Titel:Optimal Unconventional Monetary Policy in the Face of Shadow Banking
Autor:Kirchner, Philipp
Weitere Verfasser:Schwanebeck, Benjamin
Veröffentlicht:2017
URI:https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0546
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0546
ISSN: 1867-3678
DDC:330 Wirtschaft
Publikationsdatum:2024-01-19
Lizenz:https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0

Dokument

Schlagwörter:
shadow banking, un- conventional policy, financial frictions, financial intermediation, optimal policy

Summary:
Using a DSGE framework, we discuss the optimal design of monetary policy for an economy where both retail banks and shadow banks serve as financial intermediaries. We get the following results. During crises times, a standard Taylor rule fails to reach sufficient stimulus. Direct asset purchases prove to be the most e¤ective unconventional tool. When maximizing welfare, central banks should shy away from interventions in the funding process between retail and shadow banks. Liquidity facilities are the welfare-maximizing unconventional policy tool. The effectiveness of unconventional measures increases in the size of the shadow banking sector. However, the optimal response to shocks is sensitive to the resource costs of the implementation which may di¤er across central banks. Hence, optimal unconventional monetary policy is country-specific.


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