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Being Muslim and working for peace

Group identification, religious beliefsets
and political behaviour in Gujarat

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Preface: understanding and promoting peace

चलो टोल आया go, the mob assembles
टोल आया the mob assembles
चलो बॉम्ब मारो go and throw the bomb

Sitting in Halol on a balcony, reflecting on some interesting interview snippets, I heard a few children playing downstairs. It took a few rounds of their game until I became aware of the verse they used as their counting rhyme. Much later, I understood what it meant: what they were singing in heavy dialect, and what disturbed my lavish academic endeavours, was post-conflict reality in its most traumatic and absurd way. The sun was shining. And kids were counting mobs and bombs. Similar disturbance returned time and again during field research and while listening to my tapes at home. The children of Halol (almost cynically) held my analysis on track and often put my feet back on the ground in very unexpected ways. When presenting a scientific typology of "Being Muslim and working for peace", I of course do so in a way acceptable to academia. But from the beginning, this project involved more than a graduation thesis: a first idea came up among development practitioners in summer 2007, followed by field cooperation with several NGOs in spring 2008 who might eventually benefit in their work from my findings. While this preface is primarily written for them, it might also give academic readers an idea of my personal involvement: the fiction of neutral observance, though academically necessary, is still a fiction and you should be aware of what it covers.

Gujarat is the home state of Mohandas Kamarchand Gandhi; from here the Mahatma set off on his historic salt march, promising not to return until India was liberated by non-violent means (cp. Gandhi, 1939; Nanda, 2004). It is also the state with the deepest communal rifts in India (cp. Yagnik & Sheth, 2005, p. 276ff.; Varshney, 2002, p. 7). Here, fascism became mainstream political thought and led to state-supported riots against Muslims in spring 2002. Practitioners often wondered why I focussed on religion and *peace* in this context. Of course, communal *violence* of such scale has to be explained, especially when concentrated on the area where the Sabarmati Ashram gave inspiration to one of the world's most astonishing struggles. Indeed, many models have been developed to analyze the process of fascist identity shaping, the instrumentality of communal rioting or the role of intolerant religious teachings. But this knowledge about fundamentalists, rioters or terrorists is not sufficient to understand and encourage peace activism. Without denying that physical security might be the core of peace, sound research should explain its emergence or production as a process sui generis; similarly, interventions should not just be designed by simply inverting those factors leading to violence.

In short, I thus focus on peace activists as a group of its own, because "until we study ethnic peace, we will not be able to have a good theory of ethnic conflict" (Varshney, 2002, p. 6; for an even stronger bias towards violence in research on Gujarat cp. Burman, 2005, p.

4 and Heitmeyer, 2009, p. 118). Furthermore, research on peace activists with *Muslim* backgrounds could provide practitioners with arguments to challenge the core of Hindu nationalism – a problematic understanding of India’s Muslim past – and help them ground their emerging cooperations for peace. In his comprehensive work about Hindutva thought, Sharma (2006) argues that dialogue is necessary and possible to counter fascist ideology. Unless the core of this mindset is questioned, sustainable peace won’t be achieved. ”This suggestion of a conversation might sound politically naive and impractical. Yet, without undertaking a journey to the antagonistic ’other’, there is little hope” (p. 3; cp. similar arguments by Zaid, 2008, p.344 or Schäfer, 2008a, p. 12). This ”other” is primarily driven by a specific image of Islam and Muslims, portrayed as alien, violent (nowadays: terroristic) and dangerous; their assumed violence is often the prime justification for the whole project of martial Hinduism, undertaken as an act of ”self-defence” (Sharma, 2006, p. 10; cp. also Metcalf, 2005, p. 217). Unfortunately, much of recent academic and journalistic writing supports this biased picture by focussing on fundamentalism. I hope to be able to show that not all Muslims are violent terrorists and that instead some inspiring personalities are quite active for peace. I also want to show that rioters and peace activists can neither be distinguished by religious identity as such nor by one single of its subdimensions: some peace activists are influenced by their faith, some by their relation to their community, some by both and some by neither; some become more religious during their activism, some shed this aspect of their identity. All these configurations and dynamics can also be found among terrorists (cp. Miller, 2006, p. 126 or Esposito & Mogahed, 2008, p. 161f. and p. 182). With a comprehensive explorative research design, I thus try to move beyond formal and overly abstract categories to give an initial understanding of how complex religious identities relate to the struggle for peace, presenting the diversity of this relation among Muslims in Gujarat. If a clearer picture inspired fresh intervention designs and new coalitions for conflict transformation, it would make me happy and the interviewees’ contributions worthier than they would be for a shelved thesis.

The hope for practical relevance finally leads back to the children of Halol – and to Gandhi-Ji. His central assumption was that lasting peace must be based on truth and justice (cp. Iyer, 2000, p. 229). Overcoming communal hatred and religious fascism by building *justice* (or inventing new counting rhymes and rules) is out of reach for a researcher. But as far as *truth* is concerned (and I am fully aware how dangerous that word can be in the realm of social sciences) I hope to give further insights – so that understanding peace helps promoting it.

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1 Research question and relevance

This study explores one particular aspect of religion in conflict: the variety of connections between a person's religious identity and his or her peace activism. The biographies of 19 Muslims provide the empirical basis; they were given and explained to me in qualitative interviews in Gujarat/India in spring 2008. Among them, I found very different functions of religious identity for political behaviour, including irrelevance. For example, some interviewees were inspired by an Islamic ethic to build refugee camps or to initiate interfaith dialogue (like those in section 5.1), while others did not particularly care about religious beliefs, but developed a deep bond to fellow Muslims from which they drew strength to assist in trauma healing (a prominent theme in section 5.4). Further, there were those born as Muslim, but active for different reasons (introduced in section 5.2) – and frequently, identities were influenced in reverse and transformed by the struggle for peace (most prominently discussed in section 5.3).

By looking in depth at this complexity, I try to counter three shortcomings in existing research on religious identity and conflict: a methodical gap, theoretical confusion and a biased selection of cases. Methodically, a few specific assumptions are frequently generalized without sufficient exploration, skipping a crucial step in the research process. That way, rather marginal theological ideas could be overrated and theories about ethnic conflicts could improperly be transferred to religious groups. An example of the latter is the opinion that elites maintain an optimal ingroup size to gain advantages over outgroups by instrumentalizing markers of identity (e.g. Schlee, 2006, p. 36). This ignores that the maintenance of *religious* group boundaries might often be based on genuine dogmatic concerns and does not necessarily intend a change in intergroup relations (for India cp. Mines, 1981, p. 85). An example of the former opinion is the idea that Sufis' spirituality is comparatively peaceful because its emphasis on a "greater spiritual jihad" appears non-political (e.g. Rosemann, 2007, p. 86). Quite on the contrary, Schlee (2006, p. 96) calls (reformed) Sufism the first manifestation of modern political Islam and during the identity-sharpening Islamic revivalism in India in 19th century, Sufis played a key role (cp. Mayaram, 1997, p. 232). By systematically disclosing empirical variance, explorative qualitative research can broaden such narrow perspectives and enables the development of sound theories: prior to deductive research, one has to find out what might be relevant therein.

An often vague empirical foundation leaves more space for theoretical unclarity, the second shortcoming I try to address. In particular, two contradictory but equally narrow identity concepts compete. On the one hand, mainstream socio-psychological tradition states that the mere fact of identifying with a group could cause dichotomic perception and facilitate violence (e.g. Hammack, 2008, p. 228 – ultimately referring to Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In their practical conclusions, scholars in this tradition tend to assume that less identification would increase the likeliness of peace activism. They also tend to treat religion purely as a variety of ethnicity and thus emphasize group dynamics over religious beliefs (cp. Jackson & Smith, 1999 as an

overview; Svensson, 2007, Seul, 1999 or Hanf, 1999 in relation to religion; and Ghosh & Kumar, 2007 or Ruback & Singh, 2007 on India). Meanwhile, other scholars present just the opposite argument: religious actors should be strengthened, because only "mature" identity and "strong" religiosity enables them to resist religion's instrumentalization and to nurture peace (cp. primarily Appleby, 2000 and Johansen, 1996 for India). With identity, though, the latter mainly mean personal basic beliefs and tend to ignore group dynamics.

Unfortunately, neither tradition on its own can reliably grasp the existential frame of political behaviour, because religious "identity has a structure which sometimes involves a symbolic order *and* at times a corporate or social order" (Mines, 1981, p. 65; my emphasis). Moreover, scholars in both traditions frequently argue essentialistic, ignoring how experience and culture dynamically shape identities. Brubaker (2004) concludes that "whatever its suggestiveness, whatever its indispensability in certain practical contexts, 'identity' is too ambiguous, too torn between 'hard' and 'soft' meanings, essentialist connotations and constructivist qualifiers, to serve well the demands of social analysis" (p. 29). As an alternative, he suggests three comparatively clear-cut concepts, which cover *both* uses of "identity" discussed above in precise terms: "categorization" (an abstract, marker-based process, p. 41ff), "self-understanding" (a set of cognitive assumptions, p. 44ff) and "groupness" (as an emotional feeling of belonging, p. 46ff). His dimensions one and three can be combined when analyzing the biographic experience of one's *own* identity, since an emotional attachment requires a categorically specified group to attach to and on the other hand self-categorization without *any* emotion is unlikely (though it happens; cp. section 5.2). I thus analyze dynamics of group identification (consisting of categorization and degrees of "groupness") and religious beliefsets (the cognitive aspect of being Muslim, partly manifested in ritual practice) to understand religious identity more completely and less confusing than usual – and, through identity, peace activism.

Research question: by exploring political behaviour, religious beliefsets and group identification, I hope to develop a comprehensive understanding of how religious identity (as an abstract categorization *as well as* a psychodynamic process linking oneself to a Muslim community *and* a set of beliefs about God, religion and the world) accounts for biographical anchorage of peace activism and how political behaviour in turn influences dimensions of religious identity. My aim is to hermeneutically extract, separate and characterize different ways of "being Muslim and working for peace", systematically disclosing empirical variance.

The title of this thesis has several connotations, most of them unintended. First of all, it suggests that identity is static while activism is dynamic. Of course, whatever constitutes the inner self might arguably be *more* static than the multitude of activities taking place while working for peace (identity, after all, signifies something staying identical). But identities are never *absolutely* unchanging background factors. To see how they are dynamically shaped through

activism is an important counter balance to understand how activism is facilitated by identity. More, religion is not necessarily the most important identity dimension for all those born as Muslims, although scholars often assume so. While I put particular focus on religion, this must not reflect interviewees' priorities – and in fact, some were rather upset when addressed in religious categories (in particular those activists presented in section 5.2). Further, identity seldom determines action. Kippenberg (2008, p. 25) argues that even persons with clear value-rational motivation still act in changing contexts and that belief and behaviour therefore correlate at best (for the unclear relation between religious belief and prosocial behaviour in particular cp. Grom, 1992, p. 210). Even more: nobody acts without contingency. Although social scientists naturally strive to identify motivations for deeds, they should weigh their explanations with respect to serendipic factors, as Becker (1998, p. 32) demonstrates.

Still, peace activism does not happen at random: which options for action people perceive in the first place is pre-structured by identity (together with situational factors; social psychologists speak about category salience; e.g. Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, & Martin, 2001, p. 14). While group identification dynamics and religious beliefsets do not determine action, they shed light on important subjective restraints and leeways for activism as a micro-level factor distinct from, but linked to agency (cp. Schäfer, 2008a, p. 23f.). Reconstructing the dynamics of identity means reconstructing the relation between religion and peace on the very level on which activism emanates. Pure literature studies, which interpret a body of cultural or religious heritage (such as the Quran), would be inappropriate for understanding identity, because "the relation between the structural elements of experience and its performative expression always resembles a risky, fallible transformation [...], a creative translation between a culturally shaped interpretation of meaning and a qualitative conduct of life" (Jung, 2007, p. 65f.; my translation). Any study of religious identity must necessarily proceed empirically to be able to catch the contingency and liberty space between religious identity and political behaviour, "retain[ing] a clear commitment to the individual as a meaningful unit of analysis" (Hammack, 2008, p. 240).

But not only "being Muslim", also the phrase "working for peace" invites contestation: which work in particular is an adequate mean to this end? For sampling, I pragmatically bypassed the problem and included everybody who would refer to him- or herself as a "peace activist" (cp section 4.1 for sampling details; for the different Hindi terms section 5.3). A substantial conceptualization of peace activism is not necessary due to the scope of my research question: I try to reconstruct several ways of how religious identity and political behaviour interact, not several ways of working for peace as such. Conceptually, I treat peace activism as a black box to be filled empirically. Consequently, I found quite diverse approaches and people working for negative and positive peace alike: some provide victims relief or legal counsel, others promote dialogue, heal trauma or influence friends and family. Not all approaches might be considered proper peace activism if one uses a normative definition (e.g. as proposed by Brand-Jacobsen

& Jacobsen, 2003, p. 107ff.). One can especially question if a mere private influence on family members is institutionalized enough to be considered activism, if this is, even in a broad sense, *political* behaviour. One can also doubt whether rehabilitation of internally displaced people could not be better described as disaster relief – and the fact that one interviewee (in section 5.1) presented missionary activities as peacebuilding is definitely problematic. Nevertheless, most activities at least broadly fit – and because a proper definition is contested among local practitioners themselves (important implications are summarized in chapter 2), I leave the final judgement to them (and will take up the issue again in the conclusion).

Last not least, field research was situated in India to tackle the third shortcoming in existing research: a biased selection of cases. Many studies on India ignore Muslims and most on Islam ignore India (for exceptions cp. section 3.3). This surprises, because looking at India could highlight once more that a scriptural approach to Islam (as said to be prevalent in the Arab countries) demands sociological explanation and should not just be mirrored in bluntly deductive research designs: actual beliefs can not be derived from presumably standardizing scriptural sources (cp. Brasted, 2005, p. 109 and Malik, 2003, p. 376). Unfortunately, the "normative thrust of this approach has [...] prevented the appreciation of the bewildering diversity of beliefs, rituals and religious practices that underlies the faith in different parts of the world. [...] While Muslims in India no doubt subscribe to the fundamental Islamic precepts [...] each community carries its own social construct of what is orthodox" (Ahmad, 1981, p. 11 and p. 18; cp. Mines, 1981, p. 69 and Burman, 2005, p. 9f.). India could be an instructive case for a sociological appreciation of the diversity in Islamic doctrine – and again an explorative design seems most appropriate for reconstructing the role of religious identity in Muslims' political behaviour.

There is a second reason to look at India: there, the prevalent form of religious violence is communal rioting and not the fundamentalist terrorism dominating academic and political discourse. Because these riots are neither clearly an issue of psychological group dynamics (identification) nor of religious content (beliefsets), they are promising to develop a comprehensive understanding of identity. That way, they differ from the cases of terrorism or sectarian cults (which do not necessarily draw from a wider ingroup basis) and of ethno-religious separatism (which uses far more political and historical than purely religious references). An example of India could thus also enhance the understanding of identity by inspiring an integration of beliefsets with socio-psychological dynamics (or at least a simultaneous consideration of both).

Reflecting general demography, a bigger share of Indian activists has a Hindu background. I nevertheless chose to focus on Muslims – and this is the last decision to be justified in this introduction. A first reason is purely pragmatic: I simply know far more (and still too little) about Islam than about Hinduism, and would neither be able to work through Hindu religious beliefsets nor deal with the question to what extent "Hinduism" could or should be described as a religion the way Islam could. Further, practitioners are more interested in research on

Muslims and Islam than on Hindu traditions. But there is also a reason beyond pragmatism: "the project of sustaining communal coexistence, although nominally espoused by a majority of [people], is one which inevitably falls much more heavily on the shoulders of [...] Muslims, given the wider political context in which ultimately it is their livelihoods, lives and well-being which remain most at stake" (Heitmeyer, 2009, p. 118). It is unfortunate that many studies on communalism reconstruct in detail how "othering" Muslims facilitates formation of Hindu identity, while treating Muslim identities in turn rather vague (cp. M. Hasan, 2008, p. 2). Still, a similar study about Hindu peace activists would be interesting.

Following this introduction, the next chapter sketches the actual field context – in the Indian state Gujarat – by commenting on institutional landscape and NGO debates over proper interventions into communal conflict. Chapter three will roughly summarize five academic discourses, presenting the background knowledge on which later analysis builds upon. Chapter four contains a set of explorative tools and methods of classification: the scientific foundation of abductive research. Throughout the paper, a diagram with central concepts, research instruments, analytical tools and index categories is generated in four steps, with the first version printed below. In chapter five, I shall present results and introduce four typical combinations of group identification, religious beliefsets and political behaviour identified among Gujarati Muslims working for peace: faith based actors, secular leaders, emancipating women and doubting professionals. Although this typology targets some of the gaps in existing research, it can of course not solve all problems. Finally, chapter six invites to think beyond my initial steps – to further improve the understanding of religious identity and political behaviour during conflict.




Figure 1: conceptual framework; Brubaker (2004)'s dimensions highlighted (continued with research instruments on page 32, analytical tools on page 35 and index categories on page 42).

2 Field context

Inside India, the central districts of the western state Gujarat was chosen for field research (cp. map in the appendix). After justifying the research question, I shall roughly introduce the institutional and discursive context. Since long, Gujarat has comparatively deep communal ruptures in many districts. Following a brutal pogrom against Muslims in 2002, parts of civic society started explicit post-conflict interventions (cp. Hardiman, 2007; Varshney, 2002, p. 220f.). In spring the same year, 59 Hindu nationalist pilgrims were burned in a train in Godhra; the fire was set by a majority Muslim crowd after heated exchanges of words and fists (cp. Engineer, 2003, p. 18f.). Soon, mainstream media and the state government encouraged "revenge". What followed was not spontaneous, though, but largely resembled a pre-planned assault on the state's Muslim communities, using Godhra as a pretext. The violence claimed over 2.000 casualties in three weeks, affected over 150.000 Muslims and left several ten thousands of them permanently internally displaced (cp. Yagnik & Sheth, 2005, p. 282 and Heitmeyer, 2009, p. 104). Finally, chief minister Narendra Modi and his BJP party won a landslide victory in the december elections 2002: "communal intolerance had reached flash point" (Brasted, 2005, p. 106). The direct involvement of the state, brutality, scale, and one-sidedness of violence are reasons for many activists not to speak of "riots" but of "ethnic cleansing" (Setalvad, 2007, p. 108), "genocide" (Hashmi, 2007, cover) or "holocaust" (Engineer, 2003, p. 1). Although these terms are debatable, they rightly point out two obvious characteristics of the 2002 violence: direct state facilitation and massive support of the elite.

But the state played ambivalent roles in previous riots as well (cp. Basu & Kohli, 1998 and Basu, 2007 who by and large argue that the complicity of the state has reasons in caste-related electioneering). *Genuinely* new were only the NGO interventions in the aftermath: many development practitioners in Gujarat became involved in conflict management for the first time. Prior to actual interviews, I spoke with 14 (both Hindu and Muslim) NGO representatives and prominent individuals in Ahmedabad and Baroda/Vadodara (cp. appendix) to understand how they approach peacebuilding in general and the relations between religion and conflict in particular. After 2002, nearly all organizations formed common action platforms to provide victims with immediate relief. While some faith-based organizations did not change this focus, some other of them and most secular organizations did (throughout the whole paper, I will use the term secular/secularism as it is popularly used in India, i.e. not as an academic, but as a political term, used in a society's self-reflection; cp. Ruh, 2008, p. 36 and section 3.3). Today they are working in various fields from justice to dialogue to education. Most organizations propagated a contact hypothesis and tried to engage people from different communities in cross-cutting issues (working *in* conflict). The long established NGO Sanchetana, for example, describes a typical strategy using such a contact hypothesis in a recent leaflet:

”Identify the common problems of the common poor people, work with them to create awareness about the commonality of their problems. This could lead to a possibility of forming organizations of people from various religions to address the issues afflicting them. The bondage thus created can be strengthened by jointly planning action programs. This breaks the alienation and sense of separateness.”

Many background informants, who chose this peacebuilding approach, argued that religion has been instrumentalized by politicians in 2002; consequently, it would be more promising to weave a strong social fabric which can resist such instrumentalization than to start interfaith dialogues. For them, an attempt to reconstruct inter-communal everyday relations is key, not a deep engagement in conflict dynamics themselves. Fewer organizations ventured into explicit peacebuilding (working *on* conflict), an approach exemplified in a brochure of the NGO Samerth:

”In the year 2005, Samerth initiated the process of networking with schools to conduct sessions with the children on peace building using the peace education modules. [...] One of the staff comments: ‘if children ingrain these values, change in their attitudes will definitely ensure peace and harmony.’”

Here, communal conflict is at the center of intervention – be it as peace education, religious dialogue or through the reconstruction of shared spaces, holy sites visited by several communities (cp. section 3.4). Irrespective of the strategic difference between working *in* or working *on* conflict, though, very few background informants had experience with work in conflict before 2002. After the riots, many NGOs considerably changed their approach or staff composition (if they were not founded as a reaction to the riots anyway). The institutional landscape is still changing as the quest for an adequate reaction continues. Most NGOs consider it a mistake that they ignored Muslim communities before 2002 and started to include them as a new target group in existing programs. Background informants justified this inclusion by attributing neediness, passiveness and a lack of leadership to Muslim communities (cp. Noorani, 2004, p. 1), which they explained by a lack of education, insufficient political representation, surrender to fate or plain fear. But although it is important to work against the socio-economic marginalization of many Muslims (cp. Sachar et al., 2006), it often remained unclear why this should prevent violence or strengthen peace.

Even more, the above mentioned assessment of Muslim communities was strongly contested by other informants and I witnessed a lively discussion where the attribution of passiveness was rejected as a subtle variety of victimization. This objection of a minority of NGO representatives (as well secular as faith-based) hints at a deeper problem: the ”peace community” in Gujarat could be structurally blind for its Muslim members. Despite frequent tensions between small rural and large urban organizations, many secular NGOs in particular had problems with faith-based counterparts, which they consider highly communalized. At the same time, non-practicing Muslims active for peace were not recognized as Muslims. It is not the point to judge these decisions in any specific case, especially since my own sampling was based on self-categorization

only (cp. section 4.1). But I want to highlight how boundaries are maintained: the leadership from within Muslim communities is rejected as illegitimate because it is faith-based, and, if it is not faith-based but secular, it is not recognized as coming from Muslims. Lack of leadership might be then the logical consequence of these prior assumptions, but not necessarily an empirical fact. This potentially wrong conclusion often stems from the flawed assumption that all Muslims always act religiously, while my research intends to unravel the *complexity* of the interaction between religious identity dimensions and political behaviour. I can not statistically proof whether Muslims are more or less active than other people, but the data at least suggest the possibility that different groups just ignore each other.

Despite mapping the institutional landscape and prevalent intervention designs, I was also interested in background informants' take on religion in communal conflict. Most of them intuitively focused on the relation of religion and *violence* and propagated an hypothesis of instrumentalization: religion "itself" was either innocent or terrible, but ultimately irrelevant (cp. sections 3.1 and 3.5 for similar argumentative tendencies among social scientists). Many pointed at the successful indoctrination of rural and lower-caste masses through martial Hindutva ideology, but saw therein a political, not a religious strategy. For example, the RSS's sustainable grassroots approach was recognized as a case of optimum NGO work. But this merely left an uneasy feeling, and did not start a reflection on possible causes for their success, especially not for causes which could be related to religion. The ignorance towards genuine religious factors was shared by faith-based and secular organizations alike, although some of the former tended to essentialize religion – for them, the issue then was less one of essentials being instrumentalized, but more one of true essentials vs. false essentials. Directly asked about the relation between religious *identity* and *peace*, about a third of all background informants mentioned ambivalence, another third saw a spiritual motivation as fruitful in peacebuilding and a last third held that religious concepts might be inspiring, while groupness should best be shunned. When saying "identity", most of them meant primordial group membership combined with a fixed set of religious beliefs: an essentialistic and stable conceptualization.

Similar collections of interviews conducted by Lobo and Das (2006), Engineer (2003) and Ganguly, Jowher, and Dabhi (2006) by and large confirmed what my informants said: their account seems to reflect mainstream civil society discourse. In an ethnographic study of a central Gujarati town neighbouring the locations of the interviewees of this study, Heitmeyer (2009, p. 103) convincingly termed the "normative discourses presenting the 2002 violence as an aberration [...] a collective strategy of containing the tension and mutual suspicion which remain constant undercurrents in daily life". While containing tensions might pragmatically be necessary, though, it does not help to clarify the role of religion in conflict; this research tries to move beyond them.

3 Academic discourses

This study is based on explorative interviews, from which I extract an empirically grounded typology (the method is further explained in chapter 4). In this process, existing literature on Islam and Muslims or on politics and identity serves as a pool of inspiration, not as a rigid theoretical foundation. For heuristic purposes, careful deduction is not necessary. Besides, dealing comprehensively with religion, conflict, fundamentalism, and several hundred years of Muslim history in India on a few pages would be beyond the scope of this study. Instead, five discourses relevant to my topic will roughly be sketched by commenting on a few instructive books in each. Doing so, one can extract those "sensitizing concepts" (Blumer, 1954, as commented by Kelle & Kluge, 1999, p. 25f.), which will later become instructive for the interpretation of empirical data. The first two sections present how global academia treats religion in conflict, on the one hand acknowledging the ambivalence of the sacred (3.1), on the other hand frequently limiting the topic to the problem of fundamentalism (3.2). The other sections cover important political traditions in Indian Islam and colonial influence (3.3), criticize clear-cut group categorization (3.4) and review recent academic work on Hindu-Muslim riots (3.5).

3.1 The ambivalence of the sacred

"Most religious societies, in fact, have interpreted their experience of the sacred in such a way as to give religion a paradoxical role in human affairs – as the bearer of peace and the sword. These [...] reflect a continuing struggle within religions – and within the heart of each believer – over the meaning and character of the power encountered in the sacred and its relationship to coercive force or violence. [...] The ambivalence of religion toward violence, toward the sacred itself, is actually good news for those who recognize, correctly, that religion will continue to be a major force [...] indeed, religions, despite the shameful record of a minority of their adherents, are strikingly accomplished in developing their own traditions of peace-related practices and concepts." (Appleby, 2000, p. 27 and p. 306)

Religion has always been at times a more, at times a less fashionable topic in social science (cp. Kippenberg, 2008, p. 28f.). The latest shift of emphasis occurred with the Iranian revolution in 1979 and drew particular attention to the link between religious revivalism and violent conflict. Latest since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, even those who were otherwise ignoring the issue (cp. Frühbauer, 2004, p. 126) deal with it in one or two paragraphs of their texts: "religion matters" (Philpott, 2007, p. 522). The historical triggers predestinate a particular focus: while the modernistic paradigm of global secularization ceded, the rediscovery of religion was and often still is understood as a "return" that brings back a violence thought to be historically overcome (cp. Hildebrandt, 2007, p. 3 or Makrides & Rüpke, 2005, p. 7). This is true of many recent books and articles, irrespective of whether examples of religious "holy wars" are collected (e.g. Partner, 1997), fundamentalism is feared (sometimes well informed,

e.g. Pargeter, 2008, sometimes hysterically, e.g. Ulfkotte, 2007), today's relevance of secularism is discussed (e.g. Maier, 2004; Roy, 2007), religious human rights are claimed (e.g. Little, 1995), religiously inspired terror is explained (e.g. Juergensmeyer, 2005; Miller, 2006), Huntington's thesis of a clash of civilization is assessed (e.g. Fox, 2001, 2004) or the monotheistic idea is reconstructed (e.g. Assmann, 2000, 2003 and, partly revising, 2006). In summary, Lewis (2002) simply asks: "what went wrong?" (cp. critically Robinson, 2007, p. 6).

It is largely due to the intervention of Appleby (2000) that a growing part of academic discourse begins to assess religion as an *ambivalent* factor in conflict (cp. Wilhelmy, 2006; Weingardt, 2008, 2009). If this had previously been noticed at all, it was usually explained with a compromise between "ideological consideration" and "compulsion of living" (Madan, 1981, p. 58); religion was either a violence-provoking ideology restrained only by context or a harmless traditional way of living, viciously exploited by politics of identity (cp. Oberdorfer, 2004, p. 142). Appleby (2000) instead argues that religion itself oscillates "between eden and armageddon" (Gopin, 2000), that ambivalence roots in the core of the "mysterium tremendum et fascinans" (Otto, 1917). But speculations about the essence of the sacred do not help to understand the social specifics of its experience: additional factors mediate the transformation of ambivalence into political strategies (cp. Kippenberg, 2005, 2008, p. 206f.). According to Hasenclever and de Juan (2007), at least four religious factors can escalate conflict:

1. "Religious traditions can be used to develop a sense of community despite political, social, or ethnic fragmentation" (p. 25) as they anchor identities in transcendental spheres.
2. Having achieved this, religion is (like any ideology) able to transform divisible into indivisible conflicts, which are often more complicated to resolve (p. 26).
3. Religious teachings can justify sacrifices (or even make them more likely) by promising transcendental rewards in the afterlife (p. 26).
4. Religious organizations often have access to well developed logistic networks and transnationally generate income; they might use both for escalation (p. 27).

On the other hand, religion can support de-escalation of conflict, too. Again, Hasenclever and de Juan (2007) list several factors that have been suggested in recent research:

1. Religious authorities can publicly demand an end to violence or a (re-)secularization of conflicts with moral arguments (p. 28; prominent in Gujarat: Bandukwala, 2006)
2. Religious communities can mobilize global civic society, as they often can continue to report on conflicts when international aid agencies had to withdraw (p. 29).
3. Religious authorities frequently have high credibility among conflict parties which they can use as mediators in peace negotiations (p. 29).

4. In the long run, inclusivist religious teachings can change actors' perceptions through initiatives of interfaith dialogue or powerful rites of interpersonal reconciliation (p. 30; cp. on dialogue Grieser, 2005, p. 181, Abu-Nimer, 2001, p. 16 and Gopin, 2000, p. 42).
5. Last not least, religions can contribute to the reduction of structural causes of conflict by objecting social injustice (p. 32).

For most research, religious *identity* serves only as an empty signifier, though: the term hints at the other side of the respective analysis, but can not account for it (interesting exceptions are Seul, 1999, Hammack, 2008 and Schäfer, 2008b, who try to include identity in their framework). This study in contrast focusses on identity in order to de-essentialize Appleby's main insight: that religion's ambivalence in conflict might well root in the experience of the sacred itself. Many scholars object "transcendental experience" as conceptually too inflexible and inaccessible to context-sensitive analysis. But by emphasizing the sacred's subjective interpretation on cognitive as well as on experiential, social-psychological levels (beliefsets and group identification), objectivating essentialism can be avoided without reducing religion to a passive factor whose ambivalence stems only from context. One can reconstruct religious identities as semantic operators and psychodynamic processes and highlight the conditions and consequences of their formation without denying that actors themselves experience them as an essential force.

In this sense, this study builds on Appleby's main insight: it explores the peaceful side of ambivalence, but try to avoid essentialism with an abductive design (re-constructing, not just mirroring narratives) and a theoretical focus on (subjective, thus contingent) identity. This will hopefully help to concretize the "ambivalence of the sacred" on the micro-level to make it usable for a better understanding of political behaviour.

3.2 Fundamentalism

"Fundamentalist movements are movements which (1) absolutize religious convictions (i.e. any belief) and which (2) deduce from these convictions a strategy of social dominance that tries to subdue private and public life. Context (3) for such a strategy is the fundamental politicization of all spheres of life during modernization processes" (Schäfer, 2008a, p. 18, my translation)

Most authors in the emerging discourse on religion and conflict, whether they share the consensus of ambivalence or not, focus on the problem of fundamentalism. Under this heading, they discuss either orthodox beliefs (read: teachings in certain Sunni law schools), scriptural understanding of religious texts (read: of the Quran), traditionalist moral demands (read: patriarchy in the Arab peninsula) or global terrorism (for the problematical use of obscuring labels – often meaning Islam without saying so – cp. Heine, 2004, p. 9). In the Indian context, the semantic is even less precise; for example, A. Khan (2005, p. 29ff.) lists that "Islamic radicals" oppose secularism, modernism, ethnic nationalism, Sufism, traditionalism, all kind of political

or economical elites and several groups of non-Muslims at the same time. On the contrary, Schäfer (2008a) suggests a narrow and formal definition to enable precise analyses: only those actors should be termed fundamentalist who treat beliefs as unquestionable and try to impose them on society. Although absolutizing anything necessarily includes a notion of superiority and thus a potential nucleus of conflict, Schäfer urges to distinguish privatist seclusion from a political strategy of dominance (referring to Weber's definition of world-dominating rather than world-escaping religion; cp. similar definitions by Rieger, 2005; Conermann, 2003a; Riesebrodt, 2000, p. 55 or Heine, 2004, p. 81 – and their comprehensive discussion by Kessler, 2008). Only actors with a strategy of dominance enter the struggle of contesting modernities. Despite their traditionalist image, they act as modern as their opponents in equally politicizing all spheres of life. Compared to them, though, fundamentalists adopt a particularly radical approach and construct politics as a friend-enemy distinction, which, when unchecked by pragmatic restraints, easily leads to violent annihilation (cp. Bakr et al., 2003, p. 8 and Schmitt, 1927).

Schäfer's definition is intentionally formal to cover fundamentalists of several religious traditions and he analyzes fundamentalism as a specific mode of politics combinable with *any* belief. Still, *Islamic* fundamentalists by and large share not only a formal dynamic, but also a common theological argumentation (cp. A. Alam, 2007, p. 32). It is particularly the thought of one of the most influential theologians of political Islam on the subcontinent, the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami Maulana Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi that exemplifies this framework (cp. Conermann, 2003b; Ende & Steinbach, 1996, p. 636). He writes:

"The most fundamental and the most important teaching [...] is faith in the oneness of God. This is expressed in the primary Kalimah of Islam as 'There is no deity but Allah' (La ilaha illallah). This beautiful phrase is the bedrock of Islam, its foundation and its essence. [...] The acceptance or denial of this phrase produces a world of difference between man and man. The believers in it become one single community and those who do not believe in it form an opposing group. [...] [The] real difference lies in the conscious acceptance of this doctrine and complete adherence to it in practical life. [...] Man became guilty of shirk [...] only because he turned away from the teachings of the Prophets and depended on his own faulty reasoning, false perceptions or biased interpretations. Tawhid dispels all the clouds of ignorance and illuminates the horizon with the light of reality." (Maududi, 2004, p. 83f. and p. 89)

To insist on the oneness of God (Tawhid) as the core of Islam is nothing spectacular and that this belief, if absolutized, separates Muslims from an "opposing group" is a logical consequence. Since the time of the Caliphs, mainstream Islamic scholarship assumes that Tawhid also includes God's word, the Quran. Because this book is not only regarded as one of God's many creations but as part of his being, adding or removing something from it by way of autonomous reasoning becomes highly problematic (cp. Küng, 2006, p. 360ff.). But this mainstream tradition does not denounce reason as such: there has always been "a strong and continuing tradition of interpretation and reinterpretation of Islamic principles to address changing times" (Smock &

Huda, 2009, p. 5). Tradition emphasizes a never-ending circle of interpretation: suspected contradictions between reason and Quranic teachings should inspire the believer to take the application of reason a step further, ultimately leading to the (re-)integration of both; until then, the case is kept pending (cp. Özsoy, 2008, p. 279). Maududi, on the contrary, *categorically* distinguishes "the teachings of the Prophet" and "faulty reasoning, false perceptions or biased interpretations". He claims that the only objective interpretation of Quran is *his* (his own journal was titled "Interpret of Quran"; cp. Conermann, 2003b), which he presents not as an interpretation rather than as the direct, "unbiased" representation of Quranic reality, reducing further thinking to a mere act of memorization and reason to a semantic guise. Because more and more spheres of life become inaccessible to deliberation if the "light of reality" putatively speaks for itself, this approach leads, when turned into a political strategy, indeed to a radical "world of difference" between those accepting "reality" and those who do not. Fundamentalists "draw a line inside the Muslim world between what is Islamic and what is not. [...] The need to [...] define objectively what Islam is - in short to 'objectify' Islam - is a logical consequence" (Roy, 2004, p. 22; similarly Buruma & Margalit, 2004, p. 121f. and Schieder, 2008, p. 59ff.). In precisely this sense fundamentalism is a modern phenomenon; it attempts acculturation to a non-reflexive Western modernity, similarly hiding the contingency in the application of practical and political reason behind rationalist ideology (cp. Rorty, 1992, p. 91 and the famous debate between Al-Azm, 1981 and Said, 1978).

This reification of reason is the problematic core of Islamic as well as early-modern fundamentalist thought, because it leads to a dichotomic approach to politics. It is typically achieved by interpreting certain theological concepts in a certain way. These are in particular "Sharia – divine law, Jihad – to strive in right path, Jahilliya – pre-Islamic age of ignorance, Dawa – to invite towards Islam, and Umma – religious unity of Muslims in the world" (A. Alam, 2007, p. 53). Their use can be exemplified by fundamentalists' obsession with gender relations and sexuality: women symbolize the unity and morality of the Umma, they have to be protected from the contemporary Western Jahilliya by application of Sharia, spread through Dawa in a moral and at times martial Jihad (cp. Robinson, 2007, p. 137 and in detail Bredi, 2008). Here, fundamentalists re-enact an essentialist contrast between culture on the one hand, which subjugates the God-created world and is therefore considered immoral, and nature or a "natural" system of familial honour, represented by the innocent female, on the other hand (cp. Buruma & Margalit, 2004, p. 128ff.). This idea can also be found in Western romantic responses to industrialization, another hint that fundamentalists are indeed part of processes of modernization.

To conclude, two main aspects of fundamentalism should be kept in mind because later analysis will refer to them: the usefulness of a narrow definition (including political intention) as well as the identification of the radical restriction of reason as the core problem. Both will be particularly important to understand faith based actors' diversity (in section 5.1).

3.3 Secular polity and colonial legacy

”Where are you going and why? Raise your eyes. The minarets of Jama Masjid want to ask you a question. Where have you lost the glorious pages from your chronicles? [...] I want to remind you that these bright etchings which you see all around you, are relics of the Qalifas of your forefathers. Do not forget them. Do not forsage them. Live like their worthy inheritors, and, rest assured that if you do not wish to flee from this scene, nobody can make you flee. Come, today let us pledge that this country is ours, we belong to it and any fundamental decision about its destiny will remain incomplete without our consent” (Maulana Azad’s Address to Delhi Muslims at Jama Masjid, Delhi, October 23rd 1947; quoted in Noorani, 2004, p. 54)

After a general review of literature on religion and conflict, I shall now move on to specifics of the subcontinent. Due to the enormous complexity of history, though, this section will not present meta-level academic discourse, but immediately reconstruct traditions of Islamic political thought (by and large following Robinson, 1983, 1986, 2000, 2001, 2007; a competing analysis is separately presented in section 3.4). Spoken in midst of refugee tracks by an eminent Muslim leader, the words quoted above were a desperate plea to develop ownership of the new political order and to escape what was perceived as the ”identity trap” (Mehta, 2004, p. 72) that led to the partition of British India. Above all, the processes culminating in the formation of Pakistan, the scars of partition and the context of a young secular polity still frame Muslims’ contemporary political behaviour: in the young republic, in principle everybody can become a political subject independent of religious identity – and is expected to be secular.

But beyond constitutional claims, caste and religious barriers remain strong and ”for the millions of Muslims who stayed in India, secularism did not prove inclusionary enough” (Brasted, 2005, p. 117). Meant as the polity’s foundation, secularism soon became partisan policy. While it is still instructive to explain why ”India has not witnessed large-scale Islamic militancy, despite the growth in Islamic fundamentalist organizations” (A. Alam, 2007, p. 30), secularism’s potential of regulating conflict decreases and its credibility is fading as a common ground for political competition (cp. further Nandy, 1992, p. 86ff., Bhargava, 1996, p. 58 or M. Hasan, 1996, p. 172). In consequence, pre-secular religio-political traditions regain importance (cp. Reetz, 1995, p. 87). These traditions root back into the time of Moghul-Rajput rule, they were challenged by colonialism and reformulated by revivalists at the end of the 19th century. For several decades, they lost their influence after the trauma of partition and under the strong imperative of secularism. But in today’s identity politics they could well experience a comeback.

Initially having been an elite project of theologians and families of influential saints, these traditions had various explicit Islamic foundations, with ”law (that is sharia, but defined – as we shall see – rather broadly); tasawwuf (that is sufi ideology and practice); and language” competing for influence (M. Alam, 2008, p. 5; the linguistic dimension is today far less relevant, though). Each of these fields is in itself rather complex: in Sharia traditions, for example, it was and still is contested which techniques of interpretation of juridical sources or even which sources

themselves are legitimate and if and how which Sharia principles were to be politically enforced (cp. M. Alam, 2008, p. 8 and 11). As another example, the Sufi proponents of Tasawwuf moved Muslim politics beyond legalism by combining ostentatious (though not necessarily substantial) orthodoxy with acculturation in various social and ritual domains (cp. M. Alam, 2008, p. 192). In particular Sufi's attribution of legitimacy to miracles (Karamat), enacted by a saint's spirit or his descendants, inspired a flexible reaction to the diverse social realities of India (cp. Aquil, 2008, p. 40ff. and section 3.4).

Under colonial influences and challenged by western science, this broad history of thought transformed and inspired several "revivalist" movements (cp. Robinson, 2007, p. 88). Most important probably were the alumni from Deoband (cp. Metcalf, 2004, 2006a, 2006b), those inspired by Ahmad Riza Khan Barelvi (cp. Sanyal, 1996), the Aligarh movement (cp. T. Hasan, 2006; Lelyveld, 2003) and the fundamentalism of Maududi (discussed in the former section). Their revivalism built on earlier traditions in contradictory ways: the frequent labels orthodox-reformist (Deoband), traditionalist-syncretist (Barelvi), modernist-liberal (Aligarh) and fundamentalist are highlighting the varying relative importance of religious doctrine in general (least in Aligarh) and the attitudes towards folk tradition in particular: "if the Deobandis wanted to conserve Islam as they found it in the Hanafi law books, Barelwis wished to conserve it as they found it in nineteenth-century India" (Robinson, 2007, p. 66). Till today, this difference fuels a rivalry between the Tablighi Jamaat (a Deobandi missionary movement and possibly the world's largest Islamic institution; cp. Metcalf, 2006b; Ibrahim, 2008) and actors inspired by Barelvi's thoughts. Right now, traditional Sufi practice is the "clear loser" (Robinson, 2007, p. 52), while the Tabligh and the more radical Ahl-e-Hadith often are "hardening inter-community differences, by crusading against composite, syncretic religious and cultural traditions that bind Muslims with others among whom they live, and by stressing external markers of 'Muslim identity' that sharply divide Muslims from others" (Sikand, 2002, p. 312).

Nevertheless, the Tabligh in many ways resembles "a true modern incarnation of Sufi aspirations" (Reetz, 2006, p. 48), which exemplifies the complexity of the transformation of Moghul traditions. While Deobandis and Barelvis focus in doctrine on Sharia rather than on Tassawwuf, those emphasizing such legalism were often descendants of respected Sufi families (cp. Mayaram, 1997, p. 231f.), reflecting an openness towards (even orthodox) reform inherent in Sufism (cp. Schimmel, 1985, p. 514). Similarly, Shaikh argues that the "secular" leaders in Aligarh were influenced "by a specifically Indo-Muslim Mughal tradition [and] by a faith which stressed a community bound in service to some higher end" (p. 230): the distinctions are not easy.

That the usual labels are not quite appropriate has its reason in an underlying commonality: all four revivalist traditions perform a powerful shift from other-worldly to this-worldly or political religion. This shift does not necessarily lead to fundamentalism: both Deobandis and Barelvis, for example, "emphasize hermeneutic interpretation, taqlid or the application of

reason to law, and the right to assess whether the hadis are authentic or fabricated” (Mayaram, 1997, p. 221), which enables them to work in the deliberative structures of a secular polity (cp. Heinrich, 2006, p. 56ff. and extensively Sachedina, 2001). Instead, individualism in hermeneutics as well as in political behaviour is the main result of this-worldliness: ”at the heart of this activism, and the energy which it created, was the placing of the responsibility of fashioning Islamic society on each individual Muslim” (Robinson, 2007, p. 177; cp. also Roy, 2004, p. 148ff.). Individualism in turn led to an emphasis on education during the Islamic revival in the 19th century: although quite diverse in pedagogy and curricular content, Deobandis and Bareilvis run madrassas to shape personal consciousness, and, as the most pointed example, an influential university was founded in Aligarh (cp. Robinson, 2007, p. 19 and in depth Sikand, 2005). Development of personality through education finally led to a growing importance of identity (cp. Nassehi, 1995; Hahn, 1995):

”The period of British rule saw the emergence of new strands of identity among Indian Muslims. For many their religious identity became their prime identity. Muslim imagination expanded to embrace the lives and fate of Muslims elsewhere in the world; for some this became an all-absorbing concern. Increasingly, Muslim identity in public space acquired a feminine dimension. Moreover, individuals were beginning to emerge who wished to be treated as individuals; they rejected the demands made upon them by their ’community’ and resisted all stereotyping from without. It should be clear that not all Muslims were affected by all of these processes, and some by none of them. In sum, the period of British rule saw a particular privileging of the religious dimension of Muslim identities, but at the same time it also saw other strands emerge which Muslims might choose to emphasize.” (Robinson, 2007, p. 141)

This leads back to the precarious state of secularism: stronger personal religious identities should not be confused with stronger beliefs of any certain kind, nor with stricter observance of rituals or rising importance of group identification. Although religio-political traditions might well experience a second revival in times of a contested secular polity, the individualistic spin given them during their colonial transformation should prevent a precipitated ”glorification of religious seminaries” like Deoband (M. Hasan, 2008, p. 132). On the contrary, personalisation above all *diversifies* identities, fostering multiple religious revivals while at the same time nourishing ”the liberal and secular trends among Muslims” (M. Hasan, 2008, p. 132).

To conclude, several insights from this extremely rough sketch will be relevant to interpret my typology: to understand the complexity of faith based actors (cp. section 5.1), it is indispensable to know about the argument between Tassawwuf’s and Sharia’s advocates over sources of authority, which is layered by the competition between Deobandis and Bareilvis that focuses on the aspect of folk tradition. The underlying forces of individualization, which strengthen the relevance of identity as a political factor *and* enable liberalism, are crucial in doubting professionals’ dynamics (cp. section 5.4). Finally, the context of a contested secular polity can explain several statements of secular leaders (cp. section 5.2).

3.4 Liminality and shared spaces

”Much of the academic writing [...] tends to structure the subcontinental experience into the categorial identities of 'Hindu' and 'Muslim'. Groups are either one or the other. [...] Both the nationalist and nineteenth-century social reform movements anchored themselves in [this] tradition, seeking to define identities in terms of authenticities. [...] This conceptualization of identity, however, tends to be grounded in singularity and does not incorporate the layers, the plural character of existential liminality [...], a potentially anti-structural questioning of categorial identities, in this case 'Hindu' and 'Musalman'. Folk traditions both derive from and contest 'great traditional' practice.” (Mayaram, 1997, p. 4ff. and 38f.)

A reconstruction of explicit Islamic traditions, contrasted only with secularism, recently came under heavy critique. The research by Mayaram (1997, 2007) is exemplary of a discourse that questions the dualistic categorization of Hindu and Muslim as elitist and emphasizes liminality and shifting religious identities on the subcontinent. Mayaram argues that a clear-cut distinction mirrors more a colonial projection (which inspired revivalism in the upper castes) than any actual folk religiosity – which on the contrary often oscillates *between* Islamic and Hindu traditions (an argument also presented in variations by Nandy, 1992, p. 71, Nandy, Trivedy, Mayaram, & Yagnik, 1997, p. 56ff. and many other ”post-colonial” authors). Indeed, Mayaram’s remark on Meo communities fits quite some Indian Muslims: ”censuses recorded them as Muslim, [while] ethnographers [...] found it difficult to say whether they were Hindus or Muslims because their beliefs and practices drew upon both religions” (Mayaram, 1997, p. 4).

In Gujarat, Burman (2005) and Engineer (1989) collected many examples of such liminality, ranging from an abundance of shared spaces visited by followers of any faith to whole communities observing ”unorthodox” Islamic traditions. As prominent shared spaces, Dargahs (shrines of Muslim saints) over the times acquired ”therapeutic, social, economic and political significance; and in contrast to mosques, they provide an alternative source of communication and identity for women” (Malik, 2003, p. 377). Although they were initially linked to Islamic Sufi traditions, their contemporary spiritual significance is broader and often ambiguous, partly because they are organized around non-religious categories (such as gender; Dargahs will play a crucial role in understanding emancipating women in section 5.3). As examples of ”syncretic” communities, on the other hand, the Shia Nizari Ismailis and, to a lesser extent, the Bohra Ismailis, follow ”’an esoteric Islam clad in a regional culture’ [and] live their beliefs, celebrate their rites and holidays, and rule their daily lives according to customs which appear to be eminently Hindu” (Mallison, 2003, p. 360). Unlike mainstream Sunni Islam, both communities have priestly hierarchies and unlike both Sunni and Shia tradition they revere additional scriptures besides the Quran, which picture Islam as the completion of Hindu tradition (cp. Mallison, 2003, p. 365). To protect their unorthodox doctrine, they adopted a tradition of ”taqiyya (precautionary dissimulation of one’s faith) which [...] gradually led some groups to shift their allegiance, and their religious identity had largely remained 'liminal'” (D.-S. Khan, 2003, p. 44).

Today, liminal communities and shared spaces are under severe stress, as "the rise of political Islam [and] Gandhi's introduction of political Hinduism" (Misra, 2004, p. 15) led to attempts of "purification" from both sides (cp. Wessler, 2007, p. 228). In the 2002 pogrom, too, Dargahs were more frequently targeted than, for example, mosques (cp. Heitmeyer, 2009, p. 109). Confronted with such overt hostility, some communities refine their strategies of disguise, a practice now common well beyond Nizari Ismaili circles, while others indeed "purify" their practices: "one enduring consequence of this encounter was the production of a stereotype of Islam, which [...] also began to shape the way in which Muslims *themselves* perceived their religion" (M. Alam, 2008, p. 16, my emphasis; cp. also D.-S. Khan, 2002, p. 169 and for Hinduizing influences Mayaram, 1997, p. 34 or Shah, 1996, p. 228). Normatively one might regret it, but because colonial and revivalist essentialism did *successfully* trickle down to lower castes, eased by socio-structural modernization, orthodoxy "is steadily eating into local custom-centered traditions" (Robinson, 1983, p. 187), reducing the practical relevance of the latter.

Still, lower-caste, rural and female liminality will receive particular attention in my analysis to avoid an academic reinforcement of these processes – and because many NGOs try to reconstruct and protect shared spaces as part of their peacebuilding (as already mentioned in chapter 2).

3.5 Communal riots

"In answering the [...] question why religion becomes salient in politics at some times and not others, scholars have offered two broad explanations. First there are those who see religious mobilization as stemming fairly naturally from the religious beliefs of politicians and their communities. [...] The fact, however, that demands framed in religious terms change over time despite a great deal of apparent stability in religious beliefs and practices has convinced many scholars that it is political elites and their changing instrumental political and material calculations [...] that determines the salience of religious politics." (Wilkinson, 2007, p. 4)

While the last sections mainly provided sensitizing concepts, this final part of the literature review will position my study in the academic discourse on communal riots. In early (including colonial) research, "a substantial part of the understanding of ethnic conflict in the Indian subcontinent has been grounded within an essentialist framework" (Mayaram, 1997, p. 36). This tradition still lives on in some Indian contributions: Pandey (2007, p. 545) for example fears a civil war between religious communities, a perception that reminds not only Brasted (2005, p. 106) of the theses propagated by Huntington (1997). That mostly Muslims are blamed for a "clash of civilizations" in such "research" reveals a widespread Islamophobia in the Indian public (cp. Brasted, 2005, p. 118, Misra, 2004, p. 236ff. or M. Hasan, 2008, p. 33ff.).

In contrast, contemporary academic mainstream favours an hypothesis of instrumentalization, which was made popular by Paul Brass and since then reiterated in many variations (cp. Brass, 1974, 1985, 1991, 1996, 2003, 2006 and the discussion in Hansen, Momin, Petersen, &

Brass, 2006). He argues that "riots [...] first and foremost persist because they are a [...] well-known and accepted [...] part of the general armory of weapons used by activists and interested parties within both communities for personal, local, and political advantage" (Brass, 2003, p. 356 and p. 366f.). Riots are instrumentally useful to the extent of institutionalization; the religious semantics around them is in Brass's opinion merely a guise for worldly goals. Many NGOs in India repeat this argument, which provides them with a picture of unempowered, passively exploited masses. These are ideal target groups to legitimize interventions and to prolong an organization's existence: instrumentalization is the civil society's leading interpretation of communal riots (cp. chapter 2). Recently, instrumentalists' argumentation was refined in comparative studies by introducing additional variables (e.g. by Varshney, 2002, 2007):

"Perhaps the leading town-level explanation for communal violence focuses on the role of economic competition. [...] The difficulty lies, however, in deciding whether [this] represents the cause of the riot in the first place. [...] More recently, scholars and activists have [thus] begun to focus on the value of inter-ethnic engagement in reducing communal prejudice and violence. [...] [But] are successful inter-ethnic associations really a cause of peace so much as its effect? [...] I would argue that none of [these approaches] really provides the key to understanding why communal violence takes place. This is because a focus on the town-level [...] leaves out the critical role of India's elected state governments in deciding whether to prevent violence or quickly stop it when it does break out. [...] The most convincing explanation for why some state governments prevent communal violence while others do not, it seems to me, is one that focuses on state-level electoral incentives." (Wilkinson, 2007, p. 8ff.)

These studies' merit is the rebuttal of overly blunt primordialism. Nevertheless, Wilkinson's summary reveals that the quest for an optimal set of explanatory variables external to religion itself never ends: it can explain religious violence to a certain (and important) extent, but seems to permanently miss something. Consequently, more and more scholars develop a constructivist "line of argument [which] takes religion far more seriously" (Mayaram, 1997, p. 18; cp. Brasted, 2005, p. 121 and Copland, 2008, p. 28f.). They complement what instrumentalism lacks "not so much [in] reasonably wellgrounded explanations of political change, but [in] a more sustained regard for the normative prescriptions of a religious and political tradition" (Shaikh, 1992, p. 4). They argue in particular that a religious tradition must *a priori* provide an adequate pool of symbols if instrumentalization is to succeed (cp. Hansen et al., 2006, p. 112) and that the semantic of instrumentalist politicians, when rooted in identities, acquires a quasi-primordial stability and thus effectively frames political behaviour in turn (cp. Kakar, 1996, p. 209).

Although I look at *peace* activism and not at communal *violence*, this study shares a constructivist impetus: I take religion more serious than most instrumentalists and analyze genuine religious content as well as psychological processes of identity formation. But in contrast to old-school primordialists, I look at the *reproduction* of identity, explaining structural persistence and dynamic change in the same framework (cp. Kippenberg, 2008, p. 23).

4 Design and methods

My research neither follows a hard deductive nor an intuitive inductive logic: it uses an abductive-hermeneutic design as developed as a basic epistemological approach by Kelle and Kluge (1999, p. 23f.). For them, abduction is informed explorative thinking: the researcher is surprised by common characteristics as well as irregularities in data and develops preliminary hypotheses to understand them. This requires awareness of what could constitute "common characteristics" or "irregularities" in a specific field and how they could tentatively be understood: abduction acknowledges that insights do not miraculously emerge out of data. But more than mainstream deductive designs, on the other hand, abductive methodology encourages creativity while generating hypotheses in close interaction with empirical data. In the following sections, I shall thus first demonstrate how the selection of instruments reflects the research question and makes use of sensitizing concepts developed in the literature review (in section 4.1). Then I shall show how sampling brings up a multitude of potentially surprising cases (again in section 4.1) and how analytical tools systematically inspire creativity and extract variance (for textual data in section 4.2, for psychological scales in section 4.3). A methodical explanation of the actual process of extracting an empirically grounded typology conclude the chapter (in section 4.4).

4.1 Instruments, sampling and field dynamics

I used three instruments to generate data: storytelling, structured interviews and psychological tests (cp. appendix). They each reflect one aspect of the overall research question, namely political behaviour (focus of storytelling), beliefsets (focus of the structured interviews) and group identification (focus of psychological scales; cp. also figure 2 on page 32). With the first pillar, I wanted to explore how interviewees became active for peace and which motives they present for their activism. As Gollnick (2005) mentions: "a person's identity is not to be found in his or her behavior, nor even in the reaction of other people, but in the capacity to keep a particular narrative going" (p. 105; cp. also p. 107ff. and Hammack, 2008, p. 223ff. for the suitability of narratives in identity research). Specifically, 21 interviewees told the story of their initial involvement in peace work and an exemplary success story.

The second pillar was a structured interview covering religious beliefs. Because the guideline was initially based on studies undertaken in different cultural contexts (especially on a study by Schlösser, 2003), a pre-test with three Indian Muslims led to major adjustments. One idea throughout the guideline's construction was to assess the extent of dichotomy in religious belief and the rigidity of ritual practice, both often seen as potential obstacles for peace activism (cp. Hörter, 2007, p. 30 and section 3.2). Nevertheless, I did not "test" for certain beliefsets, but tried to explore what interviewees think and experience in several areas related to identity formation; which combinations of beliefs join into a set was empirically determined.




Figure 2: Research instruments and their relation to the conceptual framework (a continuation of figure 1, further extended with analytical tools on page 35 and index categories on page 42).

The third pillar, finally, was a self-administered questionnaire with four socio-psychological instruments; some demographic details were enquired at the very end to control potential sampling biases. To be able to use these instruments outside large-N settings, clinical tests designed for individual assessment were selected. The Giessen Test (GT; Beckmann, Brähler, & Richter, 1991), the first part of the questionnaire, assesses a person’s unconscious attitude towards groups in general. It has already been applied successfully and with good results in India for interviews with communalist rioters by an eminent Indian psychoanalyst (Kakar, 1996); intercultural transfer seems therefore less problematic. Due to constraint of time, only those three (out of six) scales important in Kakar’s study were used: “social resonance” (reflecting whether one experiences positive or negative feedback from others; p. 90), “social permeability” (assessing openness to one’s surrounding and sense of basic trust; p. 105) and “dominance” (showing intrusive and aggressive desires; p. 125f.). “Depressivity”, which was also important, had to be dropped due to research-ethical restrictions. While GT scales were available in English by the publisher, other translations to English and Hindi were done by myself and revised by a native speaker. A second part of the questionnaire provides a categorization ranking, reflecting that religion is in a secular context only one among several aspects of being Muslim (cp. section 3.3); the ranking asked for the relative importance of gender, language, nationality, caste and religion. Further, nine items helped to assess the intensity of identification with the religious ingroup itself; they were assembled from Zee, Atsma, and Brodbeck (2004, p. 290), Ganguly et al. (2006, p. 65ff.), Varshney (2002, p. 303ff.), Schlösser (2003, p. 105ff.) and Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, and Turner (1999, p. 813). Following the distinction by Jackson and Smith (1999, p. 121ff.),

four items concern attraction to the ingroup, two items the perception of the intergroup context and three items depersonalization and beliefs of interdependency (due to the small item count, sub-results had to be treated with caution, though). The last part was a psychological inventory measuring tolerance towards ambiguity (IMA; Reis, 1996). Again only three scales were used, namely those dealing with "social conflicts" (for obvious reasons), irritations of traditional "role models" (mainly gendered ones) and "new experiences" (with which peace activism frequently confronts). This inventory was in particular helpful to concretize the general ambivalence of the sacred on the micro-level of personal agency, even though religion was not explicitly covered (cp. section 3.1). Neither IMA nor the scale of identification intensity have yet been applied in India and were thus carefully translated by two Indian colleagues.

In the field, I closely cooperated with the youth movement Yuv Shakti and its umbrella organization Jan Vikas, which partly work among internally displaced Muslims. They provided me with practical field support, contacts, and credibility towards a reserved target group; in turn, I provide them with a systematic study about a topic they are interested in. Inevitably depending on them for most of the sampling (and on those NGOs which I visited for background talks; cp. chapter 2), I at least asked everyone for potential interviewees as different from themselves as they can imagine (a strategy proposed by Mercer, 2006, p. 101 and others).

Beyond the resulting restrictions in field access, the sample was purposefully selected to include a broad variance (following Blee & Taylor, 2002): the goal was to find many different combinations of religious beliefsets, group identification and political behaviour – irrespective of how these might be distributed among a larger population. During April and May 2008, I conducted 21 interviews of average 45 minutes duration in the state capital Ahmedabad and the semi-rural district Panchmahal, both centres of violence in 2002 and therefore target area for many NGOs (cp. map in the appendix). Two interviews could not be transcribed because of very bad tape quality; two other interviews with poor quality were partly summarized; the remaining interviews were literally transcribed in their original language. In the final sample, eleven interviewees were male and eight female, their average age in 2008 was 38 years (standard deviation 12). One woman (a former Brahmin Hindu) converted by marriage, all other interviewees were Muslims by birth. The average household size was between six and seven members, the average number of siblings lay between three and four; in the case of both indicators for socio-economic status, broad standard deviations suggest a wide range. The educational background also broadly varied from illiterate to multiple post-graduate. Seven interviews were conducted in rural, twelve in urban contexts. Only ten interviewees worked formally with NGOs, while nine were grassroot or volunteer activists. Overall, sampling was successful in including a broad variety of people, both in terms of demographics and of peacebuilding approaches. It necessarily remains unknown if this is the broadest variety possible – the demographic summary only excludes the possibility of gross sampling biases and was solely included for this purpose.

The majority of interviewees only spoke Hindi and I faced the usual problems, necessities and advantages of research in foreign languages: above all the possibility to misunderstand culturally important overtones – but also the chance to learn from these misunderstandings and the chance to have an uninvolved outsiders' viewpoint (cp. Winchatz, 2006; Bujra, 2006). To balance the problems, a female, Indian, but non-Gujarati research assistant (not affiliated with Jan Vikas) helped with interviewing and transcriptions. Cooperating with her was also an imperative of research ethics in post-conflict settings: if re-traumatization had occurred (which gladly was not the case), only a native speaker could have intervened (Kumar, 2007 gave valuable advice on this). In some interviews it was an issue that she had a Hindu background (Kakar, 1996 faced similar problems, p. 261), but that she came from outside Gujarat dissolved potential anxieties and her gender was especially helpful to access the eight female interviewees. Except five interviews, which were conducted in English by myself, the assistant usually led the conversation in Hindi, establishing a comfortable ambience while I was able to listen closely and to intervene when crucial themes arose. To further improve the relationship between researcher and researched, instruments were also arranged from flexible to structured and the guidelines in pillar two were administered as what they are: guidelines (cp. Kelle & Kluge, 1999, p. 63).

Due to the increased political and psychological sensitivity of the topic, the research clearance was subject to certain research-ethical restrictions, including strict anonymization, encrypted and locked storage of all interview tapes, transcripts and questionnaires, provisions regarding confidentiality in assistants' contracts and careful interaction with cooperating NGOs (most strategies advised by Harrison, 2006). I also obtained informed consent from all interviewees (cp. appendix as well as American Sociological Association, 2007, chapter 11 and 12 and Deutsche Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft, 2002, section B), although it turned out that the actual consent was almost always given after oral explanations and discussions – the written form itself remained a formality barely looked at (similar experiences are reported and critically discussed by many scholars, cp. for example Bhattacharya, 2007; Sin, 2005).

As often in explorative settings, some elements of this design changed during the field process. In particular, the exact phrasing was continuously adjusted to outcomes of earlier interviews and situational necessities. Further, interview guidelines were soon shortened to counter time constraint, mostly by removing redundancies initially planned to increase reliability. Finally, a new question was introduced halfway through the process, inquiring how the in- and outgroup perceptions changed under the impact of 2002 violence to simplify the interpretation of psychological scales on this issue. All interviews were accompanied by field notes; transcription and analysis was done in the respective original language. With a first summary directly after the field phase, I began to discuss my preliminary findings with background informants and primary interviewees. After returning to Germany, this exchange continued via email – and although it can not validate my results (cp. Silverman, 2005, p. 267), dialogue continued.

4.2 Analysis of textual data

Having recorded over 15 hours of interviews, analysis was started by looking at each single transcript in depth before the variance across interviewees was explored. To prevent analytical artefacts, details were systematically read in light of other information per interviewee before a common aggregative framework was applied to all transcripts (cp. Schwandt, 1999, p. 454). Both steps will be discussed in this section; additionally, figure 3 visualizes how the different analytical tools relate to research instruments and conceptual framework.

In the narratives in pillar one, activists presented their political autobiography as a chain of causally linked events, "telling a story of their being and development, and providing explanations as to how and why they have reached their present situation or identity" (Lieblich, Zilber, & Tuval-Mashiach, 2008, p. 613). By extracting their causality with the software ethno (Heise, 2007), I tried to understand the motivations, restraints and contingencies of being a Muslim and working for peace. To clarify how this "event structure analysis" worked, figure 4 on the next page presents an example of one interview (for the method cp. also Heise, 1997; Labov, 2001). Several events are chronologically arranged from top to bottom and linked wherever the interviewee himself established causal inference. His story starts from three separate events: the fact that he "came to [place one]", that he earlier "lived in [place two]", and "1992" (a code for the demolishing of the Babri Masjid by Hindu nationalists; cp. Meisig, 2005). It ends with the event "professionalized", his term for peace activism.




Figure 3: Analytical tools and their relation to instruments of research and conceptual framework (a continuation of figures 1 and 2, further extended with index categories on page 42).




Figure 4: Graphical output from an exemplary event structure analysis of one narrative

By running along the causal links from top to bottom until each event occurred at least once, the software ethno generates salience statistics. Relative frequency – the first indicator – counts how often an event occurs in this rundown, divided by the total number of events (thus scaled like a percentage). Priority – the second indicator – calculates how likely an event will be evoked when evokable (instead of entering an alternative branch); in other words, it measures how indispensable an event is for the story’s logical consistency (higher numbers indicate higher priority). Centrality – the third indicator – measures how many other events are linked to a particular event as precondition or consequence (again scaled from 0 to 100). The following table lists these indicators for a few events in the exemplary narrative structure in figure 4:

	relative frequency	priority	centrality
2002	30	21	58
bringing up advanced	45	90	37
came to [place one]	45	10	63
developed understanding	15	75	90
frustration and fear	20	36	47
professionalized	15	75	90

The event "came to [place one]", for example, is evoked rather frequently (because the web branches out beneath it, necessitating several software rundowns), but has less priority than, say, the event "bringing up advanced", whose occurrence is as frequent, but far more important in a particular stage of the story. Since the first event is more central, though (linked to larger chunks of the narrative), this importance is easily missed. Statistical indicators can thus highlight what is not obvious. To interpret them meaningfully, though, the respective narrative context must be taken into account. This is especially necessary for events after which causality stops: although interviewees tried to present a coherent story, explaining "occasions of exceptional trauma and holocaust" led to "a rupture of language" (Mayaram, 1997, p. 193) in many narratives. This rupture, which limited and at times broke causality, was not artificially bridged but preserved as a "rhizomatic element" (Sermijn, Devlieger, & Loots, 2008) in the chain of events, hindering overly smooth interpretation. While the event "frustration and fear" in the exemplary interview, which has no further consequences, is slightly rhizomatic in this sense, ruptures can also be so deep that they rip narratives into several nearly independent parts.

After analyzing event structures, interviewees' literal answers to the questions posed in pillar two were systematically collected and categorized. Beyond obvious and important factual information, one should also look at structural content: grammatical devices like repetitions or passive constructions help to identify interesting passages; word choice, dichotomic expressions, metaphors and other semantic specifics give insights in how people look at their world; finally, interviewees navigate the discursive context: they were naming and framing, convincing and denying, including and excluding. In all three dimensions – grammatic, semantic and pragmatic – answers transcended literality (cp. Ryan & Bernard, 2003, p. 19).

Factual information and structural content each imply a distinct way of establishing inference. The first option is to reconstruct interviewees' own causality as narrated: "notwithstanding what 'real' forces propel one's life, the question of one's identity is treated through one's manner of constructing one's life in one's present life story" (Lieblich et al., 2008, p. 618). I largely relied on this kind of inference. But to restrict analysis to interviewees' own accounts would miss out personally and culturally unconscious dynamics (cp. Zilber, Tuval-Mashiach, & Lieblich, 2008, p. 1054f.). While event structure analyses remained more strictly bound to them causality (though admittedly in a highly abstract reconstruction), the interpretation of grammatic, semantic and pragmatic details more often necessitated "sociological imagination" (Mills, 2000). Such imagination develops its arguments by applying sensitizing concepts (developed in chapter 3) and by conducting cross-case comparisons. Thus it was not only necessary to unify observations' level of detailness *per interviewee*, but also *across interviewees* (cp. Kelle & Kluge, 1999, p. 73). To enable sound comparisons, an heuristic framework developed by Lieblich et al. (2008) provides several meta-concepts around which all detailed observations were arranged (axial coding; cp. Corbin, 2008, p. 195). They ask:

”What drives the story forward, from the perspective of the narrator? Does the narrator present oneself as a free actor with *agency* and experience oneself as someone whose deeds, choices, and preferences have determined one’s situation? Is this person attributing much influence to others and to one’s relationships within one’s social network – what we term *’communion’* – in the manner one’s life turned out to be? Is he or she relating his or her life story mainly as an outcome of randomness, luck, or chance, which we term *’serendipity’*? Or does one narrate one’s life as being controlled by external circumstances such as one’s social class, gender, or historical period, namely, by social *’structure’*?” (p. 613f.; their emphasis)

In their model, own agency is first contrasted with structure and serendipity, a heuristic differentiation particularly useful to appreciate the precarious causal links reconstructed in pillar one. External influence from both directions should not be reduced to ”an expression of helplessness or lack of control”, though, but seen ”as manifesting openness to experience: the ability to improvise and use so-called random events and choices made by others [...] for the benefit of the narrator” (Lieblich et al., 2008, p. 617f.). Serendipity and structure are as much a barrier to subjective freedom as its precondition. On a second level, agency itself can either be used to enhance the own position (agency) or that of someone else (communion). To discern the recipient of agency, beliefsets are instructive – their literal presentation, but also their underlying grammatic (who is subject?) and pragmatic (for what purpose?) dimensions.

Overall, this model proved to be quite fruitful, probably because it fulfills the request by Kelle (2008, p. 164) that a proper explanation of social action should take external influences (structure and serendipity), as well as internal motives (agency or communion) and culture-specific implicit knowledge (visible through the sensitizing concepts of chapter 3) into account (cp. similarly Hammack, 2008, p. 224). All literal answers, grammatic, semantic and pragmatic observations as well as the event structures’ statistical measures were aligned around the four meta-concepts developed by Lieblich et al. (2008), using them as coding axes to enable a systematic comparison and to integrate narrative with structured parts of the interviews (these coding axes then became part of a categorical index; a process described in section 4.4).

4.3 Analysis of psychological scales

In contrast to the textual data of pillar one and two, pillar three produced numerical information. Psychological scales enrich qualitative findings and should be interpreted in light of them. But numbers never speak for themselves: a series of statistical remarks and aggregating transformations are necessary to enable proper interpretation. These remarks will fill the following pages. As basic computational unit, values for scale subdimensions were calculated from GT and IMA items according to test manual instructions; the items measuring ingroup affiliation, intergroup context assessment and depersonalization were additively aggregated; the categorization ranking finally was inverted so that higher numbers reflect greater importance. The resulting indicators were pragmatically treated as interval scales.

Uniform or seemingly extreme answers posed a first problem. Without a controlled sample or test norms of India (which are not available), these cannot be meaningfully interpreted, because they could simply indicate a shifted distribution in a different cultural context. For example, most interviewees only used the lower part of the scale measuring tolerance towards ambiguous conflict (numerically speaking 1 to 3), while tolerance towards irritating role models seemed to be higher (numerically 2 to 6). This could have been an interesting and plausible finding, but with due caution, only variance inside each scale is interpretable. To reflect this restriction in later cluster computations, raw results were z-standardized (cp. Bortz, 1999, p. 45f.); normalizing standard deviations that way at ± 1 ensured that the empirical variance in each dimension is equally weighed, independent of actual scale use (numerically, 1 to 3 and 2 to 6 were both treated as -1 to 1). Further, each scale got centered at 0, so that positive values always indicate strong expression and negative values weak expression compared to other interviewees.

After this preparatory step, the combination of correlated variables was attempted (cp. figure 5 and appendix). This aggregation purely relied on conceptual considerations; measures to assess the reliability of differences beyond chance (such as statistical significance) were neither achievable in this design nor relevant: I do not intend to generalize (cp. Bortz, 1999, p. 115). Unfortunately, most correlations were low, and where they were high, the remaining variance was either conceptionally too important to allow its dismissal by aggregation – or aggregation made theoretically little sense. An exception were the intensity scale subdimensions of depersonalization and ingroup affiliation (correlated at .90): most activists with strong bonds to their ingroup experience group and self as one entity. This resembles what Brubaker (2004) terms "groupness" (cp. section 1) – and as the remaining difference was conceptionally unimportant, both subdimensions were combined under this catchword (as expected, the subdimension "intergroup outlook" was statistically independent; cp. Jackson & Smith, 1999, p. 132ff.).




Figure 5: Graphical overview of the relations between psychological variables. Longer arrows pointing in similar (or opposite) directions are correlated; short arrows cannot be interpreted. Axes are linear combinations apt for an optimal representation in two-dimensional graphs; percentages show how much variance these combinations are able to reflect.

After reducing the array of *variables* proved unsuccessful, hierarchical cluster analyses according to Ward (1963) reduced variance comparatively boldly by revealing similarities and differences between *cases* (an overview of the final cluster solutions is given as reference in the appendix). Because a case-oriented approach retains a link to real persons, the creation of statistical artefacts was preventable through frequent cross-checks with relevant interview passages: out of several statistically possible cluster solutions, those were chosen, which were most plausible in light of qualitative data. GT dimensions and intensity scales on the one and IMA scales on the other hand were separately aggregated to maintain a reasonable ratio between cases and variables ratio; the identification ranking was grouped by hand (mainly because interviewees frequently added comments to their questionnaires, which a solely numerical analysis would lose). Clustering changed the level of measurement, which in turn simplified later integration with textual data: each interviewee's continuous test results were aggregated under categorical labels for each cluster, breaking variance into disjunct blocks. These blocks became part of a categorical index during the extraction of my typology, as shall now be discussed in detail.

4.4 Typology extraction

The overall goal of the design so far was to extract as much variance from data as possible. This focus started to shift with aggregation around coding axes and clustering of psychological scales. These strategies reduced complex narratives to salience pattern, summarized literal answers and clustered psychological results into disjunct blocks. The resulting catchwords and labels establish a categorical index, which was a necessary intermediate tool for systematic comparisons, as it keeps variance manageable during the extraction of the typology (cp. Kelle & Kluge, 1999, p. 57; the final design is visualized in figure 6 on page 42). Since I will ultimately use interview snippets and psychological raw results directly for a rich description of the extracted types in chapter 5, though, I will only give a brief overview here. This should suffice to clarify how the heuristic index categories derive from last sections' analytical steps and from the conceptual considerations in the chapters before. The first four categories explore political behaviour, the next three focus on religious beliefsets and the last three on group identification:

Success story: this category lists interviewees' exemplary success stories as told in pillar one, revealing the respective subjective understanding of peace activism. As mentioned in section 1, not all examples fit a scientific definition, but as a part of the biographical narrative they should anyway be treated analytically rather than normatively.

Salience pattern: this category reflects the narrative role of own peace activism compared to the influence of the 2002 riots and to events evoking religious identity. This was formalized in event salience statistics (cp. section 4.2) and conceptually relates to the existential level of structural and serendipic influence suggested by Lieblich et al. (2008).

Structural influence: this category combines observations in the event structure with those questions in pillar two which dealt with government action, moral rigidity or familial background. While "salience pattern" described restraints and leeways globally, this category looked in depth at the structural side of Lieblich et al.'s model.

Serendipic influence: this category in turn deals with the serendipic side and tries to assess the role of chance or fate, mainly by tracing grammatic hints (passive constructions, non-designated subjects) and by looking at the causal consistency of a narrative's event structure, again combining insights from both pillar one and two (cp. sections 1 and 4.2).

Internal motivation: this category reflects interviewees' own accounts of how (un-)important religious beliefs were for their activism, moving on to the motivational level in Lieblich et al.'s model. It summarizes findings in pillar two, using the sensitizing concepts for interpretation as developed in the review of literature (in particular sections 3.2 and 3.3).

Ritual life: this category combines answers to a series of questions dealing with ritual practice, which were again interpreted in light of insights from the review of literature (in particular from sections 3.2 and 3.4). As these answers were rarely explicitly related to peace activism, inference here heavily relied on "sociological imagination" (cp. section 4.2).

IMA cluster: this category consists of the cluster solution calculated in section 4.3 and reflects how interviewees deal with ambiguous experience (cp. cluster solution in the appendix). Although methodically located in pillar three, it conceptually takes up the cross-cutting issue of ambivalence (not only of the sacred; anyway cp. section 3.1).

Intensity and GT cluster: this category also consists of the respective cluster solution from section 4.3. It tried to catch the way interviewees identify with their ingroup; because the clustering was – unlike the one of IMA scales – rather weak (cp. appendix), it was interpreted along with the qualitative findings in the following category.

Community motivation: this category combines interviewee's own account of how important their community was for their activism with the semantic they used when speaking about in- and outgroup and the changes of perception that did or did not follow the 2002 riots. Conceptually, it fits the motivational level of Lieblich et al.'s framework (cp. section 4.2).

Identification ranking: this category finally reflects the relative importance of religion as compared to other modes of identification (cp. section 1). As already mentioned in the last section, the categorization ranking was not statistically clustered but arranged by hand, because statistics could only take into account the absolute position of an option but not the characteristical order of a sequence nor additional comments of interviewees.

To accomplish the final generation of the typology, categories became crucial whose dimensions were able to clearly separate the heterogeneity of all cases, while categories in which most cases were more or less similar (or totally diverse) became less relevant. For the classification itself, the cases which were internally homogenous and externally heterogenous in a maximum of categories were grouped by applying a fuzzy clustering algorithm to an improved Gower dissimilarity matrix of the categorial index (cp. Gower, 1971 and Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 1990, p. 164ff. and p. 235f. as well as Kuckartz, 2007, p. 237ff.). Heuristic exploration revealed four or five statistically possible clusters of interviewees with distinct combinations of index categories. This preliminary grouping was moulded into four final types after reading the actual interviews a second time: only by looking beyond abstract combinations of categories did the typology acquire the necessary density and reliability (cp. Kelle & Kluge, 1999, p. 77ff.). While a typology could not have been created without the abstract index, without highly aggregated narrative salience statistics or without psychological clusters, the next chapter will nevertheless return to less aggregated data and attempt to convincingly prove that the four types found in the complex analytical process described in this chapter are more than just statistical artefacts: they are distinct ways of "being Muslim and working for peace".




Figure 6: Final index categories; coding axes from Lieblich et al. (2008) and dimensions of identity from Brubaker (2004) highlighted (based on the preliminary figures 1, 2 and 3).

5 Being Muslim and working for peace: a typology

Using last chapter's comprehensive set of analytical tools and classification methods, I was able to separate four ways of how political behaviour, group identification and religious beliefsets interact among the interviewees. Each represents a distinct empirical dynamic, further condensed into ideal types (cp. Weber, 1988, p. 191). While the respective combinations of index categories of those interviewees who constitute a particular type were largely distinct from each other, statistical methods can only ensure external heterogeneity and internal homogeneity to the extent empirically possible; thus the characteristics of the four types partly overlap.

Ex-post and rather roughly arranged according to the role of dimensions of religious identity and the extent of dynamic in this role, the typology looks as follows:

	religious identity important	religious identity unimportant
no influence of 2002	faith based actors (5.1)	secular leaders (5.2)
change after 2002	doubting professionals (5.4)	emancipating women (5.3)

The presentation of each group of "Muslims working for peace" in the coming sections always starts with a summary of the respective core dynamic, followed by success stories and typical features of political behaviour (drawing on the index categories salience pattern, structural and serendipic influence), religious beliefsets (drawing on internal motivation, ritual life and IMA cluster) and group identification (drawing on community motivation, intensity and GT cluster and the ranking of identification options). While I try to keep the presentation concise, this chapter naturally tends towards a thick description, whose details might not always be explicitly related to my research question; its analytical implications will be discussed in chapter 6.

5.1 How faith based actors react to riots

A first possibility to combine religious identity and political behaviour was expressed by those (male) interviewees which I term "faith based actors". Their activism strongly roots as well in specific religious beliefsets as in a strong group identification; reverse influence – in which agency influences identities – was rather seldom. One interviewee summarized:

Snippet 1 — इसलाम में दो तरह के हक हैं। एक हुकुक उल्लाह यानि अल्लाह के हक। ... दुसरे, लोगों के, कौमों के आप पर क्या हक बनते हैं।

There are two sources of strength in Islam. One is [to be a tool for Allah's will]. The other is the strength created by the people, by the community.

In "being a tool for Allah" and serving their community, faith based actors are guided by a dogmatic interpretation of reality – a view which did not substantially change after 2002. In this stable framework, riots merely appear as contingent interruptions of otherwise well-ordered lives, as a serendipic "disturbance", which "happened" and had to be dealt with:

Snippet 2 — Actually २००२ के बाद, [...] जो पूरा episode था, २००२ का, जो लोग *disturbed* थे उनको shelter दिया था। Actually, after 2002, when this whole episode of 2002 happened, we gave shelter to those people who got *disturbed*.

The common formal stability of influences of religious identity dimensions covers considerable variance in content. All faith based actors are strongly influenced by a comprehensive moral framework, common rituals give them strength and all tend to avoid narratives in favour of a reified dogma – but the dogma itself varies according to different religio-political orientation. Similarly, faith based actors experience themselves as part of a collective subject – but their understanding of "community" is far from uniform. The following sub-sections on political behaviour, religious beliefsets and group identification each explore a dialectic of imagined stability and the dynamics and variations hidden behind it. This dialectic is the core feature of how faith based actors combine religious identity and political behaviour.

Success stories

I shall start by discussing the character of most faith based actors' success stories, which consisted of classic relief, rehabilitation and welfare work. Even though the a-priori goal was to separate different ways of combining dimensions of religious identity with political behaviour, and not different ways of working for peace (cp. chapter 1), and although the typology does not really coincide with specific peacebuilding approaches, a difference in *emphasis* can be observed. One in this sense typical account is given in the following interview snippet:

Snippet 3 — उस वक़्त ज़रूरत थी field की। [...] जो लोग अपने गाँव जाना चाहते थे उनके लिए व्यवस्था करनी पड़ी। [...] जो committees हैं, जो fund देने वाली, उन लोगों के साथ contact किया। [...] उसने बहुत मदद की [...] एक सौ परिवार को तो हमने वहाँ पे [...] बसाया और वहाँ पे मकान भी बना दिए। That time, the demand lay in the field. [...] Arrangements were necessary for those people who wanted to return to their villages. [...] Existing committees and charitable people were contacted. [...] They helped a lot. [...] We rehabilitated one hundred families here and also arranged for the construction of houses.

Later in his story, this interviewee explained how the construction of these houses was arranged exactly, explained the outline of the new neighbourhood and was almost lost in details. Like him, many faith based actors were absorbed in rehabilitation charity – but not totally, and some not even predominantly. In many cases, relief projects were accompanied by educational efforts, intra- and interfaith dialogue initiatives. One town-level and one personal example:

Snippet 4 — [location] में 2002 के बाद मैं पहला मुसलिम शख्स हूँ, जिसने हर ईद पर, ईद day मिलने को arrange किया हो, जिसमें सभी community के लोगों को call किया हो, उनके धर्मगुरुओं को बुलाया हो, उनकी speeches और अच्छी खासी। In [location], I am the first Muslim after 2002, who arranged meetings during every Id day [here: end of Ramadan], who invited people from each single community, who called in their religious leaders, who gave good keynotes.

Snippet 5 — मेरे अमुक दोस्त नहीं मानते थे कि हमें इस काम में जाना चाहिए। वे भी धीरे-धीरे इस काम में आए हैं और आज उनकी मानसिकता बदली है। वे आज इस काम से जुड़े हैं। कई दोस्त। और हमारी यही कोशिश है कि दोस्तों को हम [NGO] के programme में ले कर जाएँ।

Many of my friends did not think that we should want to go into this [peace] work. [But] slowly, they began with this work and today their mindset has changed. They now joined this work, many of them. And this is very much my intention: to bring friends into [NGO] and initiate a programme.

While many faith based actors did either charitable work or tried to mobilize their friends and family for peace and for a peaceful religiosity as presented so far, one faith based actor steps out of line: he presented his missionary work in the Tablighi Jamiat (cp. section 3.3) as the core element of his activism. To him, peacebuilding is a genuinely religious project, through which he wants to counter the moral laxity among Muslims, which he identified as the cause for a fateful punishment in 2002. In the following snippet, he describes his agenda:

Snippet 6 — Islam is a religion of moral values. Moral values never change. [...] Actually [...] I hear lot of people saying that Islam should be modernized. But how? What should be modernization [cross speech]. No [need to have] human rights anything. To, actually, actually the free sex. What do you think? Is it a moral view? Its a moral view to have free sex? Moral values?! Actually, its a *chaos* civilization. It's an animal instinct. It's a carnal desire over there. It's a carnal lust desire over there, to have free sex. [pause] So, what shall we do? [...] Actually we are over here as mentioned in the Quran: you are the best of the people, rescuer of the mankind. You are the *best* of the people, rescuer for the mankind! That's our work.

The frequent use of the word "actually" resembles reification efforts, to "rescue mankind" from "carnal desire" is clearly a strategy of social dominance, and the focus on sexuality appears familiar: all three elements were introduced as notable features of fundamentalism in section 3.2. Still, it is important to note that only this one interviewee was fundamentalist in pursuing a political strategy of dominance. Most faith based actors emphasize an unchangeable dogma, but proceed quite differently, as the following subsection will show.

Political behaviour

A first commonality in faith based actors' interviews was the irritating fact that many of them barely told a story. Although they could not avoid minor narrative episodes due to my insistence, they felt notably uneasy and switched quickly to other rhetoric formats: they asked counter-questions ("what do *you* think?"), presented long analyses of the general political climate ("the media ..."), suggested improvements to my research approach ("be Edward Said!"), or lectured on dogmatic compulsion ("any Muslim has to work for peace"). Even on a lingual level, mostly third person constructions (unpersonal speech) were used to indicate the grammatic subject, followed by first person plural (representative speech) and rarely replaced by the first person singular (own personal agency): the own story is preferably clad in non-narrative rhetoric.

Meanwhile, faith based actors did not object narrative style when quoting Hadith (sayings about the Prophet's life) or relating the life story of a beloved Pir (Muslim holy man). This specific avoidance of the *own* story surprises and distinguishes them from most other interviewees. In her coursebook on narrative interviews, Küsters (2009, p. 67) suggests to treat such a "failure" of narrative style as an interesting observation itself; in the following pages, I shall develop two hypotheses as to why faith based actors might feel uneasy about subjectivity and storytelling. On the one hand, and for some interviewees, a *personal* story might not appear adequate because their activism is indeed not a personal choice but a hereditary occupation. On the other hand, non-narrative rhetoric might be preferred over storytelling because it hides dogmatically unpleasant contradictions in the actual biography.

In most cases, a simple argument overruled subjective narratives: Islam means peace, thus the only prerequisite for peace activism is to be born as Muslim. Surprisingly, this short equation could be an appropriate biographic summary for some activists – if they hold a hereditary conflict-mediating and welfare-providing position for the local community. One respected village elder, for example, started his story by tracing his lineage back to prophet Muhammad himself (discernable by his name, which is anonymized here; cp. in general Matin, 1996, p. 113ff.):

Snippet 7 — वैसे जो संस्था के साथ जुड़ा, जो संस्था मैंने बनाई, वे तो दंगों के बाद बनाई। लेकिन इसके पहले का जो मेरा जीवन था, वे भी इसी राह में जुड़ा हुआ था। लेकिन वे सिर्फ minority, हम लोग caste तक सीमित थे। हम लोग [caste / family name] हैं। उस caste के अंदर मैं vice-president पिछले २४ साल से हूँ।

Actually, the NGO which started, which I created, this was created after the riots. But in my life as it was before this, I was already going on this path. But they were only a minority, our caste was our limit. We are [caste / family name]. I have been the vice-president in this caste since the last 24 years.

His activism de facto derives from being born into a particular Muslim family. When he told me about the massive influx of refugees after 2002, he left the "natural-born theory" of a time-honoured family tradition and became pragmatic. Because Muslimness only did not suffice under these exceptional circumstances, he explained in detail how he used his good education and mobilized a network of friends and colleagues to professionalize his activities beyond traditional charity. Still, these pragmatic steps ultimately ensured the survival of his hereditary responsibility: in his final summary, he again equated Muslimness and peace activism.

But not all faith based actors held hereditary positions. If they did not, the equation often served ideological purposes. One interviewee, for example, referred extensively to world politics to justify why "being Muslim" would describe his work more clearly than "working for peace":

Snippet 8 — Actually nowadays [pause] this term is a wide scope term, peace activism, peace activist. Actually *everyone*, whether you ask this question to Bush, or Dick Cheney or Ariel Sharon, or whomsoever [...] they label themselves as peace activist. [...] Why should I label myself as peace activist? We are by birth peace activist, by birth. [...] "Islam" word derives from Salam, means peace. The root, the

root mean is there. So every Muslim is a peace activist. [...] Peace is an *inherent* quality in Muslims. Is inherent, is *ingrained* in them from the very first moment. [...] Actually, [pause] if I only label myself I label myself as a Muslim, not as a peace activist. [...] If there is a Muslim, actually, you don't even have to *ask* them!

Another interviewee at least implied a "natural-born theory" when he argued that a lack of peace stems from a lack of true Muslimness, a situation which he deeply regretted:

Snippet 9 — लेकिन मुझे ये बात भी कहने दो कि मुसलमान आज मुसलमान नहीं रहा। मुझे बहुत अफ़सोस है इस बात का। क्योंकि उस बेचारे तक real तालीम पहुंची ही नहीं। अगर मुसलमान, सच्चा मुसलमान बन जाता तो दुनिया में ये लड़ाई जगड़े और ये Mr. Raphael को peace के बारे में thesis लिखने की ज़रूरत नहीं पड़ती। Why do you have to research on peace? [emotional breakdown follows; tape stopped for roughly two minutes]

But let me tell you also that today, Muslims have not remained Muslims. I regret this very much. Because these people have not yet obtained real education. If Muslims had become real Muslims, then we would have no fighting of wars in this world and it would not be necessary that Mr. Raphael writes a thesis on peace. Why do you have to research on peace? [emotional breakdown follows; tape stopped for roughly two minutes]

Unlike hereditary activists, for whom peace activism by birth is an accurate biographic description, these two faith based actors use the "natural-born theory" to make a theological statement. Event structure analyses show that frequent dogmatic digressions and the remaining scattered biographical snippets form parallel but in themselves consistent causal chains: faith based actors tell two stories in one (cp. the exemplary event structure in figure 7 on page 48). While the dogmatic story resembles a theological lecture, the pragmatic story describes actual auto-biographic experience. Pragmatic webs connect to dogmatic causality at exactly two junctures: in the fact that both lead to peace activism and in instances of "labelling", in which the appropriate semantic for assessing reality is negotiated. I therefore assume that the dogma does not simply *replace* subjective narratives, but *interprets* them in non-narrative terms: it provides a specific semantic foil. This hypothesis is backed by salience statistics, which reveal that dogmatic references occur far more frequent than pragmatic events, but are statistically less important to the narratives' internal logic: the actual causality relies on a subdued pragmatic event chain, while theological episodes appear as a dispensable rhetoric feature. But why do faith based actors use such a rhetoric and what are the consequences thereof? A hint:

Snippet 10 — In the Indian context is, what we have to do is [that] we have to get our organization registered. So, we have, we got the thing registered, according as to the state laws. And accordingly we are running all our welfare activities. Including peace activities, so these organizations — **Interviewer: so you became involved in all that in this way?** — See, I just told you, [cross-speech] No, listen, this is like a putting a question in other words: how are you a peace activist? So there is no such story. [...] this is a *fact* that anybody who strives for peace and he is a Muslim [pause] so there is a very clearcut definition, so you don't need any other story.




Figure 7: Graphical output from the event structure analysis of one faith based actors' narrative (cp. section 4.2). Visible are the few links between pragmatic (left) and ideological (right) parts.

Here, dogmatic rationality helps to reduce an unprecise, contingent and contextual story to reliable "facts". This change in semantic leads to a reification of reason – which was already identified as one aspect of fundamentalism in section 3.2. Indeed, the one clearly fundamentalist faith based actor already mentioned in the last subsection (who also pursued a strategy of dominance) was particularly strong in his preference of dogmatic arguments. But even in his extreme case, an underlying pragmatic rationale revealed a quite different reality:

Snippet 11 — Interviewer: Do you speak a lot about religion in your family? Are there different opinions about religion? — This is not a question of different opinions. Why? Because every Muslim believes in Allah. No different opinion over there. Everyone believes in Mohammad, no different opinion over there. We have to obey Allah's commandments, no different opinion over there. We have to follow the Ilm of prophet Mohammad, no different opinion over there. We have to pray five times a day, no different, we are paying Zakat, we go to the Hajj. Actually there is no different opinion regarding these all things. As far as I am concerned, as far as my family background is concerned, [...] and as far as my friends is concerned. [...] **Interviewer: How did you learn about Islam? Also from your family, or from friends? —** Actually, I learn Islam from the missionary work. Jamiat Tabligh. [...] I learn Islam from them only [pause] Because, actually [pause] in India [pause] Muslims are scattered. [...] So, from our upbringing I didn't come, at all I did not get in touch with Islamic scholars, or Imams. Who can explain Islam, what Islam means. Actually, after that, I came in touch with these people.

As long as dogmatic causality prevails, a difference of opinion and religiosity is denied. Asked about the source of his knowledge, though, the pragmatic causality surfaces and the interviewee tells a story where being a Muslim actually means *becoming* a Muslim. Again, the avoidance of subjective narratives is a tool to subdue a dogmatically uncomfortable tension – but unlike the reifying semantic suggests, pragmatic restraints introduce additional criteria to the concept of “natural-born” peace activism. This confirms how important actual empirical exploration is, even in the seemingly clear cases of faith based actors: to differentiate between fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist activists is as necessary as to look beyond overt claims of orthodoxy into actual biographies to be able to understand faith based actors’ political behaviour. The following subsection will show that a similar dialectic of overt commonality and subdued variance can also be found in those dogmatic assumptions inspiring their activism.

Religious beliefsets

When asked which Islamic idea is dearest to them, faith based actors focused on an ethical imperative to serve other people and to live an honest life (which for most explicitly excluded any compulsion in religion). This imperative was formulated rather general and leaves space for diverse religio-political orientations. Indeed, most major schools of thought presented in section 3.3 can be found among faith based actors: while Bareilvi activists and one fundamentalist Tablighi were already mentioned, other interviewees lean towards classic Deobandi thought:

Snippet 12 — सुन्नी के अंदर दो partition हैं। सुन्नी, जमिआती [pause] तो मैं जमिआती हूँ। उसके अंदर, मेरे जो दोस्त थे, वे अलग प्रकार के थे, जो मैं अब हूँ। और दुसरे हैं वे ताजिया निकालते हैं, वे अलग हैं। मेरे father उस तरफ़ थे। मैं इस तरफ़। [...] लेकिन मस्जिद में जब एक जगड़ा हुआ तो मैं उन लोगों के साथ नहीं, कुदरती ऐसा हो गया कि मैं late आया। अब late आया, तो जिधर पहले लोग हैं वहीं हम खड़े रहेंगे। आगे तो जा नहीं सकते अपन, पिछे ही रहेंगे न? तो मैं पिछे खड़ा था।

Sunnis are divided in Sunnis and Jamiatis. [pause] So I am Jamiati. I had a friend with this different background, and I adopted his view. Then there are those, which take out [a replica of the shrine of Husain]; they are different. My father came from this tradition. I come from that. [...] But I do not align during controversies in the mosque. I arrange that I come late. When you come late, then you stand behind earlier people. If you can not go to the front, then you have to stay in the back, right? So I remained in the background.

This interviewee was born into a rural Sunni caste, in which a syncretic variety of the Shia festival Moharram is the religious key event of the year (cp. Saiyid, Mirkhan, & Talib, 1981, p. 121ff.). Later, he came in touch with Tablighi missionaries and adopted their interpretation of Islam. Unlike the fundamentalist Tablighi quoted in the last subsections, he does not intend to base his political strategy on dogmatic differences (“I do not align”) – again, exploration beyond labelling is fruitful (for the Tabligh’s diversity cp. further Mayaram, 1997, p. 221f.). If opinions already differ inside one institution, they do so even more across schools:

Snippet 13 — You must be knowing the Deobandi Tablighi Jamiatis and the Sunni Barelvis. So I belong to the Barelvi community. And we have *many* differences; so to remove the doubts and certain exaggerations done by the Tablighis, we strive *hard*. And we try to establish a good *image*. [...] We used to organize a Sufi festival and did an *amalgamation* of the Hindu and Muslim [...]. And because [name of saint] was an ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity, it was a *massive* success. [...] **Interviewer:** **On which aspects may opinions differ on Islam?** — No, a big No. [...] The things are very *clear*. [...] We have a difference of opinion. But *not* a conflict.

In this snippet, the dogmatic demand for unity is a mere afterthought to "many differences" between Barelvis and Deobandis, whose religio-political competition was already mentioned in section 3.3. The actual diversity in theological approach was particularly visible in the fact that faith based actors disagreed widely on how a modern Islam should look like. Three examples:

Snippet 14 — आधुनिक के साथ बदलना जरूरी है। या तो आप ना बदलो तो उसको अपने घर में रखो। बाहर जाओ तो भारतीय नागरिक जैसे। With modernity, change is necessary. If you do not change then you should stick to your own home. If you go outside, then you are an Indian citizen.

Snippet 15 — We have no new version. We have not a revised version [...], there is a set of laws which is just unnegotiable. So *this* is the Islamic society.

Snippet 16 — लोग इस्लाम को अच्छी तरह से समझ लें तो आज जिसे हम आधुनिक कह रहे हैं वे १४०० साल पहले भी था। लेकिन लोग समझते नहीं। If people would understand Islam correctly, then we would have had since the last 1400 years what we now call modern. But people don't understand.

Should Islam change in present times, is it eternally fixed or might it even be truly modern from the beginning? Obviously, fundamentalists, Deobandis, Barelvis and followers of traditional Sufi orders do not share a common interpretation. But whatever their respective point of view, it strongly influenced their activism – this is the underlying commonality:

Snippet 17 — I am sure कि मेरा धर्म मुझे ऐसा करने को कह रहा है। Because I have read the biography of prophet Muhammad— और उनकी तो पूरी life ऐसे है। social work में, social reform में और दुसरो की मदद में। [...] और उनके जो रस्ता है, उस पर चलना मुझे पसंद। I am sure that my religion is telling me to do it like this. Because I have read the biography of prophet Muhammad. His whole life was to help others through social work and social reform. [...] And it appeals to me to proceed on his path.

A second commonality were beliefs about the afterlife (cp. Heine, 2004, p. 30f.). Most faith based actors imagined the end of times in precise terms and emphasized that the looming accountability of judgement day should already transform their earthly lives. For them, morally correct behaviour is not only a demand of social reciprocity, it also ensures future salvation:

Snippet 18 — Ha, we have an excellent understanding of the afterlife. [...] See, there is only one creator. It is a final thing. [...] *One* administration is over there. If there are two administrations, what will happen?! [...] The same message is running throughout all the books. The *same* message. That there is a creator, we are the prophets, do what we say, if you want to succeed in this life and day after.

This snippet metaphorically expresses that earthly life and afterlife could not be separated, because the rules for both root in the same belief – in the oneness of God. The same "excellent understanding" ensures success "in this life *and* day after" (my emphasis). On the contrary, the vast majority of other types of interviewees said that they could only *hope* for salvation, because the afterlife is essentially unknown. Schäfer (2008a) explains the difference between both beliefs by terming the latter "eschatology, and not apocalypticism. The focus lies on the relevance of today's behaviour for the future. Apocalypticism imagines future and declares its immediate relevance for the present" (p. 74; my translation). Eschatology formulates a relatively open relation between ethical behaviour and future salvation, while apocalypticism provides a more hermetic interpretation: because the rules of the afterlife are well-known – they are "running throughout all the books" –, salvation is guaranteed if and only if one lives accordingly. Faith based actors' moral acquires its preciseness from apocalyptic beliefs. The eternal horizon could explain the stability in their configuration of dimensions of religious identity and political behaviour, which was not influenced by the 2002 riots (cp. Hasenclever & de Juan, 2007, p. 26). Beliefs determine agency rather straightforward and with little reverse influence.

Following the questions on religious belief, I also asked interviewees about their ritual life, because it is frequently assumed that "in Islam, orthopraxis is more important than orthodoxy" (Heine, 2004, p. 13; my translation). Indeed, all faith based actors told that they pray daily (like most interviewees, they use the religious term "to read Namaz" for the ritual prayer) and that this practice deeply grounds their lives (including their political behaviour). As one interviewee expressed, the daily prayer bonds him to Allah and helps him to deal with emotions:

<p>Snippet 19 — नमाज़ के लिये जब भी खड़ा होता हूँ तो एक तो अल्लाह के सामने खड़ा हूँ और अल्लाह मुझे देख रहा है। [...] कभी कभी नमाज़ में रो भी देता हूँ। भावुक हो जाता हूँ। उसके बाद बहुत अच्छा लगता है। बहुत सुकून। [...] मैं इत्मिनान और सुकून की जिंदगी जी रहा हूँ।</p>	<p>Whenever I am standing for Namaz, I stand in front of Allah and Allah looks upon me. [...] Sometimes I shed tears in Namaz. I become emotional. Afterwards, I feel very good. Very at ease. [...] I am living my life with leisure and at ease.</p>
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Despite describing such personally stabilizing effects, faith based actors argue that the religious ritual has close and direct links to political behaviour as well, because both would share the same objective and because the ritual would link beliefs inevitably to group identification, resulting in stronger ingroup coherence (cp. also Hardenberg, 2009, p. 83):

Snippet 20 — Religion covers all aspects of life. And for us, if we are praying five times a day, and if we are governing a state, actually both are the same [...] for us. Here, five times a day, we are trying to improve ourselves. While governing a state, we are trying to improve [...] the whole society. [...] That has been sanctified by the religion also, and [...] Muslims as a solidarity they express *themselves* on these days. Because of the *mass* gatherings, they are better able to express themselves.

Consequently, the ritual life of faith based actors was comparatively intense. It also remained strictly inside orthopraxis and only minor influences of acculturation were traceable in some interviews. For example, the semantic which some faith based actors used to talk about Dargahs (liminal shared spaces where Muslim saints' spirits enact miracles; cp. section 3.4) is notable; one English speaking interviewee, who regularly goes to the mosque on "friday", went to Dargahs on "guruvar" (thursday) – a Hindi word with Hindu background: it is the day for the reverence of one's guru. Orthodox Muslim eschews intermediaries between the believer and Allah. Another faith based actor recommended a book about "maulvi buddh", elevating Buddha to the position of an Islamic scholar. But such examples were neither widespread nor more than minimal semantic hints – and should definitely not be mistaken for liminality:

Snippet 21 — Because the Sufi shrines – actually they are good Muslims. People follow them. And they have worked for the cause of Islam. [...] Why we are going there? Because we respect them. Respect them. Try to imitate their lives, because they are the best, and they have delivered the message of Mohammad, peace be upon him. [...] What happened in Russia? Russia had a total ban on that religious activities. But the Islam still existed, and it is more better existing than in India. Because this tradition survived in a *Sufistic* manner.

To sum up, faith based actors' beliefs on the one hand considerably differ and reflect the whole breadth of religio-political tradition in Indian Islam except liminality. On the other hand, all faith based actors share a strong moral motivation, backed by apocalypticism and stabilized in orthopraxis: again a dialectic of commonality and diversity. This supports the thesis that the various forms of Islamic revivalism share a trend towards this-worldly religion (cp. section 3.3), in which beliefs (e.g. about the afterlife) are directly relevant for today's praxis as well as the individualistic notion inherent. As far as the research question is concerned, it further strikes that the direction of causality unilaterally runs from identity to agency with little reverse influence, while this relation is complex for many other interviewees.

Group identification

Psychologically, faith based actors experience themselves as capable of leadership and prefer a traditional setup for their activism. This is visible in distinctly low measures for tolerance towards irritations of role models (and, less clearly, towards new experiences) and high ones for social dominance (cp. figure 8 on the next page). This is plausible, as the influence of an unchangeable reified dogma serves as a powerful motivation for leadership (high dominance) while at the same time emphasizing eternal unchangability (low ambiguity tolerance). For dominance, the distinctness rendered among the strongest effect sizes in the whole dataset.

Despite this strong dominance, though, faith based actors feel attracted to their community to an extent which leads to higher levels of depersonalization than in many other interviewees' cases: the boundaries between individual and community become blurred (cp. Shaikh, 1992, p.

18). How can someone act strongly when he is not identifiable in the first place? A look in the interviews helps to clarify the relation of self, group and agency:

Snippet 22 — Interviewer: That’s also your personal understanding? — No, not my understanding - it’s the understanding of every Muslim! [...] I am the part and parcel of the community. [...] See, our community lies on the foundations of the very religion. Without religion there is no community. [...] This division exist in the Western society. But not in the Muslim society. So there is no question about this or who will decide. The thing is if a community in consensus decides, this is one and the same thing when an individual decides!

This account reveals that depersonalization implies not so much a loss of subjectivity – but a loss of individuality. The shift to this-worldly religion does apparently not only lead to an emphasis on each single person – in doing so, it also *hides* the same behind the experience of collective subjectivity. Thus high groupness is not just an example of what Lieblich et al. (2008) call "communion", agency for others (cp. section 4.2); faith based actors actually experience themselves *in* their agency as collective subjects, as "part and parcel of the community". In light of this finding, the dogmatic rhetoric found to layer personal narratives appears to be more than just instrumental; groupness is not only semantic, but roots in psychological dynamics.

But again, dialectic is at work and individuality re-appears on a deeper level: although all faith based actors tend to closely combine self and ingroup, they mean quite different people with "community" or with the "we" in corresponding grammatic constructions. Often, the term referred to the Umma, the entirety of all Muslims – but at times "community" also designated the population of a particular geographic area (irrespective of religion), a specific Muslim caste, or members of a religio-political movement. The ranking of identification options adds more unclarity: surprisingly, only one faith based actor claimed that religion is highly important for his self-categorization, while all others presented themselves as deliberate non-categorizers (i.e.




Figure 8: Those dimensions of faith based actors’ psychological test results with a variance considerably and interpretably different from that of other interviewees. Scales are z-standardized and two measures assess differences numerically: Hedges’ g is a coefficient for the effect size or *degree* of deviation (values above .2 indicate a medium effect; cp. Hedges, 1981, p. 112ff.), the p-value stems from a non-parametric Wilcoxon test on variance equality, estimating the *clarity* of this deviation (lower values indicate higher clarity; cp. Bortz, 1999, p. 149f.).

assigned equal importance to all options of identification) or explicitly as patriots. The latter must be seen in context: Indian Muslims encounter deep-rooted mistrust about their national loyalty, in particular when they act in public (cp. section 3.3 and Misra, 2004, p. 230ff.). Therefore, faith based actors might emphasize their Indianness simply because they are under close observation. The way in which many of them creatively transformed the instrument confirms this: faith based actors frequently wrote comments on the margins of their questionnaires or changed the wording or layout of the ranking (cp. figure 9 below as an example). I therefore tend to understand the surprising unimportance of religious categorization as a reaction to a challenging research instrument and not so much as a reflection of actual priorities.

A last psychological commonality was the typical assessment of the intergroup context by faith based actors: they had a distinctly positive outlook compared to other interviewees (cp. figure 8). This statistical finding is confirmed in many interview snippets, which also reveal the roots of such optimism: an instrumentalization hypothesis. One interviewee, for example, told that his view of Hindu communities positive because it is independent of "politics":

<p>Snippet 23 — Assistant: तो २००२ से पहले जो थे आप और उसके बाद आपका नजरिया हिंदुओं के प्रति बदला, नहीं बदला, तो कैसे? — नहीं बदला न। [...] ये political लोग अपने स्वार्थ के लिए, किस तरह से बदलते हैं [cross-speech] सारे मुसलमान या सारे हिंदू खराब नहीं हैं [...]</p>	<p>Assistant: so did your view on the Hindu community change after 2002, or not, and how? — No, it did not change, no. [...] This [was done by] political people for their own advantage [cross-speech] neither all Muslims nor all Hindus are bad [...]</p>
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Overall, the psychological results leave an ambivalent impression: high groupness is paired with strong dominance, while various ingroups were hidden behind this experience of collective subjectivity. Uniform was faith based actors' comparatively low tolerance towards role model irritations and their positive outlook on (religious) intergroup relations.




Figure 9: Commentary in one faith based actor's questionnaire; the Hindi comment, written in Gujarati script, reads: "such questions should never be kept" and seems to refer to caste, gender and religious categorization. The national option is numbered with a "1".

5.2 What secular leaders do

After faith based actors, this section introduces a group of interviewees who are in many ways their opposite. For these "secular leaders", neither religious beliefsets nor group identification dynamics play any role in their activism – but they categorize themselves as Muslims and are thus part of the sample (cp. section 4.1 and chapter 6 for explanation). By terming them secular, their preferred self-description is mirrored and not a substantial definition of secularism. In their stories, religion, secularism and related issues are marginal to the extent that they do not even feel an urge for coherence when talking about them.

In their political behaviour, secular leaders focussed on *what* they do, not on *why* or *how* they do it, and emphasize their success stories. The structured interviews on religious beliefs were quickly executed and the only overt commonality in the psychological scales was a comparatively low groupness, confirmed in small stories like the following one:

Snippet 24 — मैं [location] में इतने साल रहता था लेकिन muslim community को नहीं जानते थे कि मैं मुसलमान हूँ। सिर्फ़ जुम्म नमाज़ पढ़ने के लिए यहाँ होता था नमाज़ पढ़ के वापस गाए घर पे या [business] पे। [...] तो community मैं गरी ऐसा enter होती हैं तो उन लोग सामना होते थे: कौन हैं आप? I lived so many years in [location], but the Muslim community did not know I am Muslim. If at all then I went there for Friday Namaz, and after praying, I returned to my home or [business]. [...] So when I entered the community with my car, those people confronted me: who are you?

Secular leaders do not necessarily reject religion – most are just "religiously unmusical" (cp. Weber, 1994, p. 65). This implies that their interviews were on a first look not too fruitful: if there is no relation between religious identity and political behaviour, it can not be analyzed; lest can be said about the spirituality of religiously unmusical people and a non-relation to the ingroup can be stated and made plausible – but this won't fill many pages. The sparse comments in the biographical interview parts do not even really clarify whether secular leaders' professional stance on religion stems from personal areligiosity – or if causality runs the other way round and professional secularism shapes religious identities. The family background of secular leaders, for example, differs broadly – which would support both hypotheses.

While this section will therefore, by necessity, be a little less comprehensive, there is one important finding regarding secular leaders: the fact that they exist at all. This is remarkable because much research, and even more so public discourse, assumes the opposite: that Muslims are always religious and, an even bigger mistake, always act out of religious motivation. "When the culture of India was introduced to Europe, it was made to look predominantly religious. [...] The mystical stereotype was confirmed and extended by romantic orientalists [...]" (Heehs, 2008, p. 257) – and keeps on harming a clear view even inside the local NGO community, where it leads to structural blindness to its secular Muslim members (cp. chapter 2). The trite possibility of secular Muslims working secularly for peace should thus be boldly emphasized.

Success stories and political behaviour

Quite like faith based actors, many secular leaders held the biographic aspects rather short in their narratives. Unlike the former, though, they do not leave the narrative format, but use it to present examples from their work; because success stories and political behaviour were so closely integrated, but are discussed in one subsection. Success stories last up to one and a half times as long as biographical passages, a relation which is just opposite to most other interviews: because their biography is, much like their religious identity, not a problem for secular leaders, they prefer to narrate what they actually do. This is also confirmed in salience statistics: the most important as well as most frequent events in secular leaders' accounts stem from the success stories. Typical for these is a focus on the individual victim:

Snippet 25 — Assistant: कोई एक कहानी बता सकती हैं जैसे आप success story मानती हों। — बहुत सारी हैं। [locality] नगर में [name] है। जो riots के दौरान ही widow हुई थी। [date] को जब टोला आया और बंद का एलान था तो उस वक्त हर मुसलिम area में attack हो रहे थे। [name] के husband भी सुबह, गोले की लाठी लेकर जा रहे थे। और उन पर attack हुआ, और वे वहीं मर गए रस्ते में। तो इस वजह से जो वे [name] हैं वे काफ़ी, एकदम, वे उसका [pause] मानसिक तरह से काफ़ी परेशान हो गई थी और कुछ कर नहीं सकती थी। और वे भी एक मुसलिम परिवार की हैं। कहीं उसका बाहर आना जाना, कुछ knowledge नहीं बाहर की। [...] हम उन्हें बार-बार मिले, बाहर ले के गए। अब वे इतना developed हो गई कि खुद का सारा काम वे खुद करती हैं। [...] आज वे इतनी आगे निकली कि उन्हें अपना [pause] सिलाई काम भी करती है खुद।

Assistant: can you tell any story which you would consider a success story. — there are really many. In [locality] lived [name]. She became a widow during the riots. When the mob came on [date], when the curfew was in place and all Muslim areas were attacked. The husband of [name] also took his stick in the morning and went. And he was attacked and died right there on the street. Then [name] was much, totally, she was [pause] she developed many psychological problems and was not able to do anything. She also came from a Muslim family. She had no idea how to go outside, she had no idea about the public sphere. [...] We met her again and again, took her out. Now she is so developed that she does all her work on her own. [...] Today she is so developed that her own [pause] she has her own sewing business.

It is such victims' concrete problems which secular leaders try to solve through empowerment and development of skills: most of them were working *in* conflict and relied on classic NGO methods (cp. chapter 2 for the prevalent peacebuilding approaches in Gujarat). In their immediate relief and rehabilitation work, secular leaders' programs resemble faith based actors' activities, and indeed both cooperated initially. But while faith based actors remained in a charity paradigm of aid or else ventured either into missionary activity or worked for the reconstruction of shared spaces, secular leaders move beyond relief by adopting a rights-based approach to development. They frequently provide legal training, mirror human rights violations and politically lobby for internally displaced. One interviewee described the necessity thereof:

Snippet 26 — जब जिन लोगों की complaints लेनी थी कि क्या हुआ, [...] तो naturally offence हुआ था। [...] उस के लिए हमने representation किया। तो उसके पहले तो local वहाँ के BJP leader जो भी politicians हैं, BJP या VHP वाले camp को आकर affected लोगों को दम करना शुरू किया। कि अगर आपको जिंदर [uncomprehensible word] तो कोई complaint नहीं आप देनी।

When people filed complaints about what happened [...] it was naturally an offence. [...] Therefore we gave [juridical] representation. Before this, local BJP leader, politicians, people from the BJP or VHP came to the camp and started to put pressure on people. That 'if you [uncomprehensible word] here, then don't give any complaint'.

A frequent consequence of secular leaders' focus on human rights were complaints about the state's complicity in the 2002 violence (cp. introduction), as in the following example:

Snippet 27 — अभी गुजरात के अंदर तो मुसलमानों के नाम पे जिन्दा जलाया जाता है। [...] सिर्फ 2002 ही नहीं। [...] ये है क्या? क्यों? [...] Chief minister बोलते हैं कि 4 करोड़ गुजराती हैं, तो हम भी आते हैं उसमें। लेकिन वे बोलते कुछ हैं और करने कुछ और हैं। उसका उनहोंने पालन नहीं किया। minority community को एक तरह ही छोड़ दिया है।

Right now the name of Muslims is burned alive in Gujarat itself. [...] not only in 2002. [...] What is this? Why? [...] The chief minister said there are 40 million Gujaratis, so we are among them as well. But talking and acting are two different things. He did not observe what he said. In a way, the minority community is left out on purpose.

Equally common was critique towards the charity of faith based actors and against those preferring explicit peacebuilding over rights-based or even classical development work. One interviewee, for example, commented sarcastically about other NGO activists:

Snippet 28 — ये सब peace activism सब drama है सब drama है। camp में खाना नहीं है। और आ रहे हैं सब NGO उनके समझाने peace के लिए। अरे [uncomprehensible word] उनको बताइए कि अगर peace करने चाहिए तो इनहोंने जुल्म किया, तुमहें दम है, जओ VHP leaders के, BJP leaders के पास और उनके साथ meeting करो peace के बारे में। उनके peace के लिए training दे दो। फिर बंध करो।

This whole peace activism is a huge drama, a huge drama. In the camp is no food. And the NGOs parade in to impart an understanding of peace. Well [uncomprehensible word] tell them that if you like to make peace then have the stamina to go to the oppressors, arrange meetings about peace with VHP leaders and BJP leaders. Give *them* a training about peace. Otherwise shut up.

So far, the narratives' of secular leaders stick out because they focus on own success stories and emphasize rights-based approaches. Like faith based actors, they propagate a pure hypothesis of instrumentalization (cp. section 3.5) and were interested in the *political* side of religio-political conflict. Like them, they also started their activism with classic relief operations. But quite contrary to the latter, religion became no issue therein – and played no role in their personal lives either, as the following subsections will show.

Religious beliefsets

When directly asked whether religious beliefs have any relevance to their peace activism, no secular leader needed more than a few sentences to negate. Lacking personal experience to narrate, they often share their general impression of religion in conflict to say at least something:

Snippet 29 — Assistant: आपका धर्म या आपका विश्वास क्या शांती के कार्य में आया, या नहीं? इस बात को आप कैसे देखते हैं? — कोई जगह पे इश्वर के नाम से शांती तो मिली नहीं है। धर्म के नाम से, और मजहब के नाम से, शांती का ये जो नाम है, चेहरा अलग ही आता है। मेरे को सिर्फ़ श्रमजीवों के अंदर जब श्रम की बात होती है, वहाँ ही शांती मिलती है।

Assistant: does your religion or your faith play a role in your peace work, or not? How do you look at this issue? — nowhere is peace in the name of God. Wherever peace is clad in the name of religion, reality looks quite different. In my opinion, peace will only develop when the work-force makes labour relations a topic.

Although this account sounds anti-religious, the overall account of this (born Muslim, turned Marxist) interviewee was totally contradictory. Later on, for example, he lauded Islamic ethic:

Snippet 30 — Assistant: आपके हिसाब से इस्लाम की एक ऐसी idea जो सबसे important है, इस्लाम की एक अहम बात है कुछ ऐसा? — हाँ, इस्लाम से अहम बात तो ये हैं कि जो मुहम्मद पैगंबर, वे यहाँ के सरदार जो आए तो उनको एक लपट कुरान में दिया हुआ है। अल्लह तो अल्लह हैं, ये जितने भी छीजें बनाई हैं, एक झाड़ है। [...] इश्वर-अल्लाह है, ये मैं नहीं जानता। अब है या नहीं है, किसी ने देखा नहीं है। [...] [लेकिन] वे जीजें हमको बहुत पसंद हैं।

Assistant: is there any idea in Islam which is most important for you, anything in Islam which touches your heart? — yes, what is close to me in Islam is that, when the rich of his time came to Prophet Muhammad, he gave them a blaze in the Quran. "Allah is Allah", and whatever those create is only dust. [...] I do not believe in God or Allah. He might exist or not, nobody has seen him. [...] [But] this pleases me very much.

The seeming contradiction between his earlier claim that peace in the name of religion is an illusion and the later reverence to the egalitarian ethic brought by Muhammad is resolved in the generality of both statements. Stripped from any theological reference, only the overall impulse to strive for equality or to do the morally good remains. Similarly, who would not agree that religion has the potential to be a conflict-escalating factor (a bunch of problematic aspects was already listed in section 3.1)? The following snippet helps to understand secular leaders' rather general and at times even contradicting take on religion:

Snippet 31 — मैं actually religious person नहीं हूँ। धर्म में क्या है वे मुझे मालुम नहीं। frankly बता रहा हूँ। मैंने कुरान पढ़ा है। खैर अमन का [uncomprehensible word] तो हर धर्म में है ही। कोई भी धर्मग्रंथ ले लो। [...] मदरस्सह में भी गए हैं [...] लेकिन वहाँ शरारत इतनी करी कि हमको भगा दिया गया।

Actually, I am not a religious person. I have no idea what faith is all about. I say that frankly. I read the Quran. Well, the [uncomprehensible word] of peace is in each and any religion. Take any sacred book. [...] I also went to a Madrassah [...] but made so much hub-bub there that they threw me out.

This interviewee has no real interest, lest much personal experience with religion. Many secular leaders were not even decisively anti-religious – if a group in my sample rejected religion, then the emancipating women presented in section 5.3. Secular leaders would rather agree with the famous words of Weber (1994, p. 65): “I am religiously absolutely unmusical and can neither create any religious edifice in my soul nor do I need one – this is just impossible, and I refuse it. But precisely? I am neither anti-religious nor unreligious” (my translation).

Secular leaders also said little about religious practice. Some highlight that the ritual prayer keeps the body flexible like gymnastic exercises, some other highlight that it helps to structure one’s day – but only one of them actually prays, and he does so only on fridays, as a family ritual. Similarly, secular leaders express openness for religious ceremonies and some visit Dargahs, but not out of any inner, spiritual motivation, as one interviewee explained:

Snippet 32 — Assistant: क्या आप नमाज पढ़ते हैं? — हाँ। मैं नमाज पढ़ती हूँ, रमजान के महीने में रोज़े भी रखती हूँ, कुरान-शरीफ़ भी पढ़ती हूँ, सब पढ़ती हूँ। लेकिन लगता नहीं है। मेरे घर का महौल है कि रोज़ा, रमजान सब करते हैं तो आदत सी पड़ गई है। [...] [मैं भी] सब जगह गई हूँ। पूजा नहीं, किस तरह पूजा करते हैं वे तो नहीं पता है। जो सब friend हैं वे गए तो उनके साथ में गई। उनको इस तरह नमस्कार किया बस इस तरह। church में भी जा कर आई और वहाँ भी किया।

Assistant: Do you pray? — yes. I pray, I also fast during the month of Ramadan, I am learned in the Quran, I read everything. But there is no emotion. The atmosphere in my home emphasized fasting and all that in Ramadan, so it is an enforced habit. [...] [I also] go to all the places. Not for offerings, I have no idea how this ritual works. All my friends go, so I go with them. I pay them respect that way, that is all. I also frequent the church to pay my respect.

To sum up, religious beliefsets were not only unimportant in secular leaders’ narratives – they also play no significant role in their personal life. In their statements, religion remains a general category, an empty signifier: secular leaders are religiously unmusical.

Group identification

Secular leaders’ psychological scales, finally, were to a large extent nondescript. The only measures with considerable and reliable differences to other interviewees were the groupness scale (with a medium negative effect) and the tolerance against ambiguous conflict scale (with a small, instable, negative effect; cp. figure 10 on page 60). Secular leaders have a considerably weaker emotional bond to their ingroup and conflicts tend to irritate them more. The latter could be a correlate of the strong rights based orientation in their activism: conflicts are nothing to be tolerated, but something to be fought out. And low groupness fits the overall picture plausibly: this second dimension of religious identity was equally unimportant as the first one. Consequently, secular leaders strictly emphasized that group identification – in their case mostly plain self-categorization – does not influence their activism. One interviewee, for example, explained that

he helps other Muslims because Muslims are structurally powerless and thus frequent targets of communal violence – not because they constitute his ingroup:

Snippet 33 — हिंदू अगर इस तरह होते तो मैं हिंदुओं का साथ देती। उनके लिये लड़ती। और जाहिर-सी बात है कि मैं मुसलिम हूँ और मुसलमानों के साथ ये हुआ। और कोई भी riots होते हैं तो मुसलमानों को ज्यादा भोगना पड़ता है और उनको ही ज्यादा नुकसान होता है।

If something like this would happen to Hindus, I would extend my hand to Hindus. I would fight for them. Equally true is that I am Muslim and that this happened with Muslims. And whatever riots happened, Muslims had to feel them the most and suffered the most.

Often grammar (first person plural) was the only reminiscence of secular leaders' personal identification, when they assessed their ingroup through the lense of development professionals:

Snippet 34 — हम minority हैं, हम [uncomprehensible word] में कम हैं। इसलिए हमको दबाने में [...] हम लोग पिछड़े हुए भी हैं। काफ़ी सारी education नहीं है, कौम्वाद की वजह से नौकरी नहीं मिलती है तो मुसलिम परिवार यही कहता है कि हम लोग अगर बच्चों को पढ़ाते भी हैं तो हमारे बच्चों को नौकरी अच्छी नहीं मिलती है। ये भी एक सोच, ये भी एक मानसिकता है।

We are a minority, we have little [uncomprehensible word]. That's why we are oppressed [...] and why we people are also quite backward. We have little education, due to communalism we find no jobs, so Muslim families say that "even if we educate our children, they would anyway not find a good job". This is also a thought, this is also a psychological dynamic.

To sum up: secular leaders might have a professional opinion about their ingroup, but considerably low groupness and related interview passages make clear that group identification is as unimportant for their activism as are religious beliefs.




Figure 10: Those dimensions of secular leaders' psychological test results with a variance considerably and interpretably different from that of other interviewees. Scales are z-standardized and two measures assess differences numerically: Hedges' g is a coefficient for the effect size or *degree* of deviation (values above .2 indicate a medium effect; cp. Hedges, 1981, p. 112ff.), the p -value stems from a non-parametric Wilcoxon test on variance equality, estimating the *clarity* of this deviation (lower values indicate higher clarity; cp. Bortz, 1999, p. 149f.).

5.3 When emancipation transforms identities

Despite stark contrasts, both faith based actors and secular leaders would agree that communal riots are not a religious problem and the configuration of religious identities and peace activism changed for neither type after 2002. Riots are political, and identities stable – these two claims also dominate NGO discourse in Gujarat (cp. chapter 2). But the next two types challenge both central assumptions. On the one hand, a group of women, who shall be introduced in this section, quickly had to deal with manifest religious patriarchy while becoming activists – which led to a fundamental transformation of their religious identities. Doubting professionals on the other hand (presented in section 5.4) propagate a strong and profoundly ambivalent role of religion in conflict and were influenced by the 2002 riots either in their group identification, their religious beliefsets, or in both dimensions of identity.

First to those female interviewees, whose religious identity transformed after the riots in a complex dialectic interaction with political behaviour. They share extremely similar stories: all women were victims in 2002, came in contact with secular NGOs in refugee camps, joined their grassroot groups and later became staff members and multiplier in their communities. In this process, they emancipated themselves from own victimization as well as from religious patriarchal structures, confirming that "it is precisely in the power of activity that possibilities for identity transformation [...] may occur" (Hammack, 2008, p. 235). To highlight the dynamic character of this process, I shall refer to them using the clumsy term "emancipating women".

The analysis of their interviews and scales poses a difficult methodical problem: reconstructing a dynamic with data from only one particular point of time. Of course, narratives contain retrospective episodes and an extensive hermeneutical analysis of these might suggest that the process of transformation also changed religious identities. But because the psychological scales and many answers in pillar two, which could confirm that this actually happened, are merely snapshots, only a methodical trick can reveal dynamics in these dimensions. This trick assumes that different women proceed with different pace on the path from victim to peace activist, and were therefore in different stages of transformation at the time of our interviews. Some women, for example, described a rather complex and far-reaching change, others narrated only initial attempts. But because the first steps of the former very closely resemble what the latter described as their current situation, it is possible to assume a common dynamic by ordering all interviews in a hypothetical chronology. This quasi-chronological concatenation of momentary insights reveals ideal-typical developments in non-narrative dimensions.

As was already said, emancipating women develop agency and self-efficacy against the backdrop of victimization and structural patriarchy and finally proclaim their own biography as an exemplary success of peace activism. In a hypothetical chronology, event salience statistics show typical shifts in the relative frequency, relative importance and centrality of key events during this process, namely between the generalized events 2002 riots, own victimization, NGO

intervention and own peace activism. Parallely, the role of religious beliefs changed as well: starting from a traditional and liminal religiosity, most women discovered the Islamic dogma of equality and temporarily used it to stabilize their emancipation – but ultimately turned away from religion. The dynamics of group identification finally reflect how difficult this process was on a psychological level, typically expressing fading groupness and rising tolerance towards new role models on the one hand and fading dominance and low resonance on the other: an ambivalent picture. Strictly speaking, these hypothetical transformation processes can be reduced to a collection of synchronic differences. But due to the strong commonalities in those stages of emancipation which many women shared, and because retrospective episodes in the structured interviews fit the picture, an imposed diachronical order seems sufficiently reliable.

Success stories

Even though emancipating women work in similar NGO projects like other interviewees doing the same kind of work (though more often at grassroot level), they report clearly distinct success stories, which were always related to their own personal transformation. The following woman, for example, talks about the micro-credit program which she joined and now works in:

Snippet 35 — जब दंगा हुआ, तब ऐसा था कि औरतें बैठ के क्या करंगी। उनसे दिमाग में अभी तक जो हमारा हुआ, उसको ले के ऐसा कुछ याद आ जाता है तो मन में ऐसा बहुत सा जो जाता है कि एक दो इंसान गुजर गया, और जो कुछ था वे भी चला गया। [NGO] training दिलवाना थी हमको। तीन-तीन महीने। उस training में हमने lucknow-style handicrafts का काम किया। [...] पैसा लेती हूँ आपसे। और हम तीन बहनें हैं, supervisor हम खुद जाते हैं। अहमदबाद, बजार से कपड़ा लाते हैं और खुद सिलाने भी लाते हैं। [...] हम खुद अपने-आप करती हैं और फिर exhibition लगते हैं। Bombay में, [list of locations] ऐसा कहीं भी लगाना होता है। [...] ये जो करते हैं वे लोग बहुत ही अच्छा काम करते हैं। अमन-शंती के लिए।

After the riots, women sat around, not knowing what to do. In their souls they still remember what had happened to us, so the fact that some lives were lost still wanders through their mind, [but] what happened is past. [NGO] provided us a training. Every three months. In this training we fabricated lucknow-style handicrafts. [...] I borrowed money from them. And we are three women who supervise themselves. We buy cloth from the Bazar in Ahmedabad and sew it independently. [...] I myself sew and than an exhibition took place. One should arrange this in Bombay, in [list of locations] as well. [...] Those who did this, did a very good work for peace.

Distinct in this snippet is not so much the micro-credit program – secular leaders, for example, did similar work – but that this woman *herself* participated. She explicitly reported her own transformation into a businesswoman (and later peace activist) as her major success after 2002. Their own transformation is what emancipating women ultimately aspire to spread, as the following two typical statements show:

Snippet 36 — Assistant: इसमें से कोई एक कहानी जो तुम्हारी दिल है कहिये, तुम्हारा अपना योग था — कहानी तो नहीं है लेकिन ऐसी कोई गुस्सा नहीं लेकिन मैं अपनी success उस तरीकी से मनती [NGO] से जोड़ने के बाद मुझे ऐसा कि मैं acting कर सकती हूँ। [...] उसने अपने बाड़ा success मनती। क्योंकि इस से पहले मुझे पता नहीं था कि मैं इतना [...] नाया कर सकती हूँ।

Snippet 37 — मेरे को ऐसे सफलता लगती है कि जो पहले डर रहे थे, जिनहोंने देखा आँखों से कि इस तरह बलातकर हुआ, मार डाले, वे देखा था और नहीं निकलते थे, ऐसी बहनों को हमने बाहर निकला। उसके लिए हमको ऐसा लगता है कि हमने कर के दिखाया। मैं मेरे खुद का कहती हूँ कि जब मेरे मामू जिंदा थे तो वे हमको [location] से [location] नहीं आने देते थे। अकेले। लेकिन अब मेरे को ऐसा होता है कि मेरे को बहुत ज्यादा हिम्मत आ गई है। [...] मेरे को मेरी जात पे ऐसा लगता है कि अब मैं मजबूत हो गई हूँ। मैं किसी से डरने वाली नहीं हूँ। [...] औरतें अभी तक बोलती हैं कि [name] आप तुमने बहुत हिम्मत की, तुमने हमको आगे बढ़ाया। मैंने कहा जो मेरा धरवाला है, मेरा ही पहले देखो, मैं भी ऐसे ही थी। औरत ही थी, मैं कोई ज्यादा नहीं थी। अमीर नहीं थी, गरीब ही थी। ऐसे ही मैं निकली हूँ बाहर। तुम चलो। ऐसे समझा के बहनों को निकाला।

Assistant: could you please tell a story, which is close to your heart, which was your own contribution? — there is actually no story, but, it should not be pretentious, but I see my success in this direction, that I, after joining [NGO], that I can act in that way. [...] I think this is my own big success. Because before I did not know, that I am able to [...] do something new.

I think it is a success that those who were frightened before, who saw rapes with their own eyes, feared death, who saw this and did not leave their home, that we took these women outside. We think that this demonstrates [a success]. I myself already told that while my uncle was still alive, he did not allow us to go from [location] to [location]. Not alone. But today, I acquired quite some courage. [...] In my community, people think that I became strong. I do not fear anyone. [...] Women say till today that "[name], you are very brave, you brought us progress". I say "look also at my background, how I was before, I was not like this. I was also a women, I was nobody special. I was not rich, I was poor as well. From this position I came forward. [Now] you go." By giving them this understanding, I bring women forward.

While many emancipating women became part of trauma healing or dialogue projects, organize small-scale business training workshops for their organizations or have other grassroots-level jobs, their *own* perceived contribution lies in the personal sphere: they try to let other women participate in a thorough transformation – which shall be analyzed in the next subsection.

Political behaviour

As was already said, all emancipating women were direct victims in 2002 and many still live in refugee camps. An often dramatic personal history is the first commonality which distinguishes not only their success stories from most other interviewees. Before the riots, none of these women was an activist; thus they do neither report a story of "naturally born" peace activism (like faith based actors) nor of longstanding professional development work (like secular leaders) – but a story of serendipically experienced victimization. Two women report:

Snippet 38 — मैं [village] की रहने वाली हूँ। [...] और वहाँ जब ये riots हुआ, दंगा हुआ, तब दंगे में हम यहाँ निकल के आ गए। रात में ग्यारह बजे, २३ लोग थे। हमारा पूरा परिवार था। यहाँ से अभी तक हम बाहर गए नहीं। हमको rehabilitate नहीं कर गया। हमारा मकान का पथर वथर सब ले के गए। [...] तीन दिन तक हमारा पूरा समान ले के गए। [few inaudible words] हमारा कपड़ा [pause] सब कुछ था।

I am a resident of [village]. [...] And when these riots happened, we came here, to this place. At night, at 11 o'clock, there were 23 people. My whole family. We have not left this place yet. We have not been rehabilitated. Our whole house was destroyed [...] In three days, all that we owned was taken. [few inaudible words] our clothes [pause] all and everything.

Snippet 39 — जो 2002 की दंगों में हुआ, हमको तो इतना अजीब सा लगा। कि बहुत खतरनाक हुआ। मेरे पे तो बहुत खतरनाक गुजरी है। मेरा कोई नहीं बचपन से। ऐसा जबरदस्ती हम खड़े हुए अपने पै पे। [place] में आए [...] हम ऐसे [place] में रहे कि दो दिन तक तो हमने खाना भी नहीं खाया। मेरा बेटा भी था, मेरी बेटी भी थी। कोई ने हमको एक कटोरी सालान भी नहीं दिया। [...] बहुत बाक्रहई टालत थी मेरी।

When the 2002 riots took place, we felt so terribly bad. That it was very dangerous. In my case, extreme danger passed by. I have noone since childhood. We were forced to stand on our own feet. We came to [place] [...] we lived there in the first two days without even having any food. My son and daughter as well. Nobody gave us cutlery or a room to rent. [...] For me it was a big grievance.

From further hints in her interview, it becomes plausible that the latter woman was raped in 2002. Others, like the former woman, were displaced, robbed or saw family members die. In this context, it is remarkable that both referred to 2002 in much clearer terms than other interviewees: while many spoke of "disturbance" or referred to "whatever happened", emancipating women had no problem with using the words "riots". This explicit semantic is one among several hints that they actually overcame the passivity which is inherent in victimization.

A second hint is contained in typical pattern in the salience statistics. A quasi-chronological ordering of interviews, as justified earlier in this section, enables the comparison of three hypothetical stages in a presumably common process of emancipation. Although all narratives contain reports on initial stages, salience statistics are different when these reports were the core of a story from cases in which they were only a retrospective introduction to something more current. To assess changes in the relative frequency and relative importance of certain key events, I compared different interviews which are exemplary of different stages of transformation. The following table lists salience indicators of four common events in these interviews (first relative frequency, then priority, then centrality; cp. section 4.2 for the methodical background):

	First stage	Second stage	Third stage
2002 riots	55 – 45 – 86	36 – 8 – 86	30 – 6 – 70
Own experience of violence	55 – 83 – 86	36 – 89 – 95	25 – 83 – 100
NGO intervention	33 – 38 – 100	23 – 45 – 100	30 – 86 – 90
Own peace activism	33 – 30 – 86	23 – 83 – 100	15 – 75 – 75

These statistics have three implications. The first two rows show that 2002 is crucial as a *personal* event: the riots themselves, as an abstract historical event, never reach the importance of own experience of violence (even less so in later stages of transformation). Many women narrate them in a row with other tragic biographic events, like, for example, becoming a widow. But unlike those other tragedies, internal displacement became the central precondition for fundamental changes in political behaviour: many women pooled in this section would probably not have become peace activists without the turmoil of riots. Some of them thus presented 2002 not only as a fatefully tragic, but indeed as a serendipically lucky event:

Snippet 40 — वैसा भी मैंने बोला कि ये जो riots हुआ, murder किये, मार दाले, उनके दिलों पर बहुत कुस्ह हो गया। पर एक क्षण मैं ऐसा सोचती हूँ कि ये जो हुआ बहुत ही बढ़िया हुआ कि जो हमारे मन में था, हमारे पास जो हुनर था, वे जो के कहीं बाहर निकला।

Like I said before, those, who murdered, who beat up people in the riots, they were pleased with their action. But for an instance, even *I* thought that what happened was [in fact] wonderful – because what was in our mind, what skills we had, that came to the surface then.

This crucial influence of 2002 as the source of activism as such distinguishes emancipating women from the two groups of interviewees described so far. As a precondition for NGO interventions and own peace activism, the riots and in particular own experience of violence also remain important events throughout all stages of transformation. But in later stages, they were less frequently mentioned and increasingly put into context. In these stages, self-efficacy develops, the serendipic starting point gets a positive meaning and step by step own peace activism reaches the same level of importance as the experience of violence: the third hint in the salience statistics. This transformation from victim to peace activist was a tough one. One young professional street theater player, for example, told me:

Snippet 41 — शुरु शुरु के तीन महीने तो मुझे बहुत awkward लगोगी। क्योंकि ये सब मुझे बहुत different है। उस तरह की बातें; नाटक में मैंने पहले कभी नहीं देखा था कभी नहीं किया था। नाटक में हिस्सा लेना, दुसरे लोगों से बात करना। [...] ज्यादा दलित थे, फिर लड़के भी थे। इस तरह कभी हुआ नहीं कि हम लड़के से बात करें था लड़को से इस तरह से मिलकर बैठकर बातों करें, काम करें। ऐस बिलकुल नया था। [...] तो शुरु के तीन महीने मैंने तो बहुत awkward।

In the initial three months, I would have felt very awkward, because all this is very different for me. This kind of talk; I have never seen a play in theater nor did I participate in it. To take part in it, to talk with other people. [...] There were many Dalits, and also boys. I never talked with boys, met them, sat with them and talked with them, worked with them. Such things were totally new. [...] So, during the first three months, I felt really awkward.

The personal struggle with own hesitation, as expressed in this snippet, could finally explain the third interesting feature of the salience statistics: own peace activism was in an intermediary stage far more important for the logic of emancipating womens' narratives than NGO interventions, although both were equally frequent. In this stage, the development of self-efficacy is as

crucial that it overpowers its organizational context – a dynamic which only changes in the third stage, when own agency is already somewhat stabilized.

The typical process of (re-)acquiring own agency after victimization, as proposed by a hypothetical chronology of event salience statistics, is the first commonality of emancipating womens' political behaviour. A second common feature was the confrontation with gender barriers. While they started as peace activists (the just quoted street theater player, for example, performed plays on communal harmony and social upliftment), they transformed soon into women rights' activists, to counter the difficulties which they experienced in patriarchal structures on their way (later on, to stick to the example, the theater player also included gender issues in her plays). During their transformation, emancipating women interestingly also used different Hindi words for peace: if they earlier talked about "shanti", a kind of holistic calm with an undertone of a cosmic balance (often justifying structural violence like castism), they later talked about "aman", meaning only absence of violence without any religious inference and in the last stage simply about "nyay": justice. While a serendipic event – the 2002 riots – opens the leeway for agency, structural influence restricts it. One example:

Snippet 42 — मेरे घर का जो महौल है, काफ़ी मेरे पपा मम्मी, धर्म को लेकर बहुत वे हैं [pause] कि कभी ऐसा काम न करें जो धर्म के खिलाफ़ हो। [...] kyo.mki jaba mai.m bhI shuru shuru me.m yahA/[NGO] में जुड़ी तो बहुत problems हो गई। जैसे कि इसमें काम करने से कभी आठ बजे गए घर पहुँचने को, कभी सात बजे जाए। तो उससे मुझे घर पे बहुत बातें होतीं। [...] तो मेरे मम्मी पपा तो कम बोलें, बाहर जो लोग हैं वे इस बातें बनाकर बोलें।

In my home was this atmosphere, that especially my parents take a lot from religion. [pause] That 'you should not do such a work, it would be against religion'. Because when I started and joined [NGO], many problems came up. In this work, you sometimes come back home at eight o'clock, sometimes you leave at seven. So this was a permanent discussion at home. [...] Even if my parents did talk less about it, other people did.

I could list a bunch of similar accounts: all emancipating women faced the same problems when becoming self-eficacy peace activists. For younger women and widows alike, it was mainly the insistence of neighbours or family members on Purdah. Although this term does, in the areas of my interviews, not mean the total separation of men and women as in other parts of the subcontinent, it still denotes a strategy to restrict public exposure of womens' bodies. This strategy obviously conflicts with, say, street theater players who discover the expressive quality of the same. Emancipation from victimization quickly transformed into an emancipation from religio-patriarchal structures as well. Before I present this struggle with religion in detail, I would like to summarize those features of emancipating womens' stories found so far: a transformation from own victimhood to peace activism through NGO interventions, which followed serendipic riots; in this transformation a development of agency and self-efficacy against own victimization and structural patriarchy; and finally the proclamation of their own story as a success exemplary to other women.

Religious beliefsets

Emancipation was not only a process of overcoming victimization, but also a struggle with patriarchal religious beliefsets. Emancipating women typically start from a traditional-cultural family background, which they shed in a second stage for a selective acquisition of those beliefsets which can support their personal emancipation process – often against their family. Finally, they totally drop religion and become secular or even anti-religious.

Women in the initial stages of transformation did generally not care much for religion, because they had to struggle with daily survival (which, by the way, contradicts the common assumption that people turn to God in the absolute darkest times – according to the experiences in my research, religiosity is rather a feature of *relative* dark outlooks). If religious beliefs or ritual life were important in initial stages at all, then in a traditional and liminal configuration. Although it often remained unclear if women talked about themselves or about their family's preferences, Dargahs and other shared spaces (as introduced in section 3.4) were at the center of their religiosity in this stage. One victim, for example, narrates:

Snippet 43 — Assistant: मस्जिद तो नहीं? — औरतों को मना है। दरगाह मैं जाती हूँ — **Interviewer:** कौन स? — हलोल में अभी है ये बादस्हाह बाबा। और मेहसाना तक [जाती हूँ] **Assistant:** not to the mosque? — this is not for women. I go to Dargahs. — **Interviewer:** which ones? — in Halol there is at the moment this Badshah Baba. And I go up to Mehsana.

Badshah Baba is a non-descript local saint. Mehsana, though, is a surprise. Although no famous Dargah is directly located in this northern Gujarati town, the village of Unana is really close by. There, Mir Datar is buried, a saint who "has specialized in helping people who are afflicted with 'madness'. The dargaha dropped – or never developed – all other functions which are usually associated with Muslim shrines. Its only function is [...] the religious healing of those afflicted with some kind of 'psychosis' or 'neurosis'. More precisely, it has a reputation for healing those stricken by a bhut. [...] Bhuts are believed to be the roaming souls of unpeacefully deceased persons (suicide, violent death). The symptoms which result from this latent possession are somatic ailments combined with mental disturbance. [...] The saint's spirit [is] one of the most powerful exorcists in the country" (Pfleiderer, 1981, p. 218ff.; cp. in detail Pfleiderer, 2007). If this is indeed the shrine which this particular lady visits (which seems plausible, given her history of victimization), she most likely does not do so for religious purposes but to overcome what modern psychology calls a post-traumatic stress disorder (cp. Nemeroff et al., 2006), clad in a "culture specific illness theory" (Pfleiderer, 1981, p. 232) as the possession by an evil spirit. While it remains to a good extent speculation which experience traumatized her and whether she really visits Mir Datar to overcome PTSD, the fact is important that emancipating women's visit to Dargahs is (in this and other cases) not a *religious* affair. During the first stage of transformation, a traditional or habitual religiosity is typical: emancipating women go to saint festivals to maintain social networks or complain about the familial urge to celebrate holidays

even in economical hardship – and some visit Dargahs for healthcare. This if at all implicitly religious role of beliefs and ritual practices changes in the second stage of transformation. Here, many women discovered Islamic dogma:

Snippet 44 — Assistant: अगर जो भी है, तुमहारा knowledge इसलाम का उनसे कुछ होगी एक सब से महत्त्वपूर्ण भाग इसलाम की, अगर कोई है? [...] — इसलाम में उन देख में जओ तो एक तरह, कि समंता है। [cross-speech] अगर हम हिंदू धरम में देखे तो हम वर, ना व्यवस्था वह कोई कई नहीं चाहिए, कोई दलित हैं। उस तरह का एक भेद-भाव है। लेकिन मुसलिम धरम में इस तरह का नहीं है। [...] [लेकिन] अनुश्रुदात बहुत है। — **Interviewer:** superstitious — हाँ। क्योंकि क्या होता है, न? कि हम उस तरह से सोचने के कोशिश ही नहीं करते हैं कि जैसे, कि पैगम्बर कि इसलाम जिन्होंने दुनिया फिर ला आएगा। [...] उस तरह का नहीं पसंद। और दुसरा यह है कि इसलाम में जो महिला में जो स्थिती है दुसरे number देना है।

Assistant: in your knowledge of Islam, is there one most important part of Islam, is there something like this? [...] — if you look inside Islam, then, in a way, there is equality. [cross-speech] If we look into Hindu religion, then there are chastity boundaries through castism, there are Dalits. This kind of divisions are there. But in Muslim religion there is nothing like this. [...] [But] there is a lot of superstition — **Interviewer:** superstitious — yes. Because it is like this, right? that we do not try to think about that time, that the world of the prophet's Islam is gone now. [...] I do not like this approach. And also that women are given the second place in Islam.

Women in an intermediary step of transformation call for the contextualization of Quran. An explicitly religious ethic of (gender) equality seems to become key to their own emancipation (although it is difficult to assess whether this is an instrumental move or actual religiosity). In contrast to their male opponents, whom they locate in the realm of faith based actors (though a few of those were actually quite open to the empowerment of women), they do not back their ethic with detailed and stable beliefs about the afterlife, though, but try to appropriate the imperative of equality to their own process of emancipation by dynamically modernizing moral commandments. One example:

Snippet 45 — — Assistant: एक ऐसी बात बताइए इसलाम में जो आपके दिल को चुति है — [...] तो वे नमाज पढ़ना है। और अच्छे से पूरा तन पर कपड़ा ढाँक के पहनता है, ओढ़ के पहनना है, वे इसलाम का एक बहुत ही अच्छा है। ऐसा नहीं है कि आप नकाब में रहो। मगर आप सर ढाकी या पूरा ओढ़ के फ़िरो तो वे इसलाम की एक अच्छी बात है, मुझे अच्छी लगता है। [...] अपना नुमाईश बाहर मत दिखाओ।

— **Assistant:** Please tell me one thing in Islam which is close to your heart — [...] Reading Namaz. And that you keep your whole body well covered with clothes, wear a veil, this is something in Islam that is really very good. Not like: wear Nakab! But to cover yourself, well this is a good thing in Islam, that pleases me a lot. [...] Do not exhibit yourself.

Such an reacquisition of ethical commandments (cover yourself, but do not force the wearing of Nakab) was a typical feature for the second stage of transformation. In an intermediary step, such religious beliefsets strongly inspire the activism of emancipating women:

Snippet 46 — Assistant: जो भी आप काम कर रही हैं इसकी प्रेरणा आ आपकी अपने धर्म से और कौम से मिली या नहीं? — जी। हाँ, हमारे धर्म से। मतलब ये जो हुआ उसके बाद भी धर्म हमने छोड़ा नहीं। कि उपर वाला तेरा लाख-लाख शुक्र है।

Assistant: do you get the inspiration for your work from your religion or community, or not? — Yes, from our religion. I mean, after what has happened, we have not given up our faith. That God commands highest gratitude.

This woman confirms that she roots her quest for equality in Islamic beliefs. Besides, the snippet is interesting for its grammar as well: she asserts her religiosity by making a general claim to Muslims ("we have not given up our faith"). Together with what will be reported in the next subsection, this could explain *why* these women (selectively) turn to religion in an intermediary stage of transformation: their community ("we") might if at all tolerate an emancipation of women when justified in Islamic terms – but not if this goes hand in hand with a perceived neglect of religion. Thus, emancipating women appropriate feminist theology.

But while a religious ethic is a necessary strategy to stabilize an intermediary transformatory step, it ultimately does not last and is replaced by a secular justification of equality and womens' emancipation in the last stage of transformation. In sum, emancipation leads at first to a transformation and discovery, but finally to a renunciation of religious beliefs:

Snippet 47 — अभी मैं ऐसा कि लग है कि मैं अलाह है या भगवान नहीं मनती। इतनी मैं नास्तिक हो गयीं। और percent तो कुछ है, साच से बाकी है फिर वे भी कम मुझे आएगा। क्योंकि मेरा परिवार ऐसा है कि वे पूरा, वे पूरा धर्म में मनते हैं, पूरा खुदा में मनते हैं, पूरा 5 time को नमाज पढ़ते हैं, रमदान में रोजा रख देंगे। तो कुछ percent है ऐसा जो उनकी तरफ मुझे मिला आएगा। वे मुझे एकदम 100 percent नास्तिक होने में रोक रहेग।

Right now, I do not believe that there is Allah or any god. That much I became atheist. A few percent still hold that there is truly something else, but they will also go. Because my family completely religious, they believe totally in Allah, make use of all five prayer times a day, fast during Ramadan. So a few percent are still there from this direction. They will prevent me from becoming 100 percent atheist.

In summary, it became clear that most women start with a traditional religious (or cultural) life, then discover an explicit Islamic theology of equality which they use to stabilize their emancipation, but ultimately turn away from religion. Very different religious beliefs play very different roles, and in the hypothetically constructed dynamic, their influence can increase as well as decrease: this is in a sharp contrast to the stable relation between religious dimensions of identity and political behaviour found among faith based actors and confirms corresponding conceptual claims about identity made in the introduction chapter.

Group identification

By now, it became obvious that the role of emancipating womens' religious identity is intricately linked to their ingroup. Many of them changed to the first person plural when answering

questions on religion and spoke more about community tradition than about their own faith. Group identification became particular salient after 2002, as one woman explained:

Snippet 48 — सब से main मोतार था कि २००२। उस के बाद मुझे मुसलिम होगी और महिला होगी ज्यादा। [...] तो एक वे identity थी उस वक़्त मेरी कि मैं मुसलिम हूँ इसलिये मैं [NGO] में एक उसकी जरूरत मुझे ही गई। लेकिन बाद में

The main impulse was 2002. Afterwards I became very much a Muslima and a woman. [...] So my only identity at that time was that I am a Muslima, and that is why [NGO] needed me.

Would they not have categorized themselves as Muslims, they would not have been of any interest to those NGOs which discovered Muslim communities as new target groups after 2002 (cp. chapter 2). But at the same time, joining NGOs meant opposition to the family and community and thus started an emancipation not only from victimization and passivity, but also from patriarchy, as described in the last subsection. As Muslimness was as much a precondition as an obstacle in their story, the relation to their ingroup remained ambivalent: they can neither easily dismiss group identification nor uphold an unbroken relation to their community. And although they were externally seen primarily as Muslims, emancipating women consequently identified themselves primarily as women in the ranking of categorization options. This ambivalence has its psychological correlate in distinctly low measures for dominance and resonance (cp. figure 11): emancipating women were not able to considerably influence their ingroup, nor did they meet much confirmation.

In the last subsections, the internal differences between emancipating women were spread on a timeline to construct a hypothetical dynamic. Statistical restrictions render this trick rather adventurous when applied to the psychological scales. On the other hand, the dynamic that becomes visible by differentiating women in initial and later stages of transformation fits the




Figure 11: Those dimensions of emancipating womens' psychological test results with a variance considerably and interpretably different from that of other interviewees (separately for initial and later stages of transformation). Scales are z-standardized and two measures assess differences numerically: Hedges' g is a coefficient for the effect size or *degree* of deviation (values above .2 indicate a medium effect; cp. Hedges, 1981, p. 112ff.), the p-value stems from a non-parametric Wilcoxon test on variance equality, estimating the *clarity* of this deviation (lower values indicate higher clarity; cp. Bortz, 1999, p. 149f.).

overall impression too well to be left aside. With a big methodical caveat, therefore, it seems that groupness declines during the transformation process, while tolerance towards (on item level gendered) irritations of role models increases. The shift from patriarchal structures to personal emancipation fits that dominance completely fades. That resonance remains low could, on the other hand, reflect the continued grip of the community. One example:

Snippet 49 — जो निकले तो सब ऐसा बता रहे हैं कि आपने तो मुसल्मान हैं, और मैं विधवा थी, अकेली औरत सब ऐसा बोलते थे कि जो नौकरी करती है वे नहीं करना चाहिए। औरत जात नहीं निकलती बाहर। [...] हाँ मुसल्मान धर्म अपना अपने दिल में रखे। [...] यहाँ अपने ऐसा tension अभी से ले के क्या करेंगे।

Whoever became active was told "but you are a Muslim", and I am also a widow, a lone woman so everybody said that it is not advisable that she works, has a job. Women folk should not enter the public. [...] Yes, the Muslim faith is deep in my heart. [...] There develop such tensions now, what shall I do?

"Such tensions" because of low resonance plausibly reduce dominance. The lack of support from the community finally inspire some emancipating women to a radical change of identification: they want to fundamentally get rid of their Muslimness by becoming Hindu. But even this option has pitfalls, which one emancipating woman described as follows:

Snippet 50 — **Assistant:** आप २००२ में सोच्छा कि आप हिंदू होना चाहिए? — हाँ। तो मेरा २००२ के सोच्छ था कि हिंदू होना चाहिए। तो मेरे लड़ाई नहीं हो। [...] मगर ये २००२ के बाद ऐसा होता है कि ये लोग कैसे हैं अगर इनके अंदर ईमान होता तो वे लोग ऐसा नहीं करते। death के तीसरे दिन ऐसा हुआ।

Assistant: after 2002 you wanted to be Hindu? — yes. After 2002, I wanted to be Hindu. Then I would not have to struggle. [...] But after 2002, I [also] wondered how these people are – if they had humanity in them, then they would not have done such things, so much death in three days.

Overall, the discussion of emancipating womens' dynamics of group identification highlights the difficulties of a process of transformation. This is visible in the combination of fading groupness and rising tolerance towards new role models with low and fading dominance and rather low social resonance. Further difficulties lie as well in the need to categorize as a Muslima while attempting to shed this option of identification as finally in the non-feasability of radical solutions. Group identification remains an ambivalent factor in emancipating women, which conceptually makes them an interesting case for reconstructing the ambivalence of the sacred on the micro-level (cp. chapter 6). That both subdimensions of religious identity can transform in different directions also confirms the importance to differentiate them, as proclaimed in the introduction: while the influence of religious beliefs sets initially increases but ultimately vanishes totally, the influence of dynamics of group identification steadily recedes without fading completely.

5.4 Why some professionals develop doubts

A last type of interviewees were (previously secular) professionals who develop doubts about their earlier stance that religion is irrelevant. For them, 2002 initiated a journey to "the own shadow, the sum of those dimensions of the own being which were subdued and not realized" (Brück, 2008, p. 142; my translation). Like emancipating women, their identities were influenced by their activism as much as the other way round. One of these "doubting professionals" summarized:

Snippet 51 — I saw [...] communal conflict and, you know, [...] this is how I *understood* my own identity. Because again and again people used to started asking me: *who* are you, *who* are you? And *till* then, that time I was [age] years old, I never knew who I *am*. Because for *me*, I was born as a Muslim, my family was Muslim, but it was very personal [...] and we never carried our identities.

After the usual relief and rehabilitation stories, doubting professionals narrate in particular one kind of success: the initiation of cross-community religious learning projects. This mirrors the importance of a development of (self-)understanding and the exploration of ambivalence in their own biographies (the little "why" in the title hints at this):

Snippet 52 — [Only] as we went into deep and we tried to learn and we were oriented in the social work and all this background, with the researches and the studies [...] [we] then said that we should also take up this issue.

During their learning process, doubting professionals openly exposed their religious identities to irritation and developed an holistic-aesthetical spirituality and a feeling of responsibility for their ingroup. At the same time, they do neither need religious beliefsets for detailed moral guidance nor does their psychological stability rely on high groupness. On the contrary: doubting professionals are the only type of interviewees who have an external standpoint towards religion and can thus fully embrace its ambivalence. Unlike faith based actors and secular leaders, their identity is in flux – and unlike emancipating women, they do not turn away from religion, but discover in it a "beautiful" language to express what underlies their activism. Because doubting professionals themselves reflect extensively on this dynamic in their narratives, temporalizing differences – the trick applied to the case of emancipating women – is not necessary for diachronic analyses. They will explain their doubts themselves.

Success stories

In the diversity of successes that doubting professionals reported, one variety of peace work sticks out: many of them venture into religious education. They organize workshops on Islam, partly for Muslims, partly for both Muslims and Hindus. They invite both communities to celebrate their festivals together. Some start explicit interfaith dialogues. A few examples:

Snippet 53 — Interviewer: Could you tell me one short story where you were successful in campaigning for peace? — see, while working with the Muslims and all that we have been able to bring together the people as well from Dalits as well as Muslim communities *together*. By explaining all these things by giving analysis of whatever [uncomprehensible word] has happened, by taking the example from their live and what have gone through, and of course what the *religion* itself says about peace and all that. Because in Muslim religion, it is a precondition that even you can't have, as simple as that, you can't fulfill your stomach as long as your neighbour is not fulfilled, he is not, he is hungry. So that a religion can't talk about war and violence and this thing and that thing.

Snippet 54 — हम youth के साथ [...] discussion में हिस्सा लेते। [...] जब मैं democratic rights की बात करता हूँ, जब मैं youth का nation-building में क्या हो सकता है, मैंने जब youth के बात किया, जब syncretic culture की बात की, harmonic atmosphere बनाने की बात की तो बहुत से लड़कों ने आ के सीधा सीधा बोल दिया कि आप मुसलिम नहीं लगते। मतलब, उन्होंने मुसलिम के बारे में एक ऐसी सोच बनाते रखी जिसमें मैं fit नहीं होता हूँ। ये हमेशा रहा है। लेकिन धीरे-धीरे फिर यही बात होने लगी कि आप ये मानना शुरू करें कि मुसलिम भी इस तरह की बात करते हैं। [...] फिर हमको religious leaders, communal लोग आके दूसरी community के बारे में बताते हैं। [...] धीरे-धीरे ये बातें समझ में आती हैं।

We took part in discussions with the youth [...] When I spoke about democratic rights, about what could be the role of youth in nation-building, about issues of the youth, about syncretic culture and creating a harmonic atmosphere, then many boys came and talked back to me: you seem not to be a Muslima. That is to say, they were holding a concept of Muslima into which I did not fit. This always happens. But then slowly they began to realize that actually a Muslima is talking this way. [...] Then we gathered religious leaders and communal people and told them about the respective other community's affairs. [...] Slowly they began to understand these things.

Snippet 55 — Initially of course, one wanted to *reconcile*. [...] So we started working and I told you we [...] brought *both* the communities together. First thing that was the month of Ramazan, so we were fasting, so we invited all our Hindu friends, you know who have fought at the border side, so we invited both the communities and broke the *fast*. [...] Lot of Hindus came. It was a *huge* number, and they were all from the neighbours and they were *so* happy and then they hugged each other and they apologized and said "we are very sorry, for what people have done to you" (the Hindus) [...] and there are *hundreds* of such stories, which *we* did and we *tried* to bring both the communities together.

The commonality of all three stories lies in their focus on education and understanding as well as in their inter-communal scope. Like other interviewees, doubting professionals also provided immediate relief and extensively worked in human rights advocacy. But closest to their heart are those initiatives where they spread a productive understanding of religion – initially inside their own NGO, later on in broader society. The next subsection will show that the development of understanding is not only the core of their professional peace activism, but also the core of their own story after 2002.

Political behaviour

In the narratives of doubting professionals, own peace activism statistically appears at first less frequent and far less important than in most other interviews; the respective indicators lie as much as one and a half standard deviation below average. At the same time, many doubting professionals hold leading positions in their organizations and my field notebook remembers them as being quite self-confident. Indeed, on a second look the seeming unimportance of own activism turns out to be a statistical flaw which results from the complexity of most stories: own activism takes, in *absolute* terms, as much space as in other interviews – it is just not the *only* thing doubting professionals talk about, thus the *relative* importance appears low.

What is it that doubting professionals add to their narratives? Figure 12 shows an exemplary dense event structure, in which two causal chains are intertwined: one links to peace activism and one to the 2002 riots. Both do only partially overlap, but each in itself is more complex than most other interviewees' stories. Such partial independence should not be confused with the parallel causality found in faith based actors' narratives, though: doubting professionals remain strictly narrative in their rhetoric. While faith based actors tell two parallel stories in distinct semantic and create separate causal chains, doubting professionals narrate a single, but complex story, in which peace activism has more preconditions than just 2002 and 2002 more consequences than just peace activism. Saliency statistics further reveal that the most frequent as well as most important events were neither violence nor peace activism. Instead, a cluster of events generalizable as "understanding" was crucial: processes of reflection, a discovery of religious sources, political analyses and similar knowledge- and learning-related events. The development of understanding is paramount for doubting professionals and links the parts of their story about the 2002 riots with their biography of activism. One example, in which an interviewee tried to catch the ambivalence of religion, shall be quoted at length:




Figure 12: Graphical output from the event structure analysis of one doubting professional's extremely complex narrative (cp. section 4.2). While details don't matter for now, a considerable logical independence of events connecting to 2002 (marked in the left graph) and events connecting to peace activism (marked in the right graph) is obvious.

Snippet 56 — मुसलिम समाज में देखते तो मिला कि education बहुत ही कम है लोगों में, पढ़ाते नहीं हैं, हर बात मजहब को लेके ही करते हैं। मजहब से ही जुड़े हो रहे हैं। क्योंकि बचपन से बच्चों को मद्रस्सों में जाता है। [...] बच्चों को वही तालीम ही जाती है, कुरान-शरीफ़ की। और कुरान-शरीफ़ में भी जो आरबी में है तो [...] हम गुजरात में रह रहे हैं, हमारी मातृभाषा गुजराती है तो आरबी भाषा क्या कहना चाहती है? [...] जो आज से १४०० साल इसलाम आया, जब बात की थी, तो आज की date में तो नहीं मिल रही है। [...] इसलाम के जो belief हैं दया, करुणा, समानता, education वे सब जो किया है आज से १४०० साल पहले। [लेकिन] लोग ज्यादा मजहब की पकड़ में रह गए हैं और लोग मौलाना जो बताते हैं उसको ही लेते हैं। [...] इस तरीके से जो ये लोगों के अंदर नफ़रत धाली गई और आमने-सामने दंगे करवाए गए, उसकी वजह से आज हमें कितना नुकसान देखने को मिला। [...] तो ये सब analysis में करके गए तो उसके बाद ऐसा लगा कि [...] फिर भी ये न्याय मिलेगा? हमारे देश में न्याय की प्रक्रिया बहुत जथिल है। बहुत लमबी चलती है, मगर हम मजबूत रहेंगे तो हमको न्याय मिलेगा। मगर लोगों के अंदर ये समझ बनाना बहुत मुश्किल का काम है। लोग गईब होते हैं, असर ग्रस्त जब हुए हैं तो न्याय लेने निकलते हैं तो उनको दबाव आता है। लालच ही जाती है, धराया ही जाता है। [...] भाई लोग काम के नहीं लएंगे तो बहने क्या पका के खिलाएंगी, बच्चों के शिक्षण का क्या होगा। [...] तो फिर वे लोग थंधे हो के जाते कि भई जैसे अल्लाह की मर्जी वैसे जियो और हमें कुछ नहीं करना। और काफ़ी लोग धर्मिक भी हो गए, ये [२००२] होने के बाद। [...] [लेकिन] इसलाम के जो values हैं वे बहुत अच्छे हैं। इसलाम का जो सिद्धंत है, कि जो निराकार है उसको ही तुम मानो, जो समांता की बात है, जो आजादिकी बात ही है। जो महिलाओं को समांता ही है, वे मुझे बहुत अच्छी लगी। उसके जो core values हैं। इसका मूल [बात] क्या है [...] हम meetings करते हैं [...] हमारी कोशिश चलू है। ये लोगों को समझ देना।

If you look at the Muslim community, then the education of the people is very poor, they are illiterate and act by taking everything from religion. They would be very religious. Because from childhood on, kids go to madrassas. [...] Children are very learned in the Quran. But the Quran is in Arabic, and [...] we live in Gujarat, our mother tongue is Gujarati, so why would we want to tell in Arabic? [...] [And] if you talk about the Islam of 1400 years back, then it does not fit the present times. [...] An Islamic ethic would consist of mercy, compassion, equality, education – all this was already proclaimed 1400 years back. [But] people are very much in the grasp of religion, and take for true whatever thing the Maulana say. [...] This way intolerance is planted inside people and by and large riots will be created; in this way we have seen so much sorrow today. [...] After we made this whole analysis, we felt that [...] anyway, will people achieve justice? In our country, juridical processes are very complex. They take very long, although we will meet justice if we remain strong. But it is very difficult to develop this understanding inside people. There is also envy, also fear which was created. [...] Men find no jobs, so what can women cook, how will the education of children be? [...] So then these people's energy cools down and they claim that if it is Allah's will then live this way and do not do anything. And many people became very religious, after this [2002] happened. [...] [But] Islam has these great values. In Islam there is the doctrine that you should revere the numinous, there is the teaching of equality, also the issue of freedom. There is even the equality of women, which I like very much. These are the core values. About all these basic things [...] we hold meetings, we put our effort in this. To give these people an understanding.

On the one hand, this snippet presents religion as part of the vicious circle of victimization, marginalization and violence – on the other hand, it claims that Islamic ethic could provide a source of strength and orientation. This interviewee tried to resolve the ambivalence by taking into account socio-economic and educational factors: learned people can make good use of religion (because they can adopt ethic to modern times), while the poor remain in the grasp of 1400 years of backwardness. Consequently, (religious) education is the goal of intervention. As already mentioned in the last subsection, doubting professionals often ventured beyond cross-cutting issues (“working in conflict”) into explicit peacebuilding (“working on conflict”; cp. chapter 2) and many indeed entered the realm of peace education, reflecting the importance of learning in their own biography. For example, one interviewee, who was not active before 2002, reports how crucial reading and discussions with peers were during the initial steps of her work, which at the time of our interview led to the formation of her own NGO:

Snippet 57 — २००२ में जो हुआ तब मैं masters degree part two करता था। उसके साथ-साथ एक स्कूल में पढ़ाता भी था। और जब ये carnage हुआ, तो उसके बाद में गुजरात में जिस तरह की situation दो गई थी, तो हमेस्हा ये ख्याल रहते थे कि क्यों? [...] और क्या ये नहीं बदल सकता? [...] क्योंकि मुझे पढ़ने का पहले से स्हौक था तो फिर मैंने पढ़ना शुरू किया और समझ में आया कि इस तरह हंगामा हुआ। [...] लेकिन [...] ये तो पता ही नहीं था कि इस तरह की organization हो और काम करे issues पर। [...] धीरे-धीरे लगा कि मैं इस तरह का काम। उस समय वैसे भी कोई हल समझ में नहीं आता था। गुस्सा था, frustration या दर्द था।

Before 2002 happened, I had finished the second part of my masters degree; I was also teaching in a school. And after this carnage happened, [I wondered] in what kind of situation Gujarat was thrown; there was always the thought: why? [...] And could this not change? [...] Because I always had a passion for reading, I started to read and acquired the understanding that the riots happened this way. [...] But [...] we did not know that an organization would develop and that we would work on these issues. [...] Slowly I realized that I would like to work in this way. Initially, I did not have a complete picture. There was anger, frustration, fear.

Of course, other interviewees also tried to understand what happened in 2002. But in contrast to faith based actors and secular leaders, doubting professionals typically emphasize context factors and draw ambivalent conclusions, mirroring the academic state of the art in this area (cp. section 3.1). The next two snippets show exemplary how doubting professionals argue:

Snippet 58 — **Interviewer: First I would be interested if you can tell *your* story. Basically. How did you involve yourself in that peace work?** — It was beyond 2002, it was even before that, because it was, in 1992, there was a Babri Masjid. In the media, and it was a very important event, because [pause]. Firstly that I would say I got involved in all that peacebuilding work or understanding that whole world of conflict, because I came to *Gujarat*. I came to Gujarat from [location] [...] and – before that I had never experienced anything like this, like communal riots. I have never been *exposed* to it. So Hindutva forces and all that. [...] I used to ask my father that why are we staying in this big Ghetto, because at that time we were staying at a place called [location]. *Exclusively* that colony was

meant for Muslims. [...] So I said: "Father, before that we have never been to such an area where everybody is Muslim, I don't like this". And my father said: "You don't know, you are in *Gujarat*. You will understand later".

Snippet 59 — Behaviour also it is contextual. The community, the culture, the culture of that particular geographical area – so it has a lot of bearing on that behaviour. It's not always so much defined by the religion.

Three aspects are typical in these snippets: the contextualization in history (referring to the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodya; cp. Meisig, 2005), in location ("you are in *Gujarat*") and finally the parallelization of "peacebuilding work" and "understanding that whole world of conflict". Contextualization typically led to a comprehensive assessment of the contemporary situation: while doubting professionals put religion into context, they also argued that it should not be left aside totally. This balanced view on religion inspired a change in their organizations' interventions towards explicit peacebuilding. One interviewee reported:

Snippet 60 — As a *team* today there is very *strong* consensus and very *strong* commitment to *absolutely* work on this issue [of religious conflict]. And *not* only make it a cross-cutting issue and say, there was a conflict in Dahod and Panchmahal, so we start *working* with that community. Because we started working with that community and there was lot of *risk* and we were beaten up two, three months back, we were attacked and all those are part of it. So earlier those things used to really scare the team, in terms of not knowing how to handle it. For other reasons there were the meetings, because we were working on land rights and all the conflicts – but this was a *different* kind of conflict and we did know how to handle it. [...] Today the team says we have to learn how to deal with it in a better way. [...] That we *have* to ask, you know we have to ask that community to become morally responsible. So we have to *ask* for an apology, a kind of a public apology, and that is the process. I mean that is the stand which women are taking and [...] which [NGO] has taken.

Earlier, this NGO merely extended their established interventions to Muslim communities (a prevalent approach; cp. chapter 2). But after their office was attacked, they realized that classic interventions only were not enough and started to make communalism an explicit issue. This change in approach necessitated of many NGOs an often painful and complex processes of organizational change. In this process, doubting professionals developed considerable leadership. Even though many of them hold high positions in their organizations, they had to regain agency in a dynamic which resembles the one described of emancipating women (cp. section 5.3). They gain it not so much from own victimization, though, but from the shock of having been caught unaware. The following account is exemplary of this process (my emphases):

Snippet 61 — So all this *was happening* and then of course this 2002. What *happened* in 2002 it was really, really [pause] I mean *it shook* us all, because *the immediate realization was* that all the groups that we had in our field area, how insensitive they were to what had happened, to a particular community. Some of them were naive but some of them were almost feeling that: OK, whatever happened

has happened for good. This is what they deserve. [...] Oh it did not make sense. Because at different level there were very senior people who had some kind of political orientation and social orientation. [...] And then *one* really *started thinking*: is this what [NGO] should be all about? [...] So as a result of all this, what *we felt*: it is, it is absolutely important to work on this issue, and this is the first time that *I felt*, *I am saying*: *I am going to* take a stand and a position.

Here, the regaining of agency can even be traced on a grammatic level: first something "was happening" (a serendipic formulation) and "immediately" caused a "realization" (as an exigent, uncontrollable consequence). Only a few sentences later, subjectivity is attributed: initially to an anonymous actor ("one started thinking"), then in the first person plural ("we felt") and finally as individual agency ("I felt, I am saying: I am going to"). Even though doubting professionals have been caught unaware, the own ability to act returns – and it does so when interviewees actively choose an own viewpoint and develop own understanding.

This confirms the statistical importance of knowledge-related events in the narratives on a grammatical level: a context-sensitive analysis of religion in conflict really is crucial for doubting professionals' political behaviour. To what extent dimensions of religious *identity* and their interaction with peace activism also changed shall now be discussed in the next two subsections.

Religious beliefsets

Most doubting professionals have a liberal middle-class family background, which typically brought them (if at all) only cursorily in closer contact with religion. But even if they were not religiously raised, their professional interest frequently inspired a reflection on their own personal position towards religion. A typical story is told by the following doubting professional, who grew up a-religious, but discovered Islamic beliefs after 2002:

Snippet 62 — I saw women, and livelihoods lost, and for example: there were people, and this is a big area, 3 lakh [30.000] population Muslim, and people had no food, and they were not regularly eating *one* meal and all this was affecting me really badly and then I moved around. Because before that I have never been to that, you know: what is Juhapura [one of the biggest Muslim ghettos in Ahmedabad; RS]. I just had a house, and as a typical donor and development worker, I did get out of my house and I travelled all over the world, but I didn't know what Juhapura is all about. And I was getting much and much – I was *lost*. So I was *psychologically* affected. [...] And I realized that I did not know anything about *my* faith. That thought came repeated again and again. And then I started *reading*, I started reading Quran, the english version of Quran, and then I started reading books [...]

This snippet shows how the discovery of religion is not only part of developing a professional understanding – it is also a process of acquiring a deeper self-understanding. In this process, doubting professionals (unlike secular leaders; cp. section 5.2) abandon their prior assumptions. But unlike faith based actors (cp. section 5.1) or emancipating women in an intermediary

stage (cp. section 5.3), they do not pick out theological details but develop instead a holistic-aesthetical spirituality. To them, religion is neither about details of the good (a detailed ethic or moral) nor about details of the truth (theological metaphysics). They are concerned with the beauty of the good and the truth (aesthetics) and would typically equate religion with calm, comfort, and a feeling of coherence. One young activist, for example, who has an orthodox background but began his own quest for religion after 2002, related the following Sufi anecdote:

Snippet 63 — कुरान में ७०० पन्ने हैं। [...] उसका आश्वीरी पन्ने में आश्वीरी शब्द बस है। तो पूरा पढ़ने की बात छोड़ो। ये दो शब्द समझ लो तो दिमाग में आ जाएगा। कि ये ब और अ और स क्या हुआ? बस। बस यानी कि बस। और उसको अलटा दो तो सब हो जाएगा। उसमें सब कुछ आ गया।

There are 700 pages in Quran. [...] The first word on the first page is "bas". Then you should stop reading. If you understand the following two words, it will come to your mind. "B", "a" and "s" are what? "bas". "Bas" means "enough". If you turn it around, it will become "sab" ["everything"]. Everything goes in this word.

This interviewee is not interested in the details of 700 pages Quran. To him the experience of coherence, of the beauty of everything, of a spiritual look on the world is sufficient. "To find oneself in the irritating in-between, to become certain of oneself in sweeping presence, [...] to stimulate and move beyond the known and expectable: this is religion, lived religion. It is more than mere assuredness in the vulnerabilities of life. It becomes life-experience as surprising self-experience. And this exactly happens when [religion] foregoes to clad itself in metaphysics or morality, when it rejects to legitimize through holy texts and exposes itself to questions" (Korsch, 2007, p. 257f., my translation; this must not be confused with more specific European discussions about "aesthetical religiosity", though, despite the fact that both emphasize interiority; cp. Müller, 1999, p. 123. Doubting professionals frequently claim that Islam would be truly progressive if only seen as such a holistic spiritual way of life, not as a set of fixed moral rules or demanding metaphysical beliefs. Unlike secular leaders, who denounce religion, doubting professionals prefer reinterpretation, incorporating modern science and psychological insights into a religion which fosters self-reflexion. Two examples:

Snippet 64 — देखो मैं सुबह पढ़ने को कोशिश करता हूँ क्योंकि औरतो की दादागरी रहती है। [...] नमाज व्यक्तिगत के लिए है। सुबह पाँच बजे उठ के, काम निपटा के पढ़ो। नमाज एक योग है। [...] तो नमाज का बहाना है और योगा हमारे शरीर के लिए बहुत जरूरी है। ये पूरा एक विज्ञान है। और नमाज का तरीका इसलाम में कताइ है। कि भई इसकी वजह से तुम तुम्हारी body को सही रख सकते हो।

Look, I [only] try to pray in the morning, because my wife insists. [...] Namaz is for personal wellbeing. After you rise at five in the morning and after the work settled, you should pray. Namaz is Yoga. [...] So the pretext of Namaz and of Yoga is very important for our body. It is all science. And like Namaz is the whole Islam. That "look, you should keep your body well".

Snippet 65 — I think that the most important thing about Islam is this whole thing of *equality*. Which is something, which I find is *so* important, you know, and

the place of women [...] those were the things which were very very close to me, in terms of humanity, and loving others and all that. And the most challenging thing is about this whole jihad. How *jihad* is being interpreted by others and also Islam by the Muslims – but this is such a *wonderful* concept of fighting your own egos.

Surprisingly, the word "jihad", which dominates academic and public discourse on Islam and conflict, occurs only this one time in all 19 interviews: as part of an advice to work on own self-improvement (which is, by the way, not a good sign for the academic obsession with this concept). Similarly, if doubting professionals use the term "Islamic behaviour" at all, then to designate an overall ethical orientation, which is functional for societal integration, but not a detailed moral (resembling the famous argument of Böckenförde, 1976, p. 60). Their personal religiosity is neither the rigid framework that faith based actors promote nor the patriarchy from which emancipating women try to escape with the help of secular leaders – but something for which all three types of activists have comparatively little intuition: a spirituality "not attempting assurance about any transcendental a-priori, but more in the romantic sense of a reflexive and thus ironical relation to oneself" (Luhmann, 2000, p. 110; my translation). This is confirmed in the following snippets:

Snippet 66 — That whole thing about Fatwa and do this and there Fatwa and I do that, this is kind of a [pause]. Basically Fatwa is advice, it is not like making a [cross speech] rule, an ethical law and things like that. [...] *So much* we are saying that Islam is connected to *science*. And logic, and way of life and love and all that – so it is such a *beautiful* religion, in terms of if you bring those things in life.

Religion is beautiful when connectable to one's own life: doubting professionals do not just prefer aesthetic over given sets of metaphysical beliefs or authoritative moral commandments – they do so because religion is only credible when related to experience. To find an own relation to religion, which is cleared of anything not coherent with autobiographic integrity, requires considerable inner freedom, not least of community tradition:

Snippet 67 — I am not a *practicing* Muslim, because I have not seen religion in that way. When I was a child I was *absolutely* like three times Namaz, I would never miss Namaz, and so many times going though Quran and all those things. [pause] So, but today I follow my own understanding: I don't *have* to do this, I don't *have* to do Namaz. [...] And now, being a part of that community that I am in, if you go to a mosque, or a tomb, or a Dargah, than I have to wear a *Burqa* [whole-body veil]. So I say: no, I don't want to. I am not going to pretend [...] I visit so many temples, I go to Jain temples, I go to all the beautiful places, you know like to to Sufi places.

In this snippet, an inner freedom in religious affairs becomes visible, which neither of the three other types of interviewees possess. This partly stems from certain characteristics of personality, which will be discussed in the next subsection. But part of it also results from awareness of the empirical variance within Islam. The only convert in my sample explains:

Snippet 68 — शुरुआत करूँ तो, मेरा नाम [name] है। पहले मेरा नाम ये नहीं था। पहले मेरा नाम हुआ हिंदू समाज से। मेरा नाम [name] था। marriage की मुसलिम से, और [...] जब शादी हुई तो इसलाम स्वीकार किया। और मेरा नाम [name] रखा गया। [...] education के दौरान ही love हुआ, पहचान हुई, इंसान अच्छा लगा। उसके ज्यादा detail में नहीं गए और उसके साथ ही स्हादी कर ली court marriage की [...] यहाँ पे आई तो मेरे ससुर मुझसे ज्यादा बातें करते थे कि बेटी इसलाम में ऐसा है कि एक तो मुरति पूजा नहीं होती। जो दिखता नहीं है, वे निसकारी है, उसको हम पूजते हैं। और नमाज इस तरह पढ़ी जाती है, काफी बातें जो ससुर से जब सीखी तो, दरगाहों पे नहीं जाते। क्योंकि [caste name] हैं, ये लोग, पूरंते टोते हैं, न। [...] इसलिये इसलाम में जो लिखी हुई बातें हैं, मैं जितनी जानती हूँ। [...] [लेकिन] मैं [NGO] की भी आभारी हूँ। क्योंकि काफी जगह पे हमको ले गए, काफी जगह अलग अलग लोगों से मुलाकाते हुए। उनके विचार जानते को मिले, उसके द्वारा भी हमको इसलाम और कुरान में क्या है जानने को मिला।

To begin with, my name is [name]. Earlier this was not my name, though. Earlier my name was a Hindu one. My name was [name]. I married a Muslim, and [...] then converted to Islam. And my name became [name]. [...] During my education, I fell in love, met him, we felt that we fit. We did not go into details and quickly went together for a court marriage. [...] When I came to their place, my father in law talked a lot with me, that daughter, in Islam we do not revere an idol. We do not have an image, he, whom we revere, is invisible. And Namaz is read in this way, I learned many things from my father in law. "Do not go to Dargahs"; because these people are [caste name], they are very puristic, right. [...] [Therefore] I know quite a lot about Islam as it is written. [...] [But] I am also thankful to [NGO]. Because with them, we went to many places, and met very different people. We learned about their respective beliefs, and through this we [really] understood what Islam is and what Quran is.

Her last sentence confirms how important and fruitful it is to empirically assess religion (as argued in section 1), something all doubting professionals did. Parallel to their professional discovery of religion, they developed a reflexive, holistic-aesthetical spirituality. This spirituality provides them a symbolic language to express their experience and grounds their demanding work for peace by giving them calm. But it does not include moralistic or metaphysic details, and it remains open to irritations.

Group identification

As in their assessment of religious belief, all doubting professionals emphasize internal complexity and plurality when talking about Muslim communities (something few other interviewees did). And like the professional interest in Islamic teachings personally influenced many of them, a confrontation with group identification after 2002 frequently changed the relation to their community. Not all doubting professionals made both moves, but all did change in at least one dimension of religious identity. An example for group identification:

Snippet 69 — So I have never thought that we should work for Muslims or that because I am a Muslim, I should do something for them, it never occurred to me. [...]

[But] my own identity [...] started surfacing. Which was very dominated before. [...] So I think that identity started surfacing for me and I used to think very strongly about my own community. [...] It started surfacing and I thought: "ya, I am a Muslim and I have some responsibility for this community". [...] The first time I had this. The thought: I have ignored it, and I am not going to ignore it any more. [...] I will do something for them, this is something, this is my moral obligation towards the community. [...] So that is what came to my mind.

This is an example where the new interest in religious beliefsets remained restricted to the professional level, while the group identification side of religious identity became very personal. Because not all doubting professionals reacted with rising groupness, most psychological results remained inconsistent: low and high groupness, optimistic and pessimistic assessment of intergroup relations and all levels of permeability for and resonance in one's surrounding were present among them. The ranking of identification options was equally unclear: women activists and willed non-categorizer were among them as much as those who put religion, caste or language at the first priority. The measure of dominance was comparatively low (cp. figure 13 on page 83), probably reflecting the difficulties doubting professionals experience in the formidable challenge of organizational development. But even in this dimension, the effect is low and rather unreliable. Only one finding was really interpretable: doubting professionals' comparatively *high* tolerance towards ambiguity in all IMA dimensions, especially towards irritations of role models. This in particular separates them from emancipating women, who show *low* tolerance towards ambiguity. Ambivalence as well as ambiguity was forced upon both, but doubting professionals endured it better:

Snippet 70 — You know the *fear* that you have, you know coming from a minority [voice breaks], that [pause] though I was a leader, I could not [pause]. I am sorry — **Interviewer: not at all** — That [pause] even working in that team, where the majority of the team came from the Hin, the majority community. You know from the [pause] [...] I felt that I am a *strong* person and humanity and all that. One felt that – but we became *so* vulnerable. Because suddenly I felt that I wanted to work on this issue [of communal peace], I felt that it was very *important*, you know, to *involve* Muslims, and to work on this whole issue of *conflict* between Hindus and Muslims and even as one did not know how to go about it, it was very important to work on this issue. But I became very, kind of vulnerable, because I wasn't sure how the team was going to respond.

This snippet shows how grammatic constructions break down and how singular, plural and non-designated subjects are all invariably mixed when it comes to the issue of group identification. Like for emancipating women, changes in group identification were psychologically not an easy dynamic for doubting professionals either – but they chose to confront this dynamic because they feel responsible, as a second example, from a Bohra interviewee (a prominent liminal community in Gujarat; cp. section 3.4), indicates:

Snippet 71 — I would like to start by saying that, you know, from where did I get the inspiration. And that is very much me and my family itself, from my mother and my aunt. [...] She was, I mean, she was very very pakka [particular] of her prayers, she never missed any prayer and all that. Even now, she is [age] now. And her – lot of people used to say [name] you don't look like a Muslim. You know since *childhood* I had really heard about that, you know "you don't look like a Muslim". And my mother just used to laugh and say, that well, we all are human beings, so nobody looks like a Hindu or a Muslim. But at times she also used to get very angry and she said: "what do you mean by 'what Muslims have?' Some horns?" [...] This dialogue [in the family] has been more in terms of what *really* the Islam is, you know, what *real* principles of Islam is and what *we* as *we* had known Islam to be and *how* this is practiced, and the worry is that how these practicies, by the clergy, by the women [uncomprehensible word] – *how* that is taking away away, how this is forcing people like *us* to move away from the community. [...] But again, coming back to why I, as an individual, felt so strongly about working on peace [...] felt that just because I was Muslim I did shy away from taking position and did not work for the Muslim community. [...] You know in 2002, you feel that [pause] you feel responsible [emotional breakdown follows; tape stopped for one minute]

On the one hand, doubting professionals' aesthetic-holistic spirituality and their liberal – and in this case also: liminal – background create tensions with orthodox Muslims. On the other hand, and in my opinion even more important, they talk about feeling *responsible* for their ingroup. They do not need group processes for their own psychological stability, but actively chose to work for the benefit of Muslims (which does not exclude working with Hindus) – out of a rather modern, i.e. reflexive feeling of responsibility.




Figure 13: Those dimensions of doubting professionals' psychological test results with a variance considerably and interpretably different from that of other interviewees. Scales are z-standardized and two measures assess differences numerically: Hedges' g is a coefficient for the effect size or *degree* of deviation (values above .2 indicate a medium effect; cp. Hedges, 1981, p. 112ff.), the p-value stems from a non-parametric Wilcoxon test on variance equality, estimating the *clarity* of this deviation (lower values indicate higher clarity; cp. Bortz, 1999, p. 149f.).

6 Conclusion and implications

To conclude my thesis on religious beliefsets, group identification and political behaviour, I shall now return to the initial research question and review the process of answering it. Unlike a mere summary, this review concentrates on presumed and actual weaknesses of my typology and on its broader conceptual implications. In the introduction chapter, I started out with the identification of three shortcomings in prevalent academic approaches to religion and peace: a lack of explorative field studies, an underutilization of identity's explanatory power combined with its insufficient conceptualization, and a biased selection of cases, which ignores Muslims in India (cp. chapter 1). These shortcomings led to the formulation of the research question:

Research question: by exploring political behaviour, religious beliefsets and group identification, I hope to develop a comprehensive understanding of how religious identity (as an abstract categorization *as well as* a psychodynamic process linking oneself to a Muslim community *and* a set of beliefs about God, religion and the world) accounts for biographical anchorage of peace activism and how political behaviour in turn influences dimensions of religious identity. My aim is to hermeneutically extract, separate and characterize different ways of "being Muslim and working for peace", systematically disclosing empirical variance.

Informed by sensitizing concepts from academic literature and based on 19 interviews and socio-psychological tests with Muslim peace activists in Gujarat, I then developed an empirically grounded typology of the relation between dimensions of religious identity and political behaviour. This typology distinguishes four major dynamics in ideal-typical condensation:

Faith based actors are stably influenced by group identification as well as by detailed religious beliefsets. They interpret their activism by dogmatic foils and experience themselves as collective subjects. But behind this uniform facade, considerable internal variance in religio-political orientation, theological thought and ingroup definition shines through.

Secular leaders are to the contrary neither influenced by religious beliefsets nor by group identification dynamics; they were religiously unmusical before as well as after 2002.

Emancipating women overcome the passivity of victimhood through peace activism and increasingly struggle against religious patriarchy. They initially resort to Islamic ethic, but ultimately discard religion – to the psychologically possible extent.

Doubting professionals finally emphasize the complexity and ambivalence of religion in communal conflict; they develop second thoughts about pure instrumentalization hypotheses. Personally, they actively embrace a holistic-aesthetical spirituality and feel responsible for their ingroup without identifying strongly: an unmistakably modern dynamic.

Despite critique on one or the other detail, my research might provoke two rather fundamental objections, which concern the relation between prior design decisions and later outcome as well as the broader relevance of the findings. On the one hand, one can argue that the broad variety of "being Muslim" and "working for peace" circularly results from a lack of substantial definitions of both terms in the first place. On the other hand, "the cynic who comments 'Sez you'" (Silverman, 2005, p. 237) can always question whether explorative case studies are instructive beyond one specific context. Adding to the a-priori justification of the research design in chapters 1 and 4, empirical findings suggest some ex-post arguments to counter both objections.

If one questions the Muslimness of religiously unmusical secular leaders or the peacebuilding qualities of some faith based actors' projects, the typology would shrink by half. Can emancipating womens' private influence on their sisters be called political behaviour? And does everything that faith based actors do lead to peace, including the fundamentalist missionary activity which one of them pursued? While fundamentalism is indeed problematic, the very structure of my empirical findings renders the general objection pointless: the different ways of combining dimensions of religious identity and political behaviour do not coincide with particular ways of working for peace (with the exception that all emancipating women report their own biography as their success story – but even they work in very different projects). Results would therefore probably remain robust even when excluding some interviewees in favour of a narrow definition of legitimate peacebuilding. Still, the typology might actually describe Muslims being active *as such* and not only *for peace* – an option which should be reconsidered in further studies.

While a substantial definition of "working for peace" would probably not influence the typology, a substantial definition of "being Muslim" would make a difference, and above all obstruct the discovery of dynamics in the configurations of dimensions of religious identity and political behaviour. Empirically, secular leaders (whose Muslimness is most likely to be challenged) can become doubting professionals and emancipating women tend to become secular leaders. Social scientists would miss such transitions if they impose their own normative definitions of Muslimness instead of reconstructing the actual use of this category by actors themselves: my a-priori decision to rely on self-categorization proved well chosen despite inherent sponginess.

The second potentially fundamental objection concerns the broader relevance of the typology. Indeed, with a small and non-random sample, I have no possibility to assess its potential of generalization: it might or might not be transferable to other contexts (which is still something else than non-transferability). But the typology has conceptual meta-level implications which are important beyond 19 biographies in Gujarat and provides first empirical suggestions for the necessary concretization and de-essentialization of the ambivalence of the sacred on the micro-level of individual agency (cp. section 3.1). In particular the dynamics of emancipating women and doubting professionals could be instructive to this end, as shall now be discussed in detail.

Religious identities support as much as obstruct the transformation of emancipating women. In an intermediary stage, the ambivalence of the sacred unfolds between internalized feminist ethic and external patriarchal demands. In later stages, religious beliefsets lose influence, but self-categorization remains important: ambivalence now concerns the inner configuration of religious identities (cp. section 5.3). Doubting professionals, on the other hand, actively and explicitly embrace ambivalence in their modern stance on religious identity: they object moral fixation but long for holistic-aesthetical spirituality, and while they do not strongly identify with their ingroup, their self-categorization produces a reflexive feeling of responsibility (cp. section 5.4). Both types show that the ambivalence of the sacred can already be found without even considering violent actors in the sample. While the details of neither type can reliably be generalized (although my findings partly overlap with a typology of Christian and Buddhist social activists developed by Wagner, 2006), the means of identifying them provide some meta-level academic "lessons learned" for future research.

One lesson again concerns the advantage of non-substantial definitions: with too many preassumptions, unexpected varieties of ambivalence might remain undiscovered. Since identity is for both emancipating women and doubting professionals reversely influenced by political behaviour as much as it frames the latter, my research design had to be sensible to dynamics to analyze them, and because this reverse influence is an open-ended process, too many preassumptions would have been obstructive. More general, "a transformation process is always susceptible to [...] political, economic and social power relations in both discourse and institutions" (Buckley-Zistel, 2006, p. 21) – including the power of local as well as academic mainstream which favours a stable and substantial conceptualization of religious identity (cp. chapter 2 and section 3.1). Methodically, narrative interviews turned out to be a particularly useful technique to remain open to unexpected dynamics; in the case of emancipating women they even helped to construct a hypothetical chronology out of momentary insights.

A second lesson is the importance of differentiating several subdimensions of religious identity and integrating them into a comprehensive design. With only group identification in mind, emancipating women would probably appear as strongly ingroup-bound faith based actors, while doubting professionals seem to identify with their ingroup as little as secular leaders. When religious identity would on the other hand only be thought of as a certain set of beliefs, misunderstandings run the other way round. The fact that ambivalence partly unfolds between both subdimensions of identity – as is the case for these two groups of interviewees – becomes only visible when the usual narrow conceptualizations of identity are discarded.

Finally, the different stages of emancipating womens' transformation and the broad diversity among faith based actors suggest to look beyond the mere fact of dogmatic justifications of agency and in particular to use a concise definition of fundamentalism (cp. section 3.2). Only then the diversity in how beliefsets might influence political activism can be adequately analyzed.

Having so far refuted two fundamental objections against design and relevance of this case study and having outlined possible implications for future research, I shall conclude the conclusion by acknowledging actual methodical weaknesses. These in particular concern the psychological indicators, which largely fell short of expectation. The Giessen Test might have been too general (even though it produced interesting findings for Kakar, 1996), identification ranking and intensity scales did not produce enough variety and the Inventory to Measure Ambiguity is only very indirectly related to religious ambivalence. All three instruments did not deliver well interpretable data due to statistical restrictions as well as conceptual weakness. Meanwhile, more explicit models of measurement of religious identity (like those developed by Huber, 2003, 2007) only fit Christian contexts. Consequently, much of the information on group identification actually came from unsystematic hints in the narratives. This topic should have been included more explicitly in the interviews right from the outset, since socio-psychological scales probably imply too "broad generalizations about the psychological impact of group membership [...] [while] a narrative approach to the study of identity and culture restores an earlier commitment [...] to the study of individual lives in context" (Hammack, 2008, p. 223).

While the insufficient operationalization of group identification is the biggest and probably the only shortcoming of my typology, this does not, on the other hand, imply that the same is any big advance either: the relation of "Being Muslim" and "working for peace" demands continued thorough enquiry, in which the reconstruction of faith based actors, secular leaders, emancipating women and doubting professionals can only be a minor comment. Despite all arguments brought forth in this conclusion, the biggest strength of explorative research is still the possibility of thick description, while the scope for theoretical conclusions remains limited. The resulting slowness of research might be particularly disappointing for practitioners, who have to deal with religion and conflict right now. And even though I still consider broad exploration to be necessary, I would have hoped that academia could develop its advice quicker and more reliable (cp. preface). But unfortunately, "hermeneutic [research] is simply a way of seeing and interpreting the world, not an action-plan to change it. [...] Assessing the in-between is all it can do. Nevertheless, it can help us understand if and how boundaries and identities change [in] violent conflict, whether there are any obstacles to this process or whether they contribute to a peaceful future" (Buckley-Zistel, 2006, p. 22). In this sense the actual last word shall be reserved for an interview voice from Gujarat, recorded at the end of a comprehensive conversation:

I wish you have [developed] a better understanding of Islam and you proceed accordingly. [...] Do not look at Islam as the spectacle, from the viewpoint of the West. And you may not look at Islam from the viewpoint of a Muslim. [...] Just look at Islam from a third viewpoint: as what is actually happening. [...] If you are asking me such questions, I am also trying to [pause] see: these are not questions which are there in my mind. But this is also making me think! To think is good.

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
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Appendix: Map of Gujarat with locations of interviews



Source: Wikimedia Foundation
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Map_GujDist_CentralEast.png)

Appendix: NGOs visited for background talks

Individual observers and NGOs only visited for *primary* interviews not listed

Action Aid

Ahmedabad

www.actionaid.org

Gujarat Sarvajani Welfare Trust

Ahmedabad

www.gswt.in

Jan Vikas

Ahmedabad

www.janvikascommunity.net

Safar

Ahmedabad

Samerth Trust

Ahmedabad

www.samerth.org

Ulema-e-Hind

Ahmedabad

www.jamiatulama.org

Yuv Shakti

Halol

www.yuvshakti.net

Behavioral Science Center

Ahmedabad

www.bsc-sxnfes.org

Islamic Relief Committee Gujarat

Ahmedabad

Prashant

Ahmedabad

www.humanrightsindia.in

Sahr Wahru

Ahmedabad

www.sahrwaruindia.org

Sanchetana

Ahmedabad

www.sanchetana.org

Utthan

Ahmedabad

www.utthangujarat.org

Appendix: Interview guidelines

Pillar 1: Biography of activism

Structure: *your* own story, I will mostly listen

Focus: please tell me the story of your political activities in the last 10 years, with a focus on your peace activism

Timeframe: 30 minutes

Please tell me how you became active for peace.

How did 2002 change your political life?

How was your religion or community important for becoming a peace activist?

Please tell me a story where you were successful in campaigning for peace.

बतइये आपने अमन के लिये कार्यकर्ता काम कैसे शुरु किया।

२००२ के साल ने आपका राजनैतिक जीवन कैसे बदला ?

आपका धर्म या आपकी कौम आपका अमन के काम के लिये कैसे महत्वपूर्ण है ?

एक कहानी सुनाइये जिसमें आप अपने अमल के लिये काम में सफल रहे हों

Pillar 2: Religious beliefs

Preface

Structure: your family, you and Islam, your religious life, society and Islam

Important: everybody has own understanding and experience. I am not interested what the Islamic scholarship would answer, but in *your personal* answer.

Timeframe: 30 minutes – please keep answers concise

A. Your family – आपका परिवार

1. Do you speak a lot about religion in your family? क्या आप अपने परिवार में इस्लाम के बारे में बहुत बात करते हैं ?
2. On which aspects of Islam differ the opinions in your family? अपने परिवार के लोग इस्लाम के बारे में किन बातों पर अमहमत हैं ?

B. You and Islam – आप और इस्लाम

1. What is the most important idea in Islam for you? आप के लिये इस्लाम में सब से महत्वपूर्ण क्या है ?
2. When and where did you learn about Islam? आपने इस्लाम के बारे में कब और कहाँ सीखा ?
3. To what community in Islam do you belong? (Sunni, Shia?) इस्लाम में आप किस संप्रदाय से हैं? (सुन्नी, शिआ ?)

C. Your beliefs and praxis – आपके विश्वास और आपके अमल

1. Do you doubt whether some behaviour are Islamic or not? Which are these? क्या आपको ऐसा लगता है कि कोई व्यवहार इस्लाम के अनुसार है और कोई व्यवहार इस्लाम के अनुसार नहीं है? ऐसे कौन से व्यवहार हैं?
2. Do you do the prayers? What do you feel then? क्या आप नमाज़ पढ़ते हैं? तब आपको कैसा लगता है?
3. When do you visit the mosque? आप मस्जिद कब जाते हैं?
4. Do you visit saint tombs? When? क्या आप दरगाह जाते हैं? कब?
5. Which festivals and Eids do you usually celebrate? आप ईद और दुसरे कौन से त्यौहार मनाते हैं?
6. Do you visit temples or churches? क्या आप मन्दिर और चर्च जाते हैं?
7. Should Islam be adapted to "modern times"? How / Why not? क्या इस्लाम को आधुनिक समय के लिये बदलना चाहिये? कैसे। क्यों नहीं?
8. What happens after you die? (How will god judge you?) मौत के बाद इन्सान का क्या होत है? (अल्लाह आपको कैसे आंकेगे?)

D. Society and Islam – समाज और इस्लाम

1. How did your perception of Hindu and Muslim communities change after 2002? २००२ के बाद, आपकी नज़रियाँ हिंदू समाज के ऊपर या मुसलिम समाज के ऊपर कैसे बदला?
2. What are the duties of Islam and what are those of the state? इस्लाम के कर्तव्य और सरकार के कर्तव्य क्या हैं?
3. Who should decide about religious issues? How? मज़हबी मसलों में किसकी बात मानी जाती है? कैसे?
4. Should sharia be a source of legislation? The only source? क्या कानून शारिआ के अनुसार बनना चाहिये? सिर्फ़ शारिआ के अनुसार?
5. Should there be different regulations for Muslims vs. other people – in India, in countries with majority Muslims? क्या मुस्लिम के लिये और दुसरे लोग के लिये अलग अलग कानून होने चाहिये? भारत में? दुसरे देशों में जहाँ मुस्लिम लोग ज्यादा हैं?

Your questions? Thank you!

Appendix: Questionnaire (English)

In accordance with the licence requirements of the socio-psychological tests, these instruments can't be given verbatim. Therefore only the second (middle) part of the questionnaire is reproduced here.

Part two: you and your community

Following, we would like you to rank different possibilities to describe yourself. We give you five possible ways; please number them with one to five, with one being what is most important for your self-description and five being the least important way to think about yourself.

- _____ I am a men / I am a women
- _____ I belong to a specific caste or caste-group
- _____ I am a Muslim rather than a Hindu
- _____ I am an Indian citizen
- _____ I speak Gujarati / Hindi / English as my mother tongue

Each of the following questions is phrased as a statement with which you might agree or disagree. You have six possible answers – please tick the answer which best describes your attitudes to the given statement. For example, if the statement is "I think Gujarat is a nice place to live", and if you really like it, please tick "agree fully". If you are, on the contrary, doubtful, please tick "disagree somewhat".

		<i>agree fully</i>	<i>agree</i>	<i>rather agree</i>	<i>rather disagree</i>	<i>disagree</i>	<i>disagree fully</i>
1 I feel good about being a member of the Muslim community	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2 My own fate is strongly connected with my communities well-being	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3 Hindu-Muslim relations will improve in next 10 years	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4 Being a member of the Muslim community is important to me	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5 I would welcome an opportunity to work for the Muslim community	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6 Hindus and Muslims often compete for jobs and power	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7 I sometimes wish I would belong to another community	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8 If the Muslim community suffers, I suffer as well	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9 I think I am a good Muslim	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Appendix: Questionnaire (Hindi)

In accordance with the licence requirements of the socio-psychological tests, these instruments can't be given verbatim. Therefore only the second (middle) part of the questionnaire is reproduced here.

दूसरा भाग – आप और आपका कौम

स्वम के बारे में बताने के लिये नीचे पाँच सम्भावनाएँ हैं। एक से पाँच अंक को काम में लाइये और सबसे महत्वपूर्ण से सबसे कम महत्वपूर्ण बात पर अंक लगाइये।

- _____ मैं पुरुष हूँ / मैं स्त्री हूँ
 _____ मैं किसी विशिष जाति का हूँ
 _____ मैं मुसलमान हूँ, हिन्दू नहीं हूँ
 _____ मैं भारत का नागरिक हूँ
 _____ मेरी मात्रभाषा गुजराती / हिंदी / अंग्रेजी है

नीचे कुछ वाक्य हैं जिसके द्वारा आपको सवाल पूछे गये हैं जिनसे आप सहमत या असहमत हो सकते हैं।
 छः सम्भावित जवाब हैं। आपको उस जवाब पर निशान लगाना है जो आपके विचार या दृष्टिकोण को चित्रित करता है। मसलन, यह वाक्य लीजिए "मेरी राय में गुजरात रहने के लिये अच्छी जगह है।" अगर आप पूरी तरह से सहमत हैं तो "काफ़ी सहमत" पर निशान लगाइये। अगर आप अनिश्चित हैं तो "कुछ असहमत" पर निशान लगाइये।

	काफ़ी सहमत	सहमत	कुछ सहमत	कुछ असहमत	असहमत	काफ़ी असहमत
१ मुस्लिम कौम का सदस्य होना मुझको पसंद है	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
२ मेरे भाग्य मेरी कौम की खुशहाली से जुड़ा हुआ है	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
३ अगले दस साल में मुस्लिम – हिंदू संबंध सुधरेगे	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
४ मुस्लिम कौम का सदस्य होना मेरे लिये महत्वपूर्ण है	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
५ मुस्लिम कौम के लिये काम करने का अवसर मुझको पसंद होगा	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
६ हिंदू और मुसलमन काम और प्रभाव के लिये प्रतिस्पर्धा करते हैं	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
७ कभी कभी मैं चाहता हूँ कि मैं दुसरी कौम का सदस्य हो सकता हूँ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
८ अगर मुस्लिम कौम को तकलीफ़ होती है तो मुझे भी होती है	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
९ मुझे लगता है कि मैं एक अच्छा मुस्लिम हूँ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Appendix: Form of informed consent (English)

Headline: addresses of both me and School for International Training, Jaipur

Informed Consent

The following information should inform you about this study's purpose, the possible consequences of your participation and your rights as interviewee. With this study, we try to find out what role the religion of young Muslim peace activists in Gujarat plays for their activism. Basically, the question is: how far is your activism influenced by your relation to your community or by your religious ideas? We pursue this study to better understand the ways in which religion and peace can interact and to give better advice how to design interventions in communal conflict to promote peace.

For our study, we will ask you three sets of questions, covering your history as an activist (how and when did you became active for peace?), your relation to your community (how do you interact with people and do you see yourself as belonging to certain communities?) and finally your religious ideas (how do you think about Allah, the world and about how one should behave). The whole interview should not take more than one hour.

Your participation in this study is absolutely voluntary. You have all rights to decide whether you want to participate at all and to what extent you want to share personal information. You can always, even after the interview begins, opt to end your participation or not to answer certain questions. This will have no disadvantage for you.

Unless you yourself request to be named, all data will be fully anonymized and stored encrypted with only the researcher and his academic supervisor having access, the latter only to the anonymized version. This form itself is kept locked at all times and is only accessible to the researcher himself and the institutional review board of his university.

The NGO Jan Vikas and its youth movement for peace, Yuv Shakti, help us in facilitating the research. Nevertheless, they have at no time access to any data or personal contact information. They will in no way be informed whether you participated in our study or what you said. Because our knowledge of Hindi and Gujarati is limited, we also have to make use of an interpreter. This interpreter is obliged by contract and applicable law to maintain anonymity. However, if you feel uncomfortable with the interpreter but would otherwise want to participate in our study, we can meet without his assistance.

If you have any questions related to our study or your rights as interviewee, feel free to contact one of us, at any time. We hope that you are willing to participate and help us to develop a better understanding of how religion can play a role for peace.

Mr Raphael Susewind

Interviewee

Mr Azim Khan

Appendix: Form of informed consent (Hindi)

Headline: addresses of both me and School for International Training, Jaipur

सहमति

हम इस सुचना से आपको बताना चाहते हैं हमारे अनुसंधान का लक्ष्य क्या है, आपकी शिरकत के परिणाम क्या हों और इस अनुसंधान में आपके अधिकार क्या हैं। इस अध्ययन द्वारा हम मालूम करने का प्रयत्न कर रहे हैं कि गुजरात में युवा मुस्लिम जो शांति के लिये कार्य कर रहे हैं उनके कार्य में उनके धर्म का क्या महत्त्व है। मूल सवाल यह है कि आपका शांति का काम आपके मजहबी विचारों से व आप के कौम से संबंध से किस तरह प्रभावित होता है। यह अध्ययन हम धर्म और शांति के आपसी संबंध को समझने के लिये कर रहे हैं जिसे कौमी संघर्ष के समय कैसे कदम उठाये जिस से शांति व अमन स्थापित हो।

हमारे अध्ययन के लिये हम आप से तीन तरह के प्रश्न पूछेंगे जो आपके अमन के लिये कार्यकर्ता बनने के बारे में है (आप कब और कैसे अमन के लिये कार्यकर्ता बनने?), आपके आपनी कौम से संबंध (आप दूसरे लोगों से कैसे व्यवहार करते हैं और आप अपने को खास कौम से संबंधित मानते हैं?) और आपके धर्म के प्रति विचार (आप अल्लाह के बारे में कैसे सोचते हैं, दुनिया के बारे में कैसे सोचते हैं और अंत में इन्सान के साथ कैसे व्यवहार करना चाहिये?) इस पूरे साक्षात्कार में करीब एक घंटे का समय लगेगा।

इस अध्ययन में आपका भाग लेना पूरी तरह आपकी मर्जी पर है। आपको अधिकार है यह तय करने का कि आप इस में भाग लेना चाहते हैं या नहीं और किस हद तक आप अपने बारे में जानकारी देना चाहते हैं। आप कभी भी (साक्षात्कार के बाद भी) यह तय कर सकते हैं कि आप आगे इसमें भाग नहीं लेंगे व आप कुछ प्रश्नों के उत्तर नहीं देंगे। इससे आपको कोई हानि नहीं होगी। जब तक आप न चाहें तब तक आपके जवाब गोपनीय रखे जाएंगे जो सिर्फ शोधकर्ता व उसके सलाहकार को उपलब्ध होंगे। यहाँ तक कि सलाहकार को बिना नाम का रूपान्तर उपलब्ध होगा। जो फ़ॉर्म हम काम में ले रहे हैं वह ताले में सुरक्षित रहेगा और वह सिर्फ अध्ययनकर्ता और विश्वविद्यालय की निरिक्षण समिति को ही उपलब्ध होगा।

इस शोध में हमारी सहायता "जन विकास" और इसकी शांति के लिये युवा मोर्चा "युव शक्ति" कर रहे हैं। हालाँकि इसका डाटा या आपका निजी विवरण उनको किसी समय भी उपलब्ध नहीं होंगे। यहाँ तक कि उनको यह भी पता नहीं लगेगा कि इस अध्ययन में साशलय या आपने क्या कहा। क्योंकि हिंदी और गुजराती का हमारा ज्ञान सीमित है, इसलिये हमें दुभाषिये की मदद लेनी पड़ती है। दुभाषिये पर कानून और अनुबंध से यह पाबंदी है कि वह आपके नाम को गोपनीय रखे। फिर भी अगर दुभाषिये की मौजूदगी से आप को आपत्ति हो और इस अध्ययन में भाग लेना भी चाहते हों तो हम उसकी सहायता के बिना भी मिल सकते हैं।

अगर हमारे अध्ययन या साक्षात्कारी के तौर पर आपके कोई प्रश्न हों तो किसी भी वक्त, बिना किसी हिचकिचाहट के हम से मिल सकते हैं। हम आशा करते हैं कि आप अध्ययन में भाग लेने के इच्छुक हैं और उसको अच्छी तरह समझने में आप हमारी मदद करना चाहते हैं।

श्री रफ़एल सूजेविन्द

साक्षात्कारी

श्री अजीम खान


Appendix: Intermediary analysis of psychological scales

Intercorrelation matrix

Correlations are given as Pearson's r; higher ones (above .5, a contingent dividing line) are printed in boldface.

	New	Conflict	Religion	Nationality	Language	Caste	Gender	Dominance	Permeability	Resonance	Ingroup	Intergroup
New	0.18											
Conflict	0.53	0.18										
Religion	0.46	0.77	0.32									
Nationality	-0.24	0.56	0.40	0.29								
Language	-0.08	0.34	-0.32	-0.36	0.15							
Caste	-0.36	-0.27	-0.34	-0.34	0.56	-0.17						
Gender	0.05	-0.58	-0.48	-0.10	-0.31	-0.17	0.15					
Dominance	-0.37	-0.37	-0.28	-0.07	0.04	0.40	0.15	0.40				
Permeability	0.08	-0.66	-0.26	-0.34	-0.40	0.15	0.04	-0.66	-0.12			
Resonance	0.48	0.44	0.59	0.08	0.17	-0.17	-0.26	0.08	0.01	0.01		
Ingroup	-0.15	0.10	0.10	0.25	-0.09	-0.28	0.28	0.42	0.29	-0.22	0.01	
Intergroup	-0.21	0.06	0.00	-0.02	0.03	0.14	-0.49	0.42	0.29	-0.22	0.01	0.90
Depersonal	-0.31	0.03	-0.05	0.34	-0.21	-0.37	0.16	0.11	-0.17	-0.17	0.18	0.18

IMA cluster solution



GT and intensity cluster solution

