Review: This volume considers the broader framework of “cognition and culture” with a programmatic agenda. Most of its articles result from an international symposium on “Cognitive Science and the Study of Religious Experience: A Working Symposium on Theory and Method”, held at the University of Vermont in 1998. Concise and profound outlines of relevant theories of P. Boyer, d’Aquili/ Newberg, D. Sperber and V.S. Ramanchandra who are absent from the volume as authors are delivered in Andresen’s Introduction to illustrate the historical spread of cognitive sciences within the science of religion. She concludes by asking for new and diversified methodologies for studying religion.

The first part of the book, on belief acquisition and its transmission, assembles B. Saler’s analysis of belief, I. Pyysiäinen’s reflections on the emotional dynamics of religious experience and S. Guthrie’s anthropomorphism thesis (ibid.: Faces in the Clouds 1993). All three share Boyer as point of reference (The Naturalness of Religious Ideas 1994). Opposing classical mental state theory and cognitive theory Saler makes a good point by stating that cognitive categories should not be understood as mapping a neuropsychological reality. Instead of a realistic stance one should take them as patterns of epistemic behaviour and as generalized from doxastic uses of claims, speech acts etc. The socio-historical context is always underdetermined by explanation. That is what W.O. Quine already expressed in his well-known thesis of ‘translation indeterminacy’ (Word and Object 1960) which states that the cognitive categories we abstract from observation can be arranged in several models. They serve equally well in predicting (religious) comportment and are, therefore, not a token but a type of neural processing. For cognitive studies as providers of methods to the science of religion this means – a conclusion Saler does not make explicit – that beliefs are always in a belief-environment with other beliefs and literary topics (he mentions media images of aliens as an example).

Pyysiäinen enlarges Saler’s belief-fixation of religion by the emotional dimension of religion. He also ties his contribution to Boyer’s paradigm of defining religious categories as contra-intuitive
categories: Religious categories are not only easily memorized because they are contra-intuitive, but they also evoke strong emotions in return which result in making religious experiences extremely meaningful.

The second part of the book introduces the theories of E.T. Lawson and R.N. McCauley who are best known for their monographs on religious theory and their sensory, as well as cognitive, analysis of ritual. J. Barrett, the third author in this second part, has published several articles on psychological experiments, mainly about religious categorization and concepts of acting. Here, he summarizes his own and others’ experiments comparing children’s and adults’ religious concepts. He opposes the common view that religious beliefs develop by maturing to a more abstract and non-anthropomorphic understanding of the world.

The distribution of the articles to different parts of the book is partly misleading insofar as, in the case of the third part, “Embodied Models of Religion” are promised. The essays, in fact, do not contribute to research into embodiment, but rather to scientific methodology. The Finnish scientist of religion, M. Kamppinen, demands improved phenomenological tools to explain religious phenomena. He criticises the classical phenomenology of religion because it reduces the philosophical phenomenology to a taxonomy of phenomena or at least to a method of scrutinization of religious experience. Kamppinen aims at staying closer to the “surface” of religion as culturally bound phenomena in his interpretation of a “sustotype-illness” (the “manchari” of Peruvian Amazon). In ethnomedical discourse the notion of susto is, like the taboo category, seen as being more significant to the history of a certain scientific discourse than as an appropriate descriptive pattern in cultural studies (e.g. K.Greifeld, Einführung in die Ethnomedizin, 2003). The ethnomedical example illustrates the fruitfulness of Kamppinen’s proposed meristic part-whole-tool taken from phenomenology. Traditional healing in Peru can be explained by a system of several souls that are part of the human being. Therefore his phenomenological model proves to be more capable of explaining than a mere neurophysiological reconstruction of magical song by its linked perceptive mechanisms. His proposal has to be considered as a good epistemological solution to the gap between a reductionist neuroscience of religious mechanisms and, on the other hand, the divergent religious experiences in the cultures. His denial of the explanatory value of neurobiology is much more convincing than Varela’s proposal of neurophenomenology.

The essay of the neuroscientist McNamara is an illuminating example of the simplification of the approach of a natural scientist and does not belong to the embodiment theory strand either. McNamara works with the premise of an evolutionary theory understood in a merely adaptationist manner, the attitude of “health and happiness through religion”, as well as, the exclusive neuropsychological understanding of psychology. His manner of thinking is easy: “people engage in religion in order to activate the frontal lobes”. Frontal-lobes-activation is responsible for human growth in personality. By activating them we mature and calm down our nervous system.

Although the Conclusion provides References to additional literature on the topic and a helpful
Index, Andresen conceals important aspects of scientific methodology in her presentation of G. Lakoff’s and M. Johnson’s metaphorology. In *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999) these two authors break down Kant and other thinkers to a core metaphor by which their intellectual enterprise in general can be grasped. According to this epistemological stance there is either the pole of hard facts of cognitive sciences or the pole of metaphors we must totally rely on in theory-building. This is a black and white painting of epistemic work and an unlimited metaphorization of discourse giving arbitrariness to thinking and absoluteness to empiricism. Such an approach cannot be accepted because it neglects constructivism in the empirical sciences as well as the limitations of intellectual categorization.

First and foremost, *Religion in Mind* demonstrates a lack of acquaintance with continental, especially German-language methodology that has been elaborated in the science of religion by sophisticated and enduring discussions on the theory and method of “Religionswissenschaft” and on conceptualising religion. This can be found e.g. in the “Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft” of the German section of the IAHR or in the “Handbuch religionswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe”. The only exception in the book reviewed here is the essay of M. Kamppinen which takes philosophical standards of the phenomenological tradition into account. Most of the other contributions are governed by dead-ends of stimuli-schemes, confusion about semiotics and semiology, mind-body-dichotomies etc.

Apart from this, I credit J. Andresen with a good overview of the cognitive approaches to religion of the last decade, mainly from the U.S. She gathers the approaches of such well known thinkers as Lawson, McCauley, and Varela in short essays that can facilitate a first contact with their more extensive monographs.

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