Publikationsserver der Universitätsbibliothek Marburg
Titel:Political Leaders´ Characteristics, Voters´ Preferences, and Fiscal Policy
Autor:Neumeier, Florian
Weitere Beteiligte: Hayo, Bernd (Prof. Dr.)
Veröffentlicht:2015
URI:https://archiv.ub.uni-marburg.de/diss/z2015/0151
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17192/z2015.0151
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:04-z2015-01515
DDC: Wirtschaft
Titel (trans.):Studien zur Fiskalpolitik: Die Interessen politischer Entscheidungsträger und der Wähler
Publikationsdatum:2015-03-09
Lizenz:https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC-NC/1.0/

Dokument

Schlagwörter:
public debt, Kollektiventscheidung, fiscal policy, debt brake, leadership, Finanzpolitik, Politische Ökonomie, socioeconomic status, Fiskalpolitik

Summary:
Die vorliegende Arbeit lässt sich in zwei Teile gliedern. Im ersten Teil wird die Beziehung zwischen der sozioökonomischen Herkunft politischer Entscheidungsträger und der fiskal- und wirtschaftspolitischen Performanz der Regierungen, die sie leiten, empirisch untersucht. Grundlage des zweiten Teils bildet eine repräsentative Bevölkerungsbefragung, in welcher die Einstellungen der deutschen Bevölkerung zu verschiedenen finanzpolitischen Themen analysiert werden.

Bibliographie / References

  1. Niskanen, W. A. (1971), Bureaucracy and representative government, Chicago: Aldine.
  2. White, H. (1980), A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity, Econometrica 48, 817–838.
  3. Alesina, A. and La Ferrara, E. (2005), Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities, Journal of Public Economics 89, 897–931.
  4. Shapiro, M. D. and Slemrod, J. (2001), Consumer response to tax rebates, NBER Working Paper 8672.
  5. Barro, R. (1979), On the determination of public debt, Journal of Political Economy 87, 940– 971.
  6. Angeletos, G.-M., Laibson, D., Repetto, A., Tobacman, J., and Weinberg, S. (2001), The hyperbolic consumption model: Calibration, simulation, and empirical evaluation, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 47–68.
  7. Lizzeri, A. and Persico, N. (2001), The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives, American Economic Review 91, 225–239.
  8. Valev, N. (2004), No pain, no gain: Market reform, unemployment, and politics in Bulgaria. Journal of Comparative Economics 32, 409–425.
  9. Alesina, A. and Ardagna, S. (2010), Large changes in fiscal policy: Taxes versus spending, Tax Policy and the Economy 24(1), 35⎼68.
  10. Cukierman, A. and Meltzer, A. H. (1989), A political theory of government debt and deficits in a neo-Ricardian framework, American Economic Review 79, 713–732.
  11. Rodrik, D. (1996), Understanding economic policy reform, Journal of Economic Literature 34, 9–41.
  12. Ainslie, G. (1975), Specious reward: A behavioral theory of impulsiveness and impulse control, Psychological Bulletin 82, 463–496.
  13. Leigh, P. J. (1986), Accounting for tastes: Correlates of risk and time preferences, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 9, 17–31.
  14. Welch, S. (1985), The 'more for less' paradox: Public attitudes on taxing and spending, Public Opinion Quarterly 49, 310–316.
  15. Blekesaune, M. and Quadagno, J. (2003), Public attitudes toward welfare state policies: A comparative analysis of 24 nations, European Sociological Review 19, 415–427.
  16. Clark, D. E. and Cosgrove, J. E. (1990), Hedonic prices, identification, and the demand for public safety, Journal of Regional Science 30, 105–121.
  17. Lunt, P. K. and Livingstone, S. M. (1991), Everyday explanations for personal debt: A network approach, British Journal of Social Psychology 30, 309–323.
  18. Stix, H. (2013), Does the broad public want to consolidate public debt? The role of fairness and of policy credibility, Kyklos 66, 102–129.
  19. Laibson, D. (1997), Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 443–477.
  20. Becker, G. S. and Mulligan, C. B. (1997), The endogenous determination of time preference, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 729–758.
  21. Brender, A. and Drazen, A. (2008), How do budget deficits and economic growth affect reelection prospects? Evidence from a large panel of countries, American Economic Review 98, 2203–2220.
  22. Guichard, S., Kennedy, M., Wurzel, E. and André, C. (2007), What promotes fiscal consolidation: OECD country experiences, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 553.
  23. Walstad, W. B. (1997), The effect of economic knowledge on public opinion on economic issues, Journal of Economic Education 28, 195–205.
  24. Mueller, E. (1963), Public attitudes toward fiscal programs, Quarterly Journal of Economics 77, 210–235.
  25. Peltzman, S. (1992), Voters as fiscal conservatives, Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 327–361.
  26. Rogoff, K. and Sibert, A. (1988), Elections and macroeconomic policy cycles, Review of Economic Studies 55, 1–16.
  27. Alesina, A. and Tabellini, G. (1990), A positive theory of fiscal deficits and government debt, Review of Economic Studies 57, 403–414.
  28. Hansen, J. M. (1998), Individuals, institutions, and public preferences over public finance, American Political Science Review 92, 513–531.
  29. Persson, T. and Svensson, L. E. O. (1989), Why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit: Policy with time-inconsistent preferences, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, 324–345.
  30. Blinder, A. S. and Krueger, A. B. (2004), What does the public know about economic policy, and how does it know it? Brookings Papers in Economic Activity 1, 327–397.
  31. Perotti, R. (2011), The 'austerity myth': Gain without pain? mimeo, Bocconi University.
  32. Shiller, R. J., Boycko, M., and Korobov, V. (1991), Popular attitudes toward free markets: The Soviet Union and the United States compared, American Economic Review 81, 385– 400.
  33. Hallerberg, M. and von Hagen, J. (1999), Electoral institutions, cabinet negotiations, and budget deficits in the European Union, in: Poterba, J. M. and von Hagen, J. (eds.), Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 265–300.
  34. Drazen, A. (2000), Political economy in macroeconomics, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  35. Afonso, A. and Furceri, D. (2010), Government size, composition, volatility and economic growth, European Journal of Political Economy 26, 517–532.
  36. Fölster, S. and Henrekson, M. (2001), Growth effects of government expenditure and taxation in rich countries, European Economic Review 45, 1501–1520.
  37. Blinder, A. S. and Holtz-Eakin, D. (1984), Public opinion and the balanced budget, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 74, 144–149.
  38. Besley, T. and Coate, S. (1991), Public provision of private goods and the redistribution of income, American Economic Review 81, 979–984.
  39. Barro, R. J. (1990), Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth, Journal of Political Economy 98, 103–125.
  40. Jacoby, W. G. (1994), Attitudes toward government spending, American Journal of Political Science 38, 336–361.
  41. De Haan, J., Moessen, W., and Volkerink, B. (1999), Budgetary procedures aspects and changes: New evidence for some European countries, in: Poterba, J. M. and von Hagen, J. (eds.), Fiscal institutions and fiscal performance, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 265–300.
  42. Hayo, B. and Neumeier, F. (2013), Public attitudes toward fiscal consolidation: Evidence from a representative German population survey, MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series 51-2013.
  43. Alesina, A. and Bayoumi, T. (1996), The costs and benefits of fiscal rules: Evidence from US states, NBER Working Paper No. 5614.
  44. Alesina, A., Favero, C., and Giavazzi, F. (2012), The output effects of fiscal adjustments, NBER Working Paper 18336.
  45. Trommsdorf, G. (1983), Future orientation and socialization, International Journal of Psychology 18, 381–406.
  46. Meltzer, A. H. and Richard, S. F. (1981), A rational theory of the size of government, Journal of Political Economy 89, 914–927.
  47. Fidrmuc, J. (2000), Political support for reforms: Economics of voting in transition countries, European Economic Review 44, 1491–1513.
  48. Huber, B. and Runkel, M. (2008), Hyperbolic discounting, public debt and balanced budget rules, Scottish Journal of Political Economy 55, 543–560.
  49. Buchanan, J. M. and Wagner, R. E. (1977), Democracy in deficit: The political legacy of Lord Keynes, New York: Academic Press.
  50. Musgrave, R. A. (1959), The theory of public finance, New York: McGraw-Hill.
  51. Thaler, R. H. and Shefrin, H. M. (1981), An economic theory of self-control, Journal of Political Economy 89, 392–406.
  52. Huckley, G. C. and Harbour, G. (1983), Revealed preferences between public expenditures and taxation cuts: Public sector choice, Journal of Public Economics 22, 387–399.
  53. Lea, S. E. G., Webley, P., and Walker, C. M. (1995), Psychological factors in consumer debt: Money management, economic socialization, and credit use, Journal of Economic Psychology 16, 681–701.
  54. Corneo, G. and Grüner, H. P. (2002), Individual preferences for political redistribution, Journal of Public Economics 83, 83–107.
  55. Warner, A. M. (2001), Is economic reform popular at the polls? Russia 1995, Journal of Comparative Economics 29, 448–465.

* Das Dokument ist im Internet frei zugänglich - Hinweise zu den Nutzungsrechten
© UB Marburg 1997 - 2024 Universitätsbibliothek Marburg