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Titel:The ECB's Independence under Siege - Political Audience Cost Theory and Unconventional Monetary Policy
Autor:Börner, Julian Nikolaus
Weitere Beteiligte: Zimmermann, Hubert (Prof. Dr.)
Veröffentlicht:2016
URI:https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/diss/z2016/0477
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-z2016-04772
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17192/z2016.0477
DDC:320 Politik
Publikationsdatum:2017-03-06
Lizenz:https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC-NC/1.0/

Dokument

Schlagwörter:
ECB, Einflussnahme, Geldpolitik, Unabhängigkeit, Europäische Zentralbank, Unconventional Monetary Policy, Political Audience Cost

Summary:
Since the beginning of the global financial crisis in the fall of 2008, the European Central Bank (ECB) and other central banks around the world have reached far beyond classical monetary policy in order to prevent the collapse of the financial system. Today, several years after any immediate risk of financial collapse has passed and despite the questionable track record of unconventional monetary policy, monetary policy has still not normalized, leaving us wondering why the ECB continues to engage in unconventional monetary policy. Applying the Audience Cost Theory, this dissertation shows that the ECB is indeed susceptible to external audience groups’ monetary policy preferences. The analysis shows that these preferences are a good indicator of actual ECB policy-making between 2007 and 2014, as for the majority of the time period covered, the ECB’s refinancing rate moved in line with the average Eurozone monetary policy preference.

Zusammenfassung:
Seit dem Beginn der globalen Finanzkrise im Herbst 2008 haben die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) sowie andere Zentralbanken auf der ganzen Welt die engen Grenzen konventioneller Geldpolitik überschritten um einen Zusammenbruch des Finanzsystems zu verhindern. Heute, Jahre nachdem die unmittelbare Gefahr eines Zusammenbruchs abgewendet wurde und trotz der bisher fragwürdigen Erfolgsbilanz unkonventioneller Geldpolitik, gibt es immer noch keine Anzeichen einer "Normalisierung" der Geldpolitik durch die EZB. Dies führt zu der Frage, warum sich die EZB weiterhin auf unkonevntionelle Gedpolitik stützt. Unter Anwendung der Public Audience Cost Theorie zeigt diese Dissertation, dass die EZB in der Tat anfällig ist für die geldpolitischen Präferenzen gesellschaftlicher Gruppen. Die Analyse zeigt, dass die ermittelten Präferenzen ein guter Indikator für die tatsächliche EZB-Politik zwischen 2007 und 2014 ist. Über weite Teile des Zeitraums bewegte sich der EZB-Refinanzierungssatz im Einklang mit dem Durchschnitt der von gesellschaftlichen Gruppen in der Eurozone präferierten Geldpolitik.

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