the same basic question, namely the conditions and chances for democratic government in Africa, and the same "case", Kenya. In the course of time I have attempted to attack this problem from a variety of angles, testing a multitude of approaches for their applicability and fruitfulness. The present solution certainly is not the "last word" on this topic, if there ever will be one, but it reflects both the development of my own thinking and the many changes our discipline as a whole has been going through during this period.

It all began with a stay of three months in East Africa in the summer of 1966, organized by the "Studienkreis Kontinente und Kontakte" in Hamburg. During this time I collected material for my "Diplomarbeit" which was already on "Das politische System Kenias und seine wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Voraussetzungen", and which was presented, under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Hans Maier, to the "Staatswirtschaftliche Fakultät" at the University of Munich in April 1967. After my examination as "Diplom-Volkswirt" in summer 1968, I did two years of graduate studies

at the University of California at Berkeley.

Among the tangible products of my invaluable experiences there are a monograph on "The Distribution of Income and Education in Kenya - Causes and Potential Political Consequences" (Munich: 1970), which deals with the "structural" side of my topic, and the basic work for my German dissertation on "Politische Kultur - Versuch der kritischen Rezeption, Ausweitung und Vertiefung eines neueren politikwissenschaftlichen Ansatzes" (Munich: 1972), an attempt to deal with the theoretical bases of the "cultural" side of my analysis. This was again presented, under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Theo Stammes this time, to the "Staatswirtschaftliche Fakultät" at Munich in May 1971. In the summer of 1970 I had also formulated the theoretical approach of the present study for the first time at the occasion of my "advancement to candidacy" for the Ph. D. at Berkeley. In the summer of that same year I took part in a first intensive course of Kisuheli at Indiana University in Bloomington/Indiana.

In the summer of 1971, as a member of the "IFO-Institute for Economic Research" at Munich, I had the opportunity to take part in the preparation of a report on "Programmierung der mittelfristigen deutschen Entwicklungshilfe an Kenia" for the "Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit" in Bonn, which included another stay of almost 2 months in this country. In 1973 I obtained a "Habilitationstipendium" from the "Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft" at Bonn-Bad Godesberg, which provided the funds for my field research in Kenya from April 1973 to October 1974

and my subsequent stay until August 1975 at the Survey Research Center of the University of California at Berkeley, where I processed the survey data I had collected and began with their analysis. For this purpose I received a further grant by the Dean of the Graduate Division there. The analysis was then continued at the University of Augsburg, where extensive use has been made of the "Rechenzentrum", until the present day.

Some of the material analyzed, with a somewhat different focus, was then accepted for my "Habilitation" by the "Philosophische Fakultät I" of the University of Augsburg in June 1978.

My intellectual debts, but also the many forms of practical assistance I received are so enormous that it is impossible to list them here in any greater detail. All in all almost a hundred persons were directly involved at different stages in the execution of this project. They and their respective institutions can be assured of my continuing gratitude. But Professors Carl G. Rosberg and Elizabeth Colson at Berkeley, who really went out of their way to assist me in any possible manner during all phases of this undertaking, must be explicitly mentioned. My thanks to them can never be "paid" for in full. My wife Irmela again was a constant companion and tireless helper in all conceivable situations. To her and to Alka and Sita, our "cross-cultural" daughters, this work is dedicated.

Steinebach/Woerthsee, September 1979

Dirk Berg-Schlosser

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	1
LIST OF TABLES	ix
PART ONE. INTRODUCTION	
	1
Chapter	
I. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	8
Dimensions of political analysis	8
The "objective" dimension	11
The "subjective" dimension	24
Some specific methodological problems and procedures	40
II. THE CASE OF KENYA	49
The reasons for selection	50
Some comparative background data	55
A brief historical account	70
The pattern of politics after independence	105
Foreign relations	129
PART TWO. THE HORIZONTAL PATTERN OF SOCIETY: THE MAIN ETHNIC GROUPS	
	136
III. THE KIKUYU	151
General background and economy	151
Social and political structures	162
IV. THE KAMPA	173
General background and economy	173
Social and political structures	183
V. THE MIJIKENDA	193
General background and economy	193
Social and political structures	205
VI. THE LUYIA	213
General background and economy	213
Social and political structures	228

	Page
VII. THE LUO	238
General background and economy	238
Social and political structures	252
VIII. THE KALENJIN	259
General background and economy	259
Social and political structures	275
IX. THE MAASAI	285
General background and economy	285
Social and political structures	302
 PART THREE. THE VERTICAL PATTERN: KENYA'S CLASS STRUCTURE	 321
X. THE AGRICULTURAL CLASSES	325
The large-scale farming sector	325
The small-scale sector	328
XI. THE NON-AGRICULTURAL UPPER AND MIDDLE CLASSES. .	339
The capitalists	339
The managerial class	340
The state class	341
The non-agricultural bourgeoisie	343
The salariat	346
XII. THE NON-AGRICULTURAL LOWER CLASSES	350
The non-agricultural proletaroids	350
The non-agricultural proletariat	352
XIII. MARGINAL GROUPS	357
 PART FOUR. THE COMPARATIVE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE MAIN CONFLICT GROUPS	 362
XIV. LEVELS OF SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION	365
Family relations	367
Traditional social bonds	371
Scope of social trust	374
Ethnic identity	379
Religious affiliations	382
Class consciousness	385
National identity	392

	Page
XV. SOME BASIC SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES	399
Ascriptive social criteria	399
The social and political role of women	403
Attitudes towards social change	414
Life satisfaction	419
Disposition towards violence	428
Political authoritarianism	433
Acceptance of democratic values	437
XVI. SPECIFIC ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS THE POLITICAL SYSTEM	443
Common historical experiences	444
Media exposure	450
Levels of political interest and political information	457
Political participation	464
System support	485
Input orientations	493
The role of Members of Parliament	499
Orientations towards central government structures and the bureaucracy	508
System evaluation	515
Alternative orientations	521
 PART FIVE. DYNAMIC ASPECTS OF SOCIETY	 536
XVII. CONFLICT-GROUP RELATIONS	537
Race relations	537
Ethnic relations	546
Religious relations	558
Class relations	562
XVIII. SOCIAL MOBILITY	573
Geographical mobility	575
Class mobility	579
XIX. THE PROCESS OF STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION	590
Class formation 1950 - 1970	592
Projected developments 1970 - 2000	600
 PART SIX. SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS	
XX. ETHNIC PROFILES	608

	Page
The Kikuyu	612
The Kamba	616
The Mijikenda	618
The Luyia	621
The Luo	624
The Kalenjin	627
The Maasai	629
XXI. CLASS PROFILES	634
The non-agricultural upper and middle classes	635
The non-agricultural lower classes	637
The agricultural classes	641
XXII. SOCIETY AND STATE	646
The present situation	648
Classificatory attempts	652
Prospects for "democracy"	658
Future dynamics	668
APPENDICES	674
I. METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX	675
Sample specifications	675
Index and scale construction	679
II. THE QUESTIONNAIRES	687
The English version	689
The Swahili version	709
III. DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT INDEX	728
IV. OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION 1950 - 1970	736
NOTES	763
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	870
MAP OF KENYA	918

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
I, 1. A structural model of Kenya's society	20
2. Selected comparative indicators of "modernization" in Kenya	59
3. Kenya's external trade (1975)	61
4. East African trade (1975)	63
5. Kenya's main trading partners	64
6. Foreign aid to Kenya	65
7. Incremental capital output ratio of main economic sectors	69
II, Comparative data for Kenya's main ethnic groups	
III, 1. Some basic aspects of class position	323
2. Dynamic types of small-scale agricultural development	331
3. Comparative data for the agricultural classes	335
IV, 1. Family relations; by class and ethnic group . .	369
2. Clan and age-set membership; by class and ethnic group	372
3. Restricted scopes of trust; by ethnic group	375
4. Aspects of general social trust; by ethnic group	377
5. Self-centeredness of ethnic groups	381
6. Self-centeredness of religious groups	383
7. Acceptance of wages and profits; by class . . .	387
8. Preferred form of land ownership; by class and ethnic group	389
9. Percentage favoring limitation of land owner- ship; by class and ethnic group	391

Table	Page
10. Objects of national pride; by ethnic group . . .	396
11. Persons being proud and/or critical of their country; by ethnic group	398
12. Agreement with ascriptive social criteria; by ethnic group	402
13. Parents' decision-making; by ethnic group . . .	405
14. Decision-making in own family; by ethnic group .	407
15. Social and political role of women; by sex and ethnic group	411
16. Expression of "traditionalism"; by ethnic group	416
17. Expression of "anomie"; by class	418
18. Life satisfaction; by class and ethnic group .	419
19. Biggest personal problem; by class and ethnic group	421
20. Perceptions of the economic future; by class and ethnic group	426
21. Disposition towards violence; by ethnic group . .	430
22. Political authoritarianism; by ethnic group . .	435
23. Acceptance of democratic values; by ethnic group	439
24. Attitude towards democracy; by ethnic group . .	440
25. Important personal experiences; by ethnic group	446
26. Important political events affecting respondents; by ethnic group	448
27. Radio exposure; by ethnic group	452
28. Newspaper exposure; by ethnic group	455
29. Political interest; by ethnic group	457
30. Political information; by class and ethnic group	460
31. Forms of political participation; by ethnic group	466

Table	Page
32. Overall political participation score; by class and ethnic group	471
33. Types of participants	477
34. Types of participants; by class and ethnic group	481
35. System support; by class and ethnic group	488
36. Input orientations; by type of participant and ethnic group	495
37. Percentage knowing name of M.P.; by class and ethnic group	501
38. Most important national problems; by ethnic group	509
39. Percentage stating that government is dominated by certain groups; by class and ethnic group	513
40. Criticism of national affairs; by ethnic group	516
41. Things respondents would do as head of government; by ethnic group	519
42. Role accorded to foreign capital; by class and ethnic group	523
43. Preference for a more socialist system; by class and ethnic group	527
44. Attitude towards Kenya's party system; by class and ethnic group	531
V, 1. Race relations; by ethnic group	541
2. Ethnic distance histograms; self assessment	548
3. Outgroup rejection	549
4. Ethnic group clustering	551
5. Ethnic distance chart; mutual perceptions	552
6. Religious relations	561
7. Work relations	566
8. Geographical mobility; by class and ethnic group	577

Table	Page
9. Inter-generational class mobility	580
10. Further aspects of inter-generational mobility	583
11. Rates of vertical mobility; by class and ethnic group	586
12. Social aspirations for children; by class . . .	589
13. Changes in Kenya's class structure 1950 - 1970	593
14. Diagrams of Kenya's society 1950, 1960, 1970 . .	598
15. Projections of further social differentiation. .	602
16. Diagrams of projected developments 1985, 2000. .	605
VI, 1. Specifications of rural sample	676
2. Specifications of urban sample	677
3. Specifications of total weighted sample	678

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

"There are two reasons why there are several types of democracy. One ... is the difference of character between the peoples of different states. The second ... is the different possible combinations of the features which characterize democracy and are supposed to be its attributes. One variety of democracy will have fewer of these attributes; a second will have more; a third will have them all. Now there is a double advantage studying all the separate attributes of democracy. Such study not only helps in constructing some new variety which one may happen to want: it also helps the reform of existing varieties."

Aristotle

For a long time the study of comparative politics was confined to the "Western" part of the northern hemisphere, and the "models which were developed largely reflected this limitation. ¹ Until the second half of this century such models were concerned mostly with "constitutional" government and "parliamentary systems", and possible institutional shortcomings in their proper functioning. In the late 1950s and early 1960s an attempt was made to "transplant" such models, whether of the "Westminster", the

French or the American type, to newly independent states in the "Non-Western" areas of the world, mostly in the southern hemisphere. It then quickly became apparent that the institutional arrangements of Western governments were not really applicable, nor could the normative concept of "democratic man", as conceived by Western philosophers, be taken for granted in these areas.

Of the more than 40 "Black" African states which achieved their independence from colonial rule during this period, only about one-fourth were able to maintain a semblance of the kind of political system originally established. The majority experienced drastic changes in their governmental institutions within a few years of independence, most often by means of a military coup d'etat. Even prolonged periods of civil war (as for example in Zaire, Nigeria, Angola, or Ethiopia) have not been uncommon. A number of countries by now have gone through multiple major changes in their system of government (e. g. Dahomey six times, Nigeria and Ghana four times each).²

On the other hand, all too often the assertion is made, in particular by those with vested interests in the preservation of existing conditions, that Africa is not "ripe" for democracy, that its peoples can only be ruled by "benevolent" authoritarian regimes who know what is best for them, and that, in the long run, the chances of any evolution towards political systems providing more representation and self-determination remain highly doubtful. Although this kind of concept was most bluntly

applied in the context of direct colonial rule, a context which has vanished, a similar rationale can be found in the arguments of many African rulers and, even more, in those of their foreign supporters.

Hardly any one of these assertions, however, has been subjected to systematic investigation and this "theory" and its empirical basis have never been properly specified. The actual cultural and social structural conditions which are conducive to democracy have hardly been explored under present-day conditions in the developing world. Among contemporary social scientists there is little agreement on the most important elements of a "theory of democracy".³ They have been able to specify neither a generally applicable normative concept for a theory of democracy nor the social conditions which might help to bring democracy about. All too often the failure of some particular institution in Africa (e.g. parliaments or supreme courts) and the collapse of supposedly representative regimes have been taken as sufficient evidence that democracy cannot work there. If insight can be gained by studying the social bases of politics at the lower end of the scale of "development", this in turn may provide a clue concerning the chances of success of democracy in other more "developed" parts of the world and a way of specifying universally applicable elements of a theory of democracy.

During the sixties various theoretical approaches were developed by a number of "modernization" theorists

to cope with the problem of political development. The original scope of comparative politics was considerably widened.⁴ It became concerned with the social and economic bases of politics, at least in aggregate terms, the large variety of possible "party-systems" and other "input"-structures, the multitude of institutional arrangements at the level of central government, bureaucracy, the military, and similar more specialized aspects.

Despite these efforts the political scientists reached no consensus about a common paradigm nor did they provide any theory useful for understanding what was going on in "developing areas". After a decade of work, there was less agreement than ever.⁵ Not only had there been an "over-selling" of concepts, as noted by Sidney Verba,⁶ but basic assumptions, such as those of the unilinearity and unidimensionality of the development process, were being challenged. David Apter, an early proponent of the study of political development, confessed that the field, as he saw it, was "a shambles".⁷

Towards the end of the 1960s another school of thought came to the fore which explicitly rejected some of the "Western" biases of the earlier modernization theorists. Its proponents stressed the external relations of Third World countries, their continuing dependence on the industrial capitalist world and the active process of under-development which this entails. In the beginning they focussed primarily on Latin America where this process has become most strongly apparent,⁸ but then they

turned to other parts of the Third World.⁹ Critics soon noted, however, that historical reality in many instances did not fit one-sided and exclusive "dependencia" explanations either and that interactions between the specific internal social and economic conditions of a country and its external partners must be taken into account.¹⁰

During the seventies a series of studies was instituted by Marxist-inspired authors who emphasized both the internal "political economy" of Third World countries and their peripheral position in the capitalist world.¹¹ These authors, at least the less orthodox among them, produced a very fruitful discussion of the modes of production, class relations, the role of the state in the Third World and its interrelationships with the capitalist metropolises both at the theoretical level and in a number of detailed case studies.¹² Needless to say, not all authors have agreed on all issues and much debate is still continuing.

Thus no generally accepted model for the analysis of class structures in the Third World has been developed so far, nor is there agreement over the role of the state in such circumstances. Some of the inherent limitations of the Marxist approach should be noted. A purely "political economic" analysis tends to neglect other potential levels of conflict, such as ethnic, religious, and other "communalistic" levels. When these coincide with class divisions, conflict may become extremely virulent. The

"objective" analysis of internal and external economic conditions alone also overlooks more subjective matters, e.g. the actual forms of consciousness and the particular historical traditions of the groups and actors concerned. These may be decisive in certain situations.

We propose to focus our own analysis on the "social bases" of politics in Kenya in a relatively broad sense of this term because we think that some of the aspects touched upon in this study have remained relatively unexplored in the more narrowly focussed earlier work. It provides additional and somewhat more comprehensive information on the Kenyan situation. It may serve as a frame of reference for other studies which seek to widen our understanding of this part of the world and thus of human relations as a whole by using a comparative approach.

Part One gives an overview of the study's theoretical framework and presents the "case" of Kenya in some detail. Part Two is devoted to an extended discussion of the traditional background of Kenya's main ethnic groups. Part Three provides an analysis of the vertical social structures, i.e. the relevant classes within Kenya's total social formation. Part Four explores the subjective aspects of these structures through an elaborate comparative analysis of the political culture of both vertical and horizontal conflict groups. Part Five discusses the immediate conflict group interactions and some of the longer-term potential structural develop-

ments. In a final section we attempt to draw conclusions as to the types of political systems which would fit the situation we describe and assess the chances of "democracy" in Kenya. These conclusions, by necessity, are of a tentative nature because of the complexity of the problem and the rapidly changing conditions in this part of the world. Hopefully the findings will be useful for a more comprehensive effort at theory-building at some later date.

CHAPTER I

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Dimensions of political analysis

Political science, like all social sciences and other fields of knowledge concerned with man, deals with a complex reality that has both "objective" and "subjective" dimensions. ¹ Whereas the former deals with the more concrete objects of the outside world, like governmental institutions and other politically relevant social structures, the latter is concerned with the "subjective" orientations and perceptions of individuals and groups relating to these structures and towards the processes which are relevant for their functioning. This is an important distinction, because it can be shown in many instances, that a purely institutional or structural analysis of a given situation will tell us little about the actual functioning of political institutions and their chances of success, if we do not take into account the beliefs, attitudes and values (in short, the "culture") of the actors involved and the individual interpretations and meanings they attach to these structures. On the other hand, a "cultural" analysis alone lacks a more stable framework to which we can link subjective perceptions and it tends to overlook significant factors of the objective reality which may develop important dynamics of their own.

Both dimensions, therefore, are indispensable for a proper and adequate analysis of political phenomena. For heuristic purposes, however, we propose not to assume any a priori causal relationship between the two, but rather to treat both kinds of variables as being potentially independent in any given situation, and to specify the exact nature of their relationship only after this has been established by empirical research.

In addition to these two dimensions of social and political life, a third one should not be forgotten, particularly in the field of political science proper. Since the early beginnings of systematic inquiry, it has been the concern of theorists in this field, not only to describe and analyze the political realities of their time, but also to establish criteria for a "good" and "just" social and political order. The bases for judgements of this kind have varied in the course of time and the processes of knowledge and experience from which these were derived range from transcendently inspired religious revelations to the critical secular reasoning of man. This field of "political philosophy", in our opinion, constitutes an equally indispensable part of political inquiry, and the "normative" dimension of politics, as we prefer to call it, should always be on our minds.

Furthermore, political reality is not only a multi-dimensional phenomenon, but one with "plastic controls".³ It occupies an intermediate position between absolutely deterministic systems ("clocks" in Popper's metaphor) and

completely indeterminate ones ("clouds"). The social sciences, therefore, in contrast to the "hard" natural sciences which are concerned with the world of "objects" alone, are dealing with a subject matter which is characterized by interactions between its different dimensions and which remains in a state of constant flux. The search for regularities and inter-subjectively transmittable knowledge, which is the task of all sciences, must thus be seen within clear limitations of time and space. Without specifying each time their special historical and geographical context, the social sciences either are pursuing a pure model platonism, devoid of all reality, or they remain at the level of extremely simple and trivial platitudes. A "medium-term" time perspective (i.e. covering, say, 5 to 20 years) and a meaningful geographical limitation (mostly at the country and "area" level in political science) are most appropriate for the majority of purposes.

"Idiographic" and "nomothetic" methods, which often coincide respectively with the historical and the comparative, the diachronic and the synchronic points of view, must be meaningfully "blended" in the analysis of each concrete case. This includes historical and hermeneutic procedures on the one hand and systematic quantitative analysis on the other. The composite picture which emerges, hopefully, will do justice to the individuality of the particular case and still be comparable in its characteristic elements and main variables.

Such an analysis also allows for a certain future-oriented perspective. By extrapolating observed trends and tendencies and revealing the dynamics of inherent tensions and contradictions medium-term potential developments can be delineated within realistic limits. This does not amount to an actual "forecasting" of particular events. Too many short-term imponderables and other not predictable factors (such as the impact of certain personalities, external events, etc.) are involved to make such attempts promising. The very idea of giving medium-term assessments about a limited range of potentialities implies that certain choices can still be made. Many social scientists would be happy if their "prophecies" could help to avoid certain outcomes and thus be "self-defeating" ⁴ in the end.

The "objective" dimension

Within this multi-dimensional framework of analysis we shall focus our attention on the "objective" and "subjective" dimensions of the social bases of politics, i.e. the most relevant social "structures" and their respective "political culture". By "structures" we understand all analytically distinct social groups which are part of the total pattern of social differentiation either in a "horizontal" or "vertical" sense. ⁵ Horizontal or "communal" groups share the following three distinguishing characteristics: ⁶

- 1) They comprise persons who, at least in a certain respect, are characterized by a common culture and identity;

- 2) they encompass the full range of age and sex differentiations in a society;
- 3) they are differentiated as is the wider society to which they belong by wealth, status, and power.

Horizontal structures in this sense are, for example, racial, ethnic, tribal or religious groupings in a larger society. In the case of Kenya, the most important and politically relevant horizontal distinction is the grouping of people according to their ethnic or "tribal" background. Although the cohesiveness and the degree of "identity" of these groups is by no means the same, they are relatively easy to identify in terms of a common language and "culture" and constitute widely accepted "reference groups" in Kenya's society. In most areas they are also geographically distinct.

It is more difficult to identify distinct structures in the overall vertical pattern of a society which are meaningful for our purposes. The current inductive models of social stratification, whether based on "objective" criteria like income or occupation or on "subjective" factors such as a person's status or prestige, usually employ an arbitrary number of categories (often of the six-fold Warner-type of "upper upper", "lower upper" etc. classes). Since most of the selected criteria are not discontinuous and do not provide any "natural" cutting points for their pattern of distribution, the dividing lines between the established categories are equally arbitrary (e.g. income groups of "less than \$ 2,000 a

year, "§ 2,000 to § 2,999", etc.).⁷ In this way very different persons with the same level of income, as for example an independent small-scale farmer, a factory worker, or a public employee who may have very distinct economic interests and political outlooks are all classified within the same category. These purely formal concepts, therefore, do not correspond to any "real", existentially-based social groupings with a capacity for mobilization. Apart from the rather limited purpose of describing the overall distribution of such factors in a given society, approaches of this kind render little information on the nature and number of actual social conflict-groups and the resulting dynamics between them.

One possibility of arriving at more meaningful inductive criteria in any given case lies in the application of more hermeneutical procedures.⁸ By subjectively "understanding" a structure and then interpreting it in this light, new insights concerning its most important constituent parts and the pattern of their interaction may indeed be gained. However, systematic application of this mode of investigation implies new and practically insurmountable problems of controlling its results inter-subjectively and of devising meaningful, general categories for purposes of historical and international comparison. For this reason, to our knowledge, no major studies of social stratification based on hermeneutically derived categories and criteria have been undertaken to date.

Deductive models have been developed mostly by Marxist-oriented authors. More dogmatic variants of this kind, using simple dichotomisations such as those between feudal lords and serfs, bourgeoisie and proletariat, oppressors and oppressed, etc., have not been very helpful for the analysis of historical social formations.⁹ Marx's own historical-materialistic analysis greatly exceeds in its empirical level of information and theoretical significance the attempts of his more orthodox followers.¹⁰ Later efforts, such as Geiger's, which were not necessarily "Marxist", but which were developed through critical discussions of Marx' categories, are rare and have not been internationally recognized.¹¹ A more historical-materialistic attempt to analyze the concrete structural developments of different social formations was undertaken by Barrington Moore in the last decade;¹² it does not, however, explicitly develop a more general structural model nor is it undisputed.

Only in recent years have Marxist-inspired authors made renewed efforts to apply theoretically more stringent and differentiated historical-materialistic categories to the analysis of particular contemporary societies.¹³ But when the same case has been analyzed by different authors, each has arrived at a very different conceptual model and concrete empirical results.¹⁴ This is mostly due to the unsatisfactory treatment of the "middle classes" in these studies and the lack of a sufficient sectoral differentiation, e.g. between private and public sectors of the economy.

A similar reproach must be made for the often employed category of "petty bourgeoisie", in which often quite different categories of people (e.g. members of the bureaucracy, petty traders, "kulak" peasants, etc.) are simply lumped together.¹⁵ Towards the end of their analysis many of these authors also commit a "jump into eschatology", which is not justified by their preceding empirical findings. This applies, for example, to the theory of "state monopolistic capitalism", which without further justification is understood as the basis of the IMSF-study, or the postulate of a "historical alliance" between the urban industrial proletariat and small-scale agricultural producers in Shivji's work.¹⁶

In view of these predicaments we have attempted to devise a social structural model which is meaningful in its theoretical content and which, at the same time, reflects Kenyan reality. Without pretending to have removed existing conceptual difficulties or even the remaining meta-theoretical contradictions, we claim to have developed, at least for the purposes of our own concrete analysis, a theoretically fruitful and empirically feasible solution of the current dilemmas of social structural categorization. Our main aim in this regard is the identification of potential conflict-groups on an overall "national" level, which cut across the existing ethnic and other "communalistic" structures in Kenya.

For this reason we renounce the "multi-dimensionality" of many current approaches of social

stratification ¹⁷ and restrict the discussion of social structures to the "objective" dimension alone. In doing so we return, with Marx and others, to a single central criterion: the economic position of individuals and groups in society and the objective dominant differences of interest which arise from it. Thus we are first concerned here with the process of occupational differentiation and the increasing division of labor which can be observed in the process of economic "development". ¹⁸ The second step then consists of identifying certain typical "clusters" in this process which comprise groups of people with objective common interests. The decisive criterion here is the relationship of each group towards the means of production.

The most basic distinction in this regard is, of course, that according to the ownership of the means of production. In this way owners and non-owners, "bourgeoisie" and "proletariat" in modern industrial society can most easily be identified. In our opinion, however, a further distinction is equally necessary, one which does not refer to the question of legal ownership of the means of production alone, but also to the actual decision-making authority over them. This applies, on the one hand, to those large-scale joint stock companies where the functions of nominal ownership by a great number of "anonymous" shareholders clearly have been separated from the actual day-to-day decision-making powers. In this way we arrive at a conceptual division between the capitalists proper whose dominant source of income is a pure "capital rent"

and the members of the "managerial class" who receive a contractually fixed salary. This distinction is also useful when "publicly"-owned enterprises have to be considered: those with the final decision-making authority at the company level similarly constitute a group of their own. In each particular case then further sectoral differentiations are required for the identification of potential conflict groups. In our case, given the still largely agricultural nature of Kenya's economy, certainly a division between the agricultural and the non-agricultural private sectors is appropriate.¹⁹ In other instances further differentiations between the private industrial sector, the commercial and financial sphere, private services, etc. may be useful.

A third relationship towards the means of production, in addition to legal ownership and the decision-making authority at the company level, is that of political control. Depending on the particular economic and political system in each country, this control varies from a rather remote setting of legal conditions, industrial standards, work relations, foreign trade regulations and the like, even in otherwise "laissez-faire"-oriented economies, to the direct interference into the production plans, prices, etc. of each firm in more centrally planned systems. The group which exercises this kind of control has variously been called the "political class",²⁰ the "state class",²¹ or the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie".²² It comprises the members of the government and usually "politically" appointed

incumbents of the top decision-making positions in the state bureaucracy, including those working in para-statal organizations, public boards, etc.

A further major step then consists in identifying the major source of income for those in each capacity and each sector. In this way three kinds of persons can be distinguished in our private ownership category: those who derive their income almost exclusively as a "capital rent", those who earn their income in approximately equal parts based on their capital and their own labor, and those who are almost entirely dependent on their labor alone. In this way the "capitalists" can be distinguished from the typical "old middle class" owner-entrepreneurs, i.e. the "bourgeoisie" in the original more restricted sense of the word, and the "proletaroids"²³ who derive their income mainly from their own labor, even though they own some minimal means of production and are formally "independent" (such as single craftsmen without any employees or small kiosk owners).

In the decision-making sphere we find it useful to make a parallel distinction between those who exercise the final authority at the company level, those who have an intermediate decision-making authority, and those who have no authority at all. In addition to the "managerial class" at the top and the "proletariat" proper at the bottom, a middle stratum of heads of departments or workshops, industrial foremen, members of the scientific or commercial "salaried intelligentsia" and other employees

at the middle management level can thus be identified. This, in our view, is a more useful distinction than the one based on a purely legal criterion such as distinguishing between "employees" and "workers" or the one derived from a simple external fact such as "white collar" or "blue collar" occupations. To subsume all kinds of employed persons under the category of the "working class", on the other hand, does not seem to do justice to the differences of interest among members of this category and the self-identification of persons at the middle level; it cannot simply be regarded as a mere "false consciousness".

These distinctions can be extended to those working in the public sector and the bureaucracy. For most practical purposes those working at the middle level in these areas can be lumped together with their colleagues in private enterprises as members of the "salarariat" or the "new middle class", while those with no decision-making authority at all in the public sphere can be considered to belong to the general "proletariat".

Finally, those persons who do not have any regular occupation or permanent source of income at all must be grouped under the residual category of the "sub-" or "Lumpenproletariat". This group includes unemployed persons, but also petty thieves, prostitutes, social "dropouts", and others who are economically "marginal".

These classifications are summarized in the following diagram:

TABLE I, 1
A STRUCTURAL MODEL OF KENYA'S SOCIETY

Relationship to means of production	Private ownership		Decision-making authority only	Political control
	Agric. sector	Non-agric. sector		
Dominant source of income				
Upper classes: Capital	Large-scale farmers	Capitalists	Final authority: Managerial class	State class
Middle classes: Capital and labor	Agric. bourgeoisie	Non-agric. bourgeoisie	Intermediate: Salarariat	
Lower classes: Labor	Agric. proletarioids	Non-agric. proletarioids	None: Proletariat	
Marginals: No permanent source	Sub-proletariat			

This model thus fulfills the criteria of a scientifically correct categorization: it is unidimensional, exhaustive and consists of mutually exclusive categories. In contrast to most common models of social stratification it also allows for a theoretical definition of the borderlines of each category. Further differentiations (such as between different economic sectors for capitalists and members of the non-agricultural bourgeoisie) may be useful in certain instances and should be judged in terms of their

relevance in each particular case. For our purposes this model proved to be by and large adequate and sufficiently operational for the analysis of Kenya's class structure. The "labels" we chose for each category are arbitrary. Similar ones (such as "old middle class" for the bourgeoisie and "new middle class" for the salariat) are equally adequate as long as the theoretically derived conceptual definitions are maintained in each instance.

It should also be noted that these categories refer to members of the labor force only. Those persons who are not yet part of the labor force are grouped as dependent family members under the "head of the household" (whether male or female) in each case. In certain instances adult students, who can no longer be considered as dependents but who have not yet become members of the labor force, can be regarded as a conflict group *suigeneris*, even though (because of the transitory nature of their position) they do not actually form a "class" of their own. Persons who have retired from the labor force or who have become disabled are still considered to be members of the class to which they originally belonged, even though their actual source of income (e.g. drawing pension benefits or being paid by a social security fund) may have changed; their form of social identification (and political consciousness) is most likely to remain the same.

The relationship between these classes is determined by the dominant mode of production, in our case a mostly "peripheral-capitalistic" one.²⁴ As far as individual classes are concerned this relationship need not

necessarily be of an antagonistic nature, as is usually implied by orthodox Marxists. Rather, symbiotic-complementary relationships (as between capitalists and the managerial class or, in certain cases, the state class) or largely autonomous positions (as that of the agricultural proletoids and the sub-proletariat) are also conceivable. The objective interests of each class and its specific conflict potential towards others ²⁵ thus have to be determined concretely in each particular case, even though some "typical" conflict situations are certainly of a more general nature. The purely quantitative size of each class, as will be established more precisely below, is, of course, not the only factor in this regard. But changes over time in the size of these groups are an important indication for some aspects of the dynamic processes which can be observed.

The possible modes of action adopted by a particular class are further factors to be considered. In this regard possible strategies of "social closure" may be of particular interest. These include "exclusive" strategies of upper classes and "solidaristic" ones of the lower classes. ²⁶ In reality some cross-cutting relationships may also be found between analytically distinctly separable classes, such as the exchange based on close kinship ties of food supplies and monetary support between the agricultural classes and members of the urban proletariat or salariat. Furthermore, the extent of intra- and inter-generational social mobility among the different classes is of great

importance for the development of their relationships and the conflicts between them. Longer-term changes in the quantitative and qualitative strength of these groups and the, at least temporary, "coalitions" they may have with others also can only be established by a concrete "historical-materialistic" analysis in each case and not by purely a priori assumptions.

The operationalization of this class model poses additional difficulties and depends to a large extent on the kind of sources and the quality of the statistical material which are at hand in any particular case.²⁷ In the class analysis of data from our own survey we made use of the job descriptions obtained by our interviewers. Only in cases where no clear-cut differentiation on this basis was possible was the income of respondents used as an additional indicator of class position. Here we divided the self-employed into capitalists who earn Kshs. 3,000.- or more per month, members of the non-agricultural bourgeoisie who earn between Kshs. 800.- and 3,000.- and the non-agricultural proletarioids who earn less than Kshs.800.-. The respective figures for employees are Kshs. 3,000.- or more for the managerial class (Kshs. 1,600.- and above for the special group of the "state class") between Kshs. 400.- and 3,000.- (1,600.- for the public sector) for the salariat, and less than Kshs.400.- for the proletariat. In the agricultural sector we divided the progressive cash crop farmers into those cultivating less than 5 acres (approximately 2 hectares), grouping them with the agricultural proletarioids, and those cultivating more

than that as members of the agricultural bourgeoisie (the truly large-scale farmers are a very distinct and clearly separable category in Kenya anyhow). Housewives and economically dependent family members were grouped along with the head of the household, usually the husband or father. All these operationalizations are, of course, arbitrary to some extent, but they seemed to be most appropriate for the present situation in Kenya and can easily be revised or adapted for other cases if necessary.

In contrast to more orthodox analysts of social classes, we do not consider this model of stratification to be universally or eternally applicable in all its features. We contend, however, that it sufficiently reflects the emerging pattern of vertical political conflict groups, based on their "objective" economic interests, in Kenya today and possibly in quite a number of other countries in comparable stages of economic development and social differentiation. In this way, we think, it constitutes a fair compromise between the exigencies of completeness and specificity on the one hand and meaningfulness and theoretical usefulness on the other.

The "subjective" dimension

The analysis of the subjective dimension of the social bases of politics has a long intellectual history. In fact it can be traced back to writers as early as Herodotus and Thucydides.²⁸ Generalizations about forms of behavior seen as characteristic for certain peoples

or ethnic groups can also be found in literary accounts all over the world. Until very recently there was no way of establishing the validity and reliability of such generalizations by empirical research, and these assessments remained largely speculative. They often contributed to the acceptance of shared stereotypes which form the basis of the common kind of prejudice members of one society have towards another. Such common perceptions of one's ethnic neighbors, for example, reflect to a certain extent the historical experience members or groups of one society have had with individuals or groups from another. The attitudes formed by this experience are transmitted by the usual socializing agents of a society. They are often reinforced by the twin processes of selective perceptions and selffulfilling expectations when an individual has the chance to come into personal contact with members of other societies himself. The grain of truth which may have been concealed in these perceptions, thus often becomes grossly distorted. As a result, very often not only "wrong" (in the sense of a false perception) but also dangerous (from a humanistic point of view) attitudes prevail which not infrequently have been the underlying cause of a great deal of hostility and warfare. Not surprisingly, therefore, the analysis of how such attitudes are formed, transmitted and acted out in manifest behavior has become one of the concerns of the behavioral sciences. 29

Social research has also been concerned with discovering the "true" character of certain social groups

and their prevalent pattern of attitudes and behavior, both because of the intrinsic values of such knowledge and as a means to expose the biased character of many of the common stereotypes. Early studies of this kind, more often than not reflected the prejudices of their authors; scientific and critical self-conscious assessments of this difficult and complex subject have remained rare.³⁰ In particular, many of the "race theories" which attempted to derive conclusions on the social and political behavior of individuals and peoples on the basis of very simple genetic assumptions, have been of the extremely prejudiced type.³¹

Compared with the analysis of "national character" or "modal personality",³² the concept of political culture is both narrower and larger. It is narrower in the sense that it is concerned only with explicit value orientations while neglecting the analysis of drives, needs, and other personality characteristics which may be the bases of these orientations. It is larger, however, in the sense that the study of political culture does not so much focus on the search for a single or even several dominant "modal" types of personality, but rather takes into account a wide range of existing value patterns in the total range of their distributions in a society, regardless of whether they show a certain typical frequency or whether they "cluster" in certain types of personalities.

The concept of political culture is also more open in its assessments about the possible "sources" of

culture in a society. It carefully avoids the tacitly implied genetic causal explanations of a good deal of the "national character" literature and clearly depicts "culture" as a "learned" phenomenon. It also takes the emphasis away from very early socializing factors in the life of individuals, which were prominent in the more psychologically oriented studies of "national character". Instead, it attempts to identify important political socializing influences during more or less the whole life-span of a member of a society. These include family structures, but also peer-group influences, the educational system, relations at the working place, etc. ³³

In addition to these individual socializing factors, the concept of political culture also includes the "collective memories" of a society. These reflect the historical experiences of a nation (and of course of all its members at this time), in particular economic or political crises or events such as economic depressions, revolutions, wars or political assassinations which leave their "scars" on its consciousness. Experiences of this kind are transmitted by the usual socializing agencies in both their cognitive and their evaluative, and possibly also affective, aspects and contribute to distinct kinds of political behavior even after several generations have passed since the original events. ³⁴

The term "political culture" as we use it today was first coined by Gabriel Almond. ³⁵ He defined it as the "particular pattern of orientations toward political

actions in which every political system is embedded".³⁶ The use of the word "culture" in this context carries the hidden danger that the many connotations associated with this word³⁷ make it a "catch-all" notion with very little analytical significance.³⁸ Indeed, to a certain extent this is what seems to have happened in recent years, and some of the major proponents of the concept seem to be somewhat less pleased with it today.³⁹ Nevertheless, since this term "covers" largely what was described above as the "subjective" dimension of political reality, it may as well be used as long as one is aware of its pitfalls and always attempts to define it in a carefully analytical manner.

For this reason we now specify how the concept shall be applied in our own analysis. "Culture" shall refer to the universe of beliefs, attitudes and values existing in a given society at a given point in time.⁴⁰ Such beliefs, attitudes and values are conceived, following Rokeach, as being grouped on a central-peripheral dimension,⁴¹ beliefs being the most peripheral and values the most central "predispositions to action". Attitudes in this concept are thought of as being in the middle position on this axis and constitute "a relatively enduring organization of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner".⁴² Conceptualized in this way, the term "attitude" constitutes, for most practical purposes, the most convenient short-hand expression. It avoids the vastness of all kinds of particular "beliefs" on

the one hand, which may number in the thousands and change relatively quickly, and the more sweeping generalizations on the other, which so easily occur if one only looks at a few central "values" in a society. Attitudes thus seem to contain a sufficient amount of specificity to make meaningful and differentiated results possible. Between the various elements of a social or individual belief system (which may, after all, be a better term than the vague "culture" with its variety of common meanings and connotations) we do not assume any a priori consistency,⁴³ i.e. a pattern free from serious internal contradictions. This could only be established by research and is not a part of the definition of the concept.

An attitude conceived in this way contains three elements which are often difficult if not impossible to isolate experimentally: the "cognitive", the "affective" and the "evaluative".⁴⁴ This distinction has become commonplace in the attitude research literature since it was, to our knowledge, first introduced by Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils.⁴⁵ The cognitive component refers to a person's orientation towards knowable objective facts regarding certain objectives, actions, etc. and answers to the question "who do you think is right (i.e. has the better information)?" The "affective" component (or "cathexis") refers to a person's emotional predisposition towards objects or actions and answers to the question "what do you like or dislike?" The "evaluative" component, finally, refers to a person's normative standards and answers to

the question "what do you think is good or bad?"

Between all these "organized beliefs" (i.e. attitudes) and their components and actual behavior no simple one-to-one relationship can be assumed.⁴⁶ Many other environmental factors can intervene in a given situation and change behavior which otherwise would have been expected from a preceding analysis of attitudes. This inherent limitation of attitude analysis in political culture has been compounded by the gap which often exists between the "micro" (i.e. in this case the individual) and the "macro" (i.e. the social) levels of analysis and has led to some dissatisfaction with the usefulness of the concept of "political culture" as it is currently employed.⁴⁷

In order to further clarify our own position, the following points are made:

1. We do not make any a priori assumptions as to which variables (e.g. the "structural", as Marx tends to do, or the "cultural" as is implied in more "Weberian" approaches)⁴⁸ shall be treated as the independent ones. We consider both kinds of variables as constituting potentially independent factors in any given situation, and we shall specify the more precise nature of their relationship only after this has been established by empirical research.
2. We do not imply any explicit or implicit normative model in our analysis of political culture as was the case in some earlier mainly American or "Anglo-Saxon" studies.⁴⁹ Instead we think it necessary to understand each

"culture" in its own terms before making normative evaluations, e.g. referring to some particular theory of democracy.

3. We do not want to reduce the analysis of political culture to the elaboration of a few central values, ⁵⁰ and consider it imperative not to preclude other elements a priori. In our view, a meaningful understanding of political culture can be gained only, if the range of variables analyzed is sufficiently wide to allow the accomodation of a large number of factors and if the analysis of a particular case is carefully linked to its concrete historical and social setting.
4. We do not imply any definite, and possibly premature, typologies of political culture at this point. Again these can only be the result of respective research where these seem to "fit" best as some convenient shorthand expression in the actually observed situation.
5. Our use of the concept of political culture does not imply any "total" explanation of the situation under consideration. Other approaches which meaningfully supplement a purely "cultural" one and which must be made explicit in any given case remain essential, too.

In view of this last point the limited explanatory power of the analysis of political culture within the more general social bases of politics must also be emphasized. In a later reflection on this problem Lucian Pye put it this way: "The situation is analogous to our ability to say 'something' about what a building will be like from the

knowledge of what its building elements are like, but to truly 'picture' the building, we need also to know the blueprints and the total design." ⁵¹ It is also in this respect that we think that "cultural" and "structural" approaches in the analysis of the social bases of politics supplement each other, the "structure" being the frame around which the "cultural" elements can be placed in erecting the "building" of any given society. In this sense also many of the "sub-cultures" (Almond), "fragmentations" (Eckstein) or "cleavages" (Lipset) ⁵² of political culture which often are observed can be taken care of.

Within the realm of the "culture" of a society as defined above and making use of its "structural" framework variables relevant for the analysis of political culture, i.e. the "subjective" dimension of the social bases of political systems, have to be identified. This is no easy task, even if a wider agreement on the notion of what is "political" could be reached. Variables of this kind have to fulfill the following conditions:

1. They must be sufficiently universal to be useful for the analysis of, at least potentially, all human societies, and to make possible meaningful comparisons among them.
2. They must be sufficiently defined both conceptionally and operationally to render useful results in empirical analyses.
3. They must be sufficiently limited in number to be manageable in empirical investigations without leaving

too much ground uncovered.

So far no satisfactory political, sociological or social-psychological model exists from which a limited but meaningful number of variables can be deducted. Almond attempted to define the range of political culture attitudes by linking them to "political objects" by which he understood the political system in general, its respective input and output structures, and the self as a political actor.⁵³ A definition of this kind, however, seems to be too limited to take into account other important attitudes in a society, which are directly or indirectly related to political matters, i.e. the degree of trust members of a society have towards each other, important authority relationships in other social structures, the degree of tolerance of the rights and beliefs of others, etc. In fact, in their own empirical work Almond and Verba considered a much larger range of variables of this kind without, however, providing us with a clear theoretical justification for their particular selection.⁵⁴

We are, therefore, left with a problem which Inkeles and Levinson describe in a similar context:

"It is evident that the choice of... variables for inclusion in recent studies is ordinarily not made on the basis of a systematic framework of... theory. Each investigator selects a few variables in which he is particularly interested, or for which quantitative measures are available. The need remains for a more inclusive, standardized and theoretically comprehensive analytic scheme in terms of which 'political culture'⁵⁵ can be described and compared cross-nationally... The quest for a standardized analytic scheme brings with it new problems. A workable scheme can hardly contain more than 30 or 40 categories. We do not yet have an adequate basis in... theory, and

certainly in empirical knowledge, for producing a set of variables sure to have universal applicability and significance. And in any case, a scheme which is limited to a relatively few, universally relevant variables would necessarily omit much that is important in any one society... A standardized analytic scheme can, at its best, add to the technical rigor and theoretical value of our investigations. Premature standardization, on the other hand, may seriously impair the flexibility and inclusiveness of analysis, and at its worst leads to rigorous measurements without concern for the theoretical meaning or functional significance of the variables measured." 56

For these reasons we decided to proceed in a tentative inductive-deductive manner at this relatively early stage of approximation between theoretical constructs and empirical reality. In a pragmatic way, we attempted, on the one hand, to "scan" some of the more important empirical investigations of political culture for the kind of variables they analyzed and to put them together in a more consistent way. On the other hand, we tried to limit the possible range of variables by defining more clearly what precisely we consider to be the realm of political inquiry proper.

In the course of the development of political science many definitions of its specific subject matter have been proposed, and since some of them serve different purposes of inquiry and are linked to certain metatheoretical points of view, there is no simple answer as to the right or wrong one. 57 For our purposes we prefer to define as "political" all elements of social life which are related to the authoritative decision-making potentially relevant for all members of a society. Conflicts about

such decisions are, given the diversity of all kinds of groups and interests in all societies we know, an integral part of this process. The central institutions of decision-making possess the monopoly of legitimate physical coercion. The basis of their legitimacy may, however, be doubtful in particular cases and can change in the course of time.⁵⁸ What properly belongs to this realm of public decision-making is, however, a matter of contention. Whereas, by their very nature, some parts of social life, must be regulated by this process, such as questions of foreign relations or defense, the compliance with certain standards of internal "law and order", and, we would add, the basic economic distributive mechanisms of a society, there are other areas which may or may not be subject to regulations of this kind (even ladies' hemlines are considered to be a political question in some countries). What is regarded to be "political" is, therefore, also part of a society's political culture or a regime's ideology, which may change in time and space.

The elements relating to the process of public decision-making include all "interests" involved and the beliefs, attitudes and values (i.e. "political culture") of individuals and groups, and the forces which shape them. The latter comprise the main socializing agents of a society, e.g. the family, schools, the place of work, the social class, and other groups of which one is a member, but only in so far as they relate to or shape "political" attitudes in the sense indicated above.

It may also be useful to distinguish between elements which are directly or indirectly political. The former include all factors which are at work in the political system proper, and which are directly concerned with the transformation of political inputs into political outputs. All other factors, such as the main political socializing agents in a society, can be considered to be only indirectly political, although their influence can by no means be neglected. On the contrary, it is one of our main arguments that these more indirect social and economic factors have been overlooked in many analyses of historical and contemporary political systems and that they are among the most important forces which shape a society's medium and long-term political development.

This is a fairly wide definition, but it has the advantage that it can be sufficiently operationalized to serve our purposes. We do not find it helpful to consider everything to be political in one way or another, as orthodox Marxists do with regard to all economic factors in a society, or as do some behavioralists with regard to all socialization processes. We think it is important to make clear analytic distinctions between the political, the economic, and other social spheres of life, although the latter undoubtedly have a considerable, but "indirect" impact on the former. We think it is more useful to make this kind of influence the object of inquiry rather than include everything a priori in the definition of what is political. Our final list can, of course, only be of a

preliminary nature. Further empirical research and subsequent theoretical refinement one day will probably bring us closer to our goal.

Three "spheres" of variables in particular seem to be relevant for our present concern. The first one refers to the degree of identification of the individual with larger social groups and, possibly, a "nation". It thus includes a measure for the range and intensity for an individual's "primary" identification with his ("nuclear" or larger) family, his attachment to sub-national "communalistic" social groups, his "class-consciousness" and his sense of "national identity".⁵⁹

The second sphere covers a number of more general social and economic attitudes which seem to be related, even if only indirectly, to the political life of a country. These comprise the acceptance of ascriptive social criteria including the role accorded to women, the degree of satisfaction with one's economic situation and the future expectations in this respect, attitudes towards social change, the acceptance of democratic values⁶⁰ and similar aspects.

The third kind of variables is directly related to political matters, i.e. to the input and output structures and the central institutions of the political system and its foreign relations. They include the level of a person's interest in politics, his degree of political information,⁶¹ the kind and degree of participation in politics⁶² (the two last-mentioned variable are strictly speaking not

attitudes but are related to a person's political interest), the degree of identification with a political party,⁶³ the sense of "civic competence",⁶⁴ the degree of "personalization" of politics in a country, the kind and degree of legitimacy of its political system, the trust in political leadership and the efficiency of public administration.⁶⁵ Certain alternatives to an existing political system may also be explored.

This huge range of variables is difficult, if not impossible to investigate in any single study. Nevertheless we think that at this early stage we should cast our net as wide as is theoretically meaningful and technically feasible in order not to miss aspects which may later turn out to be very important. In the future possibly multiple regression, factor analysis and similar techniques may be used to reduce the number of variables investigated in any single study. By then, too, firmer hypotheses may exist about particular central aspects of political culture whose interrelationships can be tested in a more specific and rigorous way.

In addition to "attitudinal" questions, a number of others are asked in most empirical studies which seek to obtain information of a more cognitive nature about an individual and his society. To this category belong the "life-history" questions about important events which affected the respondent's life, her or his most important personal problems, the most serious difficulties the country is facing and similar ones, which are used to establish or

to confirm hypotheses about individual and collective "sources" of political culture. This category of data often includes questions related to some specific but more fundamental political issues, such as basic aspects of the economic system (e.g. the role of private property, the influence of foreign capital, the role of unions, the level of wages, etc.) and other fundamental concerns in the social sphere (for example aspects of social justice), and important features of the judicial system (including, e.g., the role of capital punishment).

Finally, a range of questions about a respondent's personal status are an integral part of every empirical investigation. These are designed to fit an individual into a framework of more "objective" demographic information in order to establish correlations or, if possible, causal relationships between the "subjective" and the "objective" levels of analysis. Questions of this kind usually inquire as to age, sex, marital status, family size, ethnic group (where relevant), religious affiliation, membership in professional and voluntary organizations, level of formal education, occupation, income, place and time of residence (the latter for assessment of geographical mobility), possibly father's and mother's occupation and level of education (for comparisons of inter-generational social mobility) and similar indicators of an individual's position in society.

The selection of variables thought to be relevant for the study of political culture is only the first step

in an empirical investigation. The second one consists of an adequate operationalization of these concepts. The problems of measurement in this respect are enormous; probably only rough approximations will be possible for a long time to come. Most important, from a methodological point of view, are the problems of the homogeneity, reliability and validity of the measures employed and, for cross-national comparisons, their equivalence in different cultures. ⁶⁶

Some specific methodological problems and procedures

In order to assess all these aspects of Kenya's present society more fully we conducted a survey among seven of the main ethnic groups. The groups selected include Kenya's five largest ethnic groups, the Kikuyu, the Kamba, the Luyia, the Luo and the Kalenjin, all numbering more than one million people each, one major group from the Coast Province, the "Mijikenda", and, as a representative for the pastoralist peoples, the Maasai. In this way we were able to cover practically all important regions of Kenya except for the peoples of North-Eastern Province, who are mostly Somali-speaking. These practice the most important rural modes of production, i.e. cash crop farming, subsistence farming and pastoralism, together with some of the more important "mixes" in between. We are thus able to provide some information concerning almost 80 % of Kenya's African population, comprising the most important and the most active groups in Kenya's politics.

The final sample for our survey comprised 572 completed interviews. For the rural areas we had selected a total of 392 respondents on a quota basis, taking sex, age, and occupation as sampling criteria. In this way we were able to approximate roughly the actual distribution of these factors in each area, i.e. the "progressive" and subsistence farmers, landless farm-laborers, where these exist, and a certain proportion of those in non-agricultural occupations of all age-groups. Males were slightly over-sampled (in a ratio of 3 to 2). The interviews were conducted in each of the main districts of the home area of each ethnic group, except for the Kalenjin, where for technical and administrative reasons we had to confine our sample to Trans-Nzoia and Elgeyo-Marakwet Districts alone. The only alternative to quota sampling under the present conditions in rural Kenya and in the absence of any permanent and up-to-date population registers would have been random sampling on an area basis. This presupposes, however, the availability of detailed and reliable maps, the use of aerial photography for the selection of the individual homesteads and the accessibility of the finally selected sites on the ground, at least with some all-weather vehicle or on foot within practicable distances.⁶⁷ All this was precluded by existing administrative conditions in Kenya, and, most importantly, the size of our budget.⁶⁸

In addition we took a sample of 180 respondents in the city of Nairobi. Most of these were selected at random on the basis of their place of residence within the "Africa"

quarters" of town. These included both very poor and better-off housing areas. Detailed maps with a scale of 1:10 000 provided by the City Council proved to be adequate for this purpose. Among the shanty-dwellers of Mathare Valley we drew another small quota based on sex and age. In order to combine, where necessary, the rural and urban sample for our final analysis we weighted all respondents in agricultural occupations compared with those in non-agricultural occupations in a ratio of 3 to 1, so that in our overall sample these occupations are represented in approximately the same order of magnitude as in Kenya's society as a whole.

Even though these samples have some obvious limitations both in size and procedure, a "purer" and larger sample was not possible, given our limited resources, under the prevailing conditions in Kenya. After analyzing the data we feel confident that at least the most important qualitative aspects of the study have been sufficiently covered and that even approximately correct orders of magnitude for the distribution of the main variables have been obtained. ⁶⁹

On the whole this survey focused on the "mass" level of Kenya's society. In line with overall actual proportions it included very few members of the "upper" classes and does not allow for any generalizations at this level. An analysis of "elite" attitudes and behavior would have required a separate and sufficiently large sampling of this group. Since we were more interested in the mass

aspect of the political culture of Kenya and its main ethnic groups and classes, and again in view of our budget situation and some additional technical difficulties of a separate "elite" sample, we did not attempt to cover this aspect. A separate sample of university students, as a potential future elite, which would have been easier to obtain, did not appear to be an acceptable substitute in this case. Elite attitudes and behavior can be documented more easily with the help of other sources such as the news media, literary accounts and other written reports of people in contact with the elite, which is still the most accessible group for a great number of "Wazungu" (a somewhat derogatory Swahili term for "Europeans") in many African countries.

Each particular inquiry is also faced with a host of practical difficulties. These often start with the organization and coordination of a research program, the obtaining of a "clearance" from government authorities where necessary, the selection and training of helpers, and include many technical problems when a survey is conducted and one attempts to select a "random" sample under often extremely adverse conditions. Our study is a testimony to the difficulties of these theoretical, methodological and practical problems in the analysis of the "subjective" dimension of the social bases of Kenya's political system. The variables we finally selected for analysis are intended to reflect as much as possible the considerations given above. On the other hand, the limited availability of relevant

measures for some of them and other more practical limitations constituted important restraints.

Our questionnaire was first drafted in Berkeley in spring 1970.⁷⁰ This draft (in its English version, but used by Kikuyu-speaking interviewers) was submitted to a pre-test both in Nairobi and among rural respondents in the adjacent Central Province, the Kikuyu home area. Pre-tests in other rural areas were not possible because of the prohibitive expenditure these would have meant in travel costs, separate selection and training of interviewers at this early stage, etc. After the pre-test the questionnaire was considerably shortened. Some less important or less comprehensible, and also some "sensitive" questions were eliminated. The format was rearranged in some parts. The final version is far from ideal. In particular, it is still rather long (average interviewing time was between 1 1/2 and 2 hours). On the whole, however, it turned out to be a reasonably well-functioning research instrument.

The English version of the questionnaire was then translated into Swahili by an accredited interpreter and re-translated into English by one of our interviewers. In this way, some minor inconsistencies could be eliminated, and we are fairly confident, as far as our own knowledge of Swahili goes, and also judging from the final results which did not indicate any serious language problems among a particular group, that the two standard versions of our questionnaire are sufficiently equivalent. We could not afford, again for reasons of the expenditure involved, to

obtain similarly standardized versions for the other vernacular languages which had to be employed (Kikuyu, Kikamba, Luluyia, Dholuo, Nandi, Ol Maa, Kigiriama, etc.). Instead interviewers for each ethnic group, who all spoke the respective vernacular fluently, were trained to conduct the interview by employing one of the standard versions of the questionnaire and using their own language, where necessary, at the same time. The team of interviewers for each area also made a common verbal translation of the questionnaire and conducted some mock interviews among themselves employing the vernacular, so that at least agreement about appropriate terms, where in doubt, was reached within this group. Of all our interviews, 44 % were conducted in the vernacular language, 27 % in Swahili, 23 % in English, the rest in some mixed forms.

The selection of interviewers was conducted largely on the basis of personal contacts. When a team had completed its work in a particular area, we were usually able to recruit another one from among the friends of the first group. This was facilitated by the fact that a majority of our interviewers was drawn from a large national secondary school in Nairobi with students coming from all over the country. Most of our interviewers had completed their "A-level" examinations in the fall of 1973 and while they had to wait several months for the results of their exams, they were free (and eager!) to take up temporary employment before continuing at the university or in some other more permanent occupation. Each team of interviewers (usually

consisting of four students for a particular area) was then carefully instructed by us and trained in some mock interviews.

The basis of our operations was Nairobi for interviews with many Kikuyu, Kamba, and Maasai, but we had to travel considerable distances to reach the more remote home areas of the Luo, Luyia, Kalenjin, and Mijikenda; we stayed for about one week in each region. We usually found accommodation in some local "hotels", at mission-stations in some instances, or with private families. We must say that we developed a very good rapport with almost all of our interviewers during these common travels, sharing most aspects of daily life with them. In some cases this has developed into very cordial and still continuing personal friendships. This close contact also made it possible for each student to be immediately "debriefed" after having finished an interview so that problems could be straightened out at once. He could be sent back to a respondent, if necessary, when for example a question had been overlooked or when we wanted further clarification on a point.

In other matters we were less concerned with methodological perfection. We did not attempt, for example, to "standardize the interview situation" as some researchers do, e.g. by pitching a large tent at some place. We consider the possible distortion of having to bring a respondent over some distance to the place of the interview to be much greater (and his willingness to answer much less!) in this case. In our opinion, to sit in the shadow of a tree or

even to walk along with somebody herding his cattle provides a more appropriate interview situation under the existing circumstances in Kenya than any artificial and often meaningless "standardized" one. We also did not pay our respondents in any way, e.g. by offering them beer or "gifts" as is often done by foreign researchers in Africa. Instead our students explained the purpose of the interview as well as possible and asked for the voluntary cooperation of the respondents. The number of cases where this was refused was extremely low (less than 2 % altogether), and in most cases, after some initial distrust had been dispelled, the respondents proved to be very cooperative. In most instances we (i.e. my wife and I as "Europeans") were not apparent to the respondent in any concrete interview situation so that this element of distortion or distrust towards foreigners or people from outside one's own ethnic group could be largely eliminated.

As to the rest of our methodological and technical procedures not much needs to be added here which would differ from usually employed methods and be of more general interest. Perhaps we should mention one precaution which proved to be necessary: all our original questionnaires were transcribed by students on separate single "result sheets" so that we always had 2 copies available which could be mailed separately in several batches (photocopying of all completed 11-page questionnaires would have been prohibitively expensive). Indeed, when one parcel containing 80 original questionnaires mysteriously disappeared, we still could

make use of the completed result sheets. The processing of the data then went through the usual but time-consuming routines of coding, key-punching, cleaning, etc. at the Survey Research Center of the University of California at Berkeley. The program systems employed for data analysis were the "Berkeley Transposed File Statistical System" (nicknamed PICKLE) and, later at Augsburg, the "Statistical Package for the Social Sciences" (SPSS). 71

Our research methods and procedures are far from what they could have been "ideally". In the long run only cumulative and much more detailed studies of the different variables and social groups involved will do justice to the complex problems discussed here. If our necessarily limited "one-shot" analysis has shown some of the potentialities of the approach and, perhaps, can stimulate further investigations, it will have served its purpose.

CHAPTER II

THE CASE OF KENYA

"Case studies" are among the most important methods of investigation in the field of "comparative politics".¹ Each of the several procedures at hand attempts in a different way to cope with the most general dilemma of the "comparative method" in political science, namely the usually large number of variables and the relatively small number of cases which are to be considered. A case study is located at one of the possible extremes: it focuses on a single case, but it usually attempts to cover a very large number of variables. In this way it combines some of the idiographic aspects of the hermeneutic or phenomenological methods with the systematic and nomothetic aspirations of the social sciences, which provide the general framework for the selection of the variables and some of the major propositions. These can then be tested and, as the case may be, rejected, modified, or confirmed. A case study of this kind then can serve as a major point of reference for further investigations both across time for the same case, and space, comparing it with other studies which have a

similar theoretical framework, for example in the same geographical and cultural "area". Different "pure types" of case studies can be distinguished. Our investigation like many others, combines some of the characteristics of these types and is, in some respects, "descriptive", "interpretative", "hypothesis generating", "theory confirming", "theory infirming", and "deviant" at the same time. ²

The reasons for selection

The selection of any particular case always involves a variety of reasons, and not all of these are necessarily of a purely theoretical nature. Idiosyncrasies concerning both the respective investigator and the research conditions of a country are often of great importance in the selection. Usually some kind of compromise has to be struck between what is theoretically desirable and what is practicable and actually possible. But, after all, social science is concerned with "real life" and in our view the inherent limitations of a single case study and some of the practical shortcomings involved with the selection of a particular example are more than compensated for by the richness of the human, social and political experiences which can be gained and which in our field in most instances are by far preferable to the "sterile" conditions of an "ideal" laboratory.

The "idiosyncratic" reasons, as far as the author is concerned, include repeated personal contacts with East Africa, and particularly Kenya, as well as an undeniable affection for this country and its people which became stronger and stronger the more he got to know them. Research conditions in Kenya are relatively favorable both in terms of geographic accessibility and bureaucratic and political requirements, although this author also had his share of traumatic experiences concerning the latter. On the whole Kenya also has a well-developed statistical apparatus and most social and economic activities in the country are fairly well documented. Similarly the history of Kenya, at least since the beginning of the colonial period, has been relatively well investigated and the anthropological material concerning the traditional life of most of Kenya's different ethnic groups is in most cases sufficient for our purposes and fairly up to date. In addition, the growing "intellectual community" at the University of Nairobi and its different institutes and departments, no longer staffed exclusively by "expatriates" and other more or less temporary residents, provides a stimulating atmosphere where the "Kenyan" point of view (not necessarily that of the government, of course) is freely expressed and contributes to a fuller understanding of the facts and issues involved. Thus the "external" conditions which influenced our selection of this particular case were quite satisfactory.

But there were also sound theoretical factors determining our choice. To begin with, Kenya is one of the many countries at the "lower end" of the scale of social differentiation and economic development thereby providing a sharp contrast to the highly industrialized regions of the world, where most present-day social science theories were first formulated and of which this author, nolens volens, is also a part. If any of these theories, particularly those concerned with the social prerequisites and the viability of "democracy", should be of a truly general nature and potentially open to universal application, then Sub-Saharan Africa with its many newly formed states and its entirely different social and economic background should prove to be a particularly interesting "testing ground".

In addition to this more general reason, which applies to most African countries, there are also more specific ones which make Kenya a particularly interesting and theoretically promising case. Kenya's social structure shows an interesting mix of different principles of social stratification which have superseded each other in the course of time. Originally almost all the indigenous ethnic groups living in present-day Kenya had an "egalitarian-segmentarian" pattern of stratification, based on the different functional role of age-groups.³ Following the colonial conquest a new pattern emerged in the newly created political entity, comparable to that of a "caste"

system: ⁴ clearly defined social and economic borderlines based on racial origins were ascribed by birth and could not be transgressed. The top "caste" in this system was that of the colonial administrators, but included European settlers, businessmen and, at a later stage, industrialists. The second layer consisted of small-scale Asian businessmen and craftsmen who in most cases were also newly immigrated and who soon controlled almost all economic activities in these fields. At the bottom, finally, was the "mass" of the African population whose movements were restricted and whose economic chances were severely curtailed. As far as they were not left alone in their traditional subsistence economy, they were used as cheap labor on the European farms and in other enterprises and government services.

With the approach of independence, and very markedly thereafter, a different pattern of stratification once more, began to emerge. The racial and legal restrictions concerning the access of different economic and political positions were removed and from now on, at least theoretically, a person's position in society was to be based on his particular abilities and talents with equal chances of success. The increasing social differentiation which took place on this basis, coupled with the particular distributive mechanisms of Kenya's "capitalistic" economic system after independence, led to the formation of a "class" society where an individual's social position in a "vertical" sense is based on his differential and in some instances changing

relationship towards the means of production.⁵ In spite of the relative lack of important mineral and other natural resources, Kenya experienced an average annual rate of real economic growth of 6.6 % during her first ten years of independence;⁶ except for the Ivory Coast, this was achieved nowhere else in Africa. Thus the tendency towards the formation of "classes" was much more pronounced than in most other comparable countries.

Some aspects of class formation which are still more latent in other parts of Africa already have become manifest here. Today Kenya thus provides the peculiar example of a society where all these different factors (i.e. the egalitarian-segmentarian pattern, the "caste" and the "class" aspects) still exist side by side to a certain extent and interact in many ways. The particular dynamics generated by the different "vertical" and "horizontal" conflict groups should constitute a rewarding case, both for more generally interested conflict-theorists and researchers who are more specifically concerned with the social bases of democratic political systems.

Finally, and this is the most specific reason for selecting this case, independent Kenya has so far maintained a system of "parliamentary democracy" which includes regular and relatively "free" elections, the preservation of civil liberties and the rule of law. Without overlooking many actual shortcomings in this "democracy", it cannot be denied that the effectiveness and the duration of this

system are unique in Africa. It will be the task of this study to show under what kind of social, economic and political conditions this success was achieved, to point out some of the more important critical factors and to give an outline of some of the potentialities of political development in the future.

Some comparative background data

Keeping these considerations in mind, it is now necessary to briefly "present" the case in greater detail and thus provide the reader with some general background information. The territory which is known today as "Kenya" is situated at about the middle of the eastern coast of the African continent where it is approximately cut in half by the equator. In the east it borders on the Indian Ocean, reaching as far as Lake Victoria in the west. The country covers an area of 583,000 square kilometers or approximately 225,000 square miles,⁷ which, as these comparisons go, corresponds approximately to the size of France, but still amounts to about 100,000 square kilometers less than the area covered by the state of Texas. Only about 11 % of this land, however, is of high or medium agricultural potential with regular and sufficient rainfalls,⁸ most of the rest is covered by arid grasslands and deserts. There are few known mineral resources, and except for some soda ash and fluorspar, Kenya's main exports consist of agri-

cultural produce such as coffee, tea, pyrethrum, or sisal. For this reason, unless the continuing search for oil proves fruitful some day, Kenya belongs to the category of countries, now sometimes called the "Fourth World", who have to depend almost entirely on others for their supplies of energy and other important industrial raw materials.

In spite of the proximity of the equator the climate is temperate in most parts of Central and Western Kenya due to the relatively high altitude averaging between 1,500 and 2,400 meters (i.e. 5,000 to 8,000 feet). This relatively healthy climate and the resulting favorable agricultural conditions made these areas particularly attractive to immigrants. In the course of the great population movements on the African continent ⁹ "Eastern Nilotic" people ¹⁰ (as the Maasai) and "Southern Nilotes" (as the Kalenjin) entered the territory of present-day Kenya from the north, and people of Pantu origin came from the south (such as the Mijikenda, Kamba and Kikuyu ¹¹), and west (the Luyia and Kisii). People of "Western Nilotic" descent (the Luo) can also be found in the west and "Cushitic" groups (such as the Galla and Somali) dominate in the north and northeast. ¹² Altogether, 42 different African ethnic groups ("tribes") ¹³ are listed in the Kenyan population census. ¹⁴ This is a considerably lower number than in neighboring Tanzania (with more than 120 distinct ethnic groups), but still more than in Ethiopia, Uganda, or even Zaire. ¹⁵ The five largest groups (Kikuyu,

Kamba, Luo, Luyia, and Kalenjin), however, all of which number more than one million members each, account for more than 75 % of the total population. The comparable figure in Tanzania is only 25 % for the five largest groups. An "ethnic arithmetic" of this kind, therefore, already helps to explain some of the social and political dynamics in countries where conflict groups are largely based on ethnic factors.

In addition to this indigenous population there were also about 60,000 non-Kenyan Africans (mainly from Tanzania and Uganda), 28,000 people of Arab, 140,000 of Asian and 40,000 of European origin at the time of the last census in 1969.

The total population thus consisted of almost 11 million people. Because of the extremely high rate of population growth (3.3 % p.a. in the period between the last two censuses of 1962 and 1969) this number is increasing rapidly and at the time of writing there are probably 13 - 14 million people living in Kenya.¹⁶ This high rate of population growth is also responsible for the particular age structure of Kenya's society which can be compared to a pyramid with a very broad base and a relatively narrow and low top where about 50 % of the population are below the age of fifteen. This means, if one also includes those who are old and unable to work, that only about one-third of the population is in the productive age groups and must support the other two-thirds. This is an exact

reversal of the ratio which exists in most industrial societies today.

If one also takes into account the already mentioned fact that only 11 % of Kenya's land surface is of sufficient agricultural potential and that the rate of urbanization still is relatively low (about 10 % of the total population live in towns of more than 5,000 inhabitants), one arrives at a population density of 120 persons per square kilometer on the average in these agricultural areas. Under present methods of production this represents a genuine case of overpopulation in some regions ¹⁷ with all the ensuing results of soil depletion, erosion and ever worsening conditions of production. Kenya thus is one of the very few countries in Africa which already experiences a real shortage of agricultural land. The possibilities of enlarging this area to any significant extent or of increasing its productivity by means of irrigation, better fertilization, terracing, the elimination of the Tsetse fly etc. are also limited.

The following table gives a short statistical "profile" of Kenya using some of the more common available indicators for purposes of international comparisons:

/ Insert Table I, 2 /

As is readily apparent from this table, Kenya's rank on most of these indicators, which represent some aspects and degrees of "modernity", is almost always in the lowest quartile in world rankings. Although the data in this table are indicative of the state of affairs in the

TABLE I,2
 SELECTED COMPARATIVE INDICATORS OF "MODERNIZATION" IN KENYA

Indicators:	Kenya	Highest ranked country (name given in parentheses)	Kenya's rank (total N in parentheses)
GNP, total (in mill. US-\$)	846	695,500 (United States)	82 (135)
GNP per capita (in US-\$)	90	3,575 (United States)	108 (135)
% of male labor force in non-agric. occupations	20	99 (Kuwait)	98 (129)
Energy consumption (in kg per capita)	124	12,077 (Kuwait)	90 (129)
Food supply (calories per capi- ta per diem)	2,380	3,460 (New Zealand)	58 (107)
Medial care (physicians per mill. population)	103	2,393 (Israel)	87 (135)
Infant mortality (infant deaths per 1,000 births)	190	13 (Sweden)	92 (102)
Adult literacy (in %)	23	100 (Denmark)	93.5 (130)
Media participation: Newspaper circulation (per 1,000 population)	7	505 (Sweden)	97 (131)
Radio receivers (per 1,000 population)	37	1,234 (United States)	

Source:

Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (2nd edition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).

mid-1960s and do not show all changes which may have taken place in the meantime, these figures probably still give a fair assessment of Kenya's relative position in the world today. It also should be noted that all these indicators represent overall national averages which also include the quite substantial share of the Asian and European parts of the population. If data concerning only the African population were included here, Kenya's rank would be even lower. If we also calculate, again for purposes of comparison, an index for the "exposure to modernity" based on Deutsch's formula,²⁰ we arrive at a figure of 27 % of the population in 1963 and 43 % in 1973 who are "modern" in this sense. Corresponding levels for some other countries are (the latest available figure is for 1955!) India 34 %, Turkey 40 %, Egypt 47 %, Mexico 64 %.²¹ The annual average rate of increase in this measure thus was 1.6 % for Kenya's first ten years after independence, the "ten great years of Uhuru", as they were called at the celebrations of independent Kenya's tenth anniversary. The comparable figures (again periods prior to 1955) for some other countries are: India 0.6 %, Turkey 0.6 %, Egypt 0.7 %, Mexico 0.7 %.²² This shows, although the validity of this measure remains somewhat questionable, that the increase in the "exposure to modernity" and the corresponding rate of "social mobilization" has been very high during Kenya's post-independence period, and certainly constitutes one of the factors which help to explain some aspects of Kenya's present social dynamics.

Another very important aspect which characterizes Kenya's situation and which has received the increasing attention of social scientists in recent years²³ is her "dependence" on the outside world and her position in the "periphery" of the capitalist world economy. A few statistical facts and figures may again be helpful to illustrate this situation. A first indication of Kenya's particular kind of involvement in the world economy is given by the structure of her external trade relationships:

TABLE I,3
KENYA'S EXTERNAL TRADE (1975)

<u>Products</u>	<u>Total exports</u>		<u>Total imports</u>	
	value (mil. K.S)	%	value	%
Food	81.8	38.1	20.8	6.0
Industrial supplies	60.0	27.9	99.8	28.8
Fuels	58.2	27.1	95.0	27.4
Machinery	1.4	0.7	57.8	16.7
Transport equipment	1.3	0.6	44.0	12.7
Consumer goods	12.1	5.6	29.3	8.4
Total	214.8	100.0	346.7	100.0

Source: Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract 1976, pp. 77 and 90.

As table I,3 shows the overwhelming majority of Kenya's exports consists of agricultural products either

as food (such as coffee, tea, fruit, meat) or industrial raw materials (sisal, cotton, pyrethrum, wattle bark) and some minerals (such as fluorspat and sodium carbonate). The exported "fuels", Kenya having no oil resources of her own, are a special case because they consist entirely of re-exported petroleum products (mainly to Uganda) from the Mombasa refinery. If this item were excluded, the share of agricultural products and mineral raw materials among Kenya's exports would amount to more than 90 % of the total. In comparison, the percentage of manufactured goods, particularly as far as such important categories as industrial machinery and transport equipment are concerned, is exceedingly low. In contrast, Kenya's imports consist to the largest extent of industrial supplies, machinery and transport equipment, together with a quite sizeable amount of energy. The percentages for food and other consumer goods are relatively low, most of these products being consumed only by expatriates (including tourists), and the still relatively few indigenous members of Kenya's upper classes. It should also be noted that the overall trade balance is a distinctly negative one, not just for the particular year chosen but for all years since independence.

While these export and import structures clearly reveal Kenya's overwhelming technological dependence on the outside world, her trade relations with the neighboring countries indicate some of Kenya's importance as a "sub-

center" for the East African region:

TABLE I,4
EAST AFRICAN TRADE (1975)

<u>Products</u>	<u>Tanzania</u>				<u>Uganda</u>			
	Exports to value (mil.K.S) %		Imports from value %		Exports to value %		Imports from value %	
Food	3.3	16.2	3.6	42.9	3.1	12.0	0.2	13.3
Basic mate- rials and fuels	5.7	28.1	1.0	11.9	16.4	63.6	0.8	53.4
Manufactured goods	11.3	55.7	3.8	45.2	6.3	24.4	0.5	33.3
Total	20.3	100.0	8.4	100.0	25.8	100.0	1.5	100.0

Source: Statistical Abstract 1976, pp. 73, 75, 88, and 89.

Here, the manufactured goods clearly dominate among the exports (re-exported petroleum products to Uganda again being a special case), while the majority of goods imported from Tanzania and Uganda consist of food and basic materials (electric energy from the Owens Falls Dam at the river Nile in Uganda also being a somewhat particular item). The trade balance has been almost always in Kenya's favor.

In addition to the kinds of goods traded with the outside world, the particular direction these exports and imports take is also indicative of a country's overall "dependence":

TABLE I,5
KENYA'S MAIN TRADING PARTNERS

Area	Domestic exports by destination % (mil. KSh)		Net imports by country of origin %	
EEC	60.4	42.2	134.8	40.9
(of which U.K.)	(22.4)	(15.6)	(69.4)	(21.0)
Other Western Europe	11.2	7.8	17.5	5.3
Eastern Europe	2.3	1.6	3.4	1.0
North and South America	16.5	11.5	35.1	10.6
(of which USA)	(8.3)	(5.8)	(24.9)	(7.5)
Africa	27.8	19.4	1.9	0.6
Middle East	5.5	3.8	83.2	25.2
Far East and Australia	19.6	13.7	54.2	16.4
(of which Japan)	(4.5)	(3.1)	(30.0)	(9.1)
Total	143.3	100.0	330.1	100.0

Source: Statistical Abstract 1976, pp. 72 and 86.

Thus the vast majority of both imports and exports is conducted with Western industrial countries, the United Kingdom as the former colonial power still being the most important single partner in both regards. Trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is negligible and relations with other Third World countries (except for the oil imports from the Middle East) are equally insignificant.

A similar pattern emerges when we take a look at the sources of foreign aid to Kenya:

TABLE I,6
FOREIGN AID TO KENYA

Donor	Capital Aid 1964-71		Technical Aid (No. of personnel in 1971)			
	mil. US \$	%	Experts No.	%	Volunteers No.	%
Multilateral Aid: ^a	135.1	34	134	7	-	-
Bilateral public aid: ^b						
U.K.	162.1	41	1403	69	125	15
F.R.G.	29.3	8	72	3	36	4
Other Western European	23.3	6	277	14	315	39
Eastern European	0.5	-	11	1	-	-
USA	28.7	7	40	2	300	37
Japan	5.5	1	15	1	40	5
Other	9.3	3	65	3	-	-
Total	393.8	100	2017	100	816	100

Source: Wolfgang Ulbrich, Kenya - Voraussetzungen und Möglichkeiten der industriellen Entwicklung (Hamburg: Afrika-Verein, 1971), pp. 287 ff.

^a This consists mostly of aid granted by the World Bank and U.N. sub-organisations.

^b These figures do not include aid by non-government donors such as foundations, churches etc.

Here again the western countries and in particular the former colonial power clearly predominate. More than half of the capital aid given by the U.K. consisted, however, of subsidies for the purchase of large farms from

British settlers (approximately U.S. \$ 46.2 million) or of compensations and pensions paid to former colonial officers and civil servants (U.S. \$ 41.8 million). The share of British "experts", mostly as members of the "Overseas Services Aid Scheme" (OSAS), who perform regular duties in practically all branches of public administration, is also particularly striking. The extent of Kenya's dependence on these foreign sources becomes all the more evident when one considers the fact that 66 % of the planned overall development budget for the period 1966-70 was to be financed by foreign donors ²⁴ (the figures for the 1970-74 and 1974-78 planning periods are 53 % ²⁵ and 41 % ²⁶ respectively).

Since most of the capital aid is given in the form of loans (some on "soft" terms, others on regular market conditions), the amount of public debts incurred in this way also has been mounting continuously to a total figure of K£ 189.0 million in 1971. ²⁷ The servicing charges for these debts amounted to K£ 17.7 million, i.e. almost 10 % of the total government expenditure, in the same year. ²⁸

This external economic dependence is also reflected, again in a typical "peripheral-capitalist" manner, in the internal structure of the economy. Thus the ownership of industry and other big commercial and financial institutions still is to the largest extent in foreign, mostly British, hands. In 1968 (later comprehensive and reliable data are not available at the present stage) of all of Kenya's 458

incorporated companies with a nominal capital of KSh 3.6 million altogether only 87 companies accounting for only 12 % of the total nominal capital were owned by Africans. ²⁹ Even though this percentage may have changed somewhat in the meantime and para-statal bodies like the "Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation" (ICDC) and similar institutions, but also a number of influential individuals certainly have increased their share, there can be no doubt that still the majority of Kenya's most important industrial and large-scale commercial enterprises is foreign-owned. This dominance is also quite evident in the management of these companies. Thus in 1968 of Kenya's "top fifty" company directors only nine were Kenyans (four of whom were of European origin), two were Ugandans (of Asian origin), one was Irish, all the rest British (including seven persons of Asian descent). ³⁰

The "Africanization" of directorships and management positions also has increased somewhat in recent years ³¹ (in a number of instances only by "nominal" appointments of politically influential persons or their relatives, however), but again there can be no doubt that the majority of key positions in the private economy is still controlled by foreigners.

Because the re-transfer of the original foreign investments and their profits (which in most instances are considerably higher than the average rate of return in most industrialized countries) ³² are guaranteed by law,

the outflow of capital from Kenya has become a major drain on the economy. Official statistics show that in the period from 1964 to 1970, for example, the amount of profits on foreign investments and of private payments transferred abroad was more than KSh 83 million. This outflow was upset to a certain extent by an inflow of additional private foreign investments, including re-investment of local profits, in the order of KSh 38 million during the same period. The net export of private capital of officially KSh 45 million for this period also has to be assessed critically in light of the internal accounting procedures practiced by many multi-national corporations. Thus the official ILO mission to Kenya estimated that over-invoicing on imported intermediate goods amounted to between 5 % and 10 % on the average in the manufacturing sector.³³ Other estimates range up to 20 % and more. For this reason Colin Leys, for example, arrived at a figure of a total net outflow of private capital of KSh 80 million for the 1964-70 period.

Further consequences of the peripheral character of Kenya's economy are manifested in the very divergent productivity rates for the different sectors, the particular composition of its industries and the general lack of integration between them and the other parts of the economy.³⁴ The "incremental" capital output ratios for important sectors of Kenya's economy for the year 1970, taken as indicators of their productivity, are as follows:

TABLE I,7

INCREMENTAL CAPITAL OUTPUT RATIOS OF MAIN ECONOMIC SECTORS

Sector	Incremental capital output ratio
Non-monetary economy	1.83
Agriculture	2.84
Manufacturing	2.12
Mining	4.40
Construction	7.72
Electricity and water	5.17
Transport and communications	8.22
All sectors	2.93

Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,

Kenya: Into the Second Decade (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 136.

As was already indicated in the composition of the external trade, Kenya still has hardly any capital goods industries, at least as far as the dominant "modern" sector is concerned, and most of the manufactured products consist of "import-substituting" consumer goods. Most of these industries thus cater only for the needs of the small better-off section of the population and since they are usually operating under protected, often monopolistic internal market conditions in many instances, they would not be competitive on the world market. There are also very few "linkages" between the different branches of industry and the other

sectors, ³⁵ as one of the main indicators of a balanced and integrated modern industrial economy. This "disarticulation" (Samir Amin) must thus be seen as another important indication of the "underdevelopment" of Kenya's economy.

A brief historical account

A society, as any other living being, goes through a series of unique experiences in the course of its existence which contribute to its individuality and which lay the basis for its future. A brief account of some of the most important events which determined the "birth" and the early life-history of "Kenya" is, therefore, necessary at this point in order to gain a perspective for our later discussion of her present and future development.

Modern Kenya is, as most of the other Sub-Saharan African states, a creation of the colonial powers. Although there is certainly no reason to believe that the history of the African peoples prior to the advent of the Europeans was less eventful or less important (at least for those who were affected by it) than in other parts of the world, the fact nevertheless remains that still very little is known about these times, due to the lack of written records (except for the area of Arab dominance in Northern Africa and along the coast) and a scarcity of archaeological finds. The latter have mainly been concerned so far with the "prehistoric" era and have led to the interesting finding that the "cradle" of mankind probably stood in Africa. ³⁶

Oral traditions, the only other promising source, which still have to be exploited much more fully, often do not go back very far and are sometimes unreliable. For this reason, a great deal of information about the lives and history of these peoples, who constitute an important part of the common heritage of mankind, will probably be lost forever. We, therefore, do not imply any "European-centered" view at this point ^{when} we begin our brief account of Kenya's more recent historical developments with the advent of the Europeans and the "opening" of Africa to a wider world.

Our knowledge about settlements along the East African Coast goes back to antiquity, ³⁷ and since then this area has been a part of the established network of international trade, but also of conquest and warfare. In 1498 (i.e. six years after Christopher Columbus first set foot in "America") Vasco da Gama discovered the sea route from Europe to India. In his wake a number of forts were built along the coast and in 1593 work was begun on "Fort Jesus" in Mombasa where from then onwards a permanent garrison was established. The number of occupants to this post remained small, however, and never exceeded a few hundred men. In 1729 the Portuguese were finally expelled, and Arab sultans, at first from Oman, later on from Zanzibar, established their rule over the East African coast and islands. ³⁸ In spite of regular caravans of Arab and Swahili traders into the interior of the continent (mainly

dealing in ivory and slaves and reaching as far as Buganda and what is today Eastern Zaire) relatively little information about the lives of the peoples in these areas transpired to the outside world. 39

This changed when a second wave of Europeans, this time mostly missionaries and explorers, arrived in the first half of the 19th century. In 1848 the German missionaries Krapf and Rebmann first "discovered" the existence of snow-capped mountains near the equator and in 1851 brought reports about them to an incredulous Europe. In 1883 the first European, Joseph Thompson, travelled all across Maasai country and reached the Kenyan highlands. In their wake the scramble for colonies, which had started both for economic and imperial reasons among the leading European powers during this period, also reached this part of Africa and created the political entity we know today. A series of agreements between the United Kingdom and the German Reich, the powers most "interested" in this area, were concluded between 1884 and 1890 and defined the respective "spheres of influence". What was to become "Kenya" (named after the local word for its highest elevation, Mt. Kenya, the "White Mountain") was reserved by these agreements for colonization by the British, whereas the area south of Lake Victoria and Mt. Kilimanjaro was to become "German East Africa" or "Tanganyika". On the coast the "ten-mile-strip", which for a long time had been under the rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar, also became part of the

British territory. ⁴⁰ The northern boundary of Kenya, north of Lake Rudolf, was defined in an agreement with Ethiopia in 1907, the border with Uganda in the west, running west of Mt. Elgon down to Lake Victoria, was finally determined in 1926. ⁴¹ In 1925 a portion of mostly arid land in the north was transferred to "Italian Somaliland" leaving the border in the east running along the 41st degree of longitude.

Thus all these boundaries are largely artificial and imposed from above, most of them having been established with a ruler and the stroke of a pen at some office desk in Europe. No account whatsoever was taken of the extent and nature of social, economic or political bonds which may have existed between the peoples in this area, and some groups such as the Maasai in the south, the Somali in the northeast and some smaller groups along the Ugandan border were even cut off from their next of kin by these sudden administrative measures. Although the initial impact of these arrangements remained minor, the people so separated were subjected to quite different economic and political destinies in the long run. As in most of the other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa these newly created social units had to be filled with a new life which was to set them permanently apart from their neighbors. It is ironic and in some cases certainly tragic that the idea of rigid "national" boundaries, borrowed from 19th century Europe, was imposed on a continent still so much in a state of flux where

large-scale population movements had been going on for centuries and where all kinds and sizes of political units had arisen and disappeared in relatively short periods of time. But even the Organisation of African Unity" (OAU) today, though clearly realizing this predicament, has made the inviolability of the existing boundaries one of its most important principles. Afraid of opening a Pandora's box of even greater evils, most African leaders, therefore, prefer the status quo to any rearrangement of borderlines.

In this way the "East-African Protectorate", later to be called Kenya, was created in 1895 and acquired the status of a "crown colony" in 1920. In all likelihood it will remain the most relevant political unit in this area for a long time. This becomes particularly evident when one takes into account the failure of the only apparent alternative, a greater economic and political East African community. Also in 1895 work on the railway line to Uganda was begun, and this particular development was to influence the future of the territory in very decisive ways. Not only was a link of communication created between the Indian Ocean and Lake Victoria which traversed most of Kenya's fertile regions and which opened up the countryside to external trade and other contacts with the outside world, but also a new population movement was set in motion which was to determine Kenya's pattern of social stratification until the time of independence and beyond. Originally the railway was designed to create a link to landlocked Uganda which was, in the eyes of the British Foreign Office, the much

more promising and "developed" protectorate in this area and which brought with it the chance "to control the headwaters of the Nile". But as soon as the railway was completed (in 1901), it was realized that in order to be self-sustaining the railway also had to pick up some cargo "on the way". Since a sufficient African production for export did not seem to be feasible at this time, the "logical" answer, given the apparent "emptiness" of vast stretches of land, at least in the eyes of the administrators, was to encourage European settlement and production. ⁴²

Sir Charles Eliot, Commissioner of the Protectorate from 1901 to 1904, was particularly instrumental in this respect. He advocated the settlement of relatively well-to-do Europeans on farms of 1,000 acres and more (or on ranches of at least 5,000 acres) in order to provide the backbone for a large-scale export-oriented type of farming. For him there was no doubt that the East African Protectorate should become "a white man's country in which native questions present but little interest". ⁴³ For a while even the idea of massive Jewish settlement, organized by Theodor Herzl and his Zionist Congress, was considered but later abandoned when this met with strong resentment by British settlers, in particular by one of the most enterprising and influential among them, Lord Delamere. ⁴⁴ Actual settlement thus was mainly confined to persons of Anglo-Saxon descent, but also a number of Boer families from South Africa was attracted by the apparently shining prospects of Kenya's

highlands.

In the beginning some "roving adventurers" with little or no financial resources and hardly any knowledge of or interest in agriculture (as the notorious Captain Grogan and the "Happy Valley crowd") were among those who tried their luck. At a somewhat later stage then members of the English and Anglo-Irish nobility and gentry began to dominate, albeit also often with little knowledge of agriculture. After the wars the ranks of the Europeans were swollen by retired army personnel. The number of slightly more than 3,000 Europeans at the time of the first census in 1911 rose to about 10,000 in 1921, 30,000 in 1948 and 56,000 on the eve of Independence in 1962.⁴⁵ Those who had come later largely imitated the manners and attitudes of their predecessors, and the extravagant and rather conspicuous patterns of consumption of this group can still be seen in present-day Kenya. These include the behavior of members of the new African elite who seem to have the urge "to keep up with the Delameres".

Although the number of actual farmers among the European immigrants was never much more than 3,000 an area of 7,5 million acres, comprising about one-fourth of Kenya's high potential agricultural land,⁴⁶ was appropriated for them. Once the idea of settlement had been approved, this land was set aside in a series of ordinances by the Colonial Office. The areas chosen were those with a temperate climate and sufficient rainfall, most of them

5,000 feet or more above sea level. The largest part of them was situated in what today are Nakuru, Kericho, Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia, Nyandarua and Laikipia districts, all in the Rift Valley Province. (Nyandarua, formerly "Thompson Falls", was transferred to Central Province in the post-independence period.) The occupation of this land, most of which traditionally had been Maasai grazing grounds, was facilitated by the fact that in the decades prior to the European advent the number of people living there had been drastically reduced by a series of droughts and diseases affecting both humans and cattle. In addition, particularly severe wars during this period between some subtribes of the Maasai practically extinguished the Uasin Gishu for example. Thus, in effect, large areas of land seemed to be relatively "empty" and were, therefore, particularly tempting in the eyes of the intruders, although it must have been clear from the beginning that all land in the territory had been traditionally controlled by one or another of the peoples living there.

In addition to the occupation of these formerly pastoralist areas, some others which were already cultivated by African agriculturalists were "alienated" by the British. Most of these were situated near some other areas of European settlement as in Kiambu and Machakos districts near Nairobi, in the Nandi and Kipsigis areas adjacent to the "White Highlands", or in the Coastal strip and a few more scattered places like the Taita Hills. The total area of actually "alienated" land remained relatively small, however, e.g.

only 101,5 out of a total of almost 1,800 square miles in Kiambu district, where this was to become a particularly "hot" political issue.⁴⁷ In legal terms land tenure in all of these areas was to the largest extent based on leaseholds, most of them (6,350,000 acres) for a period of 999 (!) years, a smaller amount (591,000 acres) for 99 years. Another fraction (560,000 acres) was also granted as freehold land.⁴⁸ The rest of the country was then declared to be "tribal reserves", which meant that, at least in theory, the native population there would be free to pursue their traditional way of life. Movement between the reserves of different ethnic groups and into the European occupied zone was restricted, and in particular the boundaries for the possible expansion of cultivated areas, in contrast to the constant ebb and flow of peoples in former times, were now set once and for all.

In addition to the farmers and the colonial administrators a third group of Europeans, who had been among the first to arrive, left a lasting impact in the country: the missionaries. After first contacts in the Coastal area, dating back as far as the arrival of Vasco da Gama in Mombasa, more systematic missionary work was begun in the middle of the 19th century and soon also expanded to the hinterland. By 1900 there were about 5,000 "professing Christians" (i.e. about 0.2 % of the total population at this time) in Kenya. About half of these belonged to the Catholic church and the others were

members of different Protestant denominations. The most active groups on the Protestant side were the "Church Missionary Society" (CMS), an organization of the Anglican Church, the "Africa Inland Mission" (AIM), an international British-American group, and the "Church of Scotland Mission" (CSM), a Presbyterian institution. Among the Catholics, missionaries belonging to Italian and Irish orders were the most numerous. Soon, however, a multitude of all kinds of other Christian denominations began to work in the country, sometimes with just one or two missionaries competing with each other for "converts".⁴⁹ In addition, also an increasing number of "African Independent Churches" was founded which developed their own catechism and liturgy. They gained greatly in strength following disputes with established churches over African customs such as the controversy over female circumcision in Kikuyuland in the late 1920s.

Today a little more than two-thirds of Kenya's population profess to be "Christian", almost half of whom are Catholics and a little less than one-fourth each "Protestants" and "African Independents".⁵⁰ Another 6 % of the population are Muslims and the rest adhere to "traditional" beliefs. On the whole missionary activities have been a mixed blessing in most parts of Africa, including Kenya. Whereas undoubtedly many of the missionaries were devout and selfless men and women who sincerely believed in their work and contributed greatly to the general "development"

of the country, particularly in the fields of formal education, health care and more general social work, it cannot be denied that quite a few among them shared the same kind of prejudices as the other colonizers and that their understanding of and their relationship with the African population and their way of life remained limited. Only now that the leadership of most churches also has been "Africanized" to a certain extent, does a greater understanding of each others' aims and activities seem to prevail.

Another group of immigrants who had a lasting impact on the composition of Kenya's society entered the country in greater numbers at about the time of the creation of the protectorate: the "Asians".⁵¹ Although people of Asian descent had been living in the coastal regions of East Africa for a long time usually as traders and craftsmen, no permanent settlements of Asians had been established further inland before the beginning of the colonial period. In the wake of the European penetration of the hinterland the Asian traders followed. A large number of laborers was also brought from India (mainly from the Punjab), to help with the construction of the railway since Africans were thought to be unfit for this kind of work. Most of these, however, returned to their homelands after the completion of the railway and only about 6,700 (out of a total of 32,000) remained.⁵² At the time of the first census in 1911 the Asian population

of Kenya numbered 11,800 persons. Some even conceived of East Africa as "the America for the Hindu" and, sensing new economic opportunities, this part of the population increased considerably during the following decades. The immigrants now often consisted of groups of more well-to-do people from Gujarat, Goa, and some other parts of India. In 1931 the total number of people of Asian origin was 44,000, in 1948 they numbered 98,000, and at the eve of independence in 1962 there were 177,000 of them.⁵³ Since these immigrants were not allowed to settle in the "scheduled areas" or to become active in agriculture,⁵⁴ most of them earned their livelihood as craftsmen and traders. Initially they met with very little competition in these fields and they almost monopolized these activities (except for some local open-air markets in the rural areas). As late as 1966, three years after independence, still almost 70 % of Kenya's retail firms were owned by non-citizens, almost entirely Asians, except for some British who owned large import-export companies. In terms of the volume of sales conducted by these establishments this percentage was even higher; even among the "Kenyan-owned" firms, a large number belonged to members of the Asian community.⁵⁵ Not unlike the Jews in former times in Central and Eastern Europe, the Chinese in Southeast Asia or some other distinct ethnic communities in West Africa with a high degree of involvement in the commercial sector,

these Asians formed an almost "caste"-like layer in Kenya's society, enjoying some of the advantages of this almost monopolistic situation, but also feeling the great resentment of other groups along with it.

It was only at a later stage when a second generation within this immigrant community had grown up, whose parents could now afford an expensive education, that a higher degree of occupational differentiation occurred. A considerable number of Asians then became active in the "professions" and many of them today are lawyers, doctors, architects or engineers.⁵⁶ Others now have become owners of a variety of small-scale industrial enterprises and, on the whole, the economic position of the Asian in Kenya has significantly changed today, both as a result of internal differentiation and because of the measures of "Kenyanization" introduced after independence in the commercial sector.

The impact of these different forms of penetration from the outside on the African population of Kenya was immense and, indeed, things were never to be the same again. In the beginning, these influences were felt only very slightly.

It took a period of at least twenty years after the creation of the protectorate until the full consequences of this new era became apparent to a larger part of the population. At first the new intruders did not seem to be much different from the caravan traders from the coast and the largest part of

the African population ignored the new overlords. However these turned out to be different from everything these African societies had known before. Traditionally there had been a good deal of contact and movement, both peacefully and sometimes more violently, between the different ethnic groups in this area and also with traders from outside, but never before had any of these groups attempted to actually subjugate one of the others or to establish a permanent rule. The Maasai, for example, had been the most formidable force in this region for a long time. After having shown their strength successfully in a number of raids, usually cattle raids, on their neighbors, they had always been content to withdraw again to their own areas without permanently submitting other peoples to their rule. By contrast the British now established a network of administrative stations which had soon penetrated most of the more densely populated areas and which by 1914 clearly controlled all parts of the territory. ⁵⁷

The African reaction also was relatively slow in the beginning and the establishment of permanent British outposts met with relatively little resistance. The few violent incidents which occurred remained sporadic and on a purely local level. This was to a large extent due to the fact that almost all ethnic groups in the territory were "stateless" societies, ⁵⁸ i.e. without a permanent central leadership as it existed in the Ugandan kingdoms, for example, but also in many other parts of Africa. For this reason the

organization of massive resistance on a large scale was extremely difficult and hardly ever attempted. The people whose social organization would have been most efficient in this respect was that of the Maasai. They had a system of warriorship organized by age-groups ("morani") and in the person of the "laibon" also some kind of more centralized authority, although mainly of a religious and ceremonial nature. But they had been so decimated at this time through a series of diseases and droughts, and also some considerable internecine warfare, that they, too, did not provide any real obstacle to the imposition of colonial rule. The only major exception in Kenya were the Nandi who also had adopted a laibon-like spiritual leader, the "orkoyot", and whose power vis-à-vis their ethnic neighbors was on the rise at the time of the arrival of the British. They successfully resisted British advances for a period of more than ten years and it took the colonial administration five major expeditions until the Nandi, whose spears, bows and arrows were no match for the rifles, machine guns and cannons of the colonial power, were finally defeated in 1905. For the rest a series of "punitive expeditions", some of them quite ruthless and bloody, in different parts of the country proved to be sufficient for the final "pacification" of the colony.

Most of the colonizers had few, if any, qualms about their undertakings. Eliot himself put it most bluntly: "... white mates black in a very few moves... There can be

no doubt that the Maasai and many other tribes must go under. It is a prospect which I view with equanimity and a clear conscience... (Maasaidom) is a beastly, bloody system founded on raiding and immorality." ⁵⁹ At another place he wrote: "Their customs may be interesting to anthropologists, but morally and economically they seem to be all bad." ⁶⁰ Thus the intruders proceeded with very little remorse and the more sadistically minded among them even seem to have thoroughly enjoyed the "punitive expeditions" which they conducted.

Their descriptions of these events read almost like reports of adventurous big-game hunts, only that the "game" were human beings this time. Francis Hall, for example, after whom later "Fort Hall" (the present-day "Murang'a") was named, once gave the following account:

"As usual the natives had deserted their village and bolted with all their livestock. However we scoured the forest and collected a good deal and then proceeded to march quietly through the country, sending columns out to burn the villages and collect goats etc. We rarely saw any of the people; when we did, they were at very long ranges, so we did not have much fun, but we destroyed a tremendous number of villages." ⁶¹

Colonel Meinertzhagen who conducted one of the bloodiest campaigns in the Nyeri area, killing almost 800 people, many of them women and children, seems to have enjoyed his enterprise in a similar way. ⁶²

The complete subjugation of Kenya's peoples was

thus affected in a ruthless, but efficient manner with very few losses on the British side. But this still was a long way from actually "governing" the territory or, at least, carrying out the most immediate administrative functions. At first the colonial office attempted to institute some kind of "indirect rule", following the pattern of British administration in West Africa and Lord Lugard's experiences there,⁶³ but this proved to be impossible in societies which had been "tribes without rulers" prior to the advent of the colonialists. Any "chiefs" who were appointed were, therefore, purely the creations of the British and did not exercise any kind of traditional authority among their own people. A considerable number of them formerly had been headmen in trading caravans and had picked up some Swahili or English and thus could serve as interpreters, or had proved to be useful in some other way. In other places the British were successful in securing the support of some more highly respected individuals, for example members of relatively wealthy families, who were appointed as local headmen and administrators. None of them, however, previously had been a "chief" in the original sense of the word and the power of these appointees remained limited. Often, therefore, as demonstrated by their superiors, the use of force proved to be the main instrument for carrying out their duties. This, of course, caused a great deal of disaffection in the population at large and gave rise to internal divisions and tensions

among the local people. In this way was created some precursors of the "loyalists" of the "Mau Mau" era and the subsequent division between them and the "freedom fighters", which was to become particularly severe among the Kikuyu.

This kind of administration was not, however, very effective in the beginning and the local population still could, more or less, pursue their traditional way of life. One district officer, for example, had to admit: "the mass, however inferior it may be, must be reckoned with. It is thought that the awe in which natives stand of the government is often over-rated. By passive resistance they obtain their own way while they pretend to be only anxious to do as they are told." ⁶⁴ It took a while until the colonial government began to realize that the concept of "indirect rule" and administration through local "chiefs" really was not applicable in Kenya and the idea was gradually abandoned. In the meantime the colonialists had gained more knowledge of the actual life of the indigenous peoples and their social institutions and some changes in the pattern of administration were introduced. One of the most noteworthy attempts of this kind, apparently at the initiative of one the Provincial Commissioners, C.W. Hobley, who had been one of the first to study local institutions and customs, ⁶⁵ was laid down in the "Native Tribunal Rules" of 1911 ⁶⁶ which gave judicial authority in local matters to councils of elders who had traditionally

exercized this kind of power. This measure, however, met with only partial success, because these collective bodies were not used to carrying out, beyond their ad hoc judicial functions, any truly executive powers and attempts of this kind proved to be impractical. For this reason, the main executive tasks at the local level, such as the collection of taxes, the recruitment of laborers, the maintenance of roads etc., were still carried out by the centrally appointed "chiefs" and "subchiefs", as they still exist up to the present-day. It must be kept in mind, therefore, that these "chiefs" are administrative agents of the central government and neither represent any kind of traditional authority nor are they in any way elected by the local populace as, for example, mayors are in many European countries.

The most immediate function of this kind of administration was political, i.e. it was to secure the continuation of British rule in this part of the world. But once there, it could be put to other uses as well. As Eliot stated in very straightforward terms: "The introduction of an efficient administration is likely to produce a very large increase of revenue."⁶⁷ For this purpose, therefore, a "hut tax" for each homestead or a "poll tax" for each adult male who did not have a house of his own of initially two rupees⁶⁸ was introduced in 1901. But there was another equally important reason: since the early colonial administrators conceived of large parts

of Kenya as "white man's country" which was open to large-scale settlement by European farmers, it was necessary to provide a native labor force for their estates. Short of outright forced labor (officially outlawed in 1908,⁶⁹ but still practised in an indirect fashion for a much longer time, as for example through the "Northey circulars" of 1919),⁷⁰ the best way to make Africans work on European farms seemed to be to impose taxes which had to be paid in cash. This was necessary because unlike the proletariat in European countries, the prospective workers in Kenya still owned, as subsistence farmers, their own means of production. Attractive wages, on the other hand, which might have induced some voluntary contributions of work, were out of the question because they were "costs" which employers were not willing to bear. The imposition of taxes, therefore, proved to be the most satisfactory "solution", accompanied by restrictions concerning the cultivation of cash crops by the African population which might have provided an alternative source of cash. The "tribal reserves" in this way became the reservoir from which the required amount of labor for the European settlers could be drawn. As one of them put it: "From the farmer's point of view the ideal reserve is a recruiting ground for labor, a place from which the able-bodied go out to work, returning occasionally to rest and to beget the next generation of laborers."⁷¹

Another measure which was introduced at a later

stage also aimed at the regular supply of labor from the reserves: the introduction of registration certificates for Africans, the much hated "kipande". These contained the basic personal data and the fingerprints of every African male over the age of 16 and were to be carried at all times. They were to enable the administration to properly assess those liable to the "hut" or "poll" tax and to identify possible "deserters" from European farms or others who tried to evade the network of the administration.⁷² It was calculated that by 1920 more than 50 % of the able-bodied men from the agricultural ethnic groups were employed on European farms.⁷³ The total was to reach almost 250,000 active farm workers at the peak of the colonial era in the 1950s. The wages paid amounted to three rupees (four shs.) per month in 1904, about 12 shs. in 1924 and about 20 shs. in 1950.⁷⁴ In addition, a number of "squatter" families, in return for their labor, were allowed to clear and cultivate two to three acres on the European farms as their own subsistence plots, and sometimes also to keep some cattle.

In addition to the effects of white settlement, the wars between the European powers, fought in part on African soil, also had a great impact on the lives of Kenya's African population. During the First World War, for example, more than 163,000 African Kenyans were employed as carriers in the British Armed Forces and no less than 47,000 died during this time. Most of these casualties were not the

result of actual combat, but occurred due to extremely poor conditions of nutrition and health prevailing in the African Carrier Corps. Without proper food, hygiene and medical care the African members of the armed forces were an easy prey to all kinds of diseases if they did not die first of outright hunger. The civilian population was greatly affected, too. It was estimated that the Kikuyu alone lost 120,000 from war casualties, famine, and influenza during this period.⁷⁵ When the Second World War broke out, another 75,000 men from Kenya were recruited, this time most of them as active soldiers. They fought in the Middle East and the Far East as well as closer to home in Ethiopia and Madagascar.

All these developments left a lasting mark on the African population and were, to a great extent, responsible for a rise in political consciousness. One of the earliest manifestations of political activity as a reaction towards the increased exploitation by the colonial system occurred in the early 1920s when, in addition to the introduction of the "kipande", the hut and poll tax was doubled from five to ten rupees in order to bring forward even more African laborers from the reserves. At this time the first two African organizations of a more distinctly political nature also had been formed, namely the "Kikuyu Association", a rural based group which protested against the further alienation of land on the fringes of the "reserves", and the "Young Kikuyu Association", a more urban-oriented

group with its headquarters in Nairobi, which articulated the grievances of African workers. The secretary of the latter organization was Harry Thuku, a young Kikuyu clerk and telephone operator in the treasury, who belonged to the first group of mission-educated and literate Africans, and who was to become the first African politician of national prominence in Kenya. ⁷⁶ Thuku traveled widely in the Kikuyu homeland, but also as far as Kisumu and other parts of Western Kenya in order to raise support for his cause. In March 1922 he was arrested and the next day a protest demonstration was organized in Nairobi which in effect amounted to a general strike among the African workers there. The meeting in front of the Nairobi police station attracted almost 8,000 persons. When, at the end of a largely peaceful demonstration, the crowd turned towards the station to set Thuku free, the police opened fire and killed at least 21 Africans (the official figure). Harry Thuku was then kept in detention for more than eight years.

In the meantime another organization, the "Kikuyu Central Association" (KCA), was formed in 1925 which was to become one of the most important predecessors of Kenya's independence movement and one of the post-independence political parties. Initially the main issues of this organization were the release of Harry Thuku and the removal of restrictions for the growing of coffee by Africans. In 1928 Jomo Kenyatta, then a meter-reader in the Water Department of the City Council of Nairobi, became

general secretary of the association and also editor of its monthly journal "Mwigwithania" ("The Reconciler"). This publication had only recently been started and was the first paper of its kind in Kenya written in an African language (Kikuyu). In 1929 a major rift, which had been latent for a long time, occurred between the missions and local African politicians over the issue of female "circumcision", traditionally practised by many African peoples in Kenya.⁷⁷ Whereas the missionaries considered this custom to be a particularly abhorrent example of the barbarous way of life of the African past, the Africans regarded it as an integral part of the transition rites between the different generations and thus an important element in the social structure of their "egalitarian-segmentarian" societies.⁷⁸ Rather than following the advice of more moderate missionaries who advocated gradually reducing the impact of this custom through the process of education (which proved to be the wiser course, in view of the present-day situation), the colonial government decided to proscribe it altogether. The result was that more than 90 % of all students at missionary institutions left school. The desire for education was widespread and genuine, however, and many "African Independent Schools" were founded to replace the missionary ones. Due to the lack of trained teachers and proper teaching materials the standards of these schools were, of course, quite poor, but the enthusiasm shown by their supporters and the material sacrifices made of them were nevertheless remarkable. In 1939 an independent

teachers' training college was founded to remedy the situation somewhat.

The circumcision controversy and the ensuing political struggles concerned mainly the Kikuyu; this custom was not known, for example, among the Luo and was practised only to a lesser extent among the Luyia in Western Kenya. The pastoralist peoples, who still practise it today, were largely left alone anyway (both by missionaries and the administration), so that the most important struggles were fought between the Europeans and the Kikuyu, greatly enhancing the political consciousness and unity of the latter. In the other areas also some local organizations began to emerge, most prominent among them the "Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association" in Western Kenya and the "Mijikenda Union" of the nine tribes in the coastal area. These organizations were concerned largely with the improvement of local conditions, and were considered less controversial in the eyes of the colonial government, thus producing less outright conflict. The only major exception was a strike in Mombasa ⁱⁿ 1939, started among laborers in the public services, but which soon spread to include the dockworkers as well. The major issues were the low wages (16 shs. a month for road laborers of the municipality) and the incredible "housing" conditions (in some cases only rats in the open air). ⁷⁹ The strikers comprised members of many ethnic groups (there was already a considerable number of people from inland tribes in Mombasa at this time) and made this

incident the first of its kind on the coast where not ethnic but increasingly "class" factors were the major cause of conflict.

The Kikuyu Central Association which had greatly enlarged its membership was banned in 1940. In 1944 the "Kenya African Study Union", renamed "Kenya African Union" (KAU) in 1946, became the first African organization with truly nationwide aspirations, even though its members and leaders were still largely Kikuyu. Jomo Kenyatta returned from England in 1946 where he had stayed as a "representative" of the KCA from 1929 and where he also had come into contact with nationalist leaders from other African countries and the Pan-African Movement. He was given a "hero's welcome" all over Kenya and was elected president of KAU in 1947.

The post-war prosperity of Kenya's large-scale agriculture and other sectors of the "modern" economy brought only very few benefits for the African population: wages still were very low and small-scale farming of African peasants still contributed very little to the monetary gross national product. It even can be said that in effect the peasant sector substantially subsidized the wage economy because, had there not been regular supplies of food from relatives living up-country, the wages of most workers would not have been sufficient to satisfy their most basic and essential needs. In contrast to neighboring Uganda, where hardly any restrictions on the production of cash-crops by

Africans existed and where a much smaller part of the population depended on wages (only about 15 % of total African earnings was derived from this source compared with more than two-thirds in Kenya), the per capita income of the African population remained very low. It was even lower than for Kenya's other neighbor, the much less "developed" Tanganyika.⁸⁰ The "reserves" increasingly became overcrowded because of a relatively high rate of population growth averaging 2.5 % per annum between the censuses of 1948 and 1962,⁸¹ the restrictions put on settlement outside the assigned areas, and the absence of significant increases in agricultural production. On the contrary, due to the increasing over-use of the land, the soil became poor, erosion began, and production declined even further.

This deteriorating situation of material conditions, coupled with a higher level of political awareness among those who had returned from service in the army and others who had received some formal education, led to an increasing unrest among the African population and particularly among the Kikuyu who were most directly and most intensely affected. In addition to the attempts of Kenyatta and others to establish formal political organizations such as the KAU, political activities also took more and more violent forms. Among others, the "Forty Group" was organized by some young Kikuyu who had been circumcised together in 1940, some of whom had also done military service. The name "Mau Mau" was first used in March 1948 to describe an organization engaged

in such "underground" activities. No such word exists in any of the East African languages, a fact which Kenyatta referred to when he publicly declared that he did not know of Mau Mau, what it meant or even what language it was.⁸² However, although its origin and meaning are not clear, African acts of resistance and violence were increasingly ascribed by the colonial authorities to the activities of this "Mau Mau" organization, and in August 1950 the organization was officially prohibited.

The use of the term "Mau Mau" by the government for describing these actions also reflected the assessment of this movement by Europeans as being basically primitive and atavistic, leading Africans back into darkness and not forward on the road of "civilization". This belief was further reinforced by ceremonies, particularly repulsive to Europeans, in which newcomers to the resistance movement swore oaths as a traditionally meaningful expression of membership. Also the very acts of violence which occurred and which included the maiming of cattle on European farms, seemed to confirm this picture of irrationality, cruelty, and primitiveness. This perception of the situation only increased tensions and led to their intensification rather than to any attempt of seriously alleviating their underlying causes.

Tension continued to grow during this period, although there were relatively few outright acts of violence until October 1952 when Senior Chief Waruhiu, a

leading Kikuyu "loyalist", was assassinated. This event led to the official declaration of a "state of emergency" on October 20th 1952. Kenyatta and a number of other known activists and political leaders were arrested. Kenyatta was later tried and sentenced to the maximum penalty of seven years of hard labor. He spent these years in the hot and dry area of Northern Kenya, together with Achieng Oneko, Paul Ngei, Fred Kubai, Eildad Kaggia, and Kungu Karumba, all of whom were to become important political leaders after independence with somewhat varying fortunes. The trial was generally considered by independent observers to have been a sham, because it violated a number of important procedural rights of the defendants and did not prove its main charge of conspiracy against the government or the participation in an unlawful society, "Mau Mau".⁸³

Government forces were put on alert and additional British troops were flown in to keep control of the situation. But instead of calming things down, the declaration of a "state of emergency" only precipitated further acts of violence on a much larger scale than before. In March 1953 the "Lari Massacre" occurred in which almost 100 "loyalists" were killed in the largest single Mau Mau attack during the emergency.⁸⁴ Kikuyu country now was virtually in a state of siege. It is estimated that up to 15,000 "freedom fighters" took refuge in the large forest areas around Mt. Kenya and the Aberdares Range, from where they sporadically attacked government posts,

European farms and loyalists among the Kikuyu. Members of the "Home Guard" which the colonial government had established as a peacekeeping force in the reserves were particularly hated targets. Most prominent among the forest fighters were Dedan Kimathi and "General China", Waruhiu Itote, both of whom had had some training in the British Army during World War II. On the whole, however, military experience and training were relatively poor among those who had retreated to the forests, and "military operations" on the African side remained largely decentralized and relatively ineffective. Within the reserves proper the forest fighters could count on the support of the "passive wing" of Mau Mau, often women, juveniles or older men who were unfit for active combat and who provided the fighters in the forest with food, clothing and other essential equipment, and also with vital information about impending actions of the Home Guard or government troops.⁸⁵

The government mobilized forces of up to 70,000 men and even tanks and heavy bombers were used in some of the operations. By 1955 the backbone of resistance had been broken and the last remaining major leader, Kimathi, was finally tracked down and killed in October 1956. These military measures were coupled with a large-scale resettlement of Kikuyu peasants from their scattered homesteads to centralized villages (a program which reminds one of similar tactics used to curb guerrilla warfare later in Viet Nam), and with many arrests among the civilian

population. Altogether almost 80,000 people were put into detention camps where they had to perform forced labor and where programs of "rehabilitation" were initiated. The final casualties were 63 Europeans and 534 African soldiers killed on the government side, while 10,527 freedom fighters lost their lives in combat and another 1,071 were executed by the colonial authorities. Among the civilian population 32 Europeans and 1,926 Africans were killed.⁸⁶ As one observer put it: "The unevenness of the battle and the violence of the campaign is well-attested by these figures."⁸⁷

In addition to these efforts of restoring "law and order", the administration gradually realized that not only the symptoms but also some of the causes of the unrest had to be dealt with, if any lasting success was to be achieved. Since most of the more immediate grievances centered around the deteriorating conditions in the overcrowded reserves, the main emphasis was put on changes in the sphere of small-scale agricultural production. According to the "Swynnerton-Plan",⁸⁸ steps were taken to attack the problem of soil erosion (mainly through terracing, the construction of dams, etc.), to encourage the planting of cash-crops by Africans (e.g. coffee planting increased from about 4,000 to 26,000 acres between 1954 and 1959), and, most important for Kenya's long-term pattern of rural social stratification, to consolidate and register each holding and to issue "title-deeds" of individual private ownership.⁸⁹

While these changes occurred in the rural areas, the center of African political activities had shifted from the countryside to the towns. For the first time the number of industrial and other urban workers now exceeded those employed in European agriculture, and conflicts concerning urban working conditions, wages, etc. became more prevalent. Trade union activists such as Tom Mboya, who became general secretary of the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions in October 1953, now clearly emerged as major political leaders. As far as national politics was concerned these leaders pressed for significant reforms within the constitutional framework of the colony namely the achievement of greater African representation in the Legislative Council and, finally, majority rule.

Only in 1944 had the first African representative (Eliud Mathu) been nominated for one of the two "African" seats among the "unofficial" members of the council; before that time Africans were "represented" by European missionaries. This number had been increased to four in 1947, from a total of 22 "unofficial" and 15 "official" nominated members.⁹⁰ In 1957 the number was raised again (to eight) and for the first time the African representatives had been elected directly by universal suffrage.⁹¹ Tom Mboya, who won the seat for Nairobi, became the leader of the African Parliamentary Group. Still, African aspirations were not attained and the representatives in the Legislative Council refused to cooperate in the government and demanded

15 more seats for Africans. The "Lyttelton" constitution was, therefore, replaced by the "Lennox-Boyd" constitution in 1958 which gave six more seats (now 14 altogether) to the Africans. However, it still maintained the "multi-racial balance" of the previous arrangements, giving each racial group its own separately elected representatives and actually leaving ultimate control in the hands of the colonial power.

In the meantime the international situation also had changed and with the attainment of independence by Ghana in 1957 it became clear that direct colonial rule could not be maintained much longer in Black Africa. In January 1960 a constitutional conference for Kenya met at Lancaster House in London at which African majority rule was finally accepted in principle. The first general elections in Kenya were then held in February 1961.⁹² On the African side two major parties had emerged as the main contenders, the "Kenya African National Union" (KANU) which had its base among some of Kenya's major tribes (the Kikuyu, Luo, and Kamba being the largest among them) and the "Kenya African Democratic Union" (KADU) which consisted of an alliance of ethnic groups mainly from the Rift Valley (Kalenjin and Maasai), the Coast Province, and some groups from Western Kenya (mainly Luyia). One main issue was the release of Jomo Kenyatta from detention for which KANU campaigned very strongly. Another important question was the federate character of Kenya's new constitution, for which KADU in

particular pressed, fearing the potential domination of the smaller groups by Kenya's major tribes in a more centralized system of government. KANU was the clear winner of the elections, but the demand for Kenyatta's immediate release and his acceptance as Kenya's future leader was still anathema to the British. Thus KADU, although in the minority, formed Kenya's first African dominated government. Kenyatta was finally released in August 1961 and two months later became President of KANU. But even he did not manage to unite all African forces behind him. On the contrary, in 1962 a further split occurred and the "African People's Party" (APP), a largely Kamba-based organization under the leadership of Paul Ngei, was founded.

Constitutional squabbles between the different African factions and their European counterparts continued until a new federal constitution, "the most complicated ever devised for a colonial territory",⁹³ was decided upon in April 1963. The ensuing elections again saw KANU victorious, spurred finally by the increasing competition and considerably strengthened in its organization. Jomo Kenyatta became Kenya's first Prime Minister on June 1, 1963. After a period of internal self-government ("madaraka") under African majority rule Kenya officially achieved independence ("Uhuru") on December 12, 1963.

What, then, is the sum of the colonial experience in Kenya? Although to draw such a conclusion in a few words necessarily entails a great deal of oversimplification, a

brief attempt shall be made here: First of all, there can be no doubt that colonial rule created the state of Kenya as it exists today and no other "accident" or evolution of history could have had a similar effect in this area at this particular time. Colonial rule also provided the country with a system of communications both in the "tangible" (i.e. railways, roads etc.) and the "intangible" (i.e. markets, administrative networks, the exchange of information and ideas within certain geographical boundaries etc.) sense of the word. In this way the colonial era undoubtedly created the shape and administrative backbone of the present state of Kenya, a fact which, given the international situation in Africa today, hardly anyone could or even even would change.

But at the same time, the colonization of Kenya also established a system of subjugation and exploitation that left equally permanent marks on the country. One main aspect of this one-sided relationship is manifested in Kenya's internal social structure, another in the pattern of her external relations created by the colonial power, which has been perpetuated by the "neo-colonial" situation still existing in many ways. A third and equally important effect of the colonial period lies in the kind of attitudes and behavior which prevailed between the colonizers and the colonized. By regarding Africans as being "naturally inferior" to their European overlords and by often treating them hardly any better than other "useful domestic animals"

instead of accepting them as fellow human beings, colonialism also had a psychological impact, difficult to assess, the results of which only now can be seen somewhat more clearly. The attitudes and the behavior of the colonizers were thus often more inhumane, and in this sense more "barbarous", than the lives of those they had set out to "civilize". This is not to say, that there were not individuals or groups who showed some genuine concern for those they were working with and who, even if they sometimes failed, sincerely tried to help. But on the whole the colonial experience was undoubtedly a negative one and no rationalization, however "noble" in its proclamations, can possibly obfuscate this fact.

Nevertheless, any society, as any human being, must live with its past and make the best of it for the building of a better future. Thus Kenya, although preconditioned to a certain extent by her colonial experience, had important choices before her and a new start at the time of independence.

The pattern of politics after independence

In order to "fill in" the last part of background information relevant to our study, we shall briefly describe here some of the most important choices made by the new government after independence which significantly influenced later developments and some of the more important political events since that time.

One important question which had to be decided at

the time of "Uhuru" was that of citizenship for the non-African minority, i.e. in particular the approximately 180,000 Asians and 55,000 Europeans who were residents of Kenya at this time. The new constitution declared that everyone born in Kenya and everyone with at least one parent who had also been born there became an "automatic" citizen of the new state. In addition any other resident could opt for Kenyan citizenship within the first two years after independence.⁹⁴ After that time a naturalization of aliens was still possible under certain conditions, but this clause was applied rather restrictively by the Kenyan authorities in later years. Altogether 4,000 Europeans and 61,000 Asians⁹⁵ acquired citizenship in one way or another. Those who did not opt for citizenship and who had not left the country (about 15,000 Europeans had departed at the approach of independence) increasingly felt the measures of "Kenyanization" instituted by the government in different branches of the economy in subsequent years. Non-citizen Asians, most of whom carried British passports, were most strongly affected by these measures. Their plight was particularly severe. On the one hand, many of them were fairly easily replaceable through "Africanization" in areas where few skills and relatively little capital was required. These included traders, craftsmen, and low and middle-level employees. On the other hand, Britain established immigration quotas for what thus became in effect "second-rate British citizens", so that many of these people were

caught in between and had nowhere to go, since India also was reluctant to take them back.

A second and at least equally important problem was the question of what was to become of the "White Highlands". Some settlers had sold their property and had left the country immediately after the timetable for independence had been announced, fearing another "Congo" and a "return to the age of darkness". The majority of them, however, waited for further developments and were reassured by the British government which negotiated an agreement with the new Kenyan leaders ensuring "an orderly transition" for those who wanted to leave. 12.5 million pounds were offered in the first of these agreements to buy European-owned farms and to put them under African control. One-third of this amount was given as a grant (supposedly to account for farm houses and some implements which could not be used any longer by the new owners), the rest was in the form of a loan for a period of 30 years which carried an annual interest rate of 6.5 %. The value of each farm was fixed for these transactions at the relatively high level of 1959. In this way by 1972 about two-thirds of the former European "mixed farms" (which comprised about 1.6 million ha) had come into African hands. Large-scale plantations (e.g. for tea or sisal) and ranches (which covered another 1.4 million ha) had been left relatively untouched by these measures. In ^a number of "settlement schemes", most notably the "million acre scheme", about 500,000 ha of the

acquired land was distributed among approximately 36,000 African smallscale farmers and their families, of whom about 40 % formerly had been agricultural laborers on these farms. Another 1,200 large-scale mixed farms (altogether about 400,000 ha) were transferred in toto and taken over by Africans in different forms of individual and group ownership (e.g. cooperatives, partnerships, limited companies etc.).⁹⁶

The way in which this transfer was carried out made apparent the commitment of the new government for a more "capitalistic" development emphasizing the continuing good relations with the former colonial power. Whereas in the beginning this agreement could have been interpreted to be merely an expedient way for the Kenyan leaders to speed up the final attainment of independence, it soon became evident that the new government was to stick to the terms of the settlement and was willing to pay back the loans. Kenya's new leaders, including most notably Kenyatta himself, made it clear that there would be "no free things" after independence and that everything had to be earned and paid for. Besides the ideological commitment to a de facto "free enterprise" system, two more intrinsic reasons may have been responsible for this decision. One reason very probably lay in the fact that the territory of the "White Highlands" traditionally had belonged largely to some pastoralist groups, such as the Maasai and Kalenjin, and that the Kikuyu for whom the question of land had been most urgent and

who now dominated the government could make no claim for these areas if they were returned free of charge "to their proper owners". To carry out this transaction in a purely commercial manner giving the land to those who were willing and most able to pay, therefore, cleared the way for an expansion of the Kikuyu homelands. In fact, practically all of Nyandarua District, which was one of the main settlement areas, is today in the hands of Kikuyu owners, and together with the traditional Kikuyu districts of Kiambu, Murang'a and Nyeri, it has now become a part of Central Province.⁹⁷ Another reason became apparent in some of the subsequent developments in the first few years after independence. During this time many of Kenya's new leaders were able to acquire formerly owned European farms and other business on very easy terms and thus developed a vested interest in the preservation of private and individual ownership of these enterprises.⁹⁸

Together with the measures commercializing the small-scale farming sector in many parts of Kenya in the wake of "Mau Mau", the manner in which the transfer of the "White Highlands" was carried out most significantly set the stage for some important aspects of Kenya's future pattern of class formation. The dynamics of this pattern were then further accentuated and developed by the kind of economic system which evolved in Kenya and which in some important aspects had been predetermined by these earlier decisions after independence. The most

important programmatic statements concerning Kenya's future economic system can be found in the "KANU Manifesto" of 1963⁹⁹ and the "Sessional Paper No. 10" of 1965 which was entitled "African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya".¹⁰⁰ Whereas the former document still was somewhat ambiguous as to its concrete economic policies,¹⁰¹ the latter, reportedly drawn up with the help of some American advisors, makes these choices quite explicit. In spite of its title it opts for a basically capitalistic system where private ownership of the means of production and an allocation of resources by market mechanisms prevail.

This is somewhat tempered by elements of "planification", such as regular "Five-Year-Development Plans"¹⁰² which, however, are only of an indicative target-setting nature and do not in themselves allocate resources directly or bind private investors in any way, and some forms of joint and public ownership in some sectors of the economy. The latter are usually exercised through para-statal organizations such as the "Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation" (ICDC), the "Development Finance Company of Kenya" (DFCK), the "Kenya Tourist Development Corporation" (KTDC) and others. In 1973, i.e. after "ten years of Uhuru", the contribution of the public sector, including the para-statal organizations and Kenya's share in the organizations of the now defunct East African Community, to the Gross Domestic Product was 27.7 % (compared with 24.1 % in 1964),¹⁰³ capital formation by the public sector amounted to 42.9 % (1964: 25.0 %) of the total,¹⁰⁴ and public employment constituted 39.3 %

(1964: 31.6 %) of total wage employment. ¹⁰⁵

There is no antitrust legislation in Kenya or any other kind of governmental control of oligopolistic or monopolistic practices in the different branches of industry. Nor is there, so far, any coherent regional or structural policy attempting to regulate, e.g. by means of tax incentives for investments in less favored areas, the allocation of industries or the flow of resources into certain projects or branches of industry which would be preferable from an overall macro-economic point of view. Investments from abroad are encouraged and enjoy certain tax privileges. The free transfer of the originally invested amounts back to their countries of origin and of all profits which may have been accrued in the meantime are guaranteed.

Kenya's unions are organized by the principle of a single union for each branch of industry (as, for example, in the Scandinavian countries or West Germany), and not on the basis of the individual skills of the union members (as e.g. in Great Britain or the U.S.A.), or in terms of differing ideological orientations with unions competing among members of the same profession or branch (as, e.g., in France or Italy). All branch unions (presently about 30 altogether) also are members of a central body, the "Central Organization of Trade Unions" (COTU). It was founded in 1966 following an intervention by the government after a series of disputes both on ideological and ethnic grounds between the previously existing "Kenya Federation

of Labor" (KFT) and the rival "Kenya African Workers Congress" (KAWC). The unions do enjoy a certain measure of autonomy in their negotiations with their respective employers and their associations; a strike, as the final weapon, can only be called after all other possibilities in the very detailed regulations concerning these agreements have been exhausted. If this is not the case, the Ministry of Labor can declare a strike to be illegal, and in fact has done so in many instances. At certain times, e.g. before elections, strikes have been proscribed altogether. The judicial authority over disputes concerning industrial relations lies with a separate "Industrial Court", the members of which are also appointed by the government. In this way industrial relations are, in effect, quite closely supervised and actual work stoppages have become increasingly rare since these measures were introduced. On the whole the incidence of strikes in Kenya today is much less than, for example, in most Western industrialized countries (e.g. measured by the man-hours lost per year in relation to total man-hours or the total labor force).¹⁰⁶

Altogether one can thus speak of a "mixed economy" in Kenya, which however, leans strongly toward the "capitalistic" side. In particular the degree of involvement of foreign capital in Kenya's plantations and industries is still extremely high, and many of the by now well-known consequences of a "neo-colonial" situation are today manifest in Kenya.¹⁰⁷ Important groups which are strongly represented in the

government also have developed a vested interest in the preservation of the present situation, so that no policies aimed at changing this pattern can be expected from this side. The unions, too, do not constitute an effective "countervailing power" ¹⁰⁸ and their weight cannot possibly be compared to that of "capital" and its mostly foreign owners. As will be shown in further detail below, ¹⁰⁹ the present economic system has created or further accentuated strong imbalances both between regions (i.e. also ethnic groups) and "classes" with a great potential for increasing conflicts along these lines.

These basic choices, made at the time of independence and which strongly affected Kenya's future economic and social development, have been reflected to a certain extent in some of the more important political events of the post-independence era. The first noteworthy incident occurred just a few weeks after independence had been celebrated: the army mutiny of January 1964. Some troops stationed in camps near Nairobi and Nakuru turned against their (still mostly British) officers and demanded rapid promotions of Africans as well as better pay. Unlike the situation in neighboring Tanganyika, however, where a similar mutiny had occurred a few days earlier and had triggered to a certain extent the following events in Kenya and Uganda, things never really got out of hand and the government did not feel obliged to call in British troops as had been the case in the other two countries. ¹¹⁰ The mutineers were

swiftly dealt with and the army was thoroughly reorganized. In addition, regular police forces were strengthened and a special para-military organization, the "General Service Unit" (GSU), was created, the main task of which is the maintenance of internal security, but which is also designed to check influence of the regular armed forces in case of another conflict. ¹¹¹ Whereas this first major political turbulence could still be interpreted to have been the expression of dissatisfaction rooted in the colonial period, other events to come were more of the new regime's own making.

The first few years after independence saw a re-alignment of political forces and some important constitutional changes. The first important move occurred when an increasing number of KADU M.P.s crossed the floor to the government side and KADU was finally dissolved in November 1964 (APP already had dissolved itself and joined KANU in August 1963). At about the same time the government also decided that Kenya should become a republic and some important elements of the federal ("rajimbo", literally: "provinces" or "states") constitution which had given a good deal of autonomy to Kenya's seven main regions were abolished. The existing regional assemblies were dissolved and the provincial administration became directly subjected to the Office of the President. In December 1964 Kenya was declared a Republic and Kenyatta became its first President, replacing the Queen as head of state. The new office now combined the

functions of head of state with those of the head of government which previously had been exercised by a prime minister. In this sense Kenya followed more the U.S. or French example of a strong executive presidency. However, in contrast to the American and French models, the Kenyan president remains directly responsible to the lower house of parliament ("House of Representatives"), as do the heads of government in most Western European countries. Executive power was further strengthened when a constitutional amendment in May 1966 gave the president very far-reaching emergency powers.¹¹² These include the prohibition of organizations and public assemblies, the unlimited detention of persons, press censorship, restrictions of movements into, out of or within Kenya, the imposition of curfew and similar measures. In December 1966 the second house, the "Senate", was abolished as a further relic of the "Majimbo" constitution. Kenya thus from then on has had a one-chamber parliament which consists of 158 elected representatives and 12 members who are nominated (another remnant of colonial times) by the president. In 1968 the constitution was again changed to provide for direct elections of the president by the population at large.

This period was thus characterized by the creation of a de facto one-party state and by the continued strengthening of the executive powers in a more and more centralized political system. At the same time, however, some signs of opposition and dissent had again become

apparent below the surface. As will be analysed in further detail below, this dissent crystallized around the two main dominating factors of Kenya's political life, ethnicity and class, which in some instances can serve as countervailing powers, but which in other situations reinforce each other.

Since the early beginnings of the resistance movements in the late 1940s there had been strands of more "moderate" and more "radical" orientation among African political leaders. During this period the latter often were members of the "Forty Group" and were later strongly represented among the main activists of the "Freedom Fighters" in the forest who had their main basis of recruitment in the rural areas. The former could be found more often among those leaders who had emerged in the towns and who hoped to achieve their aims mainly through union organization and constitutional change. Kenyatta's position at this time has never become quite clear; he had been branded by the colonial government as the most "dangerous" African political leader. It remains doubtful whether he actually exercised any direct influence or control over the more radical of the freedom fighters. After his release he quickly joined those who worked for an "orderly" transfer of power and increasingly was to be counted among the more moderate and even "conservative" forces in Kenyan politics. 113

The distinction between radicals and conservatives was also to a certain extent a distinction between the

"back benchers" and the "front benchers" in Parliament. One of the first issues to become apparent was the question of payment for land acquired by African settlers in the former "White Highlands". While the radical wing did not see any reason to compensate the British for something which they considered as rightfully having belonged to Africans anyway and which had been taken forcefully by the colonial power, the government of Kenya soon agreed to a scheme of loans financed by the United Kingdom which would ensure a full compensation of the white settlers. An arrangement was made for regular repayments, including interest, by the new African occupants of the land. Many of the former freedom fighters were not satisfied with these arrangements, thus showing an element of "class conflict" within Kenya's largest and most active ethnic group, the Kikuyu. The most outspoken political leader representing this group at this time was Bildad Kaggia who had been tried along with Kenyatta at Kapenguria and who had been put in detention with him. In 1964 his disagreement with Kenyatta over this issue had come into the open and he relinquished his post as Assistant Minister for Education. He then assumed the leadership of KANU's back-bench group in Parliament. After the dissolution of KADU, which had strengthened to a certain extent the "conservative" forces within KANU, the backbenchers became Kenya's main and quite active opposition.

But this class aspect also cut across ethnic groups

at this time. Oginga Odinga, for example, who had become Kenya's Vice-President after Independence and who was the most prominent Luo leader of this period, more and more espoused "socialist" ideas. His main opponent was Tom Mboya, also a Luo, whose political base, however, was in Nairobi and not, as Odinga's, in his homeland Nyanza. Mboya, as Secretary General of KANU and as one of the key figures in Kenyatta's cabinet (first as Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, then as Minister of Economic Planning and Development), had become one of the main architects of Kenya's post-independence political and economic system. This ideological rivalry was intensified by their diverging personalities and the fact that both had strong ambitions for the eventual succession of Kenyatta. Outside forces, as is almost always the case in such situations in Africa, also came into the play and Mboya was clearly the man of "the West" while Odinga was supported by the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. 114

In February 1965 Pio de Gama Pinto, a former union activist and Member of Parliament of Goanese origin and one of Odinga's most influential associates, was assassinated in Nairobi. The circumstances surrounding his death, where some important people obviously had something to hide, remained shrouded in mystery, and were to set a precedent for similar acts of political violence. The opposition of the back-bench group became somewhat muted by this event, and when Odinga attempted to rally the support of this group

behind him, it became apparent that the "conservatives" now could clearly count on a majority in parliament. This conflict came to its climax when at a party convention at Limuru in March 1966 the office of KANU National Vice-President, the post held by Odinga, was abolished. Realizing his defeat Odinga finally resigned from the government and from KANU to become the leader of a newly founded opposition party, the "Kenya People's Union" (KPU). Together with him 30 other M.P.s resigned, including two ministers. Most prominent among them were again Bildad Kaggia and Achieng Oneko, the latter an early leader of the freedom movement, who also had been in detention together with Kenyatta.

As a result, the constitution was retroactively changed to the effect that every member who had been elected to parliament as a representative of a certain party would automatically forfeit his seat, if he for some reason were no longer a member of this party. This meant that by-elections had to be held for all seats which had been vacated by the new KPU members. These by-elections took place in June 1966 and saw a clear defeat of most KPU contenders (including Kaggia in his constituency in Murang'a District). Only nine M.P.s were re-elected (including Odinga and Oneko), most of them from Nyanza Province, the Luo homeland.¹¹⁵ What had started as an ideological issue involving class conflict had thus now become crystallized almost completely along ethnic lines. What was left of KPU increasingly came under pressure

from the government. Kagia was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment for holding an unlawful meeting, Odinga's passport was withdrawn and his Nairobi office was searched by the police. When local elections were to be held in August 1968 it turned out that all KPU candidates "had filled out their registration forms incorrectly" and no KPU member was permitted to stand for the elections. As a result of this pressure a number of KPU adherents defected and returned to KANU.

KPU as a more "radical" opposition party was thus quite effectively suppressed when suddenly in 1969 the ethnic aspects of the conflict gained a new dimension. On July 5, Tom Mboya, the leading Luo among those who had stayed in the government camp and whose position had been significantly strengthened by Odinga's defeat, was assassinated in broad daylight on a Nairobi street. Again the circumstances surrounding this death were never fully revealed, yet it was quite clear that Mboya had become too powerful a contender for the succession of Kenyatta. This non-Kikuyu bid for the presidency apparently had become too much of a threat for some leading Kikuyu politicians. Mboya's assassination immediately triggered strong reactions in Nyanza Province where the loss of the last important Luo representative in the government was a severe shock. Although Mboya, in contrast to Odinga, never really had drawn much support from his home area, his assassination made him a hero to his people. Tensions further escalated

when in August and September of the same year, following tactics used during the "Mau Mau" period, masses of Kikuyu swore "to keep the flag in the house of Mumbi" (i.e. to keep the presidency in Kikuyu hands). When President Kenyatta visited Nyanza Province in October, an angry crowd in Kisumu started to throw stones, and his guards opened fire. At least 11 persons were killed and many more wounded. Five days later KPU was finally banned and its leaders who had been held responsible for the riot were put into detention. Short of outright civil war, which would have been a rather one-sided affair anyway, many Luo employed outside Nyanza retreated into their home area in fear of Kikuyu reprisals.

This was the general background when general elections in December 1969 were held, the first after independence. KANU was once again the only party which could field candidates, but the electoral procedures had been changed so that officially administered primary elections, following the American pattern, had to take place first. KANU did not possess any effective organization itself, having lived mostly in the shadow of the government and its administration. As a result almost anybody who could make a deposit of KSh 1,000 was entitled to become a candidate. In this way more than 700 persons contested the 158 seats. In only 11 constituencies were the incumbents (including Kenyatta and some members of his inner circle) returned to office "unopposed". As a result more than half of the incumbent M.P.s were defeated, including five ministers and 14 assistant ministers. Although the real significance of these

elections and the role of parliament in the Kenyan system as a whole have to be qualified somewhat,¹¹⁶ there remains no doubt that the elections worked as an effective safety-valve for the increasing pressures in Kenyan politics.

In the same way the composition of the new cabinet helped to calm down the situation. It was formed after the elections and again reflected Kenyatta's attempt to govern by means of a "grand coalition" of the major political forces keeping at least some kind of ethnic balance.¹¹⁷ Things remained cool for the rest of 1970 and even a fumbled coup attempt in early 1971, involving a Luo university lecturer and a Kamba Member of Parliament as the main conspirators, did not disturb the political scene very much. The Army Chief of Staff and Kenya's Chief Justice, both Kamba, were also implicated in this affair and resigned from their posts, but none of them was ever prosecuted; apparently the government never perceived this attempt as any real threat. The release of Odinga and most of the other political detainees, who all joined KANU again, was another gesture of reconciliation during this period.

Behind the scenes, however, some of the deeper-lying tensions continued unabated. Kenya's economic growth, spectacular in many ways, remained unevenly distributed and accelerated existing inequalities, particularly between the Kikuyu on the one hand and most of the other ethnic groups on the other, and, among the Kikuyu, between people from Kiambu and those from the other districts of Central Province.¹¹⁸ This became manifest also at the government level where

some high-ranking politicians and top administrators have amassed considerable fortunes since independence. Most of this wealth was acquired within the legal limits of Kenya's capitalist economy, but in some cases even some quicker ways of getting rich were practiced by some people at the highest levels. The clove-smuggling affair in 1972, implicating ministers, M.P.s, and two Provincial Commissioners,¹¹⁹ and the ruby mine scandal in 1974, apparently involving Kenyatta himself,¹²⁰ were only the two most spectacular examples of this kind.

Some of the discontent which grew out of these rising tensions was articulated in student demonstrations in Nairobi, and the university was closed for several months in 1972 and 1974. Most of these demonstrations were peaceful, but riot police were called in several times and in one demonstration in February 1974 at least five students were killed.¹²¹ Another violent incident occurred in December 1972 when Ronald Ngala, a leading politician from the coast and a former member of KADU, was killed in a mysterious car "accident". As in previous cases (the assassinations of Pinto and Mboya and another fatal accident involving a Luo minister, C.M.G. Argwings-Kodhek, in 1969) the real circumstances of his death have never become entirely clear. The most outspoken critics of government policies and practices, however, included some of the back-bench members of parliament and even some assistant ministers. In particular "the three J.M.s", as they were sometimes called (J.Martin Shikuku, a Luyia, John Marie Seroney, a Nandi, and Josiah Mwangi

Kariuki, a Kikuyu whose constituency was in the settlement area of Nyandarua North), became a focal point of this kind of opposition.

The parliamentary elections of 1974 again brought a good deal of change in the composition of the government and among members of parliament. Four ministers and 13 assistant ministers were defeated and more than half the M.P.s did not return. For the first time one of the leading figures was among those defeated: Njoroge Mungai, a former Minister of Defense and of Foreign Affairs and a close associate of Kenyatta who had been given good chances for his succession, but who had fallen somewhat out of favor lately. In this way the elections did effect at least a certain "circulation" of the elite and were "meaningful" in a democratic sense, at least for the local electorate in contested constituencies.¹²² On the other hand, some politicians such as Odinga and some of the other former KPU members were not allowed to stand in the elections and again the President, the Vice-President and the Minister of State in the Office of the President, Mbiyu Koinange, who had become Kenyatta's closest aid in recent years, were returned "unopposed", so that, indeed, no real contest for the most important positions in Kenya's government has taken place.

The new cabinet again maintained a certain ethnic balance, but the more outspoken critics were, significantly, not included this time. Thus Kariuki and Shikuku, both of whom previously had been assistant ministers, together with Charles Rubia, a wealthy businessman, former mayor of

Nairobi and also a former assistant minister who had voiced some of the internal Kikuyu discontent of the people from Murang'a, were now among the back-benchers again. The ranks of this group also had been strengthened by the return of some former ministers and other important personalities as J. Odero-Jowi who had been Kenya's ambassador to the United Nations for some time or Burudi Nabwera, a former ambassador to the United States. Perhaps for this reason the new parliament showed some signs of reasserting its position and regaining some of its largely lost powers vis-à-vis the executive. This became evident when in the very first session after the elections J.M. Seroney was elected Deputy Speaker against the explicit wishes of the government. Kenyatta was so upset that he immediately prorogued parliament. When it finally reconvened in February 1975 Seroney was elected nevertheless.

Kenya's calm was then visibly shaken when in March 1975 J.M. Kariuki was assassinated. Kariuki had gone through a mixed and somewhat controversial political career, but at the time of his death he undoubtedly was the most important spokesman of the opposition. He first became known as the author of a book about his experiences as a "Mau Mau Detainee"¹²³ and had been elected to Kenya's first parliament after independence. He also was quite successful in diverse businesses and was fond of a flamboyant lifestyle, running his own horses at the Ngong race track (Kenya's "Ascot", still a "landmark" of the colonial era and its "gentlemen"),¹²⁴ and was frequently seen playing roulette at the "Casino".

In his speeches he nevertheless increasingly espoused the cause of Kenya's poor and underprivileged and developed a nationwide populist appeal. As the representative of a settlement area in the former "White Highlands" he raised, for example, the question of compensation for formerly European-owned land and more generally criticized other colonial or neo-colonial practices. Although Kariuki, in the eyes of many observers, did not possess either the intellectual capacity or the personal integrity of a more convincing "socialist" leader such as Julius Nyerere, there is no doubt that "J.M." at the time of his death was the most vocal and most popular critic of the government and the only politician, except for Mzee himself, who had a truly nationwide, non-ethnic appeal.

A special parliamentary committee was set up to investigate the assassination. Some high ranking officials, such as the head of the para-military "General Service Unit" (GSU), some other leading police officers and the Minister of State, Mbiyu Koinange, were clearly implicated but again no action was taken and the mystery remained.¹²⁵ This time, however, reactions were more pronounced. Riots occurred both in Nyeri, where Kariuki originated from, and in Kisumu, the capital of the Luo (!) area. Pictures of Kenyatta were torn from the walls in many places, marking the first time that this had ever happened. The legitimacy of his government had visibly suffered. For the first time conflict clearly manifested itself on a "class" basis, since Kariuki had been a Kikuyu; ethnic appeals by the Kenyan leadership were to no

avail in this case.

A certain calm returned when the government made it clear that it still possessed quite effective means of coercion and was willing to use them anytime it seemed necessary. The first to feel this renewed determination were the other two "J.M.s", Seroney and Shikuku. After making some relatively harmless remarks in parliament about the lack of life in KANU, they were put into detention by order of the President, even though such remarks had been made in similar forms many times before.

The question of who eventually was to succeed the aging president continued to dominate much of Kenya's behind-the-scenes politics in the following years. In August 1976 a group of influential politicians led by Kihika Kimani, a Nakuru M.P. and chairman of the powerful Ngwataniro group of companies, and including a number of present and former cabinet ministers such as Paul Ngei, James Gichuru and Njoroge Mungai called for a "change of the constitution" which would bar the Vice-President (Daniel arap Moi) from automatically succeeding to the presidency in case of death or retirement. This move was aborted when the Attorney General, Charles Njonjo, prevailed upon Kenyatta and the majority of the cabinet members to reject the suggested amendment. The reasons given were of a legal nature, but it had become clear that some political alliances among rival groups were being formed in order to prepare for the presidential succession.

These tendencies continued when elections within

the single party KANU, the first ones since the Limuru conference of 1966 (which had ended with Odinga's defeat), were to be conducted. Towards the end of 1976 practically all branch and subbranch elections had been completed and the date for the elections of the national executive was set for April 1977. Throughout most districts a similar alignment of forces as had taken place around the "change the constitution" issue could be observed. One camp, sometimes called "the incumbents", consisted of some leading cabinet members such as Moi, Njonjo, and Kibaki, the other camp, sometimes called the "challengers", comprised influential personalities from the Kiambu area such as Gichuru or Mungai, but also some "dissenters" such as George Anyona from Kisii and others. The elections then were called off at the last minute (because of an illness of President Kenyatta, as was later revealed) and the expected show-down did not take place. 126

The most dramatic test for the political institutions set up after independence occurred when President Kenyatta died in August 1978. As it turned out the succession by Vice-President Daniel arap Moi was affected quite smoothly with Attorney General Charles Njonjo in particular seeing to it that the relevant constitutional provisions were adhered to. Moi was then confirmed in office when he was elected as the single candidate to the presidency of KANU (and subsequently that of the country) by the KANU national convention which was finally held in October 1978. Mwai Kibaki was elected party vice-president and also was appointed by Moi as Vice-

President of Kenya. The KANU elections clearly were dominated by what earlier had been the "incumbents camp" which followed a strategy of a relatively well-balanced regional representation. All "challengers" to national party positions suffered heavy defeats. Within the cabinet there were only minor re-shuffles including most notably Mbiyu Koinange, Minister of State in the President's Office under President Kenyatta and his closest adviser, who was moved to a less important position.

The population at large seemed to be relieved by this smooth transition of power laying to rest, at least for the time being, fears of political turmoil or even civil war. President Moi's popularity was further enhanced when he released all political detainees in December 1978 and promised to fight administrative inefficiency, corruption and other evils. He also affected a re-shuffle in the police force and other security services which further stabilized his position. Moi's policy of "nyayo" (i.e. following in the "footsteps" of the late president) thus has been quite successful so far. What it means in terms of the major social forces shaping politics in Kenya will become clearer after we have discussed them more fully in the subsequent parts below.

Foreign relations

In contrast to Kenya's sometimes turbulent internal political developments her foreign relations have been relatively uneventful. One of the few serious problems after

independence was, however, the threat of secession by Kenya's North Eastern Province. This area of approximately 83,000 square kilometers with hardly any agricultural potential belongs to the least "developed" parts of Kenya and is inhabited by about 250,000 mostly Somali-speaking people, many of whom still are pursuing a pastoralist way of life. The neighboring Somali Republic claimed this territory after independence on the basis of the existing ethnic relationships, much in the same way as it demanded significant changes of its borders with her Western neighbor, Ethiopia. Kenya refused to cede any territory, maintaining the principle, also advocated by the Organisation of African Unity, that existing borders in Africa should not be changed except with the consent of all parties concerned. Some sporadic fighting occurred in the first years after independence between some "shifta" (local rebels supported by Somalia) and Kenya's armed forces, making it necessary to impose tight security measures. After mediating efforts by President Nyerere of Tanzania and President Kaunda of Zambia the political leaders of Kenya and Somalia agreed in October 1967 to settle the dispute by peaceful means. Since then hostilities have ceased, although no real solution to the underlying problem of the two conflicting principles of the right of "national identity" on the one hand and the maintenance of territorial integrity on the other has been found. When the "Ogaden War" between Ethiopia and Somalia broke out in 1977 Kenya officially remained uncommitted, but it was clear that she politically supported the Ethiopian side

fearing similar claims on her territory by Somalia. The Somalian defeat then settled this conflict, at least as far as Kenya is concerned, for the time being. Things will probably remain this way unless a discovery of oil or of some other important minerals will make Kenya's Northern Province more attractive and again raise this issue. ¹²⁷

The other important development in this area concerns Kenya's relations with two other neighbors, Tanzania and Uganda, including efforts towards creating some kind of larger "East African Community". The three countries inherited from the colonial era a network of "common services" (the most important were the "East African Railway's Corporation", the "East African Harbors Corporation", and "East African Airways"), and they once had a common currency and common income tax and customs and excise departments. Although in former times African politicians had resisted all settler-inspired attempts of a "closer union" in East Africa, ¹²⁸ the leaders of the three newly independent countries agreed in June 1963 that a new kind of political community should be created. ¹²⁹ It was soon realized, however, that the advantages of such of a community would be distributed very unevenly in a "laissez-faire" kind of economy, because the natural resources and the industrial potential of each territory were not sufficiently diversified to create a balanced division of labor or subsequent permanent "linkages" ¹³⁰ between them. The creation of a larger "common market" without

further specifications would simply lead to a concentration of industries in already favored areas, i.e. Kenya, particularly in the vicinity of Nairobi. To prevent this, an agreement was drawn up in Kampala in 1964 which specified the future allocation of important industries in East Africa. This agreement, however, was never really implemented and in 1965 Tanzania decided, in view of the increasing disadvantages for her side and a deteriorating balance of internal East African trade, to create her own currency and central bank, an example which was soon followed by the other two countries. In 1967 a new attempt was made and a common "East African Council of Ministers", an "East African Legislative Assembly" and a permanent "Central Secretariat" in Arusha, together with a "Court of Appeals for East Africa" and a "Common Market Tribunal" were created in addition to the already existing "common services". It was agreed that the three countries should have common customs tariffs and excise duties, and that arising imbalances in the pattern of trade between them were to be regulated by means of a "transfer tax" on certain goods. Problems in their balance of payments were to be eased by means of a "Distributable Pool Fund" which established payments by the richer to the less favored partners. Finally, an "East African Development Bank" should ensure that credits for the allocation of new industries would mainly go to areas which were lagging behind. This time the efforts to implement the agreement were more serious and for the first three years the "East African Community", by and large, worked quite well.

The military coup in Uganda in January 1971 then severely strained the relations with her neighbors, in particular with Tanzania, and interrupted some of the regular proceedings of the community for almost a year. In addition, and even more importantly, it had become increasingly clear in the meantime that an economic community in East Africa would not be feasible in the long run if the partner states continued to pursue fundamentally different economic policies, i.e. in particular if Kenya with her more "capitalistic" way of development and Tanzania with her much stronger "socialist" orientation which she followed since the "Arusha Declaration" of 1967, both continued to insist on their own individual development strategy. As a result, the common Income Tax Department was renationalized in 1974 and the administration of some of the community services became increasingly difficult.¹³¹ In spring 1977 the East African Community, weakened by mounting tensions among the three partner states, finally collapsed and its "common services" were discontinued. Kenya's border with Tanzania was closed by President Nyerere, allegedly to curb some of Kenya's continuing neo-colonial influences as a capitalistic sub-center on his country. The relations with Uganda also had turned sour when President Amin had claimed a large part of Kenya's territory in February 1976 (a claim which he later dismissed as a misunderstanding). Kenya thus saw herself relatively isolated in the area both economically and ideologically and felt compelled, in view of rising armaments around her, to increase her military

strength as well. For this she turned to the United Kingdom and the United States.

Outside East Africa, Kenya had maintained relatively stable relations with most of her partners since independence. In particular the links with the United Kingdom, the former colonial "motherland", continued to be very strong. In addition to the effects which still can be seen in many aspects of life in Kenya, reaching from the ownership of industries and the remnants in the legal and educational system to the consumption patterns of the elite and more subtle kinds of influences, Britain still is by far Kenya's most important economic partner abroad. Since 1968 Kenya has been associated with the European Economic Community (EEC) and she is one of the partners involved in the "Lomé Agreement" of February 1975 between 46 mostly African states and the EEC. Strong links also exist with the United States and other parts of the "Western" world. In this sense, too, Kenya thus clearly maintained its capitalistic preferences.

In contrast the relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries remained relatively cool, in particular since the mid-1960s when the government suspected some Soviet, and also Chinese, intervention on behalf of its internal opposition, the KPU. Except for some basic issues, as the question concerning relations with the minority regimes in Southern Africa where the government has always adhered to a strict anti-racist and anti-colonial policy, Kenya has been a "moderate" voice in

international affairs. This was, for example, manifested during the Middle East crisis of 1973 where she attempted to avoid to take sides as long as possible and then decided only to "suspend" diplomatic relations with Israel rather than to break them completely as did most other African countries.

Kenya's foreign relations thus are largely in line with her internal economic and political set-up. Major changes can only be expected if her internal conditions should change as well.

PART TWO

THE HORIZONTAL PATTERN OF SOCIETY: THE MAIN ETHNIC GROUPS

"Moins le blanc est intelligent, plus le noir lui paraît bête."

André Gide

Anyone who attempts to understand the present pattern of Kenya's society and politics must first take a look at the history and comparative development of its most important constituent parts - the ethnic groups. Unfortunately there is as yet no coherent single study which describes all of Kenya's ethnic groups, not even the most important ones, in a systematic comparative manner taking into account both traditional and contemporary aspects.

The sources which exist were originally written for a variety of purposes. They are of very unequal quality and most of them remain incomplete. Three main kinds of sources can be distinguished. First, studies were conducted by colonial administrators ¹ and missionaries ² following the penetration of the interior around the turn of the century. Even though the objective difficulties of communication and research at this time have to be acknowledged, it must also be said that a great number of these authors kept their

own purposes in mind and in many cases gave not only incomplete or faulty but very strongly biased accounts of the groups they were describing. Their own value judgements about the superiority of "Western civilization", the benefits of colonial rule, and the blessings of Christianity were all thoroughly established. Their studies reflected disdain for "savage" and "barbarous" peoples and their beliefs and customs. One of them, a member of the Consolata Fathers, proudly stated in the preface of one of the major studies on the Kikuyu: "The reader will not be surprised at discovering in these pages a genuinely Catholic atmosphere from cover to cover."³ Or, at a later point: "The reader may smile at this long catalogue of Kikuyu beliefs and superstitions, but on reflection he must entertain some feeling of pity for these poor slaves of ignorance... It is an obligation upon us civilized peoples to put these phantoms to flight and to lighten their darkness with the sun of justice and the stars of civilization."⁴

A second wave of studies was then initiated at a somewhat later stage by professionally trained foreign social anthropologists who attempted to present the life of these peoples in a less biased, more complete manner.⁵ The major method of this group of researchers was "participant observation": a trained observer lived with a group of people for a period of time and attempted to record the main aspects of their "culture" as he understood it.⁶

The advantage of this method lies in the fact that

behavior is observed as it occurs rather than through the more indirect procedures of sociometric tests, experiments, survey research etc., which have severe limitations despite their distinct advantages.

Participant observation alone, however, cannot give us a reliable picture of a society. A single observer is bound to have a point of view which reflects his conscious and unconscious biases. The very fact of his "participation" may lead to a change of behavior by those who are conscious of the presence of an outsider. If, in order to minimize bias, several observers were present at the same time, the element of distortion caused by their very presence would be even greater; or, if several observers participated at different points in time, social changes may occur which again would make their assessments not strictly comparable. Another important limitation of this method, almost by necessity, is the reduced scope of an investigation of this kind both in terms of its subject matter and, even more importantly, its geographical extensions. Most observers share the life of a very limited number of people who are expected to be "representative" or "typical" of the larger group as well. This assumption, however, is often not justified. Many "participant observers" tended to treat their objects as a homogeneous unit and thus overlooked important differences within the population studied. A third restriction of studies of this sort lies in the fact that they often concentrated on the "traditional" and "static" and thus tended to neglect social change and

social dynamics. A number of these studies have been summarized in the monographs of the "Ethnographic Survey of Africa".⁷ Not all of Kenya's peoples have been covered, however, in this effort (as e.g. the different groups of the Abaluyia),⁸ and some are only very inadequately dealt with (as e.g. the Luo).⁹

Only in more recent years have a number of indigenous authors begun to produce further studies. These give either literary or autobiographical accounts of their own experiences,¹⁰ or they describe their own societies in a more scientific manner as a result of anthropological or sociological training.¹¹ From these accounts, for which the better of the earlier studies still serve as a valuable background, a more balanced and satisfactory picture now begins to emerge.

An additional obstacle lies in the difficulties of access to a great number of the sources. Some, in particular the earlier ones, have been out of print for a long time and are available only in a few specialized libraries today.¹² Others remain entirely unpublished,¹⁴ and are almost impossible to obtain.

In view of all these difficulties we feel obliged to produce a brief account of traditional and contemporary aspects of the life of Kenya's peoples, drawing upon all sources, including available official documents and statistical information on the present situation of these groups. To fill some of the existing gaps and to provide a common frame of reference we also conducted a separate

survey. This included an extensive section on economic conditions and some aspects of traditional social organization.¹⁵ We also attempted to validate our results by cross-checking our different sources and by obtaining the judgements of some knowledgeable experts on these societies. Although it can only be a brief and sometimes necessarily incomplete sketch, the following is a first attempt at providing a description of important economic, social and political features of seven of Kenya's main ethnic groups in a comparative and up-to-date manner.

Before we turn to the detailed presentation of each group, a comparative summary of important facts and figures concerning these groups may be helpful. The selection of these data was determined by theoretical considerations in the light of the debate on the "aggregate data" approach¹⁶ and the discussion of social and economic indicators of "development",¹⁷ and by the practical availability of various statistics. In Table II we have included information about the size and general ecological conditions of the home area of each ethnic group, the most important demographic data, including present-day religious affiliation, data on the economic situation of each group and the division of labor, its educational achievements, and the infra-structural development of the area. In addition, as an indicator of local initiative, we have included figures on the recorded contributions made by each group to self-help ("Harambee") projects. Also, in order to show the other side of "development" and to give

an indication of socially deviant behavior, we have included the number of crimes committed by members of each group, both for Kenya as a whole and for the city of Nairobi, where members of different communities live under similar urban conditions. It would have been desirable to include additional indicators such as figures on income distribution, but no reliable data of this kind were available. The level of economic development of each group and its home area thus can only be inferred from the figures on the agricultural land under cash crops, farm sizes, non-agricultural occupations, and infrastructural data. Other indicators such as "consumption of electricity" or the like which are useful for industrialized countries do not make sense for Kenya; here rural electrification hardly exists at all.

We also computed an overall "rank order of development" by first establishing the rank of each group on the most significant "development"-related indicators in our table (i.e. area under "pure" cash crops, non-agricultural employment, adult literacy, roads, water supplies, hospital beds, self-help contributions and per capita income). Then we added up these ranks. In this way only ordinal numbers were computed and the obvious fallacy of adding up "apples and pears" was avoided. This method, in effect, assigns an equal weight to all indicators, which is, of course, arbitrary. But so would be any other way of weighting. The rank sums for each group also indicate to a certain extent the relative distance between them. It would be misleading, however, to infer from the rank sum of 10 for the Kikuyu,

for example, that this group is almost three times more "developed" than the Luo (rank sum 29). Such conclusions can only be drawn from differences concerning each indicator (e.g. adult literacy among the Kikuyu is about five times higher than among the Maasai).

/ Insert table II /

As it becomes apparent from Table II, the Kikuyu are by far the leading group on practically all the "development"-related indicators and in the overall ranking. They also have the highest rate of population growth, a very high population density in their home area, and are among those groups with the least favorable ratio of high potential land equivalents per person. This is one of the main reasons for their very high rate of migration to other provinces and the major cities. Their crime rate is also the highest for all groups both in Kenya as a whole and in Nairobi. The Luo rank as a distant second on our composite index, followed by the Kalenjin. The latter lie somewhat behind on some indicators (as e.g. literacy, water supplies, or hospital beds), but they enjoy a relatively favorable agricultural land population ratio and good income opportunities, which gives them a promising basis for further development (at least for those subgroups living in the climatically favored areas). The Kamba, Mijikenda and Luyia show a rather mixed picture, one group being ahead on one indicator, another on a second one.

TABLE II
COMPARATIVE DATA FOR KENYA'S MAIN ETHNIC GROUPS

<u>Ethnic group:</u> ^a	Kikuyu	Kamba	Miji- kenda	Luyia	Luo	Kalen- jin	Maasai
<u>Variable:</u>							
<u>1. Total tribal land area (km²)</u>	13,173	43,567	20,371	6,223	10,330	26,060	39,476
a) Agricultural land (high potential land equivalents)	9,120	5,890	3,250	7,410	10,050	10,160	9,550
b) In %	69.2	13.5	16.0	90.1	97.3	39.0	24.2
<u>2. Total population (in millions)</u>	2.20	1.20	0.52	1.45	1.52	1.19	0.15
a) Of which in tribal home area	1.61	1.03	0.45	1.17	1.32	1.09 ^b	0.14
b) In %	73.2	85.4	87.1	80.6	87.0	91.6	95.0
c) Of which in major cities (Nairobi/Mombasa) in %	9.4	7.5	11.7	5.5	5.6	0.5	0.8
d) Rate of growth (1962-1969 of total popul.)	3.7	3.2	2.9	3.6	3.5	3.5	0.1
e) Rate of urbanization (% living in towns over 2000)	2.74	1.41	3.09	0.80	2.61	1.90	1.24
f) Population density in home area (pers./km ²)	128	24	25	161	140	42	5
<u>3. Religious affiliation in % of total population (1972)</u>							
Roman Catholic	26	14	7	39	39	19	1
Protestant (incl. Anglicans+Indep.)	47	47	15	55	50	26	21
Muslim	--	--	40	2	1	--	--
Traditional	27	39	38	4	10	55	78

TABLE II - Continued

	Kikuyu	Kamba	Miji- kenda	Luyia	Luo	Kalen- jin	Maasai
<u>4. Land registration</u>							
a) In % of potential	99.5	15.1	16.7	95.6	47.6	40.4	62.2
b) Total no. of agric. holdings	240,000	150,000	65,000	230,000	230,000	130,000	--
c) <u>Average size of holding in registered area (ha)</u>	2.0	6.2	3.4	2.5	2.5	18.4	--
d) <u>Size distribution of small scale farms</u>							
(%) less than 2 ha	65.5 ^d	n.a.	n.a.	42.4	51.6	22.6 ^f	--
2.0 - 4.9 ha	28.8	--	--	32.5	24.1	49.0	--
5.0 - 9.9 ha	4.8	--	--	18.9	10.7	25.0	--
more than 10 ha	0.9	--	--	6.1	13.6	3.4	--
(av. size in this group)	(16.3ha)	--	--	(15.1)	(17.2)	(16.5)	--
<u>5.a) Ha of high potential land equivalents in home area/pers.</u>	0.57	0.57	0.72	0.63	0.76	1.10	6.82
b) <u>Area under cash crops (as % of cultivated area)</u>							
Definition A	54.5	59.6	61.2	55.0	32.6	52.6 ^g	--
Definition B ("pure" cash crops)	28.6	20.6	21.8	14.4	17.2	15.2	--
<u>6. Disposable income per small holding (Kshs/year):</u>							
a) Farm operating surplus	2,341	2,045	926	1,365	3,118	3,428	--
b) other sources of income (wages, remittances etc.)	2,121	1,575	2,497	1,308	1,122	1,491	--
c) Per capita disposable income	642	537	426	360	644	655	--
<u>7. Persons in non-agric. employment in the mod. sector as % of total pop. in home area</u>	3.7	1.5	1.5	1.3	2.3	1.5	ⁱ

TABLE II - Continued

	Kikuyu	Kamba	Miji- kenda	Luyia	Luo	Kalen- jin	Maasai
8.a) % of adult popu- lation with minim. literacy (home area only)	51	31	15	43	30	26	10 - 12 ^j
b) Primary school en- rolment: as % of potential primary school popul. (home area only)	88.6	73.0	27.9	60.9	53.5	42.6	14 - 15 ^k
c) Secondary school enrolment as % potential second. school popul. (home area only)	13.4	6.1	2.6	7.4	6.2	4.2	1.0
9.a) Pers./hospital bed	724	1,037	998	1,025	1,097	1,140	787
b) Pers./health unit	6,577	11,170	7,672	12,893	11,305	4,295	3,836
10.a) % of pop. served with rur. water supplies	18.5	5.1	12.0	11.3	11.9	10.0	13.2
b) Km of roads per 1000 Km ² in home area	171.8	48.9	59.2	165.7	160.2	94.9	42.2
11. Contributions to self-help pro- jects 1972 (Kshs./pers.)	11.00	5.00	1.60	2.80	3.20	7.20 ^l	2.20 ^m
12. Crimes (per '000 pop.) Kenya av.							
a) Kenya total 2.73	3.84	2.62	2.00 ^o	2.94	2.28	2.24	3.81
of which							
against							
persons 1.11	1.56	1.10	0.76	1.34	0.90	1.03	1.21
property 1.22	1.68	1.19	0.95	1.23	1.06	0.95	1.76
Nair. av.							
b) Nairobi total ⁿ 8.82	13.69	9.49	6.00	6.40	6.29	7.09	13.5 ^q
persons 3.05	4.93	2.85	1.50	2.51	1.76	2.18	6.19
property 4.54	6.99	5.54	3.83	3.09	3.33	2.73	2.06

TABLE II - Continued

	Kikuyu	Kamba	Miji- kenda	Luyia	Luo	Kalen- jin	Maas.
<u>13. Political participation:</u>							
a) Voter registration 1974: (in % of eligible voters)	73	77	61	61	83	66	66
b) Voting turnout 1974: (in % of eligible voters)	56	46	37	33	48	48	46
<u>14. Over-all rank of</u>							
a) "Development"	1	4	4	4	2	3	7
b) Rank sums:	10	34	34	34	29	33	45

Sources and remarks:

^aSince for most of the variables considered here there were no detailed statistics available on an ethnic basis we had to calculate most figures on the basis of the respective administrative districts, the boundaries of which still coincide to a large extent with those of the traditional tribal areas. Thus, for our purposes, we considered all districts of Central Province to be the traditional Kikuyu homeland. (Nyandarua District as part of the former "White Highlands" and a settlement area is a certain exception in this respect, but more than 90 % of its population are Kikuyu nowadays.) The districts of Kitui and Machakos were taken to represent the Kamba and those of Kwale and Kilifi the Mijikenda peoples.

Bungoma, Busia and Kakamega Districts were defined as the Luyia area and Baringo, Elgeyo-Marakwet, Kericho, Nandi and West Pokot Districts as the territory of the Kalenjin-speaking groups. Narok and Kajiado Districts represent the Maasai homeland and Kisumu, Siaya and South Nyanza were taken as the Luo area. Although some of these districts also constitute the traditional homeland for some smaller groups (as, e. g., Busia for the Itego or South Nyanza for the Kuria peoples) and although some members of other tribes live there (mostly pursuing non-agricultural occupations), the groups considered here are by far the dominant ones in their respective districts. We are fairly confident that the figures given here represent a satisfactory approximation (and the only one available!) for some characteristic differences between Kenya's main ethnic groups. Only in a few instances where the characteristics of the minority groups must be assumed to be very different from those of the predominant one (as, e. g., in Narok and Kajiado Districts) we attempted, as far as possible, to take this into account for some of the variables. If not indicated otherwise the sources used here are the same as for our "District Development Index" in Appendix III below.

^bIn this figure we have included the Kalenjin living in Uasin Gishu District (a part of the former "White Highlands"), which is adjacent to the "pure" Kalenjin districts and where they constitute almost 60 % of the population.

^cKenya Churches Handbook, loc. cit., Table 4, p. 181. The pattern of religious affiliation is not homogenous among the sub-groups of these peoples. Among the Mijikenda, for example, most of

the Digo are Muslims whereas a considerable number of the Giriama profess traditional beliefs. Most of the Pokot and more than half of the Elgeyo, the Marakwet and the Tugen are also traditionalists, in contrast to their more Christianized Nandi and Kipsigis kinsmen.

^dComputed from Statistical Abstract 1970, Table 78, p. 81.

^eThis figure excludes Nyandarua, a former large-scale farming area.

^fThis figure includes only Kericho and Nandi Districts.

^gThe figures available are only for Kericho, Nandi and Elgeyo-Marakwet.

^hIntegrated Rural Survey 1974/75, reported in Economic Survey 1977, p. 88.

ⁱThere are 4,780 persons (2.3%) in this category in the Maasai home districts of Kajiado and Narok, but since there are also 65,000 persons of other ethnic communities living there, it is highly unlikely that a significant number of Maasai can be found in this group.

^jThe actual district figure is 20 %, but if we assume the literacy rates of the non-Maasai living there to be equivalent to the overall national average and if we deduct this group accordingly, we arrive at these values of 10 to 12 % for the Maasai alone.

^kThe actual district figure is 28.6 %, it has again been adjusted for the Maasai proper.

^lThis figure includes the districts of Baringo, Elgeyo-Marakwet, Kericho, Nandi and West Pokot.

^mThis figure refers to the total population of Kajiado and Narok districts.

ⁿComputed from Erasto Muga, Crime and Delinquency in Kenya, (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1973), Table 1, p. 5; and Kenya Population Census 1969, p. 69. (The data analyzed by Muga are for the year 1970.)

^oThis figure is for all "Coast tribes".

^pComputed from Muga, loc. cit., Table 20, p. 51; and Kenya Population Census 1969, loc. cit., p. 70.

^qThe total number of offenses committed by Maasai in Nairobi was only 13, these rates should, therefore, be taken with caution.

^rComputed from the election results by constituency as published in Daily Nation and Standard, October 15, 1974 and later editions.

If the rank sums for these groups are any indication (all amounting to a value of 34), they are all not very far apart. The Maasai clearly rank last on almost all scores, reflecting the still mostly traditional way of life of a great majority of them.

The actual living conditions of each group and further chances of improvement can only be fully appreciated, however, after we have discussed each of them in a more comprehensive manner in the following chapters.

CHAPTER III

THE KIKUYU ¹General background and economy

The area of traditional Kikuyu settlement stretches from the slopes of snow-capped Mount Kenya (17,058 feet = 5,199 meters) in the northeast of the territory to the long mountain range of the Aberdares (highest elevation: 13,120 feet = 3,999 meters) in the west. This runs in a north-south direction and forms a part of the eastern border of the Rift Valley, ending in the wide Athi Plains. It is there, at the borderline between the mountainous area and the open grassland, that Kenya's present-day capital Nairobi is situated. In the east and north Kikuyu country is bordered by the neighboring and related groups of the Embu and Meru who live on the slopes around Mount Kenya. Further east and south it borders the hilly but more arid region of "Ukambani" (Kamba country). ² Much of Kikuyu territory lies at an altitude of about 6,000 feet above sea level, which, despite the vicinity of the equator, gives it a relatively mild and at times even chilly climate. The area experiences regular and sufficient rainfalls. The main rainy seasons are between April and June and in November and December each year. The territory is well watered by permanent rivers and streams

which originate in the Aberdares Range or near Mount Kenya and almost all of which flow in an easterly direction. These rivers cut the country into fairly regular valleys and ridges, which range from about 200 - 600 feet in height. The landscape thus exhibits a very characteristic pattern which reminds some observers of "the waves of a heavy cross sea".³ Today, all major lines of communication run along these ridges. Most of the country has rich and fertile soil, mostly of volcanic origin, although today problems of overuse and soil erosion have become apparent in some areas.

Administratively, Kikuyu country today forms Kenya's "Central Province", which consists of the three traditional Kikuyu districts of Kiambu, Murang'a (formerly "Fort Hall") and Nyeri, to which have been added the newly created district of Kirinyaga on the southern slope of Mount Kenya and the settlement area of Nyandarua (formerly: "Thomson's Falls"), the latter having originally belonged to Rift Valley Province.

The Kikuyu have traditionally practised a mostly agricultural way of life. The main crops were sorghum, millet, beans, and sweet potatoes. Traditionally the land was cultivated with the help of a wooden "digging-stick" or a big machete-like knife ("panga") which, in different variants, is common in many parts of Kenya. Nowadays a tractor, in most cases operated by a private owner, is frequently hired for plowing. The Kikuyu keep cattle, sheep and goats. The latter served as the main unit of reckoning, e.g. for establishing the amount of bride-wealth to be paid, and goats were often used for ceremonial

purposes as well. Fish and chicken were not eaten traditionally, game very rarely. The main diet was thus largely vegetarian, because the slaughter of a goat was mostly restricted to ceremonial occasions.

Today the main staple crop is maize, often a hybrid variant, but cassava, yams, bananas, sugar-cane, English potatoes and many kinds of fruit and vegetables are produced, too. The main cash crops, in addition to some of the fruit and vegetables which are sold on local markets and in Nairobi, are coffee (since the restrictions on growing were lifted in the 1950s), tea, and pyrethrum. Almost one-third of all agricultural land today is devoted to the growing of "pure cash crops", this is by far the highest percentage for any major ethnic group in Kenya. Dairy cattle of various European breeds have been introduced successfully and many small farms in Kikuyu country have at least one or two "grade" cows. The keeping of poultry also has become quite popular and chicken and eggs are a welcome and nutritious supplement to the traditional diet.

In our sample ⁴ almost 90 % of all farmers grew some maize, about 15 % of which was of the "improved" variety. 40 % also planted some traditional food crops such as yams and cassava, 30 % had pulses under cultivation. By far the most popular cash crop was coffee (60 %), the number growing tea and pyrethrum being comparatively small (less than 10 %). About one-fourth of all farmers also produced English potatoes, tomatoes, pineapples and other fruit and vegetables, most of which (particularly from Kiambu) was sold on the

Nairobi market. About four-fifths of all farms had some cattle, of which almost 80 % were grade cattle. Very few herds in the small-scale farming areas numbered more than 5 heads of either grade or local cattle, the mean being between 2 and 3. About three-fourths of all farmers sold some milk (most of them between 2 and 10 liters per day). About one-fifth of the farmers also kept sheep and goats (between 2 and 5 on the average), about one-third had some chickens.

The Kikuyu traditionally lived in scattered homesteads ("mucii"), each family on its own piece of land, surrounded by their fields ("shamba").⁵ "Villages", as a territorially more compact form of settlement, did not exist until the "Emergency" of the 1950s when larger groups of people were settled in fortified compounds. As soon as the emergency was over, most people moved back to their original shamba. Today, with land consolidation and registration almost completed in Kikuyu country (by 1974 99.5 % of all land had been registered) this decentralized pattern of settlement is made even more permanent. The average size of a holding is approximately 5 acres (1 acre = 0.4 ha). The majority of respondents cultivated between 2 and 5 acres each. About 10 % had less than 2 acres, 15 % cultivated between 6 and 10 acres, and slightly more than 10 % possessed between 11 and 20 acres. Only in the settlement area of Nyandarua District (where about 10 % of our rural Kikuyu respondents live) can larger farm sizes for "smallholders" ⁶ (between 30 and 40 acres on the average)

be found. This area is, however, of somewhat lower potential and most of the farms have not yet been fully "developed".

In modern times the dispersed form of settlement has certain disadvantages since it is much more difficult and costly to establish a modern infrastructure in rural areas (e.g. all-weather roads, schools, hospitals, market-centers etc., but also, eventually, piped water and electricity for every home), if the homesteads are very far apart from each other. From this "technocratic" point of view, the Tanzanian program of establishing consolidated "ujamaa villages", apart from the particular and apparently somewhat problematic patterns of land holding and work organization which go with it, certainly offers some benefits. ⁷ On the other hand, Kikuyu country is so densely populated today, that farm houses are not far apart anyway, and the disadvantages of being somewhat further away from the community center have to be weighed against the advantages of being a short distance from the daily work on the shamba. The particular geographical character of the area also makes the implementation of an effective infrastructure (e.g. roads, waterpipes, etc. running along the top of the ridges) relatively easy.

Land in all its aspects was of central concern in traditional Kikuyu society and it still is for many "modern" Kikuyu. Being agriculturalists, they have depended upon land as the principal means of securing their material existence, but beyond that there has also been a deep spiritual attachment. As Kenyatta put it: "Communion with the

spirits is perpetuated through contact with the soil in which the ancestors of the tribe lie buried. The Kikuyu consider the earth as the 'mother' of the tribe." ⁸

Questions of land rights were, therefore, a principal factor in many disputes between the Kikuyu and the British in the colonial era and the prime cause for the "Mau Mau"-uprisings in the 1950's. ⁹

The traditional Kikuyu system of land tenure was based on the extended family or "lineage" ("mbari"), which jointly owned a piece of land ("githaka"), usually located on the same ridge, the characteristic geographical division in Kikuyu country. Within the mbari each elementary family (i.e. a husband and his wife or wives and children) had its own pieces of land, which did not necessarily form a single consolidated unit. Each wife then cultivated a portion allocated to her to feed her children and husband. When the father died the land and other property associated with the mother was inherited by her sons. The eldest son of the first wife sometimes acted as a trustee, when his brothers or half-brothers were still minors, but in principle all sons had the same rights in regard to the property associated with their mother. When there were no sons, the property went to the deceased husband's brothers or their respective heirs. ¹⁰

In our sample about 50 % of the respondents stated that their property would be inherited one day by all their children, 15 % specified the eldest son, 10 % said "all sons", 5 % the "favorite child". The rest were undecided, partly

because they were still young and had no children or property as yet.

The original rights to land were established either through clearing or by purchase from the previous inhabitants of the area, the Dorobo. Whereas in former times there was still a considerable "reserve" of forest land to be cleared, with other lands left idle, nowadays, due to the increasing population pressure, practically every suitable inch of soil is cultivated in some form or another. Former communal grazing grounds have largely disappeared. But even in former times it was not uncommon that a githaca could no longer support all the members of an extended mbari and some, mostly younger, people had to move elsewhere, either to clear new land of their own, or to ask the permission of a family of another mbari which still had plenty of land if they could cultivate some part of it. This was done purely on the basis of mutual friendship and no rent or other forms of payment were required. However, the fact that a family head could afford to give cultivation rights to others seems to have given him a certain prestige as a wealthy and influential person. The tenant ("muhoi", pl.: "ahoi") was not allowed to plant any permanent crops, and he was also obliged to leave again when he was asked to do so.

This somewhat hidden pattern of rural stratification between owners of land and others who had only cultivation

rights became of great significance in the wake of the land reforms in the 1950s when land ownership was vested in individual persons or in the nuclear family. In many cases the former ahoi had to leave the newly consolidated holdings because most of these were relatively small in size. In this way a new rural proletariat of landless people began to emerge and their ranks are still swelling rapidly due to the continuing population pressure. This tendency, apparent throughout Kenya, is most pronounced among the Kikuyu where a tradition of people who owned no land had existed, where the land reforms of the 1950s were carried out first and in the most complete manner, and where the increase of the population in relationship to the available land is felt most severely.

The traditional division of labor among the Kikuyu was based on sex and age. Men were responsible for the clearing of fields, the care of cattle, the heavier work in house-building (such as the cutting and erecting of timber, the building of fences and granaries), and some occasional military duties. Women's work consisted of the planting, weeding and harvesting of almost all crops, the collection of fire wood, the fetching of water from near-by rivers, thatching and plastering in hut-building, sewing of skins, making pottery, and cooking and child-care.¹¹ As can easily be seen from this list, women had the much more regular, and time-consuming duties. To make matters worse, the tasks of the men have decreased in modern times (the clearing of bushland and forests has practically come

to an end in this area, and "military duties" are no longer needed). Women's chores have become even more burdensome since the supply of firewood near homesteads has been almost completely exhausted and they have to walk longer and longer distances with heavy loads on their backs. It is not rare, therefore, for women to look quite old and worn out at a relatively young age. The introduction of piped water, which has already begun in some areas, and eventually perhaps of electricity, which is virtually non-existent in rural Kenya so far, may one day make the women's work easier, too.

In contrast, the men can often be found at leisure, drinking home-made "pombe" (local beer) or, in some other parts of Kenya, "chang'aa" (a very powerful local liquor) quite early in the afternoon. What in former days was the privilege of the "wazee" (the old men), has today become an every-day pastime for the males of all generations in all areas. Nowadays exceptions occur when men begin to share women's work by planting and harvesting certain crops, in particular cash crops like coffee, tea, but also bananas, vegetables and sugar-cane. They also devote a substantial amount of their time to the more delicate and time-consuming care of grade cattle. The marketing of major products is also mostly their task. This latter duty also puts them in control of most of the cash income of the family, considerable amounts of which they often use for their own consumption.

Most agricultural plots in Kikuyu country are rather well-"developed", i.e. terraced where necessary, carefully planned in their layout and used to their full potential. Given the small size of most plots this amounts to an intensive form of what can almost be called "horticulture". In our sample almost 60 % of the farm owners said that they had received some advice from the agricultural extension service and an almost equal number had attended a course at a farmers' training center. Also about one-third had received a loan to improve their shamba. Approximately 40 % of the farmers were members of a cooperative, the Kenya Farmers' Association or a similar professional organization. 90 % of those who had grade cattle used artificial insemination and about the same percentage of farmers regularly brought their cattle to a cattle-dip. All these figures are the highest for any of the ethnic groups considered here. They indicate the high degree of "modernity" reached in Kikuyu country, but also the relatively ample attention Kikuyu are getting from the government, which provides many of these services. Almost 90 % of the farm owners stated that they planned to further improve their shamba in the near future, about half of them by planting new crops, one-fourth by upgrading their cattle, and another 15 % by improving the infrastructure or installing a water supply. About 80 % said that they intended to buy more land or grade cattle sometime. Approximately one-third

of the agricultural Kikuyu respondents had an average cash family income of less than Kshs. 100.- (i.e. less than US \$ 15.-) per month, another third earned between Kshs. 100.- and 200.-, the rest had incomes above that level reaching up to Kshs. 800.- per month.

In the past there were very few specialized full-time occupations outside of agriculture. The only major exception were ironsmiths, who belonged to certain families, and "medicine-men" (mundu mugo), who practised good or "white" magic (in contrast to evil or "black" magic or sorcery) and who performed many important medical and ritual tasks. Today this has changed and there are, among the rural Kikuyu, quite a number of specialized traders, craftsmen and owners of other businesses and enterprises, often in combination with a shamba. Together with those in "informal" occupations, including all the family members of this group, the total population in the non-agricultural sector in Kikuyu country can be estimated at about 10 %. In our sample about 40 % of those in predominantly non-agricultural occupations stated that they also possessed a shamba or a share of one. This was in most cases cultivated by the wife or some other family member. In some instances hired labor was also employed. Practically all the crops planted were for subsistence purposes only.

Social and political structures

Traditionally the structure of Kikuyu society was differentiated both "horizontally", based on ties of kinship and marriage, but also on some variations between different geographical areas, and "vertically", based on a system of age and status-groups which cut across these structures. The most basic horizontal division was that between the nine main "clans" ("mihiriga").¹² These were named after the nine daughters of the mythological founders of the tribe, Gikuyu and Mumbi. The clan names are: Achira, Agachiko, Airimo, Ambui, Anare, Anjiro, Angoi, Aithaga, and Aithirando.¹³ Variations of these names are still the most common Kikuyu names for girls (e.g. Wangare, Wambui etc.). Today these clans have several hundred thousand members each and are dispersed all over Kikuyu country. It is doubtful whether the clans ever formed the basis of distinct regional units, and they are not exogamous groups either, as has been assumed by some authors.¹⁴ Since they also do not possess any effective internal organizations which comprise the whole clan, the social and political significance of the mihiriga is limited, although practically all Kikuyu respondents in our rural sample were able to identify themselves as members of a clan.

The clans are further divided into sub-clans and a series of even smaller units which are all, however, also of little actual significance. The only economically and socially effective unit today seems to be the smallest one, the "mbari". A mbari is a group of families who trace their

descent from a common ancestor following the paternal line, often for up to seven or eight generations. Mbari vary in size, but many number in the hundreds. Most members know each other and the kind and degree of their relationship. In addition to its functions as the most important traditional land-holding unit in Kikuyu society (this has changed somewhat as a result of the land reforms of the 1950s which gave holding rights to individuals and the "nuclear" family), the mbari is an important social reference-group for many Kikuyu and still plays an effective role in many economic and social relationships including the more modern ones.

Traditionally, the "muramati" was the head of a mbari. As a rule he was the first son of the first wife of his father from whom he had inherited the decision-making rights concerning the distribution of land among the members of the mbari, the granting of cultivation rights to ahoi or similar matters. ¹⁵ A muramati was expected to allocate the land fairly to the other members of the group, and he himself did not have any more cultivation rights than his brothers. Occasionally other senior and respected members who were not first-born sons of their father seem to have been able to acquire the function of muramati, especially after the original one had proved to be incapable, or after severe quarrels over land had arisen. Today the position of the muramati has been weakened, partly as a result of the land reforms which largely curtailed his original function.

In addition to this organization of Kikuyu society based on kinship, there is also a geographical organization. First of all there is the "village" ("itura") which comprises a number of neighboring families, but which does not represent, as has been mentioned above, a unit of more compact settlement as, e.g., in Europe. In contemporary administrative terms an "itura" may best be conceived of as a "sub-location" or "location". Next, there is a certain unity of living conditions and interests among people living on the same ridge ("rugongo"), the characteristic geographical division of Kikuyu-country, which often (but not necessarily!) coincides with the "githaka" of a mbari. Then, in a more general sense, the Kikuyu are geographically divided among the three main administrative districts ("bururi") of Kiambu, Muranga'a, and Nyeri, which were already important social units (e.g. for ceremonial purposes) in pre-colonial times, although the present boundaries do not completely coincide with the previous ones. This geographical division has been further accentuated in recent times by the differential economic development of these districts and, in particular, by differences in access to urban employment and government services. It is widely felt that the people of Kiambu who live in the vicinity of Nairobi and who have been strongly represented in all post-independence cabinets, including President Kenyatta himself, have been unduly favored.

A further division is into what has been called the

"Kikuyu guilds".¹⁶ These consist of the "Maasai guild" and the "Kikuyu guild" proper, but the distinctions refer only to differences in ceremonial patterns on certain occasions, as e.g. somewhat different initiation rites etc., and do not seem to be of any greater social or political significance. Today with the disappearance of some customs and considerable changes in others "guild" importance has declined.

The most important vertical stratification in traditional Kikuyu society was based on sex and age. Other ascribed or achieved criteria which determine a person's status in other societies, e.g. the prestige of the family, wealth, income, level of education etc., were relatively unimportant. In this sense traditional Kikuyu society clearly was egalitarian since everybody had the same chance to achieve status (at least among members of the same sex), and everyone went through the different stages in an equal and almost automatic way (depending on the fulfillment of certain conditions).

The term "egalitarian-segmentarian" has been coined by some authors for the description of social structures of this kind.¹⁷ The main "age-grades"¹⁸ for a male person, for example, were:

gakenge	- baby boy
kahi	- small boy
kihi	- uncircumcised boy

mumo	- circumcised youth
mwanake	- warrior, adult man
muthuri	- elder.

Age-grades were set apart by "rites de passage" which clearly demarcated the transition from one to another. The most important and dramatic ritual in this respect was the circumcision ("irua") of boys and girls when they were initiated into early adulthood. For girls this procedure (which in its most basic physical aspect consisted of a clitoridectomy) took place once a year (usually in the period between the "long" and the "short" rains), since it was important to perform this operation before a girl reached puberty. Boys circumcision ceremonies (which were the same in ritual and timing for the whole of one of the three major districts) took place every four to five years. All those who were circumcised together formed a particular "age-set" ("rika", pl. "marika") which constituted a kind of "blood-brotherhood". This was particularly important during the time of warriorhood. Its significance tended to decrease in later years, but membership in an age-set remained one of the most essential social bonds during a person's lifetime. Each age-set was given a name referring to some extraordinary event which happened at about the time of circumcision, for example a period of famine ("ng'aragu"). In more recent times, they were sometimes called after the year of initiation, for example the already mentioned "Forty Group" ("anake a 40"). Each age-set had a leader who was selected at the time of

initiation through a race of all boys over a distance of about two miles to a sacred tree. The boy who arrived first and threw his spear over the tree became the leader and spokesman of the group. This selection of leadership was interpreted as a kind of ordeal and, as Kenyatta put it: "It is believed that such a one is chosen by the will of the ancestral spirits in communion with Ngai (the traditional central deity of the Kikuyu), and is therefore highly respected."

A vertical division in an even wider sense, also based on age, was a system of what has been called "generation-sets" or "moieties". These consisted of two divisions, each of which comprised all male Kikuyu within one "generation", i.e. a period of about thirty years. These sets were alternately called "Maina" or "Mwangi", i.e. if the father belonged to the Maina set, his son would belong to the Mwangi and his grandson again to the Maina. The older set ruled for the duration of one generation until the next one was instituted in a solemn series of ceremonies ("ituika"). The last completed ituika in Kikuyu country took place in the 1890s. The ceremony which was started in the early 1930s was interrupted and then prohibited by the colonial government. By the time next generation should have taken over again in the 1960s in meanwhile independent Kenya this custom had lost its significance and apparently there have been no efforts to revive it.

The system of age-sets also disappeared among

the Kikuyu after the last ones apparently were instituted in the 1940s. Less than half of our rural respondents said they belonged to such a group. Only about one-fourth of those who were below the age of 40 were able to indicate their age-set membership, while 85 % of those who were aged 40 and above could still do so. Male circumcision is still practiced, however, and seems to survive, although today it is performed in most cases by hospital surgeons and no longer by the traditional practitioners. It has also become a largely private affair, and only a few boys of neighboring or otherwise related families are still circumcised together. Male circumcision thus has lost its original social function. Female circumcision, on the other hand, seems to be dying out completely, perhaps because the modern rationalization of cleanliness and hygiene given for the practice of circumcision seems to be more convincing for males than for females. It also should not be overlooked that the existence or non-existence of male circumcision still is an important factor in the relations between different ethnic groups in Kenya. The very low rate of inter-marriage, for example, between the Kikuyu and the Luo (who do not practice circumcision), can to a certain extent be attributed to this factor. ²⁰

The more directly political structures of traditional Kikuyu society were based on the system of age-grades and geographical divisions. For each relevant geographical unit the elders ("athuri") formed a

council which was responsible for the supervision of all important political, ceremonial and judicial matters affecting their area. The "kiama kia itora" (village council) and the "kiama kia rugongo" (council of the ridge, "district" in a narrower sense of the word) seem to have been the most important decision-making bodies in this respect. In addition there was a separate council of the members of the mwanake ("warrior") age-grade "kiama kia ita" (the "council of war"). However, this council could not decide over matters of war and peace by itself and the final responsibility remained with the athuri.

The members of each council of elders elected a spokesman and leader ("muthamaki") from among themselves choosing the one who was most respected for his experience and wisdom. Not rarely did it occur that a muthamaki became so well-known that his advice and arbitration were sought even by people outside his original sphere of jurisdiction. His functions should not be confused, however, with that of "chiefs" as they existed in other more hierarchically structured African societies. There were no special powers or privileges which distinguished the muthamaki in any way from the other elders. His influence was based purely on personal merit and could not be inherited or transferred by the incumbent in other ways.

With the arrival of the British, who sought to institute the system of "indirect rule" which they had already practiced in parts of West Africa, the position of a "chief"

was introduced. The powers of this office, however, rested solely on the backing of the colonial authorities, and appointment to the office did not require the consent of the local populace or the existing council of elders. Only in a few cases did the British happen to appoint men who were widely respected in their own communities (as, e.g., "Chiefs" Wang'ombe ²¹ or, somewhat later, Koinange), so that both sources of authority, the external and the indigenous ones, coincided.

The only important traditional social structure which has survived in present-day Kenya seems to be the extended family group, which still determines in many ways a person's allegiances, his group solidarity, and his behavior in general. This extended family does not necessarily coincide, however, with the former mbari. At any rate, as will be shown in more detail below, the extent and degree of primary group identification varies a great deal within and among the different ethnic groups and important changes in this respect are still taking place.

Social differentiation among the Kikuyu nowadays is increasingly determined by economic factors. At least four broad categories can be distinguished in the traditional homeland: First of all there are the "progressive" cash crop farmers with plot sizes above a certain minimum level, who under favorable world and national market conditions have significantly augmented their income and their general standard of living in recent years and who are now beginning

to form a kind of agricultural "bourgeoisie". This group comprises today about one-third of all farmers, i.e. about 30 % of the total rural Kikuyu population. Only about 1 % of them, however, can be termed "kulaks", i.e. "medium-scale" farmers who cultivate more than 10 ha in a modern market-oriented way and who may employ some additional labor from outside their own immediate family. Secondly, there are the "poor" farmers (about 60 % of the total population) who either are still pursuing a mostly subsistence-oriented type of farming, or, even if they are growing cash crops, have only very small plots for cultivation. The standard of living of this group has more or less remained the same in the last few decades, although their aspirations and therefore their relative dissatisfaction may have been growing. They can be counted among the "proletaroids" in Kenyan society.

Thirdly, there is the increasing number of totally landless Kikuyus who earn a meagre income as farm laborers and who constitute a true rural proletariat. It is difficult to quantify the exact size of this group, since it constitutes the major reservoir for the migration out of Central Province, particularly by young people. An estimate of about 5 % of landless Kikuyu in the home area probably comes close to reality. The fourth and final group consists of all those in primarily non-agricultural occupations in the rural areas (about 4 - 5 % altogether), whose numbers are also increasing and whose standard of living is rising. They form the

nucleus of both "old" and "new" non-agricultural middle classes in the countryside. This pattern of stratification is now cutting across older groupings and it increasingly determines the shape of internal Kikuyu conflicts. It has also become a factor on Kenya's national political scene.

Today all traditional forms of political organization have disappeared together with the system of age-sets and have been replaced by a centralized system of administration and the new political institutions of independent Kenya. The only modern organization which has exclusive Kikuyu membership (also including the related groups of the Embu and Meru) is the "Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru Association" (GEMA). In contrast to similar organizations among other groups, as, for example, the "Luyia Union" or the "Akamba Association" founded during the 1950s, GEMA only became active in the early 1970s. Although it claims to be purely a "tribal welfare organization" concerned with such matter as raising money for local Harambee projects, organizing sports events, etc., it is quite clear that GEMA, even more than similar organizations among the other groups, must be considered as a latent political party, ready to fight for the political interests of its members on an ethnic basis, if this should become necessary.

CHAPTER IV

THE KAMBA ¹General background and economy

The most important eastern neighbors of the Kikuyu are the Kamba.² Although these peoples are closely related in many ways, they form quite distinct social and political units, and exhibit a number of unique features which set them apart.

The main area of Kamba settlement descends in several steps towards the coast from a mountainous region in the west. In the southwest and south the borderline is formed by the Nairobi-Mombasa Railway which separates the Kamba from the Maasai, who live on the plains of Rift Valley Province. In the southeast the "Tsavo East National Park" limits the area of Kamba settlement. In the north the Embu living on the southern slopes of Mount Kenya are their closest neighbors, and in the east Kamba country ends in the vast unpopulated lowlands west of the Tana River. The altitude of the territory ranges between a level of 5,000 to 7,000 feet (1,500 to 2,100 m) in the hilly parts of the west to 1,000 to 3,000 feet (300 to 900 m) above sea level in the vast plains of the east and north, with the latter section constituting about two-thirds of the total area.

This lower area is interspersed with rock formations which are largely volcanic in origin.

The climate varies more or less according to the altitude. In the northwest the average temperatures are moderate and rainfall is generally sufficient, whereas the main part of Kamba country experiences mean annual temperatures of more than 80° Fahrenheit (about 25° Centigrade) and rainfall of less than 25 inches (625 mm). The annual rainy seasons are from March to May and from October to December, but in large parts of Ukambani the rains are insufficient or often (in three out of five years) completely lacking. With the exception of the Athi River, the streams and rivers of the area are dry during most of the year. Because of the insufficient and unreliable rainfall only 13.5 % of the total land area of 43,567 sq.km is arable. Most of this land is situated in the areas of high altitude in the northwest, whereas the other areas are mostly covered with dry bushland and thicket.

Ukambani was divided during colonial times into the two administrative districts of Machakos (originally: Masaku) in the west and Kitui in the east, which now belong to Kenya's Eastern Province. The Athi River constitutes the largest part of the borderline between the two districts. This division, however, is purely administrative in nature and does not reflect any deeper social distinctions going back to pre-colonial times, as was the case to a certain extent in Kikuyu country. Due to the differences in the agricultural potential of the two districts, differences in their

development exist as well. The regional variations of the dialects spoken in the different parts of Ukambani do not reflect any deeper social divisions.

In addition to the Kamba population in the Machakos and Kitui districts there are some Kamba who have settled in the neighboring Embu district (about 7,000) and in the Kwale (7,000) and Kilifi (3,000) districts of the Coast Province. In contrast to the more recent immigrants to other areas who usually pursue non-agricultural occupations in towns or are employed on large-scale farms, these people are small-scale agriculturalists who in most cases have been living in Embu, Kwale or Kilifi for a considerable period of time. Some of them have been driven from Kitui to the more fertile Embu area by the perennial droughts; others, mainly those at the coast, may be remnants of the earlier migrations of the Kamba people who supposedly once lived near the coast.

The mainstay of the Kamba economy is agriculture, although the people keep considerable numbers of livestock and are fond of hunting and collecting honey. Traditionally the main crops were sorghum, maize, and millet, but different varieties of peas and beans, sweet potatoes, yams and manioc were also grown. Today coffee, tea, pyrethrum and hybrid maize have been introduced as major cash crops in areas with sufficient rainfall (mostly in the northwest). Vegetables and fruit are also successfully grown, particularly in the area of the Mua Hills. An attempt has been made to raise cotton and sisal in some of the drier parts of Ukambani. In our sample

practically all of the agricultural respondents grew some maize, none of which was of the improved variety. Pulses were planted by most of them. These basic items of the daily diet are supplemented by some of the farmers with other local temporary crops such as yams or cassava and fruit. The most important cash crops are coffee (planted by about one-sixth of the respondents) and cotton (cultivated by about 10 %).

The main problem with all the agricultural activities in Ukambani is the lack of a regular water supply. As mentioned above, there is insufficient rainfall in large areas for three out of every five years, and people then see their freshly planted crops wither again and again, leading to periods of severe famine. During prolonged periods of drought some Kamba migrate, at least temporarily, to other areas where they seek help from more distant relatives and clan members. Others nowadays become entirely dependent on programs of famine relief, most of which are carried out by international donors. There have been efforts to dam the rivers, to drill water-holes, and to introduce artificial irrigation on a larger scale, but, apart from being very costly, these schemes in many instances have encountered serious problems. Bad maintenance of the installations and an overuse of land near the points of water supply have thwarted many efforts of this kind. Reservoirs often silted over a period of a very few years, and water-holes dried out during prolonged droughts. Frequently during long periods of

drought heavy clouds drift inland from the coast but do not shed their water until they reach the higher altitudes of the central mountain ranges. Perhaps a program of "cloud-seeding", successfully used in parts of Australia and the United States, would be feasible here.

Since depending on agricultural produce alone is precarious in many areas, the keeping of livestock assumes a relatively greater importance for the Kamba than for the Kikuyu. In addition to their land many Kamba families own a considerable number of cattle, sheep and goats. The number of cattle, usually the short-horned Zebu type, is also an important status symbol, and many social and economic transactions, including the payment of bride wealth, are carried out using cattle. Goats also serve many social and ceremonial functions. They are most numerous in the more arid parts of Ukambani, since, being browsers, they are relatively best adapted to the dry brushland there. None of our agricultural respondents possessed any grade cattle, but about 60 % had some local cattle. The great majority of the latter (about 75 %) owned less than 5 heads, none had more than 20. Milk was sold by only a few (about 15 %) and in rather small quantities (less than 5 liters per day on the average). About two thirds of the agricultural respondents possessed some goats, one-third had sheep; the numbers hardly ever exceeded 10 heads per owner. Three-fourths of the respondents had some chickens.

The social importance attached to the keeping of

livestock, particularly cattle, beyond their immediate economic value has at times led to severe overstocking with the ensuing problems of overgrazing and soil erosion in many parts of Ukambani. This problem became severe during the 1940s and 1950s when the colonial government introduced programs of compulsory de-stocking and soil conservation. Initially this was strongly resented by most Kamba. Today the situation has considerably improved after large-scale projects of land-terracing and other programs of water-control and soil conservation have been carried out and the necessity of such measures is better understood by the people. As far as the respective value of land and cattle is concerned the Kamba are in an intermediate position in comparison to some of the other ethnic groups in Kenya. Land and cattle constitute, of course, the bases of their material existence, but neither acquires the singular spiritual importance or determines the whole way of life, as, for example, land does among the Kikuyu or cattle among some of the pastoral groups.

The Kamba also used to be great hunters and were renowned for their skillful use of bows and (often poisoned!) arrows. There were some taboos, however, concerning the hunting of some kinds of animals by members of certain clans. Many families also kept their own beehives for honey and in this way added another important element to their diet.

The traditional pattern of settlement is similar to that of the Kikuyu, i.e. the Kamba live in individual homesteads (musyi, pl. misyi) which are scattered across the countryside.

In the drier parts of Ukambani these homesteads are somewhat more concentrated along rivers and other sources of water. The traditional land holding unit is the extended family (muvia, pl. mivia). Within the territory of each muvia individual plots of cultivated land (ng'undu) then are demarcated. The plot of land worked by one woman within a ng'undu is called mbee. Several mivia form a larger territorial unit, an utui (pl. motui), which can be compared to the Kikuyu ituura ("villages"). Each utui also has a common grazing ground (weu). Within the weu an area of exclusive grazing rights (kisesi, pl. isesi) can be established by special demarcation, when the elders of all concerned mivia consent.⁴ Only 15 % of the total land area has so far been consolidated and registered under the land reform program. This is the lowest percentage for all of the agricultural ethnic groups considered in this study. The average size of the farms is again rather small. In our sample three-fourths of the agricultural respondents cultivated less than 5 acres each, the rest had slightly more than that.

When the head of an elementary family dies his land and other possessions are inherited by his wives, each of them getting the piece of land she worked on. When the wife dies the land is passed on to her sons who have equal rights. A woman without a male heir can "adopt" a son, possibly from one of her co-wives, who then inherits her share. A sonless woman can also "marry" another woman, the sons of whom then become her heirs. In our sample about 50 % of the respondents

stated that their property would be inherited by their sons, of whom about one-third specified the eldest son. Another 35 % of the total said that all children would be their heirs, the rest either named someone else or did not know yet. A system of owner-tenant relationships, somewhat similar to that of the Kikuyu, can also be found among the Kamba. Since the shortage of land is not as severe a problem in Ukambani as in Kikuyu country, however, this system is of much less importance for the pattern of present-day rural stratification.

There are, of course, differences in the size of the farm and the number of cattle a single elementary family may own. But given the often quite precarious living conditions, these differences are relatively less pronounced among the Kamba than among the Kikuyu. A certain indication of the distribution of wealth in traditional Kamba society was the number of wives a man could "afford". Also in this respect it is quite evident that there were only relatively few people who could pay the bridewealth ("ngasia") for a second wife, most of them being "old and established" individuals.⁵ In our sample about one-fourth of the respondents reported that they lived in a polygamous household. The average household comprised between nine and ten persons altogether. About half of the agricultural respondents had an average cash family income of less than Kshs. 100.- per month, one-fourth earned between Kshs. 100.- and 200.-, the rest was in the Kshs. 200.- to 800.- income bracket.

The most important economic and social distinction nowadays is that between subsistence and cash crop farmers

in rural Kamba society. The magnitude of this distinction is indicated by the percentage of the cultivated area used for "pure" cash crops (approximately 20 %). This is considerably lower than in Kikuyu country, but somewhat higher than among the Luyia, Kalenjin, or Luo. Cash crop farming is, however, largely confined to the areas of high altitude and regular rainfall, most of which are located in the north-western parts of the Machakos District.

Agricultural "modernization" among the Kamba has largely been restricted so far to the climatically more favorable regions. Less than 20 % of the respondents had ever received some advice from the agricultural extension service, only a single respondent had attended a course at a farmers' training center, no respondent had ever received a loan for "development" purposes. Cattle-dips, on the other hand, were available for about three-fourths of the agricultural respondents. Two-thirds of those who did not yet have a title-deed for their land stated that they would like to have one. About 80 % of the land owners said that they were planning improvements in the near future, most of which consisted of the planting of new or better crops. Some also planned infra-structural improvements such as terracing; 70 % of this group said that they were thinking of buying or cultivating more land, about 50 % also thought of buying grade-cattle.

The traditional division of labor is based on sex and age, and is in this respect quite similar to that of the Kikuyu. Most of the daily household and agricultural work is

a task for the women, whereas tending the livestock, hunting, and bee-keeping are men's occupations. Similarly, there are only very few specialized economic roles in traditional Kamba society. Again the major exceptions are the smiths and medicine-men ("mundu mue", pl. "andu awe"). There is one great difference, however, which distinguishes the economy of the Kamba from that of the other indigenous Kenyan ethnic groups, namely their traditional involvement in all aspects of interterritorial trade. Even in precolonial times Kamba trading reached from the coast deep into the interior to what is today Lake Victoria and beyond, and south into present-day Tanzania. The most important commodity was ivory, but foodstuffs and occasionally slaves, who were captured from other ethnic groups, were also traded. Traditionally their main trading partners for exporting these goods were the Arabs and the Swahili-speaking peoples from the coast. Even today a considerable number of Kamba is engaged in trade and transport activities, which are of course of a more "modern" nature, as the operation of bus services, for example.

In modern times the economic activities of the Kamba, like those in other areas, have become more diversified. Today there are many more full-time craftsmen and businessmen in the rural areas. One craft the Kamba have become known for in the last few decades is the carving of wooden masks and sculptures. Although woodcarving does not have the same importance for dances and rituals in traditional Kamba society as it has among the Makonde of southern Tanzania or in parts

of present-day Zaire, the Kamba have quickly picked up the opportunity offered to them by the modern souvenir and tourist industry and produce all kinds of wooden objects in large numbers. In the public sector the Kamba are strongly represented in the police and armed forces. This goes back to colonial times, when the British preferred to recruit Kamba whom they considered to be good soldiers and who, moreover, were not involved in the Mau Mau activities as were the Kikuyu. Up to the present day there seems to be a certain preference among the Kamba for these occupations; a considerable number of them can still be found in the higher ranks of the Kenyan army. The general recruitment pattern today has become somewhat broader based, however, and the Kikuyu in particular have made considerable advances in recent years. ⁶

Social and political structures

The pattern of traditional social and political organization of the Kamba is in many aspects similar to that of the Kikuyu. The most basic horizontal division in Kamba society is that between different kinds of kinship groups, some of which are also geographically dispersed. In a vertical sense a system of age-sets and the corresponding social and political institutions are the dominant features of traditional Kamba society. There are, however, a number of variations between the Kikuyu and the Kamba system, concerning for example the number, size, internal coherence

and co-operation among these groups. This gives this pattern a somewhat different quality which can still be felt in present-day intræthnic and inter-ethnic relations.

The largest kinship group among the Kamba is the "mbai" ("clan"). Today in Ukambani there are about forty mbai, which vary in size and importance. ⁷ All mbai are patrilineal descent-groups and are named after a particularly outstanding common ancestor. Among the Kamba these clans are exogamous units. This contrasts with the mihiriga of the Kikuyu, where this aspect, probably because of the smaller number and larger size of the clans, has lost its importance. Each mbai, also in contrast to the Kikuyu mihiriga, had a certain totem, usually an animal, as its symbol. Each clan member had to observe certain taboos and rituals in this respect. If a clan member, for example, accidentally killed his totem animal or harmed it in any other way, he had to undergo ritual purification. Certain attributed characteristics of the totem animal, as they are described in the numerous and very popular animal stories, ⁸ were also believed to be typical for members of these clans. The Kamba system of totemic clans tends to support the interpretation by Durkheim and others ⁹ who regard the universality of these totems as an embodiment of the total cosmological reality as perceived by a people. Today this totemic aspect of the mbai has largely been lost and many Kamba cannot name their clan totem any more, ¹⁰ but all of our rural respondents were still able to give us the name of their clan.

Another difference in comparison with the Kikuyu is the relative uncertainty among the Kamba about the exact number of clans. This is probably due to the fact that all clans, at least in the view of their members, do not share the same mythological origin because the various descent groups apparently evolved at different points in time. This may also be an indication, at least at the most abstract level of mythological unity, of the differences in the sense of ethnic identity between the members of these two groups. On the other hand, the mbai of the Kamba today is a much more effective kind of social organization than the mihiriga of the Kikuyu. It is still a very relevant unit for common action, e. g. in some instances for the collection of money for mbai members to pay for studies overseas.¹¹ In this respect the mbai resembles the mbari of the Kikuyu, although the mbari is a smaller and geographically more concentrated unit.

In other respects the mbari can be better compared to the next smaller kinship unit among the Kamba, the "muvia" (pl. mivia). This term literally can be translated as "gate", which refers to the entrance in the stockade around the homesteads of several related elementary families and thus designates an extended three or four generation family. A muvia is the basic landholding unit of the Kamba. It plays a predominant role in all matters relating to the most important aspects of the everyday life of this group, including all major decisions concerning the agricultural production cycle,

questions of land use and inheritance, but also common sacrifices to the spirits of the ancestors, etc. A *muvia* also shares a shaded open space ("thome") outside the stockade where the men assemble in the evenings and discuss their daily affairs. A *mbari* of the Kikuyu thus falls, both in size and function, somewhere between the *mbai* and the *muvia* of the Kamba.

In a territorial sense the most basic unit in Ukambani is the *musyi* ("homestead"). This may comprise a single elementary family (i.e. husband and wife or wives, their children and sometimes the paternal grandparents), but also in some instances a whole *muvia*. A larger number of neighboring *misyi* then form an *utui* (pl. *motui*). This territorial unit may comprise members with different family and clan affiliations. It is also the most basic political unit in traditional Kamba society and shares a number of common institutions and a common place of worship ("ithembo").

The largest intra-ethnic territorial grouping among the Kamba is the *kivalo* (pl. *ivalo*), which comprises several *motui* and which in some ways is an equivalent to the Kikuyu "bururi" ("district"). Within the *kivalo* the greatest number of social interactions take place, including marriage. The *kivalo* also constitutes the territorial framework for the Kamba system of age-grades and age-sets and is the largest ceremonial entity for these purposes. In addition, it is the basic unit for the recruitment of warriors in traditional warfare. A *kivalo* has a common dancing ground and a common place of

worship for ceremonies which are relevant at this level.

In former times there were some occasional alliances between several ivalo, e.g. for purposes of warfare, but there were no permanent territorial or political institutions above this level extending to the whole of Ukambani.

Vertically, traditional Kamba society was divided by a system of age-grades and age-sets. This system shows many similarities to that of the Kikuyu along with some important differences. A male person, for example, for whom these distinctions were of greater social significance than for the female, went through the following major stages during his life: ¹²

Kakenge	baby boy	(up to two years of age, who is not weaned and cannot yet walk)
Kaana	small boy	(two to six years, who can walk)
Kivisi	uncircumcised boy	(about seven to thirteen years, who herds cattle and begins to learn other social roles)
Kamwana	circumcised boy	(about fourteen to sixteen years, puberty is not yet completed)
Mwanake	warrior	(about seventeen to twenty-eight years, a fully grown adult)
Nthele	married adult with children	(about twenty-nine to forty-nine years)
Mutumia	elder	(fifty years and older, after his children have been circumcised).

Among the elders (atumia) a further distinction was made between the more junior members ("atumia ma kisuka") and

the more senior ones ("atumia ma nzama"). The senior members also constituted the highest political, judicial and ceremonial authority in the utui.

The transitions between all these grades were marked by biological changes during a person's lifetime, but also, and more important, by very distinct social criteria and rituals. The most dramatic of these initiation rites were again the acts of male and female circumcision. Among the Kamba circumcision was carried out in two distinct ceremonies which took place several years apart from each other. The first kind of circumcision ("nzaiko ila nini", literally: "small circumcision"), which included the actual physical operation, may have been carried out at an age of only five or six years. The second circumcision ("nzaiko ila nene", "big circumcision"), which was socially the more important one, took place when a person reached puberty and again involved a series of elaborate rites and ceremonies. But in contrast to the Kikuyu, who did not practice a "small circumcision", no major physical operation was required at this point.

These circumcision ceremonies were carried out yearly, usually in the longer dry season, approximately between July and October. There were no "closed periods" of several years between these ceremonies, as for example among the Kikuyu and the Maasai, so that the corresponding "age-sets" among the Kamba were much less pronounced and were not named in any particular way. There was also no system of "generation-

sets" among the Kamba as was the case for the Kikuyu. In our sample most of the Kamba respondents were not able, irrespective of their age, to indicate their age-set membership.

The traditional political institutions of the Kamba incorporated the system of age-sets within the described geographical units. The most important institution was a council of elders. At the utui level, which in turn was the most important geographical unit, it was called nzama. The secular authority of the elders was based on their experience and wisdom, particularly in judicial matters, but this secular authority was also transcended to a certain extent by religious beliefs. As one observer puts it: "The community thought of an old person as having transhuman capacities - near to the deity by age and wisdom." ¹³ Traditionally some of the elders who were particularly respected for their judicial wisdom were called "asili". Sometimes these were even requested to judge a matter occurring outside of their own utui.

In addition to these judicial functions the atumia ma nzama also acted as the main decision-making body in other matters affecting the traditional community. This included decisions on the waging of war, which usually consisted of cattle raids on groups of the neighboring Maasai. In this case some experienced war leaders were also selected. The actual raids were then carried out by members of the anake (warrior) and sometimes nthele (young married men) age-grades.

In traditional society these age-grades, sometimes together with the more junior elders (atumia ma kisuka), also carried out other decisions of the nzama. This might have included the impounding of property of someone who had been found liable to pay compensation for an act which violated traditional norms. To continue the analogy these age-grades may also be called the executive branch of traditional Kamba government. It should be noted, however, that decisions of this kind never affected the ethnic group as a whole and that there were no centralized institutions in traditional Kamba society which would make actions at this level possible.

Today the political and social institutions of the Kamba have also changed, of course. The authority of the council of elders was superseded and then replaced, at first by colonial institutions and then by the modern political structures of independent Kenya. Whereas, for a time at least, the judicial services of the elders were still sought in certain matters, these have practically ceased today at the official level. The corresponding system of age-sets has also lost much of its significance. To a certain extent more "modern" criteria of formal educational achievements or of a person's economic position have replaced older criteria in the status hierarchy. Circumcision, in the sense of the actual physical act, is still carried out, but it has become almost completely a private affair involving only close relatives and friends. The actual operation is nowadays often performed in hospitals. Again, as among the Kikuyu, the

institution of male circumcision seems to survive in modern times, although it has largely been deprived of its social function. Female circumcision, on the other hand, seems to be on the decline. It is still more frequent among the Kamba than among the Kikuyu, particularly in the more remote and economically less developed areas.

Two other institutions have been adapted somewhat more successfully to modern times. One is the *mbai* as the major unit for more large-scale family actions, when mutual support is sought for certain purposes. The other is the *utui* as the still most relevant arena for communal action ("*mwethya*") which cuts across kinship ties. Nowadays these are concerned, for example, with Harambee projects and similar matters.¹⁴ The modern system of economic and social stratification has largely superseded the older structures as has been described for the Kikuyu. As yet, however, the pattern of the emerging "class" stratification is less pronounced among the Kamba than among the Kikuyu. The number of cash crop farmers, for example, and of other members of the "old" and "new" middle classes is not as high. The number of totally landless people, on the other hand, is far less significant than among the Kikuyu.

A modern social and, implicitly, also political organization was the "Akamba Association" which was founded in the mid-1950s. This group consisted mostly of Nairobi-based Kamba working in modern non-agricultural occupations and of government-appointed chiefs in the rural areas. One of its

main functions was to reassure the colonial government of the "loyalty" of this group of Akamba during the "Mau Mau"-disturbances. In the early 1960s this organization was superseded by the "New Akamba Union". It soon became a springboard for aspiring politicians of different factions in the framework of pre- and post-independence national politics. This is still one of its main functions. In addition it serves as one of Kenya's most important "tribal welfare associations" in carrying out various social activities.

CHAPTER V

THE MIJIKENDA ¹General background and economy

The "Miji Kenda" (literally: "Nine Towns" ² or "tribes") form the largest cluster of ethnic groups in the Coast Province of Kenya. Altogether they comprised about 520,000 members at the time of the last census in 1969. Other major African Peoples, which are part of the "Coastal" cluster of Bantu language groups, ³ include the Taita (104,000 in 1969), the Pokomo (33,000), the Taveta (6,000) and the Boni (4,000). In addition there are the "mixed" groups of the 26,000 Bajun and the 8,000 Swahili proper ⁴ who are the main representatives of the "Swahili culture". ⁵ The Bajun are clearly of African descent but prided themselves in former times on their "Arab" origin. The third ethnic element in the coastal area are the "immigrant" groups of 24,000 "Arabs" (90 % of whom are Kenyan citizens) and 42,000 "Asians" (60 % citizens). Again, particularly in the case of the Arabs, the distinction between the indigenous and the foreign elements is not very clear-cut; in the course of many centuries a good deal of intermarriage and intercultural exchanges has occurred between these groups.

The available secondary material on many of the coastal

ethnic group is rather scant and to deal adequately with all of them in our field research would have exceeded our limited resources by far. For this reason we limit our presentation here to the "Mijikenda" peoples. This group is far less homogenous than some of the other peoples treated in this study and it has been subject to a long history of diverging external influences. The picture which emerges is therefore much more varied and less distinct than that of the other groups presented here.

The Mijikenda (formerly called "Nyika", because they live in the coastal hinterland, Swahili: "nyika") consist of nine distinct sub-groups: the Giriama ⁶ (about 200,000 people), the Duruma and Digo (about 100,000 each), the Rabai and Chonyi (who number between 20,000 and 30,000), and the Kambe (not to be confused with the Central Bantu group of the Kamba!), Kauma, Ribe and Jibana, who all have less than 10,000 members each. ⁷ Their languages are closely related and, to a large extent, mutually understandable. This is also the case with Swahili, the native language of the "Swahili" proper, which is also the lingua franca of all coastal groups and, in somewhat simplified forms, of most up-country multi-ethnic settlements. Linguistically the Mijikenda are more closely related to the cluster of the "Central Bantu" in Kenya than the latter are to the "Western Bantu", for example the Luyia or the Kisii. ⁸ The relationship to the other Bantu groups of Coast Province (Taita, Pokomo, etc.) is also close, although they all quite clearly have

their own identity. The differentiation of "the nine" from the other coastal groups is, therefore, a matter of degree, but their similarities (and their awareness of them!) are sufficiently large to justify their grouping together in a category of their own.

The Mijikenda groups inhabit a belt of land beyond the immediate coastal strip, which before 1890 had been under the rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar. These former political and legal boundaries did not necessarily coincide in all places with the area of settlement of the indigenous peoples. In fact some Mijikenda groups, such as the Digo, also had some settlements on the coast. On the average, the area inhabited by the Mijikenda is about 30 to 40 miles wide and reaches from the Tanzania border (south of which another related group, the Segeju are living) to the settlements north of the Sabaki River. Its average altitude lies between 60 and 300 m (200 to 1,000 feet) but it also includes some higher elevations such as the Shimba Hills (420 m). The soils are generally fertile, but the actual agricultural potential is determined by the average amount of rainfall which becomes very scarce inland. Thus only 16 % of the total area can be said to be of high agricultural potential, which means that there are only 0.72 ha of high potential land equivalents per person in the Mijikenda home area. There are two main rainy seasons (April to Juni and October and November), but the reliability of the rainfall varies a great deal. In a large part of the territory the necessary minimum

of 30 inches or 762 mm is not even reached in one or two out of every five years.⁹ In such years the crops fail, showing the precarious living conditions of a good part of this population, not unlike those in the drier parts of Ukambani. There are very few permanent, but quite a number of seasonal rivers. The climate is very hot and, especially nearer to the coast, quite humid.

Of "the nine", the Digo live in the southern-most part of this territory, relatively close to the coast. Farther inland and extending farther north, but still mostly within the modern administrative division of "Kwale" District, is the settlement area of the Duruma. "Kilifi" District, which today is the other main administrative unit, is inhabited (north of the Duruma) by the Rabai and then farther north, reaching the border of the territory of Mijikenda settlements, by the largest group, the Giriama. Between these two groups and the coastal plains live the five smaller sections of the Ribe, Jibana, Kambe, Chonyi, and Kauma (in this order from south to north). About 87 % of all Mijikenda still live in their original home area, and less than 6 % live outside of Coast Province. The population density of 25 persons per sq.km is relatively low, but it must be taken into account that a considerable part of the country consists of scrub and grasslands. More than 3 % of the population in the home area live in towns of more than 2,000 people, which is the highest rate for any ethnic group in Kenya and which, in part, reflects the traditionally more compound pattern of

settlement of this group.

All Mijikenda peoples are basically agriculturalists, but, to a varying degree, the keeping of livestock, hunting, and fishing near the coast also supplement their diet. The main food crops are maize, millet, beans and cassava. In the better-watered areas mangoes, oranges, bananas and other fruit are grown. Cashew-nuts are the most important source of cash. But the most characteristic plant for the climatically more favored parts of the Coast Province is the coconut tree, which provides its owners with almost all necessities of daily life. The trunk is used as building material, the branches for thatching. The coconut itself can serve both as food and drink and also becomes a ready source of cash in the form of copra, from which coconut oil is extracted. In addition, skillful tappers produce "palm-wine" ("tembo") from the natural juices of the tree which ferment overnight and render a good-tasting, quite intoxicating liquor. Not surprisingly, therefore, the more fertile parts of Coast Province have sometimes been referred to as a second Garden of Eden where most of the pleasant things in life can be obtained with very little effort. In reality, however, the paradisaic areas are limited and, today, very heavily populated, so that only a few people can still enjoy a more leisurely way of life.

Altogether today about one-fifth of the total cultivated area is devoted to "pure" cash crops. This figure is somewhat higher than the one for most other parts of

Kenya, but it is still considerably lower than the corresponding percentage for Kikuyu country. Coconuts, however, are used partly for sale and partly for subsistence. If they are included in the list of cash crops the figure becomes the highest for all of Kenya. In our sample about half the farmers grew maize (all of which was of the "unimproved" variety), and one-third cultivated other local temporary crops as cassava for subsistence. Approximately 50 % possessed coconut palms, 30 % produced cashew-nuts, and about 20 % planted different kinds of fruit.

A number of Mijikenda groups is said to have possessed large herds of cattle and other livestock in former days. But these were allegedly depleted by Maasai raids¹⁰ and no new herds have been built up since that time. The Duruma are the only group among the nine for whom the keeping of cattle is still of some importance. They also supply milk for Mombasa.¹¹ The Digo and Giriama raise only sheep, goats and chickens. In our sample only one respondent owned a few heads of local cattle, but he did not sell any milk. About 20 % of the agricultural respondents possessed some goats (about 5 on the average), a little more than half of them had some chickens. Fishing along the coast, with small traditional fishing boats in much the same way as it is done by the Arabs and Swahilis, is an important part of the Digo economy. The Giriama catch fish in some of the inland lakes and streams and are good at trapping game.

In contrast to all other agricultural peoples of Kenya

who live in homesteads scattered over the countryside, more centralized forms of settlement can be found among most Mijikenda groups. Two types must be distinguished: the "kaya", traditionally a fortified tribal center, and the "mudzi", a more common kind of village.¹² The kaya, of which each of the nine has at least one, are situated on hill-tops and were formerly surrounded by stockades. They served as a major center of the economic, political and religious activities of each group and included the tribal council house ("moro"), the council houses of the clans ("nyanda"), and the shrine of the tribal emblems. They also contained a cultivated area, and the graves of the elders were placed within the enclosure. In this way the Mijikenda groups were able to defend themselves against intruders from the sea and the coastal strip who raided them for food and slaves. Today the stockades have disappeared and except for some ritual purposes the kaya has lost most of its original functions. The "mudzi", on the other hand, still serve a number of groups as centers of settlement and often include both agriculturalists and fishermen (for example among the Digo on the coast). They often contain several hundred people, sometimes even more than a thousand.

The pattern of land tenure in the coastal area has been influenced by its particular historical development. When the British Protectorate over the coastal strip was established, the individual property rights of the former subjects of the Sultan of Zanzibar were respected and their

land was registered under individual "free-hold" titles. The rest of the territory was deemed to be "Crown Land". At the time of independence the individual property rights in this area again were explicitly recognized and guaranteed in the constitution. Thus a number of larger estates comprising a total area of about 40,000 ha., most of which is still owned by people of "Arab" descent, can be found along the coast. The "Crown Land" was converted to "State Land" and the former "Native Land Units" which covered the main areas of Mijikenda settlement further inland were now entrusted to the local County Councils. ¹³ Within these units the traditional forms of land tenure have persisted to a certain extent, but they have also been influenced to a varying degree by Muslim laws of land ownership. Thus among the more Islamized groups of the Mijikenda, as e. g. the Digo, the Muslim law of individual free-hold property prevails today and land can be bought or sold freely by any individual or single family.

In the less Islamized parts of Mijikenda country the whole "tribe" was traditionally the main land-holding unit and the respective tribal boundaries were quite clearly defined. This was in contrast to the pattern among the more numerous up-country peoples where clans and other sub-groups often were the owners of the land. Within the territory of each group each individual or family could clear and cultivate unused land over which they then had exclusive occupation rights ("mani"). If, in the pattern of shifting cultivation so common in the past, a site was cultivated which previously

had been somebody's garden ("munda") the permission of the previous occupant had to be obtained and a certain fee was usually paid. If permanent crops had been planted on a piece of land these became the inheritable property of a family, the land as such, however, could not be sold. In the same way each single coconut or mango tree had its specific owner, even where no particular pattern of planting was apparent to an outsider. In addition to the cultivated gardens and the fallow lands ("shamba"), there was open grassland ("vuwe") which could be used by all members of the group. 14

Inheritance among the Digo and Duruma traditionally was by the nearest matrilineal relatives, i.e. the eldest sibling or half-sibling by the same mother or, more commonly, their children. Thus a Digo often inherited property from his mother's brother or sister. In the northern groups a system of male primogeniture seems to have been the rule, but the information available on this point is inadequate. In our sample, more than 50 % of the respondents indicated that their property would one day be inherited by their children in equal parts, whereas another 25 % specified the eldest son. This difference does not seem to be related, however, to the membership in any of the particular sub-groups of the Mijikenda or to Islam.

The program of land consolidation and registration which has been initiated in the 1950s in other parts of Kenya has also been introduced in Kwale and Kilifi districts.

However only about 17 % of the land, most of it apparently in the former 10-mile strip, has been registered. This represents one of the lowest figures for any area. The average farm sizes are also quite small. There are no official figures available for this part of the country, but in our sample no respondent owned more than ten acres of land; by far the majority had even less than five acres each. In this respect the degree of rural stratification is not as pronounced for the Mijikenda as, for example, for the Kikuyu. The level of modernization also does not seem to vary as much among the individual Mijikenda farmers as it does among the Kikuyu.

None of our respondents had ever taken part in a course at a farmers' training center or received extension advice or a loan for purposes of agricultural development. None of them possessed a title-deed for his land and apparently hardly anyone cared much about getting one. About one-third of the agricultural respondents said that they planned some improvements in the future (which was the lowest figure for all the agricultural groups), but they were rather vague when they were asked to specify. About one-fourth said that they were thinking of buying some more land or cattle sometime. 70 % of the agricultural respondents reported a monthly average cash income of less than Kshs. 100.-, 25 % made between Kshs. 100.- and 200.-, and only very few earned more than that.

In the area of the former 10-mile strip a stratum

of squatters exists on farms which are under individual freehold ownership, but which often have been neglected or abandoned by their legal owners. Altogether there are about 12,000 squatter families in Kwale and Kilifi Districts, most of whom probably belonging to the Mijikenda groups. Although there have been some attempts to settle these people in a permanent way, no solution has yet been found for the majority of them. 15

The division of labor in the traditional Mijikenda societies was, as among the other Kenyan peoples, based on sex and age. The women did most of the household work and cultivated their small agricultural plots. The men were responsible for fishing or hunting, and looking after livestock, cutting coconuts or tapping palm-wine. In contrast to most of the up-country peoples there was, however, even in traditional society, a greater number of specialized economic roles. In particular there is a long tradition of craftsmanship among these peoples which undoubtedly is also a result of their long history of contact with the outside world. The most common crafts were carpentry, smithery, mat-making and pottery. The latter two were usually performed by women. The percentage of the Mijikenda respondents who reported that they were earning some additional income in this way was the highest for all the ethnic groups considered here. There was a constant trade of cloth, food, spices, and agricultural implements between the inland ("nyika") peoples and their Swahili and Arab neighbors. Following the example

of the Swahilis and Arabs, some groups such as the Digo and Duruma also kept slaves for their agricultural and household work. A slave was, however, allowed to own property and marriages between slave girls and free men were also quite common. 16

In summing up the economic situation of the Mijikenda we can thus say that many of the more "modern" developments in Kenya still have largely bypassed this group. This is true also for the modern tourist business along the coast which, even in its purely occupational aspects, has provided more income opportunities for people coming from outside of the area than for local residents. One future chance may lie, for example, in the growing of more fruits and vegetables to satisfy the demands of the nearby Mombasa market and the tourist resorts, or even in the commercial use of palm-wine, if some suitable method for its preservation can be found. Another opportunity may be the growing of cloves and other spices, for which Zanzibar and the adjacent islands have so far been able to maintain their (quite lucrative!) monopoly. It seems that in order to realize possibilities of this kind, a change of both the prevailing attitudes and the infra-structural conditions, in particular adequate roads and water supplies, but also educational facilities and health services will be required.

Social and political structures

The traditional society of the Mijikenda peoples was organized by a number of clans and smaller descent groups in a "horizontal" direction, and a system of age-grades and age-sets in a vertical sense. This pattern of stratification is, however, less clear-cut than for the other major ethnic groups in Kenya. There is a good deal of variation among "the nine", and a certain confusion in the terminology, for instance between "tribes" ("kabila"), "clans" (Digo: "mafuko") and "lineages" (Giriama: "mbari"). This is reflected in the relatively sparse literature on this subject,¹⁷ and in a certain overlapping of clan-names between some of the groups, which may be a result of their common migration from "Shungwaya". Moreover, the original social and political structures have, to a certain extent, been superseded by certain external powers of the ruling Arab and Swahili families on the coast. In this respect the influence of Islam has also been felt, particularly among the southern groups.

There are six clans among the Digo and Giriama, five among the Kauma and Kambe, four among the Rabai, Ribe, Jibana, and Chonyi, and three among the Duruma. The more relevant units, however, which are also the smallest effective exogamous groups, are the "lineages", which in most groups are called "mbari".¹⁸ There are 26 lineages among the Giriama, 20 among the Duruma and Kambe, 18 among the Rabai,

16 among the Kauma, 14 among the Jibana and 13 among the Chonyi. For the Digo and Ribe no specific numbers are mentioned in the available literature. A certain degree of caution must be taken, however, in evaluating the figures for the other groups, since there seems to have been some changes over time in these numbers. There is also a certain degree of overlapping from tribe to tribe, at least as far as the names of some of these groups are concerned. All lineages in this sense are agnatic descent groups, which determine the most important kinship relations and all ensuing social rights and obligations. Among the Digo, Duruma and Rabai there are also parallel matrilineal groups, the function of which is mostly restricted to questions concerning inheritance and certain judicial and marriage affairs. 19

In most groups each clan traditionally had its own "council-house" or "club-house" (Giriama: "nyonga") which was located in the "kaya" and which was used for important social, political and ceremonial purposes. The Mijikenda clans are not totemic, in contrast to some of the other ethnic groups in Kenya, but in some of them there are certain taboos concerning the killing of animals such as the hyena ("fisi"). Today these institutions, together with the "kaya" (at least in its physical, fortified form) have largely disappeared; some of the other functions of the clan also seem to be diminishing. Only about three-fourths of our Mijikenda respondents, for example, were

able to indicate their clan affiliation, which is the lowest figure for all groups in our sample. A major factor which seems to account for this rather low percentage is the Muslim religion of about half of the respondents.

Below the lineage other groupings with varying degrees of kinship exist, the socially most relevant of which are the "extended families" (in some groups called "nyumba", literally: "house") which generally combine the closest relatives over a span of about three generations. The smallest unit is the homestead (Giriama: "mudzi") which comprises the head of the homestead ("mwenye mudzi") and his wife or wives together with their children, and possibly some of his younger brothers who may also be married, or some already married sons with their immediate families. The homestead is also the smallest geographical unit of residence. Beyond the homestead, kinship ties influence the pattern of residence to a varying degree among the Mijikenda groups. Whereas among the Digo "extended families" and even "lineages" live together in the same locations or "villages" (also called "mudzi" by the Digo, but usually larger than the Giriama ones), these kinship groups are dispersed over a larger area among the Giriama.²⁰ "Villages" in the wider sense are often loose clusters of neighboring homesteads without any particular boundaries or functions setting them apart. A more relevant geographical unit is the "district" (Digo: "lalo", pl. "malalo"), which should not, however, be confused with the modern administrative division of this

name. It is still a rather small geographical unit which corresponds approximately to the size of today's "sub-locations". Thus one author counted, for example, at least 64 "malalo" among the Giriama. ²¹

The vertical social division among the Mijikenda is, as among many other ethnic groups in Kenya, characterized by a system of age-grades, age-sets and successive "generations". There is some variation in this pattern among the "nine", but some of the more general aspects seem to be similar among all of them. Thus among the Giriama, for example, a male person goes through ten different "grades" during his lifetime from early childhood ("uhoho") to the rank of senior elder ("mhere a fisini"). There is a somewhat parallel system for females, which is, however, of less significance. The entering of each successive stage is accompanied by initiation-rites and the payment of a fee (usually goats which are used during the ceremony). The most important steps in this ladder of social rank are those between childhood and adulthood ("habasi", which consists of four distinct grades) and between the last grade of "habasi" ("kivao") and the council of elders ("kambi"), which consists of two different grades, a junior ("waya") and a more senior one ("fisi"). All those who have been circumcised together during this life-cycle (both male and female circumcision were traditionally practiced) form an age-set ("rika", pl. "marika"). Each age-set is given a specific name. Among the Giriama, for instance, there are thirteen

fixed names for the age-sets of thirteen successive years, after which these names are repeated in the same order. After this period of thirteen years the ruling group of elders hands over its power to the next one, so that this year marks a major change in the government of the people. An even more important change occurs after a period of approximately forty years when three of these successive ruling groups are given a common "generation"-name which sets them apart from previous and following generations.

Today this system of age-grades and age-sets has also undergone considerable changes and many of its original functions have been reduced or have disappeared altogether. Thus, only one-fifth of the Mijikenda respondents reported membership in a particular age-set, which is much less than, for example, among the rural Kikuyu (45 %), or among the Kalenjin and Maasai where practically 100 % identified themselves in this way. Circumcision still seems to be widely practiced, although, as among most of the other ethnic groups in Kenya, it has largely become a private affair. Instead, the "vertical" social stratification is increasingly characterized by economic factors, as among the other groups. A differentiation between successful and still "accumulating" cash crop farmers and those who only produce for their own subsistence can be observed. This process is, however, still less pronounced in this area than, for example, in Kikuyu country or the more "developed" parts of Machakos District. It is noteworthy

that in this process, at least in a period of transition, some of the old customs like the payment of bridewealth and funeral expenditures take on a new significance in light of these economic differentiations. Some functions of the elders have also been strengthened.²² As long as an official registration is not yet available in this part of the country, for instance, they are needed as witnesses for transactions of land and other property, in particular palm trees.

The traditional political structure of the Mijikenda was also more varied than that of other Kenyan ethnic groups and both "egalitarian-segmentarian" and more "authoritarian" elements can be found together, some influenced by external factors, in a form unique in Kenya. Thus at least some Mijikenda groups (as for example the Digo) claim to have been ruled by a paramount chief or king ("mfalme") before their departure from Shungwaya. It is not quite clear whether this applies to other groups as well, but in any case in more recent times the "segmentarian-egalitarian" ("gerontocratic") elements, which we also know from other Kenyan peoples, prevailed. In this system authority was traditionally placed in the elders of each larger regional unit who formed a council (Digo: "mngaro", Duruma: "moro", Giriama: "kambi") and who performed the most important judicial and other public decision-making functions. From each of these councils usually three most senior or most respected elders were selected who were called "akambi

a mvaya" ("chiefs of the elders") among the Duruma, "enyetsi" ("possessors of the land") among the Giriama, or just "jumbe" (chief) by some other groups. In this sense a more centralized system of government existed, but for most groups this did not comprise the entire "tribe" and was, at the highest level, either confined to the district ("lalo") or the area controlled by a single "kaya".²³

In addition to their internal political structures, some Mijikenda groups have been subject to the overrule of certain Arab or Swahili families living in Mombasa, the heads of which were considered as the "sheikhs" of these peoples. They received regular tribute and exercised what was called by one author a "fictitious suzerainty".²⁴ These sheikhs also provided, however, a certain protection from other outside influences and, when a succession in office occurred, they in turn had to be recognized by their respective groups and to make specific payments to them. When the ruling Mazrui family in Mombasa was replaced by the Said-Said dynasty from Zanzibar in the last century this system of external overrule seems to have lost much of its significance, and at least the payment of tribute was stopped at this time.

Political activities among the Mijikenda²⁵ during the period leading to Kenya's independence were rather restrained, particularly if they are compared with those of the Kikuyu or groups like the Luo. Some "tribal welfare unions", such as the "Digo Welfare Association", the "Young

Duruma Association", or the "Mijikenda Union" were founded in the late 1940s and early 1950s, but they do not seem to have reached a large following in the rural areas at this time. Most "Coast politics" centered around Mombasa, where different factions mainly based on racial (i.e. Arab and Asian) or ethnic allegiances (confronting Africans from the Mijikenda groups with those from up-country, particularly Kamba, Kikuyu and Luo) were vying for influence in the pre-independence negotiations with the colonial authorities. In 1960 the "Coast African Political Union" (CAPU) was founded as an instrument to represent the interests of Coastal Africans. Soon after its inception CAPU merged with some of the other political organizations, mainly from the Rift Valley and Western Province, to form the "Kenya African Democratic Union" (KADU). This party merged with KANU in 1964. Since then there has been no separate political organization to articulate the interests of the Mijikenda. The original "Mijikenda Union" is still in existence, but is of relatively little actual significance compared with, for instance, GEMA, the "New Akamba Union" or the "Luo Union".

CHAPTER VI

THE LUYIA ¹General background and economy

The Luyia ² form the largest cluster of Bantu-speaking peoples in western Kenya. Together with the Kisii (700,000) and the Kuria (60,000) they belong to the group of the "Western Bantu" in Kenya, which is linguistically further removed from the "Central" and "Coastal Bantu", but which has some closer linguistic "relatives" (e.g. the Soga and Ganda) in neighboring Uganda. A statement of this kind does not imply, however, that any feelings of a common "identity" or common political interests and affiliations exist between the "Western Bantu" of Kenya and their neighbors in Uganda. Even in pre-colonial times contacts between these groups were rather limited. The colonial power drew a largely arbitrary borderline between them, but subsequent events, in particular the contrasting political developments in their respective countries after independence, have set them apart even further. A secession of some of these groups in one direction or another seems therefore highly unlikely. In any case, President Amin's claims in February 1976 for a change of the borderline in Uganda's favor met with strong resistance. ³

The alternative he could offer was, indeed, not very attractive.

The "Luyia" are not as homogenous a group as, for example, the Kikuyu or Kamba. On the other hand, their "sub-tribes" (often called "ehili", pl. "edzihili") have more in common than the different groups of the "Kalenjin" and a feeling of common identity has started to develop among them in the last few decades. The largest of the eighteen subgroups living in Kenya are the Bukusu (230,000) ⁴ who live on the southern slopes of Mount Elgon in the north of Luyia country, the Maragoli (120,000), Bunyori (96,000), Kisa (55,000) and Marama (48,000) who live in the southernmost part of the area, the Wanga (80,000) who inhabit the center, and the Kabras (74,000), Isukha (73,000), Tiriki (56,000) and Idakho (52,000) who reside in the eastern regions of the territory. The other groups are all smaller and have between 20,000 and 45,000 members each. In addition there are three Luyia sub-tribes who live across the border in Uganda, the Bagisu, Banyuli and Bagwere, together with a part of the Samia who live on both sides of the border. Altogether these related groups in Uganda have about 500,000 members today.

The traditional area of Luyia settlement lies between the southern slopes of Mount Elgon and the easternmost part of Lake Victoria (north of the "Kavirondo Gulf", today: "Winam Gulf"). It reaches from the Nandi Escarpment in the east to the Malaba and Sio Rivers in the west along a large section of the Uganda border. In the south there is no clear natural border dividing the Luyia and their southern

neighbours, the Luo, who inhabit the shores of Lake Victoria as well as an area reaching between ten and sixty kilometers inland. Most of the territory lies at an altitude of between 1,200 and 1,800 m (4,000 to 6,000 ft.) and slowly descends from north to south and from east to west. The whole forms an undulating plain with only a few more conspicuous elevations. A remarkable feature of the area are the sometimes huge granite boulders which are scattered over the countryside. The whole territory is cut by many permanent streams and rivers which eventually all flow into Lake Victoria. The surface consists mainly of the very fertile red lateritised volcanic soil and the somewhat less fertile red, pink, or gray soils formed on granite. Rainfalls are sufficient (more than 1,000 mm. in most areas) and regular. Although the rainy seasons are not marked as clearly as in other parts of Kenya, the main periods of rainfall are between March and June and between October and December. Thus the area is well suited for almost all kinds of food and industrial crops (except those requiring a higher altitude like pyrethrum); for many of them two harvests per year are possible.⁵ In contrast to most other areas of Kenya mining also played a certain role for a short period. In the 1930s gold deposits were discovered near Kakamega and a miniature "gold-rush" set in at that time. The mine was, however, soon exhausted and all other findings of ores and minerals in this region have so far proved to be completely uneconomical.

Administratively, the whole of Luyia country (except

for a tiny section in the Siaya district of neighboring Nyanza Province) is today part of Kenya's "Western Province" which was formed from the "Elgon Nyanza" and "North Nyanza" districts after independence. The area is divided into the three districts of Bungoma, Busia, and Kakamega with the town of Kakamega as provincial capital. Not all of Western Province is, however, inhabited by Luyia groups. Luo (about 6,000) and the "Southern Nilotic" Teso (62,000) also live in Busia District, and in Bungoma District near Mount Elgon some smaller Kalenjin groups (about 32,000 people altogether) have settled.

The total Luyia population is growing at an average rate of 3.6 % p.a., but in some of the rural areas this figure is as high as 4.0 % which is among the highest in the world and near the "biological maximum". This extremely high rate of growth has led to a very unfavorable age-distribution. More than 55 % of the population is less than 16 years old, representing the highest proportion of this age group for any part of Kenya. In the total home area of 8,200 sq. km the population density is 161 persons per sq. km. In some parts, such as in North Maragoli in Kakamega District, the most crowded location, it reaches 545 persons per sq. km. This is one of the highest rates for any rural area in the world and can only be compared, for example, to some parts of Bangla Desh. The rate of urbanization of 0.80 %, on the other hand, is the lowest for all of Kenya's provinces so that practically all people

have to earn their living from agriculture. There are only 0.63 ha. of arable land per person in this territory which represents one of the lowest figures in Kenya. 42 % of all farms have less than two hectares, many of them consist of just one acre or less. Since the growth of the population is continuing almost unabatedly so far, it is clear that the "maximum land-holding capacity" will very soon be reached, in some areas the population is already well beyond this level.

Not surprisingly, therefore, Luyia country is also the area with the highest rate of out-migration in Kenya and 20 % of all Luyia today live outside their region of origin. The main thrust of this migration is directed toward the big city centers of Nairobi and Mombasa, but the chances of useful employment there are very limited in the long run. Even if some Luyia were given a chance to participate in some of the (quite limited!) settlement programs in Rift Valley Province or at the Taná River, migration alone is obviously no solution to the problems of the area. In former times in situations of extreme overcrowding (or under external pressure) people could move to other less inhabited areas and, indeed, the history of most African peoples tells of many migrations. But since international borderlines have been "frozen" by the colonial powers and interior areas of settlement have been quite clearly demarcated, no such outlet seems to be possible on a large scale. Thus most of the traditional

sparsely populated Maasai grazing grounds, for example, which in some parts are also of high agricultural potential, have been preserved so far; the rights of the Maasai in the high-potential land in the immediate vicinity of Kisii district, another most highly populated area in Kenya, are still respected by the Kenyan government.

The Luyia are mainly agriculturalists, but they also keep cattle, sheep and goats. They also do some hunting when the opportunity arises, though this has become less frequent nowadays. There is a certain difference in emphasis between the southern and the northern (e. g. Bukusu) groups; the former depend to a much larger degree on agriculture, whereas the latter keep more livestock. Traditionally, the main crops were sorghum, finger-millet, beans, peas, sweet potatoes and bananas. Today maize has become the staple food crop and some cash crops such as sugarcane and, in a few places, cotton and coffee are also grown. In our sample practically all of the agricultural respondents grew some maize, about a third of which was of the "improved" variety. The other main food crops were finger-millet (or "eleusine"), beans and local temporary crops (like yams and cassava), which were cultivated each by about one-fourth of the farmers. Sugarcane and coffee, as the main industrial crops, were planted by about one-sixth of them. Cultivation is still done mostly with the traditional hoe, but ox-drawn plows, the services of which can be hired by individual farmers, have become somewhat

more common in recent years.

The main constraints on any kind of agricultural development in Luyia country are the very high population density and the corresponding very small average farm sizes, so that almost all land has to be used for mere subsistence. This factor has also led to a reduction in the number of cattle held in the more densely populated areas, since formerly existing communal grazing grounds have largely disappeared. Another factor is that cattle are not needed so much for the payment of bridewealth anymore, since many of these transactions are conducted in cash today. Nevertheless, cattle still are an important asset; milk and, on rare occasions, beef are valuable parts of the diet.

About half of the agricultural respondents kept some local cattle, the majority of them possessed less than 5 heads each, only a few (mainly from the Bukusu area) had more than 10. Those who had more sold small amounts of milk (usually less than 5 liters a day). About one-fourth of the farmers possessed some goats and sheep, in most cases the total number was less than 5 per family. Chickens were quite popular. They were kept in small numbers by about 60 % of the agricultural respondents. The possibilities of more developed forms of "garden agriculture" (as practiced for example by many Kikuyu in the vicinity of Nairobi), are limited, even if the agricultural inputs and the know-how were available. The demand for fruits and vegetables from

the nearest major urban center, Kisumu, is not very high and can easily be satisfied by deliveries from its more immediate neighborhood. Communications are also relatively poor and although some major all-weather roads have been constructed in recent years, the necessary feeder roads are still mostly inadequate. The same limited marketing conditions apply, more or less, for dairy products and, because of the high cost, there are hardly any grade cattle in the area.

The situation is so extreme in some parts of Luyia country that the only "cash crop" available is the production of gravel from the granite boulders which can be found in many places. This is done, after the bigger boulders have been split up by the heat of a fire, by men sitting along the side of the road who crash the stones with big hammers until they have the size needed for road building or other construction work. Their product is then collected about once a week by a lorry from a construction company or a dealer in building materials. The average daily earnings of these men amount to about Kshs. 3.- (about U.S. \$ 0.40). One of the very few really lucrative occupations is the (legally prohibited!) production of "chang'aa", a traditional distilled liquor made of maize, bananas or sugarcane. This is mostly done by "expert" women in the secrecy of their huts and is rarely, if ever, detected by the government officials. There is a ready market for this product both in the immediate neighborhood, where

some people spend their last penny on a drink of this kind, and in Kisumu or even Nairobi. The "exports" to the latter destination are, however, frequently disturbed by police controls. Both because of the hazardous nature of this product which involves grave risks of accidental poisoning through impurities or methyl alcohol, and, even if these could be controlled and eliminated, because of more general considerations of public health, an encouragement of this production could hardly be seen as a solution to the problems of poverty and unemployment in the area.

One of the few brighter spots in this generally bleak picture has been the establishment of a sugar factory in Mumias in the center of Luyia country, which to a large extent obtains its cane from small-scale farmers in the vicinity. These generally have better incomes and are able to accumulate a surplus. But given the continuing high rate of population growth and the limited land area, even attempts of this kind may prove to be futile in the long run.

In terms of their level of agricultural "modernization" the Luyia occupy an intermediate position among Kenya's ethnic groups. In our sample about one-fifth of the farmers had taken part in a course at a farmers' training center, one-third had received advice from the agricultural extension service, and about one-fifth had received a loan for agricultural improvements. Cattle-dips are generally available and

they were used by all respondents who possessed some cattle. Almost 80 % of the farmers reported that they are planning some improvements on their shamba in the near future. This figure is comparable to that of the Kamba or Kalenjin, and it is almost as high as that of the Kikuyu. Most of these improvements referred to the planting of new or better crops. About two-thirds of these respondents also stated that they were thinking of buying more land or grade cattle sometime. How realistic such plans are, remains to be seen, however. Approximately 50 % of the agricultural respondents reported an average family income of less than Kshs. 100.- per month, slightly more than 20 % had between Kshs. 100. - and 200.-, about 30 % had incomes somewhat above this level.

Although there still is a considerable potential for a general increase in agricultural production (e.g. less than half of the maize planted so far is of the "improved" variety and more effective methods of cultivation, the use of fertilizer, etc., could give better yields), only a few are able and willing to pay for the required inputs. On the whole, therefore, a general pattern of "involutionary growths" seems to prevail, where the increase in production is eaten up by the greater number of mouths to be fed and an almost Bangla Desh-like situation of extreme overcrowding and increasing poverty begins to emerge. The only alternative then, particularly for the young people, is "to hit the tarmac" (which is the local expression for the

search for jobs elsewhere), but, as has been pointed out above, employment prospects in the towns or the chances of opening up new areas for agricultural settlement are not very bright either.

The majority of the rural Luyia population live , as do most other agricultural peoples in Kenya, in single homesteads which are scattered across the countryside. In former times there were in some areas fortified villages surrounded by wooden walls and ditches (e.g. among the Bukusu) which protected the inhabitants during raids from neighbors. These were destroyed when, after "punitive expeditions" by the colonial power in the 1890s, the area was finally "pacified". An attempt to settle the Luyia in a more compact manner was made in the 1920s by Christian missions which encouraged the people to form so-called "mission-lines" with their homesteads, i.e. to resettle and to exchange their land in such a way that the individual houses formed two parallel rows on either side of the road, resembling some European types of villages. After a while, however, this program met with considerable resistance by some of those who had not been Christianized and who saw no reason why they should move from their traditional sites. In the 1930s, therefore, this idea was gradually abandoned and, on the whole, the program did not have a lasting impact on the pattern of settlement in the area.

The traditional system of land tenure among the Luyia in a number of aspects is similar to that of other

Kenyan agricultural ethnic groups, but also shows some characteristic deviations parallel to some of the differences in the social structure and kinship system. The basic land-holding unit of the Luyia is the extended family consisting of the grandparents, the married sons and their families, and unmarried children. Traditionally they all built their houses on the same piece of property, but each elementary family cultivated its own field (Maragoli: "omulimi", pl.: "emilimi", the equivalent for the Swahili "shamba"). Rights of ownership were established either by inheriting a piece of the grandfather's land ("omulimi gwa guga"), by being apportioned a plot by one's father ("omulimi gwa dada"), or by cultivating a portion of virgin bushland ("oluangereka"). In addition to these plots owned by individual families, there used to be some sections which were under the control of the clan head ("eligutu"). A part of this land served as a communal grazing ground for all members of the clan. Another part was traditionally held in reserve and in times of need could be allotted by the eligutu to individual clansmen whose property this land became after they had first cultivated it. Apart from the actual land owners ("omwene"), there were also tenants ("omumenya", pl.: "abamenya") in some areas who, not being members of the resident clan of the region, could only establish occupation rights on the land of an omwene. After some initial contributions to certain ceremonies an omumenya did not have to pay any rent or dues, and for most practical

purposes his tenure was as secure after some years as that of an omwene. ⁶

Land could be inherited only by male descendants, the eldest son getting the "ancestral land" ("omulimi gwa guga"), with the other sons inheriting equal parts from their father. Even sons who had left to work elsewhere retained their inalienable rights in a share of their father's property; neither by absence nor by letting the land revert to bush could they lose their claim. If a man died before his sons were grown, one of his brothers acted as a trustee until the sons came of age. If a man had no direct male descendants, his property was inherited by his brothers or their sons. The laws of inheritance, which are to a large extent still adhered to today, are responsible, together with the overall increase in population, for the extreme fragmentation of plots which has occurred in the last decades. In our sample almost three-fourths of those respondents who gave a specific answer to our question in this respect stated that their property would be inherited by their sons, the rest said "by all children".

Today all "land reserves" of the clans have been used up and, except for small fringes along the rivers or some completely inaccessible or rocky parts, there is no uncultivated bushland in Luyia country. The communal grazing grounds of the clans have largely disappeared. In the course of the general land reforms of the 1950s in Kenya, 95.6 % of all land has now been registered under

individual title-deeds. This is the highest percentage, after that of the Kikuyu, for any small-scale farming area in Kenya. The average size of a holding in the total registered area is 2.5 ha, which is the same as for the Luo and somewhat more than in Kikuyu country, but considerably less than in Ukambani or among the Kalenjin. For Kakamega district alone this figure is only 1.5 ha which is, together with Kisii, the lowest for all of Kenya. The distribution of farm sizes shows that three-fourths of all farms have less than 5 ha (42 % even less than 2 ha), 19 % comprise between 5 and 10 ha, and about 6 % have more than that. These last figures are somewhat "inflated" by the generally larger farms in Bungoma District. For Kakamega District alone, for example, the number of farms of more than 10 ha is only 1.8 % of the total, which, after the Kikuyu, is the lowest figure for all of the small-scale farming areas. Only 14.4 % of the total area is used for "pure" cash crops which is just about half the figure for the Kikuyu and the lowest for any agricultural people in Kenya. The social differentiation among the rural Luyia is thus less pronounced than in most other parts of Kenya, but it is more an "equality in misery" than a positive indicator of a more "balanced" development.

The traditional division of labor among the Luyia is in many aspects quite similar to that of the other agricultural peoples. Within the family the duties of the members of each sex are clearly defined. The heavier burden here again lies on the wife who has to clean the house and the cattle

section, fetch water, collect firewood, cook and look after the children. The greater part of the planting, weeding and harvesting is also done by her. The husband, on the other hand, has certain duties in the construction of the house, looks after the cattle and other livestock, and is responsible for all kinds of transactions concerning the transfer of livestock in kinship relations, which in former times were often quite time-consuming. In addition, apparently somewhat more than among the other peoples, he also helps out in the agricultural work.⁷ Today many husbands are absent and are seeking employment in the large-scale farming area (as far as it is still existing) and in the major urban centers (mostly Nairobi and Mombasa). In our Nairobi sample slightly more than half of the Luyia respondents reported, for example, that they also possessed a shamba or a share of one in their home area, which was the highest figure for any ethnic group. If they find a job, they provide their families at home with cash (a large proportion of which is used for school fees and similar expenses), and occasionally they receive some agricultural produce in return. This was the case for about one-third of the respondents. Since the distances involved are usually much longer than, for example, for the Kikuyu or Kamba, contacts between the rural and the urban part of the family are much less frequent. Thus widespread "absentee" farming is an effect, but also a contributing factor to the still rather low-level of agricultural development in the area.

Traditionally there were very few specialized occupations among the Luyia, the only major exceptions being the blacksmiths (who all belonged to the Abasamia clan), the medicine-men, and the rain-makers. For almost all other purposes the family was a self-sufficient unit. Thus the amount of goods traded between the different families, clans and sub-tribes traditionally has been very low. This has changed somewhat since the beginning of this century, and clothes, household goods, soap, spices and similar items are bought today in the local market centers and "dukas" (shops), but the purchasing power on the whole is still very low. 1.3 % of the total population in the home area is employed in non-agricultural occupations today, which is the lowest figure for all of the groups considered here.

Social and political structures

The traditional social and political organization of the Luyia people shows many similarities to that of the other Bantu groups in Kenya, since it is also based mainly on a system of clans and age-sets. There are considerable differences, however, even among some of the Luyia sub-tribes themselves. The basic unit of Luyia society is the elementary family which consists of husband, wife or wives, and their unmarried children. These live together in a common homestead ("litala") which, in areas where attacks by neighboring groups or wild animals could be expected,

used to be surrounded by a thorny hedge. If a man has several wives, the huts of the wives are usually arranged in a circular order. The homesteads in most parts of Buluyia are scattered across the countryside. However, larger fortified villages ("tsingoba"), surrounded by a wide ditch and a wall and which comprised approximately up to five hundred people, could traditionally also be found among some peoples such as the Bukusu, whose settlements were frequently raided by neighboring Nandi or Maasai groups in the east or the Teso in the west.

Apart from the individual family the most important social unit of the Luyia people is the clan ("oluhia", pl.: "edzimbia"). This is a territorial exogamous group which traces its descent patrilineally from a common famous ancestor who has given it his name. The genealogies of the clan, which are still remembered today by some elders, generally reach back between ten and twelve generations. The number of clans varies between the different Luyia sub-tribes⁸ and is not fixed by tradition or mythology (as, e.g., among the Kikuyu) and can change in the course of time by the splitting up of one clan into smaller subgroups. Altogether today there are probably more than 700 clans among the Abaluyia. Each clan has a totem (as, e.g., among the Kamba, but unlike Kikuyu and Mijikenda clans) with which rituals and characteristic taboos and avoidances are connected and by which people used to swear, for example in ordeals, to prove their honesty.

In between the individual family and the clan there are a number of sub-groups or lineages (Maragoli: "anyumba"; "indzu" in other dialects, meaning "house", or "ekilivwa" which literally means "gate"). These comprise the direct patrilineal descendants of about three to four generations, all members of which are aware of the kind and degree of their mutual relationship. In former times the ekilivwa was also a residential unit living within a common enclosure (among the northern Luyia groups until well after the establishment of the British administration), but today the lineages are dispersed within the larger territory of the clan. Altogether there are several thousand lineages among the Luyia with their number varying over the course of time. ⁹

In a vertical sense, traditional Luyia society was divided by a system of age-grades and age-sets, resembling to a certain extent that of the other Bantu peoples in Kenya. As was already described in the preceding chapters, the different stages in a person's life were set apart by certain "rites de passage" in these societies. For the Abaluyia the most significant among them in some groups was circumcision, performed when young men ("abasinde") were initiated into the first stage of adulthood ("abashebe"). Circumcision has not been, however, a universal feature among all Luyia sub-groups and in some parts of the country (more to the west and south) the custom of knocking out four (or sometimes six) lower incisors prevailed (also practiced by

some Nilotic groups such as the Luo). The rationalization which is often given for the latter practice is, that in cases of locked jaw (especially as a result of tetanus, apparently fairly common in former times) persons could still be fed by means of a pipe inserted through the gap between the teeth. Circumcision apparently was adopted from the neighboring Southern Nilotic peoples some centuries ago, but only for boys. Girls were never operated upon as among the Kikuyu, Maasai, etc. Traditionally the average age of circumcision for a young man was about 18 - 20 years, i.e. when a boy had reached full physical and mental maturity, and not at the time of puberty as, e.g., among the Kikuyu.

Circumcision ceremonies used to take place every three to four years on the average, at a time set by the elders of all clans belonging to the same sub-tribe, usually after the main harvest in August. Although, except among the Tiriki, there were no official meetings of representatives of all clans for this purpose, an informal understanding was always reached, so that all clans of the same group performed the circumcisions at the same time and at the same intervals. All those who were circumcised together then formed an age-set (Maragoli: "elikula", pl. "amakula"; Bukusu: "luvaga", pl. "tjimbaga") which became known by its individual name. The names chosen among most of the Luyia groups referred to particular events of this period (such as a famine, a war, a particular meteorological event,

etc.) and thus established a chronological order, as was the case among the Kikuyu. Among the Tiriki, on the other hand, the names for the age-sets formed a cycle of twelve periods which repeated itself indefinitely (as, e.g., among the Giriama). The Bukusu, alone among Luyia people, also grouped six "tjimbaga" into a "sisingilo", which thus constituted a system resembling that of the "generation-sets" of some of the other Kenyan ethnic groups.

On the whole, this system seems to have had little functional significance for the Bukusu and apparently had been borrowed from one of the neighboring peoples. The last common circumcision for all clans took place in 1911 among the Maragoli, but among the Tiriki the system was still performed in the 1930s.¹⁰ Today, if the operation is still performed at all, it is usually done in hospitals on an individual basis and has lost most of its social significance. Whereas practically all the respondents in our rural Luyia sample were able to give the name of their clan, only about half of them stated that they belonged to a particular age-set.

The traditional political organization of the Luyia peoples was in many ways as diffuse as that of most other Kenyan groups, but in some aspects additional hierarchical and centralized elements can be identified. The most immediate level of day-to-day decision-making in Luyia society used to be that of the "clan". Being also a territorial unit (unlike, for example, its Kikuyu and Kamba counterparts)

it can be said to have been the basic element of traditional political life, although its cohesion and internal structures were exclusively based on kinship ties. Accordingly, the internal pattern of decision-making within the clan was based on a hierarchical system of family relations. The highest authority in this structure was vested in the "head" of the clan, who was usually its most senior and most respected elder (Maragoli: "omukulundu munene", i. e. "the great elder"; Bukusu: "omugasa munene", "the great arbitrator"; Wanga: "eligutu linene", "the great clan elder"; "eligutu" also means the supporting post of a hut). The clan-head was not formally selected or installed by any particular procedure, but he often was the first-born son of a particularly respected and wealthy family within the clan. His "birth-rights" alone, however, were not sufficient to qualify him as a leader and he also had to prove himself as a courageous warrior in younger years and as a wise councillor and arbiter when he became older. He had to serve, for example, as an "omuseni" who comforted the next of kin at the funeral of a deceased person and watched over the just distribution of his property. On the whole, seniority was thus the most important aspect in acquiring a position of leadership. Not only the generally accepted experience and wisdom of an old person, but also the fact that he would soon join the spirit world of the ancestors from where, if displeased, he could haunt the living, added particular weight to his authority. ¹¹ A clan leader usually did not

act in any authoritarian manner, however, and was assisted in his decisions by a council ("eshiina") of other leading elders ("abakhulundu") who met in the "oluhia", the public meeting place of a clan. In addition, open "barazas" where everyone could come and listen and where all adult men could speak were not infrequent. ¹²

As an exogamous unit, however, a clan could, by definition, never become a self-sufficient social and political entity. It therefore depended on good relations with neighboring clans with which intermarriage was practiced. These inter-clan relationships among most Luyia peoples did not, however, lead to the establishment of more formal political structures beyond the level of the clan. The most important features of inter-clan relations within a "sub-tribe" were their common descent from a remote ancestor and the uniformity of certain regular rituals and ceremonies. These included in particular the circumcision ceremonies, which took place among all clans of a "tribe" at the same time and in the same way. These ceremonies also established a certain feeling of solidarity among those who belonged to the same "age-sets" which were created in this way. For most practical purposes, however, such as the organization of warfare or the administration of justice, no permanent political institutions existed at the tribal level. In some areas some clans and their leaders were somewhat more dominant than others and more lasting alliances existed between a dominant and some of the more subordinate groups.

Between the different Luyia "sub-tribes" relationships were even more restrained. Since all of them were more or less self-sufficient units, there was very little trade between them (a major exception being iron hoes made by the Samia) and intermarriage was also not very frequent. Each sub-group identified some of the others as "friendly", in most cases due to a perceived common descent from a famous ancestor in the past. These were not raided for cattle, girls or food, as used to be the case with the others with whom they lived in an almost permanent state of war. Thus the Bukusu, for example, maintained peaceful relations with the Gishu in the west and the Kabras in the east, but were deadly enemies of most of the other neighboring groups. In the same way relatively good relations existed between the Wanga and Marama, the Tachoni and the Nyala, the Maragoli and the Idakho, etc. But even hostilities between the different sub-groups never extended to the whole tribe as such and were always confined to the particular clan which was affected by attacks from one of its neighbors. ¹³

The most striking exception to this pattern of rather diffuse tribal "government" in Luyia country was the establishment of the "Kingdom" of Wanga which resembled in some ways the traditional kingdoms in neighboring Uganda. Its origins go back about 11 - 14 generations, i.e. to some time near the beginning of the 17th century, when, according to oral tradition, Wanga, a representative of a leading clan of the Tiriki ("Abalukhoba"), and some of his people settled

in the area near the present-day town of Mumias. After some time they succeeded in submitting the local Abamuima clan to their overrule, and thus founded the new dynasty of the "Abashitsetse". Wanga established a hereditary monarchy based on male primogeniture with himself as "King" ("Nabongo"). His successors had varying fortunes, but at the time when the first Europeans arrived in this area they found the only centralized polity on the territory of the present state of Kenya. Most instrumental for the fortunes of this monarchy was the employment of a group of Uasin Gishu Maasai as warriors at the court of the Nabongo and, at a later stage, the purchase of firearms from caravans of Arab and Swahili traders. The "Kingdom of Wanga" comprised twelve major clans, which were all off-shoots of the original Abashitsetse, and 18 others which had immigrated at a later time and had submitted themselves to the rule of the Nabongo.

The Wanga were thus the only Luyia sub-tribe which was united under a single political leader. At the time of the arrival of the British they probably numbered about 20,000 people (1932 census: 26,187). The last king was Mumia, who welcomed the British and at whose court they established their first provincial headquarters in 1894. In the same year the whole of "Kavirondo" (the fictitious name which was first used for what today are "Nyanza" and "Western" Provinces) initially became a part of the British Protectorate over Uganda. In 1902 the area was transferred to the British "East African Protectorate", the present-day

Kenya. In recognition of his services for the colonial power Mumia was made "Paramount Chief" of the Luyia peoples in 1909, following the concept of "indirect rule" employed in other parts of the British Empire. He managed to install Wanga "chiefs" as administrative heads of all other Luyia sub-tribes, but these, having no traditional basis for their power and being resented by many of their subjects, were gradually replaced by headmen of the respective local clans. The office of "Paramount Chief" was also abolished when Mumia retired in 1926.

In modern times the cultural and social interests of the Luyia peoples are to a certain extent represented by the "Abaluyia Association". This is a "tribal welfare organization" on the lines of the "New Akamba Union" or the "Mijikenda Union", for example. On the whole, however, the membership and the activities of this association are rather limited. The main instrument for most Luyia for an articulation of more directly political aims in the period immediately preceding and following Kenya's independence was the "Kenya African Democratic Union" (KADU), which had a strong following in this area. Since the merger with KANU in 1964, no separate official political organization with any sizeable following has come into existence, and the support for the "Kenya Peoples Union" (KPU) between 1966 and 1969 remained very limited, too.

CHAPTER VII

THE LUO ¹General background and economy

In contrast to all other ethnic groups considered so far, the Luo belong to the "Nilotic" family of peoples, more specifically, the "Western Nilotic" group of languages. This term originally referred to ethnic groups living in the Upper Nile Valley which shared a number of common physical, linguistic and cultural characteristics. ² The Luo are subdivided into more than thirty sub-tribes ("oganda", pl. "ogendini" or, chiefly referring to the common territory held by this group, "piny"). The majority of these sub-tribes have between 20,000 and 100,000 members each. The differences among these groups are not as great, however, as, for example, among the Luyia and, although there has never been any common political organization for all of them, a sense of a common identity has existed for quite some time.

The Luo area of settlement is extended all around what today is called the "Winam" (formerly: "Kavirondo") Gulf, the easternmost part of Lake Victoria. In the north it consists of the hilly highlands adjacent to Luyia country. In the east it comprises the vast and partly swampy plains stretching

to the elevations of the Tinderet Forest which are bordered by the Nyando Escarpment and the Nandi Hills in the north and the highlands of Kericho District in the southeast. In the south Luo country reaches the Tanzanian border and is again generally hilly in character. The altitude of this area lies between the level of Lake Victoria (1,133 m) and 1,200 m (4,000 ft.) for the plains, the so-called "Lake Shore Savannah Zone", and between 1,200 and 1,800 m for most of the rest. A few elevations such as the Gwasi Hills in the south reach altitudes of more than 2,200 m. Bordering the equator, the climate is generally warm. Most of the territory has a sufficient average rainfall of between 750 and 1,000 mm in the lakeshore zone and above 1,000 mm in most of the rest of the territory. Most rains come in the form of thunderstorms, however, causing a rather irregular geographical distribution and considerable annual differences for a particular area. The main rainy seasons are from March to June and from October to December. The area is drained by many permanent streams and rivers which eventually all flow into Lake Victoria. Some parts, such as the plains south of Kisumu and the westernmost section of Siaya District, are quite swampy, and occasional floods in the lower parts hamper agricultural development. Proper drainage and regulated irrigation in these areas, which have already been started in some parts, could reduce this problem in the future. The soil mainly consists of the moderately fertile red, pink or gray granite in most of the hilly parts of the territory and the fertile but difficult

to work "black cotton soil" in the plains. A few parts of the territory such as the Gwasi Hills and the Olambwe Valley in the south and Uyoma, Asembo and Sakwa locations in Siaya District are still affected by tsetse fly infestation, which makes them unsuitable for the keeping of livestock and unfavorable for human settlement. As recently as the first decade of this century a great part of the lakeshore population was decimated by a major outbreak of the sleeping sickness transmitted by this insect. ³

In view of these difficulties the total agricultural potential of Luo country is somewhat lower than many parts of the Luyia area or the neighboring very fertile Kericho and Kisii Districts, but still much higher than, for example, most parts of Ukambani or the Coast Province .

In administrative terms almost all of Luo country lies within the boundaries of present day "Nyanza Province" with Kisumu town as its capital. It consists of the three districts of Siaya in the north, Kisumu in the east and South Nyanza ("Homa Bay") in the south. The fourth district in Nyanza Province, Kisii, is almost entirely inhabited by the Bantu-speaking group of this name. A small section of the Bantu-speaking Kuria people also lives in the south-eastern part of South Nyanza. Before 1967 Siaya and Kisumu Districts together formed the District of "Central Nyanza". In colonial times it was called "Central Kavirondo" and formed part of the larger Kavirondo Province, which also included the present-day "Western Province".

Originally all "Nilotic" peoples pursued a predominantly pastoral way of life; the Nuer and Dinka, for example, still do so to a large extent.⁴ Only in more recent times have some of them settled and become agriculturalists. To this latter group belong the Luo, who, after they had completed their migration into their present area of settlement, turned more and more to agricultural production. Among the reasons for this change are the limitations of space, the increase in the population, epidemics of rinderpest which wiped out a great number of cattle during the last century, and certain factors of cultural adaptation and assimilation. They still keep, wherever possible, large numbers of cattle, sheep and goats. A number of Luo living along the shores of Lake Victoria or near larger rivers and streams have become skilled fishermen, and fish today is a nutritious and well-liked part of the Luo diet. Many of them are also fond of hunting, although nowadays there is not very much game left in their area of settlement.

Even though most Luo today are dependent on agriculture for their subsistence, many of them still regard it as more of a necessity than as a means of improving their living conditions. The enthusiasm for agricultural modernization, so remarkable among the Kikuyu, the Kisii and a number of other peoples in Kenya has largely been lacking among the Luo; consequently, the level of agricultural development is generally still quite low. Cultivation is still mostly done by using the traditional hoe, although ox-drawn plows can be hired by

individual farmers and have lately become somewhat more common. Only about one-third of all the crops planted can be considered, generally speaking, to be potential cash crops. This represents the lowest figure for any of the agricultural peoples considered here. Only about 6 % of all the maize grown in the area is of the improved variety (Kisii: 45 %).⁵ In addition to maize the main crops are sorghum, finger millet, beans, peas, and cassava, practically all of which are used exclusively for subsistence. As industrial crops, cotton and sugarcane were introduced by the colonial administration. In recent years an attempt has been made to grow coffee in suitable areas although the total amount remains negligible and the potential for this product is rather limited. In our sample almost all farmers grew maize as the main staple food crop, only one of them planted the hybrid type. Two-thirds also cultivated millet or finger millet, one-third other local crops such as cassava. Sugar was the main cash crop, which was grown by one-fourth of the agricultural respondents, coffee and cotton were planted by a few of them.

Of the total farmland only about one-fourth is devoted to cultivation, the rest to grazing and other uses. This marks a contrast to Kikuyu country, for example, where the proportions of cultivated and uncultivated land are about equal. Practically all of the cattle kept in Luo country is of the traditional variety of which the numbers (e.g. for transactions of bridewealth) often are still of greater

importance than its quality. The incidence of disease and the mortality rate are also high. Its contribution to production in the form of milk or meat is thus only marginal. The introduction of improved breeds or European-type grade-cattle has failed so far, because the necessary infrastructure (e.g. cattle-dips, etc. for disease control), properly prepared (e.g. paddocked) grazing grounds, but also the required knowledge, skill and capital still are lacking. ⁶ Sheep, goats and chickens, kept in large numbers, are used more directly as a contribution to the local diet. About one-third of the agricultural respondents had some local cattle, the greatest part of them less than 5 heads each, none of them possessed any grade cattle. Very few of the farmers sold milk even in small quantities. Approximately one-fifth of them had some goats or sheep, chickens were kept by about half of them.

The pattern of settlement resembles that of most of the agricultural peoples in Kenya. The Luo homesteads ("dala" or "pacho") which comprise an elementary family (husband, wife or wives and unmarried children) are scattered across the countryside. Traditionally the dala was surrounded by a thick hedge, usually of euphorbia trees ("bondo"), as a protection against wild animals and other intruders. The basic landholding unit in Luo society is the "jakakwaro" which is the smallest lineage segment owning a contiguous piece of land. This term originally refers to those who have descended from a common grandfather, but in its most common

use it is often extended to comprise kinship relations reaching back a greater number of generations as well. Within the territory of the jakakwaro the land usually has been fragmented into often tiny pieces which belong to the different elementary families in this group. On the average each elementary family today cultivates about three different parcels which are often dispersed over a wide area. Some families even own ten or more scattered pieces of land. The largest lineage group which occupies a compact block of land ("gweng'", pl. "gwenge") and which comprises several jakakwaro is the "dhoot", a term which is often translated as "clan", but which, more strictly speaking, refers to the "maximal lineage" as the smallest exogamous group in Luo society. Within the "gweng'" strangers ("jidak", pl. "jodak"), i. e. people who are not members of the same dhoot, can be granted cultivation rights and are practically on equal terms with the "jogweng" ("the people of the land"; or "wuon lowo", "owner of the land"). Legally, however, they cannot become owners themselves. In addition to the individually cultivated plots there are communal grazing grounds ("lek") within each gweng'. In former times the territory of each subtribe ("piny") was separated from the neighboring one by a strip of unused land ("thim").⁷ Land and cattle were traditionally inherited by a man's sons in approximately equal parts or, in the absence of sons, by his brothers or their sons. In our sample about half of those respondents who had already made up their mind named their sons as their potential heirs, the majority of them

specifying the eldest son. The others referred to their children in general or some other close family members.

When, in accordance with the "Swynnerton-Plan", the program of land consolidation and registration was extended to Luo country in the 1950s, it met, for a number of reasons, with strong resistance by the population. First of all, it was generally felt, that these "punitive measures" which were taken by the colonial administration in Kikuyu country in the wake of the "Mau Mau" revolt should not be applied to the Luo as well. Secondly, many Luo argued that the fragmented pattern of landholding was also a safeguard against unreliable local weather conditions, such as thunderstorms, floods or droughts, the risks of which traditionally were spread more evenly over a wider area. The variations in soil and topography also allowed for different crops in places which were particularly suitable for them. Thirdly, those who only had "jadak" rights in land feared to be displaced entirely and also the group of "absentee" farmers or family members who had found employment elsewhere were afraid that they would lose their traditional rights of inheritance once the plots had been registered. In addition, there were a number of administrative misconceptions (e.g. about certain aspects of the traditional landholding pattern), and inefficiencies of the local staff, so that initially not much progress was made.⁸ After independence some of these attitudes slowly began to change when the potential of agriculture as a means of improving one's living conditions was realized by a small but growing number

of individuals. But only in the early 1970s did the impact of this program really begin to be felt and about 50 % of the total area has now come under registration.

In our sample slightly less than half of the farmers possessed a title for their land. Of those who did not yet have one, more than two-thirds stated that they would like to get one. It seems, therefore, that the issue of land registration in Luo country, the resistance to which was seen by many observers as the main impediment for agricultural development in the area,⁹ has lost much of its significance today.

The average farm size in the area is 2.5 ha, which is the same as in Luyia country and only slightly more than among the Kikuyu, but considerably less than among the Kamba or Kalenjin. More than 50 % of all farms have less than 2 ha each, approximately 35 % comprise between 2 and 10 ha, and about 14 % are extended over a larger area. This last percentage is the highest for any of the ethnic groups considered here. This shows that there is, at least in some parts of the territory, still some room for expansion, but also that a social differentiation along economic lines becomes increasingly evident. Among our cash crop growing agricultural respondents incomes for a family were less than Kshs. 100.- for about 45 % of them, between Kshs. 100.- and 200.- for another fourth, somewhat more for the rest.

Parallel to the gradual acceptance of the land reform program other agricultural innovations have been adopted by

some individuals or family groups. At least in the more fertile and better-watered parts of South Nyanza and Siaya Districts a distinctive improvement can be observed today, and coffee and some other cash crops are successfully being grown. Other factors in recent agricultural development were the establishment of a sugar factory and an outgrowers scheme at Chemelil in Kisumu District. It was initially plagued, however, by a number of technical, organizational and financial problems. Rice paddies were developed in some pilot irrigation projects near Ahero in the Kano Plains. Another major sugar project was launched in South Nyanza District in 1976. The growing of cotton has again been encouraged in recent years. Although the success of these programs has been quite limited so far, they at least show a means of tapping some of the as yet largely unused potential for development.

Among the agricultural respondents in our sample, about one-fifth had taken part in a farmers' course and one-fourth had received some extension advice. These rates place them, together with the Luyia, in an intermediate position. They are considerably higher than those for the Mijikenda or Kamba, for example, but lower than the ones for the Kalenjin and, in particular, the Kikuyu. Very few of the Luo respondents had, however, obtained a loan for purposes of agricultural development. The existence and use of cattle-dips, too, was the lowest for any of the cattle-keeping peoples considered here. About half of the respondents said that

they were planning some improvements on their farm, which, together with that of the Mijikenda, was the lowest figure for any of the agricultural groups. The percentage of those who stated that they were thinking of buying some more land or grade cattle was, again together with the Mijikenda, the lowest in our survey.

Together with the more "pastoralist" tradition and the ecological conditions of the area, another main factor responsible for the relatively low degree of a more commercialized type of farming in Luo country in the past was the relatively low level of prices which prevailed for some of the major potential cash crops, such as cotton and sugarcane. This must be compared to what could be earned by selling traditional food crops such as maize or by working as a migrant laborer on the large-scale farms of Rift Valley Province or in Nairobi. As the respective statistics, going back at least to the early 1940s, clearly show, the returns per acre of cotton were far below what could be earned by the planting of maize or even of other traditional food crops.¹⁰ This situation has continued, more or less unchanged, until the early 1970s. Only in very recent years have some efforts been made to adjust the relative price levels and to increase the production of cash crops, which constitute valuable raw materials for potential secondary industries in the area as well.

One interesting approach to agricultural modernization in Luo country has been the introduction of group-farming

schemes in some areas. All of these schemes, although varying a great deal, are characterized by a pooling of land and by the common organization of some of the main agricultural operations such as plowing, planting, weeding, and harvesting. A number of these schemes have been quite successful, which led one observer to the conclusion that "in a traditional society it is often easier to introduce new methods through group action than to have them pioneered by individuals who may thereby become the objects of envy and censure by others".¹¹ On the other hand, similar schemes in Luo country and elsewhere have failed because of a lack of cooperation and mutual trust among the members, an increasing sense of individuality, and a desire for private gains.¹² It remains to be seen, therefore, whether some forms of organization can be found which prove to be more universally applicable and which are more than a transitory measure to induce some desired changes.

The division of labor in traditional Luo society was largely based on sex and age, more or less in the same way as we have described it for the Luyia or some of the other peoples. There used to be very little specialization of economic roles, one of the major exceptions again being the working of iron which was done by certain blacksmiths' families. Some crafts such as the weaving of baskets or the making of wooden stools and implements were also carried out on a family basis. Along the lakeshore, fishing has become an important occupation and is done today by some full-time fishermen operating canoes or even larger boats. The fish,

which many Luo are very fond of, is then sold in dried form in the local markets. Altogether the amount of goods traded has traditionally been quite low and is still rather low today, due to the limited purchasing power of the majority of the population. But many women are engaged at least in the selling of some self-produced foodstuffs, pottery or baskets to supplement their income.¹³ In the home area today 2.3 % are employed in non-agricultural occupations, which is, after the Kikuyu, the second highest figure in Kenya.

Nevertheless, given the continuing high rate of population growth and the lack of more widespread agricultural modernization so far, the number of those who had to seek employment outside Nyanza Province has been very high. Together with the neighboring Luyia the Luo constitute the largest group of people who are engaged in "long-distance migration" to Kenya's major urban centers, in particular Nairobi and Mombasa.¹⁴ Unlike Kikuyu, Kamba or Mijikenda workers, whose home area is close to one of these centers, the long-distance migrants cannot return to their families more often than once a year on the average, and even then it is only for rather short periods of time. On the other hand, due to the poor housing conditions in town and the low wages paid to these mostly unskilled workers, it has hardly been possible for them to take their families along. These split families, where the male partner usually stays in town for his most productive years (most of them are in the 20 to 45 years age group), while his dependents continue

to live on the farm, have created many economic and social problems both in the cities and in the rural areas. This situation has become even worse by the relative decline of Kisumu as a center of economic activity. First the completion of the railway line to Uganda via Eldoret, which now bypassed its port, and then after independence the gradual exodus of non-citizen Asians, who had largely dominated the commercial and industrial activities of the town, complicated this problem. Unless this general tendency can be reversed by the development of labor-intensive agro-based industries (such as textile or leather processing factories), an expansion of fishing and related processing facilities, and, perhaps, some greater use of the tourist potential of the Lake Victoria area, the prospects for "development", rather than a continuing "underdevelopment" in Nyanza and in Western Kenya as a whole, seem to be rather bleak.

In the modern occupations many Luo have shown a strong preference for white collar jobs in the public service and para-statal organizations. This is in certain contrast to "modern" Kikuyu, for example, many of whom are interested in starting their own private business. Thus the Luo community is strongly represented in the East African Railway Corporation (now Kenya Railways) and certain branches of government such as the health administration and educational institutions. At the University of Nairobi a certain preponderance of Luo scholars can be noted. This

is partially due to factors lying in the colonial past, such as the relatively late start which was given to many Kikuyu in this field because of their involvement with "Mau Mau", the patronage enjoyed by the Luo at this important stage,¹⁵ but also to genuine strong interest and hard work of many Luo students in the academic field. Unlike members of some of the other ethnic groups, however, many of those who are successful in modern occupations outside their home area tend to neglect their links to "the land" back home and not much investment is channeled from these sources into the agricultural development of Luo country. Whereas the Kikuyu are known, for example, to build modern houses or to improve their family homes on their shamba as soon as they can afford it, many more successful Luo prefer to spend their money on better living conditions in town and do not seem to care very much about improving their family quarters at home.

Social and political structures

Traditional Luo society shares a number of features with the other "stateless societies" in Kenya, but it is the only one of the ethnic groups discussed here which does not have an explicit age-grade and fixed age-set system and is thus vertically even less structured than the other groups. In a horizontal direction Luo society is divided by a system of kinship ties which extends from the elementary family

as the smallest unit (comprising all "jokanyiego", i.e. all descendants of a common father) to the "maximal lineage" ("dhoot", pl. "dhouidi") which is the smallest exogamous group. Between the family and the dhoot is a network of highly differentiated and segmented kinship structures ("lineages", "libamba", pl. "libembini") which can be traced back genealogically through the paternal line to a single common ancestor whose name the dhoot carries. This genealogical structure in most cases comprises between eight and twelve generations which also determine its present size. Within this lineage system each segment stands in a clearly defined horizontal and vertical relationship to all the others, and all members of a dhoot are aware of the kind and degree of these kinship ties.

If a "maximal lineage" is extended over a large number of generations and has greatly increased in size, feuds may develop between two or more of its sub-lineages of the next lower degree. Often these feuds can no longer be reconciled, and they then lead to a splitting of the group into two or more new and independent dhouidi. This fact explains, together with past migrations, why there is no fixed number of dhouidi or even "tribes" among the Luo. These two characteristics (the continuous genealogical structure and the dynamics of their development over time) also distinguish a "maximal lineage" from a "clan" as it exists, for example, in Kikuyu society. ¹⁶ The dhouidi are also non-totemic in

contrast to the "clans" of some other societies. In our sample almost all of the rural Luo respondents were able to indicate the name of their "dhoot". Each dhoot is also a territorial unit ("gweng'") within which the most important economic, judicial, political and ritual functions are regulated.

A large gweng' may also coincide with the area of a "tribe" ("piny"). If a piny is made up of several gwenge, one dhoot is usually the dominant (not necessarily the largest) one in the area, which often gives its name to the whole piny. A tribe can be defined to be the largest social unit among the Luo peoples. Here relations exist which are still regulated by "lawful" procedures. If, for example, a person is killed, a tribe is the largest unit in which at least an attempt is made to settle the affair through the arbitration of elders and the payment of compensation between the lineages concerned ("cut"; "blood money"). If homicide has been committed by persons from outside one's own piny, these persons are regarded as "enemies" ("wasigu") and no attempts of peaceful settlement and payment of compensation are initiated. If, on the other hand, the slain person was a close kinsman of the culprit, a payment of compensation does not make sense, since the lineages are jointly responsible for the payment. In these cases the deed is regarded as a "sin" causing ritual uncleanness which has to be removed by sacrifices (usually of an ox) and other rituals. 17

As in all societies, age affects the structure of Luo

society, but these age differentiations are not as clearly set apart by fixed "rites de passage" as in the other groups discussed. Thus no clearcut system of age-grades with explicitly defined social duties for each grade exists among the Luo. Different stages in a person's lifecycle are predominantly a matter concerning the individual himself and his immediate family, but not the society or polity at large. The most important stages in a person's life are again his entrance into adulthood, marriage, and becoming an elder ("jadong", pl. "jodong"), but the ceremonies and rituals connected with some of these stages are only family, and in this sense "private", affairs. The custom of removing the six lower incisors, for example, before a boy or girl reaches puberty (sometimes between the ages of ten and twelve years) cannot be equated to the social significance of circumcision which was traditionally practiced by most of the other peoples in Kenya. Both male circumcision and female clitoridectomy are unknown among the Luo. The removal of the lower incisors has largely been stopped today. In the same way no corporate "age-sets" which constitute a permanent group of co-equals and perform clearly defined social tasks are known in Luo society. The traditional economic differentiation among the Luo, which also found its expression in the number of wives a man could "afford", was about the same as in the other agricultural groups in Kenya. Today some stronger social stratification based on economic factors is beginning to emerge, but due to the still relatively low level of agricultural development in the

area this tendency is less pronounced than in most other parts of Kenya. The number of "progressive" cash crop farmers, for example, is still rather low and as yet no truly "landless" rural proletariat has been formed.

The authority structure in traditional Luo society was rather diffuse and no specialized political roles existed, at least none affecting the Luo people as a whole. Political decision-making, in a wider sense of the word, was closely linked to the existing kinship structures where authority was determined within the framework of family and lineage. At the lowest level the owner of the homestead ("wuon dala") was in charge of all family affairs. He was usually succeeded by his eldest son, but if this son was found to be unsuitable for this position the father appointed another son or another close agnatic relative as his successor. The same combination of principles (primogeniture, personal qualifications, and appointment by one's predecessor) prevailed as criteria for the selection of leaders for the larger lineage segments of Luo society.¹⁸ Among different maximal lineages within a piny, one lineage often was dominant (the term "aristocratic" is used by Evans-Pritchard in a similar context)¹⁹ and in these cases membership in the "aristocracy" could become an additional criterion for leadership. At this level, however, leadership was rather diffuse and, it seems, often nonexistent. There is some controversy today about the degree of political centralization and the existence of specialized leadership

roles in traditional Luo society,²⁰ but it seems to be clear that at least towards the end of the 19th century centralized forms of government had developed in some piny but were still largely absent in others.²¹ It is likely that the development of centralized political structures, unknown in the still predominantly pastoral Nilotic groups,²² was concomitant to a certain degree with the more sedentary and agricultural way of life adopted by the Luo in more recent times. Nevertheless, both diffuse and more centralized political systems could be found in neighboring Luo sub-tribes (e.g. Gem and Sakwa) before the imposition of colonial rule without great apparent differences in their mode of production.

In the more diffused forms of political organization there was no acknowledged political leader or group of leaders who exercised any authority affecting the whole tribe. At the level of the "maximal lineage" there was a group of elders ("jodong gweng'") who each represented their different lineage segments and who were mostly consulted in disputes concerning land and other judicial affairs. This group did not, however, as far as we know, form a permanent corporate "council" of any sort; different members of the "jodong gweng'" were consulted in small numbers and on an ad hoc basis in most cases. Where a more central form of leadership had developed, it was exercised by an influential and wealthy man ("ruoth", pl. "ruodhi"), whose office in some cases had become hereditary (for

example in Gem, but not in neighboring Asembo)²³ so that he could more properly be called a "chief". In some instances a ruoth was a "jabilo" ("prophet", "magician"), too, who thus combined both secular and mystical functions. The imposition of colonial rule brought an end to these different patterns of traditional political authority and, following the concept of "indirect rule", chiefs and sub-chiefs were appointed in all locations and sub-locations of Luo country. Even if these had been traditional "ruodhi" before, they now derived their authority purely from the colonial power to which they now owed their loyalty.

In more recent times the social and cultural interests of the Luo community have been represented by the "Luo Union", which was founded in the early 1950s and which has become one of the most active "tribal welfare associations" in Kenya.²⁴ Even though a "political" orientation, in a narrower sense of the word, is usually denied by the leaders of these groups, there can be no doubt that they fulfill some latent political functions as well. An explicit political party, which was mostly confined to the Luo area, was the "Kenya Peoples' Union" (KPU), which was formed after Oginga Odinga resigned from the vice-presidency of the government in 1966. The ban of KPU in 1969 has led to a relative isolation and under-representation of the Luo community in Kenyan politics, which even today has not been fully overcome.

CHAPTER VIII

THE KALENJIN

General background and economy

The name "Kalenjin" ¹ (literally: "I tell you") is an artificial creation dating from the period during and immediately following World War II. At this time a series of broadcasts and a students' magazine of this name were established. It was later used in a consciously political manner and became synonymous with what formerly was known as "the Nandi-speaking peoples". The groups referred to today under the name of Kalenjin belong to the "Southern Nilotic" (formerly sometimes also referred to as "Nilo-Hamitic" or "Para-Nilotic") group of languages. Although the basis for this classification is again primarily linguistic, these groups share a considerable number of common economic, social and cultural features as well. ²

We shall confine ourselves here to the formerly so-called "Nandi-speaking" group ³ consisting of eight principal sections which are presented here in the order of descending magnitude: ⁴ the Kipsigis ⁵ (470,000 members at the time of the last census in 1969), the Nandi ⁶ (260,000), the Tugen ⁷ (130,000), the Keyo ⁸ (110,000), the Pokot ⁹

(90,000), the Marakwet ¹⁰ (80,000), the Sabaot ¹¹ (40,000), and the Terik ¹² (20,000). In former times most of these groups were further subdivided into a number of geographical and political units with all of them showing a division by clans and age-sets. These formerly independent subgroups of the Kalenjin can also be placed into the two larger categories of the "Pokot" (comprising the Pokot and Marakwet) and the "Nandi" divisions (including the other groups). Each forms a separate linguistic and to a certain extent cultural unit within which the dialects of the different groups are mutually understandable. Between groups of the "Nandi" and "Pokot" subdivisions, dialects, although linguistically closely related, cannot be understood as easily without further training and experience. The Pokot subdivision also shows a number of cultural features (for instance in dress and weapons), which indicate a greater affinity with other groups of the Southern Nilotic peoples, such as the neighboring Karamojong and Turkana. ¹³ In former times the relations between all these groups were characterized by relatively little trade and other social interactions, but a rather permanent state of traditional warfare, in particular with regard to the cattle possessed by each group. The relations between the Kipsigis and the Nandi represented a major exception in this respect. These groups never raided each other, there was a somewhat higher degree of intermarriage between them, and other clan and age-set relations were existent as well. In contrast to the Maasai, cattle raids

never occurred between subgroups of the same people.

In addition to the "Kalenjin" proper there are the "Dorobo" (altogether today about 20,000), a people of hunters and gatherers who live in the vast forests covering the escarpments and elevations west of the Rift Valley. This group today speaks a "Nandi" language and possesses a number of other cultural features which relate them to the Kalenjin. In many other aspects, however, the Dorobo are clearly set apart from all of the other peoples in Kenya. They probably belong to a stock of early inhabitants of the area which only in more recent centuries adopted the language and part of the culture of later immigrants. ¹⁴

The Kalenjin peoples are scattered over a wide area with great variations in the ecological conditions. ¹⁵ The Kipsigis inhabit the hilly highlands west of the large forest of the Mau Escarpment, a part of the western flank of the great Rift Valley. In the southwest this territory borders on the great plains of Narok District which are inhabited by the Maasai. In the south the Bantu-speaking group of the Kisii, who live under comparable ecological conditions, are the neighbors of the Kipsigis, and in the west the area is adjacent to Luo country which extends, at a lower level, along the shores of Lake Victoria. In the north the home area of the Kipsigis is separated from the territory of the related Nandi by the Nyando Valley and the Nyando Escarpment. During the colonial period a small belt of land "scheduled" for European farming was also

situated in this region between the Nandi and Kipsigis territories. The altitude of Kipsigis country lies between 1500 and 2100m (5,000 to 7,000 ft.), and the temperatures are moderate to warm. It has abundant rainfall (more than 1,750 mm on the average) and is well-drained by permanent rivers and streams which all flow into Lake Victoria. The usual two main rainy seasons of the "long" rains in the spring and the "short" rains in the fall merge in this area and in the adjacent Nandi territory into an almost continuous period of rather regular rainfalls from about March to September. The soils are generally of volcanic origin and have weathered into very rich friable loams ("latosolic soil"). Almost all of the area is thus of very high agricultural potential and is ideal for the growing of tea.

The Nandi live in the region north of the Kipsigis which is bordered by the high elevations and forests of the Elgeyo Escarpment in the east and the Nandi Escarpment in the west. In the north it reaches the open highlands formerly inhabited by the Uasin Gishu Maasai. These highlands became part of the area scheduled for European farming in colonial times. Nandi country is quite similar in topography and climate to the territory of the Kipsigis, although it receives slightly lower amounts of rainfall (between 1,250 and 1500 mm).

In stark contrast to these agriculturally well-endowed areas of Kalenjin settlement are the hot and arid

plains in the lowlands of the lower Rift Valley. They are inhabited by the Tugen and parts of the Keyo, Marakwet and Pokot peoples. Most of this territory lies at an altitude of 600 to 900 m (2,000 to 3,000 ft.) and experiences rainfalls well below the required minimum for successful agricultural production (annual averages are between 500 and 750 mm, in some parts even less). There is no external drainage for these areas and the local streams and rivers, most of which are only temporary, empty into a chain of lakes inside the great Rift Valley (such as Lakes Baringo and Hannington), and, further south, Nakuru, Elmenteita, Naivasha and Magadi). The soils are also generally shallow and stony ("lithosols"), the surface is strewn with lava beds. The vegetation in large parts consists only of hard scrub and thornbrush, and in many places, there is hardly any grass left at all. On the whole, the area is thus suitable only for rather extensive cattle-ranching or browsing by sheep and goats. The only exceptions are the more elevated sections along the escarpments on both sides of the Rift Valley and the area of the Amasya and Tugen Hills east of the Kerio Valley which receive higher amounts of rainfall.

The Keyo and Marakwet inhabit a small strip of land between the fertile highlands described above and the arid plains along the Elgeyo Escarpment, and thus share both kinds of environment. Those members of these groups who live in the plains pursue still a largely pastoral way of life,

while those who inhabit the highlands or some narrow ledges along the very steep escarpment (the difference in altitude between the bottom and top amounts to 1,200 m and more) are agriculturalists. The latter enjoy quite favorable climatic conditions and good soils for the growing of maize, wheat, vegetables and a considerable number of other cash crops. In some parts along the escarpment are traditional systems of artificial irrigation which have been maintained successfully up to the present day. The Pokot live north of this territory in an area which is also well-watered and fertile in its western (higher) parts and rather dry in the east extending into semi-desert towards Turkana country in the north.

The Terik inhabit a small pocket of land between the surrounding Luyia country and the Nandi highlands from which they are separated by a belt of thick forests. Today they have become successful agriculturalists, too, under conditions largely resembling those of the neighboring Luyia peoples. The Sabaot, finally, have withdrawn to the higher parts of the slopes of Mt. Elgon north of Luyia country from where they are still in contact with related groups across the Ugandan border.

Except for the territories of the Terik and Sabaot, which today are part of Kenya's "Western Province", all Kalenjin live in "Rift Valley Province". The areas of traditional settlement of the different groups have been respected to a large extent by the present administrative

divisions. The districts of "Kericho" (Kipsigis), "Nandi" (Nandi), "Elgeyo-Marakwet" (Keyo and Marakwet), "Baringo" (Tugen) and "West Pokot" (Pokot) are still predominantly inhabited by these groups. In between and adjacent to these areas which were made "tribal reserves" during colonial times were the vast "White Highlands" which comprised the districts of Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Nakuru and Laikipia. In addition, there were smaller blocks of European-occupied farmland in Kericho District. The labor force for these farms was mainly recruited from the neighboring Luyia, Luo, Kalenjin and Kikuyu (mainly in the east) peoples, but included some Turkana and some other members of smaller groups as well.

All Kalenjin peoples traditionally have been pastoralists and the "cattle-complex" is still largely dominant in their culture. Today, however, some groups have become, partially or entirely, settled agriculturalists. Their mode of production is nowadays determined by the ecological conditions in their area of residence rather than by cultural preferences. Thus all the Kipsigis, Nandi, Terik and Sabaot and those parts of the Keyo, Marakwet, Tugen and Pokot peoples who live under agriculturally favorable conditions (mostly in the higher elevations along the Elgeyo Escarpment, and in the Cherangani and Tugen Hills) are cultivators, while most of those who live in the arid territories of the Kerio Valley and other parts of the northern Rift Valley and the plains north of this area

pursue a pastoral way of life. Members of the same ethnic group and sometimes even of the same larger family can thus be found living in close proximity to each other, but under entirely different economic conditions, some being settled agriculturalists and the others semi-nomadic pastoralists. In addition, hunting is common among all groups, although there is relatively little game left in the most densely populated areas; honey and some wild roots and herbs are also part of the diet. The total number of "pure" pastoralists among all the Kalenjin groups can be estimated to be about 100,000 persons.¹⁶ The majority of about one million persons are agriculturalists; the rest consists of about 100,000 persons including family members who have non-agricultural occupations, both within and outside their home area.

The most important traditional crops are millet, finger millet, beans, peas and cassava. Today maize, both in its unimproved and improved varieties (the latter in particular among the Nandi, Kipsigis and Keyo), has become the dominant staple crop. Tea and, in small amounts, sugarcane and coffee are still the most important industrial crops grown by the Nandi and Kipsigis; English potatoes, wheat, pyrethrum and some vegetables have become successful cash crops for those Keyo who have settled on the plains above the escarpment in recent decades. In our sample, which comprised only agriculturalists from this group, almost all farmers grew some maize, a great part of which

was of the "hybrid" variant. Finger millet and beans, but also some wheat, were the other main food crops. In addition to maize and wheat, other main cash earners for our respondents were vegetables, sunflowers and pyrethrum. The tea-growing areas of the Kipsigis and Nandi were not included in our sample.

So far very little of the agricultural produce of the Marakwet, Pokot or Tugen finds its way to markets outside the area. Most of it is still grown for subsistence, and communications and marketing conditions are still quite poor.¹⁷ Even the traditional irrigation schemes which can be found among the Marakwet or the newly-established ones, e.g. at Perkerra in Baringo District, yield relatively little (chilies and onions are an exception) which can be profitably sold on outside markets. Cultivation in large parts is still done with the traditional iron hoe and other small implements. In those areas (e.g. among the Kipsigis, Nandi and parts of the Keyo) where the growing of cash crops has successfully been introduced on a large scale, the contracting of tractors for plowing has become quite common.

But even most of those Kalenjin who have become settled agriculturalists keep quite a considerable number of cattle, sheep and goats, averaging about ten to fifteen "livestock units" per family.¹⁸ Traditionally a part of the cattle of a single owner was often distributed among several friends and relatives. This was the so-called

"kaptic"-system.¹⁹ It was used to minimize the risk that all cattle be captured in a single raid or that all be afflicted at once by disease. In these cases the caretakers were entitled to keep the milk of the cows, but had no claim to the calves. The cattle could be recalled by the owner at will at any given time. Among the Nandi, Kipsigis and part of the Keyo the keeping of grade-cattle has been introduced successfully in recent years, and the selling of milk has become another important source of cash for these peoples. Almost all of the agricultural Kalenjin respondents kept some cattle, about one-third of which was of the "grade" variety in the small-scale farming areas. The herds usually numbered less than 5 heads of grade cattle and up to 20 heads of local cattle. About one-third of these respondents sold an average of up to 10 liters of milk per day. About one-fourth of them kept some goats, a few had some sheep. Chickens were raised by about one-third of them, two respondents even sold them on a large-scale basis to nearby urban centers like Eldoret.

The "purely" pastoral families often have twenty to thirty "units" or more of livestock, but almost all grazing areas today are greatly overstocked. Serious problems of soil erosion and the emergence of vast parts of land which are only covered by thick thornbrush and which do not have any grass at all anymore plague the area today. So far remedies such as bush-clearing, compulsory destocking,

or controlled grazing schemes, have not proved to be practicable. Thus, in spite of the relatively low overall population density in these parts, most of this area must be considered, ecologically, to be greatly overpopulated today in terms of people and livestock.

All agricultural Kalenjin live in individual family homesteads scattered across the countryside. In former times a chain of lookout-posts, which in some areas were permanently manned, served as a warning system to protect the members of one's own group against raids by others, in particular by the Maasai. Those who still are "pure" pastoralists move around with their cattle in constant search for new grazing grounds. In this way they lead a largely nomadic life without establishing permanent homes. The area of movement for these peoples is defined by custom; traditional tribal "boundaries" are usually respected.

In the same way as grazing grounds traditionally "belong" to all members of one ethnic group, for a long time the ownership of land was also communal among those Kalenjin who had taken up an agricultural way of life. Land as such was no particular asset and everyone could move freely and settle anywhere he liked within the territory of his tribe. Only by cultivating a piece of land or by doing some other work on a piece of common property (e.g. by felling a tree) would a particular part of the communal stock be considered to be one's personal possession. Under the prevailing

system of shifting cultivation, land was only a temporary possession and anyone could claim and use it after it had become fallow again. Thus, unlike a system of land tenure based on lineages, clans or some territorial groupings, there was no subtribal landholding unit in traditional Kalenjin society. In more recent times a movement of "spontaneous enclosures" has taken place. It started among some groups (e.g. the Kipsigis and Nandi) in the 1940s before any such measures were officially advocated by the government in the wake of the Swynnerton-Plan in the 1950s and was practically completed among most of the agricultural Kalenjin in the early 1960s. During this period many people had rather suddenly become aware of the fact that land was no longer a "free" good, the abundant supply of which would be ensured for all times.

At a somewhat later stage, large parts of the territory inhabited by the Kalenjin were also included in the official program of land consolidation and registration. Between 80 % and 90 % of all land in the districts of Nandi and Kericho (Kipsigis) and more than 50 % of the area in Elgeyo-Marakwet, but only about 20 % in West Pokot and 10 % in Baringo have been registered so far. ²⁰ The average size of the holdings of 18.4 ha in those parts which have already been included in this program is much larger than in all other small-scale farming areas in Kenya. Even if allowance is made for the poorer potential of some parts of this territory, it is still quite evident

that the agricultural Kalenjin have the largest amount of land available in proportion to their numbers and that they experience the least population pressure of the agricultural peoples in Kenya so far. The distribution of farm sizes reflects this generally more favorable situation. Only about one-fifth of the farmers in the relatively "best developed" and most densely populated districts of Kericho and Nandi possessed less than 2 ha, as compared to almost two-thirds among the Kikuyu and almost half of the Luyia or Luo. The vast majority (approximately 75 % altogether) are in the category of "middle farmers" who have between 2 ha and 10 ha each. Only a small minority (3.4 %), on the other hand, belongs to the group of relatively big farmers (which perhaps justifies their designation as "kulaks"), who possess more than 10 ha of agricultural land.

The level of "modernization" is also fairly high among the agricultural Kalenjin. In our sample (which seems to reflect at least the economic situation among the Kipsigis, Nandi and Keyo) between 30 % and 40 % of the respondents had attended a course at a farmers' training center or had received some advice from the agricultural extension service. Almost one-fourth had obtained a loan at some time for purposes of agricultural development; approximately the same percentage were members of a farmer's association or cooperative. All these figures are the highest, after the Kikuyu, for all the peoples in our sample. Practically all of the livestock-owning respondents

dipped their cattle regularly, one-third of those who owned grade cattle applied artificial insemination. About 80 % of the farmers said that they were planning some improvements in the near future, the majority referring to crops, about 20 % also to livestock. 90 % reported that they were thinking of acquiring more land, about 80 % stated that they were contemplating the purchase of grade cattle. These last two figures are the highest for any of the groups in our sample. About 40 % of the respondents had cash incomes of less than Kshs. 100.- per month, one-fourth earned between Kshs. 100.- and 200.-, the rest of almost one-third had incomes between Kshs. 200.- and 800.-.

As far as land rights are concerned, the areas of traditional artificial irrigation in some parts of Elgeyo-Marakwet District and West Pokot constitute a special case. Here, certain sections of particular clans own the land and the intricate system of irrigation, and are responsible for its maintenance. The main work of clearing the furrows which lead the water in a widespread network from the top of the escarpment to the bottom of Kerio Valley requires the labor of all adult men in the community. This work and the just distribution of water to the different fields are closely supervised by a council of elders. Anyone who does not show up to carry out the communal labor at the assigned time can be fined the payment of a goat. The cultivated plots in this case are allocated by the "kok" ("council")

and belong to the head of the family. Each piece is called "barap ka" ("land belonging to one homestead"). The head of the family may then subdivide this land among his sons.²¹

In traditional Kalenjin society, with the exception of the artificially irrigated land just mentioned, the only property worth inheriting was livestock. There are some variations in the laws of inheritance among the different groups of the Kalenjin, and even, to a certain extent, within them. As a rule, however, property is always inherited along paternal lines. In general, a man, if he is polygynous, divides his property equally among the "houses" of his wives, who in turn distribute it equally among their sons. If there are no direct male descendants, a man's heirs are his closest male agnates, a woman's her brother's sons.²² Today land, of course, has also become an inheritable asset, which apparently is now inherited following more or less the same rule which applies for other private property. In our sample almost 80 % of the respondents said that their property would eventually be inherited by "all children". Only a few specified their sons or the eldest son. This is by far the highest percentage of those in our sample who did not make a spontaneous difference according to the sex of their children. (The second highest percentages were those of the Kikuyu and Mijikenda with about 50 % each.)

The division of labor among the Kalenjin is largely based on the same principles of age and sex which are applied in the other ethnic groups described so far. The

responsibility for cattle, for example, lies with the men, although the actual herding is usually done by boys between the ages of about seven and thirteen. The milking of the cows, on the other hand, is in some groups done by women. It is remarkable, however, that the division of agricultural duties on the whole seems to be somewhat more balanced among the Kalenjin than among most of the other groups. Thus both men and women share the work of preparing a field for cultivation, seeding, weeding, harvesting, etc., all of which used to be considered women's duties among many of the other peoples. There were very few specialized occupations in traditional Kalenjin society. In addition to some of the ritual experts, only iron-working and in some groups also pot-making were carried out by specialists, who in some cases (e.g. the potters among the Kipsigis) used to be members of a particular clan.²³ Today 1.5 % of all persons in their home area are employed in non-agricultural occupations. This is about the average for most of the other agricultural groups in Kenya, but considerably less, for example, than for the Kikuyu or Luo. Together with the very small number of Kalenjin who have moved to the major urban centers outside their home area, this reflects the still relatively low degree of involvement of the Kalenjin in the national non-agricultural economy.

Social and political structures

In many respects the Kalenjin societies are structured more or less according to the same principles of stratification as they exist in the other Kenyan peoples. Certain aspects are expressed and combined in peculiar ways which give them a unique character. The widest social divisions among the Kalenjin in a horizontal direction are the "clans" (Nandi: "oret", pl. "ortinuek"). They are patrilineal descent groups, but unlike the "maximal lineages" ("dhoot") of the Luo for example, the members of an "oret" usually are not able to state their exact mutual relationship. On the average these kinship structures can be recalled for only about three to five generations. In most cases the oret itself is not an exogamous unit (as, e.g., the clans of the Luyia or Kamba) but is further subdivided into up to four totem groups ("tiond ap oret"), the members of which cannot intermarry. The number of clans varies from subgroup to subgroup (e.g. 17 among the Nandi, 14 among the Kipsigis, 13 among the Marakwet), with many variations in their sizes and subdivisions.²⁴ Clans are not geographical units, however (as they are, e.g., among the Luyia or Luo), and their members are dispersed all over the tribal area of settlement. Many of the clan names and totems can be found in several Kalenjin subgroups. In addition to its principal name, each clan is usually also known by one or several "nicknames". In our sample all Kalenjin were able to give the name of their clan.

In a geographical sense the smallest unit in Kalenjin society is the "hamlet" ²⁵ (Kipsigis: "temet", pl. "temenik"), a loose cluster of homesteads. Several temenik are grouped into a "village" (Nandi: "koret" pl. "korotinuek"), ²⁶ which may consist of any number of homesteads, usually between fifteen and sixty. Although these "villages" are not compact units of settlement and are not set apart by any clearly visible dividing lines, their boundaries are well-known by all people in the area. In some cases they are marked by trees, stones, or the like. Several "korotinuek" then form a larger unit (Nandi: "pororiet", pl. "pororosiek"), ²⁷ which has distinct judicial, military and more general political functions. There are fifteen altogether in Nandi country. The largest territorial division finally is the "province" ("emet", pl. "emotinuek") of which there are, for example, four among the Kipsigis and five among the Nandi. ²⁸ These "provinces" only designate certain regions within the tribal territory and are not of any other social or political significance.

Vertically, the Kalenjin societies are stratified by systems of age-grades and age-sets which, together with that of the Maasai, are among the strictest systems of this kind in Kenya. Three main age-grades are distinguished: boy (Nandi: "ng'etet"), warrior ("murennet"), and elder ("poiyyot"). ²⁹ The passing from one grade to the next is marked by particular ceremonies. Of these, the circumcision of boys ("tum", after which they become warriors) and the

clitoridectomy of girls (which makes them eligible for marriage) are by far the most striking and important. Formerly the time of circumcision was between the ages of about 20 to 30 years for males and about 16 to 20 years for girls. Today most boys are initiated between the age of 14 and 18 and girls soon after they have reached puberty.³⁰ The removal of two lower incisors at about the age of puberty is also practiced among the Kalenjin, but in contrast to the circumcision ceremonies there is no special social significance attached to this custom.

Each boy in Kalenjin society is also born into a certain age-set ("ipinda", pl. "ipinuet") of peers. Together they pass through different stages of life, each stage marked by particular ceremonies. In all, there are seven age-sets³¹ forming a recurring cycle. Their names and order are: 1. Kaplelach (in 1970 small boys among the Nandi), 2. Kipkoimet, 3. Sawe, 4. Chumo (or Juma), 5. Maina, 6. Nyongi, 7. Kimnyigei.³² The time of initiation is not coordinated, however, among the different Kalenjin groups, and it not rarely happens that a boy who is anxious to be initiated runs away from his own group to join another where an initiation ceremony is to be held soon. Among the Pokot, circumcision, performed at about the time of puberty, and the actual initiation into adulthood ("sapana"),³³ occurring several years later, are two separate events. Initiation ceremonies into one set take place during three to four years and are then "closed" for a period of between

about seven and eleven years. Among the Nandi, the inter-periodical intervals are marked by the flowering of a particular bush, an event which occurs only at these regular intervals. This temporal accuracy is also used in the historical dating of particular periods. An age-set covers a period between about twelve and fifteen years. A boy can only be initiated into the set next to but one below that of his father or into a later, but not earlier one, since if he (and correspondingly his sisters) belonged to the one immediately following his father's, a marriage to a member of the father's age-set would be regarded as incestuous.³⁴ This gap of one set between the one of the father and that of his children thus also serves to mark the period of a "generation" of approximately thirty years. All of our Kalenjin respondents were able to indicate the name of their age-set.

The traditional political organization of the Kalenjin peoples resembles that of many of the other "acephalous" societies discussed so far. However, a strong emphasis on particular forms of military organization and the adoption of a "laibon", a hereditary ritual expert, by the Nandi and, for a short period, by the Kipsigis add some new elements which show some of the similarities between the Kalenjin and the Maasai. The basic political decision-making unit with mostly judicial functions was a council of elders (Nandi: "kokuet") at the level of the "village" ("koret"). It was presided over by a leader ("poiyo ap

kokuet") who had acquired this position through his personality, social standing and proven ability, and who had acted for some time as an assistant to his predecessor. The leadership of the "poiyoṭ ap kokuet" was confined, however, to his role as a chairman of the meetings and the general respect he enjoyed for his wisdom, but he could not make any decisions by himself without the approval of the others. The rulings of the kokuet were generally accepted by the accused, because the sanctions of public disapproval were felt to be quite strong, and the curse of the poiyoṭ for disobedience was greatly feared. A council at the next higher level of the "pororiet" could convene in matters affecting several koret and in questions of war, circumcision or matters concerning the annual production cycle and other major social events. It was composed of the leaders of the village council and also two special warleaders ("kiptaienik", sing. "kiptaiyat") and was presided over by two elders (called "kiruokik", i.e. "councillors", among the Nandi).

Beyond this level there was no traditionally recognized, more general authority among the Kalenjin peoples, except for military organizations among some groups and the very special role of the "orkoiyoṭ" among the Nandi. Thus among the Kipsigis, for example, a system of four military "regiments" ("poriet") traditionally existed, into which each man was born and with which he fought when he reached the grade of warrior. These regiments did not necessarily coincide with the other territorial divisions

among the Kipsigis, whereas among the Nandi they seem to have been based on the unit of the pororiet. It is reported that among the Kipsigis these four regiments who used to fight in pairs were united after a major defeat had been suffered at the hands of the Kisii sometime during the last century.³⁵

Of a very special nature was the "orkoiyot" of the Nandi³⁶ who not only represented a foreign institution adopted from the neighboring Maasai but who actually was of Maasai origin. He was incorporated into the Nandi pattern of social and religious organization when the Il Wwasin Kishu branch of the Maasai was practically wiped out following internecine warfare towards the middle of the last century. The "laibon" family of the Il Wwasin Kishu then took refuge in Nandi country. They acted as diviners, rainmakers, and raid consultants, and their powers as ritual experts were duly recognized. They thus continued to perform the same functions among the Nandi as in their own original society. The orkoiyot enjoyed a number of important economic privileges: his fields were cultivated by others, his wives had servile help, and he received numerous gifts at different occasions. In general, however, he was greatly feared and even hated by others. The orkoiyot's influential position, (based purely on his ritual powers and not to be confused with that of a "chief"), also used to give the Nandi a considerable measure of unity. This unity made them the most important military force in this part of Kenya, especially after their

fiercest enemies in the area, the Il Wuasin Kishu, had been decimated. The Nandi were thus able to offer the strongest resistance to colonial rule towards the end of the last century, and it cost the British several large scale "punitive expeditions" before the Nandi finally could be subdued in 1905. When the orkoiyot Parserian attempted an uprising in 1923, he was deported by the colonial administration; his office has since ceased to exist. A brother of the Nandi orkoiyot (with whom he had had a quarrel) settled among the Kipsigis in 1895 and began to perform some of the functions of an orkoiyot there. In 1914 he was deported by the colonial administration and the practising of this office among the Kipsigis was thus only of very short duration.

Today the areas of Kalenjin settlement have been incorporated into the nationwide system of political organization and administration in Kenya. The social structure of the Kalenjin people is also increasingly influenced by the factors of modern economic differentiation and, as among the other groups discussed here, a pattern of "class stratification" is gradually emerging. The most striking difference in living conditions, even within the same subgroups, is between those who have become agriculturalists and those who are still largely pastoral. Whereas the latter, due to serious overstocking and overpopulation in some of the arid parts of Kalenjin territory, live under rather poor circumstances, and are, during

periods of prolonged drought, not rarely on the brink of starvation, the former in many cases have become "progressive" farmers who achieve relatively satisfactory and increasing incomes. More than 50 % of the cultivated area in Kalenjin country is today devoted to cash crops (15 %, if only the "pure" cash crops are taken into consideration). The variations between the different Kalenjin groups are, however, even greater and whereas, for example, many of the Kipsigis and considerable numbers of the Nandi and Keyo have become "progressive" farmers, the vast majority of the Tugen, Marakwet and Pokot agriculturalists are still mostly subsistence-oriented.

Modern developments also brought about the founding of the "Kalenjin Political Association" in 1960. Together with the "Coast African Political Union", the "Maasai United Front" and some Abaluyia groups this organization became the backbone of the "Kenya African Democratic Union" (KADU), the chief opponent of KANU, which found its strongest support among the Kikuyu, Luo and Kamba. KADU brought together an alliance of groups, some of whom, like the Kalenjin and Maasai, had been traditional "arch-enemies". The main reason for this new political partnership was the common fear that politics in post-independence Kenya could become dominated by the Kikuyu and Luo, the leading groups in the independence movement. In particular, many Kalenjin and Maasai were afraid that independence would bring the opportunity for a great number of Kikuyu

and Luo to move from their overcrowded home areas into the fertile farming regions of the "White Highlands" in Rift Valley Province, which in former times had been the domain of the pastoralist groups. Mainly for this reason KADU strongly supported a federal constitution for independent Kenya which could block such moves directed by a central government and which gave strong powers to the regions ("majimbo").³⁷ When KADU merged with KANU in 1964, at least some of its leading politicians were accommodated within the new central power structure, and the federal elements of Kenya's political system were slowly dismantled. As far as the land question is concerned, however, that what was originally feared by many Maasai and Kalenjin has actually happened, although in a more gradual and camouflaged way. Great parts of the former White Highlands are today in the hands of the more dominant groups. The Kikuyu play a large role here, both as participants in official settlement schemes, e.g. in Nyandarua district, and as private individual or collective buyers of large farms in the districts of Laikipia, Nakuru, Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia.

No separate common political organization has arisen in the meantime among the Kalenjin, and even the activities of "para-political" tribal welfare associations have been rather restricted. For the time being differences between the various Kalenjin groups and within these groups as well (e.g. local and religious tensions among the Nandi)

seem to be of greater importance than the representation
of common interests towards others.

CHAPTER IX

THE MAASAI ¹General background and economy

The Maasai are a part of the "Maa-speaking" group of peoples in East Africa whose language belongs to the "Eastern Nilotic" group of languages. In contrast to some other Maa-speaking groups, the Maasai traditionally pursued a purely pastoral way of life. These groups are known to the Maasai by the common designation of "Iloikop"; ² some early writers ³ sometimes referred to them by the Maasai term "Ilumbwa" ⁴ or "Wakwavi" or "Wakuafi". The other groups who live on the fringes of Maasai land include the former "Wasin Kishu" and "Ilaikiplak" ("Laikipia") Maasai, the "Iltiamus" ("Njemps") and "Ilsampur" ("Samburu") in modern Kenya, and the "Il arusha" ("Arusha") and "Ilbaraguyu" ("Baraguyu") in Tanzania. All of these groups are in part agriculturalists ; they also fish (as, e.g., the Njemps) or are hunters and gatherers (as those groups who have mixed with or have been absorbed by some of the Dorobo hordes). For this reason they were despised by the traditional "Il Maasai" proper. Today this distinction has become somewhat blurred since some members of these partly agricultural groups have been absorbed by subtribes of the

Il Maasai (in particular remnants of the Wasin Kishu and Ilaikiapiak), and some members of the Il Maasai proper have also taken to agriculture. In our discussion here we are only concerned with those Maasai who live in the present-day districts of Kajiado and Narok (or who have originated from there) and who include the bulk of the traditional Il Maasai living in Kenya. The remaining sections of the Njemps and Samburu and all Maa-speaking groups in present-day Tanzania are thus excluded from this study.

In pre-colonial times the Maasai inhabited a vast stretch of land reaching from the vicinity of Lake Rudolf in the north down to about the latitude of Dar es Salaam in the south. This region was bordered on both sides by the escarpments of the great Rift Valley, and was altogether more than 600 miles (almost 1,000 km) in length and almost 200 miles (approx 300 km) in width at the points of its largest extensions. The Maasai were the undisputed rulers in this area and were held in fearful respect by all of their neighbors. In the area of present-day Kenya the most important neighbors were the Kisii and Kalenjin in the west and northwest, the Turkana in the north, and the Kikuyu and Kamba in the east. The Maasai constituted an effective block to intruders from the coast; most trading and other caravans circumvented this area on their way to Buganda and other places in the west. The international boundary established by the Anglo-German agreements in the wake of the Berlin Conference of 1885 cut the territory

approximately in half, the northern section becoming a part of present-day Kenya and the southern belonging to what was to become "Deutsch-Ostafrika" and later the modern state of Tanzania.

The policy of white settlement in Kenya then made the great plateau of the present-day Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu Districts in the northeast of Maasai country a part of the "scheduled areas". The population living there had been greatly reduced by one of the great wars between "Iloikop" and "Il Maasai" prior to the advent of the British, and their herds had been devastated by rinderpest and prolonged droughts. It is quite clear, however, that the traditional rights of the Iloikop and Maasai in this area were still respected by all their neighbors; in no way was this area a "no-man's land" when the colonial administration declared it open for white settlement. In 1904 the area of present-day Nakuru District was also alienated from its former occupants and the Maasai were grouped into two separate "reserves", one in the northeast, the present-day Laikipia District, and the other south of Lakes Nakuru and Naivasha reaching down to the Anglo-German border. In 1913 the northern "reserve" also became part of the "scheduled areas". What was left of its original inhabitants was moved to the southern reserve. Further infringements on Maasai land rights then occurred when another section along the Tanzanian border became the Amboseli and Mara "game reserves". Here, however, the Maasai still maintain

some grazing rights. The Kenya Maasai lost about half of their original territory in this way, including the most fertile and best-watered parts. ⁵

Today most of the Kenya Maasai live in the two administrative districts of Narok and Kajiado which belong to Kenya's Rift Valley Province. This area lies south of Kenya's central and fertile highlands and covers almost 40,000 km². At its largest extensions it is about 150 km (almost 100 miles) deep (in a northsouth direction) and almost 400 km (250 miles) wide (along the Tanzanian border in the south). Most of the area consists of wide open plains interspersed by some mountain formations mostly of volcanic origin. In the west and northwest the steep escarpments of the Rift Valley form a natural boundary, in the east the territory is open towards the lowlands of Coast Province. The average altitudes range between 300 and 900 m (approx 1,000 to 3,000 ft.) for most of Kajiado and between 900 and 1,500 m (3,000 to 5,000 ft.) for most of Narok District. The average temperatures in this area are moderate to warm with the average daily maxima lying between 22° and 30° C, or about 70° to 85° F. However, one of the hottest points in Kenya, averaging about 35° C, 95° F, around Lake Magadi can be found here. The average rainfalls are rather plentiful with 30 to 40 inches and more (between 760 and 1,015 mm) along the slopes of the escarpments in the west and northwest and between 20 and 30 inches (510 to 760 mm) in most of the rest of Narok District and the

northern section of Kajiado District. In most of the rest of Kajiado the average rainfall is less than 20 inches.⁶ The main rainy seasons usually are from March to May and from November to December, but not infrequently, particularly in Kajiado District, rains may fail completely. During the resulting droughts the Maasai have often lost large parts of their livestock, as was the case during one of the most devastating droughts in 1960-61 and, most recently, 1974 and 1976. There are very few permanent streams and rivers in this territory and, except for the northeastern and eastern parts, there is no external drainage.

The soils of the area are mostly of volcanic origin. They are quite fertile in the better-watered parts of Maasai country where they have weathered into rich friable loams, but only of intermediate value (brown calcareous loams) in the semi-arid areas of Narok District and of little use (mostly volcanic ash and tuff) in the dry parts of most of Kajiado.⁷ The well-watered parts of Maasai land also have a high agricultural potential (about 24 % of the total area), whereas the zone of intermediate rainfall is only suitable for ranching. The area with very low and irregular rainfalls (i.e. most of Kajiado District) provides rather poor grazing and can support only a very limited number of livestock. The natural vegetation of Maasai country consists of highland forests on top of the escarpments and of rich and heavily treed grassland in the areas of good rainfall. The intermediate zone provides open grasslands with

scattered trees (Acacia-Themeda), while large parts of the low rainfall area are covered with desert bush and scrub.

The total population of the Maasai presently numbers about 240,000 persons; of these, a little more than 80,000 live in the modern state of Tanzania.⁸ The Kenya Maasai are subdivided into twelve major sections ("subtribes") of which the Purko (about 45,000 members) are the largest. Next in order of magnitude are the Keekonyokie and Loitokitok Kisongo with a little less than 20,000 members each. The groups of the Moitanik, Siria, Loodokilani, Kaputiei, Matapatu and Uasin Gishu number approximately 10,000 persons each. The other groups of the Loita, Damat and Dalalekutuk have about 6,000 or less (a part of the Loita and the bulk of the Kisongo group also live across the border in Tanzania).⁹ The Maasai population remained almost stagnant in the period between the two censuses of 1962 and 1969 with an average increase of 0.1 % p.a., marking a stark contrast to the rapid growth rate recorded for the other groups. The still very high mortality rate, particularly for infants, and the relatively low fertility rate are also an indication of some of the hardships involved in a still largely traditional way of life and of the lack of modern hygiene and proper medical care.

Of all the peoples considered here, the Maasai are the only purely pastoral group. Cattle ("in-kishu") play the central role, but large numbers of sheep and goats are

also kept as well as some donkeys for carrying "household implements" when the Maasai move camp in search of new pastures. The cattle usually are of the short-horned "East African Humped Zebu" type but there has been a lot of crossbreeding between the traditional "Grey Maasai" and the northern "Boran Zebu" varieties. The Maasai consider all cattle as given exclusively to them by God ("Enk-ai"); this also serves as a justification for their formerly frequent cattle raids on their neighbors who, in their opinion, are only temporary guardians of what justly belongs to them. ¹⁰ The size of the herds fluctuates greatly over the years because of changing weather conditions and recurrent diseases such as rinderpest and trypanosomiasis. The official censuses which have been conducted are often not very accurate, partly because of the traditional reluctance of the Maasai to state the exact number of their cattle or their children; along with some other East African peoples, they consider this to bring bad luck. The data given by some authors concerning the sizes of family herds, therefore, have to be taken with a grain of salt, but the average in better years seems to lie between 75 and 125 heads of cattle per family. ¹¹ Some wealthy families own several hundred animals while a very few own more than a thousand. The number of sheep and goats also varies greatly, not rarely in inverse proportions to the number of cattle held, i.e. wealthy cattle-owning families tend to have fewer sheep and goats while relatively poor families have

less cattle and more goats. ¹² In our sample the family herds of about half of the pastoralist Maasai respondents numbered between 50 and 100 heads of local cattle. The other half had more than 100 heads, two families owned more than 300 cattle. The number of goats varied between 20 and 50 for about half of the respondents, the other half had more than 50, three families had more than 100. The total number of sheep was somewhat below that of the goats, about two-thirds of our respondents had less than 50 sheep, the other third between 50 and 100.

The Maasai diet consists mainly of milk, blood and meat, all products of their animals. Blood is taken from the cattle by slitting open the jugular vein in a vertical direction with the help of an arrow; in this way the jugular vein can be closed again after some blood has been collected in a calabash. In contrast to the Kalenjin peoples or to some other pastoral Nilotic groups who eat beef only at some ceremonial occasions, the Maasai slaughter cattle to supplement their regular diet. Traditionally milk and meat could not be consumed by the same person on the same day. Warriors subsist exclusively on these three products, while children, women and older men may also eat agricultural produce like maize and beans, which they have acquired by bartering livestock or women's handicrafts (beads, ornaments, etc.) with the neighboring Bantu peoples. Fish, eggs and poultry are never consumed by traditional Maasai and most game is also not eaten.

Buffalos and eland antelopes are considered to be related to cattle and therefore the meat of these animals only is considered fit for Maasai consumption.

The rhythm of daily life and the pattern of settlement are entirely determined by the needs of the livestock. In the wet season the herds are dispersed over large areas where sufficient grass and water can be found in most parts of Maasai land. In the dry season the herds are concentrated near relatively few permanent sources of water. The cattle are then watered every other day, wandering off into different directions in the intervals. This helps to enlarge the grazing grounds and to conserve as much as possible the vegetation near the watering points. Because considerable distances have to be covered in this pattern of rotational grazing in the different seasons, the Maasai move their houses with their cattle, living in temporary camps ("enkang", pl. "inkangitie")¹³ for a number of months at a time. Each camp consists of a number of rather low huts, made of wooden poles plastered with mud and cow dung, and arranged in a circular fashion. The whole settlement is surrounded by a thick hedge of thornbrush (usually from euphorbia trees) in order to protect the inhabitants from attacks by enemies (in former times) or predatory animals. A single camp¹⁴ may consist of up to ten or more families. Most families have their own gate ("kishomi"). If it is a polygynous family, the houses of the wives are situated to the right and left of the gate

in an alternating order according to the time of their marriage, starting with the first house on the right for the first wife. The livestock is kept overnight in the center of the camp. In addition to the family camps there are special villages ("manyata") for the warriors which are similar in form and construction, but which are the exclusive residence of all the members of the warriors' age-grade in one district and some of their mothers and sisters who look after them. These manyatas were located in strategic positions in terms of traditional warfare. The number of huts in a manyata may vary between about 30 and several hundred.

The ownership of land is communal, i.e. within the territory of a subtribe each family is free to let their cattle graze and to put up their camp wherever they choose. The only kind of a more exclusive tenure of land occurs when families temporarily set aside a few acres opposite their respective gates of the camp for the calves of their herds. The area surrounding a manyata ("olokeri") is reserved for the pasture of the warriors' cattle, and trespassing in this case may be punishable by a fine. The permanent sources of water are also communal property, privately dug wells (e.g. in dry riverbeds during the rainless season), however, are used only by the family of the person who dug the well, and by his close relatives, in-laws, clan-mates or "stock-associates". Cattle and all other livestock are always owned by individual families

and they all carry the brands and special marks of their owners in addition to their clan signs. In a polygynous family the husband allocates most of his cattle to his different wives, who are then responsible for them, but he also keeps a residual part of the herd for himself. When the father dies the cattle allocated to each wife becomes the property of her sons, usually in equal parts. The residual herd of the father is often given to the first son of the first wife, but not rarely an aging father may already have subdivided his herd among all of his sons before his death. ¹⁵ In our sample about 40 % of the "traditional" respondents specified their eldest son as the heir of their property, about 30 % named all their sons, the rest said "all children".

The traditional division of labor of the Maasai is mainly based on sex and age. Girls and women perform all the household duties, including childcare, the milking of cows, the preparation of meals, etc., but also the moving of the household goods and the construction of huts at new places of settlement. The herding of the cattle is mostly done by young boys who are supervised by a few elders. The warriors are normally relieved from any duties concerning herd management, except for short periods during the dry season when the watering of large herds of cattle at the few permanent rivers or streams may require some additional help. The only specialized occupation among the Maasai is that of the smiths ("il kumono", sing. "ol kumoni") who live in settlements segregated from the rest

of the population and who are, in spite of the great importance of their craft for all Maasai, socially despised; they have a distinctly inferior status.

The Maasai are one of the very few peoples in Kenya who to a large extent still maintain their traditional way of life. Unlike some of the other pastoral groups in northeast Kenya (such as the Turkana, Poran, or Somali), where the almost desert-like environment and the remoteness from the main centers of economic activity were decisive factors contributing to a semi-nomadic way of life, the "conservatism" of the Maasai can neither be attributed exclusively to the ecological conditions of their area nor to a lack of contact with the outside world.¹⁶ Their mode of living clearly implies a cultural preference and, although the daily contacts with tourists and other peoples passing through Maasai land and the vicinity of Nairobi have had corrupting effects, traditional Maasai society on the whole has remained largely intact. It has also been of relatively little importance whether attempts to initiate significant changes in the lives of the Maasai have been made by the former colonial government, the Christian missions, a largely "capitalist" system as in Kenya after independence, or a "socialist" state as in present-day Tanzania.¹⁷

For a Maasai (and for others as well!) there is no question whether he would rather be a today often idle but socially and emotionally well-"embedded" "ol murrani" roaming in the open countryside, or an unemployed youth

(or even a worker or low-level employee) in town confronted with all the hardships of securing a daily livelihood under very adverse circumstances. On the other hand, the catastrophic drought of 1960-61 and the change in the political conditions after independence, which in some cases has already led to an infringement of their traditional rights and a loss of very fertile parts of their land to members of other ethnic groups, has brought about an awareness among at least some of them that their economic and political security may not last forever. In the long run, the choice then lies between becoming an "exotic" reserve which may contribute to Kenya's other tourist attractions, but which remains outside the center of Kenya's economic and political life, or actually bringing the Maasai into the mainstream of the country's overall economic development and political decision-making.

The main impediment for the latter alternative is the fact that, unlike the situation among the agricultural peoples of Kenya where the introduction of piecemeal improvements in production and other aspects of modernization has been possible, such a choice so far has meant an almost complete and very abrupt abandonment of most aspects of Maasai culture. In order to send children to school, for example, it would be necessary, if this were done on a larger scale, to build permanent schools and to establish permanent places of residence for the Maasai. This is a decisive, although in its consequences sometimes doubtful

part of the "new life", which largely determines the social position of individuals and groups in the modern "national" framework. This would also enable the Maasai to equip their homes with some of the more useful amenities of modern life such as clean water, electricity, etc. In the long run, this would probably contribute to a general improvement in the conditions of hygiene and health, including a decrease in the high infant mortality rate and an increase in the average life expectancy. To settle permanently, however, would also mean an abrupt change in the economic basis of their existence.

So far, the semi-nomadic way of life has been a matter of necessity. The few permanent sources of water and the extensive grazing areas needed to maintain great numbers of livestock make it impossible to stay in a single place for a longer period of time without seriously risking overgrazing the areas near the permanent water holes with all its ensuing consequences of soil erosion and an eventual complete destruction of the ecological basis of their economy. The situation becomes particularly critical in the dry season, as well as during erratic rain periods in the wet season in large parts of Maasai country.

Together with their nomadic existence, important features of their social order and traditional political organization would have to be changed as well. The imposition of the "Pax Britannica" and the establishment of a central police force in the modern state of Kenya have made the

traditional warrior class of the "il murrān" idle; except for some isolated raids and a few clashes with the police their social function has become superfluous under modern conditions. This tendency would be even more accentuated if the Maasai were to live in modern permanent places of settlement where their lives would be even more controlled and where new social occupations of the young would replace older ones. Similar arguments apply for many other aspects of the traditional social and political organization of the Maasai. Thus the traditional leadership positions of some individuals would have to change considerably; the local council of elders ("engigwana enkutoto") and the age-set system in general would lose many of its functions. Only very few individuals have been willing so far to undergo such a complete change in their conditions of living.

Significantly, the one major exception where an innovation has been readily accepted by the Maasai on a larger scale was the introduction of cattle-dips. They quickly became aware of the value of preserving their stock without engendering further-reaching changes in their way of life. Thus two-thirds of the pastoralist respondents reported, for example, that there was a cattle-dip in their area. Some Maasai have also attended mission or government schools and have adapted themselves to modern agricultural modes of production, to individual ranching, or to a life in town. Two of the few instances, for example,

where some Maasai have successfully taken up modern market-oriented enterprises, are the wheat and barley schemes in the Narok area and the individual ranches in some parts of Kajiado District. But even in these cases certain tendencies can be observed which, if not checked in time, will make it impossible for all Maasai to eventually attempt a similar change. In the wheat schemes, for example, quite a few non-Maasai middlemen have become involved and threaten to reap most of the profits, thus leaving little to the original owners of the land. Individual ranching, on the other hand, has been confined so far to the areas with good rainfall and grazing conditions; it is highly doubtful whether there will remain a sufficient basis for a pastoral way of life for the rest of the population after the best parts of land have been grabbed by a few individuals. Thus in both cases the success of a few may jeopardize the existence of the population as a whole.

The only apparent alternative so far has been the establishment of "group ranches" on an experimental basis in the Kaputiei section of Kajiado District.¹⁸ There, groups of about 50 to 100 Maasai have settled on 14 ranches ranging between approximately 25,000 and 100,000 acres, which are legally registered and which have become the common property of each group. On these ranches each family is entitled to build its own permanent home (which has been done incorporating various stages of "modernization"),

and to cultivate a small plot (usually between two and five acres) for their own subsistence. The rest of the land is reserved for communal grazing. The overall management of each ranch is conducted by a "chairman", a "vice-chairman", a "treasurer" and their "secretaries", who are all elected by the group. But even in these cases it has become evident, that at least some of the ranches are not large enough to constitute a viable economic unit both for dry and wet season grazing, that the groups settled there are not very homogeneous and in most cases they do not represent any traditional social units. This makes the fruitful cooperation of their members rather difficult, and the problem of proper watering, feeding, breeding and marketing of the animals as well as the maintenance of a limited number of stock on improved grazing grounds still remains to be solved. Since a modern infrastructure including permanent water supplies, schools, access to markets, modern means of communication, etc., is still lacking on most of these ranches, it is not surprising that a large number of the residents abandoned them when long droughts (in 1970-71 for instance) endangered their livestock. ¹⁹ In the long run, the distribution of land within each group may also become problematic. Due to changes in the size of the families and, even more significantly, to an increase of their respective herds, the available land for cultivation and grazing may become scarce. Eventually, regulations will have to be imposed

limiting both the "private" cultivation plots as well as the amount of livestock allowed for each family. A workable alternative for a more modern economic existence of the Maasai people still has to be found. ²⁰

Altogether about two-thirds of all land in Maasai country has been registered under some form of individual or communal ownership. So far this move has in most cases, however, only been undertaken in order to safeguard what is left of the territory traditionally belonging to the Maasai from further encroachments by other groups; it has not led to any further economic developments or to a change in their way of life. 70 % of the pastoralist Maasai respondents had little or no cash income, 20 % reported that they earned between Kshs. 100.- and 200.- per month on the average. 10 % had incomes above this figure. Only about 5 % of all Maasai today can be said to have become "modern" ranchers or agriculturalists. Approximately another 5 % are now engaged in non-agricultural occupations, many of them either in some kind of official administrative capacity or, at a lower level, for example as nightwatchmen in Nairobi, but also as quite successful private businessmen.

Social and political structures

The social and political organization of the Maasai combines in its own peculiar way some of the features we

have discussed in the other groups (e.g. a system of clans and age-sets). Together with some specific roles of political and ritual leadership, this gives it a unique character among East African peoples. The largest effective social unit of the Maasai which has its clearly defined geographical boundaries is the section or subtribe ("olosho").²¹ There are twelve different sections in Kenya today and 17 in Maasai country altogether. Each olosho is subdivided into smaller geographical units which, depending on its size, may comprise several stages of segmentation. The largest groups (the Purko in Kenya and the Kisongo in Tanzania) are thus divided into regions, which in turn consist of several districts, which, finally, are composed of a number of localities ("enkutoto"). In very small sections (the Damat for example) the only geographical subdivision is the enkutoto. Each of these localities has its proper name and clearly defined boundaries, and constitutes a self-contained ecological unit with sufficiently large wet and dry season grazing grounds, permanent supplies of water, and a practically permanent membership.

Localities of this kind are also the most important political unit in Maasai society. They usually comprise several hundred members (about 600 to 700 on the average), but they may also number up to a thousand or more. The smallest geopolitical group, which is also a residential unit, is the "enkang" ("kraal-camp"), the temporary home of several families who live together in close neighborhood

("elatia"). About twelve to fourteen enkang on the average form an enkutoto, but unlike the enkutoto the enkang does not have a permanent membership; in fact, it is quite common that the different families in an enkang re-group anew each season depending on their congeniality and changing personal preferences.

The social divisions of the Maasai show a characteristic dualism at many levels which is a dynamic and, at times, even antagonistic force in their interrelationships. However, because no group would be "complete" without its counterpart, it also contributes to the overall social integration. This is already reflected in the "gate-post" ("entaloishi") division within a family, where the consecutive wives of a single husband build their houses in an alternating order to the left and the right of their common family gate, thus forming a "right-hand" and a "left-hand" division within the polygynous family with certain distinct rights and duties for each part. Indeed, this analogy is often evoked when other dualisms in the social structure are explained.

At the most general horizontal level this dualism in Maasai society is expressed by a division into two non-totemic patrilineal moieties (also often called "entaloishi"), the "Lorokiteng" and the "Loodomongi". Each moiety is then subdivided into a number of clans ("olgilata"), the term "inkishomin", sing. "en-kishomi" (literally: "cattle gate"), referring to the division by descent groups which each use

a separate gate in the warrior village; "manyata", is a term also often used. The Loorokiteng moiety originally had only two in-kishomin (Laiser and Lukumai), a third one, the Laitayok, was added at a later stage and it has a somewhat reduced status up to the present day. Loodomongi comprises four clans (Molelian, Makesan, Tarosero and Mamasita).²² Each clan, in turn, consists of sub-clans ("il-gilat", sing. "ol-gilata"), the number of which varies from group to group. It appears that traditionally the clans were exogamous units, but today the subclans have taken over this function, since otherwise the choice for marriage would have become too restricted in view of the fact that a man may not take a clan member of one of his wives as a further co-wife. It is possible to ritually remove this latter restriction by paying an additional heifer as part of the bridewealth.

This social division of the Maasai by descent-groups at different levels is reflected in the way they associate certain colors of cattle with some groups: the Loodomongi, for example, are those of the "red-brown oxen" and the Loorokiteng are identified with the "black cows". All clans and subclans have their distinct cattle-brands and earmarks for their livestock. Thus, when inquiring about clan affiliation and, for example, the possibilities of marriage, a Maasai often asks for the cattle brand or earmark ("olponoto") the other person "belongs" to. The members of these different categories of horizontal social

segmentation are dispersed all over Maasai land and do not constitute distinct geographical units linked by common descent (as, e.g., among the Luyia), nor do they form a "segmentary-lineage" system either (as among the Luo). Indeed, it is characteristic for Maasai society that family members in most cases cannot trace their agnatic descent for more than three generations. This feature stems from a "systematical forgetting" of a person's lineage,²³ brought about and reinforced by the fact that the Maasai regard it as "sinful" or ritually improper to utter the name of a deceased ancestor.

In each settlement ("en kang") members of different moieties, clans and subclans can usually be found, and it is often stated by Maasai that it is preferable not to live with close relatives in the same camp, since quarrels over inheritance and other matters may ensue. "Friendship likes distance"²⁴ is one of their common sayings. Thus, altogether, the clan system is of a different nature and of relatively less importance among the Maasai than among most other Kenyan peoples. Nevertheless, all of the respondents were able to indicate their clan membership.²⁵

Instead of clan and family ties, voluntary links between persons who have established a "bond-friendship" ("shoreisho"),²⁶ i.e. who have exchanged a number of cattle (usually heifers) over a period of time, are often of greater importance in the social relationships of a Maasai. This formal bond, which always has to be initiated

by the older one of two persons concerned, also constitutes a system of social insurance whereby each partner is obliged to help out the other with some livestock (or, in modern times, money) when needed, or to grant access to a well dug by one of them.

These horizontal social divisions and personal relationships are superimposed by a vertical system of age-sets, which among the Maasai is somewhat more pronounced than among the Kalenjin for example, and which forms the backbone of their political organization. The basis of this system are the different age-grades a male person passes through during his lifetime. (The different stages in the life of a woman are of comparatively less social importance and females do not form any corporate age-sets, which also excludes them from an active political participation in the affairs of their community.) The most important grades are those of a young boy ("ol-ayioni", pl. "ilayiok"), warrior ("ol-murrani", pl. "il-murran") and elder ("ol-moruo", pl. "il-moruak"), a final grade being that of the ancient elders ("il dasati") who have retired from any form of active social and political life.

The main points of transition from one stage to the next are marked by elaborate ceremonies which are held in a similar fashion, but not necessarily at the same time, throughout Maasai land. The first significant ceremony is that of tribal initiation ("emurata"), the main part of which consists of the circumcision of boys and a sub-incision of the clitoris of girls. Whereas the operation

of girls is performed on an individual basis when they reach puberty, the emurata of boys takes place during strictly regulated periods "open" for circumcision for about seven to eight years. Circumcision then is "closed" for another two to six years, depending on the demand and the pressure generated by the still uninitiated youths, so that each group of those who have been circumcised during the same period and who then form a corporate "age-set" ("olaji", pl. "ilajijik")²⁷ is clearly set apart by this interval from the ones succeeding it. Since boys should be initiated after they have reached puberty, but only during "open" periods, their age at the time of circumcision may vary between about 14 and 20 years. The second ceremony, which promotes "junior" warriors to "senior" warriors, is that of "eunoto", which takes place at about the time when a new set is to be initiated. The final conversion from "senior warriorhood" to "junior elders" is then marked by the "olngesher" ceremony which also takes place about every twelve to fifteen years. At the time of olngesher an age-set is also given its final name by which it will be remembered in history. These age-set designations do not form, however, a recurrent cycle as is the case, for example, with the Kalenjin, although some names of former sets have been repeated in later times.²⁸

The transformation from "junior" to "senior" elders, which then follows after a similar interval, is not marked by the performance of any additional rituals, but coincides

with the passage of "senior warriors" to "junior elders" at the time of "olngesher". In the same way the time of retirement of senior elders is not accompanied by any separate ceremonies, but occurs automatically when the alternate age-set below them is initiated from senior warriors to junior elderhood. Since the date set for each "emurata", "eunoto" and "olngesher" ceremony depends on the internal pressure generated by each group to be promoted to the next stage as well as on the respective consent of the tribal ritual expert ("oloiboni loolosh") a certain overlapping between the groups promoted at each of the ceremonies may occur. A new set of junior warriors, for example, may be formed at an emurata ceremony when their predecessors have not yet been promoted by eunoto to senior warriorhood. A time lag in the performance of the same ceremony may also be found between each of the different sections ("subtribes") of the Maasai people, because each "olosh" independently sets the time for these ceremonies. This system is somewhat brought in line, however, by the fact that the people of the "Keekonyokie" section traditionally are the first to open a new circumcision period, and the olngesher ceremony is always started by the Kisongo section. In both cases the others then follow the lead of these groups, so that the total lag between the different ceremonies and the different sections of the Maasai rarely seems to have exceeded a period of about two years. 29

A further complication arises when a group of junior warriors, which was initiated at a rather early stage, is promoted to the rank of senior warriors at an eunoto ceremony before the rest of all of those who were to be circumcised during the same period. In this way "right hand" ("tatene") and "left hand" ("kedianye") segments (again reflecting the "gate-post" analogy) of the same age-set may emerge, which, however, does not give rise to the same frictions between them as exist between different sets. In any case both segments will be graduated to elderhood at the same time.

The members of each age-set fulfill clearly defined social, economic and political roles, which contribute to the functioning of Maasai society as a whole. After emurata the junior warriors of a locality usually band together and form a local "company" ("esirit"). They then live, at least for a period of time, in a separate warriors' village ("manyata"), where they receive instructions by elders of their sponsoring age-set about all aspects of Maasai society. At the same time they undergo some "military" training. (Maasai "battles" often were conducted following certain tactical formations and coordinations of movement of all parts of the "army".) They may actually engage in cattle-raids on neighboring peoples, including members of other "il Maasai" subtribes. The life in the manyata also contributes greatly to a sense of solidarity and mutual responsibility among all members of an age-set.

Senior warriors are permitted to marry after the completion of the eunoto ceremony and they gradually tend to settle down and engage more and more in their own domestic affairs. But as long as they have not yet passed olnghesher they are still the most important executive force in the political system of the Maasai, carrying out decisions by the local ruling council of elders ("engigwana enkutoto") and generally assisting in the well-being of the tribe (e.g. by taking part in the arduous task of dry-season watering of livestock).

After olnghesher a senior warrior becomes a junior elder who now fully settles down and establishes his own family. He is now allowed to participate in the deliberations of the engigwana. The center of authority in the political system of the Maasai lies, however, in the position of the "senior elders" whose advice and wisdom are greatly appreciated. They are mostly concerned with judicial affairs (settling disputes or crimes which cannot be regulated at the level of a single enkang or which affect members of several camps) and administrative matters (concerning larger-scale cattle movements, the securing of water supplies, etc.). Decisions are usually arrived at by a general consensus which emerges after extensive discussions of a particular issue when no more opposition is voiced and, if necessary, the tenor of the agreement has been summarized by a senior elder. The scope of decision making of an engigwana is, however, confined to the locality

("enkutoto") beyond which no permanent "tribal" authority (except for certain ritual functions of an oloiboni) is exercised. Exceptions may occur, however, at times of war and other unusual circumstances when a tribal meeting of all ruling elders or at least their local spokesmen may be convened on an ad hoc basis. The "retired elders", finally, still may be consulted in an individual capacity from time to time and may act as "most respected" ("enganyit-oleng") elder of the camp. They must give up their official duties, however, when the next set below them is graduated to senior elderhood; they thus no longer fulfill any regular social or political functions.

A special relationship between alternate age-sets (i.e. for example between junior warriors and junior elders or senior warriors and senior elders) exists in the bond of "olpiron" (literally: "firestick"). This term refers to the kindling of fire by the group of junior elders for those who are initiated into junior warriorhood and who in this way enter into a kind of ritual "father-son" relationship.³⁰ Whereas the relations between adjacent age-sets are characterized by friction and rivalry, those who are linked by olpiron mutually support each other. On the other hand, one of the strongest sanctions among the Maasai is the "olpiron curse" by an olpiron elder over his "son", which is expressed symbolically by the breaking of a firestick and which ritually extinguishes his social existence and makes him an outcast among his people. The olpiron bond

is also one of the most significant aspects of the political structure of Maasai society. Thus it helps, for example, to safeguard the powers of the senior elders, who can enforce their decisions with the help of their "olpiron sons" (who by then have become the senior warriors) during their period of office. But it also gives, working in the other direction, all male adult members of society access to the local council of ruling elders, one group of which always stands in an olupiron relationship to the alternating age-set of a prospective younger plaintiff. In this olupiron bond again the more general "dualism" of the structure of Maasai society with its dialectical functions is clearly expressed: the dynamic forces of conflict and friction between adjacent age-sets are checked and kept in balance by the integrative effects between alternating ones. The fact that this system is still largely in effect is also witnessed by the result of our survey where almost all of the Maasai respondents (in contrast to the majority of the Kikuyu or Kamba) were able to identify their age-set membership.

In this generally "egalitarian-segmentarian" system of social and political organization a few more specialized roles stand out, giving the system a somewhat more centralized character than that of most of the other Kenyan peoples. The most important of these are that of the age-set "spokesman" ("olaigwenani"), the age-set "ritual leader" ("olotuno") and the "tribal ritual expert" (oloiboni). The

olaigwenani is chosen by his age-mates after emurata, usually with the consent of the olupiron-elders for this group, to chair their meetings and guide them in their activities. The qualities sought in an olaigwenani are maturity, impartiality, knowledge of traditional customs and laws, and prudent judgement. He must not be an outstanding and particularly fierce or brave warrior, however, because fierceness and wisdom of judgement are properties which do not necessarily coincide in the same person, and the "military leaders" ("iloiingok", literally: "the bulls") are only chosen for their prowess and military skills, but usually do not play an important role in other social and political affairs of the group.

A spokesman may also be dismissed by his age-mates, if he does not live up to the expectations placed upon him, and not rarely does this office change hands a number of times before a final spokesman is elected at the time of olngesher. Although the position of an olaigwenani is a very honorable one, this office is not particularly sought, because it is often felt that the duties it involves are a greater burden than the prestige and the chances it offers. Each age-set of a locality has its own spokesman ("olaigwenani enkutoto" or, referring to the "company", "olaigwenani lesirit"). Gradually one of them will emerge as the most respected and influential one and become the spokesman of the age-set of the entire "subtribe" ("olaigwenani loonkishu"), whose role, however, is confined

to convene and chair the occasional meetings at this level, to represent his age-set, and to lead a delegation when the need arises. The olaigwenani of an older age-set may also become the "most revered spokesman" ("olaigwenani kitok") of the whole section at a given time. Since a person usually attains this role, reserved for very few highly respected individuals, only after he has retired from the group of "ruling elders", his function is mainly a consultative and representative one. In none of these cases should the office of olaigwenani be confused with that of a traditional "chief" as it existed in many other African societies.

Another official who is chosen to fulfill a particular function for his age-set at the level of the subtribe is that of the "ritual leader" ("olaunoni" or "olotuno"). He is appointed by the olupiron elders in consultation with the local spokesmen of the age-set at the time of eunoto. In general he is expected to possess the same qualities of maturity and knowledge in tribal affairs as the olaigwenani, but in addition an olotuno must never have killed a person, must not have any physical defects, and his parents must have been of "pure" Maasai stock. These last properties insure a certain ritual cleanness and a "sacred" quality ("sinyati") which are thought to be necessary for the proper conduct of this office, although an olotuno is not considered to possess any special ritual or magical powers himself. The main

task of the olotuno is to contact the oloiboni, the tribal ritual leader, on behalf of his age-set, to lead his age-mates in certain rituals, and to supervise their behavior in order to make sure that no important customs are violated. Although the office of olotuno entails certain privileges, such as the unrestricted choice, as the first of his age-set, of a girl for marriage and gifts of cattle by his age-mates at certain occasions, this office is even more unpopular than that of the olaigwenani and often people are afraid to be appointed to it, probably because it involves rather close contacts from time to time with the oloiboni.

The position of the oloiboni (pl. "il-oibonok") is the only one which is not related to the age-set system and which has a hereditary rather than an elective basis. It is also said that the first oloiboni was not of Maasai origin³ and that he had been adopted as a boy into the Laiser clan. Within this clan the families of the il-oibonok form a distinct subclan, "Engidongi", which is also the only one in Maasai society with a strict lineage system remembered over many generations. Three kinds of oloiboni, who act at different levels of competence and authority, can be distinguished;³² they have varying scopes for their operations. The first kind is that of a more general practitioner, who cures illness by divination on an individual basis, but who does not have the power of making prophecies. The second kind consists of those il-

oibonok who have acquired a wider reputation and who are consulted for their advice by larger groups of people (e.g. a whole enkang, a group of age-mates, etc.), and who are also able to provide their customers with protective charms. The third type, finally, is that of the "oloiboni kitok" ("the most revered tribal expert"), who has emerged as the most respected ritual expert of the area. In general, there is only one oloiboni kitok in each sub-tribe, some (as e.g. the Kaputiei, Matapatu or Purko) do not even have one of their own, but consult the oloiboni of a neighboring group. The oloiboni kitok is always consulted in matters concerning important ritual affairs of the whole section, as, for example, the timing of the different age-set graduation ceremonies, but also for rainmaking, or before a cattle raid is to be carried out. His powers of divination and prophecy are greatly respected and often feared, since he is believed to be in contact with "Enk-ai", the central deity of the Maasai. However, in a narrower sense of the word the oloiboni kitok does not play a role in strictly political matters, such as the deliberations of the council of elders and the administrative and judicial affairs of the subtribe. To compare the position of a tribal ritual leader with that of a traditional "chief" is, therefore, again misleading, although a few outstanding il-oibonok, as Subet or Mbatian during the last century, were apparently also influential, because of the weight of their personalities, in matters affecting the political

future of the whole people. Disputes and competition between different *il-oibonok*, on the other hand, as e.g. between the sons of Mbatian, Sendeyo and Lenana, tended to weaken their influence, and when the behavior and competence of one *oloiboni* proved to be unsatisfactory to some groups they were able to turn to another one.

Today the traditional political structure of the Maasai and these more specialized roles exist side by side with the institutions of Kenya's central government. The main administrative tasks and modern law enforcement are today carried out by the appointed District Commissioners and their agents in the two administrative divisions of Kajiado and Narok. Judicial matters involving modern law are in the hands of the respective courts. In the more immediate affairs of Maasai life, however, traditional structures and leaders (unlike the traditional political organization of the other groups presented here, which have practically all vanished today) still play an important role. If there is a conflict between these two levels of authority, the greater force today resides with the central government, although the scope for an evasion of decision by the latter, particularly if these are felt to be unnecessary or unjust (as e.g. in the question whether the Maasai should give up their traditional dress), is still considerable.

One of the greatest clashes which has occurred between a traditional institution and the central government

is that between the "il-murran" and the police. Because traditional warfare has lapsed since the imposition of the "Pax Britannica" and cattle raids have been outlawed and are regarded as simple theft today, the Maasai "warriors" have lost their traditional function. Their idleness, sometimes together with the consumption of considerable quantities of beer, which has become more readily available in recent years, often leads to reactions of violence, and the il murran today are not rarely a source of nuisance both to their own people and others. More useful occupations must be found for them, which would imply a considerable change of attitude on their part; otherwise it is difficult to see how this institution can survive in the long run. The disappearance of a "warrior" grade among the Maasai will then probably lead to a decline of the age-set system as a whole. ³³

A similar weakening of traditional institutions and leadership roles has been observed in some of the group ranches which have been established in some parts of Maasai country. ³⁴ There, the position of neither olaigwenani nor of olotuno seems to play a role in the management of these ranches (positions which, in contrast to the traditional ones, are highly sought after since they may bring with them a number of economic privileges), are selected on the basis of their modern educational achievements and practical qualifications, whereas the traditional office holders are

regarded as a conservative force which is opposed to modern development. The role of oloiboni also has suffered from the competition of "Swahili-laibons", who have come as healers from the coast, and the practice of modern medicine, although their ritual powers still may be feared. However, none of them commands a position comparable to that of Mbatian, for example, in the old days.

In the years before Kenya became independent "national" politics became more relevant in Maasai country. In 1960 the "Maasai United Front" was founded to represent Maasai interests and, in particular, to safeguard Maasai territory from further infringements by other groups. This organization then became part of KADU, the main party of Kenya's "minority" tribes, which essentially stood for the preservation of traditional land rights and a federal ("majimbo") political structure in the independent state of Kenya. After the merger with KANU in 1964 some Maasai representatives were adopted into Kenya's "grand coalition" at the center. A separate "tribal welfare association", as exists among some of the other groups, has not been formed so far. Modern Maasai politics are increasingly carried out at the level of elected M.P.s and other officials, and disputes between them tend to take on a new quality. ³⁵

PART THREE

THE VERTICAL PATTERN:KENYA'S CLASS STRUCTURE

"Die Entwicklung der materialistischen Auffassung, auch nur an einem einzigen historischen Exempel / ist / eine wissenschaftliche Arbeit, die jahrelange ruhige Studien erfordert..., denn es liegt auf der Hand, daß hier mit der bloßen Phrase nichts zu machen ist, daß nur massenhaftes, kritisch gesichtetes, vollständig bewältigtes historisches Material zur Lösung einer solchen Aufgabe befähigen kann."

Friedrich Engels

Here in Part Three we deal with "objective" aspects of class and the life chances of each class, including a brief discussion of the "ability to organize" and the overall "conflict potential". It is based on our own survey data and on a variety of primary (e.g. official statistics, public documents, etc.) and secondary sources. It covers only "static" aspects of the class structure. Part Four then also deals with subjective perceptions of class. Class interactions and other dynamic expressions of the prevailing modes of production and their particular "mix" in Kenya's overall "social formation" will be considered in Part Five.

Some basic data concerning some important aspects of the objective living conditions of each class are compiled in Table III, 1:

/ Insert Table III, 1 /

As Table III,1 indicates, the non-agricultural bourgeoisie and the upper classes have a cash income more than thirty times higher on average than that of the agricultural proletariats, who constitute the bulk of the population. Mean household size of the former is much smaller, making the per capita income differentials even larger. Distribution of ownership of certain indicators (a watch, clock, or radio) again demonstrates vast differences in the living conditions of Kenya's classes. The willingness and ability of members of the non-agricultural bourgeoisie and the upper classes to pay high school fees for their children are also pronounced and tend to perpetuate and exacerbate existing class differences. The non-agricultural middle and upper classes are among the best organized groups. Their relatively homogeneous economic interests tend to strengthen their conflict potential.

The different patterns of objective life chances of Kenya's classes have to be seen within the context of the overall economic situation of what is still a very poor and "under-developed" country. The living conditions of members of the "capitalist", "manager" and "state classes" can be compared meaningfully to those of their counterparts

TABLE III, 1

SOME BASIC ASPECTS OF CLASS POSITION

Class	Agricultural			Non-agricultural				Total	
	Peasants	Proletarians	Proletariat	Bourgeoisie + upper classes	Salariat	Proletarians	Proletariat		Subproletariat
Variables:									
1a) Class size ^a (male labor force 1970 in '000)	224.2	1,202.3	343.6	140.6	127.2	37.8	345.3	34.8	2,465.8
b) as % of total m.l.f.	4.5	48.8	11.9	5.7	5.2	1.5	14.0	1.4	100.0
2) Household size^b									
No. of adults (mean)	4.6	4.6	4.2	4.0	3.8	3.5	3.3	3.5	4.2
No. of children (mean)	5.6	4.0	2.2	1.7	3.2	2.2	2.8	0.6	3.1
Of which in school (mean)	2.9	1.5	1.0	0.8	1.4	0.8	1.3	0.1	1.3
% of polygamous households	27	15	5	--	14	--	22	--	15
3) Mean cash income/household^c									
(Kshs./month)	100-200	<100	>100	1,601-3,000	401-800	201-400	100-200	100-200	100-200
receiving cash income from secondary sources	24	27	30	27	25	40	30	52	27
Amount of secondary income (Kshs./month)	<20	<20	<20	<20	<20	20-50	<20	20-50	<20
% receiving food supplies	100	100	100	50	39	22	41	59	40 ^d
4) Assets & owning status									
% owning & owning shares	100	100	65 ^c	46	47	37	47	20	41 ^d
% owning house or living free of charge	100	100	100	14	33	20	17	35	26 ^d
No. of rooms (mean)	--	--	--	3	2.6	1.5	1.2	2.1	2 ^d
% having radio at home	53	32	29	86	84	64	60	75	52
% having watch or clock	42	26	12	87	85	52	59	34	47
5) Family expenditures									
Rent (Kshs./month)	--	--	--	401-600	401-600	100-200	100-200	\$1-100	100-200
School fees (Kshs./month)	201-400	101-200	51-100	401-800	201-400	101-200	101-200	\$1-100	200
6) Age group Self-supporting									
Pension, social security	--	1	9	--	2	4	--	3	2
Family	3	2	--	27	38	8	7	3	9
Family	83	84	81	53	44	58	66	63	70
Don't know	9	13	10	20	16	31	27	29	19
7) Organization memberships									
Professional	59	24	14	67	66	22	33	7	23
Non-professional, voluntary	33	16	22	27	21	21	15	22	23
Members	85	71	59	53	84	58	62	45	71
8) Work hours (mean)									
	6.3	6.2	7.6	7.5	7.6	7.9	7.6	--	6.2
Total N	61	199	31	15	61	26	86	32	516

^aThese figures have been calculated from our "class" and "occupational" analysis for the year 1970, see also Table V, 13, and Appendix IV below.

^bThe rest of these data are based on our survey results.

^cFor 58 % of the farm laborers among the respondents this consisted of subsistence-plots on large farms only.

^dThese are the raw values for members of the non-agricultural classes only.

in industrialized countries. The standard of living of the local "bourgeoisie" and the remaining classes lags far behind that of comparable groups in the industrialized parts of the world. Relative differences between the Kenyan classes, however, are marked and their subsequent conflict potential very pronounced.

CHAPTER X

THE AGRICULTURAL CLASSES

Altogether almost three-fourths of Kenya's active population are still engaged in agriculture, including pastoralism, which contributes about one-third to Kenya's overall gross domestic product.¹ Internally this sector has become very differentiated today because of the original impact of colonialism, which made Kenya one of the relatively few "settler colonies" in Africa,² the continuing influences of the world economy, and important domestic developments.³

The large-scale farming sector

The large-scale farming sector, which was created by colonists, comprised at its peak slightly more than 3,600 units with 3 million hectares. About one-third of these has been transferred to small-scale African producers through various settlement schemes. Another third of the large farms has come into the hands of Africans, either as individuals or as corporate owners. The rest remains so far in European or Asian individual or company ownership, including most notably large ranches and the extensive tea, sisal, and sugar estates. The size of these large-scale holdings varies greatly; the average for "mixed" farms is

close to 500 ha. Some plantations and ranches are much larger; a few exceed 20,000 ha. ⁴

About 1,800 households are estimated to belong to our class of large-scale capitalist farmers, about 800 of whom today are Africans. ⁵ The latter include a greater number of absentee or "telephone" farmers whose principal occupation lies in the non-agricultural sector, most often in the high-level bureaucracy or some public or private enterprise. Not much needs to be said at this place about the class position and the particular life-style of this group. ⁶

Both the remaining European large-scale farmers and their African successors exhibit a way of life reminiscent of a feudal past. It strongly accentuates the vast gap between these few and the majority of the population. One has to see the golf course and the polo fields at the "Kitale Club", for example, or the spectators at the Ngong racetrack in Nairobi to fully appreciate this situation.

In the long run, with the continuing exodus of most European farmers, the largest part of the remaining large-scale mixed farms probably will become, even if under some disguised form, de facto or "self-help" ⁷ settlement schemes. This is indicated by what has happened to most co-operative and partnership farms which have become "problematical". ⁸ It also corresponds to the clear preference expressed by a great number of co-op members and small partners. ⁹ The government has been reluctant so far to sanction officially

further sub-divisions of large farms. Since the early 1970s it has also abandoned the small-scale settlement approach. It now prefers to encourage the transfer of whole farms to co-operative forms of ownership and production under the "Shirika" program. Here, too, experience has shown that these farms only tend to be successful if both efficient supervision and management and a strong positive motivation of each co-op member can be achieved. The "shirika" form has proved to be relatively successful. In this program small subsistence plots are allotted to each family and workers are paid individually for labor devoted to the common fields under a central management. If the farm makes a profit some additional annual cash dividends are awarded to each member.

The rest of the mixed large-scale farming sector, if efficiently managed, may then remain under individual or company ownership. ¹⁰ No "ceiling" on the amount of land an individual may hold has been imposed to date, even though this has been repeatedly demanded by a number of M.P.s and would be approved by large parts of the public. ¹¹ Given the direct involvement of many members of Kenya's "state class" as large-scale land owners, the imposition of such a ceiling, even if at the proposed relatively generous level of 500 ha of farm land per individual owner, does not seem likely. Similarly, any inroads into the commercial ranching and plantation sector under expatriate individual or company ownership (such as the huge Brooke Bond Liebig Tea estates in the Kericho area), largely left untouched by "Africanization",

would require a major shift in policy.

Our class of "agricultural bourgeoisie" includes a majority of those officially settled on formerly large farms or who jointly own and cultivate remaining large units as members of a production co-operative or as official or hidden small partners (about 180,000 families altogether),¹² given their cash crop orientation and still relatively large plot sizes per family. On the whole this part of the population has been doing quite well. The marketed output of most settlement schemes has risen considerably, even though there was some initial decline in output by the large farm sector in the first years after independence. In the late sixties and early seventies this sector experienced a steady overall increase in production, except for the usual fluctuations due to changing weather conditions and, for some products, world market prices.¹³ This class will be further discussed within the general context of differentiation in Kenya's small-scale farming sector to which the largest part of this chapter is devoted.¹⁴

The small-scale sector

As we have shown in Part Two, the common pattern of small-scale agricultural production in Kenya is one of independent family cultivation of land (or livestock management as in the case of the Maasai), based (for the agriculturalists) on individual homesteads. Given the "segmentary-egalitarian" social and political organization of practically all ethnic groups, a "tributary" mode of production (as found in medieval

Europe and large parts of Asia,¹⁵ where a part of the produced surplus was appropriated by external landlords or political rulers) traditionally did not exist among Kenya's peoples. Whether one should speak of a distinct "African mode of production",¹⁶ is a question of terminology rather than of substance. Even where "African cultivators"¹⁷ traditionally were not part of a larger economic or political network, today they have come into relationship with outside forces which justifies their more general designation as "peasants".¹⁸ The nature and extent of these relationships still varies considerably. It ranges from the partial integration into the world economy of small-scale agricultural producers of crops such as coffee, tea, pyrethrum, etc., through the provision of migrant labor and food supplies for non-agricultural activities, to a relatively loose form of political overrule by the modern national authorities without much economic involvement as in the case of the largest part of the Maasai and some others.

Within this general "peasant mode of production", based on private property in land and household labor,^{on} some further sub-division into specific classes is required. One important distinction is that between agricultural producers who largely depend on their own labor, even if they own some means of production (i.e. the "agricultural proletarioids" in our terminology), and those who draw a significant part of income from the "capital" they have accumulated (such as permanent stands of tea or coffee trees, the acquisition of grade cattle producing milk for sale, or the cultivation of larger plots of

land with hired labor or machines). Even though this distinction is often a matter of degree, we think that a significant differentiation along this line can be observed in Kenya today. In our opinion it would be erroneous to assume that this tendency will necessarily lead to a full "capitalization" of the agricultural sector and a polarization between a relatively small section of "capitalist" or "Kulak" farmers on the one hand, and a large agricultural proletariat on the other. ¹⁹

In Kenya so far few "Kulaks" or "yeoman" farmers have emerged, ²⁰ i.e. larger scale agricultural enterprises oriented almost entirely to the production of cash crops using modern farming techniques and being either highly mechanized or employing paid labor from outside the more immediate family on a permanent basis. In the traditional Kikuyu districts of Kiambu, Murang'a and Nyeri, where a process of "kulakization" has been most often alleged by critics, less than 1 percent of all units exceed an area of 10 ha. The average size in this category is 16.3 ha, that of all farms only 2.0 ha. Thus the size of existing holdings puts severe limits on the emergence and further stabilization of such a class. All in all, it probably can be said that no more than about 10,000 "Kulak" farmers exist in Kenya so far, ²¹ a figure which has to be seen in relation to the overall number of approximately 240,000 "agricultural bourgeois" farmers and the more than 1.2 million "agricultural proletaroids" in the country.

Even though processes of accumulation and concentration will certainly continue in the future, these have to be weighed against the countervailing tendency to sub-divide

existing holdings, due to continuing population pressure on the very limited amount of agricultural land, and traditional practices of inheritance which are still applied in most areas. ²² This re-distribution of peasant holdings ²³ will most certainly contribute to the continuing existence of a large stratum of family-based agricultural enterprises.

In the long run differentiation within the small-scale farming sector will be mainly determined by the interaction of two factors. One is the rate of economic development as expressed in increased levels of productivity and income opportunities; the other is the rate of population growth within a limited land area. In an "ideal-type" fashion we can construct from these elements one of the common four-fold typologies:

TABLE III, 2
DYNAMIC TYPES OF SMALL-SCALE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

<u>Economic development</u> (increase of per capita income)	<u>Population growth</u>	
	Low	High
Low	Traditional stagnation	Increasing pauperization
High	Continuing accumulation	"Involuntary growth"

The labels for these types are self-explanatory, except perhaps for the notion of "involuntary growth". This signifies a continuing intensification of land use with rises in productivity set off by further sub-divisions of holdings and an ever increasing number of mouths to be fed. In view of the diminishing

returns on agricultural inputs, which are to be expected beyond a certain point of modernization, increases in population will lead to increasing pauperization, if non-agricultural forms of employment cannot be found for the population surplus. Such a process can be observed in large areas of Bangla Desh and various other parts of Asia,²⁴ It is also quite clearly visible now in some regions of Kenya, including parts of Kikuyu country, Kisii District and the Luyia area, in particular Kakamega District.

There are no precise data on income distribution by class and ethnic group which would allow ready operationalization of our typology. If we take information available on level of "modernization" of each area and on the respective distribution of farm sizes as indicators, we can arrive at a rough approximation of the regional distribution of our four dynamic types. There are about 240,000 "accumulating farms" (i. e. 20 % of the total number). Approximately 30 % of these can be found in Kikuyu country (about one-third of all Kikuyu holdings), 20 % among the Kalenjin (somewhat more than one-third of the holdings), and 15 % among the Kisii (i. e. somewhat less than 30 % of the total). Smaller percentages are found among the other groups; the Kamba, Luo, Luyia, and Mijikenda being most strongly "under-represented" in this regard. The category of the "traditionally stagnating" holdings includes about 350,000 units (i. e. $\frac{30}{100}$ of the total). These form a high percentage of the holdings of the Mijikenda and Luo and also in considerable parts of Ukambani and among less "modernized" groups of the Kalenjin and Luyia.

The total number of holdings experiencing a pattern of "involutionary growth" can be estimated to be around 280,000 (i.e. approximately 23 % of the total). These farms are most common among the Kikuyu and Kisii, and are a smaller percentage of the holdings among the more modern sections of the Kamba, Embu, Meru, and Luyia, who live under crowded conditions. The fourth category of families living under actually deteriorating conditions consists of approximately 320,000 holdings (i.e. about 27 % of the total). Holdings of this type can be found in almost all regions today. They are most strongly represented among the Luyia, in particular in Kakamega District, where they amount to probably more than 50 % of all households.

About one-fifth of Kenya's pastoral peoples, or 20 % of approximately 250,000 "households", live under conditions of increasing pauperization. This is particularly true of a significant number of Turkana and some other smaller groups in northern Kenya. The largest number of the rest belong to our "traditionally stagnating" type. They are to be found where available grazing areas are still sufficient (except for temporary periods of drought), and where the rate of population growth remains relatively low. The percentage of pastoralists who are actually "accumulating" in the modern sense as individual or group ranchers or as part-time agriculturalists is very small.

For a class analysis of the peasant population it seems sufficient to distinguish three categories:

- 1) the class of agricultural small bourgeoisie who have a steadily rising income and are part of Kenya's "middle classes";

2) the class of agricultural proletaroids with stagnating or actually deteriorating living conditions;
and 3) the actual agricultural proletariat. This class comprises about 350,000 members of the male labor force of whom approximately 150,000 are employed on the remaining large-scale farms and plantations. Table III, 3 summarizes the economic situation of members of these three classes:

/ Insert Table III, 3 /

As is readily apparent, the two agricultural land-owning classes are quite distinctly set apart in most of the aspects documented in Table III, 3. Only a minority of the agricultural proletaroids possess a title-deed for their land, grow cash crops or sell other produce. Only a small fraction of them own any high-grade dairy cattle; the mean number of heads of cattle for those who own some is only 2.4. Ownership of local cattle (mostly of the traditional "Zebu" type) is much commoner and the number of head per owner is somewhat higher. Among the Maasai, the only pastoral group in our survey, the mean is considerably higher, of course, family herds often numbering 50 heads of cattle and more. Sheep and goats are also owned in larger quantities by sizeable numbers of the agricultural proletaroids. The degree of "modernization" among them, as indicated by the use of such amenities as disinfecting dips or artificial insemination for cattle, on the whole is still relatively low. Very few have taken a farmers' course or made use of the agricultural extension service or agri-

TABLE III, 3
COMPARATIVE DATA FOR THE AGRICULTURAL CLASSES^a

<u>Variable:</u>	<u>Class:</u>	Proleta- roids	Bourgeoisie	Proletariat
1) <u>Acreage</u> (\$):	2 acres	16	--	65 ^b
	2 - 5 "	60	--	--
	6 -10 "	13	66	--
	11 -20 "	7	17	--
	21 + "	4	15	--
%having title deed		26	60	--
2) <u>Crops:</u>	% growing pure cash crops	19	44	--
	% selling other crops	30	71	--
3) <u>Livestock:</u>	% owning grade cattle	9	59	--
	no. of grade cattc (mean)	2.4	4.9	--
	% owning local cattle	41	36	3
	no. of local cattle (mean)	3.3	3.3	1.8
	% selling milk	19	64	--
Of those who have cattle:	% using cattle dip	65	96	--
	% " artificial insemination	12	45	--
	% owning goats	38	28	6
	no. of goats (mean)	3.4	3.7	2.5
	% owning sheep	25	44	--
	no. of sheep (mean)	3.7	3.5	--
4) <u>Extension:</u>	% having received advice	19	54	--
	% having taken farmer's course	12	43	--
	% having received loan	6	39	--
5) <u>Future plans:</u>	% planning im- provements	60	82	--
	% planning to buy more land	37	61	23
	% planning to buy more cattle	33	67	19
6) <u>Inheritance by (\$):</u>	eldest son	23	19	4
	all sons	15	15	14
	all children	41	37	50
	somebody else	6	7	4
	don't know	15	22	28

^aBased on our survey:

^b

For 58 % of the farm-laborers among the respondents this consisted of subsistence plots on large farms only.

cultural credit facilities. This may be due in part to variation both in climatic conditions and the availability of modern services throughout the country. Their expectations for the future, as far as further improvement of their shamba or the acquisition of additional land or cattle are concerned, similarly are more reduced. Again this may reflect a realistic assessment on their part rather than a "traditionalist" orientation. 25

The agricultural bourgeoisie, on the other hand, shows a consistent pattern pointing in the opposite direction. Besides cultivating larger tracts of land, a majority of this group grow "pure" cash crops such as coffee, tea, pyrethrum, etc., or sell sizeable amounts of other produce. Similarly a large number possess grade cattle, amounting to almost five head per owner on average. The percentage of those owning local cattle or goats in turn is much lower, although sheep are quite popular. Cattle dips are used by almost all respondents, many of whom make use of artificial insemination to improve their stock. The majority of respondents in this group have received some extension advice; almost half have attended a farmers' course or received a loan for development purposes. Plans concerning further improvements of their holdings or for the purchase of more land or grade cattle are much more common in this group, and, possibly, more realistic.

The agricultural proletariat, not to be confounded with the proletaroids, again shows different characteristics.

Those who work on large-scale farms often have the opportunity to cultivate small subsistence plots (usually two acres or less) to supplement their cash incomes. Such workers may also keep a few goats or chickens. Those who work on a permanent basis in small-scale agriculture in most instances are completely landless. Here a part of their income consist of some food or other agricultural produce given in kind. On the whole, the living conditions of the agricultural proletariat are the most miserable of all the working classes. In spite of extended work hours they have the lowest incomes and the least chances for advancement in the future. They have the lowest average level of education and, in turn, the lowest mean number of children in school, paying the lowest average amount of school fees. ²⁶ The level of organization, including participation in Harambee activities, is very low, too. While there may be some room for further organization and common actions among the workers on large-scale farms and plantations, the agricultural proletariat in the small-scale farming sector lives and works under such dispersed conditions, being also still partly embedded in traditional patterns of social relations, that no common class action seems conceivable in the foreseeable future.

All in all, the living conditions of Kenya's agricultural classes still are very modest (even for most members of the agricultural bourgeoisie) and in some instances they are outright miserable including at least temporary periods of

severe famine for some households. Most available figures on income distribution in Kenya (and international comparisons and further reaching generalizations based on them) must be regarded with a great deal of caution.²⁷ Thus a figure of KSh 20 or less per household (including subsistence supplies) for the lowest agricultural income groups in Kenya,²⁸ i. e. an income of approximately Kshs. 1.- per day, probably does not make much sense and gives a wrong picture of income discrepancies. An apparently somewhat more carefully arrived at value of Kshs. 360 per capita per year, i. e. 1 shilling per person per day, for some of the poorest sections²⁹ does seem to be plausible. For a considerable proportion of ^{the} agricultural proletarioids this translates, having built their own lodging, into an almost entirely vegetarian diet of their own produce consisting of the traditional "irio" of the Kikuyu (a dish mainly made of beans, peas, and maize) or the "ugali" (maize mush) of some of the other peoples, some ragged clothes, and little else to satisfy their most basic needs. The story of the "typical" Luo family, mockingly told by members of some other groups, may not be so far-fetched: the family eat their ugali while staring at a small piece of dried fish pinned to a pole of their hut to whet their appetite not having enough for all to eat. In any case, there can be no doubt that the life of a considerable portion of Kenya's rural population often (e. g. before the time of the new harvest or when rainfall has been irregular) borders on the brink of hunger.

CHAPTER XI

THE NON-AGRICULTURAL UPPER AND MIDDLE CLASSES

The non-agricultural sectors have their own particular "mix" of modes of production within the overall social formation. Here the "peripheral" or "derivative" ¹ capitalism of Kenya's economy clearly dominates, ² not only in a quantitative sense, but also as the "leading" mode of production determining and limiting the others. In addition, some small-scale commodity production and, within very narrow bounds, some elements of an indigenous capitalism can also be found. Within this social formation separate "classes" can be distinguished along the lines suggested in our theoretical outline in Part One.

The capitalists

The capitalists derive the largest part of their income from the ownership of industrial and large-scale commercial means of production. Today this class consists of roughly 3,000 households amounting to less than one-tenth of 1 % of the total male labor force. The majority are Asians, followed by Europeans and a small number of Africans. ³

A number of the Asians turned to industrial production because retail and wholesale trading have been restricted after independence to Kenyan citizens by the trade licensing legislation of the late 1960s. In addition, a number of contractors and successful craftsmen and businessmen have begun to operate today a variety of enterprises on a large scale. A portion of the sugar and textile industries have been in Asian hands (such as the Madhvani and Mehta groups from Uganda) for a longer period of time. Among the European non-agricultural capitalists who are permanent residents of Kenya a greater percentage originally were active in the large-scale farming sector.

Not much need be said here about the particular class position and life-style of the members of this class. It very much resembles that of their counterparts anywhere in the capitalist world. In a country like Kenya the vast difference in income and life-style between this small section and the largest part of the rural population or the urban poor makes their position all the more striking. A stronger contrast than that between the villas and palaces of Muthaiga and the almost neighboring slum dwellings of Mathare Valley in Nairobi can hardly be found anywhere else in the world.

The managerial class

A similar life-style, but derived from a somewhat different position, is practised by the members of the "managerial class". Members of this somewhat larger class

(approximately 13,000 members of the male labor force in 1970), even though they do not own the means of production themselves, carry out the day-to-day decision-making functions in Kenya's industrial, financial and large-scale commercial enterprises. Most of these are foreign-owned and a majority of the managers are still expatriates. Fluctuation in this group is relatively high, because many expatriates are seconded by their companies for a limited number of years. In this regard they resemble the personnel of foreign embassies and the "experts" coming to Kenya on programs of technical aid with whom they mingle extensively in Nairobi's plush residential suburbs. In addition to foreign nationals appointed on a temporary basis, indigenous "comprador" ⁴ or "auxiliary bourgeois" elements cooperate in the running of these enterprises. Some have been given their positions purely because of political relationships and to satisfy superficial criteria of "Africanization". Others have more objective qualifications and carry out their function effectively. All in all, Europeans and Asians still dominate this class.

The state class

The third "top" group among Kenya's non-agricultural classes is that of the "state class" or "bureaucratic bourgeoisie". ⁵ It consists of the top decision makers in all branches of public administration such as ministers, permanent secretaries, provincial commissioners and other high level personnel in the bureaucracy somewhat further down the line (typically being paid on a "super-scale" basis), ⁶ including

high ranking police and military officers. This class comprises also top level personnel in the numerous para-statal organizations who have been appointed because of political and/or administrative qualifications.

In Kenya the line between this class and the "capitalists" proper has been somewhat blurred because of the extensive engagement of members of the bureaucracy in private business enterprises. ⁷ The acquisition of large farms and urban real estate, often on very generous terms because of political connections, has been particularly favored by many members of this class, giving them an independent property base. This makes Kenya's leading classes somewhat more homogeneous than in some other countries, as e.g. in Tanzania, where the original distinctions have been maintained somewhat more consistently. All in all, if we take a somewhat generous operationalization, this class comprised about 12,000 members in 1970, the great majority of them Africans, but with sizeable minorities of Asians and Europeans. The relatively recent acquisition of wealth and the often extensive family obligations cause the life-style of the average member of this class to fall somewhere in between that of most of the European capitalists and managers on the one hand and that of the more general "salarial" on the other. In the long run, however, if Kenya's present political and economic system does not change significantly, the prospects for further capital accumulation and a consolidation of the position of the members of this class seem to be (for them!) most promising.

The non-agricultural bourgeoisie

We define this class in a somewhat narrower sense than many authors in order to distinguish it from the capitalists proper. We thus refer here to those "small bourgeois" self-employed persons who earn their living by using both their own labor and a certain amount of capital. The typical enterprise in this category is still based to a large extent on family labor plus, possibly, a limited number of permanent paid employees. In 1970 this class numbered about 110,000 members of the male labor force, of whom somewhat less than 10 % were non-Africans. It included more than 30,000 self-employed persons in the modern urban sector together with almost 50,000 "farmers-cum-businessmen" and somewhat less than 20,000 members of the male labor force in non-agricultural rural enterprises. The rest consisted of the more successful craftsmen and businessmen in the urban "informal sector" who satisfy our criteria of having a certain amount of capital or who employed paid employees (as a rough estimate we included about 10 % of the total informal sector here).

This is thus a relatively large section which ranges from the typical rural "duka wallah" (owner of a small shop, formerly mostly of Asian origin) through urban craftsmen and businessmen to self-employed members of the professions who, even though they may not always require a larger amount of capital or paid employees, earn higher incomes because of their special qualifications. This last category includes, for example, a sizeable number of second or third generation

Asian immigrants whose parents, after they had made some money in a craft or business, were able to pay for their children to be educated as lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc.

Africans who attempt to establish themselves as independent businessmen and entrepreneurs in the modern sector often have a hard time because they have to operate outside their more traditional community facing a rather stiff competition from the longer established and more experienced members of the other racial groups.⁸ But even among them a great number of persons seem to have "made it" in recent years. One of the institutions instrumental in their success is the "Industrial Estates", a kind of "kindergarten" for indigenous capitalist entrepreneurs. These have been set up in a number of towns supported by foreign aid programs. The marketing research, capital equipment, training and maintenance service provided by this institution, together with special tariff protections, has given a number of African firms a successful start. It remains to be seen whether a majority of them will be able to survive on their own under less aided and protected conditions.

Most African enterprises in the rural areas and those in the informal sector operate on a less ambitious, but also, it seems, on the whole a more solid basis.⁹ A significant number of persons in this category have turned to commercial activities, setting up small shops, local "bars" or transport businesses after having earned a starting capital through successful cash crop farming. Others have used some limited training or their self-taught skills to become independent

carpenters, masons, owners of small repair shops, etc. One interesting finding of the Marris/Somerset study,¹⁰ which is confirmed by some of our own observations, is the fact that a great percentage of those who later became successful businessmen initially had not achieved their aspirations in the formal educational system which would have led them to more ordinary careers in the civil service and similar fields. Instead, through their failure in school or because their parents could no longer pay the fees, these dropouts had to seek new opportunities. Typically these lay in the chance of starting a trade or beginning the production or repair of some commonly needed goods. Within the generally expanding framework of Kenya's economy in the post-independence years, which included a rise in the purchasing power of important segments of the rural population, many of these attempts succeeded. On the whole this class has been one of the most dynamic and rapidly expanding since independence. Its income situation and living conditions, comparatively speaking, are quite favorable¹¹ and there seems to be room for further expansion.

On the other hand, the fact that this sector is developing within the framework of the generally dominating peripheral capitalism of Kenya's economy and that it may soon reach decisive limits should not be overlooked. Modern industrial enterprises with their important high-level technology, capital intensity and business know-how often pre-empt the chances of indigenous small-scale entrepreneurs and craftsmen or make their skills obsolete. One striking example is the

establishment of a foreign-owned bread factory operating with imported highly automated machinery employing few unskilled local people and supplying a whole province, where under different circumstances a stratum of several hundred independent bakers and their families would exist. Similar conditions prevail in other branches of industry and there can be no doubt that the end results of this process will be vastly different from those in other countries under more self-reliant and "disassociated" ¹² circumstances.

The salariat

A final class which must be reckoned under the middle classes is the "salariat". Unlike the classical bourgeoisie the members of this class do not own any means of production, but they have an intermediate decision-making power over them in their respective fields of activity. Even though in actual fact the distinctions between this category and the proletariat as an entirely dependent part of the work force on the one hand and the actual managerial class as a group with final decision-making authority on the other may be somewhat blurred at the border lines, the distances between the core of one class compared to that of the neighboring one are sufficiently large (and the actual attitude and behavior sufficiently divergent) to justify the separate classification here. In any case the decisive criterion is the relative amount of decision-making power over the means of production including other members of the labor force and not more superficial

distinctions such as the judicial status of an employed person (i.e. "worker" or "employee") or the particular kind of clothes worn at work (e.g. "white collar" or "blue collar" outfits).

In 1970 this class comprised, if we are again somewhat generous in our operationalization, almost 130,000 members of the male labor force, i.e. approximately 5 % of the total. The vast majority in this category now are Africans, but a still sizeable number are persons of Asian or European descent. In view of the great expansion of the public sector after independence almost three-fourths of the members of the salariat today are on the public payroll. This includes all middle level administrative personnel, but also teachers and those members of the professions employed by the government who are not in truly executive positions. In the private sector those in middle level positions comprise heads of departments, higher level clerical personnel, better qualified sales representatives, industrial foremen and the like.¹³ Because very few non-agricultural rural enterprises in Kenya are sufficiently large to have any middle level management positions, this class, as far as the private sector is concerned, is concentrated to the largest extent in the big cities and towns. Those employed in the public sector are dispersed somewhat more widely, but the majority tend to cluster in the capital and the major administrative centers.

Even though members of this class receive considerably higher incomes than the bulk of the population, their life-style, in absolute terms, cannot be compared to

that of their counterparts in Western countries. Urban life and, in particular, adequate housing, even if this may be subsidized in some instances by the employer, are expensive in Kenya, too. Members of this class typically live in housing projects such as those undertaken by the City Council or similar institutions in Nairobi's east or south. These provide quite decent accomodation. Given the usually limited amount of space available and the considerable number of persons per household, living conditions often are relatively crowded. In any case, they are far below conditions in Nairobi's affluent western and northern suburbs. This class spends relatively large amounts of money on the education of children. Their aspirations are often set much higher than those of the lower income groups, so that economic frustrations are more keenly felt. Thus quite a few members of this class find it hard to make ends meet. For security in old age they are more dependent on official pensions and funds than any of the other groups in our survey. Their organization membership is very high on average in both professional bodies and Harambee and similar activities.

In view of the overall position of this class, which is not directly bound to the economic interest of the propertied classes, and their generally still relatively unsatisfactory material conditions, often coupled with high aspirations, it remains doubtful whether Leys is correct in concluding that this class is "broadly identified with the interests of domestic and foreign capital which the state

exists to serve".¹⁴ We shall discuss some of the political attitudes of members of this class in Part Four below.

CHAPTER XII

THE NON-AGRICULTURAL LOWER CLASSES

Two major non-agricultural categories occupy the "lower end" of Kenya's class structure. One is engaged mainly, as self-employed persons, in small-scale commodity production and the "petty" distributive sphere (whom we referred to as "non-agricultural proletaroids" in the introduction). The other consists of the "proletariat" proper of dependent workers and low level employees.

The non-agricultural proletaroids

The non-agricultural proletaroids tend to be overlooked as a separate class in more rigid formulations of the theory of the "dual economy" of Third World countries,¹ which juxtapose the "modern" and the "traditional" sectors of these economies and see few connections between the two. In contrast, more recent studies have emphasized the functions of a third "intermediate" or "informal" sector which constitutes an important link and tends to develop a significant dynamic of its own.² This sector is characterized by "ease of entry, reliance on indigenous resources, family ownership, small-scale labor-intensive technology, skills acquired out-

side the formal school system, and unregulated and competitive markets".³ It consists, for example, of masons, carpenters, mechanics, tailors, independent taxi (matatu) drivers, snack sellers, petty traders, street hawkers, etc. Most of these activities are productive, economically efficient and profitable, though not all are conducted on a regular and permanent basis and some are hampered by official licensing regulations and other legal restrictions.

By its very nature, the exact size of this class is hard to determine at any given moment. According to the best estimates available, in 1970 it comprised roughly 40,000 self-employed men of whom about one-fifth were of Asian origin.⁴ Most members of this class can be found in the larger cities, i.e. Nairobi and Mombasa, but also, to a lesser extent, in some smaller up-country towns such as Makuru, Kisumu, or Nyeri. There obviously is some overlap between this class and the "non-agricultural bourgeoisie", but for analytic reasons we define this category as composed of those persons who are self-employed, but who operate with very little "capital" and who mainly have to rely on their own labor.

In our survey we managed to include a small number of persons belonging to this class. It consisted of unlicensed craftsmen ("fundi") of various skills, self-styled "kiosk" operators, hawkers and individuals with similar occupations. Their life-style usually is very modest and, apart from occasional harassment by the police and other officials, their economic position often remains insecure. Average cash income seems to be somewhat higher than that of the proletariat

proper, but it is significantly lower than that of the non-agricultural bourgeoisie or the salariat, and, probably, more infrequent and less reliable. The mean number of hours spent working each day is the highest for all classes. The mean household size is somewhat lower than that of the agricultural classes or the non-agricultural middle-classes. Apart from the sub-proletariat, members of this class have the lowest mean number of children in school. With the proletariat, the non-agricultural proletaroids have the lowest percentage of those who own a house or live free of charge. Their links with the countryside (e.g. owning a share of a shamba or receiving food supplies) are the lowest for all non-agricultural classes. Eventual support in old age also seems to be the most insecure. Organization membership in both professional and voluntary or Harambee activities is low.⁵ The dispersed working conditions tend to make common actions, except perhaps for participation in occasional street demonstrations,⁶ very difficult.

The non-agricultural proletariat

In Marx' dichotomised system of class dynamics this class is strategically the most important one for further developments in the industrial age. Even if we use the more differentiated class system suggested above, the proletariat remains one of the most important classes in future conflicts. There has been considerable debate in recent years about

whether under prevailing conditions of dependence and peripheral capitalism, the Third World proletariat occupies a position significantly different from that of the proletariat in the early industrialized countries. Some authors have argued that the more skilled and "advanced" sections of the non-agricultural proletariat are privileged vis-à-vis the bulk of the rural population and the urban unemployed which makes them identify "upwards" and develop a vested interest in the preservation of the status quo.⁷ Others have queried the validity of this "labor aristocracy" argument on the grounds that it is the extent of relative deprivation vis-à-vis the more favored classes not the absolute level of income which may be decisive for the political consciousness of the proletariat. In any case, to speak of an "aristocracy" in view of the actual living conditions of this class is very euphemistic.⁸ Our own observations on the whole support this latter point of view.

In the historical development of Kenya roughly three stages in the formation of the proletariat can be distinguished: The first consisted of a period of more or less forced labor in the early phase of colonial rule before and during World War I. At this time "natives" from the reserves had to be made to work on the large European farms and, during the war, in the carrier corps of the armed forces by means of conscription, the hut and poll tax and similar methods of coercion.⁹ The second stage, beginning after 1919, was characterized by the gradual emergence of a group of people accepting the conditions of squatters on the European farms

on an apparently more voluntary basis in view of deteriorating chances to work their own plots in the increasingly overcrowded reserves. During this time a separate urban proletariat also began to develop, consisting, for example, of the dock workers in Mombasa, the railway workers, and low-level employees in the central administration. However, most members of this class tended to maintain links with the rural areas in a system of migrant and temporary labor. ¹⁰

Only since about the middle fifties have a large number depended for subsistence on town work on a practically permanent basis. The main reasons for this development are the continuing population pressure in the rural areas and the growing risk of not finding employment again once a job has been abandoned. But even for many members of this more stable proletariat important links continue to exist with the rural population, because wages in many instances are so low that it would be difficult to maintain a family in town and because a remaining stake in the countryside constitutes an important security against eventual unemployment, retirement, or old age. Thus a considerable portion of the urban workers, even if employed on a permanent basis, are engaged in a system of long-distance migration (particularly those coming from western Kenya), returning only once or twice a year to their families back home.

In 1970 the non-agricultural proletariat numbered almost 350,000 members of the male labor force, i.e. about 14 % of the total. In addition there were about 50,000 females and juveniles belonging to this category. Approximately

115,000 members of the male labor force were employed in the public sector, the rest in private industry and commerce. Of the latter roughly 30,000 were working in the urban "informal" sector and about 60,000 in rural non-agricultural enterprises. Almost three-fifths of those working in the formal sector (public and private) were unskilled.¹¹ Of those engaged in private industry and commerce in the formal sector about 5 % were employed in enterprises with less than five employees and about two-thirds in companies with a total of more than 50 employees, constituting the "hard core" of the industrial proletariat in the private sector.¹²

The general living conditions of the non-agricultural proletariat are poor. The average cash income amounts to between Kshs. 100.- and 200.- per month (i. e. approximately U.S. \$ 15.- to 30.- at 1974 rates of exchange). A semi-skilled construction worker, for example, often working ten hours per day including weekends, can make about Kshs. 300 per month. Those employed in the informal sector mostly have less than 100 shillings. Housing, even if provided by the employer or some public body, usually is very poor and extremely overcrowded. Members of the non-agricultural proletariat had the highest persons per room ratio of all classes in our survey. Care in old age also is very uncertain, the national social security fund mostly serving persons with higher incomes so that the vast majority will have to depend on their children and other kin when they retire. For this reason, almost half of the respondents still own a shamba or can claim a share of one at the time of inheritance from their father.¹³

The degree of professional organization in this class is considerable (one-third of the respondents claiming membership in a union), although it is apparently not as high as claimed by many unions.¹⁴ All in all approximately 38 trade unions are organized on an industry wide basis today, 28 of these being members of the "Central Organization of Trade Unions" (COTU). Even though the unions played an important part in the struggle for independence, the attitudes of many of its leaders and the membership at large seem to have become depoliticized in recent years.¹⁵ The incidence of strikes and work stoppages and the total number of man-days lost has also decreased in the post-independence period under strong pressure from the government.¹⁶ Labor relations on the whole are among the most "peaceful" in the Third World. This does not mean that existing conflicts are resolved in a manner equally acceptable to all parties concerned. There is some indication that the "trade union" or "bread and butter" mentality exhibited by some leaders, and strongly promoted by the government, may meet resistance when wider reaching political issues come to the fore again in the course of time.¹⁷

CHAPTER XIII

MARGINAL GROUPS

The last to be discussed are the "marginal" people. Marginality may rest on a number of different attributes and it may occur in a variety of ways. Thus racial, ethnic, religious or other communalistic criteria, for example, may define certain minority groups as being marginal to the overwhelming majority of a society. Similarly, certain social "deviants" and "outcasts", even if they are members of dominant communities, such as social delinquents and criminals, the physically or mentally handicapped or retarded persons, those with psychic disorders or with unusual physical attributes, may come to be treated as marginals by the bulk of a population. A third form of marginality occurs in relation to the economic position of those who, for different reasons, are not integrated into the mainstream of the economy and who do not contribute to its ordinary functioning in any significant way.

Marginals are as yet insufficiently researched and documented in an African context.¹ This is all the more regrettable, because the analysis of "marginals" in any given society not only gives valuable insights into the life situation of the most miserable and down-trodden groups, but also helps to reveal important mechanisms in the functioning (or

malfunctioning!) of the overall social order as the result of which marginalization has occurred. Analyses of kind thus would be extremely important from both a functional point of view and for a more comprehensive normative evaluation.

Here we can deal only with the economically marginal groups of the "sub-proletariat", i. e. those who are openly unemployed or who pursue only very occasional, socially disapproved "occupations" (such as beggars, petty thieves, prostitutes, etc.).² Thus we are mainly concerned with those who find themselves as the "end product" of processes of marginalization going on elsewhere in the economy or who, for a variety of reasons, more or less voluntarily have turned their back on more ordinary ways of life.

Even in this limited sense the composition of this class is a very heterogeneous one. It consists of school leavers or other young people seeking employment in town, middle-aged or handicapped people having lost their job elsewhere, those who have become too old for work without being able to turn to other sources of support, and people who have been displaced for political and other reasons in their home countries. The ranks of this last section have been swollen in recent years because of Idi Amin's repressive regime in Uganda, but it also comprises considerable numbers of Somalis (whose citizenship is sometimes unclear) and Tanzanians.³ Some of these marginals, such as the more successful criminals engaged in poaching and smuggling for example, or the "European-type" prostitutes, may have considerable incomes.

The size of the sub-proletariat is even harder to determine than that of most other classes. In the absence of reliable official statistics or nation-wide surveys, but making use of the best estimates available, we attribute approximately 35,000 men to this category in 1970.⁴ If females and juveniles are included, both being disproportionately affected by unemployment, this figure becomes much higher and may easily amount to 100,000 persons or more. Due to the very high rates of growth of the population in general and of the urban population in particular, this class is also among the fastest growing.⁵

Some information on the living conditions of this particular sub-section of the population can be gleaned from our survey. Altogether 32 persons of this category were included in our sample, a sizeable proportion of whom were among those selected from the slum dwellers of Mathare Valley in Nairobi on a quota basis (using sex and age as criteria). The majority of the respondents belonged to the youngest age category (78 % being below 30, 13 % between 30 and 50, and only 9 % above that age), and were relatively well educated (only 22 % being illiterate, 37 % having some primary and 41 % some secondary education). About one-fourth had left school at different levels of qualification without finding any employment for a longer period of time.⁶ 60 % had previously been employed in the formal sector, 20 % of whom in skilled occupations. The rest (about 15 %) had helped their family in the country-

side or had some informal occupation before looking for work. About half of them were dependent on first degree relatives for present support. Another third stayed with more remote family members or friends who cared for their most basic needs; the rest said to be self-supporting in some way. Of the female respondents in this category (33 % of the total), about one-third were suspected to be at least occasional prostitutes by our interviewers (who took a separate note in this respect).

Living conditions in this class vary enormously. While some of the school-leavers, for example, may stay with relatively well-off relatives, others have to subsist under very miserable circumstances. Not surprisingly, the percentage of those dependent on their kin for cash or food supplies from up-country is the highest for all those discussed here. On the other hand, this class has the smallest proportion possessing any agricultural land or who may eventually inherit a share. Similarly, economic prospects and care in old age are more uncertain than for any other class. Conversely, degree of organization in professional bodies and voluntary or Harambee activities is very low. ⁷

In view of the youth of most people in this class the greater number may eventually find employment, become self-employed in an "informal" occupation, or return to their families up-country. Others, particularly those who are older, have no skills, or are handicapped in some other way, and who cannot return to an agricultural occupation, will eventually turn into a class of "hard core" unemployed. Since

any modern system of social security is not available for most of its members and traditional mechanisms of support often have broken down, this class clearly is among the worst off in Kenya's society, and its ranks are swelling day by day. That crimes, especially burglaries, are rapidly increasing as well ⁸ should not surprise anybody. Whether the situation of many members of the sub-proletariat will lead to any common political action remains more doubtful. Marx' characterization of this class as "the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society", considerable parts of which may become "a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue" ⁹ will have to stand the test of history in any given case, but in many instances it may not be far from reality. It will be one of our tasks to assess both the political consciousness of this class and the dynamics of its interactions with the other classes in the subsequent parts of this study.

PART FOUR

THE COMPARATIVE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE

MAIN CONFLICT-GROUPS

"In the final analysis, our task is to realize a symbiosis of our Negro-African values and European values - European values because Europe contributes the principal technical means of the emerging civilization. Not all the values from either side are to be retained: Some are negative; others, belonging to the past, are interesting only as folklore. In a word, sub-Saharan man must realize his full potential as a man of the twentieth century, and at the same time make his contribution to the Civilization of the Universal."

Leopold Sédar Senghor

So far, we have attempted to give an account of the "objective" aspects of Kenya's main conflict-groups in both a horizontal and a vertical sense. We now proceed to an analysis of the political culture of these groups, i.e. important "subjective" perceptions which are relevant for their situation. We shall first discuss different levels of social identification both within these groups and potentially cutting across their boundaries. This is followed by a discussion of important social, economic and political attitudes which characterize these conflict-groups today. Finally, orientations towards the present

national political system and a number of fundamental political issues are examined in order to see what light they may shed on future developments. For these "attitudinal" characterizations our survey data provide the main source of information.

In order to save space and not to swamp the reader with information which may be of relatively little interest, we report in detail only those findings which are particularly outstanding and characteristic for a specific class or ethnic group. Only where the distribution of a certain variable seems to be of interest for all the groups concerned, do we reproduce a table in full, together with the necessary and most relevant controls. In each case the results were subjected to a chi-square test of "significance", i.e. of the probability that these findings are not purely due to chance. All results reported here are significant at least at the 0.05 level, i.e. a probability of 95 %. In most instances the level of significance is considerably higher. Where it seems to be of interest and indicative for certain theoretical propositions, measures indicating the strength of an association, as lambda, gamma, eta, etc., depending on the level of measurement (nominal, ordinal, or interval) of the variables concerned, are reported as well. We will not create the impression of a "false accuracy" by quoting percentages up to the last decimal point. In view of the limitations of our sample we do not feel that such a procedure would be justified. We are fairly

confident, however, that our results do reflect a correct order of magnitude for most of the variables discussed.

CHAPTER XIV

LEVELS OF SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION

A person's identifications with various groups at distinct levels of his social environment are among the most basic factors which shape political action. These range from family bonds to identifications with social classes, religious groups, ideological movements, political parties, a sense of "national" identity, and, possibly as a last stage, a feeling of solidarity with mankind as a whole. In some individuals a particular identification may become so predominant that it tends to prevail over all others as in cases of extreme ethnocentrism or nationalism. In other persons multiple identifications may exist relatively harmoniously side by side; they are activated only when a situation calls for an expression of group solidarity at a particular level. Together with such "positive" identifications "negative" ones usually can be found which more clearly define a person's attachment in terms of his "ingroup - outgroup" membership. Again some of these negative identifications may become excessive in certain individuals and groups, as in cases of extreme xenophobia, or they may find their expression in strong and persistent ethnic

or racial prejudices. ¹ The factors involved in the formation of such attitudes operate at both a psychological and a social level and they can only be meaningfully analyzed and adequately understood if both the "subjective" and "objective" conditions in each situation are considered. ²

It is very difficult to assess the different scopes and degrees of intensity of positive and negative identifications with the common instruments of empirical research. Some of the more direct "measures" which have been developed for this purpose ³ have proven to be limited in their potential applications, especially in cross-cultural studies such as ours. Truly comparative quantitative material is extremely rare and even the study by Almond and Verba, which was pioneering in many respects, provides us with relatively little information on this point. Their analysis of what they call "system affect", which deals with answers to the question "what are the things about this country that you are most proud of", ⁴ is more concerned with attributes of one's society such as the political system and economic achievements; it pre-supposes the existence of this very society by the kind of question posed. Little is revealed, therefore, as to the actual feeling of national identity which may exist in the countries discussed by them. This approach can be justified for countries which look back on a long period of relatively stable existence, but it is not possible in areas where new political entities

are in state of flux and exist on various levels side by side. Most of the measures which have been developed so far have focused on a particular kind of positive or negative identification as ethnocentrism or the question of "national identity" and do not deal with possible multiple identifications and their differing degrees of intensity within a given political unit.

We do not pretend to be able to offer any generally applicable and "final" solution to the problem of assessing a person's range of social identifications in their various degrees of intensity, but we think that preliminary insights may be gained from the answers we obtained in our survey. These at least seem to confirm some of the "hunches" advanced by other authors and certain expectations based on our own experience.

Family relations

In all societies the relationship to one's family is of the most immediate concern and constitutes one of the most intensive social bonds. In Kenya, as in most other Sub-Saharan African countries, not only is the size of a "nuclear" family (husband and wife or wives and their children) usually much larger than in Europe (the mean household size in our sample varies between slightly less than eight persons among the Kalenjin and more than thirteen among the Luyia), but feelings of intensive

family bonds often comprise a much larger intra- and inter-generational group as well. This is reflected in the terminology used in these relationships: persons who are known as "cousins", "uncles", "nephews", "nieces" etc. in European countries are often called "father" or "mother" in Kenya, if they belong to the generation of a person's actual parents, or "brother" or "sister", if they are of the same generation. In each case the descent from a common, albeit remote ancestor is the decisive criterion determining one's family membership and the kind and degree of one's obligations. There is a good deal of variation between different ethnic groups in Kenya in the extent to which these relationships are learned and perpetuated over a number of generations. We need only compare the very strict extended lineage system of the Luo and the Maasai system of "systematic forgetting" of one's ancestors to illustrate this point.⁵ But, judging from survey material and other sources we analyzed, there do not seem to be great differences in the intensity of feelings towards members of a person's "family" among the different ethnic groups and classes, even if the scope of such relationships may differ somewhat.

Three items in our survey are most directly related to this issue: "Those who earn money should share it with all members of the family"; "hospitality demands always to give food and a place to sleep even to more remote relatives"; and, contradicting the first two

statements somewhat, "I only care about myself and my immediate family, the rest must take care of themselves".⁵

TABLE IV, 1
FAMILY RELATIONS; BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage agreeing		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	'Haas.	Tot.
Agric. bourgeoisie	Share money	61	(100)	(100)	67	75	77	(23)	67
	Offer hospitality	73	(100)	(100)	92	75	100	100	83
	Only care for immediate family	50	-	-	50	37	77	(56)	51
Agric. proletaroids and proletariat	Share money	87	88	86	80	74	82	81	83
	Offer hospitality	80	90	80	85	73	91	85	83
	Care for immediate family	57	32	51	22	41	63	50	44
Non-agric. classes	Share money	82	82	100	92	76	75	(82)	83
	Offer hospitality	78	70	85	79	77	70	(75)	77
	Care for immediate family	42	31	(36)	34	37	(45)	(42)	38
Total	Share money	79	87	89	81	75	78	73	80
	Offer hospitality	79	86	83	84	75	90	85	82
	Care for immediate family	48	30	45	33	39	68	50	43
Weighted N:		269	145	90	158	194	92	107	1055

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category.

The answers to the first two questions thus were overwhelmingly affirmative, while a considerable proportion of the respondents disagreed with the third one.⁷ The variations by ethnic group are not very pronounced, at least if one compares the results among the still largely traditional agricultural proletariats. The only minor exception are the Luo who showed a somewhat lower level of agreement with our first two statements.

This pattern is affected, however, by the class position of the respondents. Here it becomes apparent that to offer hospitality even to more remote relatives still is accepted by most members of the agricultural bourgeoisie. To share one's cash income with them is, on the other hand, much less acceptable to this group. In contrast, in the non-agricultural classes hospitality obviously becomes a greater problem (living under often quite crowded conditions in town), whereas the sharing of money with other family members, reflecting the continuing links between those living in town and their kin up-country, is agreed to more often. To "care only about one's immediate family" is also more widespread among the members of the agricultural bourgeoisie. In the non-agricultural classes this attitude is less common, again possibly reflecting the more symbiotic relationship between family members in town and in the rural areas.

Further controls show that the first item in particular is strongly related to the sex of the respondents

(females stating much more often that money should be shared by all family members; $r = 0.15$, $p < 0.001$). Age and level of education, on the other hand, are factors which exercise relatively little independent influence on these attitudes.

That family responsibilities and the expectations put on better-off relatives can also become problematical is revealed by some of the answers to our open-ended question probing for the respondents' biggest personal problem.⁸ There, a considerable number of middle and higher level employees and members of the non-agricultural bourgeoisie reported that their family obligations are a heavy burden for them.

Traditional social bonds

A second level of social identification we probed for is that of the traditional social groupings within each ethnic community. We did not collect any attitudinal data in this respect, given the diversity of traditional social groups, but some factual information concerning the actual clan ("ukoo" in our Swahili questionnaire) and age-set ("rika") membership of the respondents can be provided:⁹

TABLE IV, 2
CLAN AND AGE-SET MEMBERSHIP; BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage reporting clan / age-set membership		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Agric. classes	Clan	100	100	78	100	93	100	100	96
	Age-set	46	8	18	42	-	100	100	41
Non-agric. classes	Clan	89	85	45	79	70	100	100	85
	Age-set	43	26	22	56	-	100	97	41
Total	Clan	95	97	76	93	89	100	100	93
	Age-set	45	12	19	48	-	100	99	41
Weighted N:		254	153	96	136	178	80	103	1028

Practically all of the agricultural Kikuyu, Kamba, Luyia, Luo, Kalenjin, and Maasai respondents thus are still aware of their clan membership and know their clan name. Among the Mijikenda, where a more mixed pattern of clans and lineages used to exist before it was partially superseded by outside factors, this percentage is somewhat reduced. In the non-agricultural classes, however, knowledge of one's clan affiliation has decreased in all groups, except for the Kalenjin and Maasai. These two also are the only ethnic groups where age-set membership is still reported by almost all respondents. The Kikuyu and Luyia occupy an intermediate position in this regard (almost half of them still know the name of their age-set). This percentage has been drastically reduced for the Mijikenda and Kamba, reflecting the traditionally lower significance and the

relatively early breakdown of this institution among them. The Luo did not have this form of social organization.

Age is the strongest positively correlated factor for both kinds of group membership ($r = 0.11$, $p < 0.001$ for clans, and $r = 0.17$, $p < 0.001$ for age-sets). Clan and age-set membership are also reported much more often by males ($r = 0.07$ and 0.12 respectively), and by those living in the rural areas ($r = 0.29$ and 0.09). The level of education of respondents, on the other hand, is negatively correlated ($r = 0.06$, $p < 0.05$ for clan; and $r = 0.08$, $p < 0.01$ for age-set membership).

We also attempted to assess the comparative importance of traditional leadership roles in an indirect manner. When we asked the respondents, whether they had gone to anyone recently seeking advice, ¹⁰ about one-fifth of those who had done so in our rural sample named a "respected person in the community" (one-third named family members, one-fourth friends and neighbors, and one-eighth government officials such as local chiefs). In general, those with a higher level of education tend to seek advice more often. Those who had asked "respected persons" for advice tend to be in the lower educational categories and the more subsistence-oriented occupations. We could not discern any clear-cut differences between the various ethnic groups because the total number of respondents in each sub-category was rather small. What seems to be remarkable, however, is the fact that the category of "respected person" was not mentioned by any

of the respondents in our urban sample. "Family" and "friends and neighbors" (with about 35 %) and government officials (15 %) are the categories quoted most often. In both samples the number of politicians (e.g. Members of Parliament or KANU officials), who are mentioned as advisers, is negligible.

Scope of social trust

We further attempted to assess the scope of social trust a person might have towards others: "Some people say that most persons can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with other people. How do you feel about it? Can you trust most people, only a few people, or don't you trust anybody?"¹¹ If the middle category was chosen, we probed further: "Would you say you trust only members of your family, only personal friends, only members of your age-group, only members of your clan, only members of your tribe, all Kenyans?"¹² The answers to this middle category reveal some interesting distinctions between the different ethnic groups as indicated in table IV, 3:

TABLE IV, 3
RESTRICTED SCOPES OF TRUST; BY ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage who trust only	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Family members	26	43	57	56	26	35	37	39
Personal friends	40	46	29	25	42	19	11	32
Members of age-group	2	1	-	1	5	11	21	6
Members of clan	5	-	3	4	4	5	4	4
Members of tribe	5	4	11	7	4	15	12	7
All Kenyans	22	6	-	7	19	15	15	13
Weighted N:	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	112	82	28	102	79	62	73	538

As might have been expected, family members and friends are thought to be most trustworthy in all ethnic groups. In comparison, other traditional kinships structures such as the "clan" do not play any significant role. Only for the Maasai and, to a lesser extent, the Kalenjin do other traditional social structures such as "age-sets" still prove to be very important. Trust towards all members of one's "tribe" is also rare, only the Kalenjin seem to put somewhat more emphasis on this aspect.¹³ On the other hand, the possibility "all Kenyans" was chosen, perhaps after some second thoughts, by a small but not very divergent percentage of all groups, and it seems that the respondents in this category can more or less be grouped with those trusting "most people" except perhaps for some stronger feeling of suspicion towards expatriates among them. When we controlled

for a number of independent factors possibly influencing this attitude it became apparent that urban residence and a higher level of education tend to weaken traditional attachments (e.g. trusting only members of one's family, clan, age-set or tribe) and that, instead, personal friends or "all Kenyans" are trusted more often. ¹⁴

At the most general level, too, the existence of feelings of social trust shows some interesting differences among the ethnic groups. In addition to the more general question already quoted above, we probed for two somewhat more specific attitudes: "Speaking generally, would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves?", and "do you think that most people are trying to take advantage of you, if they get the chance, or would they try to be fair?" ¹⁵ The combined answers to these questions are as follows:

/ Insert Table IV, 4 /

TABLE IV, 4
ASPECTS OF GENERAL SOCIAL TRUST; BY ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage who trust	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Most people	32	40	51	22	31	24	14	31
Only few people	53	45	31	68	48	67	63	53
Nobody	15	15	18	10	21	9	23	16
Percentage who think that people								
Help others	29	45	23	40	20	36	10	29
Look out for themselves	71	55	77	60	80	64	90	71
Take advantage	74	65	68	53	71	37	51	63
Are fair	26	35	32	47	29	63	49	37
Weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

It seems to be remarkable, that the Maasai respondents showed the lowest level of general trust and have by far the highest percentage of those who think that most people are inclined to look out for themselves. As we have seen above this attitude prevails not only towards outsiders, but, to a large extent, towards members of their own ethnic group as well. The Kikuyu and Luo are next among those who indicated high levels of distrust. The Luyia and Kalenjin seem to be most discriminating as to whom they trust (choosing the middle category most often), but their specific suspicion that others take advantage of them is somewhat lower than that of the groups already mentioned. In the case of the Kalenjin an attitude of fairness is expected to

prevail even by a clear majority of the respondents, the only group to do so in our survey. The Kamba showed, relatively speaking, the highest levels of trust in a rather consistent manner, while the findings for the Mijikenda (the highest percentage of "general trust", but rather low scores on the other two items) are somewhat ambiguous. Taken altogether, an attitude of general social trust was expressed by somewhat less than one-third of the respondents. When we compare this with the results reported by Almond and Verba, who probe for a similar attitude, this places the population in our survey as distinctly less trusting than that of the United States or the United Kingdom, for example, but far above that of Italy and still somewhat above that of Mexico. ¹⁶

When we introduced a number of controls, it turned out that the level of education and place of residence influence the overall degree of social trust most strongly across all ethnic groups. The higher the level of education the more discriminating were the respondents (62 % of those with secondary education choosing the middle category of question 23 compared to 48 % for the illiterates); the number of those "trusting nobody" increased as well (from 15 to 20 %). In town the level of distrust is also much higher (25 % "trusting nobody") than in the countryside (14 %). These results are rather consistent for all ethnic groups, the differences between them tend to disappear, however, in the urban setting. Other factors

which might potentially affect this attitude, such as sex, age, or religion, did not prove to be significant when we checked their influence within each ethnic group.

Ethnic identity

In our search for distinct levels of social identification we now come to the level of ethnic (or "tribal") identity. As we pointed out in Part Two above, none of the present main ethnic groups in Kenya constituted a single coherent social and political unit in the past. There are, however, some remarkable differences in the degree of cohesion and homogeneity which traditionally existed in these societies and a certain rank-order can be established in this respect. Thus it can probably be said that the Kikuyu and Kamba, despite regional variations, traditionally showed the greatest degree of social unity. Next are the Maasai and Luo, who, despite consisting of distinct "subtribes" in the past, demonstrate a great measure of cultural similarity and who have always been known to themselves and to outsiders by a common "tribal" name. They are followed by the Mijikenda and Abaluyia who are composed of still rather distinct sub-groups and who have come to be known by a common designation only in the relatively recent past. The least coherent group, finally, are the "Kalenjin" who comprise people showing a considerable cultural variety

and great differences in their dominant modes of production. Their common name also is the most recent and, quite clearly, the most artificial one.

All these groups, however, have developed a certain measure of "ethnic identity" and they are perceived as distinct comprehensive social units at least in their relationships towards each other. In this sense "tribalism" must be seen and understood as a modern phenomenon operating in a new social and political context and not merely as an atavistic feature. Thus it is not surprising that feelings of ethnic identity have persisted and in some cases even increased in modern urban environments, for example, ¹⁷ and that ethnic groups still constitute the most "natural" social unit with which people identify when they are acting in certain competitive situations. The degree of ethnic identity shown by each group and the loyalties which are invoked in any particular situation depend, however, very much on the actual circumstances. If "tribalism" is understood in this way, it is not only an "evil power" which causes nepotism, corruption and a great deal of social strife, but it is also, to a certain extent, a constructive force, the effects of which have to be assessed quite realistically in a larger "pluralistic" social and political setting. ¹⁸ When no feelings of superiority or dominance are implied, the particular identity and heritage of each group can become a valuable factor enriching the cultural diversity of a "nation" as

a whole.

One measure employed in our study, a scale of "social distance", sheds some light on the question of ethnic identity as well. While its main thrust was directed at analysing particular aspects of inter-ethnic relations, ¹⁹ it also opens some interesting insights into the degree of self-centeredness of each group. When we added up the mean scores of the members of each group indicating the "distance" they expressed towards all other peoples we were able to construct an index which reflects to a certain extent the intensity of social identification a person has with his or her own ethnic group. The scores obtained in this way are reported in table IV, 5: ²⁰

TABLE IV, 5
SELF-CENTEREDNESS OF ETHNIC GROUPS

=====	
Kik. Kam. Mij. Luy. Luo Kal. Maas.	
Total mean of social distance expressed towards all other groups ^a	1.20 0.81 1.07 0.99 1.16 1.78 2.19

^a Rural sample only

The Kalenjin and the Maasai thus exhibit a rather high degree of "ethnocentrism" (provided this term is not used with its aggressive and negative connotations, ²¹ but rather as a strong expression of and preference for

social relations centering around one's own ethnic group). This is in conformity with the relatively higher degree of isolation of these groups in contemporary Kenyan society. The Kamba, Luyia, and Mijikenda, on the other hand, express the lowest mean social distance towards others, while Luo and Kikuyu occupy intermediate positions. This pattern remained significant even after we introduced a number of controls.

Religious affiliations

One social bond which potentially can transcend traditional communal ties and ethnic identities is membership in a religious community. While traditionally in Kenya, as well as in most other parts of Africa, the particular characteristics of a person's religious beliefs coincided with those of his ethnic group, church organizations today are cutting across ethnic groups, but are also creating divisions within them. This spread of "modern" religious communities, however, is still rather uneven. Most of the pastoralist peoples, for example, have been left out so far, and some denominations are heavily concentrated in certain regions and ethnic groups, as, e.g., Muslims among some of the Mijikenda peoples and other groups living in the coastal area. Nevertheless, distinctions between religious communities have emerged which are independent of the ethnic origin of their members and which have led to

special group identifications. Our means of assessing the magnitude of such feelings again is not very accurate, but as was the case with the expressions of ethnic identity, at least some clues to religious exclusiveness can be gained from the answers to our "social distance" scale.²² The average mean scores of social distance expressed towards members of other religious groups thus indicate a certain degree of "self-centeredness" for each group:

TABLE IV, 6
SELF-CENTEREDNESS OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS

	Catholics	Anglicans	African Independents	Other Christians	Muslims	Respondents with no formal religion
Total mean of social distance expressed towards all other religious groups ^a	0.76	0.58	0.78	0.72	0.92	1.40

^a Total weighted sample

The scores here are generally lower than those found for ethnicity, which confirms the more general observation that religious divisions are, at least as yet, of relatively little importance in Kenya, although some political divisions based on religion exist within certain ethnic groups.

This is in contrast to neighboring Uganda, for

example, not to speak of such religiously quite strongly divided countries as the Netherlands and Germany, or India, Lebanon and Ireland. The relatively high score for those with no formal religion can be explained to a large extent by the coincidence of this feature with a high sense of ethnic self-centeredness, particularly among the Maasai respondents. The differences among the other religious communities show some slight tendencies towards greater or lesser exclusivness, in particular the somewhat higher score for Muslims can be taken as an indication of this fact.

When we controlled for ethnic group, level of education, sex, age, and social class, it turned out that ethnic affiliation is the strongest factor influencing the social distance of respondents from members of other religious groups (explaining almost one-fifth of the variance for practically all scores). The differences by religion within each ethnic group and the ethnic differences in each religious group remained significant, indicating the independent strength of both factors. Education, another significant factor, showed a curvilinear relationship: those having a medium (i.e. in our case primary) level of education showed the least distance; those with secondary education became somewhat more discriminating; those with no formal education at all showed most discrimination. Males showed considerably less distance towards members of other religions than females. Age and

social class, on the other hand, hardly influenced this attitude.

Class consciousness

The most important factor cutting across ethnic and other communal ties in modern societies is membership in a social "class", which is characterized by common interests and aspects of life-style. As we stated above, we prefer to employ the notion of class in its "objective" meaning based on the differential access to the ownership of the means of production and ^{the} authoritative decision-making power over them.²³ The question, however, whether persons who objectively belong to a certain class (i.e. who in Marx' term form a "class in itself") actually are conscious of this fact and act on this basis in a solidaristic manner (i.e. constitute a "class for itself") is an empirical problem; it cannot be resolved a priori by merely calling all discrepancies between objective conditions and subjective sentiments a "false consciousness". At least in short term analyses subjective interpretations of existence have to be considered a factor potentially as important as objective interests in deterring political actions, no matter whether the first or the second is held to be the original and independent one.

Thus we are faced with the difficult task of assessing feelings of class consciousness and potential solidarity in a meaningful and empirical way. This poses

even greater problems than in the case of ethnic or other communal identifications, because it cannot be assumed that the units of such an analysis exist, except in some very rudimentary form, in the minds of respondents prior to our investigation. Thinking in terms of belonging to the "lower middle class", "upper class" etc. is alien to African tradition. A selfassessment given in response to a questionnaire phrased in these terms thus cannot solve the original dilemma of determining the subjective sentiments of members of objectively identified social classes. For this reason we took, for the largest part, a more indirect approach. When we stratified the answers of respondents according to objectively determined class criteria some interesting differences of attitudes became apparent. While we considered this potential influence of "class" as an independent factor in the analysis of all the variables in this study, we also had included some items in our questionnaire which related most directly to respondents' perceptions of their economic position in society and some crucial aspects of Kenya's overall economic system.

One question was concerned with wages as one of the most central issues affecting worker-employer relationships: "Some people think that business firms make too much money while not paying enough to their workers, others think that they pay fair wages and make a fair profit. What is your opinion?"²⁴ The results are

reported in Table IV, 7:

TABLE IV, 7

ACCEPTANCE OF WAGES AND PROFITS; BY CLASS

Percentage who	Non-agric. bourg.	Salariat	Non-agric. proletaroids	Non-agric. proletariat	Agric. bourg.	Agric. proletaroids	Agric. proletariat	Sub-proletariat	Students	Total
Think firms pay not enough	(33)	66	50	63	55	51	71	34	52	54
Think firms pay fair wages	(40)	31	(31)	30	33	24	29	50	35	29
Don't know	(27)	(3)	(19)	(7)	(7)	25	-	(16)	(11)	17
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	15	61	26	86	181	559	93	32	61	1114

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents in a particular sub-category.

Both the non-agricultural and the agricultural bourgeoisie have the highest percentage of those who think that wages are fair, while members of the salariat, the non-agricultural proletariat, and, most distinctly, the agricultural proletariat show a high degree of dissatisfaction with the distribution of wages and profits. This pattern thus indicates a clear class division along this line. Opinion among the non-agricultural and agricultural proletaroids, members of the sub-proletariat and students,

all of whom are not so directly concerned by this issue, is more equally divided, a considerable percentage of the members of these groups also answering "don't know". This class division is maintained in particular among the Kikuyu and Luyia, but it tends to disappear within the ethnic other groups where social differentiations are less pronounced. The influence of other factors such as age, sex, or level of education, which initially showed some significant correlations also tended to disappear when we controlled for social class at the same time.

Another question relating to a basic feature of Kenya's economic system ("Should property in land be communal, that is belong to a tribe, a whole village, the government or a larger group of people, or private, that is belong to one person or one family only?")²⁵ did not quite reveal possibly expected class divisions. Across all classes approximately two-thirds of all respondents are in favor of private land ownership a tendency which is even stronger among members of the non-landowning classes. In terms of ethnic affiliation, however, some basic differences became apparent:

/ Insert table IV, 8 /

TABLE IV,8

PREFERRED FORM OF LAND OWNERSHIP; BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Percentages in favor of		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Agric. bourgeoisie	Communal land ownership	22	--	--	42	(38)	54	(25)	34
	Private	78	(100)	(100)	58	50	46	56	63
	Don't know	--	--	--	--	(12)	--	(19)	(3)
Agric. proletarioids	Communal	14	13	26	46	32	64	50	30
	Private	83	79	73	49	55	36	46	64
	Don't know	(3)	8	(1)	(5)	13	--	(4)	6
Non-land-owning classes	Communal	22	32	(14)	24	38	(25)	(25)	26
	Private	78	65	86	73	59	75	(67)	72
	Don't know	--	(3)	--	(3)	(3)	--	(8)	(2)
Total	Communal	19	17	23	36	34	51	44	30
	Private	80	76	76	61	56	49	50	66
	Don't know	(1)	7	(1)	(3)	10	--	(6)	4
Weighted N		275	156	96	158	194	108	92	1079

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents in a particular sub-category.

Thus the Kikuyu, Kamba and Mijikenda clearly stand out in their preference for private land ownership, while the Luyia and Luo take an intermediate position and the Kalenjin and Maasai are split rather equally on this issue.²⁶ This is in line with what would have been expected from our discussion of the diverging economic traditions of these groups and their differential development in recent decades. Within the ethnic groups differences between the two main agricultural classes also are significant. While the variations in the first five groups are not really outstanding (the differences for the Kamba and Mijikenda are based on a very small N for members of the agricultural bourgeoisie), the pattern for the Kalenjin and Maasai (who, taken altogether, showed the highest preference for communal ownership) seems to lend support to the proposition that economic modernization (at least under present economic and political circumstances in Kenya) works towards a greater acceptance of private land ownership in agricultural production.

That a rural "capitalism" of this kind (if it can be labelled as such) should not run completely unabated, however, is clearly expressed in the response to our next question: "Do you think people should be allowed to own as much land as they can afford or no more than they themselves can cultivate?"²⁷

TABLE IV,9
 PERCENTAGE FAVORING LIMITATION OF LAND OWNERSHIP;
 BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

		Kik.	Kan.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Total
Agric. proletarians	Unrestricted ownership	42	51	49	20	33	(27)	22	37
	Restricted	51	46	41	65	67	46	54	53
	Don't know	(7)	(3)	(10)	(15)	-	(27)	24	10
Non-landowning classes	Unrestricted	29	41	(64)	22	30	37	(11)	31
	Restricted	69	59	(36)	73	70	63	(59)	67
	Don't know	(2)	-	-	(5)	-	-	-	(2)
Total ^a	Unrestricted	37	48	54	28	32	34	21	35
	Restricted	60	50	38	64	68	56	59	59
	Don't know	(3)	(2)	(8)	8	-	(10)	20	6
Weighted N:		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

^a Including students

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents for a particular sub-category.

Three-fifth of the respondents thus stated that people should not be allowed to own more land than they can cultivate themselves, a tendency which again is significantly stronger among the non-landowning classes. Between ethnic groups some differences persist as well, which confirms to a certain extent our previous observations. Those groups who are most in favor of private land-

ownership (i.e. the Kikuyu, Kamba and Mijikenda) also tend to be for the unrestricted individual acquisition of land, while the others support this idea to a much lesser extent. The position among the Kikuyu and Luyia seems to depend most strongly on the social class of respondents, which also lends support to some of our earlier remarks concerning these groups (the number of members of the agricultural bourgeoisie among the Mijikenda in our sample really is too small to warrant any meaningful differentiations).

These opinions on certain key issues relating to the overall social and economic order thus reflect some objectively determined "class" differences. While this does not mean that an actual class consciousness or class solidarity exists among members of these classes which would make them true "classes in and for themselves" at least some latent and significant contrasts are to be shown to exist which can lead to an intensification of conflicts along these lines in the future. ²⁸

National identity

The final unit of identity to be discussed here is that of the "nation-state". In the course of a long development which culminated in Europe in the 19th century this kind of social community became the prototype which political leaders everywhere emulated. In some parts of the world its scope is again beginning to be transcended

by an even larger unit (like, possibly, a federation of European states); in other regions the very step of achieving this kind of national integration is yet to be taken and constitutes a matter of foremost concern. At the same time, it has been increasingly realized that, while some of the "objective" factors once thought essential to the process of nation-building (such as a common economy, common ethnic origin, or common language) may greatly facilitate the establishment of a larger community, they are not in themselves sufficient to account for such a development. In the last analysis, it is the "spiritual" unit, the sharing of certain positive affective and evaluative attitudes towards a common object, the nation, which is the ultimate criterion for the definition of nationhood.²⁹ A psychological factor, which may be involved in this process, is a certain "need to identify" either with a social group as a whole or with a particular political leader, which may be the result of a personal or social insecurity which causes "people to feel a deep need to be bound to others, to escape the sense of individual isolation".³⁰ The nation-state is one of the objects with which such an identification has most commonly been made at least at a certain stage of economic and political development.

In the case of most Sub-Saharan African countries the creation of "workable" modern political and economic units has been made all the more difficult by the fact that most of the boundaries between them were drawn by the

colonial powers, often dividing existing ethnic communities and grouping together others which had little or no relation with each other in the past. The borders of the present state of Kenya, for example, cut through the Maasai peoples in the south, divide sub-groups of the Abaluyia, Karamojong and Turkana in the west and separate Somali-speaking peoples in the north-east.³¹ Nevertheless, the declared policy of the "Organization of African Unity" (OAU) has been strictly adhered to so far, namely, not to open this "Pandora's box" of pre-colonial ethnic allegiances again, which could lead to a complete re-drawing of the map of this continent, but also in the very process of doing so, to utter chaos and misery. This was most dramatically shown in the cases of threatening secessions in Zaire and Nigeria.

In most cases the existing states and their boundaries have been accepted by a majority of the population living within them and the existing administrative structures have developed a sufficient momentum of their own to keep them going. This does not mean, however, that largely homogeneous "nations" in the somewhat idealized sense of European 19th century nationalism have actually emerged and even in Europe countries like Belgium, Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia are important exceptions. In most cases in Africa today it seems to be a more pragmatic, matter-of-fact acceptance of a given administrative and economic unit to which there are few if any workable alternatives. Any sense of "national identity" which may be expressed and

which centers around certain modern economic, political or other achievements of the new country thus has to be seen in this somewhat more "realistic" light. Sub-"national" identities, such as those described in the preceding sections, persist in most cases often in conjunction with some forms of attachment to the new nation, but they sometimes also create conflicts between "national" and ethnic loyalties, which, it seems, most often still tend to be resolved in favor of the latter.

One question in our survey relating to this aspect was: "As a Kenyan, what are some of the things in this country you are particularly proud of?"³² Here almost 30 % mentioned the attainment of independence ("uhuru") and the political stability and leadership of the country, about one-fifth referred to the economic and social achievements of the post-independence years, and a slightly smaller percentage named the beauty of the countryside. More than one-fourth of the respondents, on the other hand, stated that there was nothing to be particularly proud of. This general picture became more revealing when we stratified the answers according to the ethnic group of respondents:

/ Insert table IV, 10 /

TABLE IV, 10
OBJECTS OF NATIONAL PRIDE; BY ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage proud of	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Mal.	Maas.	Tot.
Political achievements	41	29	13	36	16	27	13	28
Social and economic achievements	22	15	23	30	21	25	8	21
Natural environment	20	12	15	10	9	31	32	17
Other	6	14	16	1	7	7	3	7
Nothing	11	30	33	23	47	10	44	27
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

It thus becomes apparent that political achievements are most often mentioned by the Kikuyu, the country's dominant and politically most active group. Social and economic achievements are highlighted among the Luyia, whereas the Kalenjin and Maasai most often emphasize the beauty of the natural environment. The Kamba and Mijikenda do not rank very high on any of these scores and almost one-third of them report that there is nothing in particular to be proud of. The lack of pride among almost half the Maasai and Luo is even more striking. While the figure for the Maasai can most probably be attributed to their more general "parochialism", the score for the Luo seems to be an indication of their genuine disenchantment with central political institutions in Kenya and the relative isolation

and alienation they have suffered in the wake of the assassination of Tom Mboya, the banning of KPU, and the detention of its most influential leaders.

These different ethnic characteristics remain highly significant even after a number of controls. A higher level of education, "higher" social class, and urban residence tend to decrease the number of those who are not proud of anything (most dramatically in the case of those with some secondary education, where this figure drops to only 11 % compared to 41 % for illiterates). Answers mentioning the natural environment or some other object remain rather stable, but those referring to social and economic achievements (25 % compared to 14 %) or political achievements (37 % compared to 18 %) increase significantly. It is not quite clear whether these increases are merely due to the higher level of knowledge of these groups or whether they reflect a higher degree of an affective "national" attachment as well. The fact that "political achievements" in particular are mentioned much more often by these groups tends to lend support to the latter interpretation.

In order to probe the reverse of this attitude we also asked: "What, if anything, would you criticize in this country?"³³ A cross-tabulation of this question with the preceding one resulted in the following picture:³⁴

TABLE IV, 11
 PERSONS PROUD AND/OR CRITICAL OF THEIR
 COUNTRY; BY ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Proud/not critical	39	37	37	32	16	27	28	32
Not proud/critical	3	7	10	6	21	4	-	77
Proud/critical	52	40	39	47	39	65	28	46
Not proud/ not critical	7	16	14	15	24	4	44	15
Weighted N:	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	145	123	71	134	150	77	68	868

It can be seen, supporting our previous findings, that the percentage of those who are proud of their country without criticizing anything is highest among the Kikuyu, followed by the Kamba and the Mijikenda. The Luo again have by far the highest percentage of any group who are not proud of anything, but who are critical of a number of aspects. The more general parochialism of the Maasai is confirmed by the fact that almost half of the respondents are not proud or critical of anything.

CHAPTER XV

SOME BASIC SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Before we turn to orientations and issues directly related to the present national political system we shall first provide information concerning some basic social, economic and political attitudes which help to characterize the more general "political culture" of the most important conflict-groups. These include ascriptive criteria determining social positions, among which the social and political role accorded to women is a special but important case. Then respondents' attitudes towards social change and socio-economic "conservatism" will be examined, followed by a discussion of their satisfaction with their present economic situation and the expectations they have for their economic future. Subsequently, we will discuss "dispositions towards violence" which may become active in certain social and sometimes perhaps political situations. We shall also probe the more general "political authoritarianism" of the respondents in our survey and, conversely, their acceptance of "democratic values".

Ascriptive social criteria

"Ascription" contrasts with "achievement" as a

mechanism determining a person's status in society. ¹ The former is an inherited or similarly fixed quality which one cannot escape in a given society. It includes race, sex, caste, or "estate" membership. The latter refers to the way by which status can be acquired through one's own personal efforts. "Achievement" in this sense, however, does not necessarily imply achievement motivation. ² Thus in a number of strictly hierarchical societies (such as traditionally among the Amhara in Ethiopia, or the societies of medieval Europe) a fairly high level of achievement motivation could be found, at least within certain groups like the "nobility", where fighting for one's "honor" and a competitive spirit in tournaments etc. was common. But a motivation of this kind could not significantly affect a person's overall status in these societies. On the other hand, in a society where equality of opportunity exists for practically all members and achievement thus becomes the main criterion for acquiring status, the level of achievement motivation may not be very high when most people are content with their individual position.

This distinction must be kept in mind, when we now proceed to the analysis of ascriptive criteria as they exist at the attitudinal level among the respondents in our survey. As we have pointed out before, practically all of Kenya's ethnic groups traditionally had an "egalitarian-segmentarian" social and political structure based mainly on age and sex as differentiating factors.

This fact does not mean, however, that "ascription" was either the only or the dominant criterion determining status. Within each age-set personal qualities and achievements decided a person's eventual social and political position and the esteem he or she would enjoy.

Ascription also was relatively unimportant in determining a person's economic fortune. In the traditional economy very little wealth (e.g. in land or cattle) could be accumulated over a number of generations. The main status symbol and expression of wealth was the number of wives a man could afford. By its very nature this kind of status cannot easily be transmitted to one's heirs, because polygyny usually also means having many children. The laws of inheritance of each society usually provided for dividing the property among the greater number of these children. Thus only in very few instances (such as the position of "ruoth" in some traditional Luo lineages) can inherited wealth as a source of social status be said to have played a major role among the peoples considered here.

In our survey we attempted to probe for an adherence to ascriptive criteria by a number of attitudinal statements. These included items like "When a man is born the success he is going to have is already decided"; ³ "it is only right that people who belong to a respected family should have to say more than others"; ⁴ and "it is only natural and right that women should have less freedom than men". ⁵

The inter-correlations of these items in the responses to our survey justified their putting together in a separate index of "ascription":⁶

TABLE IV, 12
AGREEMENT WITH ASCRIPTIVE SOCIAL CRITERIA;
BY ETHNIC GROUP

Agreement with ascriptive criteria (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Low	43	39	42	55	46	17	21	40
Medium	37	38	39	23	29	35	38	36
High	20	23	19	22	15	48	41	24
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N	256	149	96	154	191	92	108	1046

The Kalenjin and Maasai thus clearly have the greatest number of those scoring high, which coincides with the fact that the traditional age-set systems in these societies still have remained relatively intact, and that traditional social bonds are still strongest in these groups. The variations between the other groups are not very great. The Luo, who traditionally did not have a fixed age-set organization, have the smallest number of high scorers of all groups. These differences persist across all social classes, age groups, levels of education, religious affiliations, or places of residence. Social class (16 % scoring high in the urban middle and upper

classes compared to a level of 23 % for the urban lower classes and 28 % for the agricultural classes), level of education (27 % agreement among illiterates compared to 14 % among those with secondary education), religious affiliation (38 % among members of African Independent Churches and 29 % among traditionalists compared to 21 % among the members of the mission churches and 18 % among Muslims), and place of residence (25 % in the rural areas compared to 18 % in town) also proved to be significant independent factors. An analysis of variance gives the relative weight of these factors as follows (values of beta adjusted for other independent factors and co-variates): Ethnic origin 0.17, religious affiliation 0.17, social class 0.17, and level of education 0.13.

The social and political role of women

One important criterion of ascription is a person's sex. The continuing inequalities in this regard and the debate over the "proper" role of women in particular warrant the separate discussion of this point. Almost all over the world, in varying degrees, women have been subjugated to a socially and even more politically inferior status. This is also true for most of Africa. Except for the mythological period of matriarchal rule among the Kikuyu in times long past,⁷ men have dominated socially and politically in all the ethnic groups discussed in this study. All the

societies considered here traditionally were organized on patrilineal and virilocal principles which tended to further reinforce the subordinate role of women. In none of them could women participate in the traditional communal decision-making bodies, and most of the significant economic and social transactions (such as the exchange of bridewealth) were handled by men. In spite of these numerous restrictions, however, it seems that most African women traditionally were better off than their counterparts in traditional Arab and many Asian societies. They could (and often did) speak their mind quite freely and had their own way of expressing their wishes and getting what they wanted, even if this sometimes meant resorting to the instigation of the fear of witchcraft, which was particularly attributed to women in many African societies.

Today the traditional role of women is changing. Unlike in some parts of West Africa, where the marketing of agricultural produce and the trading of other items by women have accorded many of them a position of relative economic autonomy,⁸ rural women in Kenya are to a large extent economically dependent on their husbands who tend to monopolize the cash income of the family, particularly when they work in town. Only when women are able to earn money on their own, e.g. through handicrafts or by obtaining a job in town, can they significantly reduce their dependence.

This is also documented by a number of responses to our survey. There we had included some questions relating to the economic decision-making and educational authority in the families of the respondents. A first set of questions inquired about the patterns of decision-making and authority in the parents' generation: "When you were a child, who made the decisions relating to economic matters (e.g. the planting of crops, the work different persons do etc.)?"; and "when a child was punished for some bad behavior, who did it usually?"⁹ The responses are summarized in table IV, 13:

TABLE IV, 13
PARENTS' DECISION-MAKING; BY ETHNIC GROUP

Economic matters decided by (%):	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Father	42	66	42	54	58	63	56	53
Mother	20	5	6	14	13	-	5	11
Both	35	26	46	32	29	37	38	34
Somebody else	3	3	6	-	-	-	1	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Children punished by:								
Father	42	50	60	64	59	59	65	55
Mother	38	29	16	30	19	28	13	27
Either one	19	20	18	6	22	13	22	17
Somebody else	1	1	6	-	-	-	-	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	270	152	86	156	192	92	106	1054

This pattern clearly reflects the traditionally dominating position of the male in these societies, but in at least one-third of all cases women also took part in the economic decision-making. The relatively higher share of mothers who make economic decisions among the Kikuyu, Luyia and Luo is explained to a large extent by the higher degree of male absenteeism (husbands working in town or on large-scale farms) in these groups (32 % of the fathers of the Kikuyu, Luyia and Luo respondents were engaged in non-agricultural occupations compared to 20 % on the average for the other groups). Only 46 % of the respondents whose fathers were in non-agricultural occupations reported that economic decisions were made by the father compared to 57 % of the respondents coming from agricultural families.

In the punishment of children women played even greater roles, but still in all groups the husbands were most often responsible for the punishment. Some generational change in this regard is, however, indicated by the fact that 65 % of respondents above the age of 50 said that as a child they were usually punished by their father, whereas this figure is only 51 % for those aged below 30.

The differences between the generations become even more clearly visible when we compare this table with the answers by married respondents to whom we put the same questions concerning their own family today:

TABLE IV, 14
 DECISION-MAKING IN OWN FAMILY; BY ETHNIC GROUP

Economic matters decided by (%):	Kik.	Kan.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Father	53	76	72	68	58	90	71	66
Mother	15	15	9	18	17	-	12	14
Both	30	6	19	14	25	10	17	19
Somebody else	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Children punished by:								
Father	37	30	37	34	46	41	47	39
Mother	34	52	24	33	26	37	19	33
Either one	27	13	39	33	28	22	34	27
Somebody else	2	5	-	-	-	-	-	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	192	124	74	130	138	59	83	800

As becomes apparent from these comparisons in the younger generation the mothers, indeed, play a greater role in the punishment of children (in no group do the fathers constitute a majority among those responsible for punishment), whereas in the older generation only one group, the Kikuyu, mentioned the fathers in less than 50 % of all cases.

The economic decision-making, however, presents a different picture. While the percentage of women who make economic decisions on their own increases slightly (from 11 % in the older to 14 % in the younger generation

on the average), the percentage of those who make the decisions together with their husbands is cut by half (17 % in the younger generation compared to 34 % in the older one). Our hunch that these changes are due to a large extent to the more general social and economic developments which have occurred in Kenya in recent decades is confirmed by a closer look at the class position of the respective groups of respondents. Here, among the still largely subsistence-oriented agricultural proletariats the traditionally somewhat limited position of males in day-to-day economic affairs has remained unchanged (49 % of husbands make economic decisions compared to 53 % for the fathers in the older generation), and the number of women who make decisions completely on their own has even increased (to 30 %), because of the higher level of male absenteeism in this group today. In the agricultural bourgeoisie, on the other hand, the economic role of males now concerned with the planting of cash crops and the keeping of grade cattle has been greatly strengthened. There, 67 % of the husbands and only 14 % of the wives decide in economic matters, the number of those making joint decisions (19 % compared to 34 % on the average in the older generation) also having been reduced. These changes are even more pronounced in the non-agricultural classes: 70 % of the husbands and only 12 % of the wives make the economic decisions in these groups, 16 % make them jointly.

In contrast to what perhaps might have been

expected, modern developments thus have not led to a higher degree of "emancipation" of married women, at least in the vital sphere of economic decision-making, but rather to a greater confinement of women to their more limited role as housewives both in towns and in the more modern agricultural sector.

During the colonial period some women also became involved in national politics. One of the earliest and most dramatic incidents occurred when Harry Thuku, the first African nationalist politician in Kenya, was arrested by the colonial authorities in March 1922. A large crowd gathered in front of the central police station in Nairobi to demand his release:

"Mary Muthoni Nyanjiru (from Weithaga in location 10 of Fort Hall District) leapt to her feet, pulled her dress right up over her shoulders and shouted to the men: 'You take my dress and give me your trousers. You men are cowards. What are you waiting for? Our leader is in there. Let's get him.' The hundreds of women trilled their ngemi¹⁰ in approbation and from that moment on trouble was probably inevitable. Mary and the others pushed on until the bayonets of the rifles were pricking at their throats, and then the firing started. Mary was one of the first to die." 11

At a later time, during the "Mau Mau" unrest in the 1950s, many women actively supported the freedom-fighters by providing them with food and other items, or by hiding them when necessary. A great number of "Mama Uhurus", as they were sometimes called, contributed significantly to the struggle for independence.

In spite of these achievements the political role of women on Kenya's post-independence national scene has

remained a minor one. Only 4 of the 159 members of Parliament are women (before the elections of 1974, parliament had only one nominated female member), and no woman holds a cabinet post. The only major exception, where a woman occupied a position of major political significance, is the case of Margaret Kenyatta, who from 1966 to 1976 was mayor of Nairobi. Organizations like "Maendeleo ya Wanawake" ("progress for women"), a rather moderate form of "women's lib" mostly concerned with charity affairs and a number of practical matters such as the establishment of workshops and the creation of opportunities for vocational training of women, have made relatively little headway. More important seem to be some neighborhood groups formed among rural women for mutual assistance, but which apparently do not yet extend their activities into the political sphere. ¹²

In the survey we had included three attitudinal questions relating to the position of women. The first one, which is also included in our "ascription index", probed for their more general social role: "It is only natural and right that women should have less freedom than men." ¹³ The second asked more specifically about involvement in politics: "Some people say that women should not be active in politics. Others say, that they should have the same political rights and duties as men. What do you think?" ¹⁴ The third one was the most concrete: "Can you imagine a woman becoming president of this

country?"¹⁵ The results are summarized in table IV, 15:

TABLE IV, 15
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ROLE OF WOMEN;
BY SEX AND ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage saying:		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Women should have less freedom	Males	64	75	71	46	55	75	86	65
	Females	60	61	35	36	46	75	76	54
	Total	62	67	56	43	51	75	82	61
Women should be less active in politics	Males	50	39	36	39	34	59	81	47
	Females	31	38	37	19	25	38	44	32
	Total	42	38	36	33	30	53	68	41
Cannot imagine a woman as president	Males	76	52	43	59	48	65	91	62
	Females	54	49	41	45	56	43	68	52
	Total	67	50	42	54	52	60	33	58
Weighted N:		263	153	96	157	194	92	108	1063

The first question thus was answered in the negative by a majority of respondents, both men and women. Its wording ("it's only natural and right") refers to an ascriptive status of women based on biological criteria which extend into the social sphere. It cannot be excluded that respondents interpreted this statement ("should have less freedom than men") to be mainly concerned with sexual activities. But even in this more restricted sense the answers remain revealing. The second question, which clearly defines politics as a potential field of action, reverses previous answers to a certain extent, a majority now being in favor of an active political role of

women, and only 10 % of all respondents saying that women should "not at all" be active in politics. The discrepancy of 15 percentage points on the average between the answers of male and female respondents is nevertheless remarkable. Finally, the idea that a woman may become president of Kenya seems strange to a majority of respondents, of whom a full third stated that they can "not at all" imagine a woman as president. In addition to possible resentment towards women in high political positions, a statement of this kind may also reflect a quite realistic assessment of a woman's actual chances in view of the fact that at the time of our interviews only three women (Indira Gandhi in India, Sirimavo Bandaranaike in Sri Lanka, and Isabel Peron in Argentina) were heads of government. None of the three had come into office purely on her own merits, but rather through advantage of the position previously held by her husband (Bandaranaike and Peron) or father (Nehru in the case of Indira Gandhi). By summer of 1977 all had been replaced by men. Another very powerful woman of this period, Chiang Ching, did not politically survive the death of her husband, Mao Tse Tung, either.

In terms of the ethnic origin of respondents the Maasai and Kalenjin clearly stand out again as those interpreting a woman's social and political role in the most restrictive sense. In contrast, the Luyia, Luo, and, on the average, the Mijikenda are most "liberal" in this regard. The Kikuyu and Kamba fall somewhere in between. The

discrepancy between the answers by males and females as far as women's "freedom" is concerned is by far the highest among the Mijikenda. Here the strong influence of Islam in this group seems to be manifested quite clearly: the men strongly express their "right of dominance" which excludes their women from social contacts with other men. Apparently men often suspect women of conniving behind their "buibuis" (the large black traditional headcloths) to avoid these restrictions. In the political field the discrepancies between the sexes are greatest among the Maasai and Kalenjin, which may be a reflection of the still largely traditional social organization based on the male dominated age-set system in both groups.

In addition to the sex and ethnic origin of respondents their level of education proved to be a strong factor influencing these attitudes: Only 46 % of those with secondary education agreed that women should have less freedom compared to 63 % for illiterates. 68 % of those with secondary education also said that women should be active in politics compared to 55 % for illiterates ($r = 0.08$, $p < 0.01$). Only the chances of a woman becoming president were judged in a similarly sceptical manner by all educational groups. The independent influence of Muslim or traditional religion affecting these attitudes was largely accounted for when we further controlled this variable by sex and ethnic group (in particular among the Mijikenda and Maasai, where religion and ethnic origin

tend to coincide). Other independent factors as age, place of residence, or social class were of relatively little significance.

Attitudes towards social change

Social change has become an all-pervasive phenomenon in the world today. It has become particularly pronounced in many parts of the "Third World". There, on the one hand, the contact with the former colonial powers and the industrialized countries has led to successful innovations improving the conditions of life in certain groups and some "development" in general, but also, in some cases, to the impoverishment of others and increasing "underdevelopment".¹⁶ At the attitudinal level these changes may be accompanied by the "dynamization" of certain aspects of life, a readiness to accept innovations and similar attitudes,¹⁷ but also, on the other hand, increasing frustrations, anxieties and a more general "anomie".

For our survey we looked for a number of items relating to different aspects of social change. The main sources available were scales developed in the United states which probed for a more general "political-economic conservatism",¹⁸ but also for different aspects of possible alienation and anomie.¹⁹ It was not possible to include any of these scales in full, because the original items were too culture-bound or did not seem

applicable under Kenya's present conditions. Even the reduced number of items which we finally selected turned out to tap a variety of dimensions.²⁰ This is also the case with "conservatism" in the United States, which refers to a reluctance towards changes at the economic level, but which can also become an expression of a distinctive political attitude (in a "left-right" sense of the political spectrum), not rarely involving deeper personality aspects and religious orientations as well.²¹

These different dimensions need not necessarily coincide in the same way in all societies. "Political conservatism", for example, cannot be meaningfully analyzed, in our opinion, without looking at which groups actually exercise political power in any given country. Members of such groups may then be very "conservative" in a political sense of the word, but nevertheless quite receptive to other social or economic changes. Similarly, the persistence of certain traditional economic practices may or may not coincide with certain religious beliefs, or, at the psychological level, social changes may or may not be accompanied by increasing normlessness or anomie.

At least these four main dimensions (political conservatism, reluctance towards economic changes, religious orientations, and an expression of anomie) are related to the items dealing with different aspects of social change which affect different groups in our survey in different ways. We are not able to cover all these dimensions sufficiently

at this place. We shall focus attention here on an expression of a more general "traditionalism" on the one hand, and some of the possible psychological consequences of social change on the other. Among our items two in particular proved to be an expression of a more traditional orientation: "It's better to stick to what you have than to try new things that you really don't know about"; and "a man doesn't really have much wisdom until he is well along in his years".²² Table IV, 16 gives the combined results:

TABLE IV, 16
EXPRESSION OF "TRADITIONALISM";
BY ETHNIC GROUP

Expression of "traditionalism" (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Low	18	28	11	20	34	3	16	21
Medium	39	45	43	37	32	38	40	39
High	33	25	43	39	33	52	44	36
Don't know	10	2	3	4	1	7	-	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

As might have been expected from some of our other findings the Kalenjin, Maasai, and Mijikenda have the highest scores on this index. The Kamba, Kikuyu, and Luo, on the other hand, have the smallest number of those scoring high. The Luyia occupy an intermediate position. Controls show that the age of a respondent produces the most pronounced

differences (42 % of those above the age of 50 scoring high compared to 33 % for those below 30; $r = 0.08$; $p < 0.01$). Contrary to some clichés, women expressed a lower level of traditionalism than men (30 % of the former scoring high compared to 41 % of the latter; $r = 0.09$, $p < 0.001$). Other factors such as a respondent's level of education, place of residence, or social class accounted for only a relatively small variation on this index.

That social change is not rarely accompanied by some adverse consequences as well becomes apparent from the answers to two other related items: "Everything changes so quickly these days that I often have trouble deciding which are the right rules to follow"; and "people were better off in the old days when everyone knew just how he was expected to act".²³ Here it is not so much the ethnic origin of respondents (e.g. a difference of only 2 percentage points between the rural proletarioids scoring high among the Kikuyu and Maasai), but rather social class which accounts for the most pronounced differences:

/ Insert table IV, 17 /

TABLE IV, 17
 EXPRESSION OF "ANOMIE"; BY CLASS

Expression of anomie (%)	Non-agric. bourg.	Sub-riat	Non-agric. proletariats	Non-agric. proletariats	Sub-proletariat	Agric. bourg.	Agric. proletariats	Agric. proletariats	Tot. ^a
Low	(33)	26	22	(19)	15	18	18	13	19
Medium	(54)	38	33	(15)	47	34	36	29	25
High	-	31	36	62	31	33	38	52	37
Don't know	(13)	(5)	(9)	(4)	(7)	15	8	(6)	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	15	61	86	26	32	181	559	93	1072

Figures in parentheses indicate an N. of less than 10 respondents.

^a Including students and school-leavers

Thus the members of the urban middle and upper classes clearly have the greatest number of low scorers on this index, while the percentage of those scoring high is strongest for the agricultural proletariat and the non-agricultural proletariats. The sub-proletariat, which includes a number of "better-off" prostitutes and members of similar occupations, has the same low number of low scorers as the non-agricultural proletariats, but a greater percentage has a "medium" rather than a high score. The differences between the agricultural landowning classes are comparatively small. Other controls (such as sex, age, level of education, or place of residence) produced relatively little variation on this score.

Life satisfaction

A similar picture emerged when we took a closer look at the general satisfaction of respondents with their present life situation. One separate question ("generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your present way of life?" ²⁴) inquired about this aspect. The results are reported in table IV, 18:

TABLE IV, 18
LIFE SATISFACTION; BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage expressing dissatisfaction with way of life	Kik. Kam. Mij. Luy. Luo Kal. Maas. Tot.							
Non-agric. bourgeoisie	(50)	(50)	-	(33)	(50)	-	(100)	50
Salariat	54	77	(80)	(80)	(27)	(100)	-	69
Non-agric. proletariat	56	92	(75)	67	(53)	-	(50)	66
Non-agric. proletaroids	75	(100)	(100)	(100)	(100)	-	-	81
Agric. bourgeoisie	61	-	(50)	83	(43)	61	(46)	60
Agric. proletaroids	62	51	75	69	46	73	45	58
Agric. proletariat	73	-	(100)	100	-	100	(100)	84
Sub-proletariat	67	(50)	(100)	(50)	(75)	(67)	(100)	66
Total	64	55	77	77	51	73	47	63
Weighted N:	267	156	88	158	187	92	98	1046

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents.

On the whole, the members of the agricultural proletariat and the non-agricultural proletarioids clearly express the highest degree of dissatisfaction. The percentages for the non-agricultural proletariat and the salariat are also remarkably high. The agricultural land-owning classes show a significantly lower level of discontent, whereas the members of the non-agricultural bourgeoisie are, relatively speaking, most satisfied with their present situation. Differentiated by ethnic group, the Maasai, Luo and Kamba have the highest level of those among the agricultural proletarioids who are satisfied with their traditional way of life, whereas dissatisfaction is strongest for the Luyia, Kalenjin and Mijikenda, followed by the Kikuyu. Further controls indicate that satisfaction is higher in the older generation (48 % for those aged 50 and above compared to 33 % for those below the age of 30; $r = 0.09$, $p < 0.001$), and among females (42 % compared to 34 % for males; $r = 0.04$, $p < 0.05$). Other factors such as illiteracy, rural residence and traditional religion which also contribute independently to a higher level of satisfaction, tended to level off when we controlled them by ethnic group. Of those who said that they are somewhat or strongly dissatisfied with their present way of life almost 80 % gave economic reasons for their dissatisfaction, another 10 % cited health and other personal matters, the rest expressed a variety of minor concerns.

The answers to the question, "What would you say is the biggest problem that people in circumstances like yours face in life?"²⁵ shed some additional light on the degree of satisfaction respondents have with their present situation.

TABLE IV, 19
BIGGEST PERSONAL PROBLEM ; BY CLASS
AND ETHNIC GROUP

Biggest personal problem		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle and upper classes	unemployment	(4)	(13)	-	(12)	(8)	-	-	(7)
	general economic situation	65	(60)	(60)	(63)	(67)	-	(50)	63
	personal and family affairs	(15)	(20)	(20)	-	-	-	-	(12)
	community relations	(4)	-	(20)	-	-	(100)	-	(6)
	other	-	-	-	(12)	-	-	(50)	(3)
	no problem or "don't know"	(12)	(7)	-	(13)	(25)	-	-	(9)
Non-agric. lower classes	unemployment	13	(17)	-	(9)	31	-	(14)	14
	gen.econ. situation	61	59	(78)	53	42	(89)	(29)	58
	pers.affairs	4	(18)	(11)	(4)	3	-	(14)	5
	comm. relations	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	(1)
	other	1	-	-	(6)	-	-	-	(2)
	no problem	19	(6)	(11)	28	24	(11)	(43)	20

TABLE IV, 19 - CONTINUED

Agric. bour- geoisie	unemployment	-	-	-	-	(13)	-	-	(2)
	gen.econ. situation	78	(50)	(100)	67	50	69	(44)	65
	pers.affairs	(5)	-	-	(8)	-	15	-	7
	comm. relations	(5)	-	-	(8)	-	-	-	(3)
	other	-	(50)	-	(8)	-	-	-	(3)
	no problem	(11)	-	-	(9)	(37)	(23)	(56)	20
Agric. prole- taroids	unemployment	(4)	(1)	-	15	11	-	-	4
	gen.econ. situation	52	67	78	27	60	(18)	38	53
	pers.affairs	(10)	10	(4)	(12)	(5)	-	16	9
	comm. relations	(7)	(3)	(4)	(10)	(3)	(9)	-	4
	other	(10)	(8)	(1)	(5)	(5)	(9)	-	5
	no problem	17	11	13	31	16	64	46	24
Agric. prole- tariat	unemployment	(9)	-	-	-	-	-	-	(4)
	gen.econ. situation	82	-	(100)	72	-	100	(100)	81
	pers.affairs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	comm. relations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	other	-	-	-	(14)	-	-	-	(4)
	no problem	(9)	-	-	(14)	-	-	-	(11)
Total	unemployment	7	(4)	-	9	15	-	(2)	7
	gen.econ. situation	62	64	78	47	54	51	37	57
	pers.affairs	8	11	(5)	8	(4)	(7)	13	8
	comm. relations	4	(3)	(4)	6	(1)	(4)	-	3
	other	3	8	(1)	7	(4)	(3)	(2)	5
	no problem	16	10	12	23	22	35	46	20
Weighted N:		275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents.

Economic problems thus are foremost in the minds of all groups. Unemployment was mentioned most often by the Luyia and Luo as a particularly salient issue. Personal and family affairs are of relatively great concern for the Maasai and Kamba. Problems of community relations were stressed by a significant group of Luyia and Kikuyu. The number of those who stated that they do not have any big personal problems is remarkable high among the Luo and Maasai. This confirms our earlier findings concerning a relatively high satisfaction with their way of life, particularly among the "traditionalists" in these groups.

In terms of class stratification unemployment is a major concern for the non-agricultural lower classes (i.e. the proletariat, the non-agricultural proletoroids, and the sub-proletariat), but also for the agricultural proletoroids among the Luyia and Luo. Dissatisfaction with the general economic situation again clearly is highest among the members of the agricultural proletariat. Unemployment as a major problem is also mentioned more often by those with a higher level of education (e.g. by 15 % of those with secondary education compared to 6 % among illiterates), those in the younger age groups (9 % for those below 30 compared to 4 % above the age of 50), and those living in towns (20 % compared to 4 % in rural areas). Those who have "no problem" or who answered "don't know" are more frequent among illiterates (26 % compared to 11 % for those with secondary education), and females (24 % compared to 19 % for males).

When we probed further and asked, "is there anything that you as an individual can do to solve this problem?", the number of those who gave a negative answer is particularly high among the Maasai, Luo (78 % each), and Mijikenda (72 %), whereas the score for the Luyia, Kikuyu and Kamba varies between 53 % and 60 %, and is only 39 % for the Kalenjin. When we asked, "who else do you think could help you?", almost half of the respondents from all ethnic group named the government, the only exception being the Luo, only about one-fourth of whom expected help from this direction. The variations between other possible sources of help (family members and friends, politicians, respected persons, businessmen, foreign aid institutions etc.) were not very great. The Kamba and Mijikenda had the highest number of those (24 % and 20 % respectively) who said that nobody could help them (the mean being 14 %). Differences by class in this regard were somewhat less pronounced, the agricultural classes in general had the lowest percentage of those who expected help from the government.

In spite of the objective poverty (more than 50 % of respondents had a family cash income of less than Kshs 200.- i.e. approx. US \$ 25.- per month) and the widespread dissatisfaction with the present way of life (approximately two-thirds, taken altogether, were somewhat or very dissatisfied), a majority looks optimistically into the future, at least as far as economic prospects

are concerned. The variations which exist according to ethnic group and social class are, however, remarkable:²⁶

/ Insert table IV, 2o /

The Luo and Maasai respondents (the latter possibly fearing a further destruction of their traditional way of life) thus are most pessimistic, whereas the Kalenjin (who enjoy a favorable land population ratio in their home area) look most optimistically into the future. The other groups rank somewhere in between, but more on the optimistic side. In terms of social stratification members of the agricultural bourgeoisie, but, remarkably, also of the agricultural proletariat are more optimistic than the agricultural proletarioids. Optimism in the non-agricultural classes is rather widespread, too. The effects of further social differentiation can perhaps be seen most clearly among the Kikuyu. Here the proletarioid farmers, short of land and other resources, and the members of the proletariat are most pessimistic, whereas both the agricultural and non-agricultural middle classes and the non-agricultural proletarioids are fairly confident about their future. Further controls indicate that optimism is stronger among those with a higher level of education (78 % among those with secondary education compared to 53 % among illiterates; $r = 0.14$, $p < 0.001$), among younger people (66 % in the youngest compared to 48 % in the oldest age groups; $r = 0.13$, $p < 0.001$), and among males (68 % compared to 57 % for

TABLE IV, 20

PERCEPTIONS OF THE ECONOMIC FUTURE;
BY CLASS AND ETHNIC GROUP

Percentage perceiving economic future to be		Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Non-agric. middle and upper classes	Better	70	(45)	(100)	(50)	(33)	(100)	(50)	57
	About the same	(13)	(45)	--	(50)	(45)	--	(50)	30
	Worse	(17)	(10)	--	--	(22)	--	--	(13)
Non-agric. proletariat	Better	56	100	(80)	72	(46)	--	(50)	66
	Same	(22)	--	(20)	(14)	(27)	--	--	17
	Worse	(22)	--	--	(14)	(27)	--	(50)	17
Non-agric. proletaroids and sub-proletariat	Better	69	(100)	--	(100)	81	(50)	(100)	75
	Same	(17)	--	--	--	(13)	--	--	(13)
	Worse	14	--	--	--	(6)	(50)	--	(12)
Agric. bourgeoisie	Better	76	(100)	(100)	(78)	(33)	92	(83)	78
	Same	(12)	--	--	(11)	(67)	(8)	--	(15)
	Worse	(12)	--	--	(11)	--	--	(17)	(7)
Agric. proletaroids	Better	52	65	65	76	(25)	100	(28)	53
	Same	40	(28)	(29)	(6)	63	--	48	36
	Worse	(8)	(7)	(6)	(18)	(12)	--	(24)	11
Agric. proletariat	Better	67	--	(100)	100	--	(60)	--	70
	Same	11	--	--	--	--	(40)	(100)	15
	Worse	22	--	--	--	--	--	--	15
Total	Better	65	69	70	77	35	89	38	62
	Same	22	25	25	9	53	(10)	39	26
	Worse	13	(6)	(5)	14	12	(1)	23	12
Weighted N		231	121	57	123	152	91	87	891

Figures in parentheses indicate an N of less than 10 respondents in a sub-category.

females; $r = 0.06$, $p < 0.05$).

A certain discrepancy apparently exists, however, between the expectations of respondents as to their personal economic future and their perception of future developments in Kenya in general. Thus about three-fifths of them agreed with the statement, "in spite of what some people say, the lot of the average man is getting worse, not better."²⁷ But again the variations concerning this statement are more revealing than the absolute figures. The Luo and Luyia (with 67 % each) clearly were strongest in their agreement, which in view of the actual situation in their very densely populated home areas may be quite realistic. The Kalenjin, on the other hand, were again relatively less pessimistic (only 52 % agreeing). Pessimism also is significantly stronger among those below the age of 30 ($r = 0.010$, $p < 0.001$). Sex, level of education, place of residence, or religious affiliation of respondents are not of great importance in this regard.

The concreteness of any expectations concerning the economic future of respondents became somewhat clearer when we probed whether they had any particular plans to improve their economic situation. The Kikuyu again stand out in this regard with 65 % mentioning a specific project, followed by the Kamba (61 %), Kalenjin (59 %), and Luyia (57 %), while only a considerably lower number of Luo (50 %) or Mijikenda (43 %) have any particular initiatives in mind. The Maasai (37 %) again rank last. The planned projects of the Kikuyu and Kalenjin are most often

directed towards the improvement of their shamba or the purchase of more land, while a great number of Luo and Kamba expressed their aspiration towards a better job in town. The desire to start a new business is, comparatively speaking, strongest among the Luyia, Mijikenda and those Maasai who have any plans at all.

Disposition towards violence

Beyond the actual degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction of certain groups their potential "disposition towards violence" indicates an important aspect of their conflict potential at the attitudinal level. Violent behavior is intrinsically related to many forms of social and political conflict.²⁸ It has a variety of "subjective" and "objective" sources and can serve both "repressive" or "liberating" ends in concrete historical situations. While we cannot discuss here all the potential sources of violence in Kenya, the different forms it may take, or the ends which may be pursued by its proponents, certain attitudinal aspects expressing some of the latent potential for violent action in different social groups must be considered as an important element of this country's political culture. There can be no doubt that attitudes favoring certain forms of violent behavior and concrete acts of violence are more prevalent in some societies and social groups than in others (compare, for example, the higher level

of both general social and political violence, for different historical reasons, in the United States or Mexico with, say, the Scandinavian countries today).²⁹

The measurement of attitudes alone, however, does not provide us with an answer as to how and where such a potential may be activated in a concrete situation. This will depend on the actual social and political circumstances. Our analysis thus refers more to a potential form and intensity rather than the actual kind or reason for a particular conflict. It is also important to note that an analysis of this kind does not imply any more far-reaching assumptions as to the "innate" nature of a disposition towards violence.³⁰ Furthermore, a potential of this kind cannot be assumed to have a fixed and permanent magnitude. Rather, it must be considered to be amenable to the usual forces of social change, such as variations in socializing processes or social structural developments.

In the more general social sphere, the attitudinal potential for violent action can be measured, for example, by the degree of acceptance of statements approving violent behavior, or of certain norms which imply the forceful redress of a perceived or real insult or injustice. An additional indicator of the frequency of violent behavior in a society is also the current rate of crimes, at least those directed against persons. It is difficult and often impossible to compare measures of this kind on an international level, because the social circumstances are too

varied to be meaningfully described by such indicators alone.³¹ Within the Kenyan context and after examining the social background of each of the groups involved, however, comparisons on this basis seems to be justified, if one keeps their limitations in mind.

For this purpose we had included a number of statements in our survey relating to expressions of aggressiveness and possible acts of violent behavior. After testing their interrelationships we were able to combine four of them into a separate "index of dispositions towards violence". The items finally included are: "Human nature being what it is, there must always be war and conflict"; "it is understandable that men who feel that their honor has been violated take the law into their own hands"; "an insult to your honor should not be forgotten"; and "everybody has the right to defend himself and to use weapons if necessary".³² The responses by ethnic groups are summarized in table IV, 21:

TABLE IV, 21
DISPOSITION TOWARDS VIOLENCE; BY ETHNIC GROUP

Disposition towards violence" (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Low	35	53	44	44	65	42	39	47
Medium	39	31	36	27	28	31	21	33
High	26	16	20	29	7	27	40	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	167	143	96	151	193	85	108	1043

Among those scoring low on this index the Luo clearly stand out as having the highest percentage, thus confirming to a certain extent their general reputation of being peacefully-inclined or, as some of their potential adversaries tend to put it, "cowardly". The Kikuyu and the Maasai, on the other hand, have the smallest percentage of low scorers, followed by the Kalenjin. Controls show that this attitude is largely independent of social class, level of education, or place of residence. As might have been expected, however, females exhibit a less aggressive attitude than their male counterparts (17 % scoring high compared to 27 % for males; $r = 0.08$, $p < 0.01$). A disposition towards violence is also slightly higher in the middle age groups between 30 and 50 years (25 % scoring high compared to 22 % for the younger and 20 % for the older age groups).

If we look for a possible source of this "disposition towards violence" the expectation that this may lie in the particular child-rearing practices of each group, at least as far as we were able to determine them, ³³ cannot be confirmed: This index did not prove to be related to more severe forms of punishment of children either in the generation of the respondents or in that of their parents (the Spearman correlation coefficients in both instances are very low and statistically insignificant).

When we compare these attitudinal data with the current crime rates in Kenya, we find a certain confirmation

of this pattern: ³⁴ Both in Kenya as a whole and in Nairobi as the major urban center the Kikuyu and Maasai stand out as those who commit the greatest number of offenses (in particular against persons) in relation to their total population. In the case of the Maasai this may be an expression of their traditionally more belligerent orientation and their "fondness" for cattle-raids, which is reflected in the "nuisance" caused by many *il-murrani* under socially less approved circumstances today. In contrast, the high crime rate of the Kikuyu probably must be interpreted to be a consequence of their relatively high level of social differentiation, in particular the large number of those who today have migrated to town often without finding proper employment. Unfortunately the data presented by Muga do not allow for a further analysis in this regard.

As far as the actual conflict potential of the different ethnic groups is concerned it thus seems fair to conclude from the evidence presented here, and also if one looks at historical developments in Kenya, that a greater number of Kikuyu, Maasai, and Kalenjin may react violently if they see their position threatened. In contrast, most Luo and to a certain extent the Mijikenda and Kamba seem to be more likely to avoid a violent confrontation, if possible.

Political authoritarianism

Among the more general social and political attitudes which may serve to characterize a specific political culture the potential "political authoritarianism" of certain parts of the population can play a particularly important role.

This concept has generated an intensive and often quite controversial discussion in the social sciences after World War II.³⁵ It relates deep-seated personality aspects to an expression of socially and politically "authoritarian" behavior, which culminates in the potential "fascism" exhibited by personalities of this type. The main research tool of the original study was the California "F-" (for potential fascism) scale, which attempted to tap different dimensions of authoritarianism with a large number of attitudinal items which could be employed in survey research. By now this concept has been subjected to a thorough substantive (e.g. whether "authoritarianism" is only a characteristic of the extreme political right or perhaps also of the extreme left), and methodological criticism.³⁶ The applicability of the original research instrument is also restricted, because a great number of items of these "California F- scale" are dated and culture-bound.

While it did not make sense, therefore, to use the original F-scale or some of its shorter or "reversed" forms in our survey, we did include a number of attitudinal items designed for a similar purpose.³⁷ From some of these

we were able to construct a separate "political authoritarianism"-index. As this label (and most of the items used) suggest, we did not attempt to cover all or even the most important dimensions of "authoritarian personalities" or authoritarian behavior, but we rather restricted the use of the index to the more direct political sphere. We also believe that the designation of "fascism" for attitudes tapped by this measure does not make sense under Kenya's present socio-economic conditions. It is still highly controversial what the exact links between political attitudes of this kind and actual deeper-lying personality patterns are. Since we were not in a position to validate our results by other more directly psychological "personality" measures, we prefer to treat them as expressions of a purely attitudinal nature without implying that they necessarily represent any deeper-rooted personality characteristics:

The items which we have finally selected and put together in our index are: "When the country is in great danger, we may have to force some people even if it violates their rights"; "the government should prohibit books and films which it thinks are harmful for the public"; "a few strong leaders can make this country better than all the laws and talk"; "almost any unfairness or brutality may be justified when some important political purpose is to be carried out"; and, with a more general content, "what young people need most of all is strict discipline by their parents".³⁸ The combined results

are presented in table IV, 22:

TABLE IV, 22
POLITICAL AUTHORITARIANISM; BY ETHNIC GROUP

Expression of "political authoritarianism" (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Low	14	29	31	39	32	33	23	28
Medium	44	44	37	37	41	40	45	42
High	18	13	8	18	10	17	12	14
Don't know	24	14	24	6	17	10	20	16
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

Political authoritarianism as expressed in this index is thus strongest among the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin. The Mijikenda, Luo, Kamba, and Maasai, on the other hand, have a very low number of those who agree on most of the items presented here. The Luyia express a strongly bifurcated pattern, scoring quite high on both extremes. Controls indicate that this attitude is not very widespread in the non-agricultural bourgeoisie (only 8 % scoring high), and among the urban proletarioids and the members of the sub-proletariat (9% ranking high). It reaches intermediate levels in the agricultural bourgeoisie (15 %), and among the agricultural proletarioids (14 %), and finds its strongest expression in the urban salariat (20 %) and the proletariat (21 %). Education shows a curvilinear pattern:

while the number of high scorers is relatively low both among illiterates (12 %) and those with some secondary education (13 %), it is significantly higher among those with some primary education (18 %). Age is another important factor influencing this attitude (21 % of those aged over 50 scoring high compared to 13 % for the lower age groups), while sex remains relatively insignificant.

It must also be noted that the number of those who answer "don't know" ³⁹ on one of these items is highest in the oldest age groups, among females, agricultural proletarioids, and illiterates. The higher level of authoritarianism expressed by members of these latter groups may, therefore, be of the more apathetic and passive parochial kind, whereas the high level of authoritarianism in the urban proletariat and the salariat, which have a much higher level of awareness of overall national politics, may result in more active and aggressive forms of authoritarianism as well. More authoritarian patterns of family socialization again did not prove to be related to this index in any appreciable way. The relative weight of the different factors affecting this attitude, as determined by an analysis of variance, is an adjusted value of beta of 0.18 for the ethnic group, 0.08 for the social class, 0.08 for the level of education, and 0.02 for the sex of respondents.

The willingness to accept authoritarian acts by the government, which is expressed by the majority of our items, is also related, of course, to the legitimacy of the regime concerned. In fact, our authoritarianism index is

strongly related to our measure of "system support" (a Pearson product moment correlation of 0.37).⁴⁰ Controlling for this factor tended to level the differences between ethnic groups somewhat, particularly among those who showed a low level of system support. Among those scoring high on both indices, the Kikuyu and Luyia kept their leading positions. The rank for the Kalenjin among the high scorers is now reversed, which indicates that their originally high political authoritarianism is mainly due to the high degree of legitimacy Kenya's present regime enjoys among them. The Mijikenda, Luo, and Maasai maintained their relatively strong low scores within all control groups, while the Luyia preserved their original dichotomous pattern (having both a high number of low/low and high/high scorers). When we applied the same control to the pattern of class stratification on this index, the salariat and proletariat consistently kept their relatively high scores, while the agricultural classes and the sub-proletariat had the highest percentage of low scorers in each group. The influence of education and age on this pattern was also somewhat reduced, but these factors still tended to work in the original direction.

Acceptance of democratic values

A certain contrast to the agreement with authoritarian attitudes lies in the acceptance of democratic values. As we have already noted above, a workable democratic system

rests not only on the institutionalization of certain democratic procedures (such as regular elections, etc.), but also on the acceptance of some basic democratic values and principles (such as the guarantee of fundamental human rights and tolerance of other opinions). But, as has been demonstrated by a number of studies, even in a "stable democracy" ^{such} as presumably the United States, a greater number of people is apt to exhibit a considerable degree of intolerance towards non-conformists, ⁴¹ or, if they pay lip-service to abstract democratic principles, to think and act quite differently when it comes to the concrete application of such values in their own immediate social and political environment. ⁴²

As with some of the other attitudes considered here, it was not possible to employ any of the empirical measures developed in these studies to a greater extent in our own research. But at least some items used in these works seemed to be applicable to the existing conditions in Kenya, so that at least at this most general level some insight into the acceptance of some basic democratic values can be gained. Three of these items could again be combined into a separate index. These are: "I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views may be"; "everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say in political matters"; and "no matter what a person's political beliefs are, he is entitled to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else". ⁴³ The combined results are reported in table IV, 23:

TABLE IV, 23
ACCEPTANCE OF DEMOCRATIC VALUES;
BY ETHNIC GROUP

Acceptance of democratic values (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Low	21	29	23	30	37	33	34	29
Medium	33	37	35	34	30	29	43	34
High	34	26	29	31	31	35	19	30
Don't know	12	8	13	5	2	3	4	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	275	156	96	158	194	92	108	1079

The variation between the ethnic groups, for the high scorers around the mean thus is not very great, even though it remains statistically significant. The only major exception are the Maasai (only 19 % scoring high) among whom in particular the low scores for the "traditionalists" (e.g. 38 % of the illiterates scoring low on this index) are responsible for this position. This pattern is also reflected in the "class" membership of respondents, where 30 % of the agricultural bourgeoisie, 29 % of the agricultural proletariat and 27 % of the agricultural proletarioids rank high compared to more than 40 % for the non-agricultural middle and upper classes, and 33 % for the urban proletariat and the non-agricultural proletarioids.

Further controls show that a higher level of education (25 % scoring high among illiterates compared to 40 % for those with some secondary education), and urban residence (41 % scoring high compared to 29 % in the rural

areas) tend to lead to higher scores in all groups. The number of high scorers among males (36 %) is also distinctly higher than among females (23 %), and in the older age groups (41 %) compared to the middle (27 %) and younger ones (31 %). The relative variance explained by these factors is (values of beta) 0.18 for ethnic groups, 0.10 for social class, 0.08 for level of education, and 0.05 for the sex of the respondents.

A judgement on "democracy" is also passed by the answers to an additional, reversely worded, statement: "The main trouble with democracy is that most people don't really know what is best for them".⁴⁴

TABLE IV, 24
ATTITUDE TOWARDS DEMOCRACY; BY ETHNIC GROUP

"Trouble with democracy" (%)	Kik.	Kam.	Mij.	Luy.	Luo	Kal.	Maas.	Tot.
Agree	52	64	62	54	31	46	41	50
Disagree	35	33	19	42	54	51	42	39
Don't know	13	3	19	4	15	3	17	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Weighted N:	254	152	96	158	193	92	108	1053

Here, the Kamba and the Mijikenda clearly stand out for their high level of agreement, while the Luo are particularly adamant in their opposition. The other groups fall somewhere in between these two extremes. Controls by social class do not reveal great differences, except for

the fact that the percentage of those answering "don't know" is much higher among the agricultural proletarioids (16 %) and in the proletariat (11 %) compared to 3 % on the average for all the other classes. The differences by level of education, place of residence, age, and sex of respondents also become very small when the respectively greater percentage of "don't know" for illiterates (18 %), people in the rural areas (12 %), the older age groups (16 %, and females (15 %) are taken into account.

It would be unrealistic to expect, however, that Kenya's population can be neatly divided into "democrats" and "authoritarians" with the help of such indices. Even in the United States where similar investigations have been conducted on a much larger scale, with more refined sampling techniques, and employing thoroughly tested scales, this is not the case.⁴⁵ In addition to still existing methodological problems, the questions which dimensions of "authoritarianism" may be compatible with the acceptance of democratic procedures in certain societies and historical situations is still an open one.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the degree of "cognitive consistency" of a large part of the population should not be overestimated.⁴⁷ At a purely logical level, contradictory opinions may be held side by side by many people without their being aware of this fact and without causing any major psychological problems.

In fact, our measures of "authoritarianism" and "acceptance of democratic values" turned out to be correlated significantly ($r = 0.20$; $p < 0.001$). This relationship

was reduced somewhat when we controlled for "system support" as we did with the authoritarianism measure alone (r then had a value of 0.17). Another factor affecting this relationship was the level of political information of respondents. When both system support and level of political information were controlled simultaneously, the correlation dropped to a value of 0.15.

was reduced somewhat when we controlled for "system support" as we did with the authoritarian measure alone (it then had a value of 0.17). Another factor affecting this relationship was the level of political information of respondents. When both system support and level of political information were controlled simultaneously, the correlation dropped to a value of

0.12.







