Dokument
| Titel: | Endogenous choice of minority shareholdings: Effects on product market competition |
| Autor: | de Haas, Samuel |
| Veröffentlicht: | 2019 |
| URI: | https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0607 |
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0607 |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DDC: | 330 Wirtschaft |
| Publikationsdatum: | 2024-01-19 |
| Lizenz: | https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0 |
| Schlagwörter: |
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| Merger Con- trol, Minority Shareholdings, Collusion, Coordinated Effects, Unilateral Effects |
Summary:
Non-controlling minority shareholdings in rivals (NCMS) lower the sustainability of collusion under a wide variety of circumstances. Nevertheless, NCMS are sometimes deemed to facilitate collusion, in particular if the level of NCMS is exogenous. The present paper endogenizes _rms' choice of NCMS and answers the question: Would colluding firms find it rational to acquire NCMS in rivals? The study of the acquisition reveals that _rms have an incentive to acquire NCMS which are accompanied by a shift from collusive to competitive behaviour.
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