Dokument

Summary:
In the Mekong Delta of Cambodia and Vietnam, property rights on water and land change with the seasonally occurring flood. Land is usually cultivated on an individual basis with people holding at least private use rights to the parcels. In contrast, water is a public good and as soon as water covers the individual plots, the streams, lakes and reservoirs are legally accessed by many households using the water for many different purposes. Actually, during wet season, an open access to the water resources is found as the water use is not restricted, meaning that de facto there are no rules in place that govern the water use. This thesis focuses on the institutional arrangements that influence the management of land, water and fisheries in the region. It is assessed how property rights influence the natural resource use and how collective action can contribute to the sustainable management of land and water. The research was conducted in a community-based fish culture project that functions as a reference frame. This aquaculture project was implemented in the Mekong region by the WorldFish Center from 2005 until 2010. The aim was to test, whether community-based aquaculture can increase the food security of local communities. The thesis also addresses the question whether such a community-based approach can be successfully introduced in the described complex system of property rights. The underlying theories for this dissertation are New Institutional Economics and Game theory. As a framework for the analysis the Institutional Analysis and Design Framework (Ostrom 2005b) is used. Further, the dissertation draws upon findings from other scholars in the realm of public goods and common-pool resources. The research uses as a mixed methods approach and contains qualitative as well as quantitative results. In four case study sites, action research was conducted along with the aquaculture project implementation. Further, a socio-economic survey was implemented, providing information about different livelihood aspects of a large amount of households. Based on the findings of both these methods, hypotheses in regard to resource users’ behaviour towards natural resources were elaborated. Those were then tested using the methods of experimental economics. The implementation of the community-based project faced several challenges and the pilot phase was discontinued by most of the villages. The results presented in this thesis show that reasons for this cannot be seen in the low willingness for cooperation of participants, but rather in the underlying property rights on natural resources. Due to a missing legal base as well as other informal regulations, the project members had no possibility to exclude other local users from the project sites and thus to protect their investments in material and fingerlings. Recommendations mainly focus on the decentralisation of land and water management in the region.

Bibliographie / References

1. Fehr, E. and B. Rockenbach (2003). "Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism." Nature 422: 137-140.
2. Williamson, O. E. (2000). "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead." Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII: 595-613.
3. Levati, M. V., M. Sutter and E. Van der Heijden (2007). "Leading by example in a public goods experiment with heterogeneity and incomplete information." Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(5): 793-818.
4. Hadfield, G. K. (2005). The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments. Handbook of New Institutional Economics. C. Ménard and M. M. Shirley. AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Springer: 175-203.
5. Ménard, C. (2005). An New Institutional Approach to Organization. Handbook of New Institutional Economics. C. Ménard and M. M. Shirley. AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Springer: 281-318.
6. Rousseau, D. M., S. B. Sitkin, R. S. Burt and C. Camerer (1998). "Introduction to Special Topic Forum. Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust." Academy of Management Review 23(3): 393-404.
7. Demsetz, H. (1967). "Toward a theory of property rights." American Economic Review 57: 347-359.
8. Field, A. J. (1984). "Microeconomics, Norms, and Rationality." Economic Development and Cultural Change 32(4): 683-711.
9. Di Gregorio, M., K. Hagedorn, M. Kirk, B. Korf, N. McCarthy, R. Meinzen-Dick and B. Swallow (2008). "Property Rights, Collective Action, and Poverty: The Role of Institutions for Poverty Reduction." Capri Working Paper 81.
10. Hodgson, G. M. (2004b). "Reclaiming habit for institutional economics." Journal of Economic Psychology 25(5): 651-660.
11. MSN Encarta (2009). "Map of Mekong (river), Asia." Retrieved 23.02.2009, from http://encarta.msn.com/map_701514607/mekong.html.
12. Erlei, M., M. Leschke and D. Sauerland (2007). Neue Institutionenökonomik. Stuttgart, Germany, Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag.
13. Schlager, E. and E. Ostrom (1992). "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis." Land Economics 68(3): 249-262.
14. Isaac, R. M. and J. M. Walker (1988). "Communication and Free-Riding Behavior -the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism." Economic Inquiry 26(4): 585-608.
15. Straffin, P. D. (1980). "The Prisoner's Dilemma." UMAP Journal 1: 102-103.
16. Siegfried, T. (2006). A beautiful math : John Nash, game theory, and the modern quest for a code of nature. Washington, D.C., Joseph Henry Press.
17. Ostrom, E. (1998). "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action." American Political Science Review 92(1): 1-22.
18. Marshall, G. (1998). A dictionary of sociology. New York, Oxford University Press. xxv
19. Howe, K. R. (1988). "Against the quantitative-qualitative incompatability thesis, or, Dogmas die hard." Educational Researcher 17: 10-16.
20. Crawford, S. and E. Ostrom (1995). "A grammar of institutions." American Political Science Review 89: 582-600.
21. Vanhan, H. (2004). Agriculture in the Wetlands of Cambodia. Wetlands Management in Cambodia: Socioeconomic, Ecological, and Policy Perspectives. M. Torell, A. M. Salamanca and B. D. Ratner.
22. Mayer, R. C., J. H. Davis and F. D. Schoorman (1995). "An Integrative Model of Organisational Trust." Academy of Management Review 20(3): 709-734.
23. Flick, U. (2006). An introduction to qualitative research. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif., Sage Publications.
24. Dey, M. M., N. Sheriff and T. Björndal (2006). "Aquaculture Development in Asia: Current Status, Economics and Future Outlook." SNF Working Paper 42/06.
25. Ostrom, V. (1980). "Artisanship and Artifact." Public Administration Review 40(4): 309-317. xxvii Ostrom, V. and E. Ostrom (1977). Public Goods and Public Choices. Alternatives for Delivering Public Services: Toward Improved Performance. E. S. Savas. Boulder, CO, Westview Press: 7-49.
26. Strauss, A. L. and J. M. Corbin (1998). Basics of qualitative research. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications: xiii, 312 p.
27. Norlund, I. (2007). "Civil Society in Vietnam. Social Organisations and Approaches to New Concepts." Asien 105: 68-90.
28. Meinzen-Dick, R. and A. Knox (1999). Collective Action, Property Rights, and Devolution of Natural Resource Management: A Conceptual Framework. International Conference on Collective Action, Property Rights and Devolution of Natural Resource Management: Exchange of Knowledge and Implication for Policy, Puerto Azul, The Philippines, Zentralstelle für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (ZEL). Food and Agriculture and Development Centre.
29. Sandler, T. (1992). Collective Action: Theory and application, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
30. Ostrom, E. and J. Walker (1991). Communications in a Commons: Cooperation without External Enforcement. Laboratory Research in Political Economy. T. R. Palfrey. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press: 287-322.
31. Farmer Water User Community (FWUC) (2004). Community By-Law: Farmer Water User Community -Ton Lop Irrigation Scheme, Cambodia.
32. Heng, K. and S. Pich (2008a). Constraints on the Process of Fish Culture Group Forming in Potamom and Thnal Kaeng, Prey Veng Province. Phnom Penh, Fisheries Administration.
33. Libecap, G. (1989). Contracting for Property Rights. Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University Press.
34. Sauermann, H. (1967). Contributions to experimental economics. Tübingen, Mohr-Siebeck, Tübingen.
35. Sally, D. (1995). "Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas -a Metaanalysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992." Rationality and Society 7(1): 58-92.
36. Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2000). "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments." American Economic Review 90(4): 980-994.
37. Isaac, R. M. and J. M. Walker (1991). Costly communication: An experiment in a nested public goods problem. Laboratory Research in Political Economy. T. Palfrey. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
38. Ostrom, E., J. Walker and R. Gardner (1992). "Covenants With and Without a Sword -Self- Governance Is Possible." American Political Science Review 86(2): 404-417.
39. Heng, K. (2007). CPW35-Community-Based Fish Culture in Seasonal Floodplains. Cambodia Record Sheet. Phnom Penh, Fisheries Administration.
40. Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1997). "Does Social Capital have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation." Quarterly Journal of Economics 52(4): 1251-1287.
41. Kähkönen, S. (1999). Does Social Capital Matter in Water and Sanitation Delivery? A Review of Literature. Social Capital Initiative Working Paper. Washington, DC, The World Bank. Social Development Family. Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network. 9.
42. Ostrom, E. (2005a). Doing Institutional Analysis. Digging Deeper Than Markets and Hierarchies. Handbook of New Institutional Economics. C. Ménard and M. M. Shirley. AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Springer: 819-848.
43. Heng, K. and S. Pich (2008b). Draft Annual Progress Report. Community-based Fish Culture in Seasonal Floodplains and Irrigation Systems (CP35). Phnom Penh, Fisheries Administration. xxiii
44. Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) (2001a). Draft Fisheries Law. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, Royal Government of Cambodia.
45. Heng, K. and S. Pich (2008c). Draft Report on Biological Work. Community-based Fish Culture in Seasonal Floodplains and Irrigation Systems (CP35). Phnom Penh, Fisheries Administration.
46. Tracer (2005). "'Economic man' in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small- scale socities." Behavioral And Brain Sciences 28.
47. Hodgson, G. M. (1988). Economics and institutions: a manifesto for a modern institutional economics. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press.
48. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (2001). Enhancing Ownership and Sustainability. A Resource Book on Participation. Phillippines and India, International Fund for Agricultural Development.
49. Weingart, A. and M. Kirk (2008). "Escaping Poverty Traps? Collective Action and Property Rights In Post-War Rural Cambodia." Capri Working Paper 89.
50. Marczyk, G. R., D. DeMatteo and D. Festinger (2005). Essentials of research design and methodology. Hoboken, N.J., John Wiley & Sons.
51. Kirk, M. and N. D. A. Tuan (2009). Exiting from Collective Agriculture: Land-tenure reform in Vietnam. Millions Fed. Proven Successes in Agricultural Development. D. J. Spielman and R.
52. Roberts, L. (1983). Experimental methods: problems of design and ethics. An Introduction to Social Research. A Handbook of Social Science Methods. R. B. Smith. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Ballinger Publishing Company. 1: 325-363.
53. Marwell, G. and R. E. Ames (1979). "Experiments on the Provision of Public-Goods: 1. Resources, Interest, Group-Size, and the Free-Rider Problem." American Journal of Sociology 84(6): 1335-1360.
54. Hardin, G. (1998). "Extension of The Tragedy of the Commons " Science 289(5364): 682-683.
55. Harrison, G. W. and J. A. List (2004). "Field Experiments." Journal of Economic Literature XLII: 1009-1055.
56. Sour, K. and V. Hav (2004). Fisheries and Aquaculture in Cambodia's Wetland Environment.
57. Sverdrup-Jensen, S. (2002). Fisheries in the Lower Mekong Basin: Status and Perspectives. MRC Technical Paper No.6. M. R. Commission. Phnom Penh, Cambodia: 103pp.
58. Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) (2003). Fisheries Law.
59. Schlager, E. (1994). Fishers' institutional responses to common-pool resource dilemmas. Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan Press.
60. Luce, R. D. and H. Raiffa (1957). Games and decisions; introduction and critical survey. New York, Wiley.
61. Gintis, H. (2000). Game theory evolving. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
62. Orbell, J. M., P. Schwartz-Shea, R. M. Dawes and D. Elvin (1992). Gender as a basis for choosing partners in prisoner's dilemma games. Technical Report, University of Oregon Ethis.
63. Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York, Cambridge University Press.
64. Agrawal, A. (1999). Greener pastures: politics, markets, and community among a migrant pastoral xx Commons, J. R. (1934). "Institutional Economics." American Economic Review 21(4): 648-657.
65. Ménard, C. and M. M. Shirley (2005). Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Introduction. Handbook of New Institutional Economics. C. Ménard and M. M. Shirley. AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Springer: 1-18.
66. Frey, B. S. (1994). "How Intrinsic Motivation is Crowded out and in." Rationality and Society 1994 6: 334-352.
67. Cox, J. C. (2004). "How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity." Games and Economic Behavior 46(260- 281).
68. Joffre, O. (2008). Incentives and Discontinuance Analysis in Truong Phu B Hamlet, Thoi Lai Commune, Co Do District, Can Tho City, The WorldFish Center.
69. North, D. C. (1994). Institutional Change: A Framework of Analysis, EconWPA.
70. North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, New York; Cambridge University Press.
71. Roth, A. E. (1995). Introduction to Experimental Economics. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press: 3-109.
72. Lacoursiere, J. O., M. Torell and S. Choowaew (1998). Inventory and management of wetlands in the Lower Mekong Basin. Review and Assessment report for phase I (1990-1996). Mekong River Commission Secretariat (MRCS), Bangkok, Thailand.
73. Ravallion, M. and D. van de Walle (2003). Land Allocation in Vietnam's Agrarian Transition, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2951, World Bank.
74. Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) (2001b). Land Law. Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
75. Deininger, K. and M. Kirk (2003). "Land policy, poverty alleviation and sustainable rural development." Agriculture and Rural Development 10(2): 44-47.
76. Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) (2007). Law on Water Resources Management of the Kingdom of Cambodia. Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
77. Güth, W., M. V. Levati, M. Sutter and E. Van der Heijden (2004). "Leadership and cooperation in public goods experiments." Discussion Paper on Strategic Interaction No. 29-2004. Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Jena.
78. Gächter, S. and E. Renner (2004). "Leading by example in the presence of free-rider incentives." Working Paper University of St. Gallen.
79. Rubin, P. H. (2005). Legal Systems as Frameworks for Market Exchange. Handbook of New Institutional Economics. C. Ménard and M. M. Shirley. AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands, Springer: 205-228.
80. Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan or the Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil. New York, Touchstone.
81. Gibson, C. C., J. T. Williams and E. Ostrom (2005). "Local enforcement and better forests." World Development 33(2): 273-284.
82. Tashakkori, A. and C. Teddlie (2003). Major Issues and Controversies in the Use of Mixed Methods in the Social and Behavioural Sciences. Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research. A. Tashakkori and C. Teddlie. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications, Inc.: 3-50.
83. Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications : a study in the economics of internal organization. New York, Free Press.
84. Glaeser, E. L., D. I. Laibson, J. A. Scheinkman and C. L. Soutter (2000). "Measuring Trust." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3): 811-846.
85. Sultana, P. and P. Thompson (2003). Methods of consensus building for community based fisheries management in Bangaldesh and the Mekong delta. Capri Working Paper No.30. CAPRi. Washington, D.C., IFPRI.
86. Simon, H. A. (1957). Models of a man. New York, John Wiley.
87. McKenny, B. and P. Tola (2002). Natural resources and rural livelihoods in Cambodia: a baseline assessment. Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI) Working Paper. 23: 116.
88. Nash, J. F. (1950). Non-Cooperative Games. Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Princeton University. PhD.
89. Thayer, C. A. (2008). One party rule and the challenge of civil society in Vietnam. Remaking the Vietnamese Stata: Implications for Viet Nam and the Region., City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong.
90. Dawes, R. M., J. M. Orbell, R. T. Simmons and A. J. C. Vandekragt (1986). "Organizing Groups for Collective Action." American Political Science Review 80(4): 1171-1185.
91. Demsetz, H. (1988). Ownership, Control, and the Firm. The Organization of Economic Activity. Oxford, UK, Basil Blackwill.
92. Gonsalves, J., T. Becker, A. Braun, D. Campilan, D. D. Chavez, E. Fajber, M. Kapiriri, J. Rivaca- Caminade and R. Vernooy (2005). Participatory Research and Development for Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management: A Sourcebook. Volume 1: Understanding Participatory Research and Development. Ottawa, Canada, International Potato Centre-User's Perspectives With Agricultural Research and Development, Laguna Philippines and International Development Research Centre.
93. Phnom Penh, Cambodia, National Institute of Statistics, Ministry of Planning.
94. Werthmann, C., C. Mai Thi Truc and T. Pham Ba Vu (2007). PRA Report CP35 in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, Research Institute for Aquaculture No.2 and The WorldFish Center.
95. Morse, J. M. (2003). Principles of Mixed Methods and Multimethod Research Design. Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research. A. Tashakkori and C. Teddlie. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications, Inc.: 189-208.
96. Walker, J. M. and R. Gardner (1992). "Probabilistic Destruction of Common-Pool Resources - Experimental-Evidence." Economic Journal 102(414): 1149-1161.
97. Furubotn, E. and S. Pejovich (1972). "Property rights and economic theory: A survey of recent literature." Journal of Economic Literature 10(4): 1137-1162.
98. Ledyard, J. O. (1995). Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research. The Handbook of Experimental Economics. J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press: 111-194.
99. Isaac, R. M., K. McCue and C. Plott (1985). "Public goods provision in an experimental environment." Journal of Public Economics 26: 51-74.
100. Denzin, N. K. and K. E. Ryan (2007). Qualitative Methodology (Including Focus Groups). The SAGE handbook of social science methodology. W. Outhwaite and S. P. Turner. Los Angeles; London, Sage: 578-594.
101. Long, J. S. (1997). Regression Models for Categorical and Limited dependent variables. Thousands Oaks, California, Sage Publications.
102. Pich, S. and K. Heng (2007). Report of Stakeholder Meetings on " Community Based Fish Culture in Irrigation Systems and Seasonal Floodplains". CARE Office, Kampong Trabek District, Prey Veng Province, 13th of July 2007 and Chamroeun Cheat Khmer (CCK) Office, Koh Andet District, Takeo Province, 16th of July 2007.
103. Creswell, J. W. (2003). Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage.
104. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2003). Review of the state of world fishery resources: inland fisheries. Fisheries Circular. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Rome, Italy. 942: 68.
105. Guttman, H. (1999). "Ricefield fisheries -a resource for Cambodia." ICLARM Q. 22(2): 11-15.
106. Ganz, J. S. (1971). Rules: a systematic study. The Hague, Mouton.
107. Ostrom, E., R. Gardner and J. Walker (1994). Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan Press.
108. Edwards, P., D. Little and H. Demaine (2002). Rural Aquaculture. CABI Publishing, UK Department for International Development (DFID).
109. Do, Q.-T. and L. Iyer (2004). Rural Vietnam in Transition. World Bank.
110. Morales, E. J. and D. C. Little (2007). Self-recruiting species (SRS) from farmer-managed aquatic systems – the contribution of non-stocked species to household livelihood. Assessment of freshwater fish seed resources for sustainable aquaculture. . M. G. Bondad-Reantaso. Rome, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper. No. 501: 603–616.
111. Woolcock, M. (1998). "Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework." Theory and Society 27: 151-208.
112. Grootaert, C. (1999). "Social Capital, Household Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia." Local Level Institutions Working Paper Series 6.
113. Dawes, R. M. (1980). "Social Dilemmas." Annual Review Psychology 31: 169-93.
114. Dalton, R. J., P. M. Hac, P. T. Nghi and N.-N. T. Ong (2001). Social Relations and Social Capital in Vietnam: The 2001 World Values Survey.
115. Flood, M. M. (1958). "Some Experimental Games." Management Science 5(1): 5-26.
116. Kirk, M. (2004). "State Land Economics in Cambodia." Policy Discussion Paper, Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction, Land Management and Administration Project, Philipps-University Marburg, Germany, 2. revised version, Phnom Penh, Marburg, July, 2004.
117. Shepsle, K. (1989). "Studying institutions: some lessons from the rational choice approach." Journal of Theoretical Politics 1: 131-49.
118. Sophal, M. (2004). Sustainable Use and Mangement of Cambodian Wetlands: Social and Institutional Challenges. Wetlands Management in Cambodia: Socioeconomic, Ecological, and Policy Perspectives. M. Torell, A. M. Salamanca and B. D. Ratner. Penang, Malaysia, WordFish: 22-24.
119. Guba, E. G. (1990). The alternative paradigm dialog. The Paradigm Dialog. E. G. Guba. Newbury Park, CA, Sage.
120. Hodgson, G. M. (1998). "The approach of institutional economics." Journal of Economic Literature 36(1): 166-192.
121. Libecap, G. (1995). The conditions for successful collective action. Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains. R. Keohane and E. Ostrom. London, Sage: 161-90.
122. Moxnes, E. and E. Van der Heijden (2003). "The effect of leadership in a public bad experiment." Journal of Conflict Resolution 47: 773-795.
123. Wallis, W. A. and M. Friedman (1942). The empirical deviation of indifference functions. Studies in mathematical economics and econometrics, in memory of Henry Schultz. O. Lange, F. McIntyre and T. Yntema. Chicago,, The University of Chicago press: 175-189.
124. Hodgson, G. M. (2004a). The evolution of institutional economics: agency, structure, and Darwinism in American institutionalism. London; New York, Routledge.
125. Merton, R. and P. Kendall (1946). "The focused interview." American Journal of Sociology 51: 541- 547.
126. Kim, O. and M. Walker (1984). "The Free Rider Problem -Experimental-Evidence." Public Choice 43(1): 3-24.
127. Keskinen, M. (2003). The Great Diversity of Livelihoods? Socio-economic survey of the Tonle Sap Lake. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering., Helsinki University of Technology, Helsinki. MSc: 140.
128. Fontana, A. and J. H. Frey (2005). The interview: From neutral stance to political involvement. The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research. N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications: 695-728.
129. Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) (1998). The Law on Water Resource. No.8/1998/QH10 of May 20, 1998.
130. Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
131. Parsons, T. (1940). "The Motivation of Economic Activities." Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 6: 187-203.
132. North, D. C. (1995). The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development. The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development. J. Harriss, J. Hunter and C. M. Lewis. London, Routledge: 17-26.
133. Von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern (1947). Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
134. Taylor, M. (1987). The possibility of cooperation. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
135. Di Gregorio, M., K. Hagedorn, M. Kirk, B. Korf, N. McCarthy, R. Meinzen-Dick and B. Swallow (2004). The Role of Property Rights and Collective Action for Poverty Reduction. Washington DC 2009-1002, International Food Policy Research Institute.
136. Dietz, T., E. Ostrom and P. C. Stern (2003). "The Struggle to Govern the Commons." Science 302(5652): 1907-1912.
137. Kiser, L. and E. Ostrom (1982). The three worlds of action. Strategies of Political Enquiry. E. Ostrom. Beverly Hills, Sage: 179-222.
138. Hardin, G. (1968). "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science 162(1243-48).
139. Ostrom, E. (2005b). Understanding Institutional Diversity Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
140. Nang, D. (2003). Wetlands Protection and Management in Vietnam. Wetlands Management in Vietnam: Issues and Perspectives. M. Torell, A. M. Salamanca and B. D. Ratner. Penang, Malaysia, The WorldFish Center.
141. Giang, T. T., H. H. Cai and L. Q. Thong (2003). Wetlands Study: Lessons Learned and Future Challenges. Wetlands Management in Vietnam: Issues and Perspectives. M. Torell, A. M. Salamanca and B. D. Ratner. Penang, Malaysia, The WorldFish Center.
142. Poteete, A., M. A. Janssen and E. Ostrom (2010). Working Together. Collective Action, the Commons and Multiple Methods in Practice. Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press.
143. Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York, Free Press.
144. Creswell, J. W. and V. L. Plano Clark (2007). Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage.
145. Scott, D. A. (1989). "A Directory of Asian Wetlands " Wetlands International Retrieved 23rd of March 2009, from http://ramsar.wetlands.org/ADirectoryofAsianWetlands/tabid/822/Default.aspx.
146. Muller, A. and M. Vickers (1996). Communication in a Common Pool Resource Environment with Probabilistic Destruction, McMaster University, Department of Economics: 27.
147. Loewenstein, G. (1999). "Experimental Economics from the Vantage-Point of Behavioural Economics." The Economic Journal 109: F25-F34.
148. Dawes, R. M., J. McTavish and H. Shaklee (1977). "Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions About Other Peoples Behavior in a Commons Dilemma Situation." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35(1): 1-11.
149. Innocenti, A. and M. G. Pazienza (2006). "Altruism and Gender in the Trust Game." University of Siena. Department of Economics Working Paper 5/2006.
150. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2006a). "Country: Cambodia." Compendium of Food and Agriculture Indicators 2006 from http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/index.asp?lang=en&iso3=KHM&subj=4.
151. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2006b). "Country: Viet Nam." Compendium of Food and Agriculture Indicators 2006 from http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/index.asp?lang=en&iso3=VNM&subj=4.
152. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2009c). "Major Food and Agricultural Commodities and Producers." from http://www.fao.org/es/ess/top/commodity.html?lang=en&item=27&year=2005.
153. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2009a). "Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profile Cambodia." Retrieved 3rd of March 2009, from http://www.fao.org/fishery/countrysector/FI-CP_KH/en.
154. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2009b). "Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profile Vietnam." Retrieved 3rd of March 2009, from http://www.fao.org/fishery/countrysector/FI-CP_VN/en.
155. Meinzen-Dick, R. and M. Di Gregorio (2004). Collective action and property rights for sustainable development. Washington, D.C., International Food Policy Research Institute.
156. Schlager, E., W. Blomquist and S. Y. Tang (1994). "Mobile Flows, Storage, and Self-Organized Institutions for Governing Common-Pool Resources." Land Economics 70(3): 294-317.
157. Ostrom, E. (2007). "A Diagnostic Approach For Going Beyond Panaceas." PNAS 104(39): 15181- 15187.
158. Mason, C. F., O. R. Phillips and D. B. Redington (1991). "The role of gender in a non-cooperative game." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 15: 215-235.
159. Poppe, M. and L. Utens (1986). "Effects of greed and fear of being gypped in a social dilemma situation with changing pool size." Journal of Economic Psychology 7: 61-73.
160. Larson, B. A. and D. W. Bromley (1990). "Property rights, externalities, and resource degradation. Locating the tragedy." Journal of Development Economics 33: 235-262.
161. Kugler, T., M. G. Kocher, M. Sutter and G. Bornstein (2007). "Trust between individuals and groups: Groups are less trusting than individuals but just as trustworthy." Journal of Economic Psychology 28: 646-657.
162. Poteete, A. and E. Ostrom (2008). "Fifteen Years of Empirical Research on Collective Action in Natural Resource Management: Struggling to Build Large-N Databases Based on Qualitative Research." World Development 36(1): 176–195.
163. Vollan, B. (2008). "Socio-ecological explanations for crowding-out effects from economic field experiments in southern Africa." Ecological Economics 67: 560-573.
164. Wetlands Management in Cambodia: Socioeconomic, Ecological, and Policy Perspectives. M. Torell, A. M. Salamanca and B. D. Ratner. Penang, Malaysia, WordFish: 1-13.
165. Holler, M. and G. Illing (1993). Einführung in die Spieltheorie. Berlin Heidelberg, Springer Verlag.
166. Vyrastekova, J. and S. Onderstal (2005). "The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A note on Gender Differences." CentER Discussion Paper 2005–96.

Das Dokument ist im Internet frei zugänglich - Hinweise zu den Nutzungsrechten