| Titel: | Is a “Firm” a Firm? A Stackelberg Experiment |
| Autor: | Hildenbrand, Andreas |
| Veröffentlicht: | 2012 |
| URI: | https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/es/2024/0143 |
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.17192/es2024.0143 |
| ISSN: | 1867-3678 |
| DDC: | 330 Wirtschaft |
| Publikationsdatum: | 2024-01-03 |
| Lizenz: | https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0 |
| Schlagwörter: |
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| Stackelberg game, experimental economics., industrial organization, team behavior, framing, individual behavior |
Summary:
Industrial organization is mainly concerned with the behavior of large firms. Experimental industrial organization therefore faces a problem: How can firms be brought into the laboratory? The main approach relies on framing: Call individuals “firms”! This experimental approach is not in line with modern industrial organization, according to which a firm’s market behavior is also determined by its organizational structure. In this paper, a Stackelberg experiment is considered in order to answer the question whether framing individual decision making as organizational decision making or implementing an organizational structure is more effective in generating profit-maximizing behavior. Firms are either represented by individuals or by teams. I find that teams’ quantity choices are more in line with the assumption of profit maximization than individuals’ choices. Compared to individuals, teams appear to be less inequality averse.
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