Dokument
| Titel: | Entry deterrence due to brand proliferation: Empirical evidence from the German interurban bus industry |
| Autor: | de Haas, Samuel |
| Weitere Verfasser: | Herold, Daniel; Schäfer, Jan Thomas |
| Veröffentlicht: | 2017 |
| URI: | https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0541 |
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0541 |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DDC: | 330 Wirtschaft |
| Publikationsdatum: | 2024-01-19 |
| Lizenz: | https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0 |
| Schlagwörter: |
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| Takeover, Competition, Entry Deterrence, Brand Proliferation, Interurban Bus Services |
Summary:
In 2016, the largest operator in the German interurban bus industry, Flixbus, acquired its major rival, Postbus. We study the effects of that takeover using route-level data covering more than 6,000 routes. We find that Flixbus, on average, provided a lower frequency of bus rides and slightly decreased prices after the takeover. This indicates that Flixbus pursued a strategy of preemption: to decrease residual demand for Postbus, Flixbus offered a high number of bus rides. After the takeover, Flixbus decreased the supply of transportation services and lowered the prices to compensate the consumers for the resulting increase in inconvenience costs
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